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Serghides","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Johannes Silvis","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28381":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Johannes Silvis","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28404":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Ganna Yudkivska","Khanlar Hajiyev","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Yonko Grozev"],"28437":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Johannes Silvis","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra"],"28439":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Ale\u0161 Pejchal","Andr\u00e1s Saj\u00f3","Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Carlo Ranzoni","Dmitry Dedov","Guido Raimondi","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Iulia Motoc","Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro","Kristina Pardalos","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Ledi Bianku","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Mark Villiger","Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28447":["Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro","Julia Laffranque","Paul Lemmens","Georges Ravarani","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107"]},"courts":{"27237":"","27248":"","27268":"Supreme Court","27275":"","27277":"Supreme Court","27296":"Supreme Court","27313":"Supreme Court","27336":"","27334":"Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court","27372":"Court of Cassation;High Court of Cassation and Justice","27375":"Administrative Court","27394":"Administrative Court;Conseil d'Etat;Constitutional Court;Supreme Court","27400":"Supreme Court","27413":"Court of Cassation;High Court of Cassation and Justice","27416":"Court of Cassation","27440":"","27442":"Supreme Court","27462":"Court of Cassation","27460":"","27461":"","27464":"","27468":"Constitutional Court;Ustavni Sud Republike Hrvatske","27474":"","27485":"Court of Cassation","27538":"Constitutional Court;Supreme Court","27552":"","27555":"","27589":"Supreme Court","27591":"Constitutional Court;Supreme Court","27610":"","27632":"Supreme Court","27627":"","27625":"","27626":"","27647":"Supreme Court","27650":"Administrative Court","27652":"","27667":"Supreme Court","27693":"","27728":"Civil Court (First Hall) in its Constitutional Jurisdiction","27743":"Supreme Court","27796":"Supreme Court","27793":"Supreme Court","27794":"","27807":"","27847":"Civil Court (First Hall) in its Constitutional Jurisdiction","27897":"Constitutional Court","27919":"","27924":"Supreme Court","27934":"Supreme Court","27943":"","27969":"Constitutional Court","27996":"","28027":"Supreme Court of Justice;Supreme Court","28029":"","28032":"","28034":"Court of Cassation;Supreme Court","28052":"Supreme Court","28050":"Supreme Court","28049":"Supreme Court","28055":"Constitutional Court;Supreme Court","28057":"","28076":"Senate of the Supreme Court;Supreme Court","28093":"Court of Cassation;High Court of Cassation and Justice","28096":"","28107":"","28119":"","28146":"","28162":"Civil Court (First Hall) in its Constitutional Jurisdiction","28152":"Supreme Court","28175":"","28187":"","28209":"Raad van State","28211":"Administrative Court","28217":"","28218":"Court of Cassation;High Court of Cassation and Justice","28245":"","28259":"","28276":"","28304":"Supreme Court","28310":"Constitutional Court;Supreme Court","28323":"Supreme Court","28322":"","28341":"","28376":"Raad van State","28381":"Supreme Court","28404":"Administrative Court","28437":"Supreme Court","28439":"Administrative Court;Supreme Court","28447":"Administrative Court;Supreme Court"},"conclusion":{"27237":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Just satisfaction)","27248":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 14+3 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Prohibition of torture;Effective investigation;Positive obligations);Violation of Article 14+11 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association;Positive obligations;Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27268":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Uzbekistan);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation;Positive obligations);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review);Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Just satisfaction)","27275":"Inadmissible","27277":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27296":"Partly admissible;Partly inadmissible;Partly struck out of the list","27313":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","27336":"Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27334":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance)","27372":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","27375":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Italy);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Expulsion;Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life) (Conditional) (Italy)","27394":"Preliminary objection joined to merits (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment);Pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27400":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","27413":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27416":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Just satisfaction reserved (Article 41 - Just satisfaction)","27440":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-e - Persons of unsound mind);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention;Take proceedings);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27442":"Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)","27462":"Inadmissible","27460":"Inadmissible","27461":"Inadmissible","27464":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-2 - Information on reasons for arrest;Prompt information);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Prohibition of torture);Violation of Article 13+P4-4 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens-{general};Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27468":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Positive obligations);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage)","27474":"Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Somalia)","27485":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading punishment;Inhuman punishment) (Substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient","27538":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance;Article 6 - Right to a fair trial);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27552":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Liberty of person);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27555":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)","27589":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Conditional) (Kyrgyzstan);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention)","27591":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Syria);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Syria);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Take proceedings);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion);Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Respondent State to take individual measures (Article 46-2 - Individual measures)","27610":"Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-3 - Ratione materiae);Violation of Article 14+3 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Effective investigation);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27632":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Conditional) (Kyrgyzstan);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27627":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy","27625":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage)","27626":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","27647":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27650":"Inadmissible","27652":"Inadmissible","27667":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment);No violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);No violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Free legal assistance;Insufficient means);No violation of Article 6+6-3-d - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-d - Examination of witnesses);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for correspondence);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27693":"Inadmissible","27728":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty)","27743":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Kyrgyzstan);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27796":"Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27793":"Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)","27794":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27807":"Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty;Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27847":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention)","27897":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Kyrgyzstan);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27919":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","27924":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27934":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)","27943":"Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27969":"Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Procedure prescribed by law);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","27996":"Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28027":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","28029":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for correspondence);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28032":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Positive obligations);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28034":"Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention;Take proceedings);Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance) (Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance;Article 6 - Right to a fair trial);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28052":"Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28050":"Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28049":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)","28055":"Preliminary objections dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies;Six month period);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty;Article 5-1-d - Educational supervision;Minors);Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Criminal charge;Fair hearing) (Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance;Article 6 - Right to a fair trial);Violation of Article 6+6-3-d - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Criminal charge;Fair hearing) (Article 6-3-d - Obtain attendance of witnesses;Article 6 - Right to a fair trial);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28057":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28076":"Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 34 - Victim);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)","28093":"Violation of Article 14+3 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Effective investigation;Positive obligations);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28096":"Remainder inadmissible (Article 35-3 - Manifestly ill-founded);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28107":"Inadmissible","28119":"Inadmissible","28146":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","28162":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention;Speediness of review);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion;Extradition;Prevent unauthorised entry into country);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion;Extradition;Prevent unauthorised entry into country)","28152":"Partly struck out of the list;Partly inadmissible","28175":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28187":"Inadmissible","28209":"Inadmissible","28211":"Inadmissible","28217":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","28218":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Positive obligations) (Procedural aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28245":"Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","28259":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Sudan)","28276":"Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention)","28304":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention)","28310":"Inadmissible","28323":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance)","28322":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition)","28341":"Inadmissible","28376":"Inadmissible","28381":"Inadmissible","28404":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention;Speediness of review);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28437":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Conditional) (Kyrgyzstan);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Take proceedings)","28439":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Iraq);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28447":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)"},"externalsources":{"27237":"","27248":"","27268":"","27275":"","27277":"Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (CETS No. 210);Directive of 25 October 2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2012\/29\/EU) establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime","27296":"","27313":"","27336":"","27334":"","27372":"","27375":"","27394":"","27400":"","27413":"","27416":"","27440":"","27442":"","27462":"","27460":"","27461":"","27464":"","27468":"","27474":"UNHCR report International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing Southern and Central Somalia;Humanitarian Bulletin Somalia of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)","27485":"","27538":"","27552":"","27555":"","27589":"","27591":"","27610":"Preventing and responding to hate crimes, published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights), 2009","27632":"","27627":"","27625":"","27626":"","27647":"Report to the Government of \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d on the visit to \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 12 to 19 July 2004, Strasbourg, 15 November 2006;Report to the Government of \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d on the visit to \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), from 15 to 26 May 2006, Strasbourg, 13 February 2008","27650":"","27652":"","27667":"","27693":"","27728":"","27743":"Kyrgyzstan\u2019s second report on implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment for the period from 1999 to 2011 (CAT\/C\/KGZ\/2);Concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on  the fifth to seventh periodic reports of Kyrgyzstan, February 2013 (CERD\/C\/KGZ\/CO\/5-7);Concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture on Kyrgyzstan\u2019s second periodic report, December 2013 (CAT\/C\/KGZ\/CO\/2);2013 Amnesty International\u2019s Annual Report;Human Rights Watch\u2019s \u201cWorld Report 2013: Kyrgyzstan\u201d;Human Rights Watch\u2019s report \u201cKyrgyzstan: 3 Years After Violence, a Mockery of Justice\u201d June 2013;Human Rights Watch\u2019s 2014 World Report \n\nHuman Rights Watch\u2019s  2014 World Report \n","27796":"","27793":"","27794":"Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (\u201cCPT\u201d), CPT\/Inf (2012) 13, \u00a7 78;2nd General Report of the CPT [CPT\/Inf (92) 3], \u00a7 49;CPT\u2019s report CPT\/Inf (2015) 12, \u00a7 74;CPT\u2019s report 2013 CPT\/Inf (2014) 21, \u00a7 61;CPT\u2019s report CPT\/Inf (2011) 20, \u00a7\u00a7 105 and 106","27807":"","27847":"","27897":"","27919":"","27924":"","27934":"","27943":"","27969":"","27996":"","28027":"","28029":"","28032":"","28034":"","28052":"","28050":"3rd General Report (CPT\/Inf (93) 12;4 June 1993) by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment","28049":"","28055":"Rules 77, 78.3 and 78.5 of the 2008 European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions and measures;Guidelines 1, 2, 21 and 27-30 of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child friendly justice;Rules 7.1 and 26.2 of the Beijing Rules;Rule 38 of the Havana Rules;Point 8 of Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (87) 20;Council of Europe Recommendation (2003)20;Articles 23 and 40 \u00a7 2 (b) of the CRC, points 73 and 74 of the General Comment No. 9, and point 33 of the General Comment No. 10\n","28057":"CPT\u2019s standards;UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners;Recommendations of the World Health Organisation (\u201cthe WHO\u201d) adopted following its Joint Interregional Conference on Appropriate Technology for Birth (Fortaleza, Brazil, 22-26 April 1985)","28076":"Chapter VI, \u201cSubstantive criminal law\u201d, of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse;Articles 19 and 34 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child","28093":"","28096":"","28107":"","28119":"","28146":"","28162":"","28152":"","28175":"","28187":"","28209":"","28211":"","28217":"","28218":"","28245":"","28259":"","28276":"","28304":"","28310":"","28323":"","28322":"","28341":"","28376":"","28381":"","28404":"","28437":"","28439":"EU Council Directive 2004\/83\/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (as recast by Directive 2011\/95\/EU of 13 December 2011);UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims;UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 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Belgium, 30 July 1998, \u00a7 66, Reports 1998-V","B\u0113rzi\u0146\u0161 v. Latvia, no. 25147\/07, \u00a7 90, 25 February 2014","Bursuc v. Romania, no. 42066\/98, \u00a7 80, 12 October 2004","Cobzaru v. Romania, no. 48254\/99, \u00a7 65, 26 July 2007","Corsacov v. Moldova, no. 18944\/02, \u00a7 55, 4 April 2006","Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012","Denisenko and Bogdanchikov v. Russia, no. 3811\/02, \u00a7 83, 12 February 2009","Editions Plon v. France, no. 58148\/00, \u00a7 64, ECHR 2004 IV","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 162, ECHR 2012","Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7 51, 14 October 2010","Hurtado v. Switzerland, 28 January 1994, opinion of the Commission, \u00a7 67, Series A no. 280","Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2001 III","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000-IV","McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000","Mouisel v. France, no. 67263\/01, \u00a7 40, ECHR 2002-IX","Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7 274, 18 June 2002","Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 VIII","Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336","Rivi\u00e8re v. France, no. 33834\/03, \u00a7 63, 11 July 2006","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2008","Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 77, 4 October 2005","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR 1999 V","Tarariyeva v. Russia, no. 4353\/03, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2006-... (extracts)","Tomasi v. France, judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A, pp. 40-41, \u00a7\u00a7 108-11","Trubnikov v. Russia, no. 49790\/99, \u00a7 68, 5 July 2005","V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999-IX","Wieser v. Austria, no. 2293\/03, \u00a7 36, 22 February 2007","Wiktorko v. Poland, no. 14612\/02, 31 March 2009","Y v. Latvia, no. 61183\/08, \u00a7 54, 21 October 2014"],"27248":["A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VI","Abdu v. Bulgaria, no. 26827\/08, 11 March 2014","Alekseyev v. Russia, nos. 4916\/07, 25924\/08 and 14599\/09, \u00a7 108, 21 October 2010","Association des Amis de Saint-Rapha\u00ebl et de Fr\u00e9jus and Others v. France (dec.), no. 45053\/98, 29 February 2000","August v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 36505\/02, 21 January 2003","B.S. v. Spain, no. 47159\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 59 63, 24 July 2012","B\u0105czkowski and Others v. Poland, no. 1543\/06, \u00a7 64, 3 May 2007","Begheluri and Others v. Georgia, no. 28490\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 171 79, 7 October 2014","Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, no. 15250\/02, \u00a7 70, ECHR 2005 XIII (extracts)","Cardot v. France, 19 March 1991, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 200","Christians against Racism and Fascism v. the United Kingdom, no. 8440\/78, Commission decision of 16 July 1980, Decisions and Reports 21, p. 138","Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 247 C","Defalque v. Belgium, no. 37330\/02, \u00a7 46, 20 April 2006","East African Asians v. the United Kingdom, nos. 4403\/70 et al., Commission\u2019s report of 14 December 1973, Decisions and Reports 78, p. 5, \u00a7 208","Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 3564\/11, \u00a7 54, 28 May 2013","Ezelin v. France, 26 April 1991, \u00a7\u00a7 35 and 37, Series A no. 202","F\u00e1ber v. Hungary, no. 40721\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 37 41, 24 July 2012","Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, \u00a7 54, 2 December 2004","F\u00e9d\u00e9ration chr\u00e9tienne des t\u00e9moins de J\u00e9hovah de France v. France (dec.), no. 53430\/99, ECHR 2001-XI","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 103, 1 June 2010","Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158\/98, \u00a7 92, 17 February 2004","Hyde Park and Others v. Moldova (nos. 5 and 6), nos. 6991\/08 and 15084\/08, \u00a7 32, 14 September 2010","Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276, p. 16, \u00a7 38","Kakabadze and Others v. Georgia, no. 1484\/07, \u00a7 83, 2 October 2012","Lazariu v. Romania, no. 31973\/03, \u00a7 88, 13 November 2014","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, ECHR 2003\u2011XII","Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 138-42, 3 May 2007","Milanovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 44614\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 84 and 89, 14 December 2010","Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), nos. 41138\/98 and 64320\/01, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2005 VII (extracts)","Mudric v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 74839\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 60-64, 16 July 2013","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 160, ECHR 2005\u2011VII","Ouranio Toxo v. Greece, no. 74989\/01, \u00a7 37, 20 October 2005","P.V. v. France, no. 38305\/97, \u00a7 37, 14 November 2000","Plattform \u201c\u00c4rzte f\u00fcr das Leben\u201d v. Austria, 21 June 1988, Series A no. 139","Saghinadze and Others v. Georgia, no. 18768\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 95 and 96, 27 May 2010","Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, no. 33290\/96, \u00a7 28, ECHR 1999 IX","Sandra Jankovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 38478\/05, \u00a7 36, 5 March 2009","SARL du Parc d\u2019Activit\u00e9s de Blotzheim v. France, no. 72377\/01, \u00a7 20, 11 July 2006","Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985\/96 and 33986\/96, \u00a7 121, ECHR 1999 VI","S\u00f8rensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark [GC], nos. 52562\/99 and 52620\/99, \u00a7 58, ECHR 2006 I","Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 65542\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 115-116, ECHR 2013 (extracts)","Stoica v. Romania, no. 42722\/02, \u00a7 67, 4 March 2008","T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26608\/11, \u00a7 38, 28 January 2014","Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece, no. 26698\/05, \u00a7 38, 27 March 2008","Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, no. 72713\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 38-70, 29 March 2005","Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381\/09 and 32684\/09, \u00a7 47, ECHR 2013 (extracts)","Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6 November 1980, \u00a7 35, Series A no. 40","Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1997, \u00a7 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 I","Verein \u201cKontakt-Information-Therapie\u201d (KIT) and Siegfried HAGEN v. Austria, no. 11921\/86, Commission decision of 12 October 1986, Decisions and Reports (DR) No. 57-A, p. 81","Wilson and the National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 30668\/96, 30671\/96 and 30678\/96, \u00a7 41, ECHR 2002\u2011V","Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 25, \u00a7 63"],"27268":["A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455\/05, \u00a7 202, 19 February 2009","Abdulazhon Isakov v. Russia, no. 14049\/08, 8 July 2010","Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743\/11, 2 October 2012","Akram Karimov v. Russia, no. 62892\/12, 28 May 2014","Azimov v. Russia, no. 67474\/11, 18 April 2013","Egamberdiyev v. Russia, no. 34742\/13, 26 June 2014","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 191-193, ECHR 2012","Ermakov v. Russia, no. 43165\/10, 7 November 2013","Garayev v. Azerbaijan, no. 53688\/08, \u00a7 71, 10 June 2010","Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 128, ECHR 2012","Iskandarov v. Russia, no. 17185\/05, 23 September 2010","Ismoilov and Others v. Russia, no. 2947\/06, \u00a7 121, 24 April 2008","Kamaliyevy v. Russia (just satisfaction), no. 52812\/07, 28 June 2011","Kasymakhunov v. Russia, no. 29604\/12, 14 November 20","Labsi v. Slovakia, no. 33809\/08, 15 May 2012","Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 135-137, 24 July 2014","Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 102 and 125, ECHR 2005 I","Mamazhonov v. Russia, no. 17239\/13, 23 October 2014","Mamedova v. Russia, no. 7064\/05, \u00a7 96, 1 June 2006","Muminov v. Russia (just satisfaction), no. 42502\/06, 4 November 2010","Muminov v. Russia, no. 42502\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 93-96, 11 December 2008","Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195\/96, \u00a7 61, ECHR 1999 II","Nizamov and Others v. Russia, nos. 22636\/13, 24034\/13, 24334\/13 and 24528\/13, 7 May 2014","O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Article 50), 31 October 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 330-B","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 99, ECHR 2000 VII","Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386\/10, ECHR 2013 (extracts)","Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221\/98 and 41963\/98, \u00a7 250, ECHR 2000 VIII","Umirov v. Russia, no. 17455\/11, , 18 September 2012","Yakubov v. Russia, no. 7265\/10, 8 November 2011","Yuldashev v. Russia, no. 1248\/09, \u00a7 85, 8 July 2010"],"27275":[""],"27277":["A.M. v. Italy, no. 37019\/97, \u00a7 25, ECHR 1999-IX","Aigner v. Austria, no. 28328\/03, \u00a7 35, 10 May 2012","Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, no. 55523\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 101-103, 26 July 2007","Brandstetter v. Austria, 28 August 1991, \u00a7 52, Series A no. 211","Cobzaru v. Romania, no. 48254\/99, \u00a7 65, 26 July 2007","Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704\/04, \u00a7 100, 17 December 2009","Doorson v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 II","Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, \u00a7 91, Series A no. 22","Indelicato v. Italy, no. 31143\/96, \u00a7 37, 18 October 2001","Kuri\u0107 and Others v. Slovenia (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 26828\/06, \u00a7 127, ECHR 2014","L.M. v. Slovenia, no. 32863\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 168-169, 12 June 2014","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 133 et seq., ECHR 2000-IV","Les T\u00e9moins de J\u00e9hovah v. France (just satisfaction), no. 8916\/05, \u00a7 37, 5 July 2012","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 149, 151 and 153, ECHR 2003 XII","M\u0103t\u0103saru and Savi\u0163chi v. Moldova, no. 38281\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 88 and 93, 2 November 2010","P.M. v. Bulgaria, no. 49669\/07, \u00a7 58, 24 January 2012","S.N. v. Sweden, no. 34209\/96, ECHR 2002 V","Sa\u00efdi v. France, 20 September 1993, \u00a7 43, Series A no. 261 C","Schenk v. Switzerland, 12 July 1988, \u00a7 46, Series A no. 140","W. v. Slovenia, no. 24125\/06, 23 January 2014","White v. Sweden, no. 42435\/02, \u00a7 20, 19 September 2006","X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, \u00a7 23, Series A no. 91"],"27296":[""],"27313":[""],"27336":["Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 109-11, ECHR 2002-IV","Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 103 et seq., Reports 1998 VIII","Barabanshchikov v. Russia, no. 36220\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 49-50, 8 January 2009","Bazjaks v. Latvia, no. 71572\/01, \u00a7 74, 19 October 2010","Betayev and Betayeva v. Russia, no. 37315\/03, \u00a7 85, 29 May 2008","Eremi\u00e1\u0161ov\u00e1 and Pechov\u00e1 v. the Czech Republic, no. 23944\/04, 16 February 2012","Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, \u00a7 54, 2 December 2004","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2010","Kaya v. Turkey, 19 February 1998, \u00a7 87, Reports 1998-I","Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, ECHR 2001-III","Keller v. Russia, no. 26824\/04, \u00a7 88, 17 October 2013","Khodzhayev v. Russia, no. 52466\/08, \u00a7 151, 12 May 2010","Klaas v. Germany, 22 September 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 269","Kleyn and Aleksandrovich v. Russia, no. 40657\/04, 3 May 2012","Krivo\u0161ejs v. Latvia, no. 45517\/04, \u00a7 69, 17 January 2012","L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, \u00a7 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000 IV","Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, 24 July 2014","Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385\/99, \u00a7 74, ECHR 2004 XI","Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, 26 January 2006","Mi\u017eig\u00e1rov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, no. 74832\/01, \u00a7 89, 14 December 2010","Mrozowski v. Poland, no. 9258\/04, \u00a7 26, 12 May 2009","\u00d6nery\u0131ld\u0131z v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939\/99, \u00a7 91, ECHR 2004 XII","Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477\/99, \u00a7 55, ECHR 2002 III","Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965\/04, \u00a7 219, ECHR 2010 (extracts)","Renolde v. France, no. 5608\/05, \u00a7 82, ECHR 2008 (extracts)","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR 1999 V","Shumkova v. Russia, no. 9296\/06, 14 February 2012","Slimani v. France, no. 57671\/00, \u00a7 27, ECHR 2004-IX (extracts)","Ya\u015fa v. Turkey, 2 September 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 98 and 100, Reports 1998 VI","Zelenin v. Russia, no. 21120\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 56-57, 15 January 2015"],"27334":[""],"27372":[""],"27375":["A.A. v. Sweden (dec.), no. 8594\/04, \u00a7 71, 2 September 2008","Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, \u00a7 26, Series A no. 32","Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, no. 44599\/98, ECHR 2001-I","Bousarra v. France, no. 25672\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 38-39, 23 September 2010","Budina v. Russia (dec.), no. 45603\/05, 18 June 2009","Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238\/95, \u00a7 99, ECHR 2001 I","Chojak v. Poland, no. 32220\/96, Commission decision of 23 April 1998","D. v. the United Kingdom, no. 30240\/96, 2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III","Dragan and Others v. Germany (dec.), no. 33743\/03, 7 October 2004","F.N. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 3202\/09, \u00a7 36, 17 September 2013","Goncharova and Alekseytsev v. Sweden (dec.), no 31246\/06, 3 May 2007","H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, \u00a7 34, Reports 1997-III","Halimi v. Austria and Italy, (dec.) no. 53852\/11, 18 June 2013","Jabari v. Turkey, no. 40035\/98, \u00a7 38, ECHR 2000 VIII","Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 12738\/10, \u00a7 103, 3 October 2014","Karim v. Sweden (dec.), no. 24171\/05, 4 July 2006","Kochieva and Others v. Sweden (dec.), no. 75203\/12, 30 April 2013","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 91, ECHR 2000-XI","M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, ECHR 2011","Mohammed v. Austria, no. 2283\/12, \u00a7 72, 6 June 2013","M\u00fcslim v. Turkey, no. 53566\/99, \u00a7 85, 26 April 2005","N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565\/05, ECHR 2008","S.B. v. Finland (dec.), no. 17200\/11 \u00a7 36, 24 June 2014","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 152, ECHR 2008","Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948\/04, \u00a7 135, ECHR 2007 I","Singh and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 30024\/96, 26 September 2000","Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, \u00a7\u00a7 90-91, Series A no. 161","Stamatios Karagiannis v. Greece, no. 27806\/02, \u00a7 28, 10 February 2005","Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, \u00a7 103, Series A no. 125"],"27394":["A.C. and Others v. Spain, no 6528\/11, 22 April 2014","Budina v. Russia (dec.), no 45603\/05, 18 June 2009","\u00c7elik and \u0130mret v. Turkey, no 44093\/98, \u00a7 57, 26 October 2004","\u010conka v. Belgium, no 51564\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 81-83, ECHR 2002-I","D.P. and J.C. v. the United Kingdom, no 38719\/97, \u00a7 136, 10 October 2002","De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium, no  8595\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 68-69, 6 December 2011","De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no 22689\/07, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2012","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no 39630\/09, \u00a7 202, ECHR 2012","F.H. v. Greece, no 78456\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 107-111, 31 July 2014","Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, no 25389\/05, ECHR 2007 V","Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no 27765\/09, ECHR 2012","I.M. v. France, no 9152\/09, 2 February 2012","Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, no 15297\/09, \u00a7 62, 13 December 2011","Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no 27229\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, ECHR 2001 III","Labita v. Italy [GC], no 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV","M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no 30696\/09, ECHR 2011","Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, no 41442\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 55 and 63, 19 January 2010","M\u00fcslim v. Turkey, no 53566\/99, \u00a7 85, 26 April 2005","Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, no 48609\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 105 and 108, 18 June 2013","Nuri Kurt v. Turkey, no 37038\/97, \u00a7 116, 29 November 2005","Popov v. France, nos. 39472\/07 and 39474\/07, \u00a7 91, 19 January 2012","R.U. v. Greece, no 2237\/08, \u00a7 77, 7 June 2011","S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom, no 60367\/10, \u00a7 90, 29 January 2013","Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no 1948\/04, \u00a7 136, 11 January 2007","Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, no 16643\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 138-139, 21 October 2014","Singh and Others v. Belgium, no 33210\/11, 2 October 2012","Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, \u00a7 90, Series A no 161","Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7 283, 28 June 2011","Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 114-115, 17 July 2014","Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no 29217\/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","\u00dcner v. the Netherlands [GC], no 46410\/99, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2006 XII","Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, no 10486\/10, \u00a7 106, 20 December 2011"],"27400":[""],"27413":["Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], no. 55707\/00, \u00a7 98, ECHR 2009","Bannikova v. Russia, no. 18757\/06, 4 November 2010","Budaca v. Romania, no. 57260\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 40 45, 17 July 2012","Bulfinsky v. Romania, no. 28823\/04, 1 June 2010","Colesnicov v. Romania, no. 36479\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 78 82, 21 December 2010","Cucu v. Romania, no. 22362\/06, \u00a7 73, 13 November 2012","Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39647\/98 and 40461\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 46 and 48, ECHR 2004 X","Iacov Stanciu v. Romania, no. 35972\/05, 24 July 2012","Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 97 et seq., ECHR 2002-VI","Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no. 53254\/99, \u00a7 39, 7 April 2005","Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, ECHR 2006 XII (extracts)","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 90-94, ECHR 2000 XI","Lagutin and Others v. Russia, nos. 6228\/09, 19123\/09, 19678\/07, 52340\/08 and 7451\/09, \u00a7 90, 24 April 2014","Malininas v. Lithuania, no. 10071\/04, \u00a7 36, 1 July 2008","Mischie v. Romania, no. 50224\/07, \u00a7 50, 16 September 2014","Niculescu v. Romania, no. 25333\/03, \u00a7 75, 25 June 2013","Nosko and Nefedov v. Russia, nos. 5753\/09 and 11789\/10, \u00a7 53, 30 October 2014","Petrea v. Romania, no. 4792\/03, \u00a7 37, 29 April 2008","Pyrgiotakis v. Greece, no. 15100\/06, \u00a7 21, 21 February 2008","Radu Pop v. Romania, no. 14337\/04, \u00a7 101, 17 July 2012","Ramanauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 74420\/01, ECHR 2008","Shannon v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 67537\/01, ECHR 2004 IV","Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7 142, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 IV","Veselov and Others v. Russia, nos. 23200\/10, 24009\/07 and 556\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 89-94, 2 October 2012"],"27416":["Alberti v. Italy, no 15397\/11, 24 June 2014","Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 102, Reports 1998 VIII","Cardot v. France, 19 March 1991, \u00a7 34, Series A no 200","Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2014","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no 39630\/09, ECHR 2012","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no 22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 92-93, ECHR 2010","\u0130lhan v. Turkey [GC], no 22277\/93, \u00a7\u00a7 52-55, ECHR 2000 VII","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 161-163, Series A no 25","Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no 54810\/00, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2006 IX","Lambert and Others v. France [GC], no 46043\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 89-95, 5 June 2015","M\u0103ciuc\u0103 v. Romania, no 25763\/03, \u00a7 22, 26 May 2009","Orhan v. Turkey, no 25656\/94, \u00a7 274, 18 June 2002","Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no 59450\/00, \u00a7 117, ECHR 2006 IX","Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no 336","Rupa v. Romania (no 1), no 58478\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 97 and 100, 16 December 2008","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000 VII","Selmouni v. France [GC], no 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999 V","Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no 41461\/02, \u00a7 59, 24 July 2008","Ya\u015fa v. Turkey, 2 September 1998, \u00a7 64, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VI"],"27440":["Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 25 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 56-59, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 IV","Bure\u0161 v. the Czech Republic, no. 37679\/08, \u00a7 87, 18 October 2012","Bursuc v. Romania, no. 42066\/98, \u00a7 80, 12 October 2","Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704\/04, \u00a7 100, 17 December 2009","Gorobet v. Moldova, no. 30951\/10, \u00a7 51, 11 October 2011","Gorshkov v. Ukraine, no. 67531\/01, \u00a7 44, 8 November 2005","Grori v. Albania, \u00a7 125, no. 25336\/04, 7 July 2009","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25","Klaas v. Germany, 22 September 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 269","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, ECHR 2000-IV","Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7 126, 24 July 20","M.S. v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 75450\/12, \u00a7 98, 19 February 2015","Musia\u0142 v. Poland [GC], no. 24557\/94, \u00a7 43, ECHR 1999 II","Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, no. 54825\/00, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2005-II (extracts)","Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 68 and 74, ECHR 2001-III","Rakevich v. Russia (no. 58973\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 44-46, 28 October 2003","Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7 61, 5 February 2015","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 97, ECHR 1999 V","Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321\/99, \u00a7 158, ECHR 2003 X","V.C. v. Slovakia, no. 18968\/07, \u00a7 103, ECHR 2011 (extracts)"],"27442":[""],"27462":[""],"27460":[""],"27461":[""],"27464":["A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 3455\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 162-163, ECHR 2009","Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no 30471\/08, 22 September 2009","Adam and Others v. Germany (dec.), no 290\/03, 1 September 2005","Allan v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no 48539\/99, 28 August 2001","Alver v. Estonia, no 64812\/01, \u00a7 50, 8 November 2005","Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III","Andrei Frolov v. Russia, no 205\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 47-49, 29 March 2007","Athary v. Turkey, no 50372\/09, \u00a7 36, 11 December 2012","Babushkin v. Russia, no 67253\/01, \u00a7 44, 18 October 2007","Baranowski v. Poland, no 28358\/95, ECHR 2000-III","Belevitskiy v. Russia, no 72967\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 73-79, 1 March 2007","Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V","\u010conka v. Belgium, no 51564\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 61-63, ECHR 2002-I","Dbouba v. Turkey, no 15916\/09, \u00a7 54, 13 July 2010","De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands, 22 May 1984, \u00a7 60, Series A no 77","De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no 22689\/07, \u00a7 82, ECHR 2012","Dhahbi v. Italy, no 17120\/09, \u00a7 24, 8 April 2014","Dougoz v. Greece, n\u00ba 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2001-II","E. v. Norway, 29 August 1990, \u00a7 50, Series A no 181-A","Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, \u00a7 40, Series A no 182","G.C. v. Italy, no 73869\/10, \u00a7 36, 22 April 2014","Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, \u00a7 25, Reports 1997-IV","Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, \u00a7\u00a7 92-93, Series A no 39","Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, \u00a7 63, Series A no 244","Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no 27765\/09, \u00a7 183, ECHR 2012","Hutchison Reid v. the United Kingdom, no 50272\/99, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2003-IV","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Series A no 25","Istv\u00e1n G\u00e1bor Kov\u00e1cs v. Hungary, no 15707\/10, \u00a7 26, 17 January 2012","Je\u010dius v. Lithuania, no 34578\/97, \u00a7 56, ECHR 2000-IX","Kadikis v. Latvia, no 62393\/00, \u00a7 55, 4 May 2006","Kalashnikov v. Russia, no 47095\/99, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2002-VI","Kantyrev v. Russia, no 37213\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 50-51, 21 June 2007","Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no 53254\/99, \u00a7 39, 7 April 2005","Kehayov v. Bulgaria, no 41035\/98, \u00a7 64, 18 January 2005","Khudoyorov v. Russia, no 6847\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 106-107, ECHR 2005-X (extracts)","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no 30210\/96, ECHR 2000-XI","L.M. v. Slovenia, no 32863\/05, \u00a7 121, 12 June 2014","Labita v. Italy [GC], no 26772\/95, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2000-IV","M.S. v. Belgium, no 50012\/08, \u00a7 122, 31 January 2012","M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no 30696\/09, \u00a7 388, ECHR 2011","Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria (dec.), no 74762\/01, 8 December 2005","Moghaddas v. Turkey, no 46134\/08, \u00a7 46, 15 February 2011","Moiseyev v. Russia, no 62936\/00, 9 October 2008","Mooren v. Germany [GC], no 11364\/03, \u00a7 76, 9 July 2009","Mouisel v. France, no 67263\/01, \u00a7 37, ECHR 2002-IX","Musaev v. Turkey, no 72754\/11, 21 October 2014","N.C. v. Italy [GC], no 24952\/94, \u00a7 44, ECHR 2002-X","Nasrulloyev v. Russia, no 656\/06, \u00a7 77, 11 October 2007","Naumenko v. Ukraine, no 42023\/98, \u00a7 108, 10 February 2004","Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no 31195\/96, \u00a7 69, ECHR 1999-II","Novoselov v. Russia, no 66460\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 32 and 40-43, 2 June 2005","Peers v. Greece, no 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 68 and 74, ECHR 2001-III","Price v. the United Kingdom, no 33394\/96, \u00a7 24, ECHR 2001-VII","Rahimi v. Greece, no 8687\/08, \u00a7 60, 5 April 2011","Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 55, Reports 1997-VIII","Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos. 29787\/03 and 29810\/03, \u00a7 100, 24 January 2008","Ruiz Rivera v. Switzerland, no 8300\/06, \u00a7 47, 18 February 2014","S.D. v. Greece, no 53541\/07, \u00a7 76, 11 June 2009","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no 37201\/06, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2008","Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 13229\/03, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2008","Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no 36378\/02, ECHR 2005 III","Shtukaturov v. Russia, no 44009\/05, \u00a7 123, ECHR 2008","Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, \u00a7 88, Series A no 161","Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no 36760\/06, ECHR 2012","Sulejmanovic v. Italy, no 22635\/03, \u00a7 43, 16 July 2009","Vachev v. Bulgaria, no 42987\/98, \u00a7 71, ECHR 2004-VIII","Van der Leer v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1990, \u00a7 28, Series A no 170-A","Velinov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no 16880\/08, \u00a7 49, 19 September 2013","Vlasov v. Russia, no 78146\/01, \u00a7 84, 12 June 2008","Weeks v. the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, \u00a7 61, Series A no 114","Witold Litwa v. Poland, no 26629\/95, \u00a7 78, ECHR 2000-III"],"27468":["A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VI","Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, no. 71127\/01, \u00a7 65, 12 June 2008","Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 247 C","Dimitar Shopov v. Bulgaria, no. 17253\/07, \u00a7 47, 16 April 2013","\u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 41526\/10, ECHR 2012","Eberhard and M. v. Slovenia, no. 8673\/05 and 9733\/05, 1 December 2009","Fern\u00e1ndez Mart\u00ednez v. Spain, [GC], no. 56030\/07, \u00a7 126, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Gluhakovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 21188\/09, 12 April 2011","Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 34529\/10, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2013 (extracts)","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 167, Series A no. 25","Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7 68, ECHR 2006 IX","Kopf and Liberda v. Austria, no. 1598\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 46-49, 17 January 2012","Krzak v. Poland, no. 51515\/99, \u00a7 24, 6 April 2004","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000 IV","M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 22457\/08, 15 November 2011","Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 24 March 1988, \u00a7 59, Series A no. 130","Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, ECHR 2009","P. and S. v. Poland, no. 57375\/08, \u00a7 95, 30 October 2012","Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287\/99, \u00a7 70, ECHR 2004 I","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 61, ECHR 2002 III","Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 32, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 VIII","Remetin v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 7446\/12, \u00a7 120, 24 July 2014","Remetin v. Croatia, no. 29525\/10, \u00a7 75, 11 December 2012","S.I. v. Slovenia, no. 45082\/05, \u00a7 69, 13 October 2011","Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 68-78, ECHR 2003 VIII","\u015eerife Yi\u011fit v. Turkey [GC], no. 3976\/05, \u00a7 52, 2 November 2010","Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], no. 31871\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 66-75, ECHR 2003 VIII (extracts)","\u0160orgi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 34973\/06, \u00a7 55, 3 November 2011","Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7 203, ECHR 2012","Sultan \u00d6ner and Others v. Turkey, no. 73792\/01, \u00a7 134, 17 October 2006","Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 118 and 138, 17 July 2014","T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28945\/95, \u00a7 72, ECHR 2001 V (extracts)","W. v. Slovenia, no. 24125\/06, 23 January 2014","W. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, \u00a7\u00a7 62 and 64, Series A no. 121","X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, \u00a7 22, Series A no. 91","X. v. Germany, no. 6699\/74, Commission decision of 15 December 1977, Decisions and Reports (DR) 11, pp. 16 and 24"],"27474":["K.A.B. v. Sweden, no. 886\/11, 5 September 2013","Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2005-I","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 128, ECHR 20","Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, 28 June 2011","Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217\/12, ECHR 2014","\u00dcner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410\/99, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2006 XII"],"27485":["Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766\/05 and 22228\/06, \u00a7 118, ECHR 2011","Barber\u00e0, Messegu\u00e9 and Jabardo v. Spain, 6 December 1988, \u00a7 68, Series A no. 146","Ba\u015far v. Turkey (dec.), no. 17880\/07, 15 April 2011","Diri\u00f6z v. Turkey, no. 38560\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 28-38, 31 May 2012","Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria, nos. 15018\/11 and 61199\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 157\u2011174, ECHR 2014 (extracts), \u00a7\u00a7 247-268","\u0130mrek v. Turkey (dec.), no. 57175\/00, 28 January 2003","Kafkaris v. Cyprus ([GC], no. 21906\/04, ECHR 2008)","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2000-IV","\u00d6calan v. Turkey (no. 2),  nos. 24069\/03, 197\/04, 6201\/06 and 10464\/07, 18 March 2014","Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7 14, ECHR 2008","Schenk v. Switzerland, 12 July 1988, \u00a7 45, Series A no. 140","Talat Tepe v. Turkey, no. 31247\/96, \u00a7 48, 21 December 2004","Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 66069\/09, 130\/10 and 3896\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 59-81, ECHR 2013 (extracts)"],"27538":["Al Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763\/97, \u00a7 59, ECHR 2001 XI","Allan v. the United Kingdom, no. 48539\/99, ECHR 2002 IX","Amine G\u00fczel v. Turkey, no. 41844\/09, \u00a7 39, 17 September 2013","Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 103 et seq., Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII","Brusco v. France, no. 1466\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 46 55, 14 October 2010","Dayanan v. Turkey, no. 7377\/03, \u00a7 33, 13 October 2009","El Haski v. Belgium, no. 649\/08, \u00a7 85, 25 September 2012","Eldar Imanov and Azhdar Imanov v. Russia, no. 6887\/02, \u00a7 99, 16 December 2010","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, ECHR 2010","Gasanov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 39441\/09, \u00a7 50, 18 December 2012","Indelicato v. Italy, no. 31143\/96, \u00a7 37, 18 October 2001","Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, ECHR 2006 IX","Khan v. the United Kingdom, no. 35394\/97, \u00a7 34, ECHR 2000 V","Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933\/04, \u00a7 137, 29 July 2010","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000-IV","Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, 24 July 2014","Martin v. Estonia, no. 35985\/09, \u00a7 79, 30 May 2013","Mesut Deniz v. Turkey, no. 36716\/07, \u00a7 52, 5 November 2013","Mostipan v. Russia, no. 12042\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 58-61, 16 October 2014","Nasakin v. Russia, no. 22735\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 51-55, 18 July 2013","Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no. 42310\/04, \u00a7 263, 21 April 2011","P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 44787\/98, \u00a7 76, ECHR 2001-IX","Panovits v. Cyprus, no. 4268\/04, \u00a7 82, 11 December 2008","P\u0142onka v. Poland, no. 20310\/02, \u00a7 37, 31 March 2009","Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, ECHR 2008","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000 VII","Schenk v. Switzerland, 12 July 1988, \u00a7\u00a7 45-46, Series A no. 140","Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2006-II","Shishkin v. Russia, no. 18280\/04, \u00a7 100, 7 July 2011","S\u00f6ylemez v. Turkey, no. 46661\/99, \u00a7 122, 21 September 2006"],"27552":["Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, \u00a7 76, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI","Akt\u00fcrk v. Turkey, no. 70945\/10, \u00a7 33, 13 November 2014","Aleksandr Sokolov v. Russia, no. 20364\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 70 73, 4 November 2010","Belevitskiy v. Russia, no. 72967\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 82-85, 1 March 2007","Bulgaru v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 35840\/09, \u00a7 17, 30 September 2014","Chitayev v. Russia, no. 59334\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 173 and 204, 18 January 2007","Dimitrov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 55861\/00, 9 May 2006","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 236-237, ECHR 2012","Fatma Akaltun F\u0131rat v. Turkey, no. 34010\/06, \u00a7 29, 10 September 2013","Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, Reports 1998 III","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000 IV","Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36, 24 July 2014","Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7 61, 5 February 2015","Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 336"],"27555":[""],"27589":[""],"27591":["A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455\/05, \u00a7 170, ECHR 2009","Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no. 30471\/08, \u00a7 91, 22 September 2009","Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 105 and 254, Reports 1996-IV","Akram Karimov v. Russia, no. 62892\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 199-204, 28 May 2014","Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857\/13, \u00a7 118, 27 November 2014","Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503\/01, ECHR 2004 II","Azimov v. Russia, no. 67474\/11, 18 April 2013","Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443\/96, \u00a7 194, ECHR 2004-V","Brum\u0103rescu v. Romania (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 28342\/95, \u00a7 20, ECHR 2001-I","Cotle\u0163 v. Romania, no. 38565\/97, \u00a7 71, 3 June 2003","Croke v. Ireland (dec.), no. 33267\/96, 15 June 1999","Del R\u00edo Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750\/09, \u00a7 139, ECHR 2013","Egamberdiyev v. Russia, no. 34742\/13, 26 June 2014","Ewalaka-Koumou v. Russia (dec.), no. 20953\/03, 4 February 2010","Gaforov v. Russia, no. 25404\/09, \u00a7 144, 21 October 2010","Gayratbek Saliyev v. Russia, no. 39093\/13, \u00a7 41, 17 April 2014","Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, no. 25389\/05, \u00a7 74, ECHR 2007-II","H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, \u00a7 41, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 III","Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, ECHR 2012","Jeli\u010di\u0107 v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), no. 41183\/02, 15 November 2005","K.A.B. v. Sweden, no. 886\/11, \u00a7 67, 5 September 2013","Kaboulov v. Ukraine, no. 41015\/04, \u00a7 99, 19 November 2009","Kasymakhunov v. Russia, no. 29604\/12, \u00a7 125, 14 November 2013","Khalikov v. Russia, no. 66373\/13, \u00a7 37, 6 July 2015","Khaydarov v. Russia, no. 21055\/09, \u00a7 156, 20 May 2010","Khodzhayev v. Russia, no. 52466\/08, \u00a7 151, 12 May 2010","Kim v. Russia, no. 44260\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 39-43, 17 July 2014","Knyazev v. Russia, no. 25948\/05, \u00a7 117, 8 November 2007","Kozhayev v. Russia, no. 60045\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 85-87, 5 June 2012","Kudeshkina v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), no. 28727\/11, \u00a7 58, 17 February 2014","Labsi v. Slovakia, no. 33809\/08, 15 May 2012","Lebedev v. Russia, no. 4493\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 119, 25 October 2007","M.A. v. Cyprus, no. 41872\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 131-43, 23 July 2013","Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748\/98, \u00a7 47, ECHR 2004-I","Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2005 I","Mamazhonov v. Russia, no. 17239\/13, 23 October 2014","Melnikov v. Russia, no. 23610\/03, \u00a7 96, 14 January 2010","Mente\u015f and Others v. Turkey (Article 50), 24 July 1998, \u00a7 24, Reports 1998-IV","NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, 17 July 2008","\u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221\/99, \u00a7 210, ECHR 2005-IV","Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 21722\/11, \u00a7 208, ECHR 2013","Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806\/05, \u00a7 87, 10 March 2009","Rakhimov v. Russia, no. 50552\/13, 10 July 2014","Rustamov v. Russia, no. 11209\/10, \u00a7 150, 3 July 2012","Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229\/03, \u00a7 74, ECHR 2008","Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249\/03, \u00a7 148, 17 September 2009","Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221\/98 and 41963\/98, ECHR 2000-VIII","Shakurov v. Russia, no. 55822\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 132-13, 5 June 2012","Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009\/05, \u00a7 140, 27 March 2008","Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 293-96, 28 June 2011","Tukhtamurodov v. Russia (dec.), no. 21762\/14, \u00a7 37, 20 January 2015","Y. v. Russia, no. 20113\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 87-88, 4 December 2008","Zakharkin v. Russia, no. 1555\/04, \u00a7 158, 10 June 2010"],"27610":["Abdu v. Bulgaria, no. 26827\/08, 11 March 2014","Amadayev v. Russia, no. 18114\/06, \u00a7 81, 3 July 2014","B.S. v. Spain, no. 47159\/08, 24 July 2012","Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, no. 15250\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 69-70, ECHR 2005 XIII (extracts)","Borb\u00e1la Kiss v. Hungary, no. 59214\/11, 26 June 2012","Budayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 15339\/02, 21166\/02, 20058\/02, 11673\/02 and 15343\/02, \u00a7 110, ECHR 2008 (extracts)","D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325\/00, \u00a7 182, ECHR 2007 IV","\u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 41526\/10, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2012","East African Asians v. United Kingdom, nos. 4626\/70 and others, Commission report of 14 December 1973, Decisions and Reports 78, pp. 57 and 62, \u00a7\u00a7 196 and 207","El Masri v. \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 196, ECHR 2012","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2010","Hilal v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 45276\/99, 8 February 2000","Krumpel and Krumpelova v. Slovakia, no. 56195\/00, \u00a7 43, 5 July 2005","Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi v. Hungary (dec.), no. 2351\/06, 9 November 2010","Identoba and Others v. Georgia, no. 73235\/12, \u00a7 65, 12 May 2015","Ivan Vasilev v. Bulgaria, no. 48130\/99, \u00a7 56, 12 April 2007","Koky and Others v. Slovakia, no. 13624\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 223-225, 12 June 2012","Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 133-134, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000-IV","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7 149, ECHR 2003-XII","Matko v. Slovenia, no. 43393\/98, \u00a7 95, 2 November 2006","Milanovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 44614\/07, \u00a7 86, 14 December 2010","Mili\u0107 and Nikezi\u0107 v. Montenegro, nos. 54999\/10 and 10609\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 98-99, 28 April 2015","Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), nos. 41138\/98 and 64320\/01, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2005-VII (extracts)","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, ECHR 2005 VII","\u0160e\u010di\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 40116\/02, 31 May 2007","Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, \u00a7 33, Series A no. 26","Valiulien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no. 33234\/07, \u00a7 74, 26 March 2013"],"27632":["Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743\/11, 2 October 2012","Gayratbek Saliyev v. Russia, no. 39093\/13, 17 April 2014","Kadirzhanov and Mamashev v. Russia, nos. 42351\/13 and 47823\/13, \u00a7 91, 17 July 2014","Khamrakulov v. Russia, no. 68894\/13, \u00a7 65, 16 April 2015","Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia, no. 49747\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 71-73, 16 October 2012","Mamadaliyev v. Russia, no. 5614\/13, \u00a7 60, 24 July 2014","Mukhitdinov v. Russia, no. 20999\/14, \u00a7 79, 21 May 2015","NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7 116, 17 July 2008","Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 31890\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 132-133, 3 October 2013","Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, no. 8139\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 203-204, ECHR 2012 (extracts)","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 132, ECHR 2008","Umirov v. Russia, no. 17455\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 92-100, 18 September 2012"],"27627":[""],"27625":["Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 105, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 IV","Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008","Barilo v. Ukraine, no. 9607\/06, 16 May 2013","Cotle\u0163 v. Romania, no. 38565\/97, \u00a7 71, 3 June 2003","Dvoynykh v. Ukraine, no. 72277\/01, \u00a7 72, 12 October 2006","Goginashvili v. Georgia, no. 47729\/08, \u00a7 71, 4 October 2011","Grishin v. Russia, no. 30983\/02, \u00a7 76, 15 November 2007","Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 117, 7 November 2006","Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, 29 November 2007","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 162, Series A no. 25","Iulian Popescu v. Romania, no. 24999\/04, \u00a7 29, 4 June 2013","Kats and Others v. Ukraine, no. 29971\/04, 18 December 2008","Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2006 XII (extracts)","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000 XI","Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 159-160, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 III","Kushnir v. Ukraine, no. 42184\/09, 11 December 2014","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000 IV","McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000","Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, 28 March 2006","Mirilashivili v. Russia (dec.), no. 6293\/04, 10 July 2007","Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no. 42310\/04, \u00a7 148, 21 April 2011","Okhrimenko v. Ukraine, no. 53896\/07, \u00a7 71, 15 October 2009","Petukhov v. Ukraine, no. 43374\/02, 21 October 2010","Pokhlebin v. Ukraine, no. 35581\/06, 20 May 2010","Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 211, 13 July 2006","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002 III","Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005\/08, 14 March 2013","Ukhan v. Ukraine, no. 30628\/02, 18 December 2008","Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia, no. 57541\/09, \u00a7 80, 24 January 2012","Vitkovskiy v. Ukraine, no. 24938\/06, \u00a7 129, 26 September 2013"],"27626":[""],"27647":["Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII","Bat\u0131 and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2004 IV","\u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV","Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 79, Reports 1996-V","Corsacov v. Moldova, no. 18944\/02, \u00a7 68, 4 April 2006","Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012","Dikme v. Turkey, no. 20869\/92, \u00a7\u00a7 82 and 95, ECHR 2000 VIII","D\u017eeladinov and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 13252\/02, 10 April 2008","Editions Plon v. France, no. 58148\/00, \u00a7 64, ECHR 2004 IV","Egmez v. Cyprus, no. 30873\/96, \u00a7 78, ECHR 2000-XII","El Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, ECHR 2012","Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 83-84, Reports 1998-IV","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 87, ECHR 2010","Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7 60, 14 October 2010","Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 36549\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 64-66, ECHR 2007","Hurtado v. Switzerland, 28 January 1994, opinion of the Commission, \u00a7 67, Series A no. 280","\u0130lhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277\/93, \u00a7 85, ECHR 2000 VII","Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, ECHR 2006 IX","Ja\u0161ar v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 69908\/01, 15 February 2007","Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222\/99, \u00a7 53, 30 September 2004","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, ECHR 2000 IV","Mehmet Emin Y\u00fcksel v. Turkey, no. 40154\/98, \u00a7 37, 20 July 2004","O\u011fur v. Turkey [GC], no. 21594\/93, \u00a7\u00a7 91-92, ECHR 1999 III","Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7 274, 18 June 2002","Ota\u0161evi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 32198\/07, \u00a7 25, 5 February 2013","Rupa v. Romania (no. 1), no. 58478\/00, \u00a7 97, 16 December 2008","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999-V","Stojn\u0161ek v. Slovenia, no. 1926\/03, \u00a7 79, 23 June 2009","Sulejmanov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 69875\/01, 24 April 2008","Trajkoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 13191\/02, \u00a7 15, 7 February 2008","Wieser v. Austria, no. 2293\/03, \u00a7 36, 22 February 2007"],"27650":[""],"27652":[""],"27667":["Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom, [GC] nos. 26766\/05 and 22228\/06, ECHR 2011","Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, 10 January 2012","Berdzenishvili v. Russia, (dec.), 29 January 2004, no. 31697\/03","Blaj v. Romania, no. 36259\/04, \u00a7 96, 8 April 2014","Croissant v. Germany, 25 September 1992, \u00a7\u00a7 33 and 34, Series A no. 237 B","Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, \u00a7 36, Series A no. 275","John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996, \u00a7 63, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I","Krombach v. France, no. 29731\/96, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2001 II","Orlov v. Russia, no. 29652\/04, 21 June 2011","Pishchalnikov v. Russia, no. 7025\/04, \u00a7 69, 24 September 2009","Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7 55, 27 November 2008","Shekhov v. Russia, no. 12440\/04, \u00a7 53, 19 June 2014","Van Geyseghem v. Belgium [GC], no. 26103\/95, \u00a7 27, ECHR 1999 I"],"27693":[""],"27728":[""],"27743":["Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743\/11, \u00a7 148, 2 October 2012","Bakoyev v. Russia, no. 30225\/11, \u00a7 113, 5 February 2013","Gayratbek Saliyev v. Russia, no. 39093\/13, \u00a7 61, 17 April 2014","Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia, no. 49747\/11, 16 October 2012","Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, ECHR 2005 I","NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7 116, 17 July 2008","Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 31890\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 132-33, 3 October 2013","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 132, ECHR 2008","Umirov v. Russia, no. 17455\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 92 100, 18 September 2012"],"27796":["Ahmet Sad\u0131k v. Greece, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 26, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 V","Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 65-68, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 IV","Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008","Bi\u00e7 and Others v. Turkey, no. 55955\/00, \u00a7 23, 2 February 2006","Bubnov v. Russia, no. 76317\/11, 5 February 2013","Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, 9 January 2014","Buntov v. Russia, no. 27026\/10, \u00a7 161, 5 June 2012","\u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV","Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012","Cardot v. France, 19 March 1991, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 200","Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012","Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461\/10, 27 November 2012","Ergezen v. Turkey, no. 73359\/10, \u00a7 29, 8 April 2014","Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7 51, 14 October 2010","Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21 December 2010","Gorbulya v. Russia, no. 31535\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 56-58, 6 March 2014","Gorelov v. Russia, no. 49072\/11, 9 January 2014","Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, \u00a7 78, 5 February 2013","Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, \u00a7 48, Series A no. 24","Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 121, 7 November 2006","Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29 November 2007","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 162, Series A no. 25","Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 18 December 1986, \u00a7 22, Series A no. 112","Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI","Karner v. Austria, no. 40016\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 25-27, ECHR 2003 IX","Khatayev v. Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011","Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)","Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 58-68, 13 November 2012","Kova\u010di\u0107 and Others v. Slovenia [GC], nos. 44574\/98, 45133\/98 and 48316\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 189-192, 3 October 2008","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, ECHR 2000 XI","Kushnir v. Ukraine, no. 42184\/09, \u00a7 146, 11 December 2014","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV","Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000-XII","Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000 XII","Marie Louise Loyen and Bruneel v. France, no. 55929\/00, \u00a7 29, 5 July 2005","McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000","Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006","Oleg Nikitin v. Russia, no. 36410\/02, \u00a7 45, 9 October 2008","Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7 274, 18 June 2002","Pakhomov v. Russia, no. 44917\/08, \u00a7 67, 30 September 2010","Patranin v. Russia, no. 12983\/14, 23 July 2015","Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 208, 13 July 2006","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III","Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, \u00a7 86, 8 January 2013","Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, 8 January 2013","Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 65-73, 8 January 2013","Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 32, Series A no. 336","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII","Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4 October 2005","Scherer v. Switzerland, 25 March 1994, \u00a7\u00a7 31 32, Series A no. 287","Th\u00e9venon v. France (dec.), no. 2476\/02, ECHR 2006-III","Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6 November 1980, \u00a7 35, Series A no. 40","Velikova v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 41488\/98, 18 May 1999","Vernillo v. France, 20 February 1991, \u00a7 27, Series A no. 198","Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 78, 24 July 2008","Wasserman v. Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7 45, 10 April 2008","Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011"],"27793":["A.B. v. Russia, no. 1439\/06, \u00a7 96, 14 October 2010","Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008","Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857\/13, 27 November 2014, \u00a7 90","Bubnov v. Russia, no. 76317\/11, 5 February 2013","Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, 9 January 2014","Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012","Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461\/10, 27 November 2012","Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21 December 2010","Gorelov v. Russia, no. 49072\/11, 9 January 2014","Grishin v. Russia, no. 30983\/02, \u00a7 76, 15 November 2007","Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, 5 February 2013","Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, \u00a7 48, Series A no. 24","Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 121, 7 November 2006","Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, 29 November 2007","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 162, Series A no. 25","Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI","Khatayev v. Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011","Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)","Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, 13 November 2012","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 152, ECHR 2000 XI","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV","Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006","Mirilashivili v. Russia (dec.), no. 6293\/04, 10 July 2007","Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108\/11, 5 February 2013","Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 208, 13 July 2006","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, 2002 III","Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, 8 January 2013","Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4 October 2005","Vernillo v. France, 20 February 1991, \u00a7 27, Series A no. 198","Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 78, 24 July 2008","Wasserman v. Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7 45, 10 April 2008","Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011"],"27794":["Alver v. Estonia, no. 64812\/01, 8 November 2005","Babushkin v. Russia, no. 67253\/01, \u00a7 44, 18 October 2007","Belevitskiy v. Russia, no. 72967\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 73-79, 1 March 2007","Canali v. France, no. 40119\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 52-53, 25 April 2013","Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2001-II","Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339\/05, \u00a7 75, ECHR 2007 I","Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025\/01, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2005-IX","Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 106-107, ECHR 2005 X (extracts)","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000-XI","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000 IV","Lind v. Russia, no. 25664\/05, \u00a7 59, 6 December 2007","Novoselov v. Russia, no. 66460\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 32, 40-43, 2 June 2005","Odi\u00e8vre v. France [GC], no. 42326\/98, \u00a7 40, ECHR 2003 III","Orchowski v. Poland, no. 17885\/04, \u00a7 135, 22 October 2009","Ostrovar v. Moldova, no. 35207\/03, \u00a7 89, 13 September 2005","Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 67 68 and 70-74, ECHR 2001-III","Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 101-102 and 104, ECHR 2001 VIII","Wainwright v. the United Kingdom, no. 12350\/04, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2006 X"],"27807":["A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 3455\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 162-164, 19 February 2009","Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 55721\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 165-167, ECHR 2011","Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no 71503\/01, \u00a7 169, ECHR 2004 II","Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 102, Reports 1998 VIII","Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39692\/09, 40713\/09 and 41008\/09, \u00a7 57, ECHR 2012","Av\u015far v. Turkey, no 25657\/94, \u00a7 284, ECHR 2001 VII","Bazorkina v. Russia (dec.), no 69481\/01, 15 September 2005","Belevitskiy v. Russia, no 72967\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 62 and 64, 1 March 2007","Bi\u00e7 and Others v. Turkey, no 55955\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 20-24, 2 February 2006","\u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no 23657\/94, \u00a7\u00a7 92, ECHR 1999 IV","Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 98, ECHR 2014","Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no 29226\/03, 23 February 2012","De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium, no  8595\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 100-103, 6 December 2011","El Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no 39630\/09, \u00a7 237, ECHR 2012","Eremi\u00e1\u0161ov\u00e1 and Pechov\u00e1 v. the Czech Republic, no 23944\/04, 16 February 2012","Fairfield v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no 24790\/04, ECHR 2005 VI","Foka v. Turkey, no 28940\/95, \u00a7 75, 24 June 2008","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no 22978\/05, \u00a7 93, ECHR 2010","Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no 23458\/02, ECHR 2011","Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, \u00a7\u00a7 92 and 93, Series A no 39","Imakayeva v. Russia (dec.), no 7615\/02, 20 January 2005","Imakayeva v. Russia, no 7615\/02, \u00a7 213, ECHR 2006 XIII","Indelicato v. Italy, no 31143\/96, \u00a7 37, 18 October 2001","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no 25","Kats and Others v. Ukraine, no 29971\/04, \u00a7 135, 18 December 2008","Kaya v. Turkey, 19 February 1998, \u00a7 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I","Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no 27229\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 83-116, ECHR 2001 III","Kleyn and Aleksandrovich v. Russia, no 40657\/04, 3 May 2012","Kolevi v. Bulgaria, no 1108\/02, \u00a7 201, 5 November 2009","Kopylov v. Russia, no 3933\/04, \u00a7 132, 29 July 2010","Labita v. Italy [GC], no 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000 IV","Luluyev and Others v. Russia, no 69480\/01, \u00a7 122, ECHR 2006 XIII (extracts)","Lyapin v. Russia, no 46956\/09, 24 July 2014","Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no 50385\/99, \u00a7 74, ECHR 2004 XI","Martin v. Estonia, no 35985\/09, \u00a7 79, 30 May 2013","McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, \u00a7 161, Series A no 324","McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no 28883\/95, \u00a7 112, ECHR 2001 III","Mikheyev v. Russia, no 77617\/01, 26 January 2006","Mi\u017eig\u00e1rov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, no 74832\/01, 14 December 2010","Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and Fecire Tun\u00e7 v. Turkey [GC], no 24014\/05, \u00a7 182, 14 April 2015","Opuz v. Turkey, no 33401\/02, \u00a7 128, ECHR 2009","Ostendorf v. Germany, no 15598\/08, 7 March 2013","Osypenko v. Ukraine, no 4634\/04, \u00a7 49, and 9 November 2010","Pitsayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 53036\/08 and al., \u00a7 537, 9 January 2014","Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no 52391\/99, \u00a7 325, ECHR 2007 II","Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no 25965\/04, ECHR 2010 (extracts)","Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 38, Series A no 336","Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no 36391\/02, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2008","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000 VII","Sanles Sanles v. Spain (dec.), no 48335\/99, \u00a7 64, ECHR 2000 XI","Scavuzzo-Hager and Others v. Switzerland, no 41773\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 75-76, 7 February 2006","Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany, nos. 8080\/08 and 8577\/08, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2011","Selmouni v. France [GC], no 25803\/94, \u00a7 99, ECHR 1999 V","Shimovolos v. Russia, no. 30194\/09, \u00a7 50, 21 June 2011","Slimani v. France, no 57671\/00, ECHR 2004 IX","Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7 114, ECHR 2014","Ta\u00efs v. France, no 39922\/03, \u00a7 97, 1 June 2006","Tanribilir v. Turkey, no 21422\/93, \u00a7 70, 16 November 2000","Timurta\u015f v. Turkey, no 23531\/94, \u00a7 105, ECHR 2000 VI","Tomaszewscy v. Poland, no 8933\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 79-80, 15 April 2014","Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, \u00a7 112, ECHR 2009","Velcea and Maz\u0103re v. Romania, no 64301\/01, \u00a7 105, 1 December 2009","Zayev v. Russia, no 36552\/05, \u00a7 86, 16 April 2015"],"27847":[""],"27897":["Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743\/11, \u00a7 148, 2 October 2012","Akram Karimov v. Russia, no. 62892\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 191-192, 28 May 2014","Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 103 et seq., Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII","Azimov v. Russia, no. 67474\/11, 18 April 2013","Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, 28 September 2015","Del R\u00edo Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750\/09, \u00a7 125, ECHR 2013","Egamberdiyev v. Russia, no. 34742\/13, 26 June 2014","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, ECHR 2012","Eshonkulov v. Russia, no. 68900\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 57-60, 15 January 2015","Gayratbek Saliyev v. Russia, no. 39093\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 60-61, 17 April 2014","Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7 51, 14 October 2010","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25","Kadirzhanov and Mamashev v. Russia, nos. 42351\/13 and 47823\/13, 17 July 2014","Khalikov v. Russia, no. 66373\/13, 26 February 2015","Khamrakulov v. Russia, no. 68894\/13, \u00a7 65, 16 April 2015","Kim v. Russia, no. 44260\/13, \u00a7 38, 17 July 2014","L.M. and Others v. Russia, nos. 40081\/14, 40088\/14 and 40127\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 140-42, 15 October 2015","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 125, ECHR 2000 IV","Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 135-36, 24 July 2014","Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia, no. 49747\/11, \u00a7 72, 16 October 2012","Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2005 I","McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000","Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 107-108, 26 January 2006","NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7 116, 17 July 2008","Rakhimov v. Russia, no. 50552\/13, 10 July 2014","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 132, ECHR 2008","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000 VII","Umirov v. Russia (no. 17455\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 92 100, 18 September 2012","Zelenin v. Russia, no. 21120\/07, \u00a7 59, 15 January 2015"],"27919":[""],"27924":["Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 105, Reports 1996 IV","Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII","Av\u015far v. Turkey, no. 25657\/94, \u00a7 282, ECHR 2001-VII","Bat\u0131 and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 134 and 137, ECHR 2004 IV","Cebotari v. Moldova, no. 35615\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 58-68, 13 November 2007","Celniku v. Greece, no. 21449\/04, \u00a7 39, 5 July 2007","Cooke v. Austria, no. 25878\/94, \u00a7 46, 8 February 2000","Cotle\u0163 v. Romania, no. 38565\/97, \u00a7 71, 3 June 2003","Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, \u00a7 105, Reports 1998 IV","Fedotova v. Russia, no. 73225\/01, \u00a7 48, 13 April 2006","G\u00fcrdeniz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 59715\/10, 18 March 2014","G\u00fczel \u015eahin and Others v. Turkey, no. 68263\/01, \u00a7 50, 21 December 2006","Indelicato v. Italy, no. 31143\/96, \u00a7 37, 18 October 2001","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 162, Series A no. 25","Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 55508\/07 and 29520\/09, \u00a7 209, ECHR 2013","Kop v. Turkey, no. 12728\/05, \u00a7 27, 20 October 2009","Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933\/04, \u00a7 135, 29 July 2010","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 91-92, ECHR 2000-XI","Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7 159, Reports 1998 III","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000 IV","Lebedev v. Russia, no. 4493\/04, \u00a7 119, 25 October 2007","McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000","Melnikov v. Russia, no. 23610\/03, \u00a7 96, 14 January 2010","Muradova v. Azerbaijan, no. 22684\/05, \u00a7 99, 2 April 2009","Najafli v. Azerbaijan, no. 2594\/07, \u00a7 39, 2 October 2012","OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, no. 14902\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 521-522, 20 September 2011","Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806\/05, \u00a7 87, 10 March 2009","Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2001-III","Peraldi v. France (dec.), no. 2096\/05, 7 April 2009","Rizvanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 31805\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 46-50, 17 April 2012","Savda v. Turkey, no. 42730\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 68-70, 12 June 2012","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999 V","Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009\/05, \u00a7 140, ECHR 2008","Smirnova v. Russia (dec.), nos. 46133\/99 and 48183\/99, 3 October 2002","Tanr\u0131kulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763\/94, \u00a7 130, ECHR 1999 IV","Tekin v. Turkey, 9 June 1998, \u00a7 67, Reports 1998 IV","Timtik v. Turkey, no. 12503\/06, \u00a7 49, 9 November 2010","Timurta\u015f v. Turkey, no. 23531\/94, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2000-VI","Tomasi v. France, 27 August 1992, \u00a7\u00a7 108-111, Series A no. 241 A","U\u00e7a v. Turkey (dec.), no. 73489\/12, \u00a7 42, 30 September 2014","Vesa Peltonen v. Finland (dec.), no. 19583\/92, 20 February 1995","Zakharkin v. Russia, no. 1555\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 157-160, 10 June 2010"],"27934":[""],"27943":["Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378\/05, \u00a7 33, ECHR 2008","Bursuc v. Romania, no. 42066\/98, \u00a7 80, 12 October 2004","Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 103, ECHR 2014","De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium, no. 8595\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 53-62, 6 December 2011","Doroseva v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 39553\/12, \u00a7 30, 28 April 2015","Dzieciak v. Poland, no. 77766\/01, \u00a7 105, 9 December 2008","E.A. v. Russia, no. 44187\/04, \u00a7 35, 23 May 2013","Fairfield v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 24790\/04, ECHR 2005-VI","Geppa v. Russia, no. 8532\/06, \u00a7 71, 3 February 2011","Huylu v. Turkey, no. 52955\/99, \u00a7 58, 16 November 2006","Kaburov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 9035\/06, 19 June 2012","Karner v. Austria, no. 40016\/98, \u00a7 25, ECHR 2003 IX","Kats and Others v. Ukraine, no. 29971\/04, 18 December 2008","Kondratyev v. Ukraine, no. 5203\/09, \u00a7 72, 15 December 2011","Kushnir v. Ukraine, no. 42184\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 142-150, 11 December 2014","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000-IV","Lotarev v. Ukraine, no. 29447\/04, \u00a7 91, 8 April 2010","Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, no. 35254\/07, \u00a7 87, 22 November 2011","Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000 XII","Pearson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 40957\/07, \u00a7 67, 13 December 2011","Pokhlebin v. Ukraine, no. 35581\/06, 20 May 2010","Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005\/08, 14 March 2013","Sanles Sanles v. Spain (dec.), no. 48335\/99, ECHR 2000 XI","Sejdi\u0107 and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996\/06 and 34836\/06, \u00a7 27, ECHR 2009","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR 1999 V","Sergey Antonov v. Ukraine (no. 40512\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 40-53 and 55-56, 22 October 2015","Slimani v. France, no. 57671\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 30 and 34, ECHR 2004-IX (extracts)","Ta\u00efs v. France, no. 39922\/03, \u00a7 98, 1 June 2006","Y.F. v. Turkey, no. 24209\/94, \u00a7 31, ECHR 2003\u2013IX","Yakovenko v. Ukraine, no. 15825\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 97-102, 25 October 2007"],"27969":["Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 82-83, 28 September 2015","Fatma Akaltun F\u0131rat v. Turkey, no. 34010\/06, \u00a7 29, 10 September 2013","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25","Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 122 123, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 III","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000 IV","Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-136, 24 July 2014","Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 336","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000 VII","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR 1999\u2011V","Uzeyir Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 54204\/08, \u00a7 57, 29 January 2015"],"27996":["Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743\/11, \u00a7 222, 2 October 2012","Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, 22 December 2008","Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857\/13, 27 November 2014","Aoulmi v. France, no. 50278\/99, \u00a7 108, ECHR 2006 I","Ben Khemais v. Italy, no. 246\/07, \u00a7 82, 24 February 2009","Bubnov v. Russia, no. 76317\/11, 5 February 2013","Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, 9 January 2014","Buntov v. Russia, no. 27026\/10, \u00a7 161, 5 June 2012","\u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV","Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012","Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012","Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461\/10, 27 November 2012","Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7 51, 14 October 2010","Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21 December 2010","Gorelov v. Russia, no. 49072\/11, 9 January 2014","Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, 5 February 2013","Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 121, 7 November 2006","Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, 29 November 2007","Iulian Popescu v. Romania, no. 24999\/04, \u00a7 33, 4 June 2013","Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, ECHR 2002 VI","Khatayev v. Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011","Khloyev v. Russia, no. 46404\/13, \u00a7 67, 5 February 2015","Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)","Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, 13 November 2012","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, ECHR 2000-XI","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV","Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, \u00a7 75, Series A no. 310","Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, ECHR 2005 I","McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000","Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108\/11, 5 February 2013","Naydyon v. Ukraine, no. 16474\/03, \u00a7 63, 14 October 2010","Oleg Nikitin v. Russia, no. 36410\/02, \u00a7 45, 9 October 2008","Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7 274, 18 June 2002","Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806\/05, 10 March 2009","Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, 13 July 2006","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III","Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, 8 January 2013","Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 32, Series A no. 336","Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005\/08, \u00a7 222, 14 March 2013","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII","Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4 October 2005","Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 38773\/05, \u00a7 156, 26 July 2012","Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378\/02, \u00a7 473, ECHR 2005 III","Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009\/05, \u00a7 141, ECHR 2008","Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, \u00a7 88, Series A no. 161","Verbin\u0163 v. Romania, no. 7842\/04, \u00a7 63, 3 April 2012","Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833\/04, 27 January 2011"],"28027":[""],"28029":["Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, 10 January 2012","Demirtepe v. France, no. 34821\/97, \u00a7 26, ECHR 1999 IX (extracts)","Ferla v. Poland, no. 55470\/00, \u00a7 38, 20 May 2008","Fetisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 43710\/07, 6023\/08, 11248\/08, 27668\/08, 31242\/08 and 52133\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 82-87, 17 January 2012","Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826\/03, \u00a7 197, 22 May 2012","Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no. 53254\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 39-40, 7 April 2005","Khoroshenko v. Russia [GC], no. 41418\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 106 and 116, ECHR 2015","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000 XI","Kulikov v. Russia, no. 48562\/06, \u00a7 31, 27 November 2012","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 179, ECHR 2000 IV","Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 208, 13 July 2006","Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, 8 January 2013","Sergey Babushkin v. Russia, no. 5993\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 41-45, 28 November 2013","Van der Ven v. the Netherlands, no. 50901\/99, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2003 II"],"28032":["Beyeler v. Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 33202\/96, \u00a7 27, 28 May 2002","Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457\/04, \u00a7 64, 27 November 2007","C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692\/05, 20 March 2012","Guerra and Others v. Italy [GC], 19 February 1998, \u00a7 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 I","M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, no. 40020\/03, \u00a7 99, 31 July 2012","M. P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 22457\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 108-110, 15 November 2011","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, ECHR 2003 XII","O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Szula v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 18727\/06, 4 January 2007","Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392\/95, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2001-V\n\n"],"28034":["A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455\/05, \u00a7 203, ECHR 2009","Ananyev and others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, 10 January 2012","Colozza v. Italy, 12 February 1985, Series A no. 89, p. 14, \u00a7 28","Dudnik and Others v. Ukraine (dec.), nos. 9408\/05, 10642\/05 and 26842\/05, 20 November 2007","Dvorski v. Croatia, no. 25703\/11, \u00a7 80, 20 October 2015","Gorbatenko v. Ukraine, no. 25209\/06, \u00a7 139, 28 November 2013","Gorodnitchev v. Russia, no. 52058\/99, \u00a7 108, 24 May 2007","Iglin v. Ukraine, no. 39908\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 51-52, 12 January 2012","Kampanis v. Greece, 13 July 1995, \u00a7 47, Series A no. 318 B","Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no. 53254\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 39-40, 7 April 2005","Kaverzin v. Ukraine, no. 23893\/03, 15 May 2012","Kharchenko v. Ukraine, no. 40107\/02, \u00a7 100, 10 February 2011","Kucheruk v. Ukraine, no. 2570\/04, \u00a7 139, ECHR 2007 X","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, ECHR 2000-XI","Leonid Lazarenko v. Ukraine, no. 22313\/04, 28 October 2010","Molodorych v. Ukraine, no. 2161\/02, 28 October 2010","Navarra v. France, 23 November 1993, \u00a7 28, Series A no. 273 B","Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no. 42310\/04, 21 April 2011","Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 1), 23 May 1991, Series A no. 204, p. 23, \u00a7 51","Okhrimenko v. Ukraine, no. 53896\/07, \u00a7 98, 15 October 2009","Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29468\/95, \u00a7 84, ECHR 2000 XII","Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7 55-57, 27 November 2008","Savinov v. Ukrane, no 5212\/13, \u00a7 36, 22 October 2015","Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2006 II","Sergey Volosyuk v. Ukraine, 1291\/03, 12 March 2009","Svershov v. Ukraine, no. 35231\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 71-72, 27 November 2008","Taran v. Ukraine, no. 31898\/06, \u00a7 81, 17 October 2013","Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979\/97, ECHR 2000 I"],"28052":["Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 IV","Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008","Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012","Gherghina v. Romania [GC] (dec.), no. 42219\/07, 9 July 2015","Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21 December 2010","Gorbulya v. Russia, no. 31535\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 56-58, 6 March 2014","Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, \u00a7 78, 5 February 2013","Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 121, 7 November 2006","Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, 29 November 2007","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 162, Series A no. 25","Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI","Khatayev v. Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011","Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, ECHR 2000 XI","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV","Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006","Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138\/10, 23 February 2016","Patranin v. Russia, no. 12983\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 86-88, 23 July 2015","Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 208, 13 July 2006","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, 2002 III","Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 65-73, 8 January 2013","Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2006 II","Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, 25 March 2014","Wasserman v. Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7 45, 10 April 2008","Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011"],"28050":["Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 IV","Butko v. Russia, no. 32036\/10, \u00a7 59, 12 November 2015","Cardot v. France, 19 March 1991, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 200","Dmitriy Sazonov v. Russia, no. 30268\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 31-32, 1 March 2012","Engel v. Hungary, no. 46857\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 27 and 30, 20 May 2010","Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, 2 December 2004","Fetisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 43710\/07, 6023\/08, 11248\/08, 27668\/08, 31242\/08 and 52133\/08, \u00a7 137, 17 January 2012","Geld v. Russia, no. 1900\/04, \u00a7 24, 27 March 2012","Gherghina v. Romania [GC] (dec.), no. 42219\/07, 9 July 2015","Gorbulya v. Russia, no. 31535\/09, \u00a7 57, 6 March 2014","Helhal v. France, no. 10401\/12, \u00a7 50, 19 February 2015","Iacov Stanciu v. Romania, no. 35972\/05, \u00a7 177, 24 July 2012","Insanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 16133\/08, \u00a7 120, 14 March 2013","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 162, Series A no. 25","Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744\/08, \u00a7 59, 21 December 2010","Kadi\u0137is v. Latvia (no. 2), no. 62393\/00, \u00a7 52, 4 May 2006","Kaprykowski v. Poland, no. 23052\/05, \u00a7 74, 3 February 2009","Klyukin v. Russia, no. 54996\/07, \u00a7 55, 17 October 2013","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, ECHR 2000 XI","Kulikov v. Russia, no. 48562\/06, \u00a7 37, 27 November 2012","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV","Longin v. Croatia, no. 49268\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 60-61, 6 November 2012","Mela v. Russia, no. 34044\/08, \u00a7 61, 23 October 2014","Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 102-03, 28 March 2006","Meln\u012btis v. Latvia, no. 30779\/05, \u00a7 69, 28 February 2012","Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138\/10, 23 February 2016","Nieciecki v. Greece, no. 11677\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 49-51, 4 December 2012","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III","Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, 8 January 2013","Samaras and Others v. Greece, no. 11463\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 51-66, 28 February 2012","Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2006 II","Semikhvostov v. Russia, no. 2689\/12, 6 February 2014","Tatishvili v. Greece, no. 26452\/11, \u00a7 43, 31 July 2014","Trepashkin v. Russia, no. 36898\/03, \u00a7 92, 19 July 2007","Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6 November 1980, \u00a7 35, Series A no. 40","Vincent v. France, no. 6253\/03, \u00a7 103, 24 October 2006","Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 78, 24 July 2008","Vlasov v. Russia, no. 78146\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 81 and 84, 12 June 2008","Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, 25 March 2014","Wasserman v. Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7 45, 10 April 2008","Yepishin v. Russia, no. 591\/07, \u00a7 65, 27 June 2013","Z.H. v. Hungary, no. 28937\/11, \u00a7 29, 8 November 2012","Zarzycki v. Poland, no. 15351\/03, \u00a7 102, 12 March 2013"],"28049":[""],"28055":["A. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 51776\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 66-74, 29 November 2011","Achour v. France [GC], no. 67335\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 45-47, ECHR 2006 IV","Adamkiewicz v. Poland, no. 54729\/00, \u00a7 70, 2 March 2010","Akimov v. Azerbaijan, no. 19853\/03, \u00a7 92, 27 September 2007","Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008","Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766\/05 and 22228\/06, 15 December 2011","Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857\/13, 27 November 2014","Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, 10 January 2012","Ble\u010di\u0107 v. Croatia ([GC], no. 59532\/00, \u00a7 68, ECHR 2006-III","Bouamar v. Belgium, 29 February 1988, \u00a7\u00a7 50 and 52, Series A no. 129","Buntov v. Russia, no. 27026\/10, \u00a7 161, 5 June 2012","\u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV","Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012","D.G. v. Ireland, no. 39474\/98, ECHR 2002 III","D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325\/00, \u00a7 109, 13 November 2007","Dennis and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 76573\/01, 2 July 2002","Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, \u00a7 25, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 IV","Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 117, 7 November 2006","Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, 29 November 2007","Insanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 16133\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 159 et seq. 14 March 2013","K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702\/94, ECHR 2001-VII","Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, ECHR 2006-XII","Koniarska v. the United Kingdom, (dec.), no. 33670\/96, 12 October 2000","Krombach v. France, no. 29731\/96, \u00a7 82, ECHR 2001 II","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000 XI","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2000 IV","Luc\u00e0 v. Italy, no. 33354\/96, ECHR 2001 II","M.S. v. the United Kingdom, no. 24527\/08, 3 May 2012","Makeyev v. Russia, no. 13769\/04, \u00a7 42, 5 February 2009","Martin v. Estonia, no. 35985\/09, \u00a7 92, 30 May 2013","Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-06, 28 March 2006","Mirilashvili v. Russia, no. 6293\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 164 et seq., 11 December 2008","Mouisel v. France, no. 67263\/01, \u00a7 40, ECHR 2002-IX","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 147, ECHR 2005 VII","Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7 274, 18 June 2002","P. and S. v. Poland, no. 57375\/08, \u00a7 147, 30 October 2012","Panovits v. Cyprus, no. 4268\/04, 11 December 2008","Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 46477\/99, 4 June 2001","Poitrimol v. France, 23 November 1993, Series A no. 277 A","Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 210 to 213 and 231 to 237, 13 July 2006","Price v. the United Kingdom, no. 33394\/96, \u00a7 24, ECHR 2001 VII","S.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60958\/00, \u00a7 29, ECHR 2004 IV","Sabri G\u00fcne\u015f v. Turkey, no. 27396\/06, \u00a7 29, 29 June 2012","Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, ECHR 2008","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII","Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC], no. 9154\/10, 15 December 2015","Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, ECHR 2006 II","Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7 201, ECHR 2012","Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724\/94, \u00a7 84, 16 December 1999","V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888\/94, \u00a7 86, ECHR 1999 IX","Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, \u00a7 157, ECHR 2009","Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979\/97, ECHR 2000 I","Wenerski v. Poland, no. 44369\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 56 to 65, 20 January 2009"],"28057":["Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008","Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2001-II","Enache v. Romania, no. 10662\/06, \u00a7 68, 1 April 2014","Gubin v. Russia, no. 8217\/04, \u00a7 56, 17 June 2010","Henaf v. France, no. 65436\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 50-53, ECHR 2003 XI","Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 117, 7 November 2006","Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, 29 November 2007","Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826\/03, \u00a7 94, 22 May 2012","Irakli Mindadze v. Georgia, no. 17012\/09, \u00a7 25, 11 December 2012","Kadi\u0137is v. Latvia (no. 2), no. 62393\/00, \u00a7 55, 4 May 2006","Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002 VI","Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2006-XII","Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847\/02, \u00a7 113, ECHR 2005 X (extracts)","Kleuver v. Norway (dec.), no. 45837\/99, 30 April 2002","McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, \u00a7 220, Series A no. 324","Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006","Okhrimenko v. Ukraine, no. 53896\/07, \u00a7 98, 15 October 2009","Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 211, 13 July 2006","Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 56, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 VIII","Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 155 and 156, 14 March 2013","Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4 October 2005","Stepuleac v. Moldova, no. 8207\/06, \u00a7 55, 6 November 2007","Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia, [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7 138, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no. 32362\/02, \u00a7 45, 20 May 2010","Vitkovskiy v. Ukraine, no. 24938\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 120 and 121, 26 September 2013","Vlasov v. Russia, no. 78146\/01, \u00a7 96, 12 June 2008","X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853\/09, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2013"],"28076":["Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457\/04, \u00a7 64, 27 November 2007","C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692\/05, 20 March 2012","Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810\/10, \u00a7 28, ECHR 2014","Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, \u00a7 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 I","K.U. v. Finland, no. 2872\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 45-49, ECHR 2008","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, ECHR 2003 XII","M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 22457\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 110, 15 November 2011","Remetin v. Croatia, no. 29525\/10, \u00a7 76, 11 December 2012","S\u00f6dermanv. Sweden, [GC], no. 5786\/08, ECHR 2013","Szula v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 18727\/06, 4 January 2007","X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91"],"28093":["A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 20, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VI","Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, Reports 1996 IV","B.S. v. Spain, no. 47159\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 59 63, 24 July 2012","Bayram and Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m v. Turkey (dec.), no. 38587\/97, ECHR 2002 III","Begheluri and Others v. Georgia, no. 28490\/02, 7 October 2014","Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, no. 15250\/02, \u00a7 70, ECHR 2005 XIII (extracts)","Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, ECHR 2015","Bucure\u015fteanu v. Romania, no. 20558\/04, \u00a7 42, 16 April 2013","C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 69-72, 20 March 2012","Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no 47848\/08, \u00a7 156, CEDH 2014","Ciorcan and Others v. Romania, nos. 29414\/09 and 44841\/09, 27 January 2015","Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 247 C","Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 98-100, 17 December 2009","Georgescu v. Romania (dec.), no. 4867\/03, \u00a7 25, 22 October 2013","Gherghina v. Romania (dec.) [GC], no. 42219\/07, 18 September 2015","Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 34529\/10, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2013 (extracts)","Identoba and Others v. Georgia, no. 73235\/12, 12 May 2015","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 167, Series A no. 25","Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7 68, ECHR 2006 IX","Kuri\u0107 and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828\/06, \u00a7 286, ECHR 2012 (extracts)","M. and M. v. Croatia, no. 10161\/13, \u00a7 131, 3 September 2015","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 149-151, ECHR 2003 XII","Manukyan v. Georgia (dec.), no. 53073\/07, \u00a7 33, 9 October 2012","McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 117 and 120, 10 September 2010","Mehmet Yaman v. Turkey, no. 36812\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 43-49, 24 February 2015","Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156\/01, 3 May 2007","Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Modinos v. Cyprus, 22 April 1993, Series A no. 259","Mudric v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 74839\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 60-64, 16 July 2013","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 160, ECHR 2005 VII","O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 192-198, ECHR 2009","Poede v. Romania, no. 40549\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 56-57, 15 September 2015","Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 32, Reports 1997 VIII","S\u00f6derman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786\/08, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2013","Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7 203, ECHR 2012","Stoica v. Romania, no. 42722\/02, \u00a7 67, 4 March 2008","Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 118 and 138, 17 July 2014","Tekpetek v. Turkey (dec.), no. 40314\/08, \u00a7 40, 25 November 2014","Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, ECHR 2009","Vartic v. Romania (dec.), no. 27631\/12, \u00a7 48, 52 and 53 6 May 2014","Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], no. 17153\/11 and 29 other cases, \u00a7\u00a7 69-77, 25 March 2014","W. v. Slovenia, no. 24125\/06, \u00a7 65, 23 January 2014"],"28096":["Abdu v. Bulgaria, no.  26827\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 23-31, 11 March 2014","Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, \u00a7 67, Series A no. 94","Aksu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 4149\/04 and 41029\/04, \u00a7 58, ECHR 2012","B.S. v. Spain, no. 47159\/08, \u00a7 41, 24 July 2012","Begheluri and Others v. Georgia, no. 28490\/02, \u00a7 100, 7 October 2014","Borb\u00e1la Kiss v. Hungary, no. 59214\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 25-26, 26 June 2012","Budayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 15339\/02, 21166\/02, 20058\/02, 11673\/02 and 15343\/02, \u00a7 110, ECHR 2008 (extracts)","Ciubotaru  v.  Moldova, no. 27138\/04, \u00a7 49, 27 April 2010","Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, \u00a7 36, Series A no. 247 C","\u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 41526\/10, ECHR 2012","East  African Asians v. United Kingdom, nos. 4403\/70 and others, Commission report of 14 December 1973, Decisions and Reports 78, pp.  57  and 62, \u00a7\u00a7 196 and 207","El Masri v. \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 196, ECHR 2012","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2010","Gubacsi v. Hungary, no. 44686\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 31-32, 28 June 2011","Hilal v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 45276\/99, 8 February 2000","Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi v. Hungary (dec.), no. 2351\/06, 9 November 2010","Identoba and Others v. Georgia, no. 73235\/12, \u00a7\u00a7  63-65, 12 May 2015","Ivan Vasilev v. Bulgaria, no. 48130\/99, \u00a7 56, 12 April 2007","Khan v. Germany, no. 38030\/12, \u00a7 35, 23 April 2015","Koky and Others v. Slovakia, no. 13624\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 223-25, 12 June 2012","Krumpel and Krumpelova v. Slovakia, no. 56195\/00, \u00a7 43, 5 July 2005","Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May  1998, \u00a7\u00a7 133-34, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000-IV","Matko v. Slovenia, no. 43393\/98, \u00a7 95, 2 November 2006","Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156\/01, 3 May 2007","Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), nos. 41138\/98 and 64320\/01, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2005-VII (extracts)","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, ECHR 2005 VII","Osman  v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 116, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII","P.F. and E.F. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28326\/09, 23 November 2010","S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562\/04 and 30566\/04, \u00a7 66, ECHR 2008","Sandra  Jankovi\u0107  v. Croatia, no. 38478\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 46-47, 5 March 2009","\u0160e\u010di\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 40116\/02, 31 May 2007","Selmouni v. France, [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 101, ECHR 1999-V","Tavl\u0131 v. Turkey, no. 11449\/02, 9 November 2006","Tyrer  v. United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, \u00a7 33, Series A no. 26"],"28107":[""],"28119":[""],"28146":[""],"28162":[""],"28152":[""],"28175":["Ahmet \u00d6zkan and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689\/93, \u00a7 426, 6 April 2004","Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008","Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857\/13, 27 November 2014","Arutyunyan v. Russia, no. 48977\/09, 10 January 2012","Buldashev v. Russia, no. 46793\/06, 18 October 2011","Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012","Castravet v. Moldova, no. 23393\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 30 and 32, 13 March 2007","Engel v. Hungary, no. 46857\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 27 and 30, 20 May 2010","Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, \u00a7 56, 2 December 2004","Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21 December 2010","Goral v. Poland, no. 38654\/97, \u00a7 68, 30 October 2003","Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 121, 7 November 2006","Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, 29 November 2007","Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826\/03, 22 May 2012","Igor Ivanov v. Russia, no. 34000\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 34 35, 7 June 2007","Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 84-85, 26 July 2001","Jab\u0142o\u0144ski v. Poland, no. 33492\/96, \u00a7 83, 21 December 2000","Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744\/08, \u00a7 59, 21 December 2010","Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI","Kaprykowski v. Poland, no. 23052\/05, \u00a7 74, 3 February 2009","Khatayev v. Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011","Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)","Korchuganova v. Russia, no. 75039\/01, \u00a7 72, 8 June 2006","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000 XI","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, ECHR 2000-IV","Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, \u00a7 51, Series A no. 207","McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543\/03, \u00a7 41, ECHR 2006-X","Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006","Meln\u012btis v. Latvia, no. 30779\/05, \u00a7 69, 28 February 2012","Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108\/11, 5 February 2013","Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, \u00a7 4, Series A no. 8","Panchenko v. Russia, no. 45100\/98, \u00a7 102, 8 February 2005","Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, 13 July 2006","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III","Rokhlina v. Russia, no. 54071\/00, \u00a7 67, 7 April 2005","Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4 October 2005","Semikhvostov v. Russia, no. 2689\/12, \u00a7 85, 6 February 2014","Shishkov v. Bulgaria, no. 38822\/97, \u00a7 66, ECHR 2003-I","Sopin v. Russia, no. 57319\/10, 18 December 2012","Suslov v. Russia, no. 2366\/07, \u00a7 86, 29 May 2012","Tarariyeva v. Russia, no. 4353\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 112-117, ECHR 2006 XV (extracts)","Verbin\u0163 v. Romania, no. 7842\/04, \u00a7 63, 3 April 2012","Vincent v. France, no. 6253\/03, \u00a7 103, 24 October 2006","Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011","Yevgeniy Bogdanov v. Russia, no. 22405\/04, \u00a7 103, 26 February 2015","Z.H. v. Hungary, no. 28937\/11, \u00a7 29, 8 November 2012"],"28187":[""],"28209":[""],"28211":[""],"28217":[""],"28218":["B. v. Romania, no. 42390\/07, 10 January 2012","I.G. v. Moldova, no. 53519\/07, \u00a7 40, 15 May 2012","Juppala v. Finland, no. 18620\/03, \u00a7 42, 2 December 2008","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, 4 December 2003"],"28245":[""],"28259":[""],"28276":[""],"28304":[""],"28310":[""],"28323":[""],"28322":[""],"28341":[""],"28376":[""],"28381":[""],"28404":["Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 127, Reports 1996 V","Dalban v. Romania [GC], no 28114\/95, \u00a7 44, ECHR 1999 VI","Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, no 15297\/09, 13 December 2011","Keegan v. Ireland, 26 May 1994, \u00a7 49, Series A no 290","Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, Series A no 31","Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, no 13178\/03, ECHR 2006 XI","Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, no 41442\/07, 19 January 2010","Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no 41615\/07, \u00a7 135, ECHR 2010","Popov v. France, nos. 39472\/07 and 39474\/07, 19 January 2012","Rahimi v. Greece, no 8687\/08, 5 April 2011","Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 55, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII","S.D. v. Greece, no 53541\/07, \u00a7 72, 11 June 2009","Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, \u00a7 88, Series A no 161","Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no 76240\/01, \u00a7 120, 28 June 2007","Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, \u00a7 37, Series A no 33","Witold Litwa v. Poland, no 26629\/95, \u00a7 78, ECHR 2000 III"],"28437":[""],"28439":["Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, 19 February 1998, \u00a7 45, Reports 1998 I","Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 98, Reports 1996-V","Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden (dec.), no. 23944\/05, 8 March 2007","D.N.W. v. Sweden, no. 29946\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 42 and 45, 6 December 2012","F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611\/11, ECHR 2016","F.H. v. Sweden, no. 32621\/06, \u00a7 102, 20 January 2009","H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 III","Hilal v. the United Kingdom, no. 45276\/99, ECHR 2001-II","Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 116, ECHR 2012","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000 IV","M.A. v. Cyprus, no. 41872\/10, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2013 (extracts)","M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 286, ECHR 2011","M\u00fcslim v. Turkey, no. 53566\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 72-76, 26 April 2005","N. v. Finland, no. 38885\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 154-155, 26 July 2005","NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, 17 July 2008","Nizamov and Others v. Russia, nos. 22636\/13, 24034\/13, 24334\/13 and 24528\/13, \u00a7 50, 7 May 2014","R.C. v. Sweden, no. 41827\/07, \u00a7 55, 9 March 2010","R.J. v. France, no. 10466\/11, \u00a7 42, 19 September 2013","S.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 19956\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 69-71, 15 June 2010","S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60367\/10, \u00a7 71, 29 January 2013","Saadi v. Italy [GC] no. 37201\/06, ECHR 2008","Said v. the Netherlands, no. 2345\/02, \u00a7 49, ECHR 2005 VI","Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948\/04, 11 January 2007","Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, 28 June 2011","T.I. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 43844\/98, ECHR 2000-III","Venkadajalasarma v. the Netherlands, no. 58510\/00, \u00a7 63, 17 February 2004"],"28447":[""]},"fact":{"27237":["5.The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Kriva Palanka.","A.The applicant\u2019s transfer to Bardovci hospital on 29 October 2009","6.On 24 April 2009 the applicant was operated on for stomach cancer and subsequently underwent chemotherapy.","7.On 29 October 2009 she had been feeling anxious and distressed, and her husband requested medical assistance from Kriva Palanka hospital (110 km from Skopje). Dr M., a general practitioner, gave an instruction that the applicant was to be transferred to a psychiatric clinic in Skopje. Dr C.T., a specialist in neuropsychiatry in Kriva Palanka hospital, also gave instructions for her to be transferred to that clinic with police assistance.","8.Still on 29 October, at around 5 pm., an ambulance arrived at the applicant\u2019s house in the village of Uzem. Two police officers, who were later identified as M.N. and I.A. in the subsequent criminal proceedings, assisted with the applicant\u2019s transfer to the Bardovci psychiatric hospital in Skopje, where she remained until 31 October 2009.","9.The relevant parts of a notice of her discharge, dated 2November 2009 from Bardovci hospital provide as follows:","\u201c[This is the] first admission of (the applicant) to this hospital; it was carried out with the assistance of the police from Kriva Palanka.","According to the limited information obtained from (the applicant\u2019s) husband by telephone, (it is known) that since summer this year, when she was diagnosed with and treated for stomach cancer, (the applicant) had become ... melancholic, lethargic, and had threatened with committing suicide.","When admitted, [the applicant] was malnourished, dehydrated, and had several haematomas of different sizes, most probably of recent date (\u043d\u0430\u0458\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0458\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e \u043e\u0434 \u043f\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0432 \u0434\u0430\u0442\u0443\u043c) ... Concerning her psychological state she was depressed, anxious, tearful, and fixated on her poor state of health (cancer) ...she was burdened with depressive ideas and had a paranoid attitude towards her husband, which may be well-founded ...","She is discharged without having been examined or treated, at her husband\u2019s request.\u201d","10.Following her discharge from the hospital in Skopje, the applicant was on the same day admitted to the Kriva Palanka hospital. A handwritten medical certificate was issued and entered in the hospital\u2019s records under no. 2131. At the applicant\u2019s request a transcript of this certificate was made by Dr G.S. The relevant parts of this certificate state that:","\u201c[According to the applicant] she was handcuffed by the police during her transfer to Bardovci psychiatric hospital, as instructed by a doctor. Objectively: haematoma measuring 2 x 6 cm on both forearms around the wrist joints; 3 hematomas measuring 1 x 2 cm on both lower legs. On the right hip, (a haematoma) measuring 1 x 2 cm.","Regarding these injuries, [the applicant] says that they were inflicted by kicks and blows.\u201d","11.Still on 31 October 2009 the applicant was also examined by Doctor M. (see paragraph 7 above). The relevant parts of the medical certificate issued on that date read as follows:","\u201cOn 29 October 2009 at about 5 pm., on a request by (the applicant\u2019s) husband and as suggested in (a neuropsychiatric opinion), the patient was transported to Skopje psychiatric clinic. The applicant states that she was abused during the transfer: she was hit and punched on the legs, [a third person] sat on her legs, and her hands were handcuffed behind her back. When she arrived she was treated violently by hospital staff.","When examined ... [the following] is observed: [she] is upset; a haematoma and a scratch on the lower legs, thus 4-5 scratches on the right side measuring 1 x 2 cm; on the left side 4-5 (scratches) measuring 1 x 2 cm and 2 x 2 cm; haematomas and (two) scratches on the stomach measuring 3 x 1 cm; 5 scratches on the back measuring 5 x 6 cm; some small haematomas ...","The patient has visible injuries caused by a trauma, namely hitting and punching.","Opinion: light bodily injury.\u201d","12.On 15 February 2010 Doctor M. issued a certificate that on 29October 2009 the applicant had been examined and that an instruction had been given for her to be transferred to Skopje psychiatric clinic.","13.In support of the application before the Court, the applicant provided four photographs of her, showing the following injuries: five scratches on the lower and middle part of the back; two scratches and a haematoma on her stomach, and several haematomas on the lower legs.","B.Police reports regarding information obtained from third parties","1.Statement by S.V., a doctor at Kriva Palanka hospital","14.On 21 November 2009 the police drew up an official note (\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0448\u043a\u0430) regarding information obtained from Dr S.V. As indicated in the note, S.V. decided, \u201cfor the sake of truth\u201d, to provide relevant information in reaction to a television interview broadcasted on 3November 2009 in which the applicant had stated that she was ill-treated by police officers during her transfer to Bardovci hospital. During the interview she showed the injuries that she had allegedly sustained. The relevant parts of the note read as follows:","\u201c... I want to say that on 27 October 2009 at 9 pm., I was called, through the duty medical centre of Kriva Palanka hospital, to intervene in an urgent case reported by (the applicant\u2019s) husband. I arrived at a pensioners\u2019 home in Kriva Palanka, where (the applicant and her husband) were waiting. (The husband) told me that (the applicant) had injured herself, namely that she had hit her body and head against a wall and a bed; her face was covered with blood, and there was blood on the floor in front of the door. That suggested that she had had a nervous breakdown, for which I prescribed treatment.","In my opinion and in view of the foregoing, it is most likely that the injuries she showed to the cameras were self-inflicted on the date indicated above, which was when I intervened.\u201d","2.Statement by L.S., a neighbour of the applicant","15.On 3 December 2009 L.S. provided information to the police in relation to media statements by the applicant and her husband that the applicant had been ill-treated by the police. L.S. stated that the applicant\u2019s husband had beaten the applicant on three occasions (she did not specify the exact dates when the alleged beatings had happened, but she confirmed that it had been on \u201cthe nights of Thursday, Friday and Saturday\u201d). She further stated:","\u201cDuring the Sunday night two women, most likely journalists, visited [the applicant\u2019s husband]. On the Tuesday [the applicant\u2019s husband] invited residents to watch on television \u2018how do the police from Kriva Palanka work. I put them in a mould; I\u2019ll take a lot of money from them\u2019.","I personally believe that [the applicant\u2019s] injuries were inflicted by [her husband] who, while intoxicated, beats her up every day in front of their children.\u201d","16.The note further indicated that four individuals (whose identity was specified), together with other residents in the building in which the applicant lived, could be interviewed regarding the case.","3.A letter regarding L.S.\u2019s statement","17.On 11 January 2010 the police informed the applicant\u2019s husband that on 3 December 2009 L.S. had made a complaint against him, and that an official note had been drawn up. As stated in the letter, both the applicant\u2019s husband and L.S. had been advised to stop arguing in future. The letter further indicated that L.S. had been warned that in the event of false reporting a misdemeanour complaint would be lodged against her.","C.Criminal proceedings instituted by the applicant","18.In submissions of 27 January and 18 February 2010 the applicant brought criminal charges of medical malpractice against Dr C.T. alleging that he had instructed her to undergo a psychiatric examination without examining her, against V.S., a nurse who had accompanied the applicant during her transfer to Skopje (she had been sitting in the front passenger seat), and against M.N. and I.A., the police officers, for inflicting ill-treatment and mild bodily injury. She alleged that on 29 October 2009 she had been distressed. In the circumstances, her husband had gone to Kriva Palanka hospital, where Dr C.T. had decided that she be transferred to Skopje psychiatric clinic with assistance from the police. Doctor M. had also issued a recommendation in this respect (see paragraph 7 above). The applicant claimed, inter alia, that M.N. and I.A. had forcibly put her in the ambulance, stating that they had grabbed her arms and dragged her to the ambulance, ignoring her cries of pain from the surgery. After she had been put in the ambulance, she had been forcibly made to lie on a bed with her hands handcuffed behind her back. I.A. sat on her legs. They had gone, firstly, to Kriva Palanka hospital where Dr C.T. had given instructions, by telephone, to V.S. to administer an injection. The applicant alleged that on the way to Skopje she had been hit, punched and threatened by the police officers. As a result, she had \u201cseveral injuries (haematomas) all over the body and limbs and five to seven marks on the back from the handcuffs, of which I have photographs\u201d. In support of her complaint she attached medical certificates (see paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 above).","19.On 31 March 2010 the public prosecutor contacted the Ministry of the Interior with a request for further information regarding the incident. In reply, on 26 May 2010 the Sector for Internal Control and Professional Standards within the Ministry of the Interior submitted a \u201cspecial report\u201d regarding the case. It referred to statements (which it submitted in support) which Dr C.T., the applicant and her husband had given to the police between 13 and 15 April 2010.","20.Dr C.T. confirmed that on 29 October 2009 the applicant\u2019s husband had told him that they lived in the pensioners\u2019 home in Kriva Palanka; that the applicant\u2019s mental health was poor; that she had arrived at their family house in the village of Uzem (see paragraph 8 above) without his consent; that she had broken a window to get in; that she had been aggressive and was capable of killing herself, their children or himself; that she had been uncooperative; and that she had refused to sleep or eat.","21.In the statement, the applicant\u2019s husband confirmed that the applicant\u2019s mental health had deteriorated since the stomach surgery, and that he had explained \u201cher condition\u201d to the doctors M. and C.T. during his visit of 29 October 2009. He also informed the police officers M.N. and I.A. about her state of health while he was in the ambulance with them on the way to their family house. When they got to the house he had asked the police officers to wait outside so that he could explain to the applicant that she was going to be taken to a psychiatric hospital. When the police officers had entered the house their children had started crying and putting their arms around the applicant. The police officers had forcibly separated the children from the applicant; they had grabbed her by the arms and dragged her (while she was on her knees) towards the door. After the situation had calmed down and in order not to harm the applicant, he had taken her by the legs, and he and the police officers had taken her to the front of the ambulance. Then the police officers had put her in the ambulance; they had handcuffed her hands behind her back and made her lie on a bed. To keep her still, I.A. had sat on her legs. The police officers had remained with the applicant in the rear of the ambulance, while V.S. had sat in the front passenger seat. While he had been occupied with the children in the house, the ambulance had left the scene. The next day he had found out that the applicant had been taken to Bardovci hospital; he went there, but no visits were allowed that day.","22.In depositions made on 15 April 2010 the applicant confirmed that on 29 October 2009 she had consented to be taken to Skopje psychiatric clinic; that the police officers had grabbed her hands and dragged her; that before she got into the ambulance M.N. had hit her on the back with a baton; and that her husband had helped M.N. and I.A. to bring her to the front of the ambulance. She also stated that no infusion or injection had been administered when they had stopped at Kriva Palanka hospital; that during the transfer to Skopje hospital (the ambulance had been driven at excessive speed) her hands had been handcuffed behind her back; that I.A. had been sitting on her legs and that she (I.A.) had hit her on the legs and head with a truncheon; that M.N. had grabbed her hair and had tightened up the handcuffs; that both M.N. and I.A. had punched her and hurt her legs. When she was admitted to Bardovci hospital she was bleeding and had bruises.","23.The \u201cspecial report\u201d of the Ministry further referred to statements given by doctors S.V. and L.S. (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). It also specified that the police officers concerned had denied that they had used any force against the applicant, and that the applicant had used offensive language against them and had been screaming loudly. The record also stated that V.S. (the nurse) and J.D. (the driver of the ambulance), had also denied that the police officers had used any force against the applicant. The report went on to state:","\u201cwhen (the police officers) arrived at (the applicant\u2019s) house, they were warned by the (applicant\u2019s) husband to be cautious because Marina had a knife with which she might assault them. For that reason, he proposed going into the house first to tell (the applicant) that she was going to be taken to Skopje for medical treatment. After five minutes, (the applicant\u2019s husband) went out and called (the police officers) into the house. The police officers went in and told Marina that they would have to transfer her by ambulance to a health institution in Skopje. In response to that, Marina said to (her husband): do I deserve this from you, being taken for medical treatment; I do not belong there, you should go there because you are drunk every day and you constantly abuse and hit me and the children; I\u2019m covered in bruises because of you ...","Throughout the journey, (the applicant) used offensive language against the police officers and the nurse, she [the applicant] was very aggressive and angry, and she was screaming loudly and trying to hurt herself by hitting her head against the window of the ambulance. The police officers and the nurse had been forced during the entire transfer to hold her hands in order to prevent her from hurting herself or some of them\u201d.","24.On 8 June 2010 the Kriva Palanka public prosecutor\u2019s office, referring to the Ministry\u2019s \u201cspecial report\u201d and the discharge notice from Bardovci hospital, rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint against the accused (the decision noted that the nurse V.S. had died in the meantime), finding that the alleged offences were not subject to State prosecution. On 14June2010 the applicant, in the capacity of a subsidiary prosecutor, took over the prosecution and brought private charges before the Kriva Palanka Court of First Instance (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) on the same charges as above (see paragraph 18 above).","25.On 6 October 2010 the trial court heard Dr C.T., M.N., I.A., the applicant, who was not legally represented, and her husband. According to the transcript of the court hearing, Dr C.T.\u2019s statement was consistent with the statements he had made to the police (see paragraph 20 above).","26.The relevant parts of M.N.\u2019s statement, as described in the court record, read as follows:","\u201c(the applicant\u2019s husband) arrived at the police station and said in front of colleagues and himself (M.N.) that he had been afraid that something could happen to his children or (to the applicant), because, when she had gone to Uzem she had taken a knife and a telephone wire; they went by ambulance to Uzem ... [when they went into the house] (the applicant) became upset and grabbed one of the minor children in her arms; (the applicant\u2019s) husband took the child away, and because she did not want to get into the vehicle he (M.N.) took her arms and her husband took her legs and they put her in the ambulance.\u201d","27.I.A. confirmed M.N.\u2019s statement, and stated that she had held the applicant down with her hands to prevent her from standing up. Both M.N. and I.A. denied that they had used force or handcuffs against the applicant. They also stated that a tranquilliser had been administered to the applicant before they had left for Skopje.","28.The applicant objected to the defendants\u2019 statements. She further denied that her husband had helped the police officers to take her to the ambulance; on the other hand, she reiterated that the police officers had grabbed her and put her into the ambulance; that she had been handcuffed, and that M.N. had hit her with a truncheon; that I.A. had sat on her legs during the transfer; that I.A. had held her mouth closed to stop her talking, and had hit and punched her.","29.The applicant\u2019s husband confirmed that he had requested that DrC.T. give an instruction for the applicant to have treatment. When the applicant had refused to get into the ambulance the police officers had grabbed her by the arms and dragged her towards the ambulance. In order not to hurt her, he had grabbed the applicant by the legs and put her in the vehicle. M.N. had handcuffed the applicant. The applicant\u2019s husband denied saying that the applicant had a knife and a wire.","30.On 6 October 2010 the trial court delivered a judgment acquitting C.T., M.N. and I.A. for lack of evidence. It also discontinued the proceedings against V.S. The trial court established that:","\u201cThe accused doctor C.T. ... acted conscientiously and in accordance with his duty, and at the request of [the applicant\u2019s] husband who had informed him about [the applicant\u2019s] condition, he provided appropriate treatment; he drew up a report and instructed that she be transferred with police assistance to Skopje psychiatric clinic. [The applicant] was not examined by a specialist (\u043d\u0435 \u0438 \u0431\u0438\u043b \u0438\u0437\u0432\u0440\u0448\u0435\u043d \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043a\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0433\u043b\u0435\u0434) because she was brought [to the hospital] outside working hours (and) [Dr C.T.] was far away from the office; after [V.S.] had told him by telephone about [the applicant\u2019s] condition, he instructed that a tranquilliser injection be given and that [the applicant] be transported to Skopje. The accused M.N. and I.A., police officers in Kriva Palanka police station called to provide assistance during [the applicant\u2019s] transfer by ambulance to Skopje psychiatric clinic, acted professionally and in accordance with the law and their powers; they did not use any physical force against the applicant and they did not inflict any injuries on her.","The court established the above on the basis of evidence admitted at the trial, namely: oral evidence from the accused, who did not admit the alleged criminal offences, as well as the material evidence from the case file ... of the Kriva Palanka prosecutor\u2019s office which ... [on the basis of the Ministry\u2019s special report] rejected [the applicant\u2019s] criminal complaint ...","All these items of evidence are clear, undisputable, categorical, and inter-related; there is no reason for the court to question their reliability ... relying on [this evidence] the court delivers judgment, finding that [the evidence] does not prove that the accused committed the criminal offences with which they are charged.","The court examined [the applicant\u2019s] statement that ... the police officers had dragged her into the ambulance; that she had been handcuffed, and that M.N. had hit her with a truncheon ... that during the transfer she had been restrained with handcuffs; that police officer I.A. had been sitting on her legs and had closed her mouth to stop her talking; and (that I.A.) had hit and punched her ...","The court examined the statement of [the applicant\u2019s husband] that ... the police officers had grabbed [the applicant] by the arms and dragged her towards the ambulance, and in order not to hurt her, because she had recently had surgery, he had taken her legs and helped to put her in the ambulance; that police officer M.N. had put her head between her legs and had handcuffed her ...","The court examined evidence submitted with the criminal complaints (medical reports described in paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 above), and photographs, but they did not contain anything that could lead to a different assessment of the facts from that established [by the court]. (This evidence) is medical evidence, on the basis of which the court established that there had been an instruction for the applicant to be treated at Skopje psychiatric clinic, and a medical certificate had been issued for the visible injuries that she had; that on 29 October 2009 she had been admitted to (Bardovci) hospital; that (at that time) she had been depressed and had a depressive and paranoid attitude towards her husband; that [she] had several haematomas of recent date ... four photographs showed bruises and scratches on her legs and body.","It is undisputed that owing to [the applicant\u2019s] condition she needed to be transferred for treatment with assistance from the police; this was also what her husband had asked for. She was admitted to an appropriate institution for treatment and was then discharged at the request of her husband; the injuries described in the medical certificate and visible in the photographs \u2013 a haematoma and scratches, which were noted in the discharge notice upon [the applicant\u2019s] admission, were of recent date. However, this evidence cannot lead to a conclusion that [the injuries] were inflicted during the transfer, namely on the day when [the applicant] was transferred by ambulance with assistance from the police.\u201d","31.The applicant appealed against the judgment and reiterated her argument that she had been ill-treated, and complained that Dr C.T. and M.N. had given false statements; that the trial court\u2019s judgment had been delivered after the trial court had held only one hearing; and that her husband had not given oral evidence before the trial court.","32.On 15 December 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the facts established and the reasoning given by the trial court. The court reiterated that on the basis of a request by the applicant\u2019s husband and in view of the applicant\u2019s state of health Dr C.T. had correctly ordered urgent medical treatment with police assistance. The fact that the applicant had been hospitalised in Bardovci hospital instead of in Skopje psychiatric clinic, as instructed by Dr C.T., was irrelevant, as the medical care she had received was appropriate. The court confirmed that the police officers had acted in accordance with the law and their duties as police officers.","33.On 9 March 2011 the public prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for lodging a request for review of the legality of the judgments.","34.According to the applicant, she has never suffered from any mental disorder, nor was she receiving any medical treatment in that respect."],"27248":["5.With the exception of the first applicant, a legal entity registered under Georgian law on 8 November 2010, the remaining fourteen applicants live in Tbilisi. Their dates of birth are indicated in the attached annex.","A.Peaceful demonstration of 17 May 2012","1.Prior arrangements","6.The first applicant, a Georgian non-governmental organisation set up to promote and protect the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people in Georgia, planned to organise a peaceful march on 17May 2012 in the centre of the capital city to mark the International Day Against Homophobia.","7.In advance of the march, on 8 May 2012 the first applicant gave the Tbilisi City Hall and the Ministry of the Interior prior notice of its intention to hold a peaceful demonstration on the above-mentioned date. It informed the authorities of the planned route of the march, which would start from the grounds of the Tbilisi Concert Hall and proceed to Orbeliani Square, and the approximate number of participants. In addition, in the light of a foreseeable protest from those opposed to the LGBT community in Georgia, given the general background of hostility towards the sexual minorities, the applicant organisation specifically requested that the authorities provide sufficient protection from possible violence.","8.On 14 May 2012 the Tbilisi City Hall acknowledged receipt of the first applicant\u2019s request and explained, in reply, the rights and responsibilities of demonstrators, as provided for by the relevant law.","9.On 15 May 2012 the applicant organisation was contacted by a senior officer of the Ministry of the Interior, who clarified the details of the planned march and confirmed to the organiser that police forces would be deployed to ensure that the procession took place peacefully.","2.Clashes with counter-demonstrators","10.The second to fourteenth applicants submitted written statements describing the exact circumstances surrounding the incident.At around 1p.m. on 17 May 2012, members of the LGBT community, staff members of Identoba and other LGBT activists, including the thirteen above\u2011mentioned applicants \u2013 approximately thirty people in total (\u201cthe LGBT marchers\u201d) \u2013 gathered in the grounds adjacent to the Tbilisi Concert Hall. They were holding banners with slogans such as \u201cI am gay\u201d, \u201cI love my gay friend\u201d, \u201cLove is love\u201d and \u201cGet colourful\u201d, as well as rainbow flags and umbrellas. A police patrol was present, as agreed, near the Tbilisi Concert Hall.","11.Shortly before the beginning of the demonstration, members of two religious groups, the Orthodox Parents\u2019 Union and the Saint King Vakhtang Gorgasali\u2019s Brotherhood, arrived in the Tbilisi Concert Hall area. Journalists were also present, recording interviews with the LGBT marchers.","12.Approximately 200 metres from the starting point of the march, members of the two above-mentioned religious groups (\u201cthe counter\u2011demonstrators\u201d) stopped some of the LGBT marchers and started arguing with them. The counter-demonstrators claimed that nobody was entitled to hold a Gay Pride Parade or to promote \u201cperversion\u201d, as it was against moral values and Georgian traditions. In reply, the marchers tried calmly to explain that it was not a Gay Pride Parade but a public event dedicated to supporting the fight against homophobia, and continued to walk.","13.When the LGBT marchers reached Rustaveli Avenue, they were met there by a hundred or more counter-demonstrators, who were particularly aggressive and verbally offensive. The counter-demonstrators blocked the marchers\u2019 way, made a human chain and encircled the marchers in such a way as to make it impossible for them to pass. The marchers were subjected to threats of physical assault and to insults, accused of being \u201csick\u201d and \u201cimmoral\u201d people and \u201cperverts\u201d. Further pejorative name-calling such as \u201cfagots\u201d and \u201csinners\u201d was also repeated. At that moment, the police patrol cars which had been escorting the marchers from the Tbilisi City Hall suddenly distanced themselves from the scene.","14.The LGBT marchers, feeling threatened, immediately telephoned the police, alerting them to the danger and requesting the immediate dispatch of additional forces. While waiting for the arrival of the requested police support, the marchers noticed a few police officers present at the scene. However, when they approached them and asked for help, the officers replied that they were not part of the police patrol and it was not their duty to intervene.","15.The aggression towards the LGBT marchers continued to escalate and after approximately twenty to thirty minutes, the counter-demonstrators grabbed the banners from the hands of several activists and tore them apart. The counter-demonstrators then resorted to physical attack by pushing and punching the marchers in the front row. As a result of that assault, the sixth applicant (Mr G. Demetrashvili), who was in the front line of the march, was knocked down, beaten and kicked. Shortly afterwards, several police patrol cars arrived at the scene. Some of the law-enforcement officers intervened by stopping the beating of the sixth applicant. The police officers then separated the opposing parties by standing between them. At that time, the aggressive and agitated counter-demonstrators were still making particularly vitriolic threats, including that the marchers \u201cshould be burnt to death\u201d and \u201ccrushed\u201d.","16.The third applicant (Mr L. Berianidze), who was standing on the pavement with other LGBT marchers, asked the police to take more active measures to protect the demonstration. The police responded by forcing him into a patrol car and driving him to the Old Tbilisi Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior, where he was detained for some twenty minutes. He was given no official explanation for his arrest at that time. However, as subsequently explained by the Government, the police had simply sought to distance him from the scene in order to protect him from the angry counter-demonstrators.","17.Three other employees of Identoba \u2013 the sixth, seventh and tenth applicants (Mr G. Demetrashvili, Ms G. Dzerkorashvili and MsM Kalandadze) \u2013 were also arrested by the police when they moved from the pavement to the road. They were forced into police patrol cars and driven around the city for some twenty minutes before being returned to Rustaveli Avenue. As subsequently explained by the Government, the aim of the applicants\u2019 short-term retention was twofold: to prevent them from committing an administrative offence \u2013 impeding road traffic \u2013 and to protect them from the counter-demonstrators\u2019 assault.","18.Later on 17 May 2012, the third and sixth applicants (MrL.Berianidze and Mr G. Demetrashvili) sought medical help for their injuries. The third applicant had a bruised left knee, grazes on his left palm and fingers, a haemorrhagic forearm and a haematoma on the right eyebrow. The sixth applicant had a closed head trauma, cerebral contusions, and bruises on the left side of his chest. Two days later, on 19 May 2012, the fourteenth applicant (Ms M. Tsutskiridze) also visited a doctor. She was diagnosed with a contusion of the left wrist.","19.The clashes between the marchers and counter-demonstrators were recorded by journalists present at the scene and broadcast in the evening of 17 May 2012 by a number of national television channels. The faces of the applicants who had been attacked and the assailing counter-demonstrators were clearly recognisable.","B.Subsequent investigation","20.On 18 May 2012 members of the board of the applicant organisation filed several complaints with the Ministry of the Interior and the Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office concerning the violent acts committed during the march of 17 May 2012 by representatives of the two religious groups. The complaints were mostly based on the account of the circumstances as described in the thirteen individual applicants\u2019 written statements (see paragraphs 10-19 above).","21.On 19 May 2012 a criminal investigation was launched into the infliction of light bodily harm on the fourteenth applicant (MsM.Tsutskiridze) by unidentified persons. When questioned as a witness the same day, she stated that unidentified men had grabbed her poster and hit her with the handle of the poster. On 23 May 2012 the eighth applicant (Ms E. Glakhashvili) was also questioned about the fourteenth applicant\u2019s injury to her hand. Subsequently, on 21 June 2012 a forensic medical examination was commissioned by the investigation, the results of which suggested that the bruising and excoriation the fourteenth applicant had sustained on her wrist represented light bodily injuries. The fourteenth applicant was not granted victim status within the framework of that criminal investigation at that time.","22.On 26 June 2012 the first applicant received a letter from the deputy director of the police patrol department of the Ministry of the Interior in response to the board members\u2019 complaints of 18 May 2012. The response stated that, as there were no signs of illegality in the actions of the police during the demonstration, there was no need to launch an investigation against them for abuse of power. As to the counter-demonstrators\u2019 actions, two of them had indeed been arrested for transgression under Article 166 of the Code of Administrative Offences \u2013 minor breach of public order \u2013 and fined 100 Georgian laris (some 45 euros (EUR)) each.","23.On 3 and 5 July 2012 the first applicant and thirteen individual applicants in the present case (from the second to the fourteenth) filed additional criminal complaints with the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Minister of the Interior. The applicants specifically requested that criminal investigations be launched on account of two factual situations: firstly, the verbal and physical attacks perpetrated against them by the counter-demonstrators with clear discriminatory intent; and, secondly, the acts and\/or omissions of the police officers who had failed to protect them from the assaults. The applicants emphasised that criminal inquiries should be conducted with due regard to Article 53 of the Criminal Code, which provided that the existence of homophobic intent was an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a criminal offence.","24.The criminal complaints of the third, sixth, seventh and tenth applicants focussed on the attacks against them by the counter\u2011demonstrators and the lack of police protection. Those applicants did not request an inquiry into the alleged restriction of their liberty by the police during the incident of 17 May 2012 (Article 147 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 33 below).","25.By a letter of 17 July 2012, the Ministry of the Interior replied to the first applicant and the relevant thirteen individual applicants that during the incident of 17 May 2012 the police had called upon both the LGBT marchers and the counter-demonstrators to exercise their right to demonstrate in a peaceful manner. The Ministry\u2019s letter then reiterated the information concerning the imposition of administrative sanctions on two of the counter-demonstrators (see paragraph 22 above).","26.On 24 October 2012 a criminal investigation was opened into the alleged beating of the sixth applicant (Mr G. Demetrashvili) by unidentified persons on 17 May 2012. On the same day that applicant was interviewed as a witness. He stated that he had been encircled and insulted by five or six counter-demonstrators. The attackers then started kicking and hitting him. The ill-treatment lasted for a few minutes, until a police officer finally intervened and removed him from the scene. On 6 November 2012 a forensic medical expert issued an opinion confirming that the sixth applicant had sustained a contusion and closed head trauma. He was not granted victim status at that time.","27.In September 2014 the two counter-demonstrators who had previously been fined for administrative misconduct were examined as witnesses in relation to the beating of the sixth applicant.The latter, questioned again in September 2014 about the incident of 17 May 2012, stated that he could no longer remember certain circumstances due to the significant lapse of time. Nevertheless, he confirmed that he would still be able to recognise the faces of those individuals who had assaulted him.","28.According to the latest information available in the case file, the two criminal investigations opened on 19 May and 24 October 2012 into the light bodily injuries sustained by the sixth and fourteenth applicants are still pending, and the two applicants have never been granted victim status."],"27268":["A.The applicant\u2019s name and nationality","9.The applicant, Mr Lutpiddin Bakhritdinovich Mukhitdinov (a.k.a. Sattarov, see below), was born in 1967 in the Uzbek SSR of the USSR. He claims to have lived in Uzbekistan until 1992 when he left for Saudi Arabia.","10.Since 1997 the applicant has been living in Russia. In 2001, he acquired Russian nationality and changed his name to Sattarov.","11.On 7 May 2013 the Tyumen division of the Federal Migration Service determined that the applicant had obtained Russian nationality by fraud and cancelled his Russian passport. On 25 December 2013 the Tyumen Regional Court upheld, in the final instance, the decision of the Migration Service.","12.According to the letter from the police chief in Namangan, Uzbekistan, dated 8 April 2013, the applicant forfeited his Uzbek nationality because of his unaccounted absence from the country for more than fiveyears.","B.The charges against the applicant in Uzbekistan","13.On 7 May 1998 a criminal case was instituted against the applicant in Uzbekistan on the charge of illegal crossing of the Uzbek State border, an offence under Article 223 of the Uzbek Criminal Code.","14.On 15 December 2009 further charges were levelled against the applicant under Article 159 \u00a73 of the Uzbek Criminal Code (\u201cInfringement of the constitutional order of Uzbekistan\u201d) and Article242\u00a71 (\u201cOrganisation of a criminal enterprise\u201d). The charges related to the applicant\u2019s alleged participation in the religious terrorist organisation The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Wahhabii); he was suspected of meeting with its representatives during his stay in Saudi Arabia and of spreading the ideas of the organisation.","15.On 16 December 2009 the Namangan Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant.","C.The extradition proceedings in Russia","16.On 30 June 2013 the applicant was arrested in Tyumen, Russia.","17.On 2 July 2013 the Kalininskiy District Court of Tyumen issued a detention order valid until 30 July 2013. On the latter date the District Court extended the authorised detention period until 30 December 2013. The extension was upheld by the Tyumen Regional Court on 15 August 2013.","18.On 11 December 2013 the Russian Prosecutor General approved the applicant\u2019s extradition in relation to the offence of organising, and taking part in, the activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an extremist organisation (Article 244-2 \u00a7 1 of the Uzbek Criminal Code). It was noted that \u201cthe [applicant\u2019s] extradition ... in relation to the extremist charges ... cannot be regarded as an obstacle for extradition since no procedural decision was taken in this respect by the competent Russian authorities\u201d and further that the Uzbek authorities had provided \u201cdiplomatic assurances that [the applicant] ... would not be subject to torture, violence, other cruel or degrading treatment\u201d.","19.On 26 December 2013 the District Court approved a further extension of the detention period until 30 March 2014. The applicant challenged the extension before the Regional Court, claiming that the maximum detention period in case of a medium-gravity offence, for which his extradition had been approved, was set by law at six months. By decision of 13 February 2014, the Regional Court quashed the extension order of 26 December 2013, finding that the District Court did not give any specific reasons for extending the applicant\u2019s detention, and remitted the detention matter to the District Court. It directed that the applicant should remain in custody until 24 February 2014.","20.In the meantime, on 21 January 2014 the Tyumen Regional Court upheld the extradition order as being lawful and justified. The court noted that the Uzbekistan Prosecutor\u2019s Office provided the appropriate assurances, that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no information capable of preventing the applicant\u2019s extradition, that the Russian Federal Security Service had no information about the applicant\u2019s persecution in Uzbekistan for political motives and that counsel\u2019s allegations of a real risk of ill\u2011treatment or torture in Uzbekistan were \u201cunsubstantiated\u201d (\u0433\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0441\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0435).","21.On 21 February 2014 the District Court issued a new extension order by which the applicant\u2019s detention was extended until 30 March 2014. The applicant challenged it on the same grounds as before. On 11 March 2014 the Regional Court granted the applicant\u2019s complaint and released him from custody, finding that by virtue of Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure his detention could not have been extended beyond the initial six\u2011month period.","22.On 19 March 2014 the Supreme Court rejected at final instance the applicant\u2019s challenge to the decision on his extradition to Uzbekistan. It stated that the arguments about a real risk of torture and political persecution were \u201cunconvincing\u201d.","D.The applicant\u2019s disappearance","23.In the early morning of 22 July 2014 the applicant was taken away from his home by seven uniformed officers of the Federal Migration Service. The applicant\u2019s lawyer arrived immediately on the scene and attempted to follow them but was stopped by the traffic police.","24.When the applicant\u2019s wife and son arrived at the local office of the Migration Service later on that day, they were told that he had already been released.","25.On 27 July 2014 the applicant\u2019s representative before the Court sent a faxed letter to the Federal Security Service, the Border Control and the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, asking them to stop the applicant\u2019s unlawful transfer to Uzbekistan. She stated that she had information that the applicant was detained in a police ward in Tyumen and that he might be placed on the next flight to Tashkent.","26.Further to the Court\u2019s request for factual information (see paragraph7 above), on 7 August 2014 the Government replied that the applicant\u2019s current whereabouts were not known, that he had not been detained or transferred outside of the Russian territory by State agents and there was no information about him crossing of the State border.","27.On 20 August 2014 the Tyumen Regional Prosecutor\u2019s office advised the applicant\u2019s representative as follows:","\u201cAs regards [your] allegation about an unlawful arrest of Mr Mukhitdinov, I inform you that on 22 July 2014 the officers of the Tyumen regional branch of the Federal Migration Service conducted, in accordance with the approval plan on combating illegal migration, checks in the places where foreign nationals and stateless persons live, including the premises of a mosque at 9, Zhdanova street, Tyumen. Following the check, three persons, including Mr Mukhitdinov, were brought to the immigration control department. Upon identification, he was released.","According to the information provided, Mr Mukhitdinov (Sattarov) was not arrested by the police on 22 July 2014 or any other date; the police has no information about his whereabouts.\u201d","28.On 1 September 2014 the Tyumen Regional Prosecutor\u2019s office additionally informed the counsel that on 25 August 2014 the Tyumen Regional Investigations Committee instituted a criminal case into the applicant\u2019s disappearance.","32.For the most recent relevant reports on Uzbekistan by the international non-governmental human rights organisations, see Egamberdiyev v. Russia, no. 34742\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 31-34, 26 June 2014.","33.On 6 November 2014 the Amnesty International released a call for urgent action against an unfair trial of an extradited refugee Mirsobir Khamidkariev (EUR 62\/008\/2014):","\u201cMirsobir Khamidkariev, a producer and businessman from Uzbekistan, is currently held in a pre-trial detention centre (SIZO), in Tashkent. On 9 June [2014] he was reportedly abducted by officers of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) from a street in central Moscow, Russian Federation, and forcibly returned to Uzbekistan the following day. He was held incommunicado in a basement in an unidentified location in Moscow for a day, forced to wear a bag over his head, and subjected to repeated beatings. He was then handed over to Uzbekistani law enforcement officers at an airport in Moscow. Mirsobir Khamidkariev\u2019s wife and his lawyer in Moscow were unable to establish contact with him and did not know his whereabouts until he re-appeared in the basement of a detention facility run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in Tashkent two weeks later. According to his Russian lawyer, who was able to get access to him in Tashkent on 31 October, upon return to Tashkent Mirsobir Khamidkariev was subjected to torture and other ill-treatment by law enforcement officers for two months to force him to confess to fabricated charges. He was tied to a bar attached to the wall with his head facing down and beaten repeatedly. The officers knocked out seven of his teeth and broke two of his ribs.","The authorities in Uzbekistan have accused him of creating a banned religious extremist organization, Islam Jihadchilari, a charge he has strongly denied. According to his Russian lawyer, the charges against Mirsobir Khamidkariev refer to a conversation he had had with acquaintances at an informal gathering in Tashkent during which he allegedly expressed concern about the oppression of Islam and stated his support for women wearing headscarves. Court hearings have been postponed several times and the next one is scheduled for 13 November [2014].\u201d","34.The Committee of Ministers\u2019 Interim Resolution CM\/ResDH(2013)200, concerning execution of the Court\u2019s judgments in the Garabayev group of cases against the Russian Federation (see Garabayev v. Russia, no. 38411\/02, 7 June 2007), was adopted on 26September 2013 at the 1179th meeting of Ministers\u2019 Deputies. It reads as follows:","\u201cThe Committee of Ministers ...","Considering the cases decided by the Court, in which the latter found violations by the Russian Federation due to the applicants\u2019 abductions and irregular transfers from the Russian Federation to States where the applicants face a real risk of torture and ill\u2011treatment, and in breach of an interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule39 of its Rules of Procedure;","Recalling that given the number of communications received, including from the Court, relating to alleged similar incidents that have been reported, revealing an alarming and unprecedented situation, the Committee has been calling upon the Russian authorities to adopt as a matter of urgency special protective measures for applicants exposed to a risk of kidnapping and irregular transfer;","Noting that the Russian authorities have taken a number of general measures to prevent abductions and illegal transfers from the Russian territory of persons in whose respect extradition requests were filed and the Court has indicated an interim measure under Rule 39 of its Rules;","Deeply regretting that these measures do not appear to have been sufficient to address the need for urgent adoption of special preventive and protective measures that are effective;","Deploring that to date, no reply has been received to the letter sent on 5April 2013 by the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers to his Russian counterpart conveying the Committee\u2019s serious concerns in view of the persistence of this situation and its repeated calls for the urgent adoption of such protective measures;","Underlining that in its judgment in the Abdulkhakov case, the Court noted that \u201cany extra-judicial transfer or extraordinary rendition, by its deliberate circumvention of due process, is an absolute negation of the rule of law and the values protected by the Convention\u201d;","Stressing that this situation has the most serious implications for the Russian domestic legal order, the effectiveness of the Convention system and the authority of the Court,","CALLS UPON the Russian authorities to take further action to ensure compliance with the rule of law and with the obligations they have undertaken as a State party to the Convention,","EXHORTS accordingly the authorities to further develop without further delay an appropriate mechanism tasked with both preventive and protective functions to ensure that applicants, in particular in respect of whom the Court has indicated an interim measure, benefit (following their release from detention) from immediate and effective protection against unlawful or irregular removal from the territory of Russia and the jurisdiction of the Russian courts.\u201d","35.The Parliamentary Assembly\u2019s Resolution 1991 (2014), entitled \u201cUrgent need to deal with new failures to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights\u201d, was adopted on 10 April 2014. It reads as follows:","\u201cParliamentary Assembly","1.Recalling its Resolution 1571 (2007) on member States\u2019 duty to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights and Resolution 1788 (2011) \u201cPreventing harm to refugees and migrants in extradition and expulsion cases: Rule 39 indications by the European Court of Human Rights\u201d, the Parliamentary Assembly stresses the importance of the right of individual application to the European Court of Human Rights (\u201cthe Court\u201d). The protection of this right is the purpose of individual measures indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of its Rules of Court, which are designed to prevent the creation of a fait accompli.","2.The Assembly considers any disrespect of legally binding measures ordered by the Court, such as interim measures indicated under Rule 39, as a clear disregard for the European system of protection of human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, \u201cthe Convention\u201d).","3.The Assembly therefore calls on all States Parties to the Convention to respect interim measures indicated by the Court and to provide it with all the information and evidence it requests.","4.The Assembly strongly condemns instances of outright violations by several States Parties to the Convention (Italy, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic and Turkey) of the Court\u2019s interim measures aimed at protecting applicants from extradition or deportation to countries where they would be at risk of, in particular, torture, as well as of the interim measures in relation to Russia\u2019s military actions in Georgia (see Georgia v. Russia II).","5.The Assembly insists that international co-operation between law-enforcement bodies based on regional agreements, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or on long-standing relations, must not violate a State Party\u2019s binding commitments under the Convention.","6.The Assembly is therefore particularly concerned about the recent phenomenon, observed in the Russian Federation, of the temporary disappearance of applicants protected by interim measures and their subsequent reappearance in the country which had requested extradition. The clandestine methods used indicate that the authorities had to be aware of the illegality of such actions, which can be likened to the practice of \u201cextraordinary renditions\u201d repeatedly condemned by the Assembly.","7.The Assembly welcomes the increasing use, by the Court, of factual presumptions and the reversal of the burden of proof in dealing with refusals of States Parties to co-operate with it, which consist in their failure to provide full, frank and fair disclosure in response to requests by the Court for further information or evidence.\u201d","36.On 5 June 2014 during the 1201st meeting of the Minister\u2019s Deputies, the Committee of Ministers adopted the following decision:","\u201cThe Deputies","1.noted with grave concern that yet another applicant in this group of cases, MrYakubov, had allegedly been abducted in Moscow in April 2014 despite the repeated calls by the Committee of Ministers on the Russian authorities to take the necessary measures to prevent such incidents (see, in particular, Interim ResolutionCM\/ResDH(2013)200);","2.urged the Russian authorities to continue their investigation into Mr Yakubov\u2019s disappearance in order to shed light on the circumstances of this incident, taking into account the findings of the European Court of Human Rights as regards the involvement of the State authorities in other cases, notably in the case of Savriddin Dzhurayev;","3.noted, with concern, that this incident casts doubts on the soundness of the preventive and protective arrangements set up by the Russian authorities in response to the Committee\u2019s call in September 2013, and requested, in this context, the Russian authorities to ensure that relevant individuals are informed of the protective measures available;","4.further noted, with concern, that no information about any progress in the investigations into similar previous incidents in this group of cases has been provided;","5.invited the Russian authorities to provide information on the different issues raised in this group of cases in good time for their 1208th meeting (September 2014) (DH).\u201d"],"27275":["1. The applicant, Ms Neslihan Olsoy, is a Turkish national, who was born in 1952 and lives in Diyarbak\u0131r. She was represented before the Court by Ms Reh\u015fan Bataray Saman and Mr Serdar \u00c7elebi, lawyers practising in Diyarbak\u0131r.","2. The Turkish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent.","The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","4. At the time of the events the applicant \u2019 s son, F\u0131rat Olsoy, who was born in 1976, was serving a prison sentence in the Diyarbak\u0131r Prison.","5. On 24 January 2009 the applicant \u2019 s son asked to see the prison doctor. The doctor examined him, diagnosed him with myalgia (muscle pain) and anxiety and gave him medication to treat his problems.","6. At around 3 p.m. on 23 March 2009, suffering from severe chest pain and shortness of breath, the applicant \u2019 s son went to the prison infirmary. According to the applicant, the doctor was about to leave for the day and therefore hastily examined her son and gave him painkillers and a sleeping pill before sending him back to his cell.","7. At around 5 p.m. the same day the applicant \u2019 s son \u2019 s condition worsened and he had difficulty breathing. He told the other inmates in his wing that he had severe pain in his chest. Some of the inmates carried him to the infirmary but it was closed. Subsequently, a prison warden arrived and called an ambulance. The applicant \u2019 s son died on the way to the hospital.","8. On the same day an autopsy was conducted by a forensic pathologist at the Diyarbak\u0131r State Hospital in the presence of the Diyarbak\u0131r prosecutor. Since the cause of death could not be determined during that autopsy, blood samples and tissue samples taken from the heart, brain, lungs, liver, kidneys, spleen and the coronary arteries were sent for histopathological and toxicological examinations at the Forensic Medicine Institute \u2019 s headquarters in Istanbul.","9. The following day the prosecutor initiated an ex officio investigation into the death of the applicant \u2019 s son. He asked the prison administration to forward him the applicant \u2019 s son \u2019 s medical file and the names of the prison personnel who were on duty at the time of the events, as well as the names of the inmates detained on the same wing as the applicant \u2019 s son. That information was provided to the prosecutor on 25 March 2009.","10. On 26 March 2009 the prosecutor took a statement from the prison doctor. The doctor told the prosecutor that at around 2.30 p.m. on 23 March 2009 he had examined the applicant \u2019 s son who had come to the prison \u2019 s infirmary with pain in his chest and shoulder and complained of difficulties in sleeping. The doctor told the prosecutor that he had prescribed four medicines to the applicant \u2019 s son, namely \u201cZedprex, Cdoral, Voltaren and Duzyl\u201d, to relax his muscles, relieve his pain and calm him down. However, as he had examined a total of eighty-four prisoners that day, he did not have any further recollection of the applicant \u2019 s son or his problems.","11. The same day the prosecutor took a statement from the prison director who explained that, according to the closed circuit video recordings showing the inside of the prison, the applicant \u2019 s son had been brought to the infirmary at 5.1 9 p.m. by his fellow inmates. An ambulance had then been called and a prison guard had administered first aid. The ambulance had arrived at 5.45 p.m. and taken the applicant \u2019 s son to the hospital.","12. The prison guard who had administered first aid to the applicant \u2019 s son was also heard by the prosecutor on the same day and told the prosecutor that he had been asked to go to the prison \u2019 s infirmary some time between 5.25 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. When he had arrived the applicants \u2019 son was still alive but having difficulties in breathing. He had then called the ambulance again and urged them to come at once because the state of the applicant \u2019 s son \u2019 s health had become critical. The ambulance had arrived at 5.45 p.m. When put in the ambulance on a stretcher the applicant \u2019 s son had been alive but his condition had been critical. His body had started to take on a \u201cpurple colour\u201d. The prison guard had also got in the ambulance and the doctor in the ambulance had carried out cardiac massage. However the applicant \u2019 s son had died on the way to hospital.","13. On 27 March 2009 the prosecutor took statements from nineteen inmates who had witnessed the incident on 23 March 2009. The inmates told the prosecutor that they had been aware that the applicant \u2019 s son had been suffering from chest pains. They had also been aware that the applicant \u2019 s son had gone to the infirmary earlier that day to see the prison doctor. One of the inmates stated that he had accompanied the applicant \u2019 s son to the infirmary at around 3 p.m. but that the prison doctor had been about to leave for the day and had hastily prescribed him painkillers without giving him a proper medical examination. The applicant \u2019 s son \u2019 s condition had deteriorated after his return from the infirmary and he had been unable to get out of his bed for the roll call which took place at 5 p.m. After the roll call the inmates had carried him to the infirmary because he had been unable to walk unaided.","14. Two of the inmates who had carried the applicant \u2019 s son out of his wing told the prosecutor that the infirmary had been closed at the time and that they had instead taken him to the dentist \u2019 s office where they had waited for 15-20 minutes for a prison warden to arrive. They also stated that the telephones in the infirmary had not been working. When the prison warden arrived he tried to put an oxygen mask on the applicant \u2019 s son but then quickly took it off when the applicant \u2019 s son felt worse with the mask. The inmates then \u201cput pressure on the prison warden to call an ambulance\u201d and they waited a further 15-20 minutes for the ambulance to arrive.","15. On 30 March 2009 the applicant \u2019 s other son, Mr Orhan Olsoy, filed a petition with the prosecutor \u2019 s office and informed the prosecutor that his brother had had no previous health problems and that during his frequent visits to the prison his brother had told him that he was well and would be released soon. Mr Olsoy asked the prosecutor to find out why his brother had lost his life and requested that an investigation be conducted to establish whether the death had been due to anyone \u2019 s negligence. He also asked the prosecutor to determine whether there had been any delays in calling the ambulance and requested the prosecutor to secure in evidence the recordings from the prison \u2019 s security cameras.","16. Between 22 and 28 April 2009 the prosecutor questioned the deputy director of the prison and four other prison guards. They explained to the prosecutor how they had been informed about the deterioration of the applicant \u2019 s son \u2019 s condition and how they had then called the ambulance and sent him to hospital.","17. At the request of the prosecutor, the footage recorded by the prison \u2019 s security cameras was examined by crime scene examination experts from the Diyarbak\u0131r police headquarters on 5 May 2009. According to the report prepared by these experts, two persons could be seen carrying another person in their arms at between 5.19 p.m. and 5.38 p.m. The person was put on a stretcher at 5.45 p.m. and put in an ambulance at 5.46 p.m.","18. The applicant and her husband were questioned by the prosecutor on 8 May 2009. They both told the prosecutor that they had not been aware that their son had had any health problems. The applicant added that on one occasion some ten days before her son was imprisoned he had told her that \u201che was not well\u201d, but had not elaborated as to the nature of his problem.","19. On 9 June 2009 the prosecutor wrote to the Forensic Medicine Institute in Istanbul and urged it to carry out the necessary examinations of the blood and tissue samples taken from the body of the applicant \u2019 s son. The prosecutor sent another reminder to the Forensic Medicine Institute on 16 July 2009.","20. The doctor and the paramedic who had taken the applicant \u2019 s son to the hospital were questioned by the prosecutor on 29 June 2009. They told the prosecutor that they had been called to the prison at 5.31 p.m. and that they had arrived there at 5.39 p.m. When they had put the applicant \u2019 s son in the ambulance he had stopped breathing and his heart had stopped beating. They had tried to resuscitate him and had arrived at the hospital at 6.10 p.m. where they had handed the applicant \u2019 s son to the doctors waiting by the main entrance.","21. The doctor working at the accident and emergency department of the hospital made a statement on 13 July 2009 and told the prosecutor that the applicant \u2019 s son had already died on his arrival at the hospital. He and his colleagues had then unsuccessfully tried for approximately thirty minutes to resuscitate him.","22. The Forensic Medicine Institute in Istanbul prepared its report on 13 August 2009 and stated that according to the toxicological examinations there was no alcohol, drugs or other substances in the samples taken from the body. The Institute considered it necessary to seek the opinion of its specialist board on the cause of death.","23. On 25 November 2009 the Expertise Board of the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Institute, which consisted of eight medical experts, issued its report. It confirmed the findings of the toxicology report summarised in the preceding paragraph and added that during the autopsy no signs of traumatic changes on the body had been observed. According to the report, the eight experts unanimously concluded that the exact cause of death could not be determined.","24. On 19 February 2010 the Diyarbak\u0131r prosecutor delivered a decision of non-prosecution and concluded that there was no evidence to show that an offence had been committed. The prosecutor also added that the applicant \u2019 s son had died of natural causes and that there had been no fault or negligence attributable to another person in his death.","25. The applicant lodged an objection against the prosecutor \u2019 s decision and argued, inter alia, that the fact that there had been no signs of trauma on the body of her son and that the toxicology reports had not shown any harmful substances in his body did not exclude that someone \u2019 s negligence or fault had caused his death. She submitted that the prosecutor should have made attempts to establish whether or not the prison authorities had shown due care and attention and whether the prison doctor had examined him adequately. In this connection, she also argued that the role played in her son \u2019 s death of the infirmary being closed when his condition worsened and the appropriateness of the medicines prescribed by the prison doctor, should also have been examined by the prosecutor.","26. The applicant added in her objection petition that, according to the eyewitnesses, her son had been complaining about having breathing problems as well as pain in his chest, heart and muscles. However the doctor, instead of at least referring her son to a hospital for a detailed examination and further tests, had given him painkillers. The fact that her son \u2019 s condition had worsened after having taken the painkillers showed that the doctor had acted negligently. Finally, she alleged that the ambulance had not been called immediately.","27. On 14 May 2010 the Siverek Assize Court dismissed the applicant \u2019 s appeal. That decision was served on the applicant \u2019 s lawyer on 15 June 2010.","28. According to a report drawn up and signed by a doctor on 13 March 2013, at the time of his entry into the prison a medical examination had been carried out on the applicant \u2019 s son and no medical problems had been observed during that examination."],"27277":["5.The applicant was born in Ukraine in 1987 and arrived in Slovenia in 2000 with her sister and mother, who had married a Slovenian.","6.Between July and December 2001, at the age of 14, she was allegedly repeatedly sexually assaulted by a family friend, X, 55 years old at the time, who together with his wife often took care of her and helped her in preparations for beauty contests.","7.In July 2002 the applicant told her mother about the alleged sexual assaults by X, but was unwilling to talk about them with anyone else.","8.On 15 July 2002 a priest gave a statement to the Maribor police, in which he said that the applicant\u2019s mother had told him about her concern that the applicant had been raped by X.","9.On 16 July 2002 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a criminal complaint against X, in which she alleged that X had forced the applicant to engage in sexual intercourse with him on several occasions.","10.On 17 July 2002 the applicant was questioned by Maribor police officers and described how X had forced her to engage in various sexual activities. As regards the time frame of the assaults, the applicant stated that X had first attempted to kiss her before July 2001, when she had started modelling for fashion shows. She proceeded to give an account of a number of occasions when X had sexually assaulted her. On one occasion X had lain on top of her while she was sleeping at his house and had attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, spreading her legs with one hand and putting his other hand over her mouth to prevent her from screaming, but he was interrupted by his younger son coming up the stairs. On another occasion, when they were at a swimming pool, he had groped her in the water. On yet another occasion X had allegedly taken the applicant to an abandoned workshop owned by his family and performed oral sex on her. Moreover, according to the applicant, X had forced her to perform oral sex on him at least three times, once at his home, once at his company\u2019s garage, and the third time in his van, which he had parked in woods near the town. On that last occasion the applicant had allegedly tried to escape; however, being unfamiliar with the surroundings, she had come back to the van. The applicant stated that X had on several occasions attempted to have intercourse with her, but that she had not been certain whether he had managed to achieve penetration. She further stated that she had tried to defend herself by crying and pushing X away, but without success.","11.The applicant was also examined by an expert in gynaecology, who found that her hymen was intact. Moreover, in the course of July and August 2002 the police questioned X, who denied any sexual relations with the applicant, and three other people.","12.Following a series of unsuccessful attempts to obtain specific information from the police as regards the progress of the investigation, the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Maribor District State Prosecutor\u2019s Office (hereinafter \u201cthe State Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d).","13.On 27 June 2003 the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office sent a letter to the Maribor police, urgently requesting a copy of the criminal complaint lodged against X.","14.On 18 August 2003 the police sent a report to the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office stating that the applicant had failed to provide a detailed account of her allegations or to indicate the locations where the alleged rapes had taken place. The police noted that the applicant had given the impression of being under severe psychological stress and in fear of her mother\u2019s reaction. They concluded that it was impossible to confirm her allegation of rape, and equally impossible to establish the reasons for her serious emotional distress.","15.On 28 August 2003 the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office lodged a request for a judicial investigation in respect of X based on charges of sexual assault on a minor below the age of fifteen. The request alleged that X had forced the applicant to engage in oral sex and had had sexual intercourse with her on at least three occasions, despite her refusal and attempted resistance.","16.On 7 January 2005 X was summoned to appear before the investigating judge of the Maribor District Court. He refused to give an oral statement. On 10 March 2005 X, represented by a lawyer, submitted a written statement in which he denied the charges. He also submitted a medical report which indicated that his left arm had been disabled since birth.","17.On 26 May 2005 the investigating judge issued a decision to open a criminal investigation in respect of X. An appeal by X against this decision was rejected by the pre-trial panel of the Maribor District Court.","18.On 17 October 2005 the applicant was examined as a witness before the Ljubljana District Court, which had been asked to carry out the witness examination because the applicant lived in the area. The examination resumed on 8November 2005. Neither X nor his counsel was informed of this examination. The applicant testified in detail as to when, where and how the alleged offences had taken place. She first described the assault which had occurred in X\u2019s house, while she had been sleeping there, reiterating that X had been disturbed by his son. According to the applicant\u2019s statement, the second assault had occurred when, instead of driving the applicant home, X had parked in the woods and started to kiss her forcefully. X had then undressed the applicant, parted her legs with one hand and held her wrists with the other and again attempted to have intercourse with her, but there had been no penetration. The applicant further recounted that X had on another occasion taken her to the family\u2019s abandoned workshop and had performed oral sex on her. She stated that she had attempted to free herself of his grip, but that X had again pinned her wrists down and also slapped her across the face. Again, vaginal intercourse had been attempted but had not actually occurred. X had ordered her not to talk to anyone about this, or he would have her and her family deported from Slovenia. The applicant added that she remembered these three occasions well and the events had occurred just as she described them, and that there had been a number of other similar incidents between July and December 2001.","19.On 13 and 20 December 2005 X\u2019s wife and another witness were examined by the investigating judge of the Maribor District Court.","20.On 13 January 2006 the Koper District Court, at the request of the Maribor District Court, examined witness D., who testified that the applicant had told her of the alleged rape.","21.On 14 April 2006 the investigating judge examined witness H., who was an employee of the company owned by X and his wife. H. testified that she had not seen X behaving improperly towards the applicant on the company\u2019s premises.","22.On 16 May 2006 the investigating judge appointed an expert in gynaecology, B., in order to establish the probability that the applicant had engaged in sexual intercourse in the period between July and December 2001. The latter carried out a consultation with the applicant, who refused a clinical examination. She told B., among other things, that despite the attempts made by X there had been no actual sexual penetration. During the consultation, B. confronted the applicant with an orthopaedics report stating that X could not have used his left arm in the ways described by her, to which the applicant answered that she had seen X use it to lift heavy items. B. also presented the applicant with the police report stating that she had not been able to give a detailed account of the sexual assaults and specific locations, and asked her why she had not defended herself against X, for instance by scratching or biting. The applicant replied that she had not defended herself and had been unable to do so. On 19June 2006 the expert prepared his report, which was based on the evidence in the file, including a gynaecological report from 2002 which showed that the applicant\u2019s hymen was intact at that time, and the conversation with the applicant. He found that there was nothing to indicate with certainty that the applicant had had sexual intercourse with X at the material time. In addition to his medical opinion, the expert commented that there were certain inconsistencies in the applicant\u2019s account of the events in issue. It can be seen from the report that neither of the alleged inconsistencies was related to any medical issue.","23.On 20 June 2006 the investigating judge appointed an expert in clinical psychology, R. The latter, after holding a consultation with the applicant, submitted her report on 4 July 2006, and concluded as follows:","\u201cSince 2001 Y. has shown all the symptoms of a victim of sexual and other kinds of abuse (emotional, behavioural and physical symptoms) ...","In addition to the emotional consequences, the girl shows very typical behavioural patterns relating to the abuse experienced by her, and also some physical symptoms (disturbed sleep, nightmares, collapsing). The symptoms are indicated in the report ...","The gravity of the consequences \u2013 physical and sexual in particular \u2013 is difficult to assess at the present time. But, like the short-term ones, the long-term consequences can be predicted. Their real extent will become apparent at key stages of the girl\u2019s life and in stressful situations ...","Because of these effects, which are most serious in her psychological sphere ... it is of very marginal importance whether during the perpetrator\u2019s violent behaviour the child victim experienced hymen defloration or not ...","Sexual behavioural patterns can only be assessed properly by an expert in clinical psychology ...\u201d","24.On 15 September 2006 the Maribor district prosecutor\u2019s office indicted X for sexual assault of a child below the age of fifteen under Article 183 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. An objection by X to the indictment was rejected by the pre-trial panel of the Maribor District Court on 20October 2006.","25.The Maribor District Court scheduled a hearing for 27 June 2007. However, the hearing was adjourned at X\u2019s request on the basis of a document which showed that he was now on sick leave for several weeks.","26.A hearing was then scheduled for 3 October 2007, but adjourned at X\u2019s counsel\u2019s request. The next hearing was to be held on 12 November 2007. However, owing to the absence of a jury member, the hearing was adjourned. Subsequently, X informed the court that he was about to go on a business trip, for which reason the next hearing was postponed until 16January 2008.","27.On 16 January 2008 X failed to appear before the court. On 17January 2008 he submitted a sick-leave certificate.","28.On 25 January 2008 X\u2019s counsel informed the court that X had revoked his power of attorney and that he would be represented by another lawyer, M., from then on. However, the court received no new power of attorney authorising M. to act as X\u2019s counsel. Since X was accused of a criminal offence requiring mandatory representation, on 28 January 2008 the court appointed M. as counsel for X .","29.On 14March2008 the court held a hearing, from which the public was excluded on the grounds of protection of privacy and public morals. The court heard evidence from X. At the hearing the applicant\u2019s counsel sought to have M., X\u2019s counsel, disqualified on the ground that in 2001 the applicant and her mother had sought advice from him on the matters in issue. Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s mother had been intimately involved with him. M. denied that he had ever seen the applicant or her mother and said that he only knew that the lawyer at whose firm he had been working at that time had represented the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s estranged husband in divorce proceedings. The panel dismissed the application, ruling that no statutory grounds existed for disqualifying M. as counsel.","30.On 14March2008 X submitted written pleadings, claiming that he would have been unable to use physical force on the applicant, as his left arm had been seriously disabled since birth and was 15 cm shorter than his right arm. X alleged that he had practically no use of his disabled arm. Moreover, he asserted that he and his family had been helping the applicant and her sister to integrate into their new community and learn Slovene, while their mother had been busying herself with her private activities. According to X, the charges of sexual assault were prompted by the applicant\u2019s mother, who wished to extort money from him.","31.On 14 April 2008 the court held a second hearing in the case. X was questioned by the State prosecutor, mostly about the use of his left arm, and in this connection conceded that, although he usually drove automatic cars, he did occasionally drive a smaller manual transmission car. However, when asked whether he had ever driven a truck, X replied that this had no bearing on the case, acknowledging nevertheless that he had a licence to drive all categories of road vehicles. Then the applicant was summoned to testify, the court granting her request for X to be absent from the hearing room. While recounting the instances of sexual abuse by X, the applicant cried repeatedly and the hearing was adjourned for a few minutes on that account. X\u2019s counsel M. then questioned the applicant, asking her how tall she had been and how much she had weighed at the material time. The applicant became very agitated and asked M. why, having been the first to hear her story, he was asking those questions and was now acting as X\u2019s counsel. M. commented that this was part of the tactics. The hearing was then adjourned owing to the applicant\u2019s distress.","32.On 9 May 2008 the court held a third hearing. The questioning of the applicant continued in the absence of X. When asked how she felt about the situation with hindsight, she cried and said that no one had helped her and that the proceedings had been dragging on for several years, during which she had had to keep reliving the trauma.","33.On 27 August 2008 the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal under the Protection of the Right to a Hearing without Undue Delay Act of 2006 (hereinafter \u201cthe 2006 Act\u201d) with a view to accelerating the proceedings.","34.On 26 September 2008 the court held a fourth hearing, from which the public was excluded, at which X personally asked the applicant over a hundred questions, starting with a comment in the form of a question \u201cIs it true that you have told and showed me that you could cry on cue and then everybody would believe you?\u201d It does not appear from the record of the hearing that the applicant made any reply. X then asked the applicant a series of questions aimed at proving that they had seen each other mainly at gatherings of their families or when the applicant, in need of transport or other assistance, had actively sought his company. Among the questions asked by X were the following: \u201cIs it true that I could not have abused you on the evening of the event as you stated on 14 April?\u201d, \u201cIs it true that if I had wished to satisfy my sexual needs, I would have called you at least once?\u201d; \u201cWhy did you call me in September and ask me to take you out of town if I had already raped you five times before that date?\u201d, \u201cWhy were you calling me, because I certainly never called you?\u201d, or \u201cIs it true that you specifically asked that we drive out of town alone, because you wished to talk to me and to celebrate your success at a beauty pageant?\u201d The applicant insisted that she had not called X, nor had she initiated any outings with him, but that he had called her. X also asked the applicant whether she had told him that, once she had a boyfriend, she would always be on top, as she wanted to be the mistress.","35.Moreover, X claimed that the charges of rape were fabrications by the applicant\u2019s mother. Hence, he asked the applicant numerous questions about her mother, including about her knowledge of Slovene, her work, and her personal relationships. Further, X confronted the applicant with the medical report which indicated that his left arm was seriously disabled. The applicant insisted that she had seen X using his left arm in his daily life, including driving cars, lifting and carrying his children and their school bags, and carrying boxes and bottles. Throughout the questioning, X disputed the accuracy and credibility of the applicant\u2019s answers, extensively commenting on the circumstances described by her and rejecting her version of events. He continued to do so even after the presiding judge explained to him that he would have the opportunity to make his comments after the applicant\u2019s questioning.","36.During the cross-examination, X repeated a number of questions and was eventually warned against doing this by the presiding judge. Moreover, the presiding judge ruled out of order seven questions that she perceived had no bearing on the case in issue.","37.On three occasions, when the applicant became agitated and started crying, the court ordered a short recess. After one of these recesses X asked the applicant whether she would feel better if they all went to dinner, just as they used to, and maybe then she would not cry so much.","38.At one point the applicant requested the court to adjourn the hearing as the questions were too stressful for her. However, after being told by X that the next hearing could not be held until after 19 November 2008 when he would be back from a business trip, the applicant said, while crying, that he should continue with his questioning as she wanted to get it over with. Eventually, after four hours of cross-examination of the applicant, the presiding judge adjourned the hearing until 13 October 2008.","39.X\u2019s wife, mother-in-law and an employee of his company were examined at the next hearing, all three of them asserting that X had very little use of his left arm and certainly could not lift any burdens.","40.On 24 November 2008 a sixth hearing was held. The questioning of the applicant by X took an hour and a half. When questioned by X\u2019s counsel M., the applicant again asserted that she had told him the whole story a long time ago. M. denied this, stating that if he had been informed he would have advised the applicant to go to hospital and to the police. Once the applicant\u2019s questioning was over, her mother was questioned, mostly about her private relationships.","41.At the end of the hearing X\u2019s counsel M. confirmed that he had encountered the applicant\u2019s mother when he was working at a law firm with a lawyer who had represented her in certain court proceedings. He also stated that he would inform the court within three days as to whether he would request leave to withdraw from representing X in the proceedings in issue. On 25 November 2008 M. requested leave from the court to withdraw from the case, as he had been personally affected by certain statements made by the applicant\u2019s mother.","42.At a hearing of 15 December 2008 the court dismissed the request by X\u2019s counsel M., finding that there were no statutory grounds disqualifying him from representing M. The gynaecologist, B., was examined as a witness. He acknowledged that in order to clarify the circumstances he had also addressed certain issues in his report that had not been part of the investigating judge\u2019s request. Moreover, he reiterated that the applicant\u2019s hymen had been intact at the material time.","43.On 22 January 2009 the court held an eighth hearing in the case and examined the expert in clinical psychology, R., who again stated that sexual abuse which had happened long ago could not be proved by any material evidence, and that only the psychological consequences could be assessed. She further reiterated that the applicant displayed clear symptoms of sexual abuse.","44.On 20 February 2009 the court appointed T., another expert in gynaecology, to give an opinion on whether the applicant could have had sexual intercourse at the material time, given the results of her medical examination (see paragraph 11 above). On 10 March 2009 the expert submitted his report, which stated that those results were not inconsistent with the applicant\u2019s account of the events in issue.","45.On 16 March 2009 the court held a hearing at which it appointed N., an expert in orthopaedics, to prepare an opinion as to whether, in view of his disabled left arm, X could have performed the acts described by the applicant.","46.On 5 May 2009 N. submitted his report, in which he found that X\u2019s left arm was severely disabled, and that for those reasons some of the events could not have happened in the way described by the applicant.","47.On 8 June 2009 the court held a hearing at which N. was questioned. Further to questions put by the applicant\u2019s counsel, N. explained that he had based his opinion on the documents in X\u2019s medical file, the X-rays brought to him by X, and an examination of X.","48.A hearing was held on 9 July 2009. The applicant requested that N. be questioned further.","49.On 29 September 2009 the court held the twelfth and last hearing in the case. At the hearing the applicant and the State Prosecutor questioned N., who stated, inter alia, that X could only use his left arm to assist the right arm in carrying out specific tasks, and that he had practically no strength in his left arm. In the expert\u2019s opinion, X would not have been able to spread the applicant\u2019s legs with his left arm, and neither would he have been able to take off his trousers as alleged by her. After being asked by the prosecutor whether his assessment was based on the assumption that the applicant had used all her strength to resist X, N. stated: \u201cI did not base my conclusion on that assumption, as I did not know whether she had resisted or whether she had willingly submitted.\u201d After being asked whether the applicant, who was 14 years old at the time, could have resisted X, who had allegedly been lying on top of her, he said he believed so. N. also testified that although X had more than ordinary strength in his right arm, he could not have assaulted the applicant in the way she alleged.","50.After the examination of N., the applicant, who had sought and obtained an opinion from another orthopaedist outside the court proceedings which indicated that X might still have limited use of his left arm, asked for another orthopaedics expert to be appointed, on the grounds that there was doubt about N.\u2019s conclusions. This request was rejected by the court as unnecessary, as was the applicant\u2019s request for the court also to call as witnesses her sister and her mother\u2019s former husband, who had allegedly seen X rowing with both arms. A request by the prosecutor for the applicant to be examined again was also rejected.","51.At the end of the hearing the court pronounced judgment, acquitting X of all charges. In view of this verdict, the court recommended that the applicant pursue her claim for damages, which she had submitted in the course of the proceedings, before the civil court.","52.On 15 December 2009 the applicant lodged a new supervisory appeal under the 2006 Act. On 22 December 2009 she received a reply from the court informing her that the reasoning of the judgment had been sent to her that day.","53.In the written grounds the court explained that the expert orthopaedics report contested X\u2019s ability to carry out certain acts described by the applicant, for which he would have had to use both arms. As explained by the expert, X was not capable of even moving his left hand in a position which would have allowed him to take his trousers off or spread the applicant\u2019s legs. According to the court, the fact that some of the applicant\u2019s allegations were disproved by the expert raised some doubts as to her entire version of the events. On the basis of the principle that any reasonable doubt should benefit the accused (in dubio pro reo), the court had acquitted X. As regards the report by the expert in psychology R., which found that the applicant had suffered sexual abuse, the court noted that it could not ignore the judgment delivered in another set of proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s estranged husband, in which the competent court had accepted that he had engaged in sexual activity in front of the applicant and her sister and had also behaved inappropriately towards the applicant.","54.On 30 December 2009 the State Prosecutor lodged an appeal, in which she criticised the court for not considering the fact that owing to his age, gender and body mass X was much stronger than the applicant, and was also in a position of power on account of his economic and social status. Moreover, she pointed out that X had operated manual transmission vehicles, which required him to use both his arms. The prosecutor further argued that the criminal offence in question did not require the sexual act to have been committed by force; it was sufficient that the applicant opposed it. She also stressed that the proceedings had already been pending for eight years, which had aggravated the trauma suffered by the applicant.","55.The appeal was dismissed by the Maribor Higher Court on 26 May 2010, which found that the reasoning of the first-instance court\u2019s judgment was clear and precise regarding the doubt that X had committed the alleged criminal acts.","56.The applicant subsequently asked the Supreme State Prosecutor to lodge a request for the protection of legality (an extraordinary remedy). On 28 July 2010 the Supreme State Prosecutor informed the applicant that the aforementioned request could only concern points of law and not the facts, which the applicant had called into question.","57.On 11 February 2011 the applicant and the Government reached an out-of-court settlement under the 2006 Act in the amount of 1,080 euros (EUR), covering all pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage incurred by the applicant as a result of a violation of her right to a trial without undue delay in the criminal proceedings in issue. The applicant also received EUR129.60 in respect of the costs incurred in the proceedings.","58.Article 183 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code regulating the criminal offence of sexual assault on a person younger than 15 years, as in force at the material time, reads as follows:","\u201c(1) A person who engages in sexual intercourse or any other sexual act with a person of the opposite or same sex who is not yet fifteen years old, and where the maturity of the perpetrator and that of the victim are obviously disproportionate, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to eight years.","(2) A person who commits the above act against a person who is not yet ten years old, or against a vulnerable person who is not yet fifteen years old, or by using force or threat to life or limb, shall be punished with imprisonment of three years or more ...\u201d","59.Section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act, as in force at the material time, provides that the police, having concluded the preliminary investigation of an alleged criminal offence, will draw up a criminal complaint based on the information collected and send it to the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office. However, even if the information gathered does not appear to provide any grounds for such a criminal complaint to be made, the police must submit a report on their actions to the State Prosecutor.","60.As regards the protection of under-age victims of criminal offences of a sexual nature during judicial investigations, the Criminal Procedure Act includes a number of provisions aimed at protecting under-age victims of or witnesses to criminal proceedings. In proceedings regarding criminal offences against sexual integrity, minors must, from the initiation of the criminal proceedings onwards, have counsel to protect their rights. Under-age victims who have no lawyer are assigned one by the trial court. Moreover, the defendant cannot be present during the examination of witnesses below the age of 15 years who claim to be victims of criminal offences against sexual integrity. In this regard, section 240 of the Act provides that minors, especially those who have been affected by the criminal offence, should be examined with consideration for their age, to avoid any harmful effects on their mental state.","61.In order to ensure the smooth running of a judicial investigation, the parties and the victim may, under section 191 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1994, complain to the president of the court charged with the investigation about any delays or other irregularities. Upon the examination of the complaint, the president is required to inform the complainant of any steps taken in this regard.","62.As to the time frame for scheduling a criminal trial, section286(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the presiding judge shall schedule a first hearing within two months of receipt of an indictment. If he fails to do so, he must inform the president of the court accordingly, and the latter is required to take the necessary steps to schedule a hearing.","63.As regards the conduct of the hearing, section 295 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the public may be excluded from the hearing if so required, for example for the protection of the personal or family life of the defendant or the victim. In accordance with section 299 of the Act, the presiding judge conducts the hearing, grants the parties the right to address the court, and questions the defendant, witnesses and experts. Moreover, it is the presiding judge\u2019s duty to ensure that the case is presented fully and clearly, that the truth is established, and that any obstacles protracting the proceedings are eliminated.","64.The defendant may be temporarily removed from the courtroom if a witness refuses to testify in his presence. The witness\u2019s statement is then read to him and he is entitled to put questions to him or her. Nonetheless, pursuant to section 334(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act the presiding judge will prohibit any questions that have already been asked, that bear no relation to the case, or that in themselves suggest how they should be answered.","65.Article 148 of the Code of Obligations regulating the liability of legal persons for damage inflicted by one of their subsidiary bodies, which also applies to the determination of the State\u2019s liability for damages, provides that a legal person is liable for damage inflicted on a third party by one of its subsidiary bodies in the exercise of its functions or in connection therewith. In order for a claimant to be awarded compensation for damage inflicted by the State, he or she is required to prove all four elements of the State\u2019s liability, that is, unlawfulness of the State\u2019s action, existence of damage, causal link, and negligence or fault on the part of the State.","66.By virtue of Article 179 of the Code of Obligations, which constitutes the statutory basis for awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage, such compensation may be awarded in the event of the infringement of a person\u2019s personality rights, as well as for physical distress, mental distress suffered due to the reduction of life activities, disfigurement, defamation, death of a close relative, or fear, provided that the circumstances of the case, and in particular the level and duration of the distress and fear caused thereby, justify an award.","67.According to the decision of the Supreme Court no. II Ips 305\/2009, an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage is strictly limited to the categories of damage specified in the Code of Obligations, adhering to the principle of numerus clausus. The Supreme Court thus decided that non-pecuniary damage resulting from excessive length of proceedings could not be classified among the categories of damage recognised by the Code of Obligations, as the right to trial within a reasonable time could not be interpreted as a personality right.","68.Under section 1 of the 2006 Act, any party to court proceedings \u2013 including a victim of a criminal offence \u2013 is guaranteed the right to have his or her rights decided upon by the court without undue delay.","69.The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power adopted by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 40\/34 of 29 November 1985 provides that victims of crime should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity (Annex, Article 4). Moreover, the responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the needs of victims should be facilitated by, inter alia, taking measures to minimise inconvenience to victims, protecting their privacy when necessary, and ensuring that they and their families and witnesses on their behalf are protected from intimidation and retaliation (Annex, Article 6 (d)).","70.Victims of criminal offences further enjoy protection under the legislation of the European Union. In 2001, a Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (2001\/220\/JHA) was adopted with a view to introducing minimum standards on the rights and protection of victims of crime. Article 2 of the Framework Decision requires the Member States to ensure that victims have a real and appropriate role in its criminal legal system and that they are treated with due respect for the dignity of the individual during proceedings. Moreover, Article 3 provides that victims must be afforded the possibility to be heard during proceedings and to supply evidence; however, appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that they are questioned by the authorities only in so far as necessary for the purpose of criminal proceedings. Article 8 requires the Member States to provide a number of measures aimed at protecting the victims\u2019 safety and privacy in the criminal proceedings. Among others, measures must be taken to ensure that contact between victims and offenders within courts premises may be avoided, unless such is required in the interests of the criminal proceedings. Also, the Member States must ensure that, where there is a need to protect victims \u2013 particularly those most vulnerable \u2013 from the effects of giving evidence in open court, they may be entitled to testify in a manner which enables this objective to be achieved, by any appropriate means compatible with its basic legal principles.","71.Moreover, the EU Member States\u2019 ambition to reinforce the rights of the victims of crime led to the adoption, on 25 October 2012, of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (2012\/29\/EU) establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001\/220\/JHA. The relevant part of the Directive, which is to be implemented into the national laws of the EU Member States by 16 November 2015, provides as follows:","Recital 19","\u201cA person should be considered to be a victim regardless of whether an offender is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between them ...\u201d","Article 20 \u2013 Right to protection of victims during criminal investigations","\u201cWithout prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion, Member States shall ensure that during criminal investigations:","(a)interviews of victims are conducted without unjustified delay after the complaint with regard to a criminal offence has been made to the competent authority;","(b)the number of interviews of victims is kept to a minimum and interviews are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal investigation;","...","(d)medical examinations are kept to a minimum and are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal proceedings.\u201d","Article 22 \u2013 Individual assessment of victims to identify specific protection needs","\u201c1.Member States shall ensure that victims receive a timely and individual assessment, in accordance with national procedures, to identify specific protection needs and to determine whether and to what extent they would benefit from special measures in the course of criminal proceedings, as provided for under Articles 23 and 24, due to their particular vulnerability to secondary and repeat victimisation, to intimidation and to retaliation.","2.The individual assessment shall, in particular, take into account:","(a)the personal characteristics of the victim;","(b)the type or nature of the crime; and","(c)the circumstances of the crime.","3.In the context of the individual assessment, particular attention shall be paid to victims who have suffered considerable harm due to the severity of the crime; victims who have suffered a crime committed with a bias or discriminatory motive which could, in particular, be related to their personal characteristics; victims whose relationship to and dependence on the offender make them particularly vulnerable. In this regard, victims of terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, gender-based violence, violence in a close relationship, sexual violence, exploitation or hate crime, and victims with disabilities shall be duly considered.","...\u201d","Article 23 \u2013 Right to protection of victims with specific protection needs during criminal proceedings","\u201c1.Without prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion, Member States shall ensure that victims with specific protection needs who benefit from special measures identified as a result of an individual assessment provided for in Article 22(1), may benefit from the measures provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article. A special measure envisaged following the individual assessment shall not be made available if operational or practical constraints make this impossible, or where there is a an urgent need to interview the victim and failure to do so could harm the victim or another person or could prejudice the course of the proceedings.","2.The following measures shall be available during criminal investigations to victims with specific protection needs identified in accordance with Article 22(1):","...","(b)interviews with the victim being carried out by or through professionals trained for that purpose;","...","3.The following measures shall be available for victims with specific protection needs identified in accordance with Article 22(1) during court proceedings:","(a)measures to avoid visual contact between victims and offenders including during the giving of evidence, by appropriate means including the use of communication technology;","(b)measures to ensure that the victim may be heard in the courtroom without being present, in particular through the use of appropriate communication technology;","(c)measures to avoid unnecessary questioning concerning the victim\u2019s private life not related to the criminal offence; and","(d)measures allowing a hearing to take place without the presence of the public.\u201d","72.On 5 May 2011 the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which entered into force on 1 August 2014. The Convention was signed by Slovenia on 8 September 2011, but has not yet been ratified. The relevant part of the Convention provides as follows:","Article 49 \u2013 General obligations","\u201c1.Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue delay while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages of the criminal proceedings.","2.Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures, in conformity with the fundamental principles of human rights and having regard to the gendered understanding of violence, to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of offences established in accordance with this Convention.\u201d","Article 54 \u2013 Investigations and evidence","\u201cParties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that, in any civil or criminal proceedings, evidence relating to the sexual history and conduct of the victim shall be permitted only when it is relevant and necessary.\u201d","Article 56 \u2013 Measures of protection","\u201c1.Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect the rights and interests of victims, including their special needs as witnesses, at all stages of investigations and judicial proceedings, in particular by:","(a)providing for their protection, as well as that of their families and witnesses, from intimidation, retaliation and repeat victimisation;","(b)ensuring that victims are informed, at least in cases where the victims and the family might be in danger, when the perpetrator escapes or is released temporarily or definitively;","(c)informing them, under the conditions provided for by internal law, of their rights and the services at their disposal and the follow\u2010up given to their complaint, the charges, the general progress of the investigation or proceedings, and their role therein, as well as the outcome of their case;","(d)enabling victims, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of internal law, to be heard, to supply evidence and have their views, needs and concerns presented, directly or through an intermediary, and considered;","(e)providing victims with appropriate support services so that their rights and interests are duly presented and taken into account;","(f)ensuring that measures may be adopted to protect the privacy and the image of the victim;","(g)ensuring that contact between victims and perpetrators within court and law enforcement agency premises is avoided where possible;","(h)providing victims with independent and competent interpreters when victims are parties to proceedings or when they are supplying evidence;","(i)enabling victims to testify, according to the rules provided by their internal law, in the courtroom without being present or at least without the presence of the alleged perpetrator, notably through the use of appropriate communication technologies, where available.","2.A child victim and child witness of violence against women and domestic violence shall be afforded, where appropriate, special protection measures taking into account the best interests of the child.\u201d"],"27296":["A. The circumstances of the case","18. While most events are relevant for all applicants, their situation in the domestic proceedings has somewhat differed. However, given the number of applicants, the extent of the domestic procedures and difficulties associated with the establishment of each applicant \u2019 s procedural role, the present decision refers to them collectively as the \u201capplicants\u201d. This is based on the assumption that their position in the domestic proceedings has been relatively similar, whether or not each of them participated in the given procedural step, either directly or through their representatives (see Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 27065\/05, \u00a7 181, 2 December 2010 ).","19. The voluminous materials of the case files lodged by the applicants and submitted by the Government include documents from four criminal investigation proceedings, three criminal trials, two sets of civil proceedings for compensation, two reports by the parliamentary groups and one dissenting opinion, books and articles written in the aftermath, copies of forensic and expert reports in respect of each applicant and\/or their relatives, and the applicants \u2019 own statements to the Court. The statement of facts below is a succinct summary of the documents mentioned above as well as other publicly available information.","1. Situation prior to the hostage-taking on 1 September 2004","(a) Terrorist attacks in 2004","20. The year 2004 saw a surge of terrorist acts in Russia entailing numerous civilian victims. Mr Shamil Basayev, the underground leader of the Chechen separatist movement, either claimed or was attributed responsibility for these acts.","21. On 6 February 2004 a suicide bomber killed over forty persons and wounded over 250 in a crowded underground train in Moscow.","22. In February and March 2004 several explosions in the Moscow Region damaged gas pipelines, a water - heating station and electricity pylons.","23. On 9 May the President of Chechnya, Mr Akhmat Kadyrov, and several senior officials were killed by a bomb placed under their tribune in a stadium in Grozny.","24. On 21-22 June a large group of armed rebel fighters attacked Nazran, Ingushetia \u2019 s largest town. They primarily targeted police stations and security offices; over ninety persons were killed and an ammunition warehouse was looted.","25. On 24 August two civilian planes which had departed from the Moscow Domodedovo airport simultaneously exploded in mid-air; ninety persons lost their lives.","26. On 31 August a suicide bomber exploded at the entrance to an underground station in Moscow, killing ten and wounding about fifty persons.","(b) Evaluation of the terrorist threat in North Ossetia","27. On 18 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued the following telex no. 1751 to all local departments of the interior:","\u201c[The North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior] has received information indicating movements of participants of [illegal armed groups] from the plains of [Ingushetia] and [Chechnya] to the mountainous and forested area along the border of [Ingushetia] and [North Ossetia]. The fighters \u2019 meeting is presumably planned for mid-August of the current year, following which they are intending to commit in [North Ossetia] a terrorist act similar to that in Budennovsk. According to the available data, the fighters envisage capturing a civilian object with hostages in the territory of [North Ossetia], and then submitting demands to the country \u2019 s leadership for withdrawal of troops from [Chechnya]. A large sum of money in [foreign] currency has apparently been transferred from Turkey. [This information is] transmitted in order for preventive measures to be taken.\u201d","28. On 27 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued decree no. 500 \u201cAbout the protection of public order and security during the Day of Knowledge in the educational facilities of North Ossetia\u201d, which was sent to all district police stations. The plan provided for heightened security awareness and an increase in the number of mobile posts and police officers near public gatherings, as well as ordering a series of measures aimed at the prevention of terrorist acts and hostage-taking during public gatherings on the Day of Knowledge in the settlements situated along the administrative border with Ingushetia. The plan further stipulated that each head of the district departments of the Interior should inform accordingly the administrations of educational facilities, put in place working plans for every such gathering and personally instruct the police staff about their functions, to carry out hourly updates of the situation at public gatherings, to ensure immediate feedback to the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior and to provide for contingency staff in each police department.","29. On 25, 27 and 28 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued three other telexes to the local departments, concerning security measures to be taken during the Day of Knowledge, heightened terrorist risks in the region and the prevention of possible attacks. The personnel of the Ministry of the Interior had been put on high alert (\u201c \u0443\u0441\u0438\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0440\u0435\u0436\u0438\u043c \u043d\u0435\u0441\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b\u201d ).","(c) Preparations for the hostage-taking in Beslan","30. As revealed by subsequent investigations, in the last days of August 2004 a sizeable group of terrorists (no less than thirty persons) camped and trained between the villages of Psedakh and Sagopshi in the Malgobek district of Ingushetia. Early in the morning on 1 September 2004 this group crossed the administrative border between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, driving a GAZ-66 utility truck.","31. On 1 September 2004 at 7.30 a.m. Major S.G. from the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior stopped the vehicle for inspection at the administrative border in Khurikau. The terrorists unarmed him, placed him in the back seat of his own white VAZ-2107 and thus drove to Beslan. Major S.G. escaped there and later testified about these events.","2. Hostage-taking","32. At 9 a.m. on 1 September 2004 school no. 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, held a traditional Day of Knowledge ceremony to mark the opening of the academic year. Over 1,200 persons gathered in the courtyard of the E \u2011 shaped two-storey building located in Kominterna Street in the centre of the town, having a population of 35,000. The school was situated next door to the district police station of Pravoberezhny (the \u201cPravoberezhny ROVD\u201d). The gathering included schoolchildren (859), teachers and staff of the school (about 60 persons) and members of their families. Dozens of children aged below six were present in the crowd with their parents, since several kindergartens in Beslan were closed on that day for various reasons. One unarmed police officer Ms Fatima D. was present at the ceremony.","33. According to some sources, in the morning of 1 September 2004 Beslan \u2019 s traffic police were called to secure the passage of Mr Dzasokhov, the North Ossetian President, through the town. The applicants referred to the testimony of the traffic policemen and servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD to the effect that they had been instructed to take various positions along the route of Mr Dzasokhov \u2019 s convoy, and thus leave the school unprotected.","34. In the first minutes of the ceremony, at about 9.05 a.m., a group of at least thirty-two persons (the number of terrorists is disputed \u2013 see below), armed with various weapons, including machine guns, explosives and handguns, encircled the persons in the school courtyard and, shooting in the air, ordered them to enter the school through the main door and through the smashed windows on the ground floor. A GAZ-66 vehicle entered the yard through the main gates and a group of terrorists jumped out of it; according to some witnesses other terrorists came from behind the school and yet another group was already in the building.","35. The terrorists in the main courtyard fired into the air and there was an exchange of fire with the local residents or police. At least two local residents were killed (Mr R. Gappoyev and Mr F. Frayev) and some were wounded during the skirmish. It also appears that two terrorists were wounded. About one hundred persons, mostly adults and senior students, managed to escape at this point. Another fifteen persons hid in the boiler building, from where they were rescued later in the day.","36. Despite the initial chaos, the terrorists managed to round up the majority of those present in the courtyard \u2013 1,128 persons (the exact figure is disputed by some sources), including about 800 children aged between several months and eighteen years. Several groups of hostages initially tried to hide inside the school or to escape through the fire exits, but the terrorists were in firm control of the building and escorted everyone to the gymnasium.","37. The hostages were assembled in the gymnasium located on the ground floor in the central part of the building and measuring about 250 square metres. The terrorists informed them that it was a terrorist act and that they had to obey. The hostages \u2019 personal belongings, mobile phones and cameras were confiscated, and they were ordered to sit on the floor.","38. Then the attackers proceeded to arrange a system of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) around the gymnasium, using basketball hoops and gymnasium ladders for support. Male hostages were forced to assist them in this task, which was completed within about two hours. A single chain connected several smaller IEDs hanging above the hostages \u2019 heads, two large IEDs attached to basketball hoops on the opposite walls of the gymnasium and several heavier ones placed on the floor. Some IEDs were filled with parts such as metal pellets, screws and bolts. They were connected by wire to pedal detonators (\u201cdead man \u2019 s switch\u201d) constantly held by two terrorists in turns. Two women wearing ample black clothes with explosive belts underneath \u2013 suicide bombers \u2013 remained in the gymnasium among the hostages.","39. The attackers smashed the windows of the gymnasium, to allow air and probably to avoid the use of gas as a means of attack. Several rooms around the school building were turned into firing points, with windows smashed and stocks of food, water and ammunition arranged. During the day on 1 September 2004 the terrorists kept shooting out of school windows in the direction of military personnel and civilians gathered outside.","40. At 9.25 a.m. the Ministry of the Interior in Vladikavkaz received information about the seizure of the school; it was immediately transmitted to the North Ossetian President Mr A. Dzasokhov and the Federal Security Service (the \u201cFSB\u201d).","3. Events of 1-2 September 2004","(a) The hostages \u2019 situation","41. The hostages were forced to sit in very cramped conditions on the floor of the gymnasium. During the first hours of captivity some families remained separated, but they were allowed to reunite later during the day of 1 September.","42. The hostages were ordered to keep quiet and not to speak in languages other than Russian. Mr Ruslan Betrozov, father of two sons present in the gymnasium, repeated the captors \u2019 orders in Ossetian. One of the terrorists walked up to him and executed him in full view of the persons present in the gymnasium by shooting him in the head; his body was removed only several hours later. Mr Betrozov \u2019 s sons, Alan (born in 1988) and Aslan (born in 1990) witnessed the execution; both boys died on 3 September 2004 during the storming. Another father of three, Mr Vadim Bolloyev, was shot in the shoulder in the first hours of the crisis apparently because he refused to obey the terrorists \u2019 orders. He died in the gymnasium by the end of 1 September. His younger son Sarmat (born in 1998) survived the attack; his two daughters Zarina (born in 1993) and Madina (born in 1995) died during the storming.","43. During the day on 1 September 2004 the attackers allowed groups of children, under their escort and accompanied by adults, to access the toilets outside the sports hall, to drink tap water. They also ordered senior students to bring water into the hall in buckets and to distribute it among the hostages by small portions. Also on 1 September the terrorists brought into the gymnasium a large TV screen and on several occasions turned on the radio, so that some hostages could hear the news about the events.","44. On 1 September the terrorists allowed the elderly and sick hostages, as well as some mothers with nursing babies, to stay in the smaller adjacent weights room, where they could stretch on the floor. Later these persons were brought into the sports hall.","45. Starting from 2 September the terrorists refused to allow the hostages water and ordered them to use buckets to relieve themselves and to drink their own urine. They announced to the hostages that the tap water had been poisoned and that they had declared a \u201cdry hunger strike\u201d in support of their captors \u2019 demands. Some of the hostages chewed leaves of the interior plants in order to relieve their thirst. The survivors later complained of exasperating thirst and heat prevailing on the 2nd and especially on the 3rd of September 2004.","(b) Execution of male hostages","46. From the outset the terrorists separated most men and forced them to perform various tasks in order to fortify the building or to place IEDs. They were told that their disobedience would lead to execution of women and children in the hall.","47. Thus, in the morning of 1 September, two male hostages were ordered to lift floorboards in the library. Floorboards were also lifted in the corners of the gymnasium. Others were ordered to move furniture and blackboards to the windows of various classrooms and corridors.","48. In the afternoon of 1 September several men were lined up in the corridor of the ground floor. An explosion occurred there at 4.05 p.m., as a result of which several male hostages were killed or injured. One (or two) women suicide bombers and one terrorist of Arab descent were killed by this blast. Several explanations of that explosion were put forward; the criminal investigation accepted that the terrorist in charge of the operation, \u201c Polkovnik \u201d (Colonel), had executed the male hostages whom the terrorists no longer needed and at the same time activated the suicide bomber \u2019 s explosive belt because the women had objected to the treatment of children. Some of the surviving hostages testified that there had been an attack from the outside, as a result of which the explosive belt had detonated and killed the woman bomber, the Arab terrorist and several hostages.","49. Male hostages who survived the explosion in the corridor were finished off by automatic rifles. Karen Mdinaradze survived the explosion as well as the ensuing execution. When the terrorists discovered that he was still alive, he was allowed to return to the gymnasium, where he fainted. He later testified about these events. At about 4.30 p.m. on 1 September the terrorists forced two men to throw the bodies out of a window on the first floor. One of them, Aslan Kudzayev, jumped out the window; he was wounded but survived. His wife is an applicant, she and her infant daughter were released on 2 September; their other daughter remained in the gymnasium and received injuries during the storming.","50. According to the investigation, sixteen men were killed by the terrorists on 1 September. Another sixteen persons were wounded on 1 September as a result of shots fired by the terrorists.","51. On 2 September at about 3 p.m. the terrorists fired several rounds from automatic weapons from the windows of the school, although it appears that no one was hurt and that no return fire followed.","(c) Negotiation attempts","52. At around 11 a.m. on 1 September the terrorists transferred a note to the authorities via one of the hostages, ambulance doctor Mrs Larisa Mamitova. She walked to the school gates, handed the note to a man who approached her and returned; in the meantime her minor son was held at gunpoint inside the building. This note contained a mobile telephone number and the names of persons with whom the terrorists wanted to negotiate: the North Ossetian President Mr Dzasokhov, the Ingushetian President Mr Zyazikov and paediatrician Mr Roshal. The note also stated that the school building had been mined and would be blown up in case of an attempt to storm it and that the terrorists would shoot fifty hostages for any one of them killed. However, it appears that the mobile telephone number was either wrongly noted or had been switched off, and no telephone contact could be established at that time.","53. At 1 p.m. on 1 September the Russian State TV programme \u201c Vesti \u201d announced that the attackers had transmitted a videotape to the authorities, containing their demands and images filmed inside the school. One hour later it was announced that the videotape was empty. Later on, the very existence of this videotape remained disputed.","54. Around 4 p.m. on 1 September Mrs Mamitova brought out a second note, containing a corrected mobile telephone number and the name of another possible negotiator, aide to Russia \u2019 s President, Mr Aslakhanov. She also told the person who collected the note that there were over 1,000 hostages inside the building.","55. The authorities contacted the terrorists through a professional negotiator, FSB officer Mr Z. His attempts to discuss proposals aimed at alleviating the hostages \u2019 conditions, the possibilities of exit or surrender or the removal of the bodies from the school courtyard remained futile.","56. Mr Roshal arrived in Beslan in the afternoon of 1 September 2004. When he called the hostage-takers, on 1 and 2 September, they were hostile and told him that they would enter into negotiations only if all four persons demanded by them arrived at the school. They told him that if he attempted to enter alone, he would be killed. They also refused to accept food, water or medicines, as well as to permit him to enter the building and examine the sick and wounded.","57. On 2 September the former President of Ingushetia, Mr Ruslan Aushev, arrived in Beslan on the invitation of the operative headquarters (OH). It appears that at about 3 p.m. he, for the first time, contacted by telephone Mr Akhmed Zakayev, the head of the self-proclaimed Chechen separatist government, living in London. He told Mr Zakayev about the siege and said that the number of hostages exceeded 1,000 persons.","58. Following a telephone contact with the terrorists, at 3.30 p.m. on 2 September Mr Aushev was allowed to enter the school. He was the only person whom the terrorists agreed to let inside during the siege. Mr Aushev was led to the gymnasium and then had a meeting with the leader of the terrorists, Mr Khuchbarov (\u201c Polkovnik \u201d).","59. Following negotiations, Mr Aushev was permitted to leave with twenty \u2011 six (other sources indicate twenty-four) persons \u2013 nursing mothers and their babies; all women had elder children in the school and were forced to leave them behind.","60. Mr Aushev brought out a message addressed to the Russian President Mr V. Putin from Mr Shamil Basayev. It demanded the pulling of troops out of Chechnya and the official recognition of Chechnya as an independent state. In return, it promised cessation of terrorist activities in Russia \u201cfor the ensuing ten or fifteen years\u201d. It bore no mention of the school siege. It appears that the terrorists also gave Mr Aushev a videotape depicting part of his visit, the gymnasium with the hostages, explosive devices and one terrorist holding his foot on the \u201cdead man \u2019 s switch\u201d. It also contained Mr Khuchbarov \u2019 s statement that the negotiations should involve Mr Aslan Maskhadov, the President of the self-proclaimed independent Chechen State, who had been in hiding at the time.","61. On 2 September and in the morning of 3 September the attackers tried to contact the authorities of North Ossetia with the assistance of the school director, Mrs Tsaliyeva. Two hostages \u2013 children of the North Ossetian Parliament \u2019 s speaker, Mr Mamsurov, \u2013 were allowed to call their father on his mobile telephone and to tell him that they were suffering without water and food. It appears that family members of other possible contacts among officials and public figures (district prosecutor, a well-known sportsman) were singled out by the terrorists but that no contact was established.","62. In parallel to the negotiations carried out through Mr Z., on 2 September direct contact with the terrorists was established through Mr Gutseriyev, an influential businessman of Ingush origin. The latter supplied Mr Aushev with the requisite telephone numbers, participated in the conversations with Mr Akhmed Zakayev and eventually tried to liaise with Mr Maskhadov.","63. Thus, as can be judged from various information sources, at around 5 p.m. on 2 September Mr Aushev, Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Zakayev held a telephone conversation during which Mr Zakayev promised to involve Mr Maskhadov in the negotiations (see paragraphs 139, 321, 331, 339 below). Some sources indicated that these talks had apparently resulted in Mr Maskhadov \u2019 s agreement to come to Beslan.","(d) Coordination of the authorities \u2019 actions and involvement of army and security detachments","64. At about 10.30 a.m. on 1 September 2004 the crisis OH was set up on the premises of the Beslan town administration. The exact composition, leadership and powers of this structure remain disputed. According to most sources, initially it was headed by Mr A. Dzasokhov, the North Ossetian President, and as of 2 September by General V. Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB. It was later established that the OH included the deputy head of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia Mr Tsyban, the head of the North Ossetian Ministry of Emergency Situations (\u201cEmercom\u201d) Mr Dzgoyev, the North Ossetian Minister of Education Mrs Levitskaya, deputy head of the Information programme departments of the State Telecommunication corporation Rossiya Mr Vasilyev and the commander-in-chief of the 58th Army of the Ministry of Defence General Sobolev (see paragraphs 140, 168, 193, 312 - 333 below).","65. The detachments of the 58th Army started to arrive in Beslan in the afternoon of 1 September. On 2 September 2004 eight armoured personnel vehicles (APCs) and several tanks of the 58th Army arrived in Beslan. They were placed under the command of the FSB special purpose units and positioned around the school but out of the terrorists \u2019 sight.","66. Early in the morning of 3 September the FSB special purpose units went to Vladikavkaz for joint training with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence to prepare for a possible storming.","(e) Situation with the hostages \u2019 relatives outside the school","67. Thousands of people in Beslan were directly concerned with the crisis.","68. Despite the attempts of the authorities to clear the area, local residents, as well as ethnic Ossetians from outside Beslan, some of them armed, remained around the school building throughout the siege.","69. In the afternoon of 1 September the hostages \u2019 relatives were invited to the building of the town Cultural Centre. Until the end of the siege the Cultural Centre remained a hub for communicating with the relatives and for the provision of medical and psychological assistance to them.","70. At 7 p.m. on 1 September the North Ossetian President Mr Dzasokhov, the deputy speaker of the North Ossetian parliament Mr Kesayev and the North Ossetian Deputy Minister of the Interior Mr Sikoyev met with the relatives in the Cultural Centre. During this meeting Mr Sikoyev informed them that the terrorists had not put forward any demands and that they had refused to accept food, water or medicine for the hostages.","71. At about 9.30 p.m. on 1 September Mr Roshal participated in the meeting at the Cultural Centre. He assured the gathering that the conditions in the school were \u201cacceptable\u201d and that the hostages could survive several days without food or water. He also stated that the terrorists had not put forward any demands to the authorities.","72. On 2 September a psychological aid unit was set up at the Cultural Centre.","73. Late in the evening on 2 September Mr Dzasokhov held another meeting with the relatives at the Cultural Centre.","74. At 11.15 a.m. on 3 September Mr Dzasokhov announced to the relatives that there would be no storming and that \u201cnew personalities\u201d had appeared in the negotiation process.","75. Some of the applicants were among the relatives who gathered outside the school building or stayed at the Cultural Centre and have submitted written statements describing these events.","(f) Information about the crisis","76. From the outset the information about the hostage-taking was strictly controlled by the authorities. Mr Vasilyev, a member of the OH and senior employee of the State TV company Rossiya was put in charge of contacting the journalists.","77. In the afternoon of 1 September the media announced referring to the official sources that about 250 persons had been taken hostage. Later on the same day the media reported a \u201ccorrected\u201d number of hostages: 354 persons. According to some hostages, this news outraged the terrorists and prompted them to execute or at least throw out of the window the bodies of the executed men. It also transpires from the hostages \u2019 statements that after these announcements the terrorists refused to allow them to drink or go to the toilet, saying that \u201cthere should anyway be no more than 350 of you left\u201d (see paragraph 285 below).","78. In the evening of 2 September Mr Roshal held a press-conference. He announced that he had talked on the telephone with a terrorist nicknamed \u201c Gorets \u201d (highlander) who had put forward no demands.","79. At 1 p.m. on 3 September the State TV showed terrorists \u2019 relatives of Ingush origin who asked them to release the hostages. One woman, the wife of a presumed hostage-taker, said that she and her children were being held somewhere \u201cagainst their will\u201d and asked her husband to do everything \u201cto avoid harming the children\u201d.","4. Storming and rescue operation","(a) Morning of 3 September 2004","80. The hostages in the gymnasium were extremely exhausted and suffered from thirst and hunger. They had spent two days without sleep, in cramped conditions and the physical state of many had worsened: people started to lose consciousness; some children were hallucinating, having seizures and vomiting.","81. Early in the morning the terrorists lifted the IEDs in the gymnasium from the floor, hanging them along the walls.","82. At 11.10 a.m. the terrorists agreed with Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev to allow \u201cEmercom\u201d to collect the bodies from the school courtyard.","83. At about noon Mr Dzasokhov informed the OH that he had reached some sort of agreement with Mr Zakayev (see paragraph 331 below). According to some sources, that agreement could have extended to a possibility of Mr Maskhadov \u2019 s arrival in Beslan.","84. At 12.55 p.m. an \u201cEmercom\u201d truck and four officers entered the school courtyard. The men had Mr Gutseriyev \u2019 s mobile telephone to communicate with the terrorists. One of the terrorists came out and supervised their work. The explosions inside the gymnasium at 1.03 p.m. came unexpectedly to this group. The ensuing exchange of gun fire resulted in two officers \u2019 deaths.","(b) The first three explosions in the gymnasium","85. At 1.03 p.m. a powerful explosion occurred in the upper eastern part of the gymnasium. Part of the roofing was destroyed, the insulation caught fire, and fragments of the burning ceiling and roof fell into the gymnasium, killing and injuring people seated underneath. Many of the surviving hostages described the first explosion as a \u201cfire ball\u201d, or a \u201ccolumn of fire\u201d, followed by white\/silver powder falling from the ceiling. It appears that this explosion caused fire in the roof-space of the gymnasium (see paragraph 288 below). Twenty-two seconds later another explosion ripped through the lower part of the wall under the first window on the north-eastern side. The nature and origins of these explosions are disputed (see documents referred to below).","86. These two explosions killed both terrorists holding the detonators; however most of the IEDs remained intact (see paragraph 307 below). Dozens of people were killed, others were wounded or received burns of varying degrees, and almost everyone was shell-shocked. Many applicants submitted witness statements about these events.","87. Those hostages who could move and were able to reach the opening in the wall on the northern side started to climb through it and run outside. The terrorists fired at them from the upper floor, this prompted an exchange of gunfire between the terrorists and the security forces.","88. At this point General Andreyev issued an order to storm the building and to proceed with the rescue operation and neutralisation of the terrorists.","89. Several terrorists were killed or wounded during the first two explosions, however the majority of them survived, including \u201c Polkovnik \u201d. They rounded up the survivors in the gymnasium (about 300 persons) and forced them to walk to other premises of the main building, mostly in the southern wing: canteen, kitchen, meeting room and handicraft classrooms. Some hostages remained in the premises adjacent to the gymnasium (weights room, shower room).","90. The dead, injured and shell-shocked remained in the gymnasium, where the fire continued to spread in the roof-space.","91. At about 1.30 p.m. a third powerful explosion occurred in the southern part of the gymnasium. It appears that it was caused by one of the large IEDs which had caught fire. Soon afterwards flames spread around the gymnasium, taking to the floor and walls of the premises. Some hostages continued to escape through the openings in the walls.","92. Between 1.30 p.m. and 2.50 p.m. servicemen of the security services and local residents broke the western wall of the gymnasium and entered the hall. They helped to evacuate survivors. Their movements were covered by an APC which came close to the school. No terrorists were found there, but the gymnasium was under fire, probably from terrorist snipers on the first floor.","93. At about 1.40 p.m. part of the burning roofing collapsed.","94. Hundreds of wounded hostages and servicemen were taken to the Beslan hospital in private cars and ambulances. An \u201cEmercom\u201d field hospital had been spread out in tents in the hospital courtyard in order to sort out the wounded and cope with the influx. Many injured were taken to the hospitals in Vladikavkaz. The hostages \u2019 relatives were not allowed to enter the hospital. Over 750 civilians and over 50 servicemen received medical help on 3 September 2004 (see paragraphs 242 below and subsequent).","(c) Hostages in the southern wing","95. Over 300 hostages who had survived the explosions and fire in the gymnasium were taken by the terrorists to the canteen and kitchen situated on the ground floor in the southern wing. Other hostages were taken to the main meeting room situated above the canteen on the first floor. There they found stocks of water and food and could relieve their thirst for the first time in two and a half days.","96. The women and children in the canteen and meeting room were forced by the terrorists at gunpoint to stand in the windows and wave their clothes; some were killed or wounded by gunfire and explosions.","(d) Ensuing fighting","97. As shown by many witness statements, but not corroborated by the results of the criminal investigation, after 2 p.m. a tank with hull number 320 entered the school yard and fired several rounds at the canteen. It appears that another tank, with hull number 325 or 328, also fired at the school from a distance of about 20-30 metres. Some of the rounds were fired with solid shots, while others were probably done with ammunition (see paragraphs 294, 298, 303, 411 below).","98. Two APCs entered the school yard and took part in the fighting with their large-calibre machine guns.","99. The army and FSB assault troops were positioned on the roofs of the five-storey apartment blocks, nos. 37, 39 and 41 of Shkolny Lane, located on the eastern side of the school. These servicemen fired at the school with portable grenade-launchers and fire-launchers, although the exact timing of these attacks is disputed (see paragraphs 152, 293, 300, 408, 410 below). Two MI-24 helicopters circled above the school. According to some sources, although not corroborated by the official investigation, at least one rocket was launched from a helicopter on the school \u2019 s roof (see paragraph 410 below).","100. At 3.10 p.m. the OH ordered fire brigades with water cannons to intervene, by which time the gymnasium was ablaze and other parts of the building were on fire (see paragraphs 160, 209, 304 below). At the same time the head of the OH ordered the servicemen of the FSB special forces units Alfa and Vympel to enter the building.","101. At about 3.30 p.m. the entire roof of the gymnasium collapsed. After 4.30 p.m. the fire was contained; the servicemen of the special forces and firefighters entered the gymnasium, but found no survivors there.","102. It appears that the servicemen of the special forces entered the canteen at about 4 p.m. through the openings in the walls and through the windows, once the metal bars blocking them had fallen inside as a result of an explosion or had been pulled out with an APC. Amid fierce fighting they evacuated the surviving hostages.","103. Numerous bodies of terrorists and hostages were found in the canteen, the meeting room and rooms and corridors of the southern wing.","104. At about 5 p.m. a strict security perimeter was established around the school. All civilians, \u201cEmercom\u201d staff, firefighters and servicemen of the army were ordered to leave, leaving only the FSB special forces inside. At about 5.25 p.m. the servicemen of the FSB special units held a minute \u2019 s silence in the corridor of the southern wing in order to honour the memory of their comrades: ten members of the elite Vympel and Alfa units, including three group commanders, had lost their lives and about thirty were wounded \u2013 the biggest losses ever sustained by these units in a single operation.","105. After 6 p.m. several shots were fired at the southern wing of the building from anti-tank missiles and flame-throwers.","106. At about 9 p.m. two tanks fired at the school. There followed several powerful explosions which completely destroyed the walls and roofing of the handicraft classrooms in the southern wing.","107. The gunfire and explosions at the school continued until past midnight.","108. One terrorist, Nurpashi Kulayev, was captured alive. The rest, it appears, were killed during the storming. Consistent rumours circulated that some terrorists had escaped or were captured clandestinely.","5. Events of 4 September 2004, identification of bodies and burials","109. In the night of 4 September Russian President Putin arrived in Beslan for several hours. He visited the town hospital and administration.","110. The school building remained encircled by soldiers throughout the day of 4 September.","111. At 7 a.m. \u201cEmercom\u201d staff started to collect the bodies and to clear the debris. Between 112 and 116 charred bodies were found in the gymnasium, and about 80 bodies in the adjacent premises (changing rooms, weights room). It appears that between 106 and 110 bodies were found in the southern wing of the school and on other premises, although no exact information has been recorded in this respect (see paragraphs 130-133 below). 18 bodies of men were collected in the courtyard. About 330 bodies (including over 180 children) were placed in the school yard and then taken to the Vladikavkaz morgue.","112. During the day on 4 September bulldozers and trucks arrived at the school. The remaining debris was loaded onto trucks and taken to the town rubbish dump. The victims alleged that they and other locals later found a number of important items of evidence among this rubbish, including the terrorists \u2019 personal belongings such as backpacks and razor blades, human remains, hostages \u2019 clothes, parts of IEDs.","113. At 6 p.m. on 4 September the security lines in Beslan were lifted. On the same day after 8 p.m. the units of the 58th army withdrew from the town.","114. On 5 September 2004 the first funerals took place. Over the following days collective burials of over 100 people followed. The local cemetery was too small and had to be extended; later a special memorial was erected there (see paragraph 425 below).","115. However, many bodies were charred beyond recognition. On 17 September 73 bodies were taken to the forensic laboratory in Rostov \u2011 on \u2011 Don for identification through DNA tests. The identification and burials continued throughout December 2004 (see paragraphs 340- 341 below).","116. The 5th and 6th of September 2004 were declared days of national mourning. On 6 September 2004 Russian President Putin spoke in a televised address to the nation announcing future measures to improve agencies \u2019 cooperation in counter-terrorism measures. He called the attack a \u201cdirect intervention of international terrorism against Russia\u201d.","6. Assuming of responsibility for the terrorist act","117. On 5 September 2004 the website Chechenpress.org published a message signed by \u201cthe President of Ichkeria\u201d Mr Aslan Maskhadov, condemning the hostage-taking and terrorist attacks against civilians, but blaming the Russian authorities for the radicalisation of the Chechens.","118. On 17 September 2004 the website Kavkazcenter.com disseminated an e \u2011 mail, allegedly from Mr Shamil Basayev, a leader of the radical wing of the Chechen separatist movement, who used the titles of \u201c Amir of Riyad \u2011 us Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs\u201d and \u201cthe chief of the high military madjlisul shura of the united Caucasus mujahidin \u201d. Mr Basayev, who at the time lived clandestinely in the Russian Northern Caucasus, claimed that his \u201cmartyrs \u2019 battalion\u201d had carried out the attack in Beslan, as well as the explosions in Moscow and the plane crashes in August 2004.","119. The e-mail alleged that the special forces had started the storming and that the IEDs set up by the attackers in the gymnasium had not exploded. Mr Basayev further claimed that the following demands had been put to the authorities: that military actions in Chechnya be stopped, that troops be pulled out and that President Putin step down from his post. The note stated that all hostages, including children, had declared a \u201cdry hunger strike\u201d until these demands were granted. The letter contained details about the number and types of IEDs used, indicated the ethnic origin of thirty \u2011 three \u201c mujahedin \u201d who had taken part in \u201cOperation Nord-West\u201d (as they named the attack at the school) and alleged that the group had gathered and trained for the preceding ten days under Mr Basayev \u2019 s personal leadership near the village of Batako-Yurt [near Psedakh in Ingushetia]. The letter also mentioned the message to President Putin, which had been transmitted through Mr Aushev, and contained its full text. Mr Basayev alleged that the only surviving terrorist, Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, had been taken into the group on the night preceding the operation. The document further stated that the leader of the operation, \u201c Polkovnik \u201d, had called him after the storming had started to say that they had counterattacked, and that the last call from him had been received at 2 a.m. [on 4 September]. Finally, the letter cited the alleged costs of the terrorist attacks of August-September 2004: 8,000 euros (EUR) for \u201cOperation Nord-West\u201d, 7,000 US dollars (USD) for the explosions in Moscow and USD 4,000 for the planes.","120. In August 2005 the same website published another message signed by Mr Shamil Basayev. This message contained passages suggesting that a member of the group which had seized the school, Mr Vladimir Khodov, had been a double agent of the FSB and of Mr Basayev and that he had ensured the group \u2019 s \u201ccoverage\u201d during the preparation for the attack and their unhindered passage to North Ossetia.","121. On 10 July 2010 Mr Basayev was killed by an explosion in Ingushetia. It was announced that his death was a result of a special operation by the Russian security services; it was also reported that the blast had resulted from mishandling of explosives.","7. Criminal investigation file no. 20\/849","122. On 1 September 2004 the North Ossetian Prosecutor opened criminal investigation no. 20\/849 concerning a terrorist attack at the school by an armed group and the murder of twelve male hostages.","123. On 2 September 2004 Mr Fridinskiy, Deputy General Prosecutor, ordered the transfer of the investigation concerning the hostage-taking of over 600 persons to the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office in the Northern Caucasus. On the same day Mr Fridinskiy appointed a group of over sixty investigators from the prosecutors \u2019 offices from the Southern Federal Circuit to take over the investigation, under the command of a special investigator of the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office in the Northern Caucasus.","124. This investigation has been extended on several occasions and is still pending (adjourned).","125. Many important investigative steps aimed at establishing the exact circumstances of the preparation and carrying out of the terrorist act, as well as the explosions in the gymnasium and the ensuing storming, have been taken in the course of these proceedings. The applicants claimed that in the course of proceedings they have not been allowed full access to the documents of this file and challenged this aspect of proceedings. Upon the Court \u2019 s requests, the Government submitted the list of documents contained in this criminal case. According to this list, by 2012 the case-file contained 235 volumes, each ranging, on the average, between 200 and 350 pages. The available information may be summarised as follows.","(a) Reconstruction of the events preceding the hostage-taking and identification of the organisers of the crime","126. The investigation found out that the group which had committed the terrorist act had been organised by Mr Aslan Maskhadov, Mr Shamil Basayev, \u201ca mercenary of Arab descent\u201d called Taufik-al-Jedani (Abu-Dzeyt), and their entourage. The aim of the group was \u201cto break public peace and to scare the population, to put pressure on the State authorities in order to achieve withdrawal of troops from Chechnya\u201d. In July-August 2004 the said persons had put together a plan to seize a large number of hostages among pupils and parents of school no. 1 in Beslan, as well as to commit murders of civilians, police officers and military servicemen.","127. In the second half of August 2004 the said persons put together an organised criminal group (gang), comprising over thirty persons. Its members included residents of Chechnya, Ingushetia, other regions of Russia and foreign mercenaries. The organisers of the terrorist act entrusted the command of the operation to an active member of the gang, Mr Khuchbarov from Ingushetia, who used the nickname \u201cRasul\u201d and radio call \u201c Polkovnik \u201d (colonel). Twenty-four terrorists were identified by their names, while at least six persons remained unidentified.","128. On 31 August 2004 the gang gathered in the vicinity of Psedakh in the Malgobek District of Ingushetia. They carried the following arms and ammunition (partly originating from the attacks in Ingushetia on 21-22 June 2004): no less than twenty Kalashnikov assault rifles, four Kalashnikov machine guns (RPK-74 and PKM), one tank machine gun (PKT), two portable anti-tank missile launchers (RPG-7v), four hand pistols and corresponding ammunition, including cartridges of different calibres and grenades of various modifications. In addition, the group carried two identical IEDs comprised of plastic explosives and hexogen, filled with metal pellets and electro detonators, with an impact radius of no less than 200 metres; six IEDs made of OZM-72 anti-personnel circular fragmentation mines; and so-called \u201csuicide bomber belts\u201d \u2013 IEDs containing plastic explosives and projectiles made of cut metal wires and metal sheets. The gang also used mobile telephones, a radio station and portable radio transmitters. The members were supplied with camouflaged clothes, balaclava masks and gas masks. They used a GAZ-66 vehicle to travel.","129. On 31 August 2004 Mr Khuchbarov informed the members of the gang about the forthcoming attack and distributed the roles between them. Early in the morning of 1 September 2004 they travelled towards Beslan; in the village of Khurikau along the way they captured local policeman S.G., also seizing his handgun and vehicle.","(b) Examination of the crime scene","130. Between 7 a.m. and 6.25 p.m. on 4 September 2004 a group of investigators and experts, in the presence of twelve attesting witnesses, compiled a report of the school building and courtyard. The examination of the site was conducted simultaneously with the clearing of the debris and rescue operation. It ran to forty-three pages and was accompanied by video and photo materials (over 150 pages).","131. The report mostly concentrated on the descriptions of the items found in the school, including personal belongings and documents of the hostages, the terrorists \u2019 equipment and ammunition, damage to the structures of the building, as well as the terrorists \u2019 bodies. Very little information was given about the location and state of the hostages \u2019 bodies; most notably, page 24 of the report contained the following passage: \u201c[in the gymnasium] from the floor up to 40-50 centimetres high there are found hundreds of burnt bodies of women, children and men, occupying about half of the gymnasium \u2019 s surface\u201d. The report noted that the bodies were being carried out by the \u201cEmercom\u201d staff into the courtyard.","132. The description of the canteen on page 15 failed to mention the state of its two windows facing the railway line or to give any details about the nature and extent of damage to its walls other than \u201csigns of damage from firearms on the walls [entailing] falling off of whitewash\u201d.","133. The description of the southern wing on page 23 was limited to the following: \u201cthe said wing is almost destroyed and the \u201cEmercom\u201d servicemen are clearing the debris, as a result of which no examination of this wing is carried out\u201d.","(c) Expert report no. 1","134. Upon the investigation \u2019 s requests of October and November 2004, on 23 December 2005 an \u201call \u2011 round forensic expert examination no. 1\u201d (\u201c \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u0430\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0430 \u201d, hereinafter \u201cexpert report no. 1\u201d) was produced. The request was to evaluate the conduct of the OH and of various military and security agencies on 1-3 September 2004. The experts visited the sites in Beslan and examined numerous items of evidence, including testimony of servicemen and other witnesses, photographs, graphic tables, and tapes of telephone and radio conversations. The report comprised over seventy pages. It concluded that the actions of the officials had been lawful and reasonable in the circumstances. In particular, it found that the members of the OH and the servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior, the Internal Troops, the FSB and the \u201cEmercom\u201d \u201chad not committed any offences which could bear a causal relationship with the negative consequences resulting from the terrorist act of 1-3 September 2004 in Beslan\u201d.","135. This document was extensively cited and relied upon in the subsequent proceedings, even though it was later declared invalid (see paragraph 166 below).","136. The report focused on several questions.","(i) Actions of the Operative Headquarters (OH)","137. First, the report found that the actions of the OH had been focused on negotiations with the terrorists in order to obtain release and safety for a maximum number of persons. The terrorists \u2019 demands transmitted through Mr Aushev could not have served as the subject-matter of negotiations, since they threatened the basis of the Constitutional order and Russia \u2019 s territorial integrity.","138. The involvement of Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev as negotiators, as suggested to the OH by the FSB, and the success of Mr Aushev \u2019 s mission when he took out twenty-six persons, had served as an antidote against the escalation of the ethnic Ossetian-Ingush conflict.","139. In respect of Mr Maskhadov \u2019 s involvement in the negotiations, the report found that Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Aushev had talked to Mr Zakayev on 3 September in the morning and that the latter had told them that his connection with Mr Maskhadov had remained at a one-way level. They suggested to Mr Zakayev that he contacted Mr Shamil Basayev, but he refused in view of their past conflict.","140. The report also covered the question of Mr Dzasokhov \u2019 s involvement in the OH. It stated that on the morning of 1 September 2004 Mr Dzasokhov had taken an active part in the work of the OH. Under his command the officials had ensured a security perimeter around the school, informed the public about the measures taken, supplied the local population with the necessary provisions in the Cultural Centre, and set up a field hospital. The information to the inhabitants was provided hourly through Mr Dzugayev, the North Ossetian President \u2019 s press-secretary. Mr Dzasokhov took care of the immediate needs of the first day of the siege, coordinating various agencies involved, increasing the security of other vital objects in the Republic. When the terrorists named him as a negotiator, Mr Dzasokhov had been prepared to go ahead, but the OH formally prohibited him from doing so.","141. Having scrutinised the taped conversations between the hostage \u2011 takers and the OH, as well as between the terrorists inside the building and their collaborators outside (namely several conversations with someone using the call-name \u201cMagas\u201d recorded after the start of the storming), the experts found that the terrorists had unconditionally refused to discuss any measures aimed at alleviating the hostages \u2019 situation, or any other arrangements except for political demands relating to the situation in Chechnya, and insisted that the hostages had voluntarily joined them in declaring a \u201cdry hunger strike\u201d. The telephone conversations were often ended by them in an aggressive manner and without apparent reason. Furthermore, they had anticipated and planned their own deaths, as well as numerous deaths among the hostages, as attested by the cheers and support received by them from \u201cMagas\u201d once the storming had started. These later conversations contained references to the \u201cmeeting in heaven\u201d, \u201cfulfilling the duty\u201d, becoming martyrs ( Shahid ), welcomed the killing of infidels and referred to the situation of the storming as \u201cgoing normal\u201d.","(ii) Prevention of the terrorist act","142. The report relied on numerous telexes, orders and directives issued by the Ministry of the Interior and the FSB in July \u2013 August 2004, indicating a heightened terrorist threat in the Northern Caucasus and ordering various measures to be taken by the local police and security forces. As of 22 August all forces of the Ministry of the Interior in the Southern Federal Circuit had been put on alert (\u201c \u0443\u0441\u0438\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0432\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043d\u0442 \u043d\u0435\u0441\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b \u201d). On 24 and 31 August special measures were requested from the local police offices to prevent terrorist acts from taking place during the Day of Knowledge on 1 September.","143. In respect of the Pravoberezhny ROVD of Beslan (situated next to the school building) the report concluded that the commanding officers had failed to take certain preventive steps. In particular, the personnel of the ROVD had not been instructed about the actions to be taken in case of emergency, and no plan had been put in place to ensure additional security during the ceremonies in the schools. The only police officer present at school no. 1 was unarmed, namely Mrs D. Two other police officers who had been scheduled to guard the school during the ceremony were absent. Two patrol officers of the transport police had been transferred elsewhere to ensure the passage of Mr Dzasokhov \u2019 s convoy along the \u201cKavkaz\u201d federal highway. As a result, the terrorists had unhindered access to the school and were able to force a large number of hostages inside. No reaction from the local law-enforcement bodies had been forthcoming during the first fifteen minutes of the attack.","144. The servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, having received no instructions beforehand and having no preliminary plan of action in the event of a terrorist act, had received arms and ammunitions at the ROVD and by 10 a.m. had set up a security cordon around the school. Information about the school siege had been immediately transmitted to the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior. The report found that the actions of the senior staff of the Pravoberezhny ROVD had amounted to professional negligence.","145. In respect of the situation in the Malgobek district of Ingushetia, the report concluded that the local police had failed to prevent the members of the gang from assembling and training there at the end of August. Reference was made to the pending criminal case against the senior officers of the Malgobek ROVD (see paragraph 363 below).","(iii) Actions of the Internal Troops","146. The report concluded that the servicemen of the Internal Troops had been employed only in the outer security perimeter around the school, the first one being ensured by the FSB special forces. They had taken no part in the fighting; their actions and equipment had been in full compliance with the relevant legal acts and pertinent to their tasks.","(iv) Actions of the special units of the FSB","147. Servicemen of the FSB special forces had taken part in the operation. They were armed with customary weapons, as well as special equipment such as RPG-26 portable grenade-launchers and RPO \u2011 A \u201cShmel\u201d portable flame-throwers.","148. Turning to the events of 3 September 2004, the report presented the following chronology. By 1 p.m. no plan existed to start the storming. Two special forces \u2019 groups had been out of Beslan training for the possible development of the situation; snipers and intelligence groups kept monitoring the object from their positions; an emergency group of thirty \u2011 two persons was positioned behind the housing blocks; and the remaining servicemen stayed at the assembly point.","149. The explosions which occurred at 1.05 p.m. were caused by two IEDs. No shots were fired at that time, as the \u201cEmercom\u201d staff were working in the front yard of the school. In any event, the place of the explosion was invisible from the snipers \u2019 positions.","150. No flames appeared in the gymnasium after the two explosions. The hostages started to run out through the openings ripped in the walls. The terrorists opened fire on the escaping people using automatic rifles and machine guns. Pursuant to the instruction of the head of the OH, the servicemen of the special forces were ordered to save the hostages. The terrorists were aimed at by the fire-support group and under cover of three APC-80s.","151. A group of servicemen entered the weights room and evacuated from it several women with small children. This group then entered the gymnasium and started to take out the hostages. The terrorists opened fire at them. Two servicemen took positions on the floor and returned fire, while the rest continued to lead the hostages out. At about 1.40-1.50 p.m. the terrorists fired several shots from portable grenade-launchers (RPG \u2011 18 \u201c Mukha \u201d) at the gymnasium, killing and injuring several hostages, wounding two officers of the special forces and starting a fire in the gymnasium.","152. The rescue operation lasted until 2.40 p.m., at which time all available FSB forces had been regrouped pursuant to a previously adopted plan. At 3 p.m., upon an order from the commander, they stormed the building. Their movements inside the building were slowed down by low visibility from smoke and whitewash powder and the presence of hostages whom the terrorists were using as human shields. The terrorists employed automatic weapons, hand grenades and portable grenade-launchers, while the FSB forces were constrained to fire single shots, to avoid excessive harm to the hostages. By 6 p.m. no hostages remained in the building. Only once this had been ensured did the forces of the FSB use heavy weapons against the terrorists who had refused to surrender. Hand grenades, RPG \u2011 20 portable grenade-launchers and \u201cShmel\u201d flame-throwers were used for the first time after 6 p.m. At 9 p.m. a T-72 tank was used to make openings in the walls and to suppress enemy fire points, since further movements in the building were impossible because of mines laid by the terrorists. The records of the site examinations and video materials showed that no bodies of hostages were found in places where the terrorists were killed by heavy arms and team weapons.","153. Ten servicemen of the special forces were killed during the operation, and eleven received injuries. The fatal casualties included two lieutenant-colonels [group commanders], one of whom had died in the first minutes of the storming when he rushed to the school covering the escaping hostages; the second died in the main meeting room while trying to release the hostages detained there.","154. The report analysed the circumstances of the deaths and injuries of each serviceman of the special forces which occurred between 1.20 p.m. and 3 p.m. on 3 September and concluded that their actions had been lawful and adequate and had demonstrated their high professionalism, courage and self \u2011 sacrifice.","(v) Actions of the army","155. The commander of the 58th army of the Ministry of Defence, General Sobolev, was informed of the hostage taking at 9.38 a.m. on 1 September. On the same day, by 1.30 p.m. the third ring of the security perimeter had been set up around the school by the 58th army servicemen. The servicemen were armed with various automatic weapons and portable grenade and mine launchers, but they did not use any of them since their task was limited to maintaining the security line.","156. As to the use of military vehicles, the report found, on the basis of various descriptions, plans, logbooks and servicemen \u2019 s testimony, that on 2 September three T-72 tanks with hull numbers 320, 325 and 328 had been transferred under the command of the FSB officers. Tanks with hull numbers 320 and 328 manoeuvred around the school following the commands of the FSB officers but did not open fire. Tank with hull number 325 fired seven high-fragmentation shots, calibre 125 millimetres, at the canteen situated in the right wing of the school, following the directions of the FSB officer in charge. The shots were fired between 9 p.m. and 9.30 p.m. on 3 September 2004. The report concluded that the use of the tank had occurred after the end of the rescue operation at 6 p.m., when no harm could have been caused to the hostages and was guided by the need to suppress enemy fire in the most efficient way.","157. Several other military vehicles were used during the operation, also under the command of the FSB officers. Eight APC-80s were stationed at various points around the school from 1 or 2 September 2004 onwards. Of them two, with hull numbers 823 and 824, took part in the storming operation. APC number 823 used a heavy machine gun (calibre 7.62 millimetres) between 2 p.m. and 2.20 p.m. to suppress terrorists \u2019 firing positions on the school \u2019 s roof. At the same time an APC with hull number 824 fired several rounds from a heavy machine gun at the windows of the first floor, covering the Alpha servicemen who had entered the building. The remaining military vehicles took no active part in the fighting. The experts concluded that the use of the machine guns in the circumstances was fully appropriate and could not have entailed injuries or deaths among the hostages.","(vi) Actions of \u201cEmercom\u201d","158. From 9.35 a.m. on 1 September, various services of \u201cEmercom\u201d from North Ossetia and neighbouring regions began to arrive at school no. 1. They included brigades specialising in extinguishing major fires and fire engines with water tanks or cisterns. Rescue workers arrived with special equipment and search dogs. At 5 p.m. on 1 September 2004 fourteen psychologists started working with the relatives; by 4 September 2004 fifty \u2011 one psychologists were working in Beslan. The centre of psychological assistance was in the Cultural Centre, where ambulance doctors were called whenever necessary. In total, between 1 and 4 September 2004, 254 persons and seventy vehicles of \u201cEmercom\u201d were deployed in Beslan.","159. At 12.40 p.m. on 3 September four servicemen of the \u201cEmercom\u201d rescue team were instructed to retrieve bodies from the school \u2019 s courtyard. They received safety guarantees and a mobile telephone to communicate with the terrorists in the school. Following the explosions in the gymnasium, chaotic firing from the upper floor and roof by the terrorists left two servicemen dead and two injured.","160. The report then focussed on the actions of the fire brigades on 3 September. At 2.51 p.m. a fire alert was given to the firefighting service. At 3.20-3.25 p.m. fire brigades arrived at the scene. The delay in arriving was caused by the order of Mr Andreyev, who had considered that the firemen and their engines could have been attacked by the terrorists, rendering the rescue operation more complex. At 3.26 p.m. two brigades rolled out fire hoses and proceeded to extinguish the fire. Each cistern contained about 2,000 litres of water, which was its full capacity, used within three to five minutes. The fire hydrant in the school could not be used, as it was located in the military engagement area. At 3.35 p.m. two other fire units arrived and were stationed on the northern and eastern sides of the gymnasium. Deputy North Ossetian \u201cEmercom\u201d Minister Colonel Romanov assumed the role of incident commander. Five fire hoses were deployed. A supply of water from a water hydrant situated within 200 metres was ensured; the firemen also used water from newly arrived tanks.","161. The fire was contained and extinguished by 9.09 p.m. The operation was protracted since on two occasions the firemen were removed from the school upon the special forces \u2019 orders.","162. In the meantime, the \u201cEmercom\u201d rescue workers evacuated hostages from the school building. By 4 p.m. they took out over 300 persons, including 100 children. After the fire was extinguished, rescue teams started to search the debris in the gymnasium. They had to stop at 10.25 p.m. when unexploded IEDs were discovered and sappers were called in.","163. Immediately after midnight on 4 September a fire started in the southern wing of the school building, on the premises occupied by the canteen, handicraft classrooms, library and meeting room. Four firefighting brigades arrived on the spot and the fire was contained and extinguished by 3.10 a.m.","164. At 7 a.m. on 4 September \u201cEmercom\u201d rescue workers, assisted by military servicemen, started to clear the debris and search for the bodies. 323 dead bodies were collected and sent to the forensic unit in Vladikavkaz. At 7 p.m. the search and rescue operation in the school was over.","165. The report concluded, with reference to the evidence contained in the case file, that the deaths of 112 persons whose bodies were found in the gymnasium had been caused by the explosions of the IEDs. The bodies found there had between 70% and 100% of their surface carbonised; the carbonisation had occurred post-mortem. The firefighters had to act in extreme conditions, under threat to their lives. The organisation and equipment supplied were sufficient to ensure the carrying out of their tasks.","(vii) Challenge to the report \u2019 s conclusions","166. On 9 November 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz, upon the applicants \u2019 application, declared the expert report no. 1 invalid owing to a number of grave breaches of the procedural legislation governing the appointment of experts and the carrying out of expert evaluations.","(d) Chronology of the OH \u2019 s actions","167. The investigation established the following time-frame of the action of the OH (as set out in expert report no. 1 and subsequent documents):","(i) 1 September 2004","168. At about 10.30 a.m. the OH was set up, in accordance with the plan of action in case of terrorist threat issued on 30 July 2004. Initially it was headed by the President of North Ossetia Mr Dzasokhov, the head of the North Ossetian FSB Mr Andreyev and the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior Mr Dzantiyev. Prior to his appointment, on 2 September 2004, as head of the OH, Mr Andreyev had been in charge of coordinating the actions of various law-enforcement and military structures, including the FSB units arriving in Beslan. Two deputy directors of the FSB, Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov, who had arrived in Beslan on 2 September, acted as consultants and did not interfere in the command of the operation.","169. Between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m. the operative headquarters ensured the evacuation of residents from adjacent premises, as well as cordoning off the school. The police and security forces searched basements and attics of the nearby buildings, cleared the adjacent streets of parked vehicles and closed them to traffic, closed the local railway line and took other necessary measures. In order to avoid harm to the hostages and other civilians, it was also ordered not to respond to the random shots fired by the terrorists. Scanning of radio frequencies in the vicinity of the school had been put in place by the Ministry of the Interior, the FSB and the army.","170. At 11.05 a.m. the terrorists transmitted the first note, containing a telephone number and naming possible negotiators. However, the telephone number had been indicated incorrectly and no contact could be established.","171. Between 11.30 a.m. and 13.30 p.m. two safety perimeters were put around the school, composed of police and army servicemen, using seventeen APCs. At noon on that day the APCs were withdrawn out of the terrorists \u2019 view, in order to avoid provocation.","172. At 11.40 a.m. the OH started compiling a list of the hostages.","173. At 12.35 p.m. the OH invited the North Ossetian mufti to take part in the talks; but the terrorists opened fire on him when he tried to approach the seized building.","174. At 1.55 p.m. all reserve forces of North Ossetia \u2019 s police, including local policemen in towns and villages along the administrative border with Ingushetia and police academy students, were placed on high alert.","175. At 4.05 p.m. hostage Mrs Mamitova brought out a second note with a corrected telephone number.","176. Between 4.05 p.m. and 5 p.m. a series of gunshots and explosions were heard inside the school. The OH instructed Mr Z., a professional negotiator from the North Ossetian FSB, to contact the terrorists by telephone. The hostage-taker presented himself as \u201c Shakhid \u201d and said that he had executed ten persons and blown up twenty others because the authorities had been slow in contacting them. Then he insisted that the men indicated in their note (Mr Zyazikov, Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Aslakhanov and Mr Roshal) should arrive at the school together. Mr Z. pleaded for time to bring the four men to Beslan. The terrorist said that the gymnasium had been mined and would be blown up in case of storming.","177. At 4.30 p.m. Mr Kastuyev escaped from the school by jumping out of the first floor window. He identified a photo of one terrorist from Ingushetia; on the same day his relatives were brought from Ingushetia by the FSB. However it transpired that the identification was incorrect. This man was killed in Ingushetia later while actively resisting the authorities.","178. During the day the OH collected information about possible hostage \u2011 takers and their relatives, so as to involve the latter in the negotiations.","179. At 5 p.m. the terrorists fired several random shots from automatic weapons and portable grenade-launchers. About a dozen bodies were thrown out of the window. The OH took steps to prepare for the evacuation of injured persons to the local health establishments; psychological support had been called in for the hostages \u2019 relatives.","180. At 5.45 p.m., in order to prevent dissemination of incorrect information, it was decided that all contacts with the media should be carried out by Mr Andreyev, Mr Dzantiyev and Mr Dzugayev; Mr Peskov from the Russian President \u2019 s Administration was given the task of liaising with journalists.","181. At 6 p.m. the North Ossetian Ministry of Health designated hospitals to be on stand-by; twenty-eight ambulance vehicles were deployed.","182. At 6.30 p.m. special forces of the FSB (\u201c \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0446\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0430 \u0421\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f (\u0426\u0421\u041d) \u0424\u0421\u0411 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u201d) arrived in Beslan and set up their headquarters. They started contemplating various possibilities of liberating the hostages and neutralising the attackers.","183. At 7.20 p.m. hundreds of bottles of water, juice and food rations were stocked by the headquarters for the hostages \u2019 eventual needs.","184. At 9.30 p.m. Mr Roshal arrived in Beslan. The terrorists refused to accept water or food through him. They continued to insist that all four men indicated by them should arrive. Mr Roshal was permitted to talk on the telephone with the school director, who described the situation inside.","185. At 9.36 p.m. the OH continued talks with the attackers. They tried to involve journalists of an Arab TV company in the negotiation process, but this was rejected by the terrorists. At the same time, they contacted former President of Ingushetia Mr Aushev and an influential businessman Mr Gutseriyev.","186. At 10.20 p.m. the OH tried to arrange the liberation of hostages against payment of money and unhindered passage to Chechnya or Ingushetia; twenty buses were called in case the terrorists agreed.","187. By the end of that day, six hostages who had escaped from the school had been questioned in order to obtain information about the number and location of the terrorists and hostages inside the school, as well as to draw a plan of the IEDs.","(ii) 2 September 2004","188. At 9.30 a.m. some hostages were allowed to call their relatives, in order to put pressure on the authorities.","189. At 10 a.m. the OH authorised Mr Gutseriyev \u2019 s participation in the negotiations. His offers of money and guarantees of unhindered passage were rejected by the hostage-takers.","190. At 1 p.m. Mr Andreyev spoke in front of the hostages \u2019 relatives and assured them that no storming would take place. This was done in view of the rumours circulating among the local population and the ideas of forming a \u201clife ring\u201d around the school by civilians.","191. At 1.50 p.m. religious Muslim leaders of Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Ossetia spoke in a televised address, calling for peace and trying to prevent further ethnic clashes.","192. At 2.40 p.m. Mr Aslakhanov spoke to the attackers on the telephone; he assured them that their demands would be transmitted personally to Russia \u2019 s President. The terrorists insisted that he arrive in Beslan together with Mr Aushev.","193. At 2.45 p.m. the FSB of Russia, by a coded message, appointed Mr Andreyev the head of the OH; the list of members of the headquarters included Mr Dzasokhov, the head of Ingushetia \u2019 s FSB Mr Koryakov, commander of the 58th army General Sobolev, deputy commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior Mr Vnukov and other officials. All members of the OH were informed of their positions.","194. At 3.23 p.m. Mr Aushev was permitted to enter the school. Between 4 p.m. and 4.30 p.m. he negotiated with the terrorists; as a result of his mission twenty-six persons were released: babies aged under two and their mothers. Mr Aushev also brought out a letter signed by Mr Shamil Basayev with a demand to withdraw troops from Chechnya.","195. At 5.30 p.m. an additional debriefing of former hostages took place, in order to obtain more information about the positions of hostages and terrorists and the locations of IEDs.","196. At 5.40 p.m. the OH ordered measures aimed at identifying and neutralising possible terrorists \u2019 accomplices outside the school.","197. At 6.05 p.m. Mr Aushev proposed to the terrorists that the bodies be collected. They agreed to consider this proposal.","198. At 7.20 p.m. the attackers told Mr Roshal, Mr Gutseriyev and Mr Z. that the hostages had refused to accept food, water or medicine.","199. At 8 p.m. the terrorists fired random shots from automatic rifles and portable grenade-launchers out of the school \u2019 s windows. The OH ordered that the surrounding territory be cleared of parked vehicles.","(iii) 3 September 2004","200. In the morning an agreement was reached, through Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev, to evacuate the bodies from the school yard.","201. At 12 noon the \u201cEmercom\u201d officers were appointed and necessary transport was arranged. They received appropriate instructions and means of communication. At 12.40 p.m. the officers started to collect the bodies. One terrorist descended to the courtyard and supervised their work.","202. At 1.05 p.m. two powerful explosions occurred in the gymnasium. Part of the wall collapsed and the hostages, in panic, started to exit through the opening. The terrorists opened fire on them from automatic rifles and RPG \u2011 18 portable grenade-launchers from the windows of the first floor. Twenty-nine persons were killed as a result of gunshot wounds.","203. At 1.10 p.m. the head of the OH, Mr Andreyev, gave written orders to the units of the FSB special forces to commence the operation aimed at saving the hostages and neutralising the terrorists.","204. At 1.15 p.m. the first hostages were taken to hospitals in Beslan and Vladikavkaz.","205. At 1.20 p.m. one terrorist - Mr Kulayev - was detained, and handed over to the investigators.","206. As a result of the explosions and the ensuing fire at least 250 hostages died; the rest were forced by the terrorists to move to the meeting room and other premises of the school.","207. At 2.50 p.m. a fire broke out in the gymnasium. The expert report on fire and explosions established that the epicentre of the fire was located in the roofing of the gymnasium, above the exit.","208. Mr Andreev ordered the firemen not to intervene immediately, in view of the continuing fighting, the risk to the firemen \u2019 s lives and the danger of delaying the rescue operation, thus entailing more victims.","209. The OH ordered the firefighters to intervene at 3.10 p.m. They arrived at 3.20 p.m. and proceeded to extinguish the fire.","210. At 6 p.m. the rescue operation was over. The OH ordered the deployment of heavy weaponry to neutralise the terrorists.","211. At 0.30 a.m. on 4 September the sweeping of the school building was over and a security cordon was set up. At 1 a.m. demining started.","(e) Information about FSB actions and questioning of senior FSB officers","212. The investigation established that two deputy directors of the FSB, Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov, had been present in Beslan during the crisis.","213. A number of high-ranking FSB servicemen were questioned in the course of the investigation, including General Andreyev (questioned on 29 September 2004), General Koryakov (30 September 2004), Generals Anisimov and Pronichev (October 2005). The documents of the criminal investigation submitted by the Government do not contain the record of questioning of General Tikhonov, the head of the FSB Special forces centre, deputy head of the OH in charge of the storming operation. His name is not listed among witnesses \u2013 members of the OH in volume 124 of file no. 20\/849; the list of documents examined by the experts who had produced the expert report no. 1 does not mention his testimony either.","214. In July 2007 the applicants wrote to the FSB director and referred to the meeting they had had with the Deputy General Prosecutor in charge of the case who had told them that the relevant video and audio materials could not be found. In December 2006 State TV aired a film \u201cThe Final Assignment\u201d containing video and audio materials made by the special forces in Beslan on 1-3 September 2004. They sought to ensure that these records would be given to the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office. They also asked that the members of the special forces be questioned during the investigation. In September 2007 the FSB informed the applicants that any such actions would be done in response to the relevant requests by the prosecutor \u2019 s service and in line with the legislation.","(f) Information about the arms and ammunition employed, explosives, fire and ballistics expert reports","215. The investigation file contains a number of documents concerning the use of arms and ammunition by various State bodies; some of them are cited in other documents (see below). Dozens of various experts \u2019 reports were commissioned by the investigation. The victims challenged certain procedural steps related to the commissioning of some of the reports and complained that they had not been allowed to take copies of them but were able to assess them in the prosecutor \u2019 s office for a limited amount of time. These reports have been submitted to the Court by the Government, most relevant ones are summarised below.","216. Dozens of witness \u2019 statements were collected by the investigation between September 2004 and August 2007 from the military and police servicemen, officers of the \u201cEmercom\u201d, fire-fighters, members of the OH. These statements, consistently and in details, denied the use of grenade-launchers, flame-throwers and tank cannon prior to 6 p.m. on 3 September 2004.","217. According to a document of 9 September 2004 (act no. 3), one military unit of the 58th army of the Ministry of Defence deployed in Beslan used about 6,500 cartridges for automatic weapons and machine guns (5.45 and 7.62 mm), 340 tracer bullets (5.45 mm T), 450 armour-piercing and incendiary charges (14.5 mm BZT and B-32) and ten hand-grenades (RGD-5).","(i) Fire experts report of 22 December 2005","218. On 22 December 2005 the Russian Federal forensic expert centre produced a fire expert \u2019 s report ( \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0436\u0430\u0440\u043e-\u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u044b ) no. 2576\/17, 320-328\/18-17. The voluminous report consisted of 217 pages, accompanied by about 60 pages of tables and photographs. The report started by reviewing a number of relevant evidence, including extracts from the witness statements, expert reports, information about the arms and ammunition used, examination of the building materials, review of available photo and video materials.","219. In particular, the report cited a \u201cjoint act\u201d of 10 September 2004 of the arms and ammunitions used by the military servicemen, which included about 7,000 cartridges for automatic weapons and machine guns (5.45 mm PS, 7.62 mm LPS), 2,160 tracer bullets (5.45 mm T), 10 disposable anti-tank rocket launchers (RPG-26), 18 disposable propelled anti-tank grenade-launchers (PG-7VL), 8 high fragmentation warheads for tank gun calibre 125 millimetres (125 mm OF) and 90 smoke grenades (81 mm ZD6) (page 128 of the report). The same report contained reference to the expert examinations of a number of parts of used flame-throwers RPO-A \u201c Shmel \u201d (at least five) and a list of six empty tubes from RPO-A \u201c Shmel \u201d collected by the members of the Parliamentary Commission citing their serial numbers (batch 3-02, nos. 109-113 and 116) (see paragraph 409 below). It further mentioned document dated 25 September 2004 and signed by Lieutenant-Colonel V. from the 58th army. This document stated that the FSB units had received from the military storage seven RPO-A flame-throwers and listed their serial numbers (batch 4-96, nos. 945-948, 486-488). After the operation two flame-throwers with the indicated numbers, plus one with a different batch and number (batch 1-0, no. 12), had been returned to storage. On 25 September 2004 Lieutenant-Colonel V. from the 58th army was questioned and stated that he had received back five flamethrowers (batch 4-96, nos. 947, 948, 486, 487 and 488), plus one from another batch, which had not been issued from that storage (batch 1-03, no. 12); Major Ts. from the FSB \u201c Vympel \u201d group explained that the others had been used (pages 129-130 of the report).","220. The report further mentioned witness statement of Colonel K. who explained that he had directed a group of officers who had taken part in the storming of the school building. The group had used RPG-26 and RPO-A, but not at the premises where the hostages had been present (page 131 of the report). Witness M.K. who had been a member of a storming group stated on 23 November 2004 that he had used RPG-26 and RPO-A upon \u201cenemy firing points which had been designated in advance and identified during the storming\u201d. The firing points identified in advance were located in the window of the attic area and the third window on the first floor of the main building. No hostages were located there at that time. For the second time the flamethrower was used during night time, at about midnight, upon a group of terrorists in the handcraft classes on the ground floor. At that time the rest of the building had been in firm control of the security forces and the \u201cEmercom\u201d personnel was finishing carrying the bodies out of the gymnasium (page 183 of the report). The report also referred to the records of two experiments carried out on 13 October 2005 whereby disused buildings had been fired at with RPO-A flamethrowers, as a result of which the buildings had been demolished but no fire had started (page 183 of the report). The report concluded as follows on the use of flamethrowers (pages 185 and 217 of the report):","\u201cRPO-A \u2018 Shmel \u2019 were used during the special operation aiming to liberate the hostages. The criminal case file no 20\/849 contains no materials to conclude that the flamethrowers RPO-A \u2018 Shmel \u2019 had been used upon the roof and the structure of the gymnasium of school no 1. The use of flamethrower RPO-A \u2018 Shmel \u2019 upon the roof of the gymnasium could not have led to fire in its wooden parts\u201d.","221. In so far as the first explosions were concerned, the report concluded that the explosions in the gymnasium which had occurred within several seconds at about 1.05 p.m. on 3 September 2004 had resulted from the IEDs attached to the basketball hoop near the western wall (equivalent to about 1.2-1.3 kilograms of TNT) and located on a chair placed about 0.5 metres away from the northern wall under the window (and equivalent to 5.2 kilograms of TNT). Both IEDs were filled with multiple small metal objects. The third explosion resulted from the IED placed under the basketball hoop at the northern wall catching fire, its metal filling simply fell on the floor and the explosion, as a result of exposure to heat, of small amount of explosives (about 100 grams of TNT equivalent) (see pages 170-173 of the report).","222. The experts considered and accepted as \u201cprobable\u201d the hypotheses that the fire in the gymnasium had started as a result of use of armour-piercing and incendiary charges, which could have been employed by the terrorists (page 185 of the report). As to the place where the fire had started, having analysed the extent and degree of damages to various constructions of the gymnasium, the experts concluded that it had been most probably located in the attic area located more or less above the basketball hoop in the northern part of the room; the fire on the floor started only after the burning parts of the ceiling and roof had fallen down. The extent of damage caused by fire and explosions prevented any detailed analysis of the number of places where the fire had started, its exact cause and distribution in the building (pages 215-217 of the report).","(ii) The expert report no. 4-106","223. On 30 December 2005 the FSB \u2019 s Institute of Forensic Studies ( \u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u041a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u0424\u0421\u0411 \u0420\u0424 ) produced expert report no. 4\/106. The report focused on the examination of the IEDs used by the terrorists in the gymnasium. In concluded that the terrorists had placed no less than 16 IEDs in the gymnasium, joined into a single chain through electric cables and detonators. On 3 September no less than three IEDs had exploded in the north-western part of the gymnasium: one at the basketball hoop on the western wall (based on anti-personnel mine OZM-72, about 0,66 kilograms in TNT equivalent), the second on the right-hand jamb of the door leading into the gymnasium on the western wall (a sphere-shaped IED, no less than 0,5 kilograms in TNT equivalent) and the third on the window pane of the first window on the north-western wall (IED in a plastic bottle, no less than 1 kilogram in TNT equivalent). The summary power of the explosions had been no less than two kilograms in TNT equivalent, however it was impossible to establish their exact timing and sequence. The most likely cause of the explosions lied in intentional or non-intentional impact upon the detonator pedal; the reasons why the whole chain had failed to react were unclear but it could be suggested that the first explosions had damaged the electric cables connecting the rest of the IEDs (pages 18-29 of the report).","(iii) The expert report no. 16\/1","224. On 25 October 2006 an all-round forensic report on the explosions ( \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0430 \u043c\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0432\u0437\u0440\u044b\u0432\u043e\u0432 ) was commissioned from the experts of the State \u2011 owned scientific and production company Bazalt ( \u0424\u0413\u0423\u041f \u0413\u041d\u041f\u041f \u201c\u0411\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0442 \u201d) and the Central Research and Testing Institute, named after Karbyshev, of the Ministry of Defence ( \u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u041d\u0430\u0443\u0447\u043d\u043e-\u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u044b\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0438\u043c. \u041a\u0430\u0440\u0431\u044b\u0448\u0435\u0432\u0430 \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u041e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u044b \u0420\u0424 ). The applicants submitted that this document in its entirety was unavailable to them prior to the exchange of the parties \u2019 observations in 2012.","225. In January 2007 Mrs Tagayeva applied to the prosecutor \u2019 s office to have the experts of Bazalt dismissed, as they had been administratively dependent on the Ministry of Defence. Her application was rejected on 30 January 2007 because no subjective bias of the experts could be discerned and, objectively, the Ministry of Defence had not been a party to the criminal proceedings.","226. The expert report no. 16\/1 was produced on 14 September 2007 and run to over 300 pages, accompanied by detailed schemes and photos. It appeared to dismiss the doubts expressed, notably, by a member of the State Duma investigative committee and a renowned expert in the field of explosions Mr Savelyev about the external origins of the first two explosions in the gym (see paragraphs 406, 408, 410 below ). The conclusions of report no. 16\/1 are found on pages 264-273. They can be summarised as follows: the first explosion was the result of detonation of a large IED, measuring between three and six kilograms in TNT equivalent. The origin of this explosion was not linked to the electric wires and detonator, but resulted, most probably, from mishandling of the device by the terrorists guarding it. This IED exploded in the north-eastern part of the gymnasium, at the spot located about one metre away from the northern wall and five metres away from the eastern wall. The second explosion occurred about 20 seconds later and consisted of simultaneous detonation of several (between five and ten) smaller IEDs in the north-western part of the hall; this explosion most probably resulted from intentional or unintentional use by one of the terrorists of the detonator pedal. It could not have been caused by a cumulative charge launched from the outside. The report also concluded that out of all the recorded damages to the gymnasium \u2019 s walls, only two marks could have been caused by either a thermobaric charge or a cumulative charge projected from outside. These projectiles could not have been launched from the roofs of houses nos. 37, 39 or 41 of the Shkolny Lane (as alleged by some experts). The damage caused to the southern wing of the school could have been caused by the use of various weapons and explosives, including tank cannon, flame-throwers and grenade-launchers, however the extent of destruction excluded any detailed reconstruction of the events. The report dismissed as improbable the launching of a thermobaric charge from the helicopter pointing that it could lead to the destruction of the helicopter and death of the crew. Finally, the report listed the following types of weapons used by the members of the counter-terrorist operation, reconstructed on the basis of video materials and the documents contained in criminal case-file no. 20\/849:","\u201c- portable grenade-launchers RPG-7V and their modifications with anti-tank charges PG-7VL, PG-7VM, PG-7VS, fragmentary warhead OG-7V;","- disposable anti-tank rocket launchers RPG-26, RPG-27;","- propelled attack grenades RShG \u2011 1 with thermobaric warhead;","- flame-throwers RPO-A \u201cShmel\u201d with thermobaric warhead;","- light infantry flamethrowers LPO-97 with thermobaric charge (probably);","- firearms and portable grenade-launchers.\u201d","Based on the same sources, the report concluded that the terrorists had used portable grenade-launcher RPG-7V with anti-tank charges PG-7VL; disposable anti-tank rocket launchers RPG-26, possibly a grenade-launcher with thermobaric charge; no less than ten IEDs type \u201cbottle\u201d, no less than two IEDs made out of anti-personnel mines MON-90 and no less than four IEDs made out of anti-personnel mine OZM-72; as well as firearms and portable grenade-launchers (pages 263-273 of the report).","227. As a follow up to that report, on 14 October 2007 the North Ossetia Ministry of the Interior \u2019 s expert lab examined the explosion marks on the gymnasium southern walls and confirmed the above conclusions about the possible trajectory of the charges having been fired from the first floor of the southern wing of the school and that these shots could not have been fired from houses nos 37, 39, 41 or the garage roof (report no. S-I-63, page 12).","(iv) The expert report no. 16\/2","228. The expert report no. 16\/2 was commissioned by the investigation in April 2007 in order to dispel Mr Savelyev \u2019 s allegations about the origin of the second explosion in the gymnasium which had resulted in the destruction of a section of the wall under the window on the northern side. It was completed on 11 December 2009 (see paragraph 406 below). Like report 16\/1, it was carried out by the experts of the State-owned scientific and production company Bazalt. The experts tested all the possibilities suggested by Mr Savelyev, including the employment of various types of grenade-launchers and flame-throwers upon a similar construction and concluded that their impact was incompatible with the damages in the gymnasium. The report ran to over 130 pages and concluded that the \u201cthe origin of the hole in the north-western wall of the gymnasium ... lied in the detonation of an IED with TNT equivalent of about six kilograms, put on the height of about 500 millimetres from the floor, near the radiator... The power of this explosion \u2019 s impact upon the wall was exasperated by almost simultaneous explosion of several other IED \u2019 s located in the north-western part of the gymnasium, further away from the first explosion\u201d (pages 99-100 of the report).","(g) Decision not to charge servicemen with crimes","229. On 3 December 2004 the Vladikavkaz deputy military prosecutor issued an order not to prosecute unnamed military servicemen of the 58th army of the Ministry of Defence and of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior. The document stated that the investigation had established that the personnel of the army and the Ministry of the Interior had used automatic weapons, RPG-25 grenade-launchers, RPO-A \u201c Shmel \u201d flame- throwers and T \u2011 72 tanks. The document then proceeded to describe the events of the siege and storming, in line with witness statements of General Sobolev of the 58th army. In particular, the document stated that on 1 September 2004, during the first meeting of the OH, it had been decided that Mr Dzasokhov \u2019 s involvement in the negotiations was \u201cdevoid of purpose\u201d (\u201c \u043d\u0435\u0446\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0441\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043d\u043e\u201d ) since there was a threat of his being taken hostage too. It further stated that although the decision to clear the area around the school of civilians and armed \u201cvolunteers\u201d had been taken at about 12 noon on 1 September, it had not been implemented until 3 September. Furthermore, on 2 September the terrorists demanded that Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Zyazikov, Mr Aslakhanov and Mr Roshal arrive for negotiations, but the OH had decided that such talks were also \u201cdevoid of purpose\u201d. After the first explosions at 1.10 p.m. the terrorists opened fire at the hostages running out of the gymnasium, following which the servicemen of the second security perimeter opened return fire. At 2 p.m. a group of sappers under the command of Colonel Nabiyev started to demine the gymnasium; at the same time he called for firemen to extinguish the fire. The first fire vehicle arrived at 2.45 p.m. and contained 200 litres of water; the second vehicle arrived at 3.45 p.m. and proceeded to extinguish the fire. At 9 p.m. the storming of the building was over; the search and elimination of terrorists continued until 0.30 a.m. on 4 September 2004.","230. The document then summarised the witness statement of Mr Tsyban, who explained that the OH had officially been created on 2 September 2004 at about 12 noon under the command of General Andreyev. The OH decided that Mr Dzasokhov \u2019 s involvement in the negotiations could not be authorised in view of the threat of his being taken hostage.","231. The document then related the witness statements of about a dozen servicemen from the 58th army \u2013 sappers, tank and APC commanders. They stated that the tanks had fired seven shots in the evening of 3 September 2004 and that none of them had fired at the school during the daytime.","232. The document then referred to several hundred names of military servicemen who had been employed in the security perimeter. Their statements were summarised in the following manner:","\u201cwhile securing the area no instances of any loss or stealing of arms or ammunition were noted, and there were no attempts by the terrorists to break through or to get away. Since the commanders had issued an order not to open fire unless there was an open breakthrough of the terrorists, no fire was opened and the use of firearms was regulated by section 11 of the [Army Manual]. There were no noted instances of breaches of order or unauthorised use of firearms. No ammunitions were used\u201d.","233. The document concluded that the servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence had used \u201cpersonal, authorised, small \u2011 arms weapons, engineering hardware and chemical weapons, destined to cause harm to manpower, but this ammunition was used in line with the [appropriate] legislative acts and owing to the inability to prevent the terrorists \u2019 actions by any other means; the use of the above weapons resulted in the terrorists \u2019 extermination or detention\u201d. The document further stated that the investigation had obtained no evidence that the use of the above-listed weapons had resulted in harm to any of the hostages. Accordingly, there was no evidence of an offence having been committed.","234. The decision of 3 December 2004 was quashed on 12 September 2005 due to certain technical deficiencies. It appears that this investigation is still pending.","(h) Results of internal inquiries and decisions not to charge officials with crimes","(i) \u201cEmercom\u201d staff","235. On 29 October 2004 a commission of the North Ossetian \u201cEmercom\u201d carried out an internal investigation into the actions of the \u201cEmercom\u201d staff during the hostage crisis. According to its findings, the firefighters were aware in advance of the locations of the fire hydrants in the vicinity of the school, but could not use them since they could have been shot at by the terrorists. Hence, they started to use mobile cisterns first. The responsible staff had drawn up a plan of access of the fire engines to the school, but it was not within the firefighters \u2019 powers to ensure that these routes would be accessible \u2013 that work should have been coordinated by OH on the basis of that plan. The failure to intervene during the initial stage had been based on the OH directions. Finally, the use of more powerful hydraulic cannons has been deemed impractical by the commission, in view of limited choice of location where such cannon could be placed, distance to the source of fire of about 60 metres, narrow access to the fire and the danger to the persons who could still be alive in the burning building from the \u201chot vapour\u201d. The commission concluded that the actions of the \u201cEmercom\u201d staff had been correct and justified.","236. On 10 December 2004 an investigator of the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office Department in the Northern Caucasus ruled not to charge the North Ossetian \u201cEmercom\u201d Minister Mr Dzgoyev and his deputy, head of the firefighting service, Mr Romanov, with crimes under section 293 of the Penal Code \u2013 criminal negligence. The decision referred to the witness statements made by Mr Romanov, Mr Dzgoyev and a number of other firefighters and officials of the service. They confirmed that the information about the fire first came in after the first explosions, soon after 1 p.m., but that the OH had only allowed the firefighters to intervene after 3.20 p.m. They noted that seven fire engines were ready to take part in the operation, but that the access routes to the school remained busy with cars and persons. Two closes fire hydrants were not accessible; at first the engines used cisterns to extinguish fire from two water cannons; later a contour to the next hydrant had been made. The decision discussed the question whether the firefighters could have used a more powerful hydraulic water cannon, but the firefighters argued that it could only have produced the desired effects if used from a distance of less than 30 metres to the source of fire, which could not have been ensured in view of the ongoing fighting. The decision concluded that at the time when the firefighters were intervening, the general direction of the operation had been taken by the OH headed by the FSB, without whose permission no actions could have been taken. The FSB did not allow the firefighters to intervene for about two hours, in view of lack of special equipment for them, and thus their members could have been injured or died. In such circumstances, the actions of the \u201cEmercom\u201d officials contained no elements which could lead to the conclusion that a crime had been committed. It is unclear when the applicants had been informed of this decision and whether they had appealed against it.","237. In March 2006 the victims lodged an application to have the competent officials, including Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Andreyev, Mr Popov and Mr Romanov charged with criminal negligence and withholding of information entailing danger to persons \u2019 lives and health, with serious consequences (sections 293 part 2 and 237 part 2 of the Penal Code). In particular, they argued that no necessary preventive measures had been taken prior to the terrorist act; that the OH had remained passive and failed to ensure meaningful negotiations with the hostage-takers; that as a result of the inaction of the OH the hostages \u2019 conditions on 1-3 September 2004 had deteriorated and thus rendered them weak by the time of the storming; that the failure of Mr Dzasokhov, Mr Zyazikov and Mr Aslakhanov to appear for negotiations had excluded the possibility of a dialogue; that the security perimeter around the school had not been properly ensured; and that the storming operation had not been thoroughly prepared. The victims alleged further that the military and security forces had acted without a plan and employed excessive and indiscriminate weapons after 1 p.m. on 3 September. In respect of this last assertion they referred to several dozen witness statements collected during the trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev and attesting to the use of flame-throwers, grenade-launchers, tanks and APCs. They further alleged that the delay between the start of the fire in the gymnasium and the commencement of the extinguishing operation had taken one and a half hours, and that the firefighters had been unprepared since they lacked water. As a result, dozens of hostages including children in the gymnasium had been burnt alive, since they were injured, shell \u2011 shocked, disoriented or too weak to leave it on their own.","238. On 14 March 2006 the Deputy General Prosecutor rejected this application, having found that the decisions of the investigating officers had been lawful and that the actions sought by the victims were not necessary as the relevant facts had been established through other steps. On 26 June 2007 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz granted the victims \u2019 appeal against the said decision and ordered the Deputy General Prosecutor to examine the victims \u2019 applications in detail and to provide them with reasoned answers to each of their arguments. On 15 August 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court quashed and remitted the District Court \u2019 s decision. On 24 August 2007 the District Court confirmed the validity of the decision of 14 March 2006. It was then approved by the North Ossetia Supreme Court on 3 October 2007. The victims \u2019 subsequent requests for supervisory review proved futile.","239. In the meantime, and in parallel to the above-mentioned proceedings, on 20 April 2006 the chief of the investigative group, an investigator of the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office Department in the Southern Federal Circuit, decided not to open a criminal investigation, under the same sections of the Penal Code, in respect of the head and members of the OH. The investigator found that there were no constituent elements of an offence in the officials \u2019 actions. He relied heavily on the conclusions of expert report no. 1 to the effect that the actions of the OH had been in conformity with the relevant rules and regulations. The victims appealed, and on 3 April 2007 a judge of the Leninskiy District of Vladikavkaz quashed the said decision of the investigator, since expert report no. 1 had been found unlawful. On 2 May 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court quashed and remitted the District Court decision, having found that it was not based on all the materials available. In a new set of proceedings on 6 June 2007 the Leninskiy District Court rejected all the applications and found that even though expert report no. 1 had been invalidated, the evidence on which it had relied remained valid and supported similar conclusions. On 15 August 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld this decision.","240. In a separate decision, also dated 20 April 2006, the same investigator ruled not to open criminal proceedings against the first deputy of the Southern Ossetian \u201cEmercom\u201d, head of the fire service Mr Romanov and the head of the fire-fighting service of the Pravoberezhny District Mr Kharkov. The decision referred to sections 293 part 2 of the Penal Code, which concerned criminal negligence. The decision referred to witness statements confirming that the first information about the explosions and fire in the gymnasium has been received soon after 1.00 p.m. on 3 September; as well as to the fact that Mr Romanov had, on several occasions between 1.20 and 3.20 p.m., ordered the firefighters to intervene and then cancelled his orders due to lack of authorisation by the head of the OH. At 3.25 two fire engines arrived to the school with full load of water, which could last for about 3-5 minutes. Once it was exhausted, two other fire engines were called in; later on water has been obtained from a fire hydrant, because the closest hydrants could not be used. The decision referred to the expert report no. 1 and to the fire experts report no. 2576\/17, 320-328\/18-17 (see paragraphs 218 and subsequent).","(ii) Health Ministry officials","241. On 30 September 2005 the Russian Health Ministry informed the General Prosecutor \u2019 s office of the results of its internal inquiry into the actions of its staff on 1-3 September. The Ministry conceded that the scale and circumstances of these events had been unprecedented even for its most experienced staff, and that the situation had been \u201cexasperated by lack of verifiable information about the number of hostages, unpredictability of the events and the difficulty in predicting the types of injuries\u201d. The report noted that the situation at the site of the field paediatric hospital set up in Beslan on 2 September 2004 had been made difficult by the presence of a large number of local residents, who had \u201csometimes turned into a mob displaying signs of emotionally-psychic instability\u201d. The work of a mobile group of psychologists had aided to dispel the pressure and create the conditions necessary to carry out legal aid. The overall input of the Zaschita centre has been described as important and proven its importance.","242. The Government in their submissions made in September 2013, have summarised the documents contained in file 20\/849 relating to the work of the medical staff as follows.","243. On 1 September 2004 the Ministry of Health set up a coordination cell, joining the forces of the local and federal ministries of health, \u201cEmercom\u201d, the Zaschita centre and the centre of forensic examinations. As of 1 September evening, special units of psychological aid were put in place for the relatives. A number of other urgent steps were taken, such as putting medical personnel in a number of local hospitals on standby, preparing contingents of necessary equipment and materials, including blood for transfusion, ensuring the preparedness of the local intensive care and surgery units.","244. On 2 September an emergency paediatric field hospital was set up in Beslan. The \u201cfederal and local headquarters\u201d worked out access to the school and evacuation routes, instructed the drivers and medical and para-medical personnel involved.","245. On 3 September an additional hospital was set up in Beslan, equipped to perform urgent surgical operations and other types of emergency care. Measures were taken in order to assist a large number of injured persons. 1300 places were reserved at various hospitals in the region. Both before and after the storming medical teams had been brought in from other regions, including highly qualified doctors from Moscow.","246. Thus, by the time of the first explosions, over 200 doctors, 307 medical staff, 70 ambulances were located in Beslan. This made 94 mobile medical brigades, including 14 reserve ones.","247. Between 1.15 and 6.30 p.m. on 3 September 2004, 556 injured persons, of them 311 children, were transferred to the local hospitals. By 7 p.m. on the same day all patients had been placed in hospitals in Beslan and Vladikavkaz; 47 urgent surgeries had been performed.","248. Over one thousand persons had been provided with psychological aid.","249. As of 4 September 2004 special medical brigades visited families at homes, assisting those hostages and their family members who had gone home. Between 5 and 15 September over 200 patients (including 137 children) were transferred for treatment to Moscow by special flights.","250. In total, between 3 September and 16 December 2004 about 800 patients received medical aid. 305 died at the school, 26 persons died in hospitals. By 16 December 2004 26 patients (of them seven children) continued to receive medical aid in hospitals, others had been checked out. North Ossetia received 26 tons of medical equipment and supplies in relation to the crisis.","(iii) Other officials and members of the OH","251. In May 2007 the applicants applied to the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office in the Southern Federal Circuit to have Mr Dzantiyev, the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior, charged with criminal negligence. On 1 June 2007 that application was dismissed. Upon the victims \u2019 appeal, on 18 February 2008 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz, then on 27 March 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court, upheld that decision.","252. In July 2007 the applicants applied to the prosecutor \u2019 s office to \u201cevaluate\u201d the actions of the North Ossetian senior officials who had failed to prevent the terrorist act and to inform the population about the imminent threat or to ensure a proper security perimeter around the school, also seeking to verify the lawfulness of their actions as members of the OH who had authorised the use of indiscriminate weapons and had failed to ensure that the fire was promptly extinguished. They referred to the information contained in the Federal Assembly report (see paragraphs 398 and subsequent), also seeking the questioning of the officials concerned and the victims. On 2 August 2007 this application was partly dismissed by the investigator, who found that the questions raised by the victims were the subject of the pending criminal investigation.","(i) Establishing the cause of deaths and injuries","253. On the basis of the medical documents and forensic reports, the causes of death were established for 215 persons; the exact cause of death of 116 persons could not be established due to extensive post-mortem burns. As to the injuries, 79 persons received gunshot wounds, 91 shrapnel wounds, 302 persons suffered from the consequences of explosions, 10 persons received concussions, 83 persons suffered from fractured bones and contusions, 36 persons received thermal injuries and 109 persons suffered from psychological and neurological troubles.","254. The investigation concluded that the deaths and injuries of the victims were not connected with any actions or omissions of the State agents, including use of firearms.","255. The applicants in their numerous complaints stressed that the forensic expert reports had been carried out without the extraction of bullets, shrapnel and other objects from the bodies. They also stressed that the forensic reports for many persons failed to establish the cause of death all together, due to extensive burns.","(j) The victims \u2019 applications and complaints","256. In the course of the domestic proceedings the victims lodged several hundred applications with the prosecutor \u2019 s office seeking various procedural steps. They appealed against the results of most of these applications to district courts. Copies of most of the applications and complaints, as well as of the authorities \u2019 reactions, have been submitted to the Court or described by the applicants in their submissions.","257. Thus, in July 2006 the victims requested the investigator in charge of the case to find out who had decided against presenting the four men sought by the terrorists for negotiations; to hold confrontations between the civilian and police witnesses, on the one hand, and the army servicemen, on the other, to find out about the use of tanks and flame-throwers during the day of 3 September 2004. On 24 July 2006 the investigator rejected the application and stated that the decision to employ the appropriate weapons had been taken by the OH; witness confrontations were not considered useful by the investigation.","258. In January 2007 the applicants asked the investigator to find out the following: who had decided that the four men demanded by the terrorists should not participate in the talks; who had authorised the use of tanks and flame-throwers during the storming. On 30 January 2007 the investigator in charge granted the application and informed the applicants that they would be kept up to date with the investigation results.","259. In August 2007 the applicants requested the investigation to find out the number of hostages that had been communicated by the OH to the FSB, the Ministry of the Interior and the Russian President on each day of the crisis and to question the relevant officials. On 14 August 2007 this application was granted.","260. In November 2007, referring to the results of the forensic reports and witness statements obtained during the trial of Nurpashi Kulayev (see paragraphs 269 and subsequent), the victims argued that the bodies of 116 persons had been severely burned, rendering it impossible in most cases for the cause of death to be established. However several forensic reports indicated extensive burns as the cause of death. The victims sought to find out who had ordered the delay in the firefighters \u2019 intervention in the gymnasium and whether they had been properly equipped upon arrival. On 16 November 2007 the investigator dismissed the application to bring charges against several officials, referring to the pending investigation.","261. Following the victims \u2019 request, on 23 November 2007 the investigator appended to the file the records of the trials of the officers of the Pravoberezhny and Malgobekskiy ROVDs.","262. In December 2007 the investigator granted the victims \u2019 applications, based on the information obtained during the trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, to question a number of senior officials about the steps taken in August 2004 with the aim of preventing the terrorist act, in order to clarify the extent of local police involvement in the security of Mr Dzasokhov \u2019 s passage on the morning of 1 September and in order to find out how the OH had come up with the figure of 354 hostages that was aired during the crisis. The investigator also granted the victims \u2019 application to question General Tikhonov, the head of the FSB Special Forces Centre, in order to find out the details of the use of indiscriminate weapons upon the school.","263. On 10 May 2007 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz reviewed, upon the applicants \u2019 request, about 120 applications lodged by them with the investigator between December 2005 and March 2007, the results of which they found unsatisfactory. The complaints mostly concerned the following points: the applicants \u2019 attempts to obtain additional evidence about the exact cause of their relatives \u2019 deaths and injuries, information about the reasons for the first three explosions in the gymnasium, the details of involvement of various military and security units in the storming, information about the types and results of examination of the weapons found in school, evidence related to the actions of the OH, information about the actions of firefighters immediately after the first explosions, the extent of the officials \u2019 responsibility for the outcome of the crisis and the victims \u2019 demands to acquaint themselves with various documents in the file. The applicants \u2019 complaint was dismissed in full; the District Court found that the investigators had acted lawfully and within the limits of their professional discretion. The court also noted that the proceedings were still pending. The applicants appealed, but on 13 June 2007 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld the decision of 10 May 2007.","264. On 23 October 2007 the Promyshlenny District Court of Vladikavkaz rejected the victims \u2019 complaint about the investigators \u2019 decisions in response to their seven applications to ascertain the reasons for the first explosions and the origin of the firearms which caused the hostages \u2019 deaths and injuries, to find out more about the communications with the terrorists, to identify the person who ordered the deployment of tanks, APCs, flame \u2011 throwers and grenade-launchers, and to establish the reason for the carbonisation of 116 bodies. The court also rejected the victims \u2019 complaint about alleged inefficiency and delays on the part of the prosecutor \u2019 s office. On 8 February 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld this decision.","265. On 10 January 2008 the Promyshlenny District Court rejected another complaint by the victims in relation to five applications lodged with the investigator. These applications concerned the victims \u2019 access to the expert report on the explosions, and ballistics reports and documents relating to the existence of a real threat of a terrorist act prior to 1 September. The District Court, referring to Article 161 part 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, concluded that the limitations on the victims \u2019 access to the documents had been justified. The remaining actions in the investigation were also found lawful. This decision was upheld on appeal on 27 February 2008.","266. According to the decision of the Promyshlenny District Court of 13 March 2008, sixty-two victims and their representatives had complained to the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office and then to the court about the investigators \u2019 decisions to reject twelve applications lodged between December 2007 and January 2008. These applications concerned the following issues: to find out the exact reasons for the victims \u2019 deaths where the conclusions of the post mortem reports had been incomplete; to ascertain whether the carbonisation of the bodies had been caused prior to or after death; to seek an explanation for six victims as to why the conclusions about the reasons for their relatives \u2019 deaths had been based on external inspection without forensic reports; to establish the causal relationships between the use of flame-throwers, grenade-launchers, tanks and APCs during the storming and the hostages \u2019 deaths; to obtain additional questioning of the servicemen of the Malgobek ROVD and of a military unit stationed in the Malgobek District about the prevention of the terrorist act; to clarify the reasons for the appointment of Mr Andreyev as the chief of the OH on 2 September 2004; and to obtain full access to the materials of the case file and copies of the complex expert report (including mathematical computation of the explosions, ballistics and explosion examinations). The victims further alleged that they had received no timely responses to their applications and requests, that the investigation had been protracted and lacked in objectivity and in particular that they had not had access to the most important case documents. The Promyshlenny District Court dismissed all the applications, having found that the victims \u2019 demands had been satisfied by the investigation wherever possible, or had not been based on the pertinent legislation. On 23 April 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld that decision on the victims \u2019 appeal.","267. On 10 December 2008 the Promyshlenny District Court dismissed another complaint lodged by a group of victims against the decisions taken in response to their applications to the investigators. Eleven applications, lodged between February and September 2008, concerned the victims \u2019 access to the results of ballistics reports and the records of negotiations with the terrorists, with a request to obtain copies of certain documents in the case file and the decisions ordering expert reports. The victims also alleged that the investigation had been unnecessarily protracted, with important steps being delayed, which in turn could lead to a loss of evidence and make the judicial examination of the matters less effective. They asked for the actions of the investigators to be declared unlawful in so far as they had not conducted an effective investigation, had refused to allow victims access to the case file and had failed to establish the degree of responsibility of the officials. The court found that some documents requested by the victims were secret, while access to others was based on Article 161 part 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld the District Court \u2019 s decision on 11 February 2009.","268. The victims \u2019 subsequent attempts to seek supervisory review of these decisions have proved futile.","8. The criminal investigation in respect of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev","269. The applicants submitted voluminous documents related to the criminal investigation and trial concerning Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, the only terrorist captured alive. In particular, they submitted four volumes of the trial records (about 2,000 pages), copies of the trial court judgment (319 pages) and the cassation court decision, as well as their appeals to the cassation and supervisory courts. The most relevant documents and the applicants \u2019 submissions can be summarised as follows.","(a) Investigation and trial before the North Ossetia Supreme Court","270. On 19 January 2005 the criminal investigation in respect of the only surviving terrorist, Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, was separated from criminal case no. 20\/849 and assigned number 20\/870.","271. On 17 May 2005 the North Ossetia Supreme Court opened the trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev. He was charged with aggravated murder, terrorism, taking of hostages, membership of a criminal gang, illegal handling of firearms and attempts on the life of law-enforcement personnel (sections 105, 205, 206, 209, 222 and 317 of the Penal Code). Between May 2005 and February 2006 the trial court held sixty-one sessions.","(b) Statements by Mr Nurpashi Kulayev","272. In the courtroom Mr Kulayev stated that he had joined the group on 31 August 2004. His brother, Mr Khanpash Kulayev, had been a clandestine fighter since the early 1990s, but had lost his arm and lately lived in Psedakh, their home village. On 31 August 2004 a group of armed men arrived in VAZ-2110 and accused his brother of working for the FSB. Both brothers and two of their friends went with the armed men to a camp situated about 300 metres away from the road. Late at night on 31 August 2004 the man in charge of the camp, \u201c Polkovnik \u201d, told all those present to get into the GAZ-66 truck. There were thirty-two persons, including two women wearing masks. The explosives and arms in backpacks were placed under the benches and the men took seats on the floor of the truck. Responding to the victims \u2019 questions, Mr Kulayev stated that he had not seen wooden boxes for cartridges, which had later been found in the school canteen.","273. They spent the night in the valley and early in the morning travelled further. The truck \u2019 s body had been covered with canvas and they could not see outside. At some point the vehicle stopped and Mr Kulayev heard someone asking for the driver \u2019 s documents. Then they were told that a policeman had been captured and they travelled further. Later this policeman was released because he was a relative of one of the fighters. The ride lasted around two and a half hours. During the capturing of the school one fighter was fatally injured and \u201c Polkovnik \u201d ordered the killing of twenty male hostages. In the school Mr Kulayev was assigned to the canteen. On 1 September there was a dispute among the fighters and \u201c Polkovnik \u201d detonated the explosive device on a woman suicide bomber. This explosion fatally wounded the other woman and another fighter of Arab origin. According to Mr Kulayev, many members of the group, including himself and his brother, had been unaware of the nature of their mission, but \u201c Polkovnik \u201d referred to Basayev \u2019 s orders and executed those who attempted to object. The terrorists talked in Ingush between themselves and \u201c Polkovnik \u201d called someone to receive instructions in Russian.","274. Referring to the conversations among the terrorists, Mr Nurpashi Kulayev said that \u201c Polkovnik \u201d had told Mr Aushev that if the four men indicated by them came to the school, they would release 150 hostages for each of them. He also understood that some hostages and fighters would be able to move in buses to Chechnya, if the Russian troops had pulled out of the mountainous districts.","275. Speaking about the first explosions in the gymnasium, Mr Kulayev testified that \u201c Polkovnik \u201d had said that a sniper had \u201ckilled the man [holding the switch]\u201d, then he cried to someone over the telephone \u201cWhat have you done!\u201d and broke his mobile telephone; after that he encouraged the terrorists to fight until the bitter end. Mr Kulayev jumped out of the canteen window and shouted to the soldiers that they should not shoot there because there were women and children. He denied that he had used his machine gun and that he had walked into the gymnasium while the hostages were detained there.","276. Two persons convicted earlier for terrorist activities had testified that they had known Mr Khanpash Kulayev, the defendant \u2019 s brother, as an active member of the terrorist underground and that in 2003 both brothers and several other members of the armed group, together with their families, had lived in a rented house in Ingushetia (Ganiyev R., volume 4 page 1562 of the trial records, Muzhakhoyeva Z., v. 4 p. 1611).","(c) Reconstruction of the events preceding the hostage-taking and identification of the leaders","277. Some local residents stated in court that they had seen unknown men and suspicious boxes at the school prior to 1 September 2004 (Tomayev V. v. 1 pp. 360-363; Gutnova L. v. 1 p. 458; Levina Z. v. 1 p. 474; Kokova R. v. 3 p. 1243; Rubayev K. v. 3 p. 1305). During August 2004 the school building was partially renovated, but the teachers and director denied that anyone except the school staff and their families had been involved (Guriyeva N., v. 2 p. 542; Ganiyeva Ye. v. 3 p. 1157; Digurova Z. v. 3 p. 1238). Teachers testified that they had inspected the school early in the morning on 1 September and that there was no one there (Tsagolov A. v. 1 p. 265; Avdonina Ye. v. 2, p. 871; Komayeva \u2011 Gadzhinova R. v. 2, p. 874; Shcherbinina O. v. 2 p. 931).","278. The police officer who had been seized by the terrorists on the administrative border in the morning of 1 September 2004 testified that he had stopped the GAZ-66 vehicle between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. The armed men had taken his service pistol, VAZ vehicle and police cap and had driven to Beslan, where he escaped as soon as the shooting started. He denied having known any of the terrorists; he confirmed that the terrorists spoke Ingush between themselves and to him (G.S., v. 4 p. 1546).","279. As to the prevention of the terrorist act, a senior police officer of the Pravoberezhny ROVD testified in court in November 2005 that at about 8 a.m. on 1 September the school had been inspected, possibly with a service dog. He admitted that, unlike previous years, no police had been deployed to the school (Khachirov Ch. v. 3 p. 1215). Mr Aydarov M., the former head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD was aware that the school had been inspected with service dogs in the morning of 1 September, but no copies of the appropriate records had been provided (v. 3 p. 1410).","280. The trial court noted that criminal proceedings in respect of the organisers of the terrorist act were the subject of a separate criminal investigation (no. 20\/849, see above). The court cited statements and documents from investigation file no. 20\/849. It identified nineteen terrorists (including Mr Kulayev) and referred to thirteen unidentified persons (including \u201cAbu-Radiy\u201d and \u201cAbu-Farukh\u201d).","(d) Questioning of the hostages and granting of victim status","281. It transpires that between October and December 2004 numerous hostages and the victims \u2019 relatives were questioned and accorded victim status. By the opening of the trial several hundred persons were granted the status of victim in the proceedings. Over 230 victims were questioned during the trial; statements by others given to the investigation were read out.","282. The victims questioned in the courtroom mostly denied having seen Mr Kulayev in the gymnasium, although several hostages had seen him in the gymnasium, in the corridor on 1-3 September and in the canteen during the final stage of the assault. Most of the hostages had not seen Mr Kulayev \u2019 s brother Khanpash, who had his right arm missing. Several of them also referred to one particular terrorist: a shaven man with a large scar on his neck, who had been particularly cruel to the hostages and whom they had not identified after the siege was over (witness Mitdziyeva I. v. 2 p. 520). Most hostages saw two women suicide bombers, although some hostages referred to seeing another woman of Slavic appearance on the first floor of the school on 2 September and possibly a fourth one also on 2 September (Mitdziyeva I. v. 2 p. 518; Misikov K. v. 2 p. 571; Scherbinina O. v. 2 p. 935). One woman told the court that on 2 September the terrorist \u201cAbdulla\u201d had asked her if she was Ingush and suggested that they would let her family members go free if she agreed to act as a suicide bomber, since \u201ctheir two girls had been killed by an ammunition round\u201d fired from the outside (Kudziyeva L. v. 2 p. 525). The hostages estimated the number of terrorists at between 30 and 70 persons.","283. In respect of the taking of the school, many hostages testified that as soon as the fighters had encircled the gathering in the courtyard and started to shoot in the air, another group of fighters had fired from the top of the building. Some witnesses stated that when the shooting started some children tried to escape through Shkolny Lane, but there were fighters there who had forced them to return. Many saw fighters running to the school from the railway line (Kusayeva R. v. 1 p.147; Misikov Yu. v. 1 p. 471; Daurova M. v. 2 p.574). Others said that when they entered the school there were already armed fighters guarding the stairs to the first floor. One boy aged nine at the time testified that on 2 September he and about ten elder boys had been forced to take boxes with grenades and mines from an opening under the stage in the meeting hall (Khudalov S. v. 2 p. 866), but no one else from this group could be identified. One witness testified that when the fighters had broken the floors in the gymnasium on 1 September they had taken out a long tube which she supposed had been a grenade launcher (Tsakhilova A. v. 2 p. 896).","284. Police officer Fatima D. gave detailed submissions about the hostage taking and subsequent events. According to her, the second police officer had not arrived at the school. At about 8.50 a.m. one mother told her that a strange truck had been parked near the school. When she went out to check, she heard a suspicious noise. She ran to the teachers \u2019 room on the first floor to alert the police but as soon as she took the telephone, she was surrounded by several fighters wearing camouflage uniforms. They told her that \u201ceverything would be serious this time\u201d and led her to the gymnasium. She estimated that there were about seventy fighters (v. 1 p. 365).","285. On 1 September, under the terrorists \u2019 orders, the teachers drew up lists of children aged below seven, although these lists were never used (Levina Z. v. 1 p. 475; Shcherbinina O. v. 2 p. 937). Numerous hostages told the court that the terrorists had been extremely annoyed by the information about the number of persons being held in the school and that their attitude had become harsher after the figure of 354 persons had been announced. They testified that the terrorists had refused to allow them to drink or to go to the toilet since \u201cnobody needed them anyway and there would be only 350 of them left\u201d (Kokayeva I. v. 1 p. 413; Kaloyeva F. v. 1 p. 448; Pukhayeva Z. v. 1 p. 461; Daurova Z. v. 1 p. 481). The hostages complained about mocking, insults and ill-treatment, related how the terrorists had hit the elderly and children, subjected them to false executions, held parents and grandparents at gunpoint in the children \u2019 s view, and had fired into the air in order to keep them quiet.","286. The hostages saw the terrorists \u2019 attitude deteriorating further on 2 September after Mr Aushev had left the school. Several of them said that on 2 and 3 September the terrorists attempted in vain to liaise with the authorities through those who had relatives among officials or public figures.","287. The school director Mrs Tsalitova was a hostage, together with her family members. She stated that she had inspected the school in the morning of 1 September; she denied allegations that anyone except staff and their relatives had been involved in the renovation. Mrs Tsalitova was called by the fighters to negotiate; she testified that they had been annoyed by the absence of contact with the authorities. On 3 September she attempted to involve the children of Mr Taymuraz Mamsurov and a prosecutor \u2019 s mother in the negotiations, but to no avail (Tsalitova L., v. 1 p. 432).","288. Many hostages testified about the explosions in the gymnasium. They said that prior to the explosions the fighters had behaved in a relaxed manner and were preparing lunch. Others mentioned some agitation probably caused by electricity failure in the gymnasium. Some hostages testified that they had seen the explosion of an IED fixed to the basketball hoop (Dzarasov K. v. 1 p. 213; Archinov B. v. 1 p.274). Others insisted that when they had been leaving the gymnasium they could still see the large IEDs intact on the basketball hoops (Sidakova Z. v. 1 p. 315) or that only the third explosion had come from that IED (Bekuzariva I. v. 2 p. 962). Some described the first blast as a \u201cfireball\u201d (Dzestelova A. v. 2 p. 538). Many testified about the fire and heat emanating from the explosions, enflaming their clothes and hair and causing burns (Agayeva Z. v. 2 p. 600; Dzheriyeva S. v. 2 p. 614; Kochiyeva F. v. 2 p. 631; Tsgoyev A. v. 2 p. 748; Bugulova F. v. 2 p. 764; Makiyev V., v. 2 p. 826; Khanikayev Sh. v. 2 p. 831; Kokova T., v. 2 p. 884). Many testified that the fire could have killed injured and shell-shocked persons who were unable to leave the gymnasium on their own (Tomayeva L. v. 1 p. 357; Gagiyeva I. v. 1 p. 444; Kudziyeva L. v. 2 p. 526; Fidarova S., v. 2 p. 584; Skayeva T. v. 3 p. 1001; Mitdziyeva Z., v. 3 p. 1043; Alikova F. v. 4 p. 1577). Some hostages described how they had been saved by local men from the gymnasium and adjacent premises after the explosions (Gagiyeva I. v. 1 p. 444). Numerous witnesses also gave evidence that when the hostages started to run from the gymnasium through the opening in the wall they had been shot at from the first floor of the school, and many women and children were wounded.","289. Those hostages who had been taken by the fighters to the canteen and the meeting room testified about the fierce fighting which had taken place there. They stated that the fighters had tried to force the hostages \u2013 women and children \u2013 to stand in the windows and to wave their clothes, and some had been killed by shots fired from the outside and by powerful explosions (Kusayeva R., v. 1 p. 152; Sidakova Z., v. 1 p. 313; Urmanov S. v. 1 p. 426; Daurova Z., v. 1 p. 483; Badoyeva N. v. 2 p. 823; Makiyev V. v. 2 p. 826; Svetlova T. v. 2 p. 956; Katuyeva V. v. 2 p. 971).","290. Many also stated that they had not been satisfied with the results of the criminal investigation and that they did not intend to seek damages from the accused, since they considered that the State officials had borne responsibility for the deaths and injuries.","(e) Testimony of the Pravoberezhny ROVD police officers","291. Mr Aydarov M., former head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, was questioned in court (v. 3 pp. 1394-1414) while under investigation in criminal case no. 20\/852 for criminal negligence (see paragraph 355 below). He explained that he had only been appointed in mid-August 2004. The administrative border with Ingushetia in the district was 57 kilometres long and was mostly unguarded. Many small roads through the fields were formally closed and rendered impassable in view of the heightened terrorist threat; however this did not suit the locals, who very often removed the barriers. In August 2004 some information had been reported about a gathering of armed groups in the Psedakh district in Ingushetia and a number of steps had been taken on both sides of the administrative border, but at the time these measures had produced no known results.","292. He also explained that out of 53 officers of the ROVD who were present on 1 September over 40 were women. It was difficult to maintain the staff on alert for long time. As soon as the shooting was heard from the school, at about 9.15 a.m. on 1 September, he ordered his staff to maintain security around the building. Two servicemen of the ROVD had witnessed the hostage-taking and exchanged fire with the terrorists.","293. Mr Murtazov T., deputy head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, at the time of questioning was also under investigation for criminal negligence. Mr Murtazov gave detailed submissions about the use of \u201cShmel\u201d flame \u2011 throwers upon the school from three snipers \u2019 positions situated on the roofs of a technical building in Lermontova Street, a five-storey housing block on the corner of Shkolnaya and Batagova Streets and the gatekeeper \u2019 s house (v. 3 p. 1418). He did not know where the snipers came from. He witnessed the tank shooting at the school and the use of grenade-launchers by the military; these events occurred between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m. The officer remarked that not a single bullet had been extracted from the bodies of the deceased hostages which could have led to the identification of the servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior (v. 3 p. 1424).","294. Mr Dryayev, another senior ROVD officer, testified that immediately after the first explosions on 3 September he had seen soldiers [of the army or Internal Troops] firing with automatic weapons upon the school in response to enemy fire. Soon after 3 p.m. the witness saw the tank stationed in Kominterna Street firing about ten shots at the school corner from a distance of about 30 metres. These shots, possibly carried out without explosive heads, damaged the wall and the roof (v. 3 p. 1428).","295. Police officers of the Pravoberezhny ROVD testified that by the evening of 1 September they had carried out a house-to-house inspection of the district and had a list of 900 hostages \u2019 names which they had submitted to the officer on duty of the ROVD (Khachirov Ch. v. 3 p. 1212; Friyev S. v. 3 p. 1217).","296. The policemen also explained that two men had been beaten by the crowd on 2 September and detained at the ROVD on suspicion of aiding the terrorists. They turned out to be civilians from a nearby town; both men had been identified and testified in court about this incident.","(f) Statements by civilians and police officers who participated in the rescue operation","297. The court questioned several civilians who had helped to evacuate hostages from the gymnasium. Mr Dudiyev testified that he had entered the gymnasium after the first explosions, together with the special forces units, searching for his wife and three children. Mr Dudiyev brought out his wounded wife and the body of his daughter, while his brother evacuated his injured son; his eldest child had also been killed (Dudiyev A. v. 1 p. 251). Other witnesses, both civilian and police, told the court that they had entered the burning gymnasium several times, taking out injured women and children before the roof had collapsed (Adayev E., v. 2 p. 659, Totoonti I., v. 4 p. 1595). One policeman witnessed the fire spreading very quickly on the roof of the school, while the firemen failed to intervene (Badoyev R. v. 3 p. 1295).","298. Some witnesses saw the tanks shooting at the school soon after the explosions (Khosonov Z. v. 3 p. 1110); one man was injured by an explosion while taking a child out of the gymnasium (Gasiyev T. v. 2 p. 676). Witness E. Tetov explained that he had served in the army as a tank crew member and was well acquainted with the tanks and the ammunition used by it. Shortly after 1 p.m. on 3 September he had counted between nine and eleven shots without explosive heads fired from a tank gun. He was also of the opinion that the first explosions and the fire had been started from the outside, either from a flame-thrower or a tracer bullet (v. 2 pp. 729 \u2011 730). One civilian witness stated that he had served in the army as a grenade launcher operator and that he had identified at least two shots fired from grenade- or flame-throwers between the second and third major explosions in the gymnasium (Totoonti I., v. 4 p. 1603).","299. Several police officers testified that the storming of the building had started unexpectedly and that this explained the casualties. Some of them did not have time to don the protective gear and rushed to the school as soon as they had heard the shooting. Some servicemen described the situation after the first explosions as \u201cchaotic\u201d, when various forces shot at the school building using automatic weapons and other arms (Khosonov Z., v. 3 p. 1109). They referred to the terrorists \u2019 high level of training and preparedness, which allowed them to mount resistance in the face of the elite Russian units (Akulov O., v. 1 p. 492).","300. An officer of the Pravoberezhny ROVD testified that while he was ensuring the security cordon around the school, on 3 September at about 9 a.m. he saw two full carloads of portable grenade launchers (RPG) and flame-throwers (RPO \u201cShmel\u201d) delivered by servicemen of the Ministry of the Interior driving a white Gazel vehicle. He estimated that at least twenty flame-throwers had been unloaded and taken to the snipers \u2019 positions, located about 200 metres from the school. The snipers and the forces of the Ministry of the Interior used these flame-throwers soon after the explosions at the school, responding to enemy fire from grenade-launchers and machine guns (Khachirov Ch. v. 3 p. 1212). Up to ten shots from flame \u2011 throwers were counted by another policeman at around 2 p.m. in the direction of the gymnasium roof (R. Bidzheov, v. 3 p. 1222). Other policemen testified that between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. they had seen a tank firing at the school (Friyev S. v. 3 p. 1218; Khadikov A. v. 3 p. 1224; Khayev A. v. 3 p. 1227; Karayev A. v. 3 p. 1231;) and that shots were fired from grenade-launchers (Karayev A. v. 3 p. 1231; Aydarov M. v. 3 p. 1400).","(g) Statements by local residents","301. The hostage-taking and subsequent events were witnessed by numerous local residents; some of them were questioned in the courtroom. Several passengers of vehicles who had found themselves in the morning on 1 September in the street in front of the school had seen the GAZ-66 truck arriving in the school yard and some of them said that they had seen three or four women jumping off the vehicle. Mr K. Torchinov had been a teacher at school no. 1 and a former investigator of the prosecutor \u2019 s office; he lived in the house opposite the school and watched the ceremony from his window, from a distance of about 200 metres. He gave detailed explanations about the hostage-taking. In particular, he had counted the men who jumped out of the GAZ-66 vehicle and said that there had been twenty-seven, he also saw two other fighters in the school yard and between seven and eight who had run from the railway lines; at the same time there were shots fired from the roof and the first floor of the school; he thus estimated the number of fighters at no less than forty or forty-five persons. Mr Torchinov also stated that on 1-3 September there were no soldiers or police lined up along the backyard of the school and that it was possible to walk there to and from his house (v. 2 pp. 847-859).","302. Numerous local residents whose relatives were held in the school stated that they had been appalled by the announcement of the number of hostages. They said that the school had about 900 students \u2013 lists could have been obtained in the local department of education \u2013 and that numerous parents and relatives had also been captured. Officials from the local department of education testified that in the morning of 1 September the number of students (830) had been transmitted to the administration, with an indication that many relatives could be present at the ceremony (Dzukkayeva B. v. 3 p. 1334; Burgalova Z. v. 3 p. 1349). Moreover, on 1 September volunteers and police drew up lists of hostages which counted over 1000 persons. In view of this they could not explain how the officials had arrived at the figure of 350 persons (Khosonov Z. v. 3 p. 1107).","303. Many local residents testified that they had seen or heard the tank shooting at the school after the explosions (Duarov O. v. 3 p. 1083; Pliyev V. v. 3 p. 1085; Dzutsev Yu. v. 3 p. 1121; Gagiyev E. v. 3 p. 1300; Malikiyev A. v. 3 p. 1308; Savkuyev T. v. 3 p. 135; Ilyin B. v. 1 p. 1453). Mrs Kesayeva E. remained outside the school, where four members of her family had been held hostage. She testified that a tank positioned in Kominterna Street had fired several rounds between 1 p.m. and 4 p.m. (v. 1 p. 325). One local resident saw a tank enter a courtyard in Pervomayskaya Street and heard it shooting at the school before 3 p.m. on 3 September. The witness was about 50 metres away from the tank (Khabayeva A. v. 3 p. 1289). All those witnesses described the tank cannon shots as being particularly strong and clearly identifiable despite the overwhelming noise of fierce fighting.","304. Several residents testified about the firemen \u2019 s actions. They alleged, in particular, that the firemen had lost time before intervening in the gymnasium and that once the fire engines had arrived, they were of little use since the water in the cisterns was quickly exhausted; moreover the water hoses had been weak and could not reach the gymnasium from where the machines were stationed. Some witnesses deplored the lack of preparedness by the firemen who had failed to find out beforehand where to find water locally around the school rather than bringing it in cisterns (Tetov E. v. 2 p. 729; Katsanov M. v. 2 p. 802). Other witnesses told the court that they had seen a fire engine stuck in the courtyard and trying to find water for the cistern (Pliyev V. v. 3 p. 1086).","(h) Statements by the servicemen of the Internal Troops, army and FSB","305. Colonel Bocharov, brigade commander of the Internal Troops deployed in Beslan on 1-4 September, testified in November 2005 that servicemen under his command had ensured the security cordon. Their task was to prevent the terrorists from breaking through. Four APCs from his brigade had been transferred to the FSB forces on 2 September (v. 3 p. 1209).","306. Officers of the 58th army testified that their task had been to ensure the \u201cthird ring\u201d of security around the school. One officer explained that General Sobolev, the commander of the 58th army, had instructed him to follow the orders of the FSB officers. Each army vehicle deployed in Beslan had been completed by an officer of the FSB who had given orders and coordinated the crews \u2019 actions (Isakov A. v. 3 p. 1260; Zhogin V. v. 3. p. 1265). They denied having heard or seen grenade-launchers, flame \u2011 throwers or tanks being used prior to late in the evening on 3 September. The tank unit commander stated that between 8.56 p.m. and 9.30 p.m. one tank had fired seven high-fragmentation shells at the school (the seventh shell had failed to explode), following orders of the FSB officer in charge. No shots had been fired from the tank guns before or after that (Kindeyev V. v. 3 p. 1277).","307. One officer, a sapper, testified that he had entered the gymnasium at around 2.40 p.m. on 3 September and deactivated one IED attached to the basketball hoop. Most IEDs had not exploded and were deactivated on the following day. This officer testified that he had entered the gymnasium in a group of seven servicemen and fifteen or twenty civilians who had evacuated the hostages for about one hour. Initially there was no fire there, but the premises were under attack from the northern wing of the school. Soon afterwards he noted fire starting in the roof, above the entrance to the gymnasium from the side of the weights room (Gagloyev A. v. 4 pp. 1715, 1733).","308. Mr Z., a professional negotiator from the North Ossetian FSB, was called to Beslan at 9.30 a.m. on 1 September. He had a meeting with Mr Andreyev and then informed him of the talks and received instructions from him. He was placed in a separate room, with a psychologist, and maintained telephone contact with the terrorists with an interval of 30 \u2011 35 minutes. His efforts to establish psychological contact with his interlocutor who called himself \u201c Shahid \u201d were unsuccessful and he failed to obtain any concessions aimed at alleviating the hostages \u2019 situation. The conversations were conducted in a rude manner; the gangsters insulted him and Mr Roshal. The terrorists repeatedly said that they would talk to the four men enumerated by them and did not present any other demands. They did not specify the number of hostages they were holding, saying only that they had \u201cenough\u201d; they spoke of about twenty people shot dead on the first day and said that they had three days to wait for the authorities to bring the four men together. When asked if Mr Dzasokhov could come alone, the terrorists refused. The first telephone conversation took place on 1 September at about 4 p.m., the last one \u2013 after 1 p.m. on 3 September immediately following the first explosion. The witness recalled saying \u201cWhat have you done?!\u201d and \u201c Shahid \u201d responded \u201cWe have fulfilled our duty\u201d. Responding to the victims \u2019 questions, Mr Z. admitted that the negotiations involving Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev had been carried out independently of him and that he had only been informed of these developments after they had occurred (v. 4 pp. 1819 -1843).","309. The head of the FSB department in Beslan at the relevant time stated in court in January 2006 that he had not been aware of the information and telexes sent by the Ministry of the Interior in August 2004 about the heightened terrorist threat during the Day of Knowledge. The FSB had not been involved in the protection of the administrative border, but their services cooperated with the Ministry of the Interior in examining the area around the border (Gaydenko O. v. 4 pp. 1847-1854). He did not have any information about the possible fleeing of terrorists from the school after the storming had started.","310. The former head of the FSB department in Ingushetia, Mr Karyakov, confirmed that there was sufficiently precise information about the activities of terrorist groups in Ingushetia in the summer of 2004, a number of successful special operations had been carried out, but there was no information about the armed group in the Malgobekskiy district. The witness testified that he had arrived in Beslan in the morning of 1 September and remained there for three days, working in close cooperation with Mr Andreyev. He was not certain if he had been a member of the OH, but was fully aware of its work. In the morning of 1 September Mr Karyakov called Ingushetia \u2019 s President Mr Zyazikov and informed him about the terrorist act; at that time no demand to involve Mr Zyazikov in the negotiations had been made. Later on he could not reach Mr Zyazikov since his mobile telephone had been switched off. By questioning the escaped hostages they tried to identify terrorists from Ingushetia and to involve their relatives in the negotiations. Thus, they brought the wife and children of a presumed terrorist, but her appeal had had no effect. The witness was not aware of the note taken out by Mr Aushev (v. 4 pp. 1841-1890).","311. Most of the army and Internal Troops servicemen had failed to testify in the courtroom; their witness statements collected during the investigation of criminal case no. 20\/849 were read out (see paragraph 216 above).","(i) Statements by members of the OH and other senior officials","(i) Mr Tsyban","312. On 15 November 2005 the court questioned Lieutenant-Colonel Tsyban (v. 3 pp. 1192-1203), who at the relevant time had headed the operative direction group at the Ministry of the Interior of North Ossetia ( \u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u043a \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u044b \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u043e \u0420\u0421\u041e \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0424 ). The group was created on 11 August 2004 by an order of the Minister of the Interior with the mission to prevent terrorist acts, plan and carry out special operations, and control and direct resources allocated for counter-terrorism activities. When asked about the meetings, functions and actions of this commission prior to 1 September 2004, Mr Tsyban could not recall any details.","313. Mr Tsyban learnt of the hostage-taking at 9.30 a.m. on 1 September and went to Beslan. There, by late morning, he had organised the security perimeter around the school. As of noon on 1 September he reported to the deputy chief of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior, General Vnukov. Although he was a member of the OH, he stated that his participation had been limited to ensuring the second security perimeter. He was not aware of the number of hostages, the nature of the terrorists \u2019 demands or the negotiation attempts. He had not taken part in any meetings or discussions of the OH. As to the rescue operation, Mr Tsyban stated that the servicemen of the Internal Troops had not used weapons, had not approached the school and had not taken part in the rescue operation. He was not present at the school on 3 September. He refused to answer the question whether any terrorists could have permeated the security perimeter.","(ii) Mr Sobolev","314. General Sobolev, the commander of the 58th army of the Ministry of Defence, was questioned in November 2005 (v. 3 pp. 1316-1330). Mr Sobolev was a member of the OH as the most senior officer from the Ministry of Defence. He described the OH \u2019 s principal strategy as negotiation with the hostage takers. However, these attempts were futile because the terrorists had been prepared to talk only if the four persons designated by them arrived. Mr Roshal attempted to contact the terrorists, but they refused to talk to him; Mr Dzasokhov had been prevented by the OH from going to the school; no contact had been established with Mr Zyazikov. The danger to the lives of the four men had been too high in the absence of any goodwill shown by the terrorists. In General Sobolev \u2019 s view, no negotiations were possible under the circumstances; the storming of the school should have taken place immediately, before the IEDs had been assembled. He believed that the terrorists had been supported and funded by foreign services, including the Central Intelligence Agency (of the United States). His task had been mostly limited to ensuring the security perimeter around the school and to providing the necessary equipment; he was not aware of the number of hostages, negotiation strategies or the rest of the plan drawn up by the OH.","315. He enumerated the forces and equipment brought in by the army. Eight APCs and three tanks had been transferred under the FSB command to be used as cover in case of storming. A group of sappers demined the gymnasium in the afternoon of 3 September; they found four mines and ten smaller IEDs connected by a \u201cdouble chain\u201d which allowed them to be activated all at once or one by one. Three IEDs had exploded prior to demining; in one of them only the detonator had exploded without causing any harm.","316. Turning to the storming, General Sobolev explained that it had started unexpectedly. Officers of the FSB \u2019 s Alpha group had been training in Vladikavkaz and had to be brought in urgently; many of them had no time to prepare. This had led to extremely high casualties: one third of the elite troops storming the building had been injured or killed. General Sobolev was not aware of the use of flame-throwers or grenade- launchers. The tank cannon fired seven shots after 9 p.m. He was of the opinion that the army has successfully concluded its mission.","(iii) Mr Dzantiyev","317. Mr Dzantiyev testified in November 2005 that at the relevant time he had been the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior. He arrived in Beslan at about 10 a.m. on 1 September and followed Mr Dzasokhov \u2019 s orders. As of 3 p.m. on 1 September Mr Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB, had taken over the command of the operation. The witness \u2019 s primary task was to ensure security around the school and to evacuate civilians from the area. The victims referred to the decree of the Chairman of the Russian Government of 2 September 2004 by which Mr Dzantiyev had been appointed deputy head of the OH; however the witness insisted that he had not been informed of this, had not assumed such responsibilities and had been excluded from the OH meetings. Mr Dzantiyev received orders from the Russian Minister of the Interior and his deputy Mr Pankov who had arrived in Beslan; on two occasions the deputy head of the FSB Mr Anisimov had asked him to check the situation in two villages. Mr Dzantiyev had been aware by the evening of 1 September, from the lists drawn up by the local police, that the number of hostages had been no less than 700 persons. He did not know where the figure of 354 had come from. The Minister had no information about the use of heavy weapons during the storming except that after 3 September a number of empty tubes from \u201cShmel\u201d flame-throwers had been found on the nearby roofs (v. 3 pp. 1371 \u2011 1394).","(iv) Mr Dzugayev","318. In November 2005 the court questioned Mr Dzugayev (v. 3 pp. 1430 \u2011 1445). At the relevant time Mr Dzugayev had been the head of the information and analytical department of the North Ossetian President \u2019 s Administration. He testified that he had arrived in Beslan on 1 September 2004 at about 10 a.m. He was instructed by Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Andreyev to liaise with the press. He was not aware of the OH \u2019 s work, composition and strategy. Mr Dzugayev was asked a number of questions about the figure of 354 hostages which he had consistently announced to the press on 1 -3 September. He explained that he had been so informed by Mr Andreyev, who had referred to the absence of exact lists. He had always underlined the preliminary nature of this information.","(v) Mr Andreyev","319. Mr Andreyev, who at the relevant time was the head of the North Ossetian FSB and head of the OH, was questioned in court in December 2005 (v. 3-4, pp. 1487-1523). He gave a detailed account of his actions and of the work of the OH during the crisis. According to him, no formal leadership over the operation had been assumed prior to 2 p.m. on 2 September, but informally all the responsible persons \u2013 members of the operative directions group \u2013 had carried out their tasks under the guidance of Mr Dzasokhov and his own. According to Mr Andreyev, as of 2 September the OH included seven officials: himself as the head, Mr Tsyban as his deputy, Mr Dzgoyev, Mr Goncharov, Mrs Levitskaya, the Minister of Education of North Ossetia, and Mr Vasilyev from the State TV.","320. Mr Pronichev, deputy director of the FSB, had assisted the OH in a personal capacity but had assumed no formal role. Mr Andreyev referred to the Suppression of Terrorism Act, which stipulated the plan of action in case the hostage-takers had put forward political demands. The same law excluded political questions from the possible subjects of negotiations. He believed that the terrorists \u2019 primary aim had been to achieve a resumption of the Ossetian-Ingush ethnic conflict, of which there existed a real threat. From the first hours of the crisis, work had been carried out in close cooperation with the head of the FSB department in Ingushetia.","321. Mr Andreyev enumerated the authorities \u2019 unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the terrorists: their mobile telephone had initially been switched off, and the school telephone was disconnected. The terrorists often interrupted the contacts and said that they would call back. The OH involved a professional negotiator, who was a staff member of the FSB. The terrorists had behaved in an aggressive and hostile manner and refused to discuss any proposals unless the four men indicated by them arrived in Beslan. Mr Andreyev insisted that Mr Zyazikov, Ingushetia \u2019 s President, could not be found, while the three other men had been in contact with the OH (Mr Aslakahnov talked to the terrorists over the telephone and arrived in Beslan in the afternoon of 3 September). The OH had invited two influential persons of Ingush origin \u2013 Mr Aushev and Mr Gutseriyev \u2013 to take part in the negotiations. The terrorists had been inflexible and refused to consider any proposals aimed at aiding the hostages or the possibility of ransom and exit. No written demands had been issued and a number of political demands had been made orally through Mr Aushev. Responding to the questions about the number of hostages, Mr Andreyev insisted that no exact lists beyond the 354 names had existed and the OH did not want to air unreliable information. Responding to the victims \u2019 questions he reiterated that the terrorists in the course of the negotiations had not referred to the number of hostages and that in his opinion they were not particularly interested in the figure announced. The witness testified that in the evening of 2 September Mr Gutseriyev had talked to Mr Zakayev in London and the latter had promised to establish contact with Mr Maskhadov. However, no direct line of communication with Mr Maskhadov had been established.","322. The OH \u2019 s strategy had been to negotiate, and no plan consisting of resolving the situation by force had been considered. Mr Andreyev explained that the involvement of the special forces had been foreseen only in case of massive killing of the hostages.","323. Turning to the special forces of the FSB, Mr Andreyev clarified that the FSB Special Services Centre ( \u0426C\u041d \u0424\u0421\u0411 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 ) under the command of General Tikhonov had their own temporary headquarters, located on the third floor of the Beslan administration building on the premises of the local department of the FSB. Questions concerning the types and use of special weapons, such as flame-throwers, lay within the competence of that Centre. Mr Andreyev issued an order to start the operation aimed at liberating the hostages and at neutralising the terrorists as soon as the latter had started to shoot at hostages escaping from the gymnasium. He conceded that at the beginning of the operation there had been shots fired by other servicemen and the FSB forces were in danger of friendly fire. He insisted that the tanks and flame-throwers had been used only after 9 p.m. on 3 September when there were no hostages still alive left in the school. Mr Andreyev stated that two terrorists had been captured alive, but one of them had been lynched by the locals.","324. During the questioning, the victims openly accused Mr Andreyev of incompetence, concealing the truth and of bearing responsibility for the fatalities. They were called to order by the presiding judge.","(vi) Mr Dzgoyev","325. The court heard the statement by the Ossetian \u201cEmercom\u201d Minister Mr Dzgoyev (v. 4 pp. 1523-1544). He explained that he had been informed that he was a member of the OH in the evening of 2 September; however both before and after that time he had functioned semi-autonomously. He had estimated the number of hostages at around 800 persons and on 2 September Mr Aushev informed him personally that there were over 1000; this information was sufficient to provide for the rescue operation.","326. Mr Dzgoyev answered numerous questions about the extinguishing of the fire in the gymnasium. He stated that the information about a fire at the school (but not in the gymnasium) had been noted by their service at 1.05 p.m. on 3 September. The message that the roof of the gymnasium was starting to collapse had been noted at 2.40 p.m. General Tikhonov, the commander of the Special Services Centre, authorised the firemen to move in at 3.10 p.m. and at 3.20 p.m. they arrived at the scene. Mr Dzgoyev was told that by that time there were no hostages still alive in the gymnasium; this information was later confirmed by the forensic reports. Five fire brigades had been involved. By 4 p.m. the fire had been contained. Later the fire brigades had been ordered by the FSB to leave the gymnasium. Then they entered again and left the building at 6 p.m.","327. The witness explained that another fire vehicle had been brought in by a relative of a hostage from the nearby factory; it had been seen by many witnesses but was not an \u201cEmercom\u201d car. He also insisted that the vehicles and cisterns had been fully prepared, that hoses had been laid from the nearest water hydrants and that the fire equipment had been sufficient.","328. At 7 a.m. on 4 September the \u201cEmercom\u201d teams started the clearance operation. They worked in parallel with the staff of the FSB, army sappers and the prosecutor \u2019 s office. They collected the remains of 323 hostages, of which 112 had been found in the gymnasium and adjacent premises. 31 terrorists \u2019 bodies were also found. During the day the \u201cEmercom\u201d staff cleared the debris with the use of cranes, bulldozers and excavators; the debris was first shifted manually to collect human remains and other relevant items. Only after sifting was the rubble loaded onto the trucks supplied by the local administration. Mr Dzgoyev had personally inspected the destroyed wing of the school, where two floors had collapsed onto the cellar. He saw the terrorists \u2019 bodies but no hostages \u2019 remains. \u201cEmercom\u201d had finished the clearance work by 7 p.m. on 4 September, after which the building was rendered to the local administration.","(vii) Mr Dzasokhov","329. Mr Dzasokhov was questioned on 27 December 2005 (v. 4 pp. 1562 \u2011 1690). Then President of North Ossetia, he stated that at about noon on 1 September Mr Andreyev had received an oral instruction from the FSB, with reference to the Russian Government, to head the OH. Mr Dzasokhov was not a member of the OH, which he considered had been a mistake. However he did whatever he thought was right and within his powers. Mr Dzasokhov was prepared to go and negotiate with the terrorists, but he had been told that he would be placed under arrest if he did so. Nor did he talk to the terrorists over the telephone, since this was done by a professional negotiator. He participated in the meeting with the relatives at the Cultural Centre on 1 and 2 September. He also had several talks with the head of the FSB Special Services Centre General Tikhonov, who shared his concerns about the use of force.","330. Mr Dzasokhov believed that too much operative information of low quality had been sent around prior to the terrorist act, which made it difficult to react. In particular, there was insufficient clarity about the terrorists \u2019 plans in the summer of 2004, although the heightened security threat was evident.","331. Turning to the negotiations, Mr Dzasokhov testified that he had seen the handwritten note allegedly signed by Mr Basayev which Mr Aushev had taken out of the school. Mr Dzasokhov also explained that on 2 September he had talked to Mr Zakayev in London. At 12 noon on 3 September Mr Zakayev confirmed that the request to take part in the negotiations had been transmitted to Mr Maskhadov. Mr Dzasokhov had informed the OH accordingly.","(viii) Other officials","332. A former member of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia and secretary of its security council testified that the OH appointed on 2 September had excluded from its meetings all other persons. He had had no access to the OH, and Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Mamsurov had only been invited on two occasions to its meetings (Ogoyev U. v. 3 p. 1362). Mr Ogoyev could not recall the work of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia created on 23 August 2004 and of which he had been a member.","333. Mrs Levitskaya had been the Minister of Education of North Ossetia at the relevant time. She had come to Beslan on 1, 2 and 3 September, was present at the town administration and had a number of discussions with Mr Dzaskohov and several other Ossetian officials. She had not participated in any OH sessions or other meetings. She learnt that she had been a member of the OH on 10 September 2004 during a meeting of the North Ossetian Parliament (v. 4 p. 1696). She was informed on 1 September by the local department of education about the number of pupils at the school; she was also told that this information had already been transferred to the district authorities.","334. The North Ossetian Deputy Minister of the Interior admitted that their resources had been insufficient to monitor the border-crossing points with Ingushetia. He was also aware of the attempts to block small roads in the Pravoberezhny district and the problems that had been encountered in August 2004 \u2013 lack of staff, sabotage by the locals and absence of funds to pay for the works (Popov V., v. 4 p. 1807).","(j) Questioning of doctors","335. The director of the All-Russia Centre of Disaster Medicine at the Ministry of Public Health ( Zashchita ) Mr Goncharov (v. 3 pp. 1166-1178) testified that on 2 September he had been told that about 300 persons were being held hostage and that the medical assistance had been planned accordingly. Only after he had met with Mr Aushev on 2 September had he realised that the number of hostages was actually much higher. On the same day, in the evening, he set up emergency paediatric brigades, assembled ambulances from the region, carried out training and prepared for the arrival of patients. They mostly expected victims of injuries; the probability of gas poison was considered low. Mr Goncharov testified that though he was a member of the OH as an official of the Ministry of Public Health, he had not taken part in any meetings or discussions. He did not receive any information from the OH, as, in his view, the number of hostages was the only relevant factor and that was communicated to him personally by Mr Aushev. His own experience and available resources had been sufficient. Being highly experienced in providing emergency treatment to large number of victims, his work had been relatively independent from the rest of the OH. Besides, his previous experience had shown that the \u201cpower structures\u201d would not share their plans with the medics, out of a need to keep such considerations secret.","336. Turning to the organisation of medical assistance, Mr Goncharov explained that by the morning of 3 September they had on standby in Beslan about 500 persons, including 183 doctors, over 70 ambulances, one field paediatrician hospital and several reanimation units. \u201cCarriers\u201d with stretchers were grouped about 700 metres from the school, with ambulances and sanitary vehicles placed in several spots around the building. The idea was to bring the injured to the Beslan hospital where the sorting would take place, urgent operations and life-saving measures would be carried out in the field paediatric hospital and, for adults, in the Beslan hospital and then those who could be transported to Vladikavkaz would be taken there (about 20 kilometres).","337. Immediately after the explosions on 3 September at 1 p.m. Mr Goncharov received a call from the OH to bring in the medical rescue team. For four hours on 1 September the sorting centre at the Beslan hospital treated 546 patients and carried out 76 urgent surgeries. Five persons were brought to the hospital in agony and died within a few hours; 14 other patients died within 24 hours. 199 adults were evacuated to other hospitals after urgent medical assistance; 55 children were in life \u2011 threatening condition and had to be treated on the spot, seven children had emergency surgery. On the night of 3 to 4 September six children in critical condition were taken to Moscow in a specialised plane. Mr Goncharov mentioned difficulties in maintaining the necessary security around the school, and later around the hospital, in order to avoid disruption of services by the relatives.","338. Mr Soplevenko, then North Ossetian Minister of Public Health was questioned in court on 15 November 2005 (v. 3 pp. 1179 \u2013 1191). He also testified that on 1-3 September he had not received any particular instructions, except rather general indications by Mr Dzasokhov that \u201cadequate medical aid\u201d should be provided. He had not been part of the OH or any other body during the crisis. He learnt that more than 1,000 persons were being held in the school from the nursing mothers who had walked out with Mr Aushev on 2 September. In cooperation with Mr Goncharov he prepared the hospitals in Vladikavkaz to admit patients: beds were freed at five hospitals, surgery and reanimation brigades were put on standby, stocks of medical and dressing material were set aside.","339. Dr Roshal, director of the Moscow institute of emergency paediatric surgery, was questioned in February 2006. He stated that he had been informed by journalists on 1 September about the hostage-taking and immediately went to Beslan. There he was taken to the town administration where the OH and other officials were stationed. He was taken to the room with Mr Z. and received brief instructions from him. On several occasions he called the terrorists; each time they reacted in a hostile manner and refused to discuss anything unless all four men demanded by them arrived. His attempts to convince them to accept water, food, medicines or to allow him to examine and treat the wounded and sick were flatly rejected, moreover, the terrorists said that all hostages had declared a \u201cdry hunger strike\u201d in support of their demands. On 2 September at about 11 a.m. the terrorists called him and let him talk to the school director, who pleaded with him to intervene since their situation was dire. On 2 September Dr Roshal personally telephoned Mr Zakayev in London and let Mr Dzasokhov talk to him (v. 4 pp. 1900 \u2013 1925).","(k) Information about forensic reports","340. In December 2005 the court, upon the victims \u2019 application, questioned a senior expert of the State forensic centre in Rostov \u2011 on \u2011 Don, who on 13 September 2004 had been appointed the chief of the group in charge of identification of the remains by DNA tests. The expert explained that their centre was the best equipped in Russia and that the delay in genetic tests was between three days and five weeks, depending on the quality of the material under examination. All work in the Beslan cases had been completed within a month and a half. Mr Korniyenko stated that the results obtained through genetic pairing had been final and allowed no disputes about possible misidentification. He admitted that many relatives had refused to believe in the deaths of their loved ones and that on some occasions they had carried out second rounds of tests with other relatives \u2019 genetic material, primarily out of respect for the relatives \u2019 doubts. The expert cited difficulties in the identification of the remains which had been burnt \u201cto the ashes\u201d and in the identification of body fragments which had lasted until summer 2005. The same expert group had worked with the terrorists \u2019 remains: twenty-three had been identified, while eight remained unidentified (v. 3 p. 1469).","341. Hundreds of forensic reports on the victims had been examined by the court. They included examinations of bodies, results of identification of the remains through DNA tests, conclusions of experts on the level of damage to the health of the surviving hostages and other documents. Over 110 forensic reports concluded that the cause of death could not be established in view of extensive charring and burning of the remains and the absence of other injuries; other reports named extensive burns, gunshot wounds, traumatic amputation of extremities, and injuries to the head and body as the causes of death. Injuries from gunshots and explosions, burns and psychological traumas were recorded for the surviving hostages.","(l) Additional requests and applications lodged by the victims","342. In the course of the proceedings the victims lodged several hundred applications. Some of them were lodged with the district courts in Vladikavkaz, where the investigation was being conducted, while others were lodged directly with the North Ossetia Supreme Court. Some of them have been submitted to the Court, others are mentioned in the statement of facts or in the trial records.","343. Thus, on 29 September 2005 the victims requested the withdrawal of the State prosecutor heading the investigation team, Deputy Prosecutor General Mr Shepel. They argued that the investigation had been incomplete and failed to take into account all the relevant information about the crime. They indicated that the copies of expert reports ordered in the case had been unavailable to them, that the prosecutor \u2019 s office had ignored numerous facts and statements which had differed from the facts \u201cselected\u201d to form the basis of Mr Kulayev \u2019 s indictment, and that the role of various officials in the hostages \u2019 deaths had not been clarified. This application was dismissed.","344. In January 2006 the victims applied for the withdrawal of the prosecution and the judge presiding in the case, referring to the incomplete nature of the investigation and the repeated dismissal of their applications by the judge. They also questioned the logic behind separating the investigation concerning the terrorist act and its consequences into several sets of criminal proceedings. These applications were also dismissed (v. 4 p. 1801).","345. In November to December 2005 and January 2006 the victims applied to the trial court for permission to call and question a number of additional witnesses: members of the OH, senior civilian and FSB officers who had been present in Beslan during the operation, members of the Ossetian Parliament \u2019 s investigative commission on Beslan, and persons who had negotiated with the terrorists, including Mr Gutseriyev, Mr Roshal, Mr Z. and Mr Aslakhanov. The court granted the applications concerning several Ossetian officials who were members of the OH, but refused to call other officials, negotiators and members of the Ossetian Parliament. It also refused to include the results of the investigation of the Ossetian Parliamentary Commission in the case file (v. 3 pp. 1311-1312, v. 4 pp. 1570, 1589, 1651, 1778-1783, 1796, 1929). In January 2006 the court granted the victims \u2019 application to question Mr Z., Mr Roshal and some senior FSB officials.","346. In February 2006 the victims again sought the withdrawal of the prosecutor in the trial. They argued, with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights, that the investigation had been ineffective and incomplete in ascertaining the most important elements of the crime. They sought to appoint independent experts in order to clarify key questions concerning the preparation of the terrorist act, the composition and powers of the OH, the reasons for the first explosions, the use of flame-throwers, grenade launchers and tank guns, and the belated arrival of the firefighters. This application was dismissed (v. 4 p. 1936).","347. In July 2006 the victims sought to acquaint themselves with the entire set of documents in the criminal case and to be allowed to take copies. Similar requests were lodged in March and July 2007, but apparently to no avail.","(m) The judgment of 16 May 2006","348. In his final submissions of February 2006 the prosecutor requested the court to apply the death penalty to the accused. The victims argued that the investigation and the trial had failed to elucidate many key elements of the events and that the officials responsible should be prosecuted for their actions which had led to the tragedy.","349. On 16 May 2006 the North Ossetia Supreme Court found Mr Nurpashi Kulayev guilty of a number of crimes, including membership of a criminal group, unlawful handling of arms and explosives, aggravated hostage taking, murder, and attempts to kill State officials. The 319-page judgment summarised witness and victim statements, and referred to forensic reports and death certificates, expert reports and other evidence. The court found that 317 hostages, one Beslan civilian and two \u201cEmercom\u201d workers had been killed; 728 hostages had received injuries of varying degrees (151 \u2013 grave injuries; 530 \u2013 injuries of medium gravity; and 102 \u2013 light injuries). Ten servicemen of the FSB had been killed and fifty-five servicemen of the army and law-enforcement bodies wounded. The actions of the criminal group had caused significant material damage to the school and private property in Beslan. Mr Kulayev was sentenced to life imprisonment.","(n) Cassation at the Supreme Court","350. The victims appealed against the court \u2019 s decision. In particular, in their detailed complaints of 30 August and 8 September 2006 they claimed that the court had failed to undertake a thorough and effective investigation into the crime and that its conclusions had not been corroborated by the facts. They argued that the court had failed to investigate the authorities \u2019 failure to prevent the terrorist attack, to apportion responsibility for the decisions taken by the OH, to establish the exact places and circumstances of the first explosions in the gymnasium, and to assess the lawfulness of the use of indiscriminate weapons by the security forces. They also complained that the court had not allowed them full access to the case materials. Their complaints were supplemented by reference to the relevant statements and documents.","351. On 26 December 2006 the Supreme Court held a cassation review. Four victims and the defendant \u2019 s lawyer, as well as the prosecutor, addressed the court. The Supreme Court slightly amended the characterisation of one offence imputed to Mr Kulayev; the remaining part of the parties \u2019 complaints had been dismissed. In particular, the Supreme Court found that the questions raised by the victims had no bearing on the characterisation of Mr Kulayev \u2019 s deeds and that the victims had been allowed full access to the case documents after the completion of the investigation.","352. On the same day the Supreme Court issued a separate ruling (\u201c \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043e\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u201d) in respect of Deputy General Prosecutor Mr Shepel, who had acted as the State prosecutor in the trial. The Supreme Court noted that his request to the trial court to apply the death penalty to Mr Kulayev had been contrary to the applicable legislation and as such incited the court to adopt a manifestly illegal decision.","(o) The applicants \u2019 view of the investigation","353. The applicants in application no. 26562\/07 Tagayeva and Others submitted that during the trial they had heard testimony and examined other evidence. It had allowed them to draw conclusions about the actions of the OH and other officials, most of which could not be elucidated within the course of the trial. Referring to the case materials and other evidence the applicants made the following inferences:","- on 1-3 September the hostages had been detained in inhuman conditions, subjected to intense physical and emotional stress including deprivation of food and water, humiliation, the witnessing of suffering and deaths of family members, and a feeling of helplessness in the absence of meaningful negotiation attempts from the outside world;","- the conclusion that the IEDs had been the origin of the first explosions was not supported by the hostages \u2019 statements and the state of the gymnasium;","- after the first explosions the servicemen of the army and FSB had employed heavy indiscriminate weapons including a tank gun, APC machine-guns, flame-throwers and grenade-launchers;","- the OH had not made the saving of hostages its primary aim and had authorised the use of heavy weapons during the storming;","- the firefighters \u2019 intervention had been significantly delayed, entailing additional victims in the gymnasium.","9. Criminal proceedings against police officers","354. In parallel to the proceedings in criminal case no. 20\/849 and that concerning the actions of Mr Kulayev, two additional criminal investigations were conducted against police officers on charges of professional negligence.","(a) Criminal proceedings against the servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD","355. On 20 September 2004 the Deputy General Prosecutor Mr Kolesnikov ordered the opening of a separate criminal investigation for negligence on the part the head of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, Mr Aydarov, his deputy on issues of population security, Mr Murtazov, and the ROVD \u2019 s chief of staff, Mr Dryayev. This criminal case was assigned number 20\/852.","356. The police officers were charged with negligence entailing grave consequences and the death of two or more persons under section 293-2 and 293 \u2011 3 of the Penal Code. They were accused of having failed to properly organise an anti-terrorist defence and to prevent terrorist attacks in August 2004, despite the heightened terrorist threat and the existence of relevant telexes and orders of the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior.","357. Over 180 persons were granted the status of victim in the proceedings. Although no procedural documents have been submitted, it appears from the cassation appeal by the victims that only those whose relatives had died were granted victim status in the proceedings, while other hostages had been refused this status.","358. On 20 March 2006 the Pravoberezhny District Court of North Ossetia started hearing the case. The applicants submitted four volumes of trial records, comprising about 1,500 pages and covering sixty-nine court sessions.","359. On 29 May 2007 the court terminated the criminal proceedings against the three officials, having applied to them the provisions of the Amnesty Act of 22 September 2006. The officers agreed to the application of the Amnesty Act, which absolved them from criminal responsibility for the acts committed during the period covered by it (see paragraph 437 below). The prosecutor \u2019 s office supported the application of the amnesty, while the victims objected. The victims present in the courtroom, outraged by the verdict, ransacked the premises.","360. On 5-8 June 2007 seventy-five victims appealed against this decision. They challenged the applicability of the Amnesty Act to the circumstances of the case at issue and, in particular, noted that the counter \u2011 terrorism operation in Beslan had started after the commission of the crime in question. They also complained that the court had refused to consider civil claims at the same time, that many other hostages and relatives of injured persons had been refused the status of victim in the proceedings, that one volume of the criminal investigation file (no. 43) had been declared secret by the trial court and thus the victims were denied access to it, that a number of material witnesses had not been called, and that the trial court had refused to take into account additional evidence such as the report of the North Ossetian Parliament about the investigation into the terrorist act.","361. On 2 August 2007 the Supreme Court of North Ossetia at last instance upheld the judgment of 29 May 2007. It found the victims \u2019 allegations about procedural deficiencies to be irrelevant to the conclusion and confirmed the applicability of the Amnesty Act.","362. The victims appealed against the above decisions through the supervisory review procedure, but to no avail.","(b) Criminal proceedings against the servicemen of the Malgobekskiy ROVD","363. On 7 October 2004 a separate criminal investigation was opened in respect of the head of the Malgobekskiy ROVD, Mr Yevloyev, and his deputy, Mr Kotiyev, for negligence entailing grave consequences (section 293 \u2011 2 and 293-3 of the Penal Code). It appears that at least about one hundred former hostages or their relatives were granted victim status in these proceedings.","364. The applicants submitted various documents related to this trial, including about 200 pages of the trial court records, the victims \u2019 corrections to these records, copies of their complaints and other documents. As shown by these documents, the officials of the Malgobek ROVD had been charged with failure to spot the terrorists who had gathered and trained in the district and had travelled on 1 September 2004 to North Ossetia. The investigation obtained a number of documents which contained sufficiently clear and precise information about the possible terrorist threat and the actions to be taken to counter it. In particular, on 22 August 2004 the Ingushetian Ministry of the Interior had issued order no. 611 concerning a terrorist threat to public security, putting all staff of the Ministry on heightened alert until further notice. This document instructed all heads of district departments of the interior, inter alia, to contact the local municipalities, hunters and forest workers, in order to keep track of movements of suspicious men, and to check all trucks and other vehicles capable of transporting illicit cargo, if necessary using service dogs. On 23 August 2004 Mr Yevloyev issued a corresponding order on measures to be taken in the Malgobek District.","365. On 25 August 2004 the Ingushetian Ministry of the Interior issued order no. 617 about security measures in schools and educational facilities. By this order the police were called to take special measures aimed at the protection of educational facilities against possible terrorist acts. On 28 August 2008 Mr Yevloyev issued a corresponding document for the Malgobek District.","366. On 31 August 2004 the Ingushetian Ministry of the Interior sent a directive to all district departments, citing operative information about a possible terrorist act in educational facilities on the opening of the academic year. Again, a number of urgent steps involving the local self-government and the schools administration were recommended.","367. The trial was conducted by the Supreme Court of Ingushetia in closed sessions in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria. The defendants opted for jury trial. On 5 October 2007 the jury declared the defendants not guilty. On the same day the Supreme Court of Ingushetia fully acquitted the defendants and rejected the civil suits lodged by the victims within the same proceedings.","368. The victims appealed, and on 6 March 2008 the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of the judgment. The victims \u2019 subsequent appeals for supervisory review were futile.","10. Civil proceedings brought by the victims","(a) First group of claimants","369. In November 2007 a group of victims submitted a civil claim directed against the Ministry of the Interior, seeking to obtain compensation for the damage caused by the terrorist act. The victims referred to the judgment of the Pravoberezhny District Court of 29 May 2007 in respect of the officers of the Pravoberezhny ROVD of Beslan. They argued that the application of an Amnesty Act did not exclude the possibility of claiming damages in civil proceedings. Arguing that the Ministry of the Interior had failed to take steps to prevent the terrorist act, they sought financial compensation in respect of each family member who had died or had been a hostage.","370. The Pravoberezhny District Court, on several occasions, requested the applicants to supplement the claims. On 22 May 2008 the Pravoberezhny District Court ordered the case to be transferred to the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz, at the location of the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior. On 26 September 2008 the Leninskiy District Court ordered the case to be transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow, at the location of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia. On 21 October 2008 the North Ossetia Supreme Court, upon the applicants \u2019 appeal, quashed the District Court \u2019 s ruling and remitted the case to the Leninskiy District Court.","371. On 10 December 2008 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz dismissed the applicants \u2019 civil action against the Ministry of the Interior. It explained that the Suppression of Terrorism Act, relied on by the claimants, did not provide for compensation for non-pecuniary damage by a State body which had participated in a counter-terrorism operation. As to the applicants \u2019 attempt to link the compensation claim to the decision not to prosecute the officers of the Pravoberezhny ROVD, the court dismissed it as addressed to another defendant.","372. On 24 February 2009 the North Ossetia Supreme Court rejected the applicants \u2019 appeal against the above decision. The applicants \u2019 subsequent attempts to obtain supervisory review of these decisions proved futile.","(b) Second group of claimants","373. In separate proceedings another group of victims attempted to sue both the Russian and the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior for non \u2011 pecuniary damage caused to them by the terrorist act. With similar reasoning, on 9 December 2009 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz dismissed the claim. On 17 March 2009 the North Ossetia Supreme Court upheld this decision at last instance.","11. Report prepared by the North Ossetian Parliament","374. On 10 September 2004 the North Ossetian Parliament put together a Commission to examine and analyse the events in Beslan on 1 \u2011 3 September 2004. In its work the Commission relied on the available materials, including official documents, photographs, video footage and audio materials, press articles, witness statements and their own information sources. The Commission \u2019 s report was published on 29 November 2005. The report was forty-two pages long and contained chapters on the chronology of the terrorist act, facts and analysis of the events preceding the hostage-taking, the actions of the OH and various State agencies involved, examination of the reasons for the first explosions in the gymnasium, detailed information about the fighters involved in the crime and various statistical information relevant to the act. The report ended with recommendations to the authorities.","(a) Prevention of terrorist act","375. The Commission strongly criticised the local police and FSB branches in Ingushetia and North Ossetia. It expressed particular dismay at the fact that despite a \u201cheightened security threat\u201d the terrorist group had been able to gather and train unnoticed in the vicinity of a village and a major local road; as well as the group \u2019 s unhindered passage to the school in the centre of a town across the administrative border, which was supposed to be under special protection. The Commission argued that the police \u2019 s attention had been diverted to the presidential elections in Chechnya which had taken place on 29 August 2004 and following which no real attention had been paid to other security threats.","(b) The work and composition of the OH","376. Turning to the work of the OH, the report was highly critical of its composition and functioning. It concluded that the \u201cfirst, so \u2011 called \u2018 republican \u2019 OH\u201d had been created on 1 September 2004 at 10.30 a.m., in line with the Suppression of Terrorism Act and the preliminary plan dated 30 July 2004. It comprised eleven persons under Mr Dzasokhov \u2019 s command and included the heads of the North Ossetian FSB, Ministry of the Interior and other officials. In the presence of the OH members, Mr Roshal and a number of other public figures, Mr Dzasokohov announced that he was prepared to go to the school; however, the deputy Minister of the Interior of Russia, Mr Pankov, responded that in such case he would be authorised to arrest him. Mr Dzasokhov himself confirmed that he had been informed by senior officials in Moscow that he should not take \u201cany steps which could lead to further complications of the operation aimed at liberation of the hostages\u201d. This \u201crepublican\u201d OH continued to consider possible strategies aimed at liberating the hostages throughout the crisis. They also considered the possibility of inviting Mr Maskhadov to negotiate.","377. In the meantime, in the afternoon of 1 September 2004 the President of Russia, pursuant to a secret order of the Russian Government (no. 1146-rs), determined the composition of the OH under the command of General \u2011 Major V. Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB. This OH included the commander of the 58th army of the Ministry of Defence, General-Lieutenant V. Sobolev, the head of the North Ossetian \u201cEmercom\u201d, Mr Dzgoyev, the North Ossetian Education Minister, Mrs Levitskaya, the director of the Zashchita Centre for Disaster Medicine, Mr Goncharov, and the deputy head of the information programmes department of the Rossiya State TV company, Mr Vasilyev. The report criticised the composition of the OH, which had excluded not only Mr Dzasokhov \u2013 North Ossetia \u2019 s President \u2013 but also a number of other high-level officials from the Republic. It further noted that two deputy directors of the FSB who had arrived in Beslan \u2013 Mr Anisimov and Mr Pronichev \u2013 had not been officially designated to take on any tasks in the OH. This had led to a situation of a multitude of \u201cleaderships\u201d.","378. The report described the situation as follows:","\u201cThe striking disunity of the headquarters is further proved by their locations. The Beslan administration building saw the following distribution of bodies and officials.","In the left wing of the ground floor \u2013 FSB (Generals V. Andreyev and T. Kaloyev). In the office next to them \u2013 Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov. On the third floor, in the left wing were situated the Republic \u2019 s President, Mr Dzasokhov, Parliament \u2019 s speaker Mr Mamsurov, Representative plenipotentiary of Russia \u2019 s President in the Southern Federal Circuit, Mr V. Yakovlev, and a group of Duma deputies headed by Mr D. Rogozin. In the right wing of the third floor worked the commanders of the Alfa and Vympel special forces \u2019 units under the leadership of General Tikhonov.","However, the most closed and mysterious structure was situated in the southern wing of the ground floor of the [administration building], keeping its work secret from all members of the above-listed headquarters. In it worked persons who did not belong to any official headquarters structure: Mr Anisimov and Mr Pronichev, Mr Pankov, Mr Kaloyev and others.","Another mysterious structure was located on the second floor of the building, in the centre. This was a sort of \u2018 ideological headquarters \u2019 where all information going public was verified and edited prior to publication. Most probably, the announcement of the figure of 354 hostages had been decided there. ...","In addition, the commander of the 58th army, Mr Sobolev, had set up his headquarters outside the administration building. Mr Dzgoyev, who, according to his own statement, had been \u201cin reserve\u201d, was also stationed outside the building; as was the North Ossetian Minister of the Interior. ...","The formal nature of Mr Andreyev \u2019 s appointment as OH commander is supported by well-known facts. The head of the North Ossetian FSB had left the headquarters on dozens of occasions and thus lost control over the situation: he talked to the Beslan citizens outside the OH, met with journalists, accompanied Mr Aushev to the school on 2 September and the \u201cEmercom\u201d group on 3 September. How could the General, on whose decisions the lives of hundreds of persons depended, behave in this way? This is either excluded or, to the contrary, quite possible, if real decisions for Mr Andreyev had been taken by his immediate superiors \u2013 Mr Pronichev, Mr Anisimov and, probably, the head of the North Caucasus department of the FSB, Mr Kaloyev.","There are reasons to believe that Mr Andreyev \u2019 s orders and directives were not formally recorded, that no meetings of the OH had taken place, and that everything was decided in oral form in the course of working discussions with various agencies. ...","One gets the impression that the OH under Mr Andreyev \u2019 s command oscillated between two extremes: on the one hand, without making public the terrorists \u2019 demands, it was searching (or pretending to search) for negotiators who would be able to participate in such talks; on the other hand it constantly announced the impossibility of a forced solution, while at the same time being obliged not simply to consider this option but to take steps in order to implement it. ...","By the end of the second day, not a single federal official who could at least partially discuss the terrorists \u2019 demands had contacted them with the aim of negotiating. Becoming more and more convinced that their demands were not being considered and that the topic of negotiations remained the hostages \u2019 supply with food and water, liberation of the infants and elderly, an \u2018 escape corridor \u2019 to Chechnya and the like, the terrorists hardened the hostages \u2019 conditions. As to the terrorists \u2019 agreement to allow the evacuation of two dozen bodies from the school courtyard, it was probably caused by the fighters \u2019 wish to scare the population and to make the OH more flexible, since one could easily predict the impression on the relatives of an \u201cEmercom\u201d truck loaded with corpses.","Incomplete information about the development and content of the negotiations, and the lack of clarity about the videotape transmitted to the headquarters, leave many questions unanswered. ...","Without questioning the principle of non-compliance with the terrorists \u2019 demands, although the Suppression of Terrorism Act speaks about minimal concessions to the terrorists, it appears that it would have been much more reasonable if the federal authorities, to whom the terrorists \u2019 demands had been directed, had undertaken to implement it, rather than delegating this problem to the regional authorities or even a paediatrician. It is obvious that any promises of the regional authorities not supported by appropriate guarantees by the highest officials could not have inspired the fighters \u2019 confidence, and they could not have taken seriously the so called \u2018 security corridor \u2019 .\u201d","(c) The first explosions","379. The report argued that the first two explosions could not have come from the IEDs. The first explosion, according to the hostages \u2019 testimony, had occurred in the northern part of the gymnasium \u2019 s roofing space; it had destroyed part of the roof and created a mushroom-shaped smoke cloud above the explosion. The report argued that this could not have been the result of an IED explosion for a number of reasons: the terrorists had not mined the roof or the roofing space of the gymnasium, not a single electric cable had led there; a mine in the gymnasium could not have destroyed the ceiling and roof six metres above; there should have been several simultaneous explosions because they had been connected in a single chain; the mushroom-shaped cloud could not have risen within seconds to about 13 \u2011 15 metres above the roof from an IED explosion inside the gymnasium; the damage to the basketball hoop and the brick wall of the gymnasium bore evidence of the passage of an externally fired device. The second explosion, which had created a half-metre-wide opening in the brick wall under the window, had not been the result of an IED either, since the floorboards immediately near the hole had not been damaged; unlike the floorboards under the basketball hoop where the IED had later detonated.","380. The report stated that the video-recording of the events had captured not only the smoke cloud from the first explosion, but also the sounds of both explosions, leading to the conclusion that the shots had been fired from a grenade-launcher or a flame-thrower. The report considered that the nature of the destruction was consistent with this version. The choice of targets inside the gymnasium was determined by the presence there of the pedal \u2011 holding fighter; since the sniper could not have reached him, the grenade had resolved this situation.","381. The report found that the third explosion most probably resulted from an IED being affected by spreading fire, following which the fire spread from the ceiling to the floor of the gymnasium.","382. The document concluded by saying that the exploration of the first explosions should have been carried out properly within the framework of the criminal investigation. The report deplored the hasty clearing of the site, which had been opened to the public on 5 September 2004 and referred to \u201chundreds of people who had found objects which should have been of interest to the investigation\u201d. A number of items had apparently been collected at the rubbish dump where the debris had been taken on 4 September in trucks.","383. In a separate conclusion, the report stated that the active involvement of civilian volunteers immediately after the explosions had saved many hostages \u2019 lives. The evacuation had been carried out by those persons who had taken on \u201cthe functions of police, firemen and emergency workers\u201d.","(d) The actions of rescue and security forces","384. The report evaluated the number of army and police forces (excluding the FSB) deployed within the security perimeter around the school at about 1,750 persons. Three security lines were judged to be of little effect and had basically fallen apart once the operation had started. Hundreds of civilians and dozens of private cars had circulated without hindrance through the lines; filtration groups, formed in advance out of servicemen of the police special forces (OMON) and the Pravoberezhny ROVD, had not stopped for identity check any of the volunteers who had helped to evacuate the hostages. The report remarked that many men had arrived from elsewhere in Ossetia and spent two days around the school; they were often unshaven, dirtied with blood and soot, and could not have been distinguished from terrorists.","385. The report then addressed the problem of ambulance and fire \u2011 brigade access to the school, commenting that it was made difficult by the vehicles parked in the adjacent streets and which had not been towed away. The first fire vehicle which arrived at the school at about 2 p.m. had not carried a full load of water in its cistern. Other fire brigades which arrived even later had allowed civilian volunteers to operate the water hoses.","386. The report found it established that on 3 September between 2 p.m. and 2.30 p.m. a tank with hull number 328, stationed behind the railway line, had fired several times at the canteen and kitchen with non-explosive warheads; around 4.30 p.m. tank with hull number 325 in Kominterna Street had fired from a close distance at the canteen, at the area immediately above the entrance to the cellar. The Commission \u2019 s members could not agree that the use of the tank to fire at the canteen before 5 p.m. had been justified in view of the probable presence of the last group of hostages with the terrorists. The Commission had entered the cellar and found it entirely intact and bearing no traces of the terrorists \u2019 alleged stay there. No complete information could be obtained about the use of tanks, helicopters, flame \u2011 throwers or other heavy weapons.","387. The document separately noted the multitude of responsibility lines within the various agencies involved. Thus, according to the Commission \u2019 s information, the commander of the 58th army had regularly reported to the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Defence in Moscow and had obtained directions from him in return. The Ministry of the Interior had commanded the largest contingent in Beslan and it had initially followed the orders of its own headquarters based in the administration building; later it followed the directions issued by the FSB.","388. Turning to the role of the FSB, the report stated the following:","\u201cThe Russian FSB has remained the most closed structure in terms of the Commission \u2019 s efforts to obtain information in order to find out about its actions on 1 \u2011 3 September 2004. Therefore it is very difficult to accept, without further verification, the statement that, according to the operative groups of the Special Services Centre, by 6 p.m. there remained no living hostages with the terrorists (in the classes, cellar and roofing space).\u201d","(e) The fighters \u2019 identities","389. The report devoted some attention to the number of fighters and their identities. It noted discrepancies in the names and number of identified and non-identified terrorists in the documents issued by the prosecutor \u2019 s office in relation to the investigation in criminal case no. 20\/849. Relying on the information provided by the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office, the report listed 38 names or aliases; of them 22 persons (including Mr N. Kulayev) were identified by their full name, date of birth, ethnic origin and place of residence, and 14 persons were identified provisionally. In the list of 38 persons, at least nine had previously been detained by the law-enforcement authorities; some of them had been released for unknown reasons. Thus, according to the report, Mr Iliyev had been detained in 2003 in Ingushetia on charges of illegal handling of weapons and ammunitions, but the case had been closed two months later; Mr Khanpash Kulayev had been sentenced to nine years in prison in 2001; Mr Shebikhanov had been charged with attacking a military convoy in August 2003 and released by jury in July 2004; Mr Tarshkhoyev had been convicted at least three times and given suspended sentences for illegal handling of arms and theft, most recently in March 2001; Mr Khochubarov (\u201c Polkovnik \u201d) had been on trial for illegal handling of arms; Mr Khodov had been wanted for a number of serious crimes including terrorist acts and had been detained in 2002 but released. Most other identified terrorists were known to the law \u2011 enforcement authorities, who had retained their fingerprints, on the basis of which their bodies were identified. Many were on wanted lists for various crimes.","390. Some persons initially announced by the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office as identified bodies in Beslan had later been killed in other places. Thus, Mr Gorchkhanov \u2019 death had first been announced in Beslan; in October 2005 his name was again announced by the Deputy General Prosecutor Mr Shepel among the organisers of the attack at Nalchik, Kabardino \u2011 Balkaria, who had been killed. Mr Kodzoyev was first identified among the terrorists in Beslan and apparently had a telephone conversation with his wife, whom the authorities had brought to the school on 2 September; then his death had been announced in an anti-terrorist operation in Ingushetia in April 2005. The report deplored the lack of clarity in such an important aspect of the investigation and called the prosecutor \u2019 s office to issue clear and exhaustive information in this regard.","(f) Statistical information","391. The report contained a table, composed on the basis of information provided by the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office, with various figures related to the total number of hostages, the number of killed and injured, persons liberated as a result of the anti-terrorist operation, etc. In this respect the Commission noted that the causes of death for 331 persons were distributed as follows: 20 persons had died in hospital; 51 persons (including 21 men killed on 1 September) had died of gunshot wounds; 150 had died of shell wounds; 10 of fire injuries; and 4 of blunt injuries. In 116 cases the cause of death could not be established owing to extensive fire damage. 83 bodies were identified through DNA matching; six cases called for exhumation and a DNA test; these procedures lasted until April 2005. The Commission concluded that the real reasons for many victims \u2019 deaths and injuries had not been established: the bullets and shell fragments had not been extracted from the bodies; no ballistics reports had been made to analyse the bullets and cartridges found at the scene. Thus, concluded the report, the real reasons for many victims \u2019 deaths had not been established.","(g) The report \u2019 s publication, reactions and further information","392. The Commission \u2019 s report was made public in December 2005. Mr Torshin stated that the report posed more questions than it gave answers; its findings and conclusions were not mentioned in the report prepared by the Federal Assembly (see part L below).","393. In 2007 the report was published as a separate book. By that time the authors had prepared additional statistical data. It included a complete list of hostages, with indications of injuries and dates of death, and other important findings. Many figures arrived at by the authors of the report differed from those used by the prosecutor \u2019 s office.","394. In particular, the authors stated that 1,116 persons (not 1,127 as indicated by the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office) had been taken hostage; three persons had escaped on 1 September; 17 (not 21) men had been shot dead on 1 September; 24 (not 26) persons had been led out by Mr Aushev on 2 September. By 1 p.m. on 1 September 1,072 hostages remained alive in the school; 284 had been killed during the storming; ten died in hospital within two months and three more by 2006. 10 special forces servicemen were killed, two servicemen of \u201cEmercom\u201d and seven civilians: three were killed on 1 September by the assailants and four more during the storming, while evacuating the hostages. 35 civilians were wounded, the majority of them while evacuating the hostages from the school.","395. The publication gave a list of the servicemen of the FSB, the Ministry of the Interior and \u201cEmercom\u201d who had been killed (12 persons) and injured (52) during the terrorist act.","396. Turning to the causes of death, the publication stated that the Commission had examined over 300 orders for forensic expert reports issued by the prosecutor \u2019 s office on 3-4 September 2004 and the forensic reports issued by the North Ossetia State Forensic Bureau ( \u0411\u044e\u0440\u043e \u0421\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e \u2011 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u044b, \u0411\u0421\u041c\u042d ). The document recalled that the investigation \u2019 s orders had suggested that the experts should examine the bodies externally, and carry out a full forensic report only \u201cwhere necessary\u201d. Only a few cases had thus entailed a full forensic examination; one third of the expert reports had concluded that \u201cthe cause of death could not be established\u201d. In total the document stated that signs of burns were noted on 159 bodies out of 333, although for most cases the experts had noted that the carbonisation had most probably occurred post mortem. They also noted the disproportionally high number of victims who had died of gunshot wounds: 44 civilians, including 11 women and 9 children; while only 7 servicemen out of 11 had died of gunshot wounds.","397. Finally, the report noted that nine (and not six as indicated in the official documents) exhumations for additional verification of remains had been carried out. The report listed these cases.","12. The Federal Assembly report","(a) Report prepared by the Commission chaired by Mr Torshin","398. On 20 and 22 September 2004 both chambers of the Federal Assembly (the Russian Parliament) \u2013 State Duma and Federation Council \u2013 decided to create a joint commission in order to investigate the reasons for and circumstances of the terrorist act in Beslan. About twenty members of both chambers were appointed to the Commission, chaired by Mr Aleksandr Torshin, Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council. The Commission undertook a number of investigative measures, including several visits to Beslan as well as to Ingushetia, Chechnya and Rostov-on-Don.","399. The Commission questioned 45 high-ranking officials, including the Prime Minister, several federal ministers, Mr Aslakhanov, aide to Russia \u2019 s President; Mr Patrushev, Mr Pronichev and Mr Anisimov - the head of the FSB and his two deputies; General Tikhonov, head of the FSB Special Services Centre; several high-ranking officials from the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office, including four deputies to the General Prosecutor; North Ossetian and Ingushetian officials, including Mr Dzasokhov and Mr Zyazikov; and persons who had negotiated with the terrorists: Mr Aushev, Mr Gutseriyev and Mr Roshal. The Commission received several hundred telephone calls to a special line and letters.","400. On 22 December 2006 the Commission \u2019 s report was presented to the Federal Assembly. The written report ran to 240 pages. It included a chronology of the terrorist act, chapters on the actions of the State authorities, a historical and political analysis of terrorism in the Northern Caucasus and a number of legislative recommendations. Two Commission members refused to sign it; one of them, Mr Savelyev, prepared an alternative report (see below).","401. The report \u2019 s main conclusions were principally in line with the conclusions of the criminal investigations. In particular, the report noted the following:","- Prior to the terrorist act, a number of security measures had not been taken by the local administration and police forces in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The conduct of police in the Malgobek district was described as professional negligence and the actions of police in Ingushetia in general \u2013 as \u201ckeeping aloof\u201d from following orders from the Ministry of the Interior (pages 107-108 of the report). The police force of North Ossetia failed to comply with certain precautionary measures and this had facilitated the terrorists \u2019 attack at the school.","- The actions of the federal authorities were adequate and correct.","- The OH had been correct in its actions aimed at negotiations with the terrorists, however a number of weak points had been identified in the composition of the OH, the conducting of its work, and the informing of the population about the developments (pp. 84, 94).","- The first explosions in the gymnasium were caused by two IEDs (p. 87).","- The use of flame-throwers and the tank gun against the school had been authorised by the head of the FSB Special Services Centre after 6 p.m. on 3 September and had not caused any harm to the hostages, who by that time had been evacuated (p. 89).","(b) Separate report by Mr Yuriy Savelyev","(i) The report","402. Mr Yuriy Savelyev, a deputy of the State Duma elected in 2003 from the Rodina party, was a member of the Parliamentary Commission headed by Mr Torshin. Mr Savelyev is a rocket scientist by profession, holds a doctorate in technical sciences, was the director of the St Petersburg Military Mechanics Institute, and is the author of numerous scientific works and training manuals on rocket construction, ballistics, thermodynamics and pertinent fields.","403. In the summer of 2006 Mr Savelyev announced a serious disagreement with the report drafted by the Commission. Later that year he published a separate report, based on the examination of the materials to which he had access as a Commission member. The report, entitled \u201cBeslan: The Hostages \u2019 Truth\u201d (\u201c \u0411\u0435\u0441\u043b\u0430\u043d: \u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0434\u0430 \u0417\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0436\u043d\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432 \u201d), contained seven parts:","- Part 1. The first explosions in the gymnasium, 259 pages with 58 photos.","- Part 2. The origin and development of the fire in the gymnasium, 133 pages with 43 photos.","- Part 3. Use of portable fire-launchers and grenade \u2011 launchers, 97 pages with 49 photos.","- Part 4. Use of T-72 tanks and APC-80 military vehicles, 140 pages with 52 photos.","- Part 5. Women in the terrorist group, 69 pages with 12 photos;","- Part 6. Losses among hostages sustained outside the gymnasium, 145 pages with 54 photos.","- Part 7. The circumstances of the seizure of hostages, 296 pages with 21 photos.","404. This report was submitted to the Court, its entire content being published on the Internet site pravdabeslana.ru.","405. Although based on the same factual materials, the report also relied on the author \u2019 s own technical expertise and drastically differed in its presentation and conclusions from the document signed by the majority of the Parliamentary Commission and thus from the conclusions reached by that time by the criminal investigation.","406. To sum up the most important distinctions, in Part 1 Mr Savelyev concluded that the first explosion had resulted from the detonation in the attics over the north-eastern part of the gymnasium of a thermobaric grenade launched by a portable grenade-launcher from the roof of house no. 37 in Shkolny Lane. The terrorist holding the \u201cdead man \u2019 s switch\u201d right under the detonation had been killed instantly. The explosion created a zone of powerful smouldering combustion in the wood and insulation material of the attics, which later turned into fire. The second explosion occurred twenty-two seconds later under the first window of the northern side of the gymnasium, destroying the brick wall and throwing the bricks outside, while the window pane situated immediately above the opening had remained intact. Mr Savelyev concluded that the nature and extent of destruction in this particular area ruled out the idea that it came from an IED inside the gymnasium. He argued that the explosion had been caused from the outside, probably by a portable anti-tank missile fired from the roof of house no. 41 in Shkolny Lane. The projectile had entered the gymnasium from the opposite window and created the opening in the wall.","407. Mr Savelyev further argued in Part 2 that the fire which had been triggered by the first explosion in the attics had continued to spread unabated until 3.20 p.m. The broken windows of the gymnasium and the opening torn in the roof by the explosion had created a powerful draught, feeding the smouldering insulation with oxygen. The fire raged in the attics with sufficient force to destroy the wooden beams holding the roof slates, which finally collapsed by 3.20 p.m., burying under the burning fragments those hostages who were unable to leave. The firemen intervened after 3.20 p.m., when the fire from the collapsed roof had spread to the floor and walls of the gymnasium.","408. Part 3 of the report included detailed information and analysis of the type and number of arms and ammunitions used between 1 and 4 September 2004. This information was made available to the Commission, whilst the victims had no direct access to it. According to the report, volume 1 of the criminal investigation file no. 20\/849 contained a \u201cjoint record of use of arms and ammunition during military operation\u201d (\u201c c\u0432\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0430\u043a\u0442 \u043e\u0431 \u0438\u0437\u0440\u0430\u0441\u0445\u043e\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0431\u043e\u0435\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432 \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u0439 \u0431\u043e\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0430\u0447\u0438 \u201d) no. 27 of 10 September 2004. Pursuant to this record, various military units had used over 9,000 cartridges for automatic weapons (5.45 mm PS, 7.62 mm LPS, 5.45 mm T), 10 disposable anti-tank rocket launchers (RPG-26), 18 disposable propelled anti-tank grenade-launchers (PG-7VL), 8 high fragmentation warheads [for tank gun] calibre 125 millimetres (125 mm OF) and 90 smoke grenades (81 mm ZD6) (see paragraphs 217 and 219 above).","409. The report further noted that on 20 September 2004 the members of the Parliamentary Commission had discovered in the attics of house no. 39 in Shkolny Lane six empty tubes from RPO-A flame-throwers and three empty tubes of disposable RPG-26 anti-tank rocket launchers, the serial numbers of which had been noted by the Commission members in an appropriate record on 22 September 2004. These tubes were transmitted to the prosecutor \u2019 s team carrying out the criminal investigation. According to the report, volume 2 of criminal case file no. 20\/849 contained a document dated 25 September 2004 and signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Vasilyev from military unit no. 77078 of the 58th army. This document stated that the FSB units had received from the military storage seven RPO-A flame-throwers and listed their serial numbers. After the operation two flame-throwers with the indicated numbers, plus one with a different serial number, had been returned to storage (see paragraph 219 above) At the same time, Mr Savelyev noted that the serial numbers of flame-throwers noted in the Commission \u2019 s record of 22 September 2004 and in the document issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Vasilyev on 25 September 2004 differed. He referred to other contradictory evidence given by military servicemen and the statements by the Deputy General Prosecutor in relation to the use of flame-throwers and concluded that no less than nine disposable RPO-A flame-throwers had been used by the special forces. Mr Savelyev also referred to the witness statements of one serviceman of the FSB given to the investigation and contained in volume 5 p. 38 of file no. 20\/849, according to whom the RPG-26 and RPA had been used during the storming (in daytime) (see paragraph 220 above) and the statement of FSB General Tikhonov to the Commission made on 28 October 2004 that the RPG and RPO-A had been used at 3 p.m.","410. Mr Savelyev listed detailed characteristics of each type of projectile in question. According to his conclusions, after the first two explosions at 1.03 p.m., the school building was exposed to the following assault: between 1.30 p.m. and 2 p.m. the windows of the first floor of the southern wing were fired at with portable grenade launchers, probably types RPG \u2011 26 and RShG \u2011 2; between 2.50 p.m. and 3.05 p.m. flame-throwers (RPO-A) were used upon the roof of the main building, RPG-26 and RShG-2 grenade-launchers were fired at the south-facing windows of the first floor of the southern wing and a RPO-A flame-thrower upon the roof of the southern wing at the point where it joined the main building. He also argued that at least one thermo-baric explosive grenade had been launched from a MI \u2011 24 helicopter at the target in the central area of the main building \u2019 s roof above the Ossetian language class, at the position of a terrorist sniper which could not have been suppressed by any other means.","411. Part 4 concentrated on the use of tanks and APCs during the storming. Having analysed numerous witness statements and material evidence, the report drew the following conclusions: three tanks with hull numbers 320, 325 and 328 took positions around the school. Tanks with hull numbers 325 and 328 were positioned near house no. 101 on Kominterna Street. These two tanks repeatedly fired at the school building at 2.25 p.m. and then between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. on 3 September. Seven additional shots were fired from tank with hull number 325 at the canteen windows and the wall and stairwell of the southern wing.","412. Part 5 of the report was devoted to the analysis of the witness statements and other evidence about the number of women in the terrorist group. Mr Savelyev concluded that the group had counted five women: four suicide bombers who changed places with each other so that two of them remained at any one time in the gymnasium, while the fifth woman was probably a sniper and remained on the top floor of the school.","413. Part 6 of the report examined the situation of the hostages whom the terrorists had forced to move from the gymnasium to the southern wing after the first explosions. From the photographs and video footage of the events and the witness \u2019 accounts, Mr Savelyev construed that between 1.05 p.m. and 2.20 p.m. the terrorists had evacuated about 300 persons to the southern wing. There the hostages were distributed in more or less equal numbers between the premises of the canteen and kitchen on the ground floor and the main meeting room on the first floor. The southern wing became the area of fierce fighting between the terrorists and the assault troops; eight out of ten FSB elite officers died there. The presence of hostages in that wing was not taken into account by the assaulting troops, who had employed indiscriminate weapons. Mr Savelyev noted the absence of a detailed description of the location of the hostages \u2019 bodies, whereas this could have allowed the circumstances of the hostages \u2019 deaths in the southern wing to be established. He argued that the bodies in the gymnasium had been exposed to fire; the number of persons who had been found dead on the premises adjacent to the gymnasium was known. He thus estimated the number of hostages who had lost their lives during the fighting in the southern wing at about 110 persons.","414. To Part 6 was appended a \u201cstudy case\u201d \u2013 a document prepared by several authors including the head of the North Ossetian State Forensic Bureau, summarising their experience in the Beslan terrorist act and the completion of forensic reports. The document listed various problems related to the collection, transportation and storage of remains, the organisation of the identification process and the compiling of forensic reports. In view of the large number of remains, many with extensive injuries and difficult to identify, together with the presence of numerous aggrieved relatives, on 4 September the prosecutor \u2019 s office had taken the decision first to permit identification of the remains by the relatives and then to carry out forensic examinations. As a result, there were a number of incorrect identifications which later had to be corrected. Furthermore, in view of these constraints most identified bodies were subjected only to an external examination. The exact cause of death had been established in 213 cases: of those, gunshot wounds in 51 cases (15.5 %), shell wounds in 148 cases (45%), burns in 10 cases (3%), and blunt injuries in 4 cases (1.2%). The cause of death had not been established in 116 cases (35.6%) due to extensive injuries by fire. The document concluded by giving a number of recommendations for the future, including establishment of a single information centre and careful compliance with various procedural stages, with persons responsible for each stage.","415. Part 7 of the report covered the first moments of the school seizure on 1 September. On the basis of witness accounts, Mr Savelyev construed that a small group of terrorists \u2013 between five and seven persons \u2013 had been present in the crowd by 9 a.m. Upon the signal of one of them, who started to shoot into the air, another group of ten to twelve persons entered the school building from Shkolny Lane and other sides. Some of them ran to the first floor while others broke windows and doors on the ground floor so that the hostages could enter the building. At this point the GAZ-66 vehicle stationed in Kominterna Street near the school fence approached the main school entrance and up to fifteen persons descended from it. This vehicle left after the fighters had descended. Finally, the second GAZ-66 vehicle with a different registration plate entered from Lermontovskaya Street to Kominterna at high speed, raising a large column of dust noted by many witnesses. Over twenty fighters, including four women, descended from it and ran towards the school; the vehicle then broke the school gates and stopped in the courtyard. The overall number of terrorists in the school was between 56 and 78.","(ii) Official and public reaction","416. In response to Mr Savelyev \u2019 s allegations about the origins of the first explosions and the use of indiscriminate weapons upon the gymnasium, the Prosecutor \u2019 s Office commissioned expert reports. In 2007 and 2008 the experts of the State-owned scientific and production company Bazalt and the Ministry of Defence Central Research and Testing Institute, named after Karbyshev, produced two criminalist expert report on the explosions (see paragraphs 224 and 228 above). Its results were not published, but were cited by several Internet sites and by Mr Savelyev. The reports ruled out the idea that the first explosions came from externally delivered sources such as thermo-baric grenades or projectiles.","417. In March 2008 Mr Savelyev published an extensive interview in the Novaya Gazeta, illustrated by diagrams of the gymnasium that indicated four different places and origins of the first explosions in the gymnasium: three from expert reports commissioned by the investigation and his own. He argued that the results of the three experts \u2019 reports differed to such an extent that it was impossible to reconcile them. He further argued that the conclusions about the reasons and yield of the explosions contained in the latest expert report were inconsistent with the witness statements and material evidence. Finally, he drew attention to the fact that the remaining parts of his report concerning issues other than the first explosions had not been addressed by the investigation.","13. Other relevant developments","(a) Political consequences","418. In September 2004 the entire North Ossetian government was dismissed by Mr Dzasokhov.","419. On 6 September 2004 Russia \u2019 s President Putin appeared in a televised address to the nation. He referred to the events in Beslan as an \u201cattack on Russia\u201d, called for mobilisation of society and promised a series of radical measures to improve security, both internally and at an international level.","420. On 13 September 2004 the President signed a decree aimed at setting up a more efficient system of anti-terrorist measures in the North Caucasus region. On the same day, at a joint meeting of the Government of Russia and heads of Russia \u2019 s regions, President Putin announced the following measures aimed at achieving greater national unity and better representation of the population \u2019 s concerns: cancellation of direct elections of the regional heads of the executive, who would be elected by the regional parliaments upon the Russian President \u2019 s nomination; the setting up of a purely proportional system of parliamentary elections; establishment of a consultative body comprised of representatives of non-governmental organisations \u2013 a Civic Chamber (\u201c \u041e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u041f\u0430\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u201d); reinstatement of a special federal ministry charged with inter-ethnic relationships; implementation of a plan for social and economic development of the North Caucasus region, and some other steps. By the end of 2004 these administrative and legal measures had largely been implemented.","(b) Humanitarian relief","421. Pursuant to Russian Government order no. 1338-r of 11 September 2004, the victims of the terrorist act were awarded the following compensation: 100,000 roubles (RUB) (approximately 1,520 euros (EUR)) for each person who had been killed, RUB 50,000 for each person who had received serious and medium gravity injuries and RUB 25,000 for each person with minor injuries. Persons who had been among the hostages but escaped unharmed received RUB 15,000 each. In addition, the families received RUB 18,000 for each deceased person in order to cover funeral expenses.","422. The President of North Ossetia ordered, on 6 and 15 September 2004 (orders 58-rpa and 62-rp), the payment of RUB 25,000 in funeral costs for each person who had died, RUB 100,000 for each deceased, RUB 50,000 to each person who had suffered serious and medium injuries and RUB 25,000 to each of the other hostages.","423. The terrorist act in Beslan triggered a major humanitarian response, resulting in collections of significant sums of money.","424. Pursuant to Ossetian Government decree no. 240 of 17 November 2004, the North Ossetian Ministry of labour and social development distributed the funds paid into their account devoted to humanitarian relief to the victims in the following manner: RUB 1,000,000 for each person who had died; persons who had received grave injuries were granted RUB 700,000; persons with medium gravity injuries received RUB 500,000 each; persons who had minor injuries or were among the hostages received RUB 350,000 each. In addition, each child who had lost their parents received RUB 350,000 and other persons who had been briefly detained but were not among hostages, received RUB 75,000 each. Similar sums were allocated to the families and victims among the servicemen of the FSB and \u201cEmercom\u201d who had been killed or wounded.","425. In 2005 a memorial complex \u201cCity of Angels\u201d was opened at the Beslan town cemetery. It comprised a single monument to the victims, individual burials of over 220 persons and a monument to the FSB servicemen who had died on 3 September 2004.","426. In 2004-2008 there followed a number of other measures by the Russian and Ossetian Governments, aimed at covering additional medical and social costs for the victims, as well as financing other projects in Beslan. Thus, in November 2004 the Russian Government Decree no. 1507 \u2011 r provided for the construction of two new kindergartens and schools in Beslan, a multi \u2011 functional medical centre, an institute of social support to children and families and a number of housing projects aimed specifically at the victims \u2019 families. Most of these projects, financed from the federal budget, were completed by 2010.","427. One sports boarding school opened in Beslan was constructed with the participation of Greece and was named after Mr Ivan Kanidi (also spelled Yannis Kannidis), a sports teacher from school no. 1. Mr Kanidi, a Greek and Russian national, was 74 years old at the time and refused the terrorists \u2019 offer to leave the school. After the explosions in the gymnasium on 3 September he struggled with an armed fighter while trying to rescue children and was killed. In December 2004 he was posthumously awarded a Golden Palm Order by the Greek Prime Minister.","(c) Media and public reactions, most important publications","428. During and after the Beslan terrorist act, numerous journalists from all over the world covered the events.","429. On 1-3 September 2004 a number of incidents occurred with journalists who had been in Beslan or were attempting to get there. Thus, on 2 September Mr Babitskiy, a correspondent of Radio Free Europe, was detained in a Moscow airport while boarding a plane to the Northern Caucasus; on the following day he was sentenced to fifteen days \u2019 detention for an administrative offence. On the same day, a journalist from the Al \u2011 Jazeera TV company was arrested in the Mineralnye Vody airport in the Stavropol Region, on charges of possession of ammunition. Also on 2 September a well-known Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who had written about the conflicts in the Northern Caucasus and who had acted as a negotiator during the \u201cNord-Ost\u201d hostage crisis in Moscow in 2002, was severely poisoned in a plane travelling to the Rostov-on-Don airport. She fell into a coma and was treated over the following days in Rostov, and then in Moscow. A number of other Russian and foreign journalists were questioned, had their materials confiscated or were detained briefly while in Beslan. The editor-in-chief of the influential Russian daily Izvestia, Mr Raf Shakirov, was dismissed immediately after publishing explicit photos from the school on 4 September 2004.","430. In January 2005 the US network CBS in their programme 48 hours aired a film about the hostage-taking. In it, for the first time, was shown an extract filmed by the terrorists. The network alleged that the tape had been found by locals among rubble on the site and thus obtained by their journalist. The tape was made on 2 September 2004 inside the school and showed the fighters \u2019 leader, \u201c Polkovnik \u201d, about a dozen other terrorists in full military gear and the talks with Mr Aushev. It also showed the mothers with nursing babies being led out by Mr Aushev. At the last moment one baby girl (the youngest hostage aged six months) was handed to Mr Aushev by her mother who could not force herself to part with her two elder children (aged three and ten, only the three-year-old boy survived). The extract ended with the school door being closed and locked by the terrorists filming from inside. The extract was tagged by the operator \u201cFun Time \u2011 2\/09\/2004\u201d.","431. Several large reports were produced by the journalists who had been in Beslan during the siege and by those who had investigated the tragedy afterwards. Notably, over the years the Moscow-based Novaya Gazeta and Moskovskiy Komsomolets ran a series of reports dedicated to the hostage-taking and the investigation; Der Spiegel published a large report in its December 2004 issue; The Esquire published a story entitled \u201cThe School\u201d in March 2007.","432. A significant number of other TV productions, documentary films and books have covered the subject. The applicants in the present cases, in particular, have referred to the relevant chapter from Mr Rogozin \u2019 s book \u201cPublic Enemy\u201d. An Internet site http:\/\/pravdabeslana.ru is dedicated to the tragedy and subsequent proceedings.","(d) Victims \u2019 organisations","433. The relatives and victims of the terrorist act have joined efforts, striving primarily to obtain a comprehensive investigation into the events of 1 \u2011 3 September 2004 and to determine the degree of the officials \u2019 responsibility.","434. In February 2005 the victims set up a non-governmental organisation Materi Beslana ( \u201c Beslan Mothers \u201d ). Today this organisation counts about 200 members \u2013 former hostages and relatives of the victims. It is headed by Mrs Dudiyeva.","435. In November 2005 several hundred victims set up another organisation, Golos Beslana ( \u201c The Voice of Beslan \u201d ), chaired by Mrs Ella Kesayeva. In November 2005 the NGO issued a public statement labelling the criminal investigation inefficient and fraudulent. It called anyone who could assist them with obtaining or gathering factual information about the events to do so. On 15 October 2009 the Pravoberezhny District Court of Vladikavkaz found that it had contained statements defined as \u201cextremist\u201d pursuant to The Suppression of Extremism Act (Federal Law no. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002) and put it on the federal list of extremist materials, making it an offence to diffuse it by any means.","436. These organisations have played an important role in collecting and publishing materials about the terrorist act in Beslan, advocating the rights of victims of terrorist acts in general, supporting victims in similar situations, and organising public gatherings and events. On two occasions \u2013 in September 2005 and in June 2011 \u2013 their representatives met with the Russian Presidents; they also regularly meet with local and federal officials and high-ranking international visitors.","B. Relevant domestic law and practice","The Amnesty Act of 22 September 2006 enacted by the State Duma","437. The Amnesty Act of 22 September 2006 was passed in respect of perpetrators of criminal offences committed during counter-terrorism operations within the territory of the Southern Federal Circuit. It applied to military servicemen, officers of the Ministry of the Interior, the penal system and other law-enforcement authorities, and covered the period from 15 December 1999 to 23 September 2006. It extended to criminal proceedings, whether completed or pending."],"27313":["5.The applicant, Mr Yuriy Vitaliyovych Lutsenko, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1964.","A.Background of the case","6.The applicant was the Minister of the Interior. He occupied this post from 2005 to 2006 and from 18December 2007 to 11March 2010. Since 27August 2014 he has been the leader of the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko party.","7.On 2 November 2010 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office (hereinafter \u201cthe GPO\u201d) instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and another individual, Mr P., on suspicion of abuse of office under Article 191 \u00a73 of the Criminal Code. On 5 November 2010 the applicant was formally charged. On the same day he gave a written obligation not to abscond.","8.On 11 December 2010 the GPO instituted another criminal case against the applicant for exceeding his official powers under Article 365 \u00a7 3 of the Criminal Code, on the ground that he had arranged for the allocation of a one-room apartment to his driver, Mr P.","9.The two criminal cases were joined together.","10.On 13 December 2010 the GPO completed the investigation in the case and formally charged the applicant with both offences, having reclassified his actions specified in the first charge under Article 191 \u00a7 5 of the Criminal Code (misappropriation, embezzlement, and conversion of property by malfeasance).","11.On 26 December 2010 the applicant was arrested and detained in the Security Service Detention Centre (\u0421\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u0438\u0439 \u0406\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0421\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0438 \u0411\u0435\u0437\u043f\u0435\u043a\u0438 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438).","12.On 27 December 2010 the Pechersk District Court (\u041f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u0440\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434) (hereinafter \u201cthe Pechersk Court\u201d) ordered that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant be changed from a written obligation not to abscond to remand in custody.","13.On 28 December 2010 the applicant was transferred to Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre no. 13 (\u041a\u0438\u0457\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0421\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u0438\u0439 \u0406\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u211613) (hereinafter \u201cthe SIZO\u201d).","14.On 17 May 2011 the GPO submitted the applicant\u2019s criminal case to the Pechersk Court which, on 27 February 2012, rendered a judgment sentencing the applicant to four years\u2019 imprisonment. The case received extensive attention in both national and international media which were present at court hearings. Photographs depicting the applicant behind metal bars were published soon after the court hearings.","15.On 7 March 2012 the applicant appealed, seeking the quashing of the first-instance judgment on the ground of lack of guilt.","16.On 16 May 2012 the Kyiv Court of Appeal (\u0410\u043f\u0435\u043b\u044f\u0446\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u043c\u0456\u0441\u0442\u0430 \u041a\u0438\u0454\u0432\u0430) upheld the judgment of the Pechersk Court.","17.On 31 August 2012 the applicant was transferred to Mena colony in Chernihiv Region to serve his prison sentence.","18.In a judgment of 3 April 2013 the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine for civil and criminal cases (\u0412\u0438\u0449\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0456\u0430\u043b\u0456\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u0443\u0434 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u0437 \u0440\u043e\u0437\u0433\u043b\u044f\u0434\u0443 \u0446\u0438\u0432\u0456\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0456 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0456\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432) upheld the applicant\u2019s prison sentence slightly reducing the amount of compensation that he had to pay.","19.On 7 April 2013 the former President of Ukraine issued a decree of pardon in respect of a number of individuals, including the applicant, who was released the same day.","B.The applicant\u2019s health and the medical care provided to him","20.Prior to his arrest the applicant was diagnosed with diabetes mellitus type 2 and chronic gastritis and pancreatitis.","21.Upon his admission to the SIZO on 28December 2010, the applicant was examined by the head of the medical unit and a duty doctor. He underwent clinical, laboratory and X-ray examinations. On the basis of those examinations and the applicant\u2019s anamnesis, he was diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension and it was recommended that his arterial pressure be constantly monitored. According to the applicant, the prison doctors did not pay attention to his chronic diseases which were mentioned in the medical report submitted to the Pechersk District Court and indicated orally by him on a number of occasions.","22.According to the Government, during the period from December 2010 to April 2011 the applicant was under constant supervision by doctors of the SIZO medical unit who visited him on 29, 30 and 31 December 2010, 1-9, 17 and 24 January, 10, 18 and 25 February, 1, 10 and 20 March and on 1 April 2011. During this period, no complaints were received from him and his state of health remained satisfactory. Doctors regularly measured his blood pressure and pulse rate and carried out his general examination. The applicant denied that he had not complained about problems connected with his state of health. According to him, during the three first months of his detention, he lost more than 20 kilograms, his low-grade fever and spastic stomach pain was constant.","23.Following the applicant\u2019s complaints about the deterioration of his health, on 24February 2011, a private medical laboratory took blood samples from him for analysis. Inflammation was diagnosed as a result. The doctor who arrived at that conclusion presumed that it was probably a mixed viral and bacterial infection. A provisional diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis was also made. For more specific diagnoses, further specialist examinations were required.","24.On 9 March 2011 the applicant was diagnosed with arthritis by SIZO doctors.","25.On 15 March 2011 a new blood analysis showed some negative changes in the applicant\u2019s immune system. His requests for examination by the cardiologist\/rheumatologist who issued the above conclusion were without success.","26.According to the Government, on 6 and 13 April 2011 the applicant was examined by the head of the SIZO medical unit. He complained of pain in the joints. He was diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension and generalised osteoarthritis, and blood pressure monitoring was recommended.","27.On 21 April 2011 the applicant went on hunger strike in protest at his continued pre-trial detention.","28.According to the Government, between 22 April and 10 May 2011 the applicant was under daily supervision by doctors of the SIZO medical unit. From time to time he complained of dizziness and general weakness. His state of health remained satisfactory during this period.","29.On 29 April 2011 the SIZO administration placed him in a solitary-confinement cell and demonstrated forced-feeding facilities (such as handcuffs, a mouth widener and a rubber tube). Those were apparently never applied to him.","30.According to the Government, on the same day, the applicant was examined by the head of the SIZO medical unit. He complained of heart pain, which he said was worse when he made turning movements. The applicant was diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension, generalised osteoarthritis, and myositis of the left major pectoral muscle. At the same time, he informed the doctor that he had eaten no food for several days and had only had tea without sugar and coffee with sugar. An analysis of the applicant\u2019s urine was carried out. There was a one-plus reaction for acetone. General monitoring of the applicant\u2019s state of health, of the acetone level in his urine, and of his blood pressure was recommended.","On 1 May 2011 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from the State Prison Service of Ukraine (\u0414\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0435\u043d\u0456\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0446\u0456\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0430 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438) (hereinafter \u201cthe SPS\u201d). He was prescribed an \u201canti-starvation food mixture\u201d (semolina or oatmeal, butter, sugar, milk, eggs, boiled meat, salt, and ascorbic acid, with a total caloric content of 1,638.5 kcal) and the following medication: NaCL solution, vitamins Bl and B6, and Riboxin solution. On the same date a general blood analysis, a blood sugar-level test and a urine acetone test were carried out for the applicant - (a \u201cthree-plus\u201d reaction was obtained). On the same date the applicant consumed 500 ml of \u201canti-starvation food mixture\u201d.","On 2 May 2011 the SPS medical panel found his general state of health stable and held that positive progress was being made in overcoming dizziness and general weakness. A urine test for acetone was carried out for the applicant (a \u201cthree-plus\u201d reaction was obtained).","On 3 May 2011, upon another examination by the SPS medical panel, a urine acetone test was carried out for the applicant. A \u201cthree-plus\u201d reaction was obtained. On the same date the applicant consumed 400 ml of \u201canti-starvation food mixture\u201d. It was recommended that he undergo further biochemical and general blood tests, a general urine analysis, a blood-sugar-level test and a urine acetone test, and also ultrasonic examinations of his abdominal cavity and kidneys. Injections of Reosorbilact solution and of glucose in solution were given to the applicant.","On 4 May 2011 the SPS medical panel saw the applicant again. He was found to have moderate diffuse changes in the liver, chronic cholecystitis and chronic pancreatitis. On the same date the applicant consumed 500 ml of \u201canti-starvation food mixture\u201d. Injections of Reosorbilact solution and of glucose in solution were given to the applicant.","31.On 5 May 2011 the applicant\u2019s wife asked the SIZO administration to carry out medical examinations of her husband in her presence. By that time, the applicant had lost about fourteen kilograms in weight. On the same day, according to the Government, the applicant was examined by the SPS medical panel. A general blood test, a blood-sugar-level test and a test of the urine for acetone were carried out at the Dila Laboratory. The test results were low-grade positive. The applicant was diagnosed with chronic cholecystitis and chronic pancreatitis. It was also found that the applicant\u2019s state of health reflected his starvation. On the same date, the applicant refused to eat food or to undergo fluid-maintenance therapy to restore the balance of water, protein, and electrolytes in the body.","32.On 6 May 2011 the applicant was transferred to the SIZO medical unit. According to the Government, he was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. He was diagnosed with hypertension of the 1st degree, cardiac insufficiency, type 2 diabetes mellitus in a mild form at the compensation stage, chronic cholecystitis in unstable remission, chronic pancreatitis in unstable remission, osteoarthritis without exacerbation, disseminated osteochondrosis of the spine, and thoracic kyphosis. It was recommended that the applicant: (1) undergo an exercise electrocardiography (ECG) test and ultrasonic examination of the heart in order to exclude ischaemic heart disease; (2) take antihypertensive medication (Prestarium Combi) when the blood pressure was higher than 140\/90 mm Hg; take Metoprolol in order to stop the tachycardia which occurred when the pulse rate was higher than 100 beats per minute. The applicant received this medical treatment in full.","33.According to the Government, on 7 May 2011 he was once again examined by the SPS medical panel. A check test of the urine for acetone was carried out (a \u201ctwo-plus\u201d reaction was obtained) and a general urine test was also done for the applicant. The panel confirmed the previous diagnosis. The applicant refused to consume any of the \u201canti-starvation food mixture\u201d or to undergo fluid maintenance therapy.","On 8 May 2011 he was examined by a panel of doctors from Kyiv-based medical institutions of the Ministry of Health. The previous diagnosis was confirmed and it was additionally found that the applicant had chronic gastritis in unstable remission. The panel noted that the applicant\u2019s hunger strike was significantly affecting his general state of health. Electrocardiography and echocardiography tests were carried out for the applicant. The urinary reaction for acetone was one-plus. The applicant was refusing to consume the \u201canti-starvation food mixture\u201d. He was subjected to fluid-maintenance therapy with Aminoven. It was also recommended that the applicant broaden the variety of foods he ate, limiting the consumption of easily digestible carbohydrates (sugar, honey, and sweets); consistently take graduated physical activity; take Duphalac or Guttalax (to normalise bowel function) and probiotics (Lacium or Symbiter).","On 9 and 10 May 2011 the applicant was examined by the SPS medical panel. The urinary reaction for acetone was low-grade positive. He refused to consume \u201canti-starvation food mixture\u201d. He was subjected to fluid-maintenance therapy with a physiological solution, vitamins Bl, B6, C, Riboxin, and Reosorbilact.","34.According to the applicant, before 10 May 2011 his medical monitoring had been limited to measuring his blood pressure and weighing him, along with a superficial examination by the SIZO doctor.","35.On 10 May 2011 he was taken to the Kyiv Clinical Emergency Hospital (\u041c\u0456\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0430 \u043a\u043b\u0456\u043d\u0456\u0447\u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0456\u043a\u0430\u0440\u043d\u044f \u0448\u0432\u0438\u0434\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u0434\u043e\u043f\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0433\u0438) (hereinafter \u201cthe Emergency Hospital\u201d). On the following day, the management of the hospital informed the investigator that the applicant was suffering from chronic pancreatitis in the aggravated stage, chronic gastroduodenitis, cardial-type neurocirculatory dystonia, and type 2 diabetes. His condition was evaluated as moderately serious.","36.On 18 May 2011 the deputy medical director of the Emergency Hospital gave additional details to the applicant\u2019s wife as regards his health. In addition to the aforementioned diagnoses, he noted the following illnesses: chronic cholecystitis, gall bladder polyposis, autoimmune thyroiditis, euthyroidism, seborrheic dermatitis, myopia, osteochondrosis, chronic sinusitis, right-ear deafness, duodenal ulcer, gastric erosion and duodenogastric reflux.","37.On 23 May 2011 the applicant ended his hunger strike.","38.According to the Government, on 24 May 2011 he was examined by doctors of the SIZO medical unit. On the same date he ate gruel. He was also subjected to fluid-maintenance treatment with Aminoven and Pariet. Generally, although he continued to complain of general weakness, his condition improved considerably once he had ended the hunger strike.","The SIZO doctors saw the applicant also on the next day. They concluded that the applicant was suffering from the following illnesses: exacerbated chronic pancreatitis, chronic cholecystitis, gall-bladder polyposis, chronic duodenal ulcer, autoimmune thyroiditis, euthyroidism, type 2 diabetes mellitus, cardial-type neurocirculatory dystonia of medium severity, seborrheic dermatitis, cervical osteochondrosis, toxic-dyscirculatory encephalopathy of endogenic origin (degree I-II), duodenal ulcer, papillomatous gastropathy, and gastric erosions. On the same date the applicant ate gruel and drank water and carrot juice. The applicant underwent fluid-maintenance treatment and anti-ulcer treatment.","On 26 and 27 May 2011 the doctors of the SIZO medical unit confirmed the previous diagnosis. The applicant received fluid-maintenance and anti-ulcer treatment and underwent a urine test (which indicated no acetone), a blood test for sugar, and biochemical analysis of the blood. A consultation with a gastroenterologist was also scheduled for the applicant.","On 28 May 2011 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. As a result of the examination, the panel found the applicant\u2019s general state of health to be satisfactory. The applicant was diagnosed with the following conditions: peptic duodenal ulcer, post gastrointestinal haemorrhage condition, erosive gastritis, and mild post haemorrhagic anemia. It was recommended that he receive anti-ulcer treatment as an in-patient basis at a gastroenterology clinic. If it was impossible to arrange in-patient treatment for him, he would have to continue to take Pariet; again undergo a fibrogastroscopy with biopsy, a general blood test, electrolytes (potassium, phosphorus, fecal occult blood test) and eat five small meals a day, sticking to a diet with a high protein content.","39.According to the applicant, on 28 May 2011 he was examined in the SIZO and diagnosed with a duodenal ulcer in the progressing phase, gastrointestinal bleeding, erosive gastritis, and toxic-metabolic encephalopathy. Moreover, all his previously diagnosed diseases were confirmed.","40.According to the Government, on 29 May 2011 he was examined by SIZO doctors, who confirmed the previous diagnoses. He continued to receive the anti-ulcer treatment and multiple small-portion meals.","41.On 30 May 2011 the applicant underwent a urine acetone test, which revealed no acetone, a blood test for sugar, and a general blood test. The examination results confirmed the previous diagnoses.","42.On 31 May and 1 June 2011 he was examined by SIZO doctors who confirmed the previous diagnoses. Analyses of his blood and urine were carried out. He continued to receive the anti-ulcer treatment and appropriate diet.","43.On 8 June 2011 the governor of the SIZO informed the President of the Pecherskyy Court of some further diagnoses regarding the applicant\u2019s health, established during his examination of 28 May 2011, and sought leave for him to be examined in the Emergency Hospital. According to the Government, the letter was sent to the court only on 9 June 2011.","44.In his reply of 14 June 2011 the judge of the Pechersk Court stated that the court did not object to the applicant\u2019s being examined in a civilian hospital. A copy of this letter was sent to the Convoy Service of the Ministry of the Interior with a request for escorted transport for the applicant.","45.On 23 June 2011 the Convoy Service replied that the applicant\u2019s medical care was the responsibility of the SIZO administration.","46.On 24 June 2011 the applicant\u2019s wife and his legal representative made a new request to the court that he be hospitalised. They alleged that the applicant had constant stomach pain and had lost more weight, 24kg in total. On 29 June 2011 the judge replied that the court had no objection.","47.According to the Government, from 2 June to 2 July 2011 the applicant was examined daily by SIZO doctors. In line with the instructions given following the previous examination by the medical panel, the applicant had regular clinical, biochemical, and general blood tests and urine analyses (these took place on 7, 8, 15, 18, 19, and 30 June 2011). The applicant was receiving anti-ulcer treatment, the recommended diet, and the prescribed outpatient treatment. During this period, the above-mentioned diagnoses remained valid. Furthermore, on 24 June 2011 the doctors found that his peptic duodenal ulcer had begun to cicatrise, which indicated a gradual improvement in his state of health.","48.According to the Government, the court gave its permission for the applicant\u2019s examination at the Emergency Hospital on 14 July 2011.","49.On 15 July 2011 the applicant was examined at the Emergency Hospital. Fibrogastroscopy and ultrasonic scans were performed for the applicant. The examination revealed that he had esophageal varicose veins with 1st degree dilatation, moderate portal hypertensive gastropathy, chronic cholecystitis, gall-bladder polyposis, chronic pancreatitis, and urolithic diathesis. It was recommended that the applicant undergo a biochemical blood test, a general blood test, analyses for hepatitis B, C, and D antibody titers, abdominal ultrasonic scanning with Doppler sonography. According to the applicant, he did not receive any of the prescribed medicines.","50.On 21 July 2011, blood samples were taken from the applicant in the presence of his lawyer for complex liver function tests (hepatitis B, C, and D). At the applicant\u2019s request, in order to ensure an objective analysis, the samples were sent to two laboratories: Eurolab and Synevo.","51.On 22 July 2011 the applicant underwent abdominal ultrasonic scanning with Doppler sonography at the Emergency Hospital. On the basis of the examination, the following diagnosis was made: signs of diffuse damage to the liver in a chronic hepatosis pattern, portal hypertension of the P\u2019 degree, splenomegaly of the lst degree, and chronic cholecystitis. In pursuance of the recommendation, the applicant was tested for hepatitis B, C, and D markers, and liver function tests were done.","52.On 23 July 2011 the applicant was prescribed the following medication: Ursofalk, Essentiale Forte, Primer, Chophytol, and Duspatalin.","53.According to the Government, from 2 to 30 August 2011 the applicant was under daily supervision by SIZO doctors. His state of health remained unchanged. He continued complaining of discomfort in the upper abdomen. He received the medical treatment prescribed for him earlier.","54.On 30 August 2011 two senior civilian doctors examined the applicant in the SIZO. They diagnosed cirrhosis of the liver supposedly triggered by the earlier hunger strike. Furthermore, two internal haemorrhages were noted. It was recommended that the applicant undergo a more thorough examination in a specialist civilian hospital. In the meantime, he needed to get proper nutrition.","55.According to the Government, on 2 September 2011, following a court decision, the SIZO was visited by a panel of doctors (gastroenterologists, an endoscopist, and an ultra-sonographer). The applicant refused to be medically examined, to have blood samples taken, or to undergo ultrasonic examinations and fibrogastroduodenoscopy, which had been recommended by the medical panel.","56.On 6 September 2011 a commission of the Ministry of Health examined the applicant in the SIZO. It recommended that he undergo examination with special equipment so that specific diagnoses could be made.","57.On 7 and 8 September 2011 blood samples and faeces were taken from the applicant for laboratory tests.","58.On 13 September 2011 the applicant\u2019s wife again requested the Pechersk Court to allow her husband to be hospitalised and given proper treatment.","59.On 15 September 2011 the applicant was hospitalised and examined in the Kyiv City Diagnostic Centre, which diagnosed the initial signs of portal hypertension, as well as signs of chronic cholecystitis, angiomyolipoma of the right kidney, and parenchymatous cyst of the left kidney. On the same date the applicant underwent an abdominal ultrasonic scan, which discovered signs of gall-bladder polyps and pancreatic diffuse changes, and confirmed the aforementioned kidney pathologies.","60.On 20 September 2011 the applicant underwent a colonoscopy which showed sigmoid colon diverticulitis. On the same day a newly appointed commission of the Ministry of Health examined him and diagnosed fatty liver disease. Dietetic therapy, mineral-vitamin complex, proton pump blockers and hepato-protectors were prescribed.","61.According to the Government, on 22 September 2011 the applicant consulted a haematologist. In view of a decreased number of white blood cells (leukocytes) and thrombocytes in his blood, it was recommended that he again undergo a general blood test at two independent laboratories, to be identified by the Ministry of Health. Once the results of those examinations were known it was recommended that the applicant again consult a haematologist.","62.On 23 September 2011 the applicant\u2019s blood samples were sent to the laboratory for a general blood test. On 26 September 2011, following the haematologist\u2019s recommendation, a blood sample was sent to the Sinevo laboratory for a coagulation profile test.","63.On 28 September 2011 the applicant again consulted the haematologist. The results of the previous examinations led the doctor to find that he had no blood system disorders.","64.On 24 October 2011 the applicant completed the course of medical treatment prescribed by the panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions on 20 September 2011.","65.On 29 September 2011 it was proposed that he undergo a liver biopsy, which he declined.","According to him, the biopsy is a surgical intervention, after which the patient should stay in the medical institution under medical supervision for a period the doctor considers necessary to monitor any post-operative complications. However, the applicant was not provided with guarantees that the medical care would be adequate and that he would stay in the hospital after the biopsy. He considered that removing him immediately to the SIZO would hurt his state of health. Besides, the applicant feared that proper medical care would not be provided to him in the SIZO if there were complications after the biopsy. He referred in this connection to his previous experience.","66.On 4 October 2011 the applicant\u2019s relatives brought him the proton pump blockers and hepato-protectors which had been prescribed by the Ministry of Health commission specialists as early as 20 September 2011.","67.According to the Government, on 2 November 2011 the applicant was examined by SIZO doctors. When examined, he complained of general weakness, dragging pain in the right hypochondrium, and discomfort in the upper abdomen and in the intestine area. He was diagnosed with fatty liver disease, signs of incipient portal hypertension, erosive haemorrhagic helicobacter-associated gastritis, and diverticular disease of the sigmoid colon. As the applicant had completed the prescribed course of outpatient treatment, it was proposed that he undergo laboratory and instrumental tests. The applicant submitted a written statement refusing to undergo fibrogastroduodenoscopy and rectosigmoidoscopy.","68.On 3 November 2011 blood samples were taken from the applicant for laboratory examination at the Kyiv diagnostic centre. In particular, he underwent clinical, general, and biochemical blood tests and a coagulation profile test.","69.On 5 November 2011, upon a court decision, the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. He was diagnosed with the following conditions: fatty liver disease, signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter associated gastritis, and diverticular disease of the sigmoid colon. It was recommended that the applicant undergo an abdominal ultrasound scan, a faecal occult blood test, and a faecal analysis for helminth eggs and protozoa, consult a urologist, receive diet-based treatment, take a mineral-vitamin complex, and continue to take proton-pump inhibitors.","70.On 8 November 2011 the applicant underwent abdominal ultrasonic scanning at the Kyiv City Diagnostic Centre. He was diagnosed with gall bladder polyp signs, moderate pancreatic changes, angiomyolipomas of the right kidney, and small cysts of the left renal sinus. However, he refused to consult a urologist.","71.On 9 November 2011 he received a parcel with the necessary medication.","72.According to the Government, during November 2011 the applicant\u2019s state of health remained satisfactory. From time to time he complained of general weakness, discomfort in the large intestine area, and pain in the right hypochondrium. During that period, he was examined daily by doctors of the SIZO medical unit, and regularly provided with the prescribed medical treatment. The diagnosis remained unchanged.","However, the applicant continued to complain of periodic discomfort in the large intestine area. He received the medical treatment prescribed by the panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions on 5 November 2011.","73.On 14 December 2011 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. The results of the earlier examinations led the doctors to diagnose the applicant with the following conditions: fatty liver disease, signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter-associated gastritis, irritable bowel syndrome, and diverticular disease of sigmoid colon, but no signs of blood disorder were found. The doctors recommended that the applicant undergo some additional examinations: electrocardiography, irrigoscopy, and an analysis of faeces for dysbiosis, to determine pancreatic (faecal) elastase, and a faecal occult blood test. Also, the applicant was prescribed the following medical treatment: diet-based treatment; Spasmomen or Meteospasmyl; Posterisan suppositories; Kreon; Validolum, to stop pain in the stomach; Chophytol, to continue to take from 19 December 2011. However, on 19 December the applicant on his own initiative refused to start the medical treatment prescribed.","74.In early January 2012 the applicant complained to the SIZO administration of stomach and intestinal pains.","75.On 5 and 14 January 2012 he underwent various laboratory tests in respect of his chronic gastrointestinal diseases, and on 11 January 2012 an ultrasonic examination of his abdominal cavity was conducted.","76.On 19 January 2012, during a court hearing, the applicant complained that he did not feel well. An ambulance was therefore called. The doctor diagnosed exacerbation of chronic pancreatitis and administered some medication to the applicant. The applicant\u2019s overall state of health was assessed as satisfactory.","77.On 20 January 2012 the applicant was examined by a panel of medical specialists delegated by the Ministry of Health which established the following diagnoses: fatty liver disease (steatosis), signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter-associated gastritis, irritable bowel syndrome, and diverticulosis of sigmoid colon. While the commission acknowledged a deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health due to \u201cnutrition-regime disturbance and psycho-emotional overload\u201d, it found his health generally satisfactory and not warranting in-patient treatment in a specialist civilian hospital. The physicians recommended normalisation of the nutrition regime and reduction of the psycho-emotional pressure. They also prescribed some medication.","78.On 23 January 2012 the Ministry of Health delegated another panel, of three gastroenterologists, to examine the applicant in the SIZO. The doctors found him to be in a generally satisfactory state of health, and concluded that he did not require hospitalisation. They also specified the medication to be administered to the applicant, and repeated the earlier recommendation regarding his nutritional needs.","79.On 24 February 2012 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. They noted that his state of health had improved. The applicant was diagnosed with fatty liver disease (steatosis), signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter-associated gastritis, irritable bowel syndrome, and diverticulosis of sigmoid colon. It was advised that he receive rational nutrition diet, continue to take Duspatalin and take Kreon, Valeriana extract, and suppositories with belladonna. The applicant received that medication in full.","80.On 6 April 2012 he was transferred from the SIZO to the Emergency Hospital for further examination.","81.According to the applicant, despite numerous check-ups, there was no proper medical treatment or medicine available to him in the SIZO. He received proper medical treatment in the Emergency Hospital on 10 May 2011 and 6April 2012, but was discharged from the hospital on 23 May 2011 and 20 April 2012 respectively, upon an arbitrary decision by the Prison Service authorities, rather than upon a decision of the doctors treating him at the hospital. He was provided with medication which was incompatible with his general state of health, and although they treated his immediate health problem they contributed to the deterioration of his general state of health.","C.Material conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the SIZO","82.Upon his admission to the SIZO, the applicant was placed in cell no.158, measuring 8.58 square metres. He shared the cell with one or two other inmates. According to him, the cell had poor ventilation and lacked personal hygiene facilities. Its walls had mould traces. Furthermore, there was no access to drinking water. Except for period from 28 April to 8 May 2011 (see paragraph 110 below), he shared this cell with two other detainees.","83.According to the Government, the cell had a proper ventilation system and natural lighting. The applicant had had daily exercise in the fresh air, except on days when lengthy court hearings were held. He was permitted to receive drinking water from relatives. He was allowed to take a shower once or twice a week.","84.From 8 to 10 May 2011, the applicant was held in cell no. 257 in the SIZO medical unit, which measured 23.21 square metres.","85.From 10 to 23 May 2011 he was a patient in the Emergency Hospital.","86.On 23 May 2011 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 260, measuring 22.32 square metres, in the SIZO medical unit, which he shared with another person. He remained there until 1 July 2011.","87.On 1 July 2011 he was transferred to cell no. 158, which he shared with another inmate.","88.On 27 March 2012 he was moved to cell no. 136.","89.On 6 April 2012 the applicant was transferred to the Emergency Hospital. He returned to cell no. 136 on 20 April 2012.","D.Conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention during the court hearings","90.From the documents provided by the Government, in particular the minutes of the hearings held before the Pechersk Court (see annex), it appears that between 23 May 2011 and 16February 2012 the court held seventy-nine hearings at which the applicant was present. At the hearing of 27 February 2012, it pronounced the judgment convicting the applicant. During thirty-five hearings, the court did not withdraw for deliberation on intermediate procedural issues but at least one break was announced, during twelve hearings the court both withdrew to deliberate and announced at least one break, and eleven hearings were interrupted by deliberations on intermediate procedural issue of the court but otherwise were carried out without a proper break. On 14 and 19 July, 22 August and 29 September 2011, 17, 27 and 31 January, 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 14 and 15 February 2012 the court announced breaks for lunch. However, on 14 July 2011 the applicant had been removed from the courtroom for the rest of the hearing because of his improper behavior before the lunch break was announced.","Moreover, eighteen hearings were carried out without any deliberation and the court did not announce any break. In particular, on 12 October 2011 the hearing lasted two hours and 51 minutes, on 18 October 2011 it took three hours and 36 minutes, and on 16 and 21November 2011 the hearings lasted almost three hours.","91.The applicant continued his hunger strike up to 23 May 2011. He was informed beforehand that the preliminary hearing would be held on that day. According to him, he was woken up at 4.30 a.m. to be taken to the court building for a hearing which started at about 11 a.m. He had to wait in a small convoy room of about 1.5 square metres. Overall, for about twelve to fourteen hours, he was allegedly held without food and drinking water, in poorly ventilated premises. On the same day, he terminated the hunger strike, which had lasted for about a month.","92.According to the Government, this information was incorrect. The applicant left the hospital at 7 a.m., reaching the court-house at 7.20 a.m. At 10.30 a.m. he was transferred to the courtroom.","93.According to the applicant, he was brought to the court hearing with an open bleeding stomach ulcer, although this condition required immediate hospitalisation. After the eight-hour hearing he was driven to the SIZO. He was transferred to the medical unit of the SIZO only after he had lost consciousness. Despite this, no treatment was recommended for him. Late at night the applicant\u2019s state of health suddenly worsened.","94.According to the Government, as long as the applicant was in hospital, his health was under constant supervision by medical specialists there. In the event that his state of health did not permit him to take part in a hearing, this would be notified by the medical staff and the applicant would not then have been convoyed to the court hearing.","95.According to the applicant, he suffered from the absence of drinking water and nutrition, as well as the lack of rest, during the later court hearings too, while being kept in a metal cage in the courtroom.","96.On 20 January 2012 the applicant, in his requestunder Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which was subsequently not granted, maintained that on 17and 18January 2012 the Pechersk Court had held the hearings daily despite his complaints of deteriorating health and acute pain in his stomach. According to him, the hearings had lasted from 9 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. usually with one thirty-minute break. On 19 January 2012 the court hearing had lasted from 9 a.m. until 11:30 p.m. The applicant stated that after having left the SIZO, he had not been provided with any food or water until his return. Moreover, on 19January 2012 the court called the ambulance for him four times.","97.According to the information submitted by the Government, on the days of the hearings detainees received food packs from the prison authorities: the applicant refused these in writing on 1December 2011 and11, 19 and 20 January 2012, noting that he had his own food supply.","98.The Government submitted tables of the schedule of the hearing days (see annex) containing the information about the time when the applicant was put in the car and reached the courtroom, when the hearings started and were closed and the time when the applicant was put in the car and arrived back in the SIZO. They also submitted the minutes of the court hearings held before the Pechersk Court.","104.Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules, adopted on 11 January 2006 at the 952nd meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies (\u201cthe European Prison Rules\u201d)","Which provide a framework of guiding principles for conditions of detention and health services. The relevant extracts from the Rules read as follows:","\u201cAllocation and accommodation ...","18.1The accommodation provided for prisoners, and in particular all sleeping accommodation, shall respect human dignity and, as far as possible, privacy, and meet the requirements of health and hygiene, due regard being paid to climatic conditions and especially to floor space, cubic content of air, lighting, heating and ventilation.","18.2In all buildings where prisoners are required to live, work or congregate:","a.the windows shall be large enough to enable the prisoners to read or work by natural light in normal conditions and shall allow the entrance of fresh air except where there is an adequate air conditioning system;","b.artificial light shall satisfy recognised technical standards; ...","18.4National law shall provide mechanisms for ensuring that these minimum requirements are not breached by the overcrowding of prisons.","18.5Prisoners shall normally be accommodated during the night in individual cells except where it is preferable for them to share sleeping accommodation ...","Hygiene","19.1All parts of every prison shall be properly maintained and kept clean at all times.","19.2When prisoners are admitted to prison the cells or other accommodation to which they are allocated shall be clean.","19.3Prisoners shall have ready access to sanitary facilities that are hygienic and respect privacy.","19.4Adequate facilities shall be provided so that every prisoner may have a bath or shower, at a temperature suitable to the climate, if possible daily but at least twice a week (or more frequently if necessary) in the interest of general hygiene.","19.5Prisoners shall keep their persons, clothing and sleeping accommodation clean and tidy.","19.6The prison authorities shall provide them with the means for doing so including toiletries and general cleaning implements and materials.","19.7Special provision shall be made for the sanitary needs of women.","Clothing and bedding","20.1Prisoners who do not have adequate clothing of their own shall be provided with clothing suitable for the climate.","20.2Such clothing shall not be degrading or humiliating.","20.3All clothing shall be maintained in good condition and replaced when necessary.","20.4Prisoners who obtain permission to go outside prison shall not be required to wear clothing that identifies them as prisoners.","21.Every prisoner shall be provided with a separate bed and separate and appropriate bedding, which shall be kept in good order and changed often enough to ensure its cleanliness ...","Health care","39.Prison authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care.","Organisation of prison health care","40.1Medical services in prison shall be organised in close relation with the general health administration of the community or nation.","40.2Health policy in prisons shall be integrated into, and compatible with, national health policy.","40.3Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.","40.4Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer.","40.5All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.","Medical and health care personnel","41.1Every prison shall have the services of at least one qualified general medical practitioner.","41.2Arrangements shall be made to ensure at all times that a qualified medical practitioner is available without delay in cases of urgency ...","41.4Every prison shall have personnel suitably trained in health care.","Duties of the medical practitioner","42.1The medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall see every prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is obviously unnecessary ...","42.3When examining a prisoner the medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall pay particular attention to ...","b.diagnosing physical or mental illness and taking all measures necessary for its treatment and for the continuation of existing medical treatment ...","f.isolating prisoners suspected of infectious or contagious conditions for the period of infection and providing them with proper treatment ...","43.1The medical practitioner shall have the care of the physical and mental health of the prisoners and shall see, under the conditions and with a frequency consistent with health care standards in the community, all sick prisoners, all who report illness or injury and any prisoner to whom attention is specially directed ...","Health care provision","46.1Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialised institutions or to civil hospitals when such treatment is not available in prison.","46.2Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities, they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide the prisoners referred to them with appropriate care and treatment.\u201d","105.The relevant extracts from the Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 9 to 21 September 2009 (published on 23 November 2011) read as follows:","\u201c5.Conditions of detention of the general prison population","a.pre-trial establishments (SIZOs)","i)the SIZO in Kyiv","100.The SIZO in Kyiv occupies a complex of buildings in one of the central areas of Kyiv. Some of the detention buildings had been constructed some 140 years previously. Three smaller, more recent blocks provided accommodation for sentenced working prisoners, women and juveniles. A new block for women was in the process of construction, but that process had virtually been halted due to lack of resources.","With an official capacity of 2,950 places, on 8 September 2009 the establishment was holding 3,440 inmates, including 217 women and 69 juveniles. The vast majority of the inmate population was on remand. The establishment was also holding 297 inmates awaiting the outcome of their appeal (including 41 life-sentenced prisoners), 93 prisoners in transit and 100 sentenced inmates assigned to work in the prison\u2019s general services and maintenance. Further, there were 11 inmates who had been subject to forensic psychiatric assessment and who were awaiting a final decision concerning their criminal responsibility. The prisoner population comprised 210 foreign national prisoners (of whom 170 were from countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States).","Since 2001, following amendments to the CC, a section referred to as an \u201carrest house\u201d had been set up for first-time offenders serving sentences of up to 6 months ...","103.Material conditions prevailing in the section for women were somewhat better [than those in the section for men]. In particular, the cells were less overcrowded (e.g. 6 inmates in a cell measuring 8 m\u00b2; 16 prisoners in a cell measuring 27 m\u00b2). The cells had good access to natural light, but ventilation was inadequate and prisoners complained that in the summer the cells became very hot. The in-cell sanitary annexes were fully partitioned and had both cold and hot water taps. Some of the cells had been decorated by the inmates themselves and gave a homely impression ...","104.The section for sentenced working prisoners provided the best conditions of detention in comparison with the other sections. The dormitories were adequately lit, well ventilated and clean. They were suitably furnished (beds, tables and chairs or stools, some shelves and lockers) and inmates could have their own radio or television. Further, the section comprised a sports hall, a spacious \u201cclub\u201d where prisoners could watch films and play table tennis, and a chapel.","105.The prison did not provide inmates with personal hygiene products other than soap. As mentioned in paragraph 88, access to the shower was limited to once a week.","As regards food, prisoners were provided with three meals a day. The quantity of the food appeared to be sufficient, but many prisoners complained about its poor quality and lack of variety. In particular, there was no fresh fruit, eggs or milk (not even for juvenile prisoners). To supplement their diet, prisoners relied to a great extent on food parcels from their families and purchases from the prison shop ...","The SIZO had a library with a collection of some 27,000 books. The delegation was surprised to learn that remand prisoners were not allowed to receive books (other than the Bible) or newspapers from outside. The CPT would like to receive the Ukrainian authorities\u2019 comments concerning this prohibition.","The only regular out-of-cell activity was outdoor exercise of one hour per day, which took place in a series of exercise yards located on the top of the accommodation blocks. By virtue of their size and configuration, these high-walled, bare areas (measuring between 16 and 60 m\u00b2) did not allow prisoners to exercise themselves physically.","The CPT recommends that the Ukrainian authorities make strenuous efforts to offer organised out-of-cell activities (work, recreation\/association, education, sport) to prisoners at the Kyiv SIZO. Further, the Committee recommends that steps be taken to construct more appropriate exercise yards which allow prisoners to exert themselves physically, as well as indoor and outdoor sports facilities ...","6.Health care","a.introduction","123.In the course of the 2009 visit, the delegation was informed of a proposal to set up a working group to study the transfer of prisoners\u2019 health care to the Ministry of Health. The CPT can only encourage this initiative, which is consistent with the remarks made in paragraph 142 of the report on its 1998 visit, namely that a greater involvement of the Ministry of Health in the provision of health-care services in prison will help to ensure optimal health care for prisoners, as well as implementation of the general principle of the equivalence of health care with that in the outside community. The Committee wishes to be informed of the action taken on the above\u2011mentioned proposal.","In this context, the CPT also wishes to stress the need for continued professional training for prison health-care staff, with a view to enabling them to perform their duties satisfactorily. The Committee would like to be informed of the national policy in this respect.","124.The reports on previous visits by the CPT to Ukraine contain a number of recommendations, comments and requests for information in the area of provision of health care to prisoners. Despite efforts made by the Ukrainian authorities in recent years and the goodwill and commitment of health-care staff at the penitentiary establishments visited, the provision of health care to inmates remains problematic, due to the shortage of staff, facilities and resources. During the visit, the delegation heard a number of complaints from prisoners at the establishments visited concerning delays in access to a doctor, lack of medication, and the inadequate quality of care.\u201d","106.The relevant extracts from the Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 29 November to 6 December 2011 [CPT\/Inf (2012) 30] read as follows:","\u201c... 48.On the occasion of this visit and in the light of reports recently received by the CPT, the delegation also examined in detail the health care being provided to certain persons who were being held at the Kyiv SIZO and, in particular, Mr Valeriy IVASHENKO, Mr Yuriy LUTSENKO and Ms Yulia TYMOSHENKO.","In this connection, the CPT would like to stress that the role of medical members of a visiting delegation is not that of a treating doctor; their task is to assess the quality of health care and, more specifically, the access to medical treatment of detained persons. The Committee also wishes to recall that the prison authorities are responsible for the health care of all prisoners; all efforts possible must be made to ensure that a precise diagnosis is promptly established and that adequate treatment required by the state of health of the person concerned is provided to all prisoners.","The CPT must express its concern that in respect of each of the three above-mentioned persons, considerable delays occurred \u2013 for various reasons \u2013 in arranging specialised medical examinations outside the SIZO. Problems of this kind have repeatedly been observed by the CPT during all previous visits to the Kyiv SIZO as well as to other penitentiary establishments in Ukraine. The Committee urges the Ukrainian authorities to take all the necessary measures to ensure that in future, all prisoners who are in need of specialist treatment\/examinations are transferred to an outside hospital without undue delay.\u201d","107.On 9 June 2011 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Ukraine. The relevant part of the resolution reads as follows:","\u201cThe European Parliament,","... G.whereas 12 former high-ranking officials from the Tymoshenko government are in pre-trial detention, including the former Interior Minister, Yuri Lutsenko, one of the leaders of the People\u2019s Self-Defence Party, who has been charged with abuse of office and misappropriation of funds and was arrested on 26 December 2010 for alleged non-cooperation with the prosecution, ...","H.whereas Mr Lutsenko was not released from pre-trial detention when his trial opened on 23 May 2011, despite the fact that detention for alleged non-cooperation in the investigation of his case is an extremely disproportionate measure,","I.whereas a preliminary report of the Danish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights on the Lutsenko ... trials has listed massive violations of the European Convention on Human Rights ...","1.Stresses the importance of ensuring the utmost transparency in investigations, prosecutions and trials, and warns against any use of criminal law as a tool to achieve political ends;","2.Is concerned about the increase in selective prosecution of figures from the political opposition in Ukraine as well as the disproportionality of measures applied ...","3.Reminds the Ukrainian authorities that the principle of collective responsibility for the decisions of the government does not permit the prosecution of individual members of the government for decisions that were taken collegially ... \u201d"],"27336":["6.The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Nalchik. She is the mother of the late Ms Madina Eneyeva, who was born in 1972 and died in2007.","A.The events of 26 May 2007","7.On 26 May 2007 Ms Eneyeva was at a local market together with MrA, her brother-in-law. One of the stall-holders, MsG.Zh., suspected that MsEneyeva was planning to steal a skirt from her market stall. The twowomen started a fight and exchanged a few blows. The police arrived and arrested the applicant\u2019s daughter on suspicion of theft. Ms Eneyeva and MrA. were both put into a police vehicle.","8.The parties have presented different accounts of the subsequent events.","9.According to Mr A., after Ms Eneyeva had been put into the police vehicle, an unknown police officer with the rank of lieutenant approached the vehicle, kicked Ms Eneyeva fifteen times on her legs and then left. Once at the police station, MrA. was released. According to the applicant, upon arrival at the police station, her daughter was taken to the interrogation room situated on the second floor (in Russian referred to as the \u201cthirdfloor\u201d) of the police station and was beaten by the police officers until she fainted. While MsEneyeva was unconscious, unspecified police officers threw her out of the window.","10.In the Government\u2019s submission, it was alleged that during the drive to the police station Ms Eneyeva had unsuccessfully tried to escape from the police vehicle. Upon arrival at the police station, she had been escorted to the office of Lieutenant A.Zh. She had refused to answer his questions and had asked for permission to use a lavatory. Since there were no female police officers in sight, A.Zh. escorted her to the lavatory on the second floor of the police station himself and waited for her in the corridor outside the locked door. Being unguarded, Ms Eneyeva jumped out of the window in an attempt to escape from police custody.","11.Ms Eneyeva was then taken to hospital by ambulance. She underwent urgent surgery. At 10.45 p.m. on 26 May 2007 Ms Eneyeva died of complex internal injuries to her head, body and extremities.","12.The applicant then sought an investigation into her daughter\u2019s suspicious death and ill-treatment. According to the applicant, her daughter had no suicidal tendencies; she had three young children and a good home in recently obtained social housing.","B.Subsequent investigative proceedings","13.On 26 May 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office of Nalchik (\u201cthe town prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) were notified that Ms Eneyeva had jumped out of the window of the police station and then died.","14.On an unspecified date the town prosecutor\u2019s office opened pre\u2011investigative inquiry no. 663-07 into the circumstances of MsEneyeva\u2019s death.","15.On 28 May 2007 a forensic expert issued a post-mortem report, according to which \u2012 apart from various injuries \u2012 Ms Eneyeva had bruises and scratches on her legs, those injuries being unrelated to the fall.","16.On 4 June 2007 the deputy town prosecutor received and examined the applicant\u2019s complaint, in which she alleged that her daughter had been thrown out of the window by the police officers. He stated that the investigator in charge of pre-investigative inquiry no. 663-07 had not yet carried out all requisite investigative measures, in particular, that he had not questioned a number of persons: the police officers who had arrived at the market once Ms G.Zh. had reported the theft, those who had arrested MsEneyeva, the ambulance crew members and Mr A. Nonetheless, the deputy town prosecutor concluded that \u201cthere is nothing to suggest that MsEneyeva\u2019s death on 26 May 2007 in Nalchik was a violent one, as suggested in the complaint; moreover, there is no proof that the police officers of Nalchik were implicated in her death ...\u201d and decided to dismiss the applicant\u2019s complaint.","17.After a pre-investigation inquiry, on 5 June 2007 an investigator from the Nalchik prosecutor\u2019s office concluded that the applicant\u2019s daughter \u201chad made another attempt\u201d to escape from the police station, and refused to institute criminal proceedings in relation to Ms Eneyeva\u2019s death.","18.The above decision was later quashed by the Nalchik prosecutor who considered that it was established that the applicant had sustained injuries at the hands of an unspecified police officer.","19.On 17 June 2007 the investigator again refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s daughter\u2019s death. The decision was quashed by the deputy town prosecutor on 20 June 2007.","20.On 7 July 2007 the investigator from the Nalchik prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute a criminal case to investigate the circumstances of MsEneyeva\u2019s death.","21.On 27 July 2007 the Kabardino-Balkariya prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the decision of 7 July 2007 refusing to open an investigation into Ms Eneyeva\u2019s death. However, no further investigation into the circumstances of the death appears to have taken place and no further decision regarding this appears to have been taken after 27 July 2007. On11August 2007, however, Lieutenant A.Zh. was subjected to disciplinary measures for failure to comply with the procedure concerning escorting detainees.","22.For reasons unknown, on 27 July 2007, while quashing the refusal to investigate the death of Ms Eneyeva, the Kabardino-Balkariya prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal proceedings in case no. 25\/35-07 to investigate an alleged abuse of powers by an unidentified police officer who had hit MsEneyeva on her legs inside the police vehicle at the market on 26 May 2007. They referred to the medical expert report (see paragraph 15 above) according to which there had been bruises on MsEneyeva\u2019s legs which had not been caused by the fall out of the window. The authorities relied on Article286 of the RussianCriminal Code (\u201cabuse of power by a public official\u201d). The circumstances of MsEneyeva\u2019s death lay outside the scope of the investigation in question.","23.On 13 September 2007 the applicant was granted victim status in case no. 25\/35-07.","24.On 22 October 2007 a forensic expert carried out another examination of Ms Eneyeva\u2019s body to establish the origin of the scratches and bruises on the legs and concluded that the injuries in question had been inflicted by blunt objects.","25.On 27 October 2007 the investigation into the abuse of power was stayed for failure to identify those responsible. On 19 November 2007 the investigation was resumed and eventually stayed again on 28 February 2008.","26.In view of the authorities\u2019 failure to institute a criminal investigation into Ms Eneyeva\u2019s death, the applicant brought court actions on 31January 2008 and on 26 February 2008. Eventually, on 23 June 2008 the Nalchik Town Court held in favour of the applicant, finding that the investigator\u2019s failure to investigate had been unlawful.","27.On 8 April 2009 the applicant again complained about the investigator\u2019s lack of action. On 14 May 2009 the Nalchik Town Court granted the applicant\u2019s claim and held that the investigator\u2019s continued failure to comply with the judgment of 23 June 2008 was unlawful.","28.On 23 March 2010 the deputy prosecutor of Nalchik quashed the ruling of 28 February 2008 staying the investigation (see paragraph 25 above).","29.Accordingly, on 31 March 2010 the investigation was again resumed.","30.On 11 April 2010 Mr K., a police officer on duty on 26 May 2007, was questioned as a witness. No essential information was obtained as a result of the interview.","31.In April 2010 the investigators tried to find eye-witnesses who had seen Ms Eneyeva at the market on 26 May 2007, but in vain. Also in April2010 the certificate of death of Mr A. was included in the case file.","32.On 15 April 2010 the investigators decided to carry out a forensic medical examination of the injuries found on Ms Eneyeva\u2019s body by a group of experts on the basis of the documents in the case file. However, no information on the results of the examination had been made available by 29January 2015.","33.On 25 April 2010 Mr Ch., a police officer on duty on 26 May 2007, was questioned as a witness. He did not provide any relevant information.","34.On 8 May 2010 two shop assistants were questioned as witnesses and submitted that they had not seen the police using any force on MsEneyeva.","35.On 8 May 2010 the investigation was suspended owing to failure to find those responsible.","36.On 28 August 2010 the investigation was resumed.","37.On 22 September 2010 the investigators questioned Ms B. as a witness. Ms B. was the wife of Mr O., a forensic expert who had examined Ms Eneyeva\u2019s dead body in 2007. Ms B. stated that her husband had left for Moscow for a lengthy period of time.","38.On 30 September 2010 the investigation was again suspended.","39.On 21 January 2015 the investigation was resumed. An internal inquiry was instituted by the Investigative Committee of Russia regarding poor supervision of the investigation of case no. 25-35\/07. The investigation appears to be still pending.","40.The applicant stated that after 23 March 2010 she had not received any update on the progress of the investigation from the domestic authorities."],"27334":["5.The applicants are a married couple. They were born in 1976 and 1988 respectively. The first applicant is serving a sentence of imprisonment in Kholodnogirska penitentiary no.18. The second applicant lives in Kharkiv.","A.Background facts","6.At the time of the events the applicants lived in a two-room apartment together with Ms S., the second applicant\u2019s mother.","7.Ms S. had a pending judicial dispute with a certain Mr L. regarding the inheritance of a house. The applicants, being interested in improving their living conditions, provided her with various support in those proceedings.","8.In April 2008 the first applicant visited Mr L. with a view to dissuading him from pursuing the mentioned dispute.","B.Events between 27 June and 2 July 2008","9.On 27 June 2008 Mr L. was found dead in his house. His throat was cut and there were multiple stabs and cuts on his body. One of the windows was broken, and there was a hoe lying nearby on the floor.","10.On the same day a criminal investigation was opened into the murder.","11.At about 10 p.m. on that same day the applicants came home where several police officers were waiting for them. The applicants were taken to the Kharkiv Frunzenskyy District Police Department (\u0424\u0440\u0443\u043d\u0437\u0435\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0434\u0456\u043b \u0425\u0430\u0440\u043a\u0456\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043c\u0456\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0456\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0413\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0456\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0456\u0448\u043d\u0456\u0445 \u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432 \u041c\u0412\u0421 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u0432 \u0425\u0430\u0440\u043a\u0456\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456). According to the applicants, this was done under the pretext that they needed to be questioned in respect of the first applicant\u2019s debt vis-\u00e0-vis some third persons. As submitted by the Government, the police apprehended the applicants on suspicion of the murder of Mr L.","12.The applicants were questioned regarding their whereabouts and actions on 26 and 27 June 2008. They stated that they had been together shopping, going to the cinema, having meals and so on.","13.Both applicants were held in the police station during the night on 27-28June 2008. They stated in their submissions to the Court that they had not been subjected to any ill-treatment at that stage.","14.On 28 June 2008 the first applicant underwent a forensic medical examination. According to its report, which was completed on 1 July 2008, the examination revealed multiple bruises and sores on virtually all the body of the first applicant. They included about thirty multidirectional sores on his back and about the same number of sores on his hips, buttocks and knees. The expert gave the following possible dates of the injuries: a bruise on the left shoulder and a sore on the torso \u2013 between 22 and 24 June 2008; bruises on the right part of the torso \u2013 between 25 and 27 June 2008; sores on the torso, the back and the legs \u2013 between 25 and 27June 2008. Those sores were assessed as having possibly originated from the impact of some protruded blunt objects, such as glass fragments.","15.According to the first applicant, he sustained the injuries discovered on 28 June 2008, having accidentally fallen a day before.","16.The first applicant submitted the following account of the subsequent events. After the aforementioned examination, he was taken to the criminal investigation department, where one of the officers suggested that he should confess to the murder of Mr L. As the first applicant refused to do so, some officers brought in a dirty mattress and a gas mask. They put wet cloths around his wrists and handcuffed him. One of the officers punched him in the solar plexus and pushed him on the mattress. The others twisted his arms behind his back and made him split his legs while beating him to his torso and genitals. The gas mask was then put on the first applicant\u2019s face and the vent was blocked. He fainted several times and was made regain consciousness with cold water. The gas mask was repeatedly put on his face, and he was made inhale cigarette smoke. At the same time, his genitals were being twisted. The first applicant\u2019s ill-treatment continued as described above in several rounds. The officers threated him that they would bring his wife and do the same with her in front of him. He then signed a confession to the murder of Mr L. He had, however, to adjust it many times as dictated by the police. The first applicant was made memorise his confession.","17.The Government maintained that the first applicant had not been subjected to any ill-treatment.","18.According to the detention logbook of the police station, the first applicant was detained at 8.15 p.m. on 28 June 2008 as a criminal suspect.","19.On the same date, 28 June 2008, the investigator appointed a lawyer, MrM., for the first applicant. He maintained his initial confession during his questioning in the presence of the lawyer. According to the first applicant, he did so fearing further ill-treatment and not having the possibility to talk with the lawyer in private prior to the questioning.","20.As regards the second applicant, in the morning on 28June 2008 she was taken from the police station to her home, where a search was conducted. The police allegedly threatened her that if she did not testify against her husband, they would accuse her of a drug-related offence having previously planted drugs in her apartment.","21.Thereafter the second applicant was taken back to the police station, where she made a statement, allegedly under coercion, that her husband had admitted to her having murdered Mr L. More specifically, the second applicant submitted that three police officers had hit her several times on the head and had pulled her by the hair.","22.On 30 June 2008 a reconstruction of the crime was conducted in the presence of the first applicant\u2019s lawyer, during which the first applicant confessed again to the incriminated crime. About forty minutes later he, however, retracted his confession as made under duress and complained of his ill-treatment by the police. According to the first applicant, he did so after his first confidential conversation with his lawyer, which had taken place only after the aforementioned event. His lawyer subsequently stated that he had had his first confidential meeting with the first applicant prior to the latter\u2019s questioning on 28 June 2008 (see paragraph 65 below).","23.On 1 July 2008 the investigator submitted for approval to the Frunzenskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Frunzenskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) an application for the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial. The prosecutor decided to question the first applicant himself before taking a decision. He saw that the first applicant had multiple injuries and concluded that his confession had been extracted by force. Furthermore, the prosecutor noted a number of discrepancies between the confessions of the first applicant and the autopsy report in respect of the victim. The second applicant was questioned too. She submitted that she had incriminated her husband under duress.","24.As a result, the prosecutor refused to approve the investigator\u2019s application, quashed the latter\u2019s decision on bringing the charges against the first applicant and released him. The prosecutor also directed his subordinates to question both applicants about their ill-treatment in police custody and to duly report their submissions.","25.While the applicants were making written statements in the office of the deputy prosecutor, at about 10.30 p.m., four officers of the Frunzenskyy District Police Department, namely, the first deputy head of the department (\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0438\u0439 \u0437\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u0438\u043a \u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0456\u0434\u0434\u0456\u043b\u0443) Mr K. (see also paragraphs68 and 83 below for additional information about this police officer), the head of the criminal investigation department (\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u043a \u0441\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0443 \u043a\u0430\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u043e\u0437\u0448\u0443\u043a\u0443) MrPap., his deputy (\u0437\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u0438\u043a \u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u043a\u0430\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u043e\u0437\u0448\u0443\u043a\u0443) Mr Par., and the chief of the investigation unit (\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u043a \u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0434\u0456\u043b\u0443) Mr M., broke in. Disregarding the objections of the deputy prosecutor and constraining him by force, they took the applicants out. There were more police officers waiting in the corridor.","26.The applicants were handcuffed and taken to the Frunzenskyy Police Department, located near the prosecutor\u2019s office. On the way, one of the officers allegedly hit the first applicant in the right hip.","27.The first applicant was taken to an office on the ground floor where he was made sit quiet with one of the police officers. The office was locked from inside, and the light was switched off. About an hour later, he was taken to another office where the bars on the window could be removed. He was made write a note that he had left the police station at 10.30 p.m. The first applicant was then taken outside through the window behind the building of the police station. The police officers placed him a car, parked that car in a nearby yard and waited there till 3 or 4 a.m. It is not known what happened thereafter. It appears that the first applicant remained detained (see, in particular, paragraph 31 below).","28.After the police had taken the applicants from the prosecutor\u2019s office, at 11.15 p.m. the deputy prosecutor visited the Frunzenskyy Police Department. According to the visitors\u2019 logbook, the applicants had entered the building at 10.30 p.m. and had been remaining there. Having searched the premises, the prosecution officials found the second applicant in tears in one of the offices. The first applicant could not be found. Police officer K. submitted to the prosecutor a note on behalf of the first applicant, but without his signature, that he had left the police department at 10.30p.m. The prosecution officers went to the applicants\u2019 home, but the first applicant was not there.","C.Investigation of the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment and related events","29.On 30 June 2008 the first applicant complained to the prosecution authorities that he had been ill-treated by the police (see also paragraph22 above). It appears that the second applicant raised a similar complaint too.","30.On 2 July 2008 the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office opened a criminal case against the police officers K., Pap. and Par. under Article365\u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (exceeding power by engaging in the violent or degrading treatment of a victim) in respect of the events of the evening of 1July and the night from 1 to 2 July 2008.","31.On the same date the applicants were assigned victim status and questioned. Also on that day the first applicant underwent a forensic medical examination, after which he was released.","32.On 4 July 2008 a report of the first applicant\u2019s examination was delivered. It documented multiple bruises on his shoulders, torso, back, chest, arms, hips, thighs and legs. Their colouring varied from yellowish to violet and purple. The first applicant also had crust-covered sores and bruises on both wrists. The expert concluded that most of the injuries had originated from the impact of blunt objects between 23 and 27 June 2008. One bruise on the first applicant\u2019s back below the left shoulder blade was assessed as sustained between 30 June and 1 July 2008. Lastly, according to the report, some sores on the right forearm, the left elbow and the right ankle had been inflicted on the first applicant on 1 July 2008.","33.On 2 July 2008 the second applicant underwent a medical examination too, which did not reveal any injuries. According to the second applicant, she complained to the expert that she had headaches and was advised to apply for help to a hospital.","34.On 5 July 2008 she was examined by a neurosurgeon in the local hospital who reported that she had bruises of the head soft tissues.","35.On 8 and 9 July 2008 the applicants were questioned in respect of their alleged ill-treatment by the police. They recognised the officers K., Pap. and Par. at the photos shown to them.","36.On 11 and 14 July 2008 a reconstruction of the events of 28 June and 1-2 July 2008 was conducted with the applicants\u2019 participation.","37.On an unspecified date the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office directed the management of the police department to establish the whereabouts of the officers K., Pap. and Par., who had not complied with the prosecutor\u2019s summonses.","38.On 18 July 2008 the Chief of the Frunzenskyy Police Department wrote to the prosecutor that all those three officers were on sick leave and that their whereabouts were being established.","39.On 21 August 2008 the police officers K., Pap. and Par. were questioned in respect of the alleged ill-treatment of the applicants. K. and Pap. refused making any statements. It is not known what Par. stated.","40.On 2 September 2008 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the criminal investigation in respect of the aforementioned police officers, having concluded that the wrongdoings imputed to them were to be qualified as interference with the activity of a law-enforcement official (the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor) rather than exceeding power by engaging in the violent or degrading treatment of a victim. Accordingly, a different criminal case was opened, with a new charge.","41.On an unspecified date in October 2008 K., Pap. and Par. were questioned again. They denied any ill-treatment of the applicants. As to their behaviour on 1 July 2008, they submitted that they had believed that the applicants had posed a danger to the deputy prosecutor.","42.On 21 October 2008 the prosecutor, who had been involved in the events of 1 July 2008, gave detailed statements regarding those events, when questioned as a witness in the framework of the criminal investigation against the police officers.","43.Between 19 and 23 December 2008 the first applicant underwent a forensic medical examination with a view to establishing the origin of his injuries documented earlier.","44.On 23 December 2008 the examination report was completed. It reiterated the findings of the first applicant\u2019s examinations of 28June and 2July 2008 (see paragraphs 14, 31 and 32 above). Furthermore, it noted that the sores on the first applicant\u2019s wrists could have been caused by his handcuffing. The report stated that the findings of the earlier examinations did not contradict the other materials in the case file.","45.On 30 December 2008 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminated the criminal investigation into the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment, for the lack of corpus delicti in the actions of the police officers. The prosecutor noted a contradiction in the first applicant\u2019s submissions, according to which his only injury as of 28 June 2008 had been a bruise on his right hip from an accidental falling the day earlier, and the forensic medical examination report of 28 June 2008, which had established many others injuries. The expert who had examined the first applicant on 2July and 23December 2008, had stated during his questioning by the prosecutor that the injuries sustained by the first applicant after 28 June 2008, were located in the body parts accessible for self-infliction, apart from the bruise below the left shoulder blade. It appeared impossible to establish the origin of that bruise. The expert had also noted that no injuries on the first applicant\u2019s genitals had been revealed. Overall, the prosecutor concluded that those few injuries which were dated later than 28 June 2008 \u201ccould have been sustained [by the first applicant] in circumstances unrelated to any use of force by the police against him\u201d. It was also noted in the ruling that the first applicant had never raised any complaints before the medical personnel of the detention facility. Lastly, as regards the allegations of the second applicant that she had been ill-treated by the police, the prosecutor noted that her medical examination of 2 July 2008 had not revealed any injuries. In sum, the ill-treatment allegations of both applicants were found to be without basis.","46.On 9 October 2009 the Kharkiv Chervonozavodskyy District Court (\u201cthe Chervonozavodskyy Court\u201d) quashed the above decision and directed the prosecution authorities to carry out an additional investigation. It noted, in particular, that the contradictions between the first applicant\u2019s submissions that he had had no injuries as of 28 June 2008 and the forensic medical examination report of that date, according to which he had had numerous injuries, had to be clarified.","47.On 27 May 2010 a reconstruction of the events of 28June and 1\u20112July 2008 was conducted with the participation of the first applicant. He maintained the allegations of his ill-treatment by the police.","48.On 27 and 28 May 2010 a forensic medical expert examined the available documents in respect of the first applicant with a view to clarifying the origin of his injuries. The case file does not contain a copy of the respective report. It appears that, according to the expert\u2019s conclusions, only some of the first applicant\u2019s injuries could have originated in the circumstances as described by him.","49.On 31 May 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office once again terminated the investigation initiated on 2 July 2008 for the lack of corpus delicti in the actions of the police officers concerned. The prosecutor noted that, even though the first applicant had sustained some injuries while in detention, the exact time and circumstances of their infliction remained unknown. Furthermore, the location of some of the injuries allowed to presume that they could have been self-inflicted. The prosecutor also noted that the first applicant had not \u201cpersonalised\u201d his injuries: in other words, that he had not specified who exactly of the police officers had inflicted each specific injury on him. The investigator had also questioned the forensic expert who had conducted the examination of the first applicant on 28 June 2008 who had confirmed her findings.","50.On the same date, 31 May 2010, the Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office delivered two additional rulings refusing to open a criminal case following the complaints of ill-treatment by each of the applicants.","51.On 29 November 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, acting as a court of first instance in the first applicant\u2019s trial, ordered the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office to investigate the first applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment by the police. It noted that, according to the first applicant, the presence of his fingerprint on the hoe seized at the crime scene was explained by the fact that the police officers had put that hoe in his hands by force during his ill-treatment.","52.On 28 December 2010, 25 April and 5 May 2011 the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office, to which the investigation was re-assigned, refused to open a criminal case against the police, having mainly relied on the respective rulings of 31May 2010 (see paragraphs 49 and 50 above). All those decisions were, however, quashed as premature.","53.On 18 May 2012 the Frunzenskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office again refused to open a criminal case against the police officers allegedly involved in the applicants\u2019 ill-treatment.","54.On 11 June 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered a forensic medical examination of the first applicant by an expert panel with a view to clarifying his injuries and the possible circumstances of their infliction. The investigator noted that similar examinations, which had been carried out earlier, were inconsistent in their conclusions.","55.On 12 July 2012 a panel of experts issued a forensic medical examination report, in which they stated, in particular, that the first applicant might have sustained all the injuries (with the exception of two bruises and one sore) at the time and under the circumstances as indicated by him during the reconstruction of the events conducted on 27 May 2010 (see paragraph 47 above).","56.On 6 August 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office, which was apparently investigating the matter in parallel, refused to open a criminal case against the police officers too. On the same day it terminated, on similar grounds as earlier, the criminal investigation initiated on 2July 2008. On 5 September 2012 the Chervonozavodskyy Court quashed both aforementioned rulings as based on an incomplete and one-sided investigation.","57.On 8 October 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld that decision.","58.On 22 October 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to open a criminal case against the police officers in respect of the second applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. On the same date it discontinued the criminal investigation against the police officers in respect of the first applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, which had been launched on 2 July 2008 (see paragraph 30 above).","59.The first applicant unsuccessfully challenged the aforementioned decision before the domestic courts.","D.The first applicant\u2019s trial","60.On 11 November 2008 the first applicant was committed for trial.","61.On 18 May 2009 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Kharkiv Court\u201d), sitting as a court of first instance, remitted the case for additional investigation. It noted, in particular, that the first applicant\u2019s initial confession could not be relied on because he had later retracted it as obtained under duress and given that his ill-treatment complaint had not been duly investigated. The court also indicated a number of contradictions between the first applicant\u2019s confessions and the case-file materials.","62.On an unspecified date the additional investigation was completed and the case was referred to the trial court again.","63.On 26 January 2011 the Kharkiv Court found the first applicant guilty of murder for profit and sentenced him to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment with confiscation of all his personal property. It relied, in particular, on the first applicant\u2019s initial confessions, which he had later retracted. Furthermore, the court referred to certain material evidence inculpating the first applicant (such as the hoe with his fingerprint found at the scene of the crime, and his shorts with a blood stain possibly originating from the victim). His allegations that he had been ill-treated and that the evidence against him had been fabricated were dismissed as unsubstantiated.","64.On 20 September 2011 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court quashed the above judgment mainly on the ground that Article3 of the Convention and the Court\u2019s case-law required a proper investigation of the first applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, which had not been done. The Higher Court also remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination.","65.On 4 July 2012 the Kharkiv Court once again found the first applicant guilty of murder for profit and sentenced him to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment with confiscation of all his personal property. The court relied, inter alia, on his confessions made on 28 June 2008 and further reiterated on 30 June 2008 in the presence of his lawyer (see paragraphs19 and 22 above). It was noted in the judgment that the first applicant\u2019s lawyer, who had represented him on the aforementioned dates, had been questioned and had stated that he had had a confidential conversation with the first applicant prior to the first questioning and that there had been no violations of the criminal procedure.","66.As regards the first applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been ill-treated on 28June 2008, the court noted that the prosecution authorities had thoroughly investigated the matter and had decided not to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers concerned. The Kharkiv Court referred in this connection to the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 18 May 2012 (see paragraph 53 above). At the same time, having regard to the ill-treatment allegation on the part of the second applicant, which was still under investigation, the Kharkiv Court decided not to rely on her statements incriminating the first applicant, which she had made during the pre-trial investigation.","67.In so far as the first applicant complained of his kidnapping by the police from the prosecutor\u2019s office on 1 July 2008, the trial court noted that the investigation was ongoing and that it was not necessary to wait for its outcome for the pronouncement of the judgment.","68.The first applicant challenged the judgment on points of law. He submitted, in particular, that that there was no solid evidence proving his guilt and that the trial court had wrongly relied on his self-incriminating statements obtained under duress, without any adequate investigation of his ill-treatment complaint. He referred in this connection to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Savin v. Ukraine (no. 34725\/08, 16 February 2012), which concerned that applicant\u2019s torture by K., the same police officer who was involved in the alleged ill-treatment of the applicants in the present case.","69.On 22 January 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court and its reasoning."],"27372":["5.The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently being detained in Giurgiu Prison. He is married and has four children. His wife resides in Turkey together with their children.","6.On 28 June 2005 the Bucharest County Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and sentenced him to eighteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The Bucharest County Court also decided that the applicant would be deported to Turkey at the end of his prison term.","A.Conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention","1.The applicant\u2019s account","7.In his letters to the Court, which he began sending on 15 July 2008, the applicant complained of the inhuman conditions in which he was being detained, first in Rahova Prison and then in Giurgiu Prison. He described a severe lack of hygiene in both prisons, with insufficient cleaning and personal hygiene products being provided by the prison authorities. He alleged that he could not sleep at night because of bed bugs. He also complained that the food was not adapted to his diabetes.","8.The applicant further alleged that throughout his detention in both prisons he had not been included in any educational activities and had notbeen allowed to do any work. He had thus been unable to integrate, to be re-educated or to have the term of his prison sentence reduced.","9.In 2008 the applicant was diagnosed with type II diabetes and a sleep disorder.","2.The Government\u2019s account","(a)Rahova Prison","10.In Rahova Prison the applicant was detained in cells measuring 21sq.m, which he shared with seven other prisoners (2.62 sq. m of personal space). The cells contained eight beds, a window measuring 1.2 by 1.2 m and their own bathroom with a shower, a sink and a toilet. Cold water was always available and hot water was available twice per week. Heating was provided during the winter up to a maximum temperature of 18oC.","11.The Government submitted that, whenever the presence of bugs was noticed, disinfection operations took place without delay. They submitted documents showing that disinfection had been performed two or three times per year in 2005, 2007 and 2008 in the cells occupied by the applicant in Rahova Prison.","12.The food provided to the applicant was adequate and adapted to his diabetes by substituting pork with beef.","13.The applicant participated in educational and recreational activities whenever necessary. The Government further indicated that the applicant\u2019s reduced participation in the above-mentioned activities was due to his state of health.","(b)Giurgiu Prison","14.The Government submitted that on 17 January 2009 the applicant had been transferred to Giurgiu Prison where he was currently being held in a cell measuring 21.47 sq. m together with five other prisoners (3.57 sq. m of personal space). The cell contained six beds, three bedside tables, one bench, one table and a box for shoes. It had a window measuring 1.5 by 1.8m and a bathroom with a shower, a sink and a toilet. During the winter, a temperature of 19oC was ensured in all the cells. Hot water was provided twice per week.","15.With respect to the prisoners\u2019 personal hygiene, once per month the prison administration provided each prisoner with two bars of soap, onetube of toothpaste, one tooth brush, one tube of shaving cream, onerazor, and toilet paper. Concerning the hygiene in the cell, the Government submitted that prisoners were responsible for cleaning the cells and were provided with cleaning products by the prison administration. Regular disinfection was conducted once every three months.","16.The applicant received a menu adapted for his diabetes, which included 125 grams of meat per day.","17.With respect to activities in Giurgiu Prison, the Government submitted that in December 2011 the applicant had watched a folk music concert and in December 2012 he had taken part in a discussion on religious themes conducted by the orthodox priest. Also, once in 2013 and once in 2014 the applicant had taken part in a quiz on Romanian history.","B.The applicant\u2019s requests for transfer to Turkey","18.In 2007 the applicant lodged a request with the Romanian Ministry of Justice based on the provisions of the Convention between Romania and Turkey on the transfer of convicted persons, seeking to serve the rest of his sentence in a Turkish prison. According to the applicant, he wanted the transfer in order to be closer to his family, who lived in a Turkish village in humble conditions and did not have the means to travel to Romania.","19.The Romanian Ministry of Justice acted on the applicant\u2019s request and initiated the transfer proceedings. As a result, on 5 June 2007 the Ankara District Court acknowledged the judgment of the Romanian court which had convicted the applicant and decided that the rest of the applicant\u2019s sentence should be served in Turkey.","20.On 4 February 2008 the applicant\u2019s transfer request was brought before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. The applicant claimed before the court that such a transfer would be in accordance with the convention signed between Romania and Turkey and would allow him to see his children and to receive visits from his family, who would provide him with adequate food and treatment for his diabetes.","21.In a judgment of 4 April 2008 the Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected the applicant\u2019s transfer request, on the ground that Turkey had less severe legal provisions on conditional release, which might lead to the applicant\u2019s release in a shorter period of time. The punitive and educational purpose of his sentence would thus fail to be achieved.","22.On 15 December 2011 the Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected with the same reasoning a new transfer request lodged by the applicant."],"27375":["5.The applicant is a Syrian national of Kurdish origin. He was born in 1988 and currently lives in Geneva. On an unknown date he entered Swizerland from Italy, where he had arrived also on an unknown date. On 18 February 2013 he sought asylum in Switzerland.","6.On 8 May 2013 the Federal Office of Migration (the \u201cFOM\u201d) rejected the applicant\u2019s asylum request on the basis of the fact that his fingerprints had already been registered in EURODAC, in Greece, on 16 August 2012, and in Italy, on 21 January 2013. Furthermore, the Italian authorities had accepted the Swiss authorities\u2019 request of 17 April 2013 to take the applicant back into their territory by virtue of Article 10 \u00a7 1 of Regulation no. 343\/2003\/EC (the \u201cDublin Regulation\u201d). The FOM further ruled that the applicant\u2019s two sisters, who were living in Switzerland respectively since 2006 and January 2012, did not fall under the category of \u201cfamily members\u201d as provided in Article 2 (i) of the Dublin Regulation. Regarding the back problems alleged by the applicant, it considered that Italy was obliged to grant him access to medical treatment and that nothing indicated that those health problems impeded the transfer of the applicant to Italy.","7.The applicant appealed against the FOM\u2019s decision to the Federal Administrative Court (the \u201cFAC\u201d). He maintained that he had fled his home country Syria because he had been persecuted, detained and tortured there. As established by medical certificates, he had been diagnosed with severe post-traumatic stress disorder, for which he was receiving medical treatment. He was also receiving medical treatment for his back problems. He claimed that the FOM\u2019s decision was in breach of Article 10 \u00a7 1 of the Dublin Regulation because Greece was the first member State he had entered less than twelve months before. Thus it was the Greek authorities which were theoretically responsible for examining his asylum request. It could not, however, be derived from the fact that he could not be returned to Greece as established in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC] no. 30696\/09, ECHR 2011) that Switzerland could return him to Italy. Therefore, the Swiss authorities\u2019 request for his return to Italy was in breach of the law because they had known that the Italian authorities were not competent in that matter, and Italy had erroneously accepted the request. According to the applicant, the FOM\u2019s decision also violated Article 15 \u00a7 2 of the Dublin Regulation which provided that persons who were dependent on relatives who were residing in a member State should be kept together with them. In this regard he established that two of his older sisters were legally residing in Switzerland with their families. He claimed that owing to the presence of his sisters he had regained a certain emotional stability in his life. His expulsion to Italy, where he had no family member to care for him, would therefore aggravate his mental health problems in such a way that he would be at risk of irreparable harm contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.","8.On 13 June 2013 the FAC dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It ruled that according to the Dublin Regulation the applicant had to return to Italy, whose authorities had, prior to accepting the Swiss request for return, been informed by Switzerland that the applicant had first entered the \u201cDublin area\u201d in Greece. Furthermore, the FAC considered that in view of the dates of arrival in the respective countries it could not be excluded that on leaving Greece the applicant had left the \u201cDublin area\u201d before entering Italy. Furthermore, it established that the applicant was not so severely ill that he was dependent on the assistance of his sisters. Therefore, Article 15 \u00a7 2 of the Dublin Regulation was not applicable in his case and neither was Article8 of the Convention. Moreover, the FAC held that with regard to the asylum procedure and the availability of medical treatment for asylum seekers it had not been established that there were structural deficiencies in the Italian reception system and that Italy failed to respect its international obligations in respect of asylum seekers and refugees. Therefore, nothing indicated that the applicant would suffer treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of expulsion to Italy. Finally, the FAC stated that it was up to the Swiss authorities to inform their Italian counterparts about the applicant\u2019s health problems when they were executing the expulsion.","9.Before this Court the applicant produced in particular a medical report dated 6 June 2013 establishing that, as a result of trauma allegedly suffered in detention in Syria, he had back problems and showed severe symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. As a result, the applicant was put on a course of twice monthly psychotherapy sessions with a general practitioner and was prescribeda daily dose of Sertraline, an anti-depressant, as well as sleeping pills (Zolpidem) and pain-killers for his back (Tilur).","The report also stated that in the absence of medical treatment the applicant\u2019s health status would deteriorate quickly and put him at a high risk of alcohol or drug abuse as well as suicide. The risk of suicide would be greater should the applicant be returned to his country of origin.","Moreover, according to the report, the involvment of the applicant\u2019s sisters was \u201can absolute necessity\u201d (absolument n\u00e9cessaire) for him to gain some emotional stability in order to overcome the multiple traumas suffered.","Upon the recommendation of his doctor, the applicant was allocated an individual apartment unit for asylum seekers. The applicant also submitted his sisters\u2019 declarations, according to which he was virtually spending the whole time with their families, he was in great emotional need, could not be left alone and spent only the nights alone in his apartment. They added that they were willing and able to provide him with emotional support so that he could recover from his trauma.","14. A detailed description of the asylum procedure and the legal framework and organisation of the reception system for asylum seekers in Italy is also set out in the Tarakhel judgment (\u00a7\u00a7 36-50)."],"27394":["6.The applicants, Mr V.M. and Mrs G.S.M., and four of their children were born in 1981, 1977, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2011 respectively and live in Serbia. Their eldest daughter, who was also an applicant, was born in 2001 and subsequently died on 18 December 2011 after the application had been lodged.","A.The applicants\u2019 movements prior to their arrival in Belgium","7.The applicants are of Roma origin and were born in Serbia, where they spent the greater part of their lives. They explained that they decided to leave their country for Kosovo because of the discrimination and ill\u2011treatment they had suffered on account of their origin in every sphere: access to the employment market, medical care, schooling difficulties and so forth.","8.The eldest daughter of the first two applicants had been physically and mentally disabled since birth and had suffered from epilepsy.","9.After failing to obtain a more secure situation for themselves in Kosovo, in March 2010 the applicants travelled to France, where they lodged an application for asylum. Their application was rejected by a final decision on 4 June 2010.","10.The applicants stated that in the meantime they had returned to Kosovo, and then to Serbia, in May 2010 owing to the precariousness of their situation in France and their inability to provide for their essential needs.","11.In March 2011, as their situation had not changed, the applicants decided to go to Belgium, where they lodged an asylum application on 1April 2011.","B.\u201cDublin\u201d procedure in Belgium","12.During their interview with the \u201cDublin\u201d department of the Aliens Office on 4 April 2011 the applicants gave an account of their movements to date and expressed their fears in the event of a return to Serbia. The first applicant stated that he had chosen to seek asylum in Belgium because he had been told that he could obtain better treatment for his disabled daughter there. He said that he was suffering from psychological problems. The second applicant said that Belgium had been the choice of the smuggler. When asked about her health, she replied that she was six months\u2019 pregnant. She also mentioned their eldest daughter\u2019s health problems.","13.The applicants maintained that they had explained the reasons why they refused to return to France, where they had been living in extremely precarious conditions. They submitted that they had not been asked to provide any evidence of having left the territory of the Member States of the European Union (\u201cEU\u201d) or regarding the family members\u2019 state of health.","14.On 12 April 2011 the Belgian authorities sent France requests to take the applicants back on the grounds that the latter had been unable to prove that they had left the territory of the Member States of the EU for Serbia since their stay in France.","15.On 22 April 2011, relying on Article 16(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 343\/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third\u2011country national (\u201cthe Dublin II Regulation\u201d), France refused to take charge of the applicants on the grounds that the couple were considered to have disappeared since May 2010 because they had not collected the notice of final refusal of their asylum application dated 4 June 2010 and this corroborated their statements to the Aliens Office according to which they had left the Schengen Area in 2010 and re-entered it in March 2011, thus leaving for a period of more than three months.","16.On 2 May 2011 the Belgian authorities asked the French authorities to reconsider their position given that there was no conclusive evidence that the family had left the territory of the Member States for more than three months since their stay in France and the applicants were clearly aware of the rejection of their asylum application in France.","17.On 6 May 2011 France accepted the request to take the family back pursuant to Article 16(1)(e) of the Dublin II Regulation.","18.On 17 May 2011 the Aliens Office issued decisions refusing the applicants leave to remain and ordering them to leave the country for France on the grounds that under Article 16(1)(e) of the Dublin II Regulation Belgium was not responsible for examining the asylum application and that France had agreed to take charge of the family. The decisions indicated among other things that the family, who were originally from Kosovo, \u201chad not furnished evidence of their stay\u201d in Kosovo after staying in France nor any certificates regarding any medical treatment or care in respect of the pregnancy, or concerning the child or the father. Considering that France was a country which respected human rights, had democratic institutions, had ratified the Convention and the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, and was bound to implement the directives of the European Union on asylum and that if a return were to raise a problem under Article 3 of the Convention, the family could always lodge an application with the Court for interim measures, the Aliens Office considered that the Belgian authorities did not have to use the sovereignty clause provided for in Article3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation.","19.Accordingly, the applicants were ordered to leave the country within seven days and to report to the French authorities at the border crossing. On the same day the applicants were issued with laissez-passer.","20.On 19 May 2011 the applicants, through their legal representative, contacted the Aliens Office for the purposes of providing it with evidence that they had left the territory of the European Union for more than three months (gynaecologist\u2019s certificates, the second applicant\u2019s health card and proof of enrolment at school of one of their children).","21.On 25 May 2011 execution of the orders to leave the country were extended until 25September 2011 on account of the fact that the second applicant was soon due to give birth.","22.On 16 June 2011 the applicants lodged an application with the Aliens Appeals Board for the decisions refusing them residence permits and ordering them to leave the country to be set aside and for a stay of execution. They argued that the decisions, with the reasons given therein, had not provided them with the examination required by Article 13 taken together with Article3 of the Convention (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 336, ECHR 2011) of their fears regarding a return to Serbia and of their health problems. Firstly, the reasoning was erroneous and incomplete (error as to their nationality, identifying them as Kosovars instead of Serbs, failure to mention their return to Serbia and their Roma origin). Secondly, they could not be blamed for having failed to provide, during their Dublin interview, documents certifying their health problems and their movements to date or for not having substantiated their fears regarding a transfer to France. Like all Dublin asylum-seekers at that time, when they had attended those interviews they had not been assisted by a lawyer or informed of the documents that they should bring and no document had been requested of them. As they had expressed their fears, the Belgian authorities should have asked the appropriate questions and requested the relevant documents in order to ensure that their return did not infringe their fundamental rights. The applicants also argued that France should not have been determined as the State responsible for examining their asylum applications. Under Article 16(3) of the Dublin II Regulation, the obligations regarding the determination of the State responsible ceased where the third-country national had left the territory of the Member States for at least three months. That was precisely the position the applicants had been in on account of their return to Serbia from May 2010 to March 2011 as certified by the documents subsequently sent to the Aliens Office (see paragraph 20 above). Lastly, they submitted that the Belgian authorities should have used the sovereignty clause or the humanitarian clause both on account of their special vulnerability and of the notoriously difficult situation of the Roma minority in Serbia and of the conditions for the reception of asylum-seekers in France.","23.The hearing before the Aliens Appeals Board took place on 26August 2011.","24.On 23 September 2011 the applicants unsuccessfully sought a further extension of the order to leave the country pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Aliens Appeals Board.","25.On 27 September 2011 the applicants lodged an application with the Court for interim measures suspending their transfer to France pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Aliens Appeals Board.","26.On 28 September 2011 the Court refused to indicate an interim measure.","27.In a judgment of 29 November 2011 the Aliens Appeals Board ruled on the application to have the decisions refusing residence permits and ordering the applicants to leave the country set aside and for a stay of execution.","28.The Aliens Appeals Board dismissed the ground of appeal regarding the conditions of reception in France and based on the risk alleged by the applicants of being exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. It found as follows:","\u201c... the Board cannot but observe that the applicants have failed to show that they encountered difficulties in their dealings with the French authorities regarding access to health care for their child or their conditions of reception as asylum-seekers. They have not adduced so much as a shred of evidence regarding the circumstances of the ill-treatment they have allegedly suffered and have merely asserted in their application, without substantiating this with the slightest evidence that could corroborate the facts,\u201cthat they found themselves in an extremely precarious situation at the time of lodging their application for asylum and that their only refuge was a night hostel that they had to leave the next morning\u201d. Moreover, although their daughter\u2019s disability had been specified in the \u201cDublin form\u201d, the parties have not made any allegation whatsoever before the Aliens Appeals Board of encountering particular difficulties in the reception of asylum-seekers as organised by the relevant French authorities.\u201d","29.The Aliens Appeals Board also criticised the applicants for failing to produce in full the NGO reports that they had cited in support of their application, which had prevented it from checking whether the extracts produced did actually concern France.","30.The Aliens Appeals Board set the decisions aside, however, on the ground that the Aliens Office had not established the legal basis on which it considered that France was the State responsible for examining the applicants\u2019 asylum application.","31.On 23 December 2011 the Belgian State lodged an appeal on points of law with the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat against the Aliens Appeals Board\u2019s judgment. It disputed the Aliens Appeals Board\u2019s analysis of the applicable legal basis.","32.In an order of 12 January 2012 the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat declared the appeal admissible. In a judgment of 28 February 2013 it rejected it for lack of current interest on the grounds that the operative provisions of the Aliens Appeals Board\u2019s judgment were no longer a source of complaint for the applicants because they had returned to Serbia and had left the territory of the Member States for more than three months with the result that Belgium was relieved of any obligation in the process of determining which Member State was responsible for their asylum application.","C.Application for regularisation of residence status on medical grounds","33.In the meantime, on 22 September 2011, the applicants had lodged an application for leave to remain on medical grounds under section 9ter of the Aliens (Entry, Residence, Settlement and Expulsion) Act of 15December 1980 (\u201cthe Aliens Act\u201d) on behalf of their eldest daughter. They referred to the extreme precariousness of their position and the discrimination they had suffered as Roms in Serbia and Kosovo. Citing several international reports in support of their submissions, they argued that for that reason they had no guarantee that they would be able to obtain the necessary treatment for their daughter\u2019s health condition. They sought temporary leave to remain pending the outcome of the asylum proceedings they had instituted in Belgium.","34.On 30 September 2011 the Aliens Office declared their application inadmissible on the grounds that the medical certificate of 26 June 2011 (see paragraph 38 below), produced in support of their application to have their residence status regularised, certified the existence of a medical problem and stipulated the treatment considered necessary but, contrary to the requirements of section 9ter \u00a7 3, 3o of the Aliens Act, did not specify the degree of seriousness of the condition.","35.The applicants indicated in their observations in reply that they had learnt of the existence of that decision during the proceedings before the Court.","D.Reception in Belgium and medical care","36.On 1 April 2011 the Federal agency for the reception of asylum-seekers (\u201cFedasil\u201d) assigned the applicants a reception facility as their mandatory place of registration, namely, Morlanwez asylum-seekers\u2019 reception centre.","37.The social worker from the centre took down the following account by the applicants of the conditions of their reception in France:","\u201cThe family decided to leave France because they had no means of subsistence. They were living in a night shelter which they had to leave in the day. They and the children were out on the streets from 7 a.m. They had to use a pushchair as a wheelchair for S., who is disabled. They had no information of any kind apart from the status of asylum-seeker which had been given to them on their arrival. No doctor, no social worker, no lawyer, no interpreter. They had absolutely no means of communication. They had no idea what they should do or what to expect. S. was not receiving any medical treatment of any kind. When her health deteriorated and she had to be taken to hospital, it was the mother\u2019s sister who drove her to the emergency ward at the hospital and acted as interpreter. Once at the hospital the little girl had [epileptic] fits and her hair fell out. That was what decided the family to return to Serbia\u201d.","38.The eldest daughter was examined on 26 June 2011 by a neuro\u2011psychiatrist at Jolimont-Lobbes Hospital and a medical certificate was drawn up on that day certifying the child\u2019s disabilities.","39.In that certificate, which was sent to the Aliens Office on 1 July 2011, the doctor noted that the child had \u201ccerebral palsy with epilepsy\u201d, suffered from \u201csevere axial and peripheral hypotonia\u201d, that she could not sit up unassisted and soiled her underwear, that she could not talk and appeared not to understand others. He also noted that the child was taking medicines and that she required physiotherapy and appropriate equipment (orthopaedic braces, seat-brace). Those medical findings were confirmed by a neurological examination carried out on 1 July 2011.","40.The eldest daughter was admitted to hospital on 7 and 8 July 2011 for her epileptic fits and a neurological report drawn up.","41.After the second applicant gave birth on 26 July 2011 the family were assigned a new reception centre on 5 August 2011 in an open centre suitable for families, in Saint-Trond in the province of Limbourg.","42.On 26 September 2011, when the order extending execution of the order to leave the country expired, and as they could no longer benefit from material assistance for refugees, the applicants were removed from the Saint-Trond reception centre.","43.The applicants travelled to Brussels, where voluntary associations indicated a public square in the municipality of Schaerbeek, in the centre of the Brussels-Capital administrative district, where other homeless Roma families were also staying. They stayed there from 27September to 5October 2011.","44.On 29 September 2011, through their legal representative, the applicants asked the French-speaking community\u2019s General Delegate to the Rights of the Child to intervene urgently with the national authorities responsible for the reception of asylum-seekers.","45.On the same day the General Delegate sent a letter to the Director-General of Fedasil requesting that accommodation be found urgently.","46.A signed statement by the General Delegate dated 2 October 2011 indicated that he also contacted the municipality of Schaerbeek in an attempt to find urgent accommodation for the family. According to the General Delegate, the municipal authorities stated that they did not have power to make a decision and that it was for the federal authorities to decide, and Fedasil declared that it did not have power on account of the decision taken by the Aliens Office regarding France\u2019s responsibility for processing the asylum request (see paragraph 18 above). Fedasil also stated that the application to the Aliens Appeals Board (see paragraph 22 above) was not of suspensive effect, which was why the reception centre had applied the rules terminating the right to material assistance.","47. On 5 October 2011, following the intervention of the General Delegate, the Secretary of State\u2019s office for Asylum and Migration, Social Integration and the Fight against Poverty instructed Fedasil to designate a reception centre as a matter of urgency.","48.After spending two days at the transit centre of the Woluwe\u2011Saint\u2011Pierre municipality, also in the Brussels-Capital administrative district, on 7October 2011 the applicants were assigned a new reception centre as a mandatory place of registration: the Bovigny reception centre for asylum-seekers in the province of Luxembourg approximately 160 km from Brussels.","49.The Government maintained that the applicants had failed to register at the centre. The applicants, for their part, stated that they had gone there by train and a special bus but had been sent back to Brussels to Fedasil\u2019s Dispatching Department on the grounds that their \u201cannex 26quater [order to leave the country] was invalid.\u201d","50.When they got back to Brussels on 7 October 2011 the applicants got off the train at the Brussels Gare du Nord, where they remained without any means of subsistence and with no accommodation despite the very cold weather for nearly three more weeks until their return to Serbia was organised via a charitable organisation as part of the Fedasil return programme. The applicants left Belgium for Serbia on 25 October 2011.","51.In the meantime, on 12October 2011, the applicants\u2019 mandatory place of residence had been changed to code 207 \u201cno-show\u201d (see paragraph 81 below) and on 25 November 2011 the applicants\u2019 names were deleted from the waiting register.","E.Return to Serbia","52.After their return to Serbia their eldest daughter\u2019s health deteriorated, forcing the applicants to leave the room they had rented on account of the insalubrious conditions. They went to stay with a relative in Novi-Sad and then to the suburbs in Belgrade.","53.The applicants\u2019 eldest daughter was admitted to hospital on 4December 2011 suffering from a lung infection. She died on 18December 2011.","54.In a letter to their lawyer of 21 November 2012 the applicants stated that they had been attacked by Serbs on a number of occasions: among other incidents, some men had driven by in a car and broken the windows of their home by throwing stones, and had uttered threats, complaining of their links with the \u201cBelgians\u201d and ordering them to leave Serbia. The first applicant had attempted to defend himself and been beaten up twice by his attackers.","A.European Union law","1.Dublin Regulation","100.At the material time the\u201cDublin\u201d procedure was governed by Council Regulation (EC) No343\/2003 of 18February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (\u201cDublin II Regulation\u201d).","101.The main relevant provisions of the Dublin II Regulation are set out in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above (\u00a7\u00a7 65-76). Article 16(1) of that Regulation also provides that the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application under the Regulation must take back, firstly, an applicant whose application is under examination and who is in the territory of another Member State without permission (Article 16(1)(c)) and, secondly, a third\u2011country national whose application it has rejected and who is in the territory of another Member State without permission (Article16 \u00a71e)). The obligations specified in paragraph 1 cease where the third\u2011country national has left the territory of the Member States for at least three months (Article 16(3)).","102.The Dublin II Regulation was recast by Regulation (EU) No604\/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, known as the \u201cDublin III Regulation\u201d. The main lines of the recast are set out in Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 35-36, ECHR2014 (extracts).","2.Reception Directive","103.Council Directive No 2003\/9 of 27January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers in the Member States (\u201cthe Reception Directive\u201d) provides that the States must guarantee asylum-seekers","\u2013 certain material reception conditions, including housing, food and clothing, in kind or in the form of financial allowances; the allowances must be sufficient to protect the asylum-seeker from extreme need;","\u2013 arrangements to maintain family unity;","\u2013 medical and psychological care;","\u2013 access for minors to the education system, and to language classes where necessary for them to undergo normal schooling.","104.The Reception Directive was recast by Directive No2013\/33 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, with a view to guaranteeing a common European system for the physical reception conditions and fundamental rights of asylum-seekers, and ensuring that the administrative detention of asylum-seekers is used only as a last resort.","105.In Cimade and Gisti (C-179\/11, judgment of 27September 2012), the Court of Justice of the European Union (\u201cCJEU\u201d) specified that a Member State in receipt of an application for asylum was obliged to grant the minimum conditions for reception of asylum-seekers laid down in the Reception Directive even to an asylum-seeker in respect of whom it decided, under the Dublin II Regulation, to call upon another Member State, as the Member State responsible for examining his application for asylum, to take charge of or take back that applicant (\u00a7 50). That obligation ceased only when that applicant had actually been transferred by the requesting Member State (\u00a7 58).","106.In the case of Federaal agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers v. Selver Saciri, Sanijela Dordevic, Danjel Saciri et Sanela Saciri (C-79\/13, judgment of 27 February 2014), a request for a preliminary ruling was made to the CJEU by the Brussels Employment Tribunal concerning the arrangements for providing the physical reception conditions.Basing its answer on the text of the Reception Directive and its scheme and purpose and stressing the importance of respect for fundamental rights, in particular respect for human dignity, the CJEU said that the asylum-seeker could not be deprived \u2013 even temporarily after an asylum application had been lodged and before being actually transferred to the responsible Member State \u2013 of the protection of the minimum standards laid down by that directive (\u00a7 35). With regard to the level of the physical reception conditions, the CJEU said that this must be sufficient to ensure a dignified standard of living and adequate for the health of applicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence (\u00a7 40). Furthermore, the Member States were required to adjust the reception conditions to the situation of persons having specific needs. The financial allowances also had to be sufficient to preserve family unity and the best interests of the child (\u00a7 41). The CJEU specified that where a Member State provided these conditions in the form of financial allowances, those allowances had to be sufficient to enable them to obtain housing, if necessary, on the private rental market (\u00a742). Where families were concerned, those allowances had to enable minor children of asylum-seekers to be housed with their parents (\u00a7 45).","3.Return Directive","107.Directive 2008\/115\/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (\u201cthe Return Directive\u201d) governs removal and placement in detention where necessary and provides for procedural guarantees.","B.The European Social Charter","108.Belgium ratified the European Social Charter on 16October1990 and the revised European Social Charter (\u201cthe revised Charter\u201d) on 2March 2004. It accepted Article 17 of the revised Charter which is worded as follows:","\u201cWith a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of children and young persons to grow up in an environment which encourages the full development of their personality and of their physical and mental capacities, the Parties undertake, either directly or in co-operation with public and private organisations, to take all appropriate and necessary measures designed:","1.a.to ensure that children and young persons, taking account of the rights and duties of their parents, have the care, the assistance, the education and the training they need, in particular by providing for the establishment or maintenance of institutions and services sufficient and adequate for this purpose;","b.to protect children and young persons against negligence, violence or exploitation;","c.to provide protection and special aid from the state for children and young persons temporarily or definitively deprived of their family\u2019s support;","2. ..\u201d","109.The European Committee of Social Rights (\u201cECSR\u201d) ruled on Belgium\u2019s compliance with its obligations under Article 17 of the revised Charter regarding the reception conditions of unlawfully present unaccompanied and accompanied foreign minors in the decision of 23October 2012, Defence for Children International (DCI) v.Belgium, complaint no.69\/2011. The relevant extracts of the decision read as follows:","\u201c56.According to the DCI, however, because of the saturation of the reception network, FEDASIL has since 2009 been refusing to take in illegally resident families, as they are not prioritises as compared with asylum-seekers and are not registered on any waiting list. As a result of this situation, many families are forced to live in the street with their children. The public social welfare centres, which are competent at the municipal level, have also refused to intervene, referring the responsibilities to FEDASIL. The only legal possibility involves lodging a judicial appeal with the Labour Court in order to force FEDASIL to accommodate them. According to the organisation, 1773 illegally resident families had still not been granted accommodation on 30 September 2010.","57.The DCI also alleges a targeted refusal to accommodate these families, such refusal being systematic even when the network is not saturated. ...","...","82.[The] Committee considers that the fact that the Government has, since 2009, no longer guaranteed accompanied foreign minors unlawfully present in the country any form of accommodation in reception centres (through either through the FEDASIL network or other alternative solutions) breaches Article 17\u00a71 of the Charter. The persistent failure to accommodate these minors shows, in particular, that the Government has not taken the necessary and appropriate measures to guarantee the minors in question the care and assistance they need and to protect them from negligence, violence or exploitation, thereby posing a serious threat to the enjoyment of their most basic rights, such as the rights to life, to psychological and physical integrity and to respect for human dignity. Similarly, the fact that at least 461 unaccompanied foreign minors were not accommodated in 2011 and the problems posed by inappropriate accommodation in hotels lead the Committee to the conclusion that the Government failed to take sufficient measures to guarantee non-asylum seeking, unaccompanied foreign minors the care and assistance they need, thereby exposing a large number of children and young persons to serious risks for their lives and health.","83.Consequently, the Committee holds that there is a violation of Article 17\u00a71 of the Charter.\u201d","110.The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (\u201cECRI\u201d) made the following findings in a report on Serbia (fourth monitoring cycle, CRI(2011)21), published in May 2011:","\u201c62.NGOs estimate that two-thirds of the Roma population continue to live in informal settlements lacking schools, medical care, water, electricity and sewage facilities. These settlements are overpopulated and are at a great distance from basic facilities and services. In addition, the majority of Roma who live in these settlements do not have the relevant ownership documentation for their homes or land, thus compounding their housing problems. There are Roma settlements in all parts of Serbia with the majority being in Belgrade and in other larger cities and municipalities. The improvement of the living conditions in the settlements is one of the stated goals of the Strategy for Improvement of the Status of Roma and ECRI therefore hopes that the necessary resources will be allocated to measures taken to that end.","63.ECRI notes with concern that there is strong public opinion against relocating Roma. One specific problem is that when the Serbian authorities propose that Roma will be relocated to appropriate housing, the local population protests and refuses to agree to a Roma population moving into their neighbourhood. It thus appears that measures are still necessary to combat the intolerance and racism faced by Roma in the housing sector.","64.ECRI notes with concern that there have been many forcible evictions of Roma in and around Belgrade since its first report ... .","...","69.ECRI notes with concern that in many respects, the hygienic and sanitary conditions in many Roma settlements have not improved since ECRI\u2019s first report. The health situation of Roma, in particular Roma women, children and elderly is particularly alarming and there is a difficulty in access to health care in the absence of the necessary medical registration. The mortality rate of Roma children in Serbia is four times higher than that of the general population.\u201d","111.In its concluding observations on the initial report of Serbia (CERD\/C\/SRB\/CO\/1; 78th session, 14 February-11 March 2011), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed the following concerns and made the following recommendations:","\u201c14.The Committee is concerned that the Roma population, in many cases, lives in segregated settlements and experiences discrimination in respect of adequate housing and, in particular, is often subject to forced eviction with no provision of alternative housing, legal remedies, or compensation for damage and destruction of personal property. While noting with interest the Law on Social Housing, the Committee expresses concern about the particular difficulties faced by the Roma when applying for social housing programmes, resulting in a perpetuation of discrimination (arts. 2, 3, 5 (e) (iii) and 6 ).","The Committee urges the State party to ensure that any resettlements do not involve further forced evictions and that procedural protections which respect due process and human dignity be put in place. It recommends that the State party strengthen the measures aimed at improving the housing conditions of the Roma, and in this regard, recommends that it accelerate the implementation of the National Plan for Housing of Roma adopted in 2009. In light of the Committee\u2019s general recommendations 27, paragraphs 30-31 (2000), on discrimination against Roma, and 32 (2009) on the meaning and scope of special measures, it also recommends that the State party intensify efforts to avoid residential segregation of minorities and encourages it to consider developing social housing programmes for the Roma.","15.The Committee expresses its concern that members of the Roma minority continue to experience segregation with regard to access to education. It is also concerned by the fact that Roma children returnees, upon readmission agreements from Western European countries, face additional difficulties in entering the Serbian educational system, due to inter alia enrolment and placement procedures (art. 3 and 5(e) (v)).","Bearing in mind its general recommendations 27, paragraphs 17-26 (2000) on discrimination against Roma, 32 on the meaning and scope of special measures, the Committee strongly urges the State party to address de facto public school segregation, and carry out the necessary measures to facilitate access to quality education including through anti-discrimination training for school staff and awareness-raising for parents, increasing the number of Roma teaching assistants, preventing de facto segregation of Roma pupils, and other measures for the promotion of inclusive education. It also encourages the State party to develop specialized and appropriate procedures for the reception, assessment and placement of children returnees and to increase the awareness of school teachers of the importance of such procedures.","16.While noting with appreciation the efforts taken by the State party to improve the situation of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians and to prevent and combat racial discrimination against persons belonging to these groups, the Committee is concerned that they are subject to discrimination, prejudice, and stereotyping, in particular in access to employment, health care services, political participation and access to public places (Article 2, paragraph 2, and Article 5 of the Convention).","Bearing in mind its general recommendations No. 27 (2000) on discrimination against Roma and No. 32 (2009) on the meaning and scope of special measures, the Committee encourages the State party to intensify its efforts to prevent and combat racial discrimination against Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians. It recommends that the State party ensure effective implementation of policies aimed at the equal enjoyment by Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians of the rights and freedoms listed in article 5 and special measures to advance their effective equality in employment in public institutions and adequate political representation at all levels. The Committee also encourages the State party to actively carry out campaigns that raise awareness of the difficult position of these groups, in particular the Roma, and build solidarity.\u201d","112.In his report published on 22 September 2011 following his visit to Serbia from 12 to 15 June 2011 (CommDH(2011)29), the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe made the following findings and expressed the following concerns:","\u201c3.Human rights of Roma","82.In the 2002 census 108.193 persons, approximately 1.44% of the total population, identified themselves as Roma. The actual number is deemed to be much higher. According to the Serbian government\u2019s estimates the actual number of Roma ranges from 250 000 to 500 000.","...","85.Notwithstanding the government\u2019s efforts to improve the human rights of Roma, the problems facing Roma remain some of the most serious human rights challenges. The Commissioner underlines that the Roma-related projects must be accompanied by resolute efforts to combat prejudice and deep-seated stereotypes against Roma. Efforts are necessary to raise awareness among the Roma population on available mechanisms to combat discrimination. In this context, the Commissioner welcomes the Equality Commissioner\u2019s activities organised in Roma settlements which aim to raise their awareness about the work of her office.","...","3.a.Access of Roma to health care","...","89.Despite the progress made in the area of health care, Roma still face barriers due to lack of information, lack of personal identity documents and poverty. The 2005 Law on Health Insurance aims to enhance access of Roma to health care, as well as to improve their living conditions. This law provides for the right to health care for members of vulnerable groups, including Roma.","90.In 2011 ECRI noted with concern that in many respects, the hygienic and sanitary conditions in many Roma settlements have not improved since ECRI\u2019s first report in 2008. The health situation of Roma, in particular Roma women, children and elderly persons is particularly alarming due to the absence of necessary medical registration. According to UNICEF, although the official estimates show a decrease in Roma child mortality rates since 2005, this rate is still at least four times higher than the national average.","3.b.Access of Roma to quality education","...","94.However, it is estimated that the number of Roma children attending pre-school education is between 4% and 7%, while 66% of Roma children (as opposed to 94% of the total population) enrol in primary school. According to the Ministry of Education only 16% of Roma enrol in secondary schools, and less than 1% of young Roma attend college or university.","...","96.The Commissioner is seriously concerned by the fact that the number of Roma children enrolled in schools for children with mild mental disabilities increased from 26.7% in 2002\/2003 to 31% in 2008\/2009.","97.In 2011 ECRI expressed concerns that Roma children still face hidden and overt forms of discrimination by school authorities, school staff, teachers, other children and non-Roma parents. Reportedly, as teachers have lower expectations of Roma pupils, there is a tendency to use lower criteria when assessing their performance. The Commissioner is concerned by reports indicating that due to the increase in Roma children attending schools, there is a tendency among non-Roma parents to transfer their children to other schools with fewer Roma children.","...","3.c.Access of Roma to employment","99.ECRI reported in 2011 that Roma in Serbia continue to suffer from a high unemployment rate, low economic activity and almost total exclusion from the public sector. There are almost no Roma in public and state-owned companies, indicating a pattern of discrimination. There are cases where Roma who present themselves for job interviews are informed that the position has been filled, and a few cases of discriminatory job advertising. The majority of Roma are outside the employment system, employed illegally and mostly registered as unemployed.","3.d.Access by Roma to adequate housing","100.The majority of Roma in Serbia live in very poor housing conditions. The problems that Roma face in this field are related to the overpopulation of settlements due to the small number of available housing units, unresolved property issues and illegal constructions, and lack of access to public infrastructures. Some studies have indicated that out of the 593 existing Roma settlements in Serbia, 72% have not been legalised, while in Belgrade alone there are 137 informal settlements.","...","102.The Commissioner has noted with concern reports on the increased number of forced evictions of Roma from informal settlements in Belgrade. He is particularly concerned by the reported failure by the authorities to comply with legal safeguards during evictions. Physical attacks by state officials during evictions and destruction of personal property without compensation have also been reported in various cases such as the one concerning the evictions in the informal Roma settlement Gazela, Belgrade, on 31 August 2009. Following these evictions 114 Roma families were provided with accommodation in metal containers in settlements scattered around the outskirts of Belgrade.","...","106.The Commissioner is particularly concerned by the housing situation of the Roma displaced from Kosovo, and Roma who are being forcibly returned from Western European countries. Reportedly they make up around 17% of the Roma populations in informal settlements. They face the harshest living conditions. Their difficult situation is aggravated by the lack of personal identity documents (see also below, sub-section on lack of birth registration and personal identification documents among Roma). Prospects for their local integration are generally bleak.","107.The Commissioner noted that the living conditions in the informal Roma settlement in Marija Bursa\u0107, Blok 61, Belgrade, which he visited on 14 June, are clearly sub-standard and may be qualified as degrading. The settlement hosts approximately forty Roma families and consists of wooden barracks, some of which have been severely damaged due to bad weather. The settlement is not connected to the public utilities system and there are no electricity, water and sanitary facilities. Parents told the Commissioner that because of these living conditions sending children to school is a very difficult task. The Commissioner saw children from the settlement washing their faces with dirty water from a nearby polluted stream. The presence of rats was also reported by inhabitants. On the positive side, the Commissioner has noted that almost all of the inhabitants had obtained personal identity documents through the UNHCR\u2019s EU-funded Roma Inclusion Project.\u201d"],"27400":["5.The applicant was born in 1982 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Lepoglava.","A.Background to the case","6.On 23 October 2008 I.P., a well-known Croatian journalist, and his business associate N.F. were killed by the explosion of an improvised device placed under I.P.\u2019s car, which was parked in front of his publishing company. The explosion also caused injuries to two employees of the publishing company and considerable material damage on the surrounding buildings and nearby parked cars.","7.On 23 October 2009 the State Attorney\u2019s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta; hereinafter: the \u201cState Attorney\u2019s Organised Crime Office\u201d) indicted several persons in the Zagreb County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu) on charges of conspiracy to kill I.P. and for putting that into action. The applicant was indicted for having participated in the group by aiding and abetting the direct perpetrators.","8.On 3 November 2010 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to sixteen years\u2019 imprisonment.","9.The applicant\u2019s conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 8 February 2012.","B.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by the police","10.Following the attack against I.P. and his publishing company, the intelligence available to the police showed that the applicant and several other persons could be implicated in the events and it was therefore decided to arrest them.","11.The Police Director (Glavni Ravnatelj Policije) issued an oral order that the arrests be carried out by an antiterrorist team of the Special Police Forces (Specijalna policija, Antiteroristi\u010dka jedinica Lu\u010dko; hereinafter: the \u201cATJ\u201d).","12.On 29 October 2008, at around 6.05 p.m., the ATJ stormed into the applicant\u2019s flat, where he was at the moment together with his sister and grandmother.","13.According to the applicant, immediately after breaking into the flat, the AJT officers threw him on the floor and started punching him over the head and body.","14.According to the Government, an ATJ team of six officers broke into the applicant\u2019s flat and ordered him to lie down. As he started resisting, the police officers applied the throwing technique of \u201cfoot sweep\u201d, which made the applicant to lose his balance and while falling on the ground he hit the table with his head. He was immediately offered medical assistance but he refused.","15.A report available to the Court signed by the Commander-in-chief of the Special Police Forces (Zapovjednik Specijalne Policije) of 30 October 2008, which is essentially a verbatim of a report of one of the arresting ATJ officers (see paragraph 36 below), in its relevant part concerning the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest, reads:","\u201c... the intervention with a view to arrest [the applicant] started by the ATJ officers forceful breaking the front doors using the [battering ram]. Inside the flat they found the suspect and an older woman to whom they issued several orders: \u201cPolice, lie down on the floor\u201d. As the suspect resisted, two officers approached him and grabbed him by the arms but he continued to resist. [The officers] then applied the technique of foot sweep and pulled him to the ground. As he was still trying to set himself free he was handcuffed. While he was falling on the ground he hit the table with his face ... Afterwards ... [the officers] offered to the suspect medical assistance but he refused it saying that he felt good.\u201d","16.According to the applicant, following his arrest he was blindfolded and taken to a remote place by a river, where he was again beaten up and his head was immersed in the water, forcing him to confess to the murders of I.P. and N.F. and some other crimes. The police officers also continued to beat him up while taking him to the police station.","17.According to the Government, following the applicant\u2019s arrest he was taken to the parking area of the police station used by the Organised Crime Unit of the Zagreb Police Department (Policijska uprava zagreba\u010dka, Sektor kriminalisti\u010dke policije, Odjel organiziranog kriminaliteta; hereinafter: the \u201cpolice\u201d) where he was kept in the minivan of the ATJ in the period between 6.45 and 8.30 p.m., awaiting other suspects to be arrested and brought to the police station.","18.The available report of the arresting ATJ officer (see paragraph 36 below) in this respect indicates that the applicant was brought to the parking area of the police station at 7.00 p.m. where he was kept in the minivan of the ATJ until 7.40 p.m. and then surrendered to the police inspectors.","19.Once when he was brought to the police station on 29 October 2008 at around 8.30 p.m. the applicant was placed in a room under the control of two police inspectors M.A. and M.M.","20.According to reports of these two police inspectors dated 18 April and 14 May 2012 respectively, the applicant was for a while guarded by an ATJ officer but then, at unspecified time, they requested that officer to leave the room. The police inspectors also submitted that the applicant had been handcuffed when he was brought to the police station and then, at unspecified time but sometimes soon after his arrival, the handcuffs were taken off. They also acknowledged that they had seen visible injuries on the applicant\u2019s head and nose for which he had been allegedly offered medical assistance but he had refused it. The emergency had been called in only after the order of their superiors.","21.The emergency service came to the police station on the same day at 10.55 p.m. The relevant record of the applicant\u2019s examination, in so far as legible, reads:","\u201cBrought to the police station. Visible open injury above the left eye; 1,5centimetre long. Contusion and haematoma of the nose with the possible fracture. Regular general status. The patient refuses to go to the hospital and further treatment.\u201d","22.The applicant stayed in the police station until 30 October 2008 at 8.30 p.m. During that period he was taken to searches of his house and car and he was questioned by the police inspectors M.A. and M.M. in the presence of a lawyer and a Deputy at the State Attorney\u2019s Organised Crime Office.","23.According to the applicant, throughout his stay in the police station he was tightly constrained, beaten and threatened that he should make no problems concerning his injuries.","24.According to the Government, during his stay in the police station the applicant was kept in one of the offices ordinarily used by the police officers. Apart from several minutes upon his arrival to the police station, the applicant was not handcuffed. He also had access to the toilet and drinking water. He was obliged to sit on a chair as there were no beds but it was impossible to take him to the detention unit as the investigative actions were still ongoing. In any case, he had an opportunity to ask for a rest and food but he did not make any such request.","25.On 30 October 2008, at around 8.30 p.m., the applicant was taken to the Police Detention and Escort Unit (Jedinica za zadr\u017eavanje i prepratu; hereinafter: \u201cJZP\u201d) for a rest. A report accompanying his transfer, signed by the Chief of the police and dated 30 October 2008 indicated, inter alia, that he had no visible injuries.","26.A report signed by the on-duty officer at JZP, dated 30 October 2008, indicated that the applicant was admitted to the detention unit with visible injuries of his face.","27.According to the applicant, during his stay in JZP he was offered a sandwich but he could not eat due to a strong jaw pain.","28.According to the Government, during his stay in JZP the applicant was placed in a room which was equipped with beds and sanitary facility. The room was appropriately heated and ventilated and had access to natural and artificial light. The hygiene and sanitary conditions were good and the applicant was provided with food and water.","29.On 31 October 2008 at 9.15 a.m. the police took the applicant from JZP to participate in a further search of his premises.","30.On the same day, at around 6.45 p.m., the applicant was brought for questioning before an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court. He decided to remain silent concerning the charges held against him, but with regard to his injuries the applicant stressed:","\u201cThe only thing I would point out is that before I was taken in [to the police station] I fell in my flat and according to the findings of the doctors who were called in to the police station, I sustained a nose fracture, most probably with dislocation. I refused the medical assistance in order to get out from the police station as soon as possible.\u201d","31.The investigating judge put no additional questions concerning this matter nor did he take any further actions in that respect.","32.Following the applicant\u2019s questioning, an investigation into the explosion was opened in respect of him and several other persons. At the same time, an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court ordered his pre-trial detention.","33.On 3 November 2008 the applicant was examined in Zagreb Prison Hospital (Zatvorska bolnica u Zagrebu) and several medical records were drafted.","34.One medical record available to the Court indicates that the applicant sustained his injuries after a fall on 30 October 2008, whereas two other medical reports refer to several blows on the applicant\u2019s head and nose.","35.Based on his medical examination in Zagreb Prison Hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with contusions of head, nose and shoulder and a nose fracture without dislocation, as well as a distortion of a metal implant in his hand related to an old injury. His general medical condition at the time was regular and he had a smaller hematoma on the left side of his head and nose and smaller hematomas below both eyes. He also had a smaller hematoma on the left shoulder and a visible dislocation of the metal implant in his hand but without a fresh fracture. In July 2009 the applicant again saw a doctor who indicated testicular problems.","C.Investigation into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment","36.On 29 October 2008 one of the arresting ATJ officers reported on the applicant\u2019s arrest to the Commander of the ATJ. In his report, he indicated that the ATJ had been requested to arrest the applicant in connection with a suspicion of double murder. The report also provides the details of the arrest already observed above (see paragraphs 15 and 18 above).","37.On 30 October 2008 the Commander of the ATJ requested the Commander-in-chief of the Special Police Forces to assess the lawfulness of the ATJ\u2019s actions; and the latter forwarded that request to the Police Director.","38.On the same day the Police Director assessed the reports concerning the ATJ actions by indicating the following:","\u201cThis is to inform you that I find the use of force, namely the physical force and the measures of restraint, used by the ATJ team on 29 October 2008 during the arrest of Amir Mafalani ... lawful within the meaning of sections 54, 55 and 57 of the Police Act and sections 30, 31, 32 and 35 of the By-law on the police conduct.\u201d","39.In October 2011 the applicant, through lawyers, requested Zagreb Prison Hospital and the emergency services to provide him the relevant medical records concerning the injuries he had sustained during his arrest on 29 October 2008. He also requested the police to provide him the relevant documents related to his arrest.","40.On 2 November 2011 the police replied that all relevant reports were confidential and could not be disclosed. This reply was forwarded for information to the State Attorney\u2019s Organised Crime Office.","41.On 11 November 2011, after receiving the reply, the applicant complained to the State Attorney\u2019s Organised Crime Office asking why an effective investigation, within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, had not been conducted.","42.The State Attorney\u2019s Organised Crime Office replied on 16November 2011, indicating that the applicant should consult the relevant domestic law on the use of police force and that, in case of any complaint to that effect, he could always lodge a criminal complaint with the competent State Attorney\u2019s Office.","43.In the meantime, the applicant obtained the requested medical records.","44.On 15 February 2012 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu) against unidentified perpetrators alleging ill-treatment during his arrest and stay in the police station.","45.On 20 February 2012 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office informed the applicant that his criminal complaint had been forwarded to the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office (\u017dupanijsko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zagrebu) for further examination.","46.On 3 March 2014 the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office rejected the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint on the grounds that there was no reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence had been committed. It relied on a written report of the Police Director and written reports of the police inspectors M.A. and M.M. It also observed the applicant\u2019s medical documentation and search and seizure records as well as the interrogation records in the criminal proceedings against him.","D.The applicant\u2019s civil proceedings against the State","47.On 31 January 2012 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Op\u0107inski gra\u0111anski sud u Zagrebu) against the State claiming damages in connection with his alleged ill-treatment by the police during his arrest and stay in the police station.","48.The Zagreb Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office, representing the State, challenged the applicant\u2019s civil action on the grounds that the police had acted in accordance with the law and that their use of force had been caused by the applicant\u2019s conduct.","49.During the proceedings, the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court heard the applicant and several witnesses, including the applicant\u2019s sister and grandmother, one of the applicant\u2019s co-suspects and the police inspectors M.A. and M.M. , as well as the Police Director.","50.The applicant\u2019s grandmother testified that she had seen the police officers immediately attacking and hitting the applicant as they had entered the flat, and his sister confirmed that she had heard him screaming and had also seen him being dragged around by the police.","51.The applicant\u2019s co-suspect in his testimony submitted that he had seen the applicant seriously injured in the police station, while the police inspectors M.A. and M.M. denied any ill-treatment, as did the Police Director who also stated that the police had monopoly of the use of force.","52.In his statement of 14 January 2015 the applicant contended that during his arrest he had been severely beaten by the ATJ officers all over his head and body. Afterwards he had been taken near a river and again beaten, subjected to mock execution and immersed in the water. When he was finally brought to the police station, the uniformed police officers continued to beat him with the acquiescence of the police inspectors M.A. and M.M. He was also tightly constrained to a chair and at one point, while he was dragged from one office to another, he felt strong pain in his shoulder. Later on, during his transfer to the investigating judge, two uniformed police officers who escorted him said that he should say nothing about the ill-treatment and that he would soon go home. In the ensuing period, he started feeling various health problems related to the ill-treatment and has been seeing doctors regularly.","53.The civil proceedings are still pending.","A.The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment visit to Croatia in 2007","63.The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) visited Croatia from 4 to 14 May 2007. The relevant part of its report CPT\/Inf (2008) 29 of 9October 2008 reads:","\u201c2. Ill-treatment","13.At the outset of the 2007 visit, the CPT\u2019s delegation was informed of various measures taken by the Ministry of the Interior with a view to putting an end to ill-treatment by the police. In particular, instructions had been adopted aimed at ensuring that police staff strictly observe the relevant legislation and regulations when dealing with persons in custody. Efforts had also been made to step up professional training in order to improve the attitude of police officers towards detained persons. Nevertheless, the information gathered during the visit suggests that continued determined action is needed to combat ill-treatment by the police. The CPT recommends that a clear message of \u201czero tolerance\u201d of ill-treatment (whether of a physical or verbal nature) be delivered, from the highest level and through ongoing training activities, to all police officers. Police staff should also be reminded that no more force than is strictly necessary should be used when bringing persons presenting violent and\/or agitated behaviour under control, be it at the time of apprehension or in a detention facility; once such persons have been brought under control, there can never be any justification for their being struck.","14. It is equally important to promote a culture respectful of the law, where it is regarded as unprofessional \u2013 and unsafe from a career path standpoint \u2013 to work and associate with colleagues who have resort to ill-treatment. This implies the existence of a clear reporting line, including the adoption of effective safeguards for protecting whistle-blowers. Police officers interviewed on this matter during the 2007 visit generally indicated that if they had reason to believe that colleagues had ill-treated a detained person, they would inform the head of the police station where the possible ill-treatment had occurred, despite the existence of special investigation teams whose task was to inquire into such cases. The CPT recommends that the Croatian authorities establish, within the police, a clear reporting line for information indicative of ill-treatment (which implies the obligation for staff to immediately forward such information to the competent authorities and services).","15. The CPT must also stress that, if the emergence of information indicative of ill-treatment is not followed by a prompt and effective response, those minded to ill-treat persons deprived of their liberty will quickly come to believe that they can perpetrate such acts with impunity.","From the information collected during the 2007 visit, it would appear that judges and prosecutors do not always pay sufficient attention to allegations of ill-treatment and frequently fail to take action. At best, the head of the police station where the person making the allegation had been detained would be asked to provide information concerning the alleged ill-treatment. The CPT recommends that whenever a detained person brought before a judge alleges ill-treatment by police officers, these allegations be recorded in writing, a forensic medical examination be immediately ordered, and the necessary steps be taken to ensure that the allegations are properly investigated. Such a procedure should be followed whether or not the person concerned bears visible external injuries. Moreover, even in the absence of an express allegation of ill-treatment, judges and prosecutors should adopt a proactive attitude; for instance, whenever there are other grounds to believe that a person could have been the victim of ill-treatment, a forensic medical examination should be requested. If necessary, the law should be amended to reflect these principles.\u201d","B.The CPT visit to Croatia in 2012","64.The CPT visited Croatia from 19 to 27 September 2012. The relevant part of the report CPT\/Inf (2014) 9 of 18March 2014 provides:","\u201c2. Ill-treatment","The Committee recommends that the Croatian authorities reiterate the message that all forms of ill-treatment (be they at the time of apprehension or transportation or during subsequent questioning) are absolutely prohibited, and that the perpetrators of ill-treatment and those encouraging or condoning such acts will be punished accordingly.","4. Conditions of detention","23.With the entry into force of the CCP in 2009, the Detention and Escort Units are now the primary facilities for holding criminal suspects overnight and for stays of more than 24 hours. The detention and escort unit of Oranice served as the main law enforcement holding facility for the County of Zagreb and offered accommodation of a good standard. Each of the ten cells measured around 30 m2 and was designed to accommodate up to six persons. For this purpose, they were equipped with two long plinths and mattresses\/blankets. The cells had access to natural light, sufficient artificial lighting and ventilation and possessed a functioning call-bell. All cells were under CCTV supervision. Detained persons were provided with basic hygiene items and could access a shower room and toilets upon demand. However, there was no outdoor exercise facility, although it would be feasible to create one given that the detention unit is located within a large, secure police compound. The CPT recommends that the Croatian authorities take the necessary steps to offer outdoor exercise to all persons held in police custody for longer than 24 hours.","24.As already indicated above, persons deprived of their liberty by law enforcement officials are usually detained in police stations in temporary detention cells (smje\u0161taj za zadr\u017eavanje) before being transferred to the competent detention and escort unit or administrative detention centre. The temporary detention cells visited by the delegation displayed a number of shortcomings such as limited access to natural light and poor artificial lighting (at Zagreb VIII and Petrinja Police Stations respectively) and inadequate ventilation (at Zagreb VIII, VII, IV and Petrinja Police Stations). Steps should be taken to remedy these deficiencies.","Each of the cells was equipped with a small wooden bench and a plastic chair and could be considered as acceptable for stays of a few hours. However, some of the temporary detention cells were inadequate for use as overnight accommodation due to their limited size (e.g. a mere 4m2 at Zagreb VIII and Petrinja Police Stations). Despite this, it was clear from custody registers that persons were on occasion held overnight in such cells.","The CPT recommends that the Croatian authorities take the necessary steps to ensure that temporary detention cells of less than 5m\u00b2 are never used for overnight accommodation and that persons held overnight in larger temporary detention cells are provided with a mattress and blankets.","25.A number of persons met by the delegation who had recently been held in different police stations complained that they had received no food despite being held in these places for several hours. The CPT notes that in accordance with the relevant Rulebook, detained persons are offered three meals a day once they have been transferred to a detention and escort unit. Nevertheless, persons may be kept in police stations for up to 24 hours (or 48 hours in the case of foreign nationals staying irregularly), during which time they should be offered something to eat and drink at regular intervals. The CPT recommends that the Croatian authorities take the necessary steps to ensure that persons detained in police stations for more than a few hours are provided with food.\u201d"],"27413":["4.The applicants, two brothers, were born in 1982 and 1974 respectively and live in Tautii Magheraus.","A.The drug transactions between the applicants and the undercover agent","5.According to the first applicant, in the summer of 2004 he was contacted on several occasions by an undercover police agent who wanted to buy ecstasy from him, brought into the country from the Netherlands.","According to the prosecutor\u2019s report, the police gained knowledge of the first applicant\u2019s alleged involvement in drug trafficking at the beginning of September 2004.","6.It was established by the prosecutor and domestic courts that some time in September the first applicant brought a batch of drugs into the country and sold ten tablets to the undercover agent on 26October 2004 and 115 tablets on 29 October 2004. According to the transcripts of the conversations intercepted between the first applicant and the police agent, on 28 October the latter called the first applicant, asked him if he had \u201cany left\u201d and at the applicant\u2019s confirmation that some 150 remained, the undercover agent calculated their price at 1,000 euros, and advised the applicant on where and how to meet the next day for him to buy them all.","7.On 29 October 2004 the police intercepted a conversation between the undercover agent and the first applicant when they met for the drug transaction. The police agent told the applicant that the day before he had been offered a batch of \u201c1,000 pieces\u201d (1,000 de buc\u0103\u0163i) which would be available the next week, and that he would not want to miss such an opportunity. The applicant offered to bring the same amount for him. The police agent agreed, and asked how much more he could bring. They settled for 5,000 pieces. The undercover agent warned the first applicant repeatedly during their conversation that if he did not receive his supply from the applicant he would go to the other provider. During the conversation it appeared that the applicant had meanwhile sold some twenty more tablets. The first applicant called someone on his mobile phone and discussed in English getting 5,000 or 10,000 tablets. He then reported to the agent that he could get him some stronger tablets, and described the sensations he had had when he had used them himself. The agent proposed the place and arrangements for their next transaction.","8.The new transaction was postponed for various reasons and was finally planned to take place on 23 December 2004 in Baia Mare. That day the first applicant informed his brother for the first time that he had brought drugs into the country and about the deal. After having initially refused and argued extensively about it with his brother, the second applicant agreed to help, in order to save the family from potential retaliation by the Dutch seller. That evening he took the drugs to an agreed location while the first applicant negotiated the terms of the transaction with the undercover agent.","9.The first applicant and the undercover agent then joined the second applicant; the agent was offered an ecstasy tablet for testing and then left with the first applicant in order to set out the details of the transaction. The second applicant was to wait at the same location for the buyer to return with the money to pay for the drugs. Meanwhile, the second applicant saw police agents approaching in a taxi. He threw the bag containing the drugs into a nearby bush and phoned his brother to warn him. The first applicant told the undercover agent that the transaction was cancelled.","10.Police agents apprehended the two applicants and later recovered a bag containing 4,409 ecstasy tablets from the bushes.","11.The applicants were taken to the police station for further questioning. After consultation with their counsel they refused to make any statements. They were arrested.","B.The criminal prosecution","12.On 25 October 2004 the organised crime and terrorism division of the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Cluj Court of Appeal (\u201cthe prosecutor\u201d) identified the first applicant as being apparently involved with trafficking in drugs and drug consumption, the merchandise being brought from the Netherlands.","13.On 26 October 2004 the prosecutor authorised the use of an undercover police agent to infiltrate the applicants\u2019 circle in order to obtain information and evidence about the drug trafficking. It also authorised the undercover agent to purchase 150 ecstasy tablets. After each transaction the undercover agent wrote a report on the meeting with the first applicant. The prosecutor noted as follows:","\u201cthere are strong indications that the crime of drug trafficking has occurred\/is about to occur ... as Ciprian Vl\u0103du\u021b Pop bought in 2004 high-risk drugs from the Netherlands, namely ecstasy tablets (MDMA), which he is selling in Baia Mare and Cluj-Napoca.\u201d","14.On 29 October 2004 the prosecutor started criminal prosecutions against the first applicant on suspicion that he had both consumed and sold drugs. On 23December 2004 the prosecution was extended to the second applicant.","15.On 27 October and 11 and 18 November 2004 the Cluj County Court authorised for a period of thirty days, at the prosecutor\u2019s request, the tapping of the first applicant\u2019s telephone and that of the undercover police agent. On 24 November and 22 December the authorisation was extended by thirtydays on each occasion. Some 100 CDs were recorded in the process.","16.The prosecutor asked for the tablets purchased by the undercover agent to be tested by the police laboratory for physical and chemical analysis (\u201cthe police laboratory\u201d). On 28 October, 2 November, and 27December 2004 the police laboratory submitted its reports on the three batches of tablets, concluding that they contained methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA). The tablets remaining after the laboratory test were sealed and stored in a special police depository.","The applicants and two taxi drivers who transported the police agents to the crime scene were interviewed by the prosecutor.","17.On 11 January and 10March 2005 the first applicant stated that he had visited the Netherlands in the summer of 2004 and met P., who had afterwards visited Romania and spent a few weeks at the applicant\u2019s home. P. found out that ecstasy sold very well in Romania, and offered to obtain some for the first applicant. The applicant brought a first batch of 250tablets and sold some of them to the undercover police agent; the remaining tablets he either consumed himself or gave away to others. During the night of 22\/23 December 2004 the applicant returned from the Netherlands with a batch of 5,000 ecstasy tablets from P. He contacted several individuals to offer to sell them tablets, but the undercover police agent offered to buy them all.","18.The second applicant gave statements on 11 January 2005. He declared that before 23 December 2004 he had not known of any dealings in drugs that his brother might have had, that during the night of 22\/23December he had returned with his brother from the Netherlands but had not been aware until later that day that his brother, who had crossed the border on his own on foot, had brought drugs into the country. He further explained that he had agreed to help his brother because he feared his brother was in danger of being attacked and killed by the drug dealers, given the large amount of money involved in the transaction. He further explained that it was morally impossible for him, at the time of the crime, to denounce his brother to the authorities. He also explained that he had never taken drugs himself.","19.On 2 March 2005 the prosecutor presented the transcripts of some of the recorded conversations, along with forty CDs, to the Maramure\u015f County Court. He sought confirmation from the court that the evidence produced before it was relevant to the case (procedure under Articles 913 and 915 of the CCP). The hearing took place on 9 March 2005. Defence counsel asked for an adjournment to allow her to study the evidence and form an opinion on the relevance of the CDs. She also expressed the wish to examine the remaining recordings which had not been produced before the court by the prosecutor. The court dismissed the requests and accepted the evidence in the file, as proposed by the prosecutor. It agreed with the prosecutor\u2019s opinion and ruled that the remaining CDs were not relevant to the case.","20.On 10 March 2005 the applicants, in the presence of their counsel, acquainted themselves with the prosecution file.","21.On 15 March 2005 the prosecutor committed the applicants to trial for trafficking in drugs, under Law no. 143\/2000 on the fight against drug trafficking and illegal drug use (\u201cLaw no. 143\/2000\u201d). The prosecutor noted that the first applicant was also a drug user, whereas his brother, the second applicant, was not and had had no knowledge of his brother\u2019s dealing before 23 December 2004. The prosecutor also noted that the first applicant had a prior conviction for theft and breach of firearms regulations (nerespectarea regimului armelor).","C.The first-instance court proceedings","22.The case was heard by the Maramure\u015f County Court. The applicants\u2019 detention pending trial was extended at regular intervals by the court.","23.On 5 April 2005 the applicants gave statements before the court, reiterating their declarations from the prosecution phase. It appears that at that time the first applicant was suffering from withdrawal symptoms and was under sedatives prescribed by the prison doctors to alleviate his symptoms.","24.The applicants\u2019 counsel asked for an expert evaluation of the tablets to establish whether they contained MDMA or a lighter drug. Relying on the principle of equality of arms, defence counsel requested that the expert examination be performed by experts from the Ministry of Justice and not by experts from the Forensic Institute, as the latter institution was attached to the police. The prosecutor advised that the Police Forensic Institute was normally responsible for such analyses. On 11July 2005 the Ministry of Justice informed the court that it would not be possible for their experts to perform the requested tests.","25.The second applicant also asked the court to hear evidence from the undercover police agent. His request remained unanswered.","26.On 26 July 2005 the first applicant, who was suffering from withdrawal symptoms, became ill in the court building and had to be taken to hospital. Defence counsel asked for a medical assessment of his client. Despite repeated requests by the court, the prison authorities later failed to take the first applicant to hospital so he could receive the expert examination ordered by the court.","27.On 10 August 2005, at the court\u2019s request, the Police Forensic Institute re-examined the drugs and in a comprehensive report confirmed that the tablets contained MDMA.","28.On 8 November 2005 the court heard pleadings from counsel for the prosecution and the defence. The applicants did not deny the substance of the charges. The first applicant admitted that the police operation respected the domestic legislation, but doubted its morality; in particular, he argued that if it had not been for the undercover police agent\u2019s insistence he would not have bought ecstasy in the first place. In his view the undercover police agent asked on purpose for a high-risk drug to attract a heavier penalty for the applicants, whereas if he had requested a milder drug the sentencing would have been consequently lighter. The prosecutor replied that as it was known that the first applicant had brought ecstasy into the country in the summer of 2004, the undercover agent had done no more than follow that lead; it would have made no sense for him to ask for another drug so long as there was no indication that the applicant had dealt in any other type of drugs.","The second applicant pointed out that he had only been informed about the drug dealing on the very day when the last transaction had taken place, and that by telephoning his brother that day he had in fact prevented the crime from being committed.","29.The County Court rendered its judgment on 25 November 2005, based on the evidence in the file, namely the police reports from the undercover operation, witness statements (the two taxi drivers who had brought the police officers to the scene of the transaction and who had seen the applicants handcuffed and the police retrieving the bag containing the drugs from the bushes), the transcripts of the intercepted telephone calls and the expert reports concerning the content of the tablets. It reiterated the history as it had been established in the bill of indictment, and concluded that the applicants were guilty of the offences they had been accused of. The court gave no further answers to the arguments raised by the defence. It convicted both applicants and sentenced the first applicant to seven years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and the second applicant to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment.","D.The appeal proceedings","30.The applicants reiterated their complaints concerning breach of the principle of equality of arms, in that the tablets had been analysed in police laboratories and not by an independent expert. Finally they renewed their request to have all the transcripts of the intercepted conversations produced before the court, and complained that they could not have access to them as the remaining recordings had been destroyed. Before the court, they also argued that the unlawfully obtained evidence should be removed from the file and reiterated that the police operation had started only from a suspicion that the first applicant was a drug user.","Throughout the proceedings, the second applicant made repeated requests to be allowed to study his file, but received no answer from the court.","31.On 5 October 2006 the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute examined the first applicant and his medical record. On 19 January 2007 it rendered its medical report, which was examined at the court hearing held on 31 January 2007. The experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s drug addiction could be treated in the prison hospitals and that the medication he had received so far had been adequate; as he was not experiencing withdrawal symptoms, he did not need to be placed in a special drug withdrawal programme; they also considered that his medical condition was compatible with detention.","32.The Cluj Napoca Court of Appeal delivered its decision on 7February 2007. Concerning the defence\u2019s arguments about lack of access to the transcripts of the intercepted telephone calls the court reiterated that on 9 March 2005 it had decided which transcripts were useful to the case. The court dismissed their complaints concerning the secret police operation; in doing so, it relied on the report drafted by the undercover agent and by the prosecutor, and observed that the applicants\u2019 own statements to the police and before the courts corroborated those reports.","The court of appeal substantially maintained the conclusions of the first\u2011instance court.","33.The applicants appealed on points of law and reiterated their main defence arguments. However, their appeal was dismissed in a final decision rendered on 29 March 2007 by the High Court of Cassation and Justice.","E.The conditions of the second applicant\u2019s detention","34.The second applicant described his detention as follows. He was arrested on 23 December 2004 and remained imprisoned until 1 May 2007. He spent the first three months of detention in police detention facilities, the following eight to nine months in Baia Mare Prison, then thirteen months in Gherla Prison; he spent the remaining time in Jilava Prison.","35.He had to share cells with smokers, although he was a non-smoker himself. He repeatedly asked the prison administration to place him in a cell with non-smokers. No such arrangements could be made for him, as the pre\u2011trial detention facilities were already overcrowded and there were no places available in the non\u2011smoking cells; according to the applicant, in Baia Mare Prison the ratio was of thirty-nine bunk beds, placed on threelevels, for sixty inmates. When in Baia Mare Prison the applicant went on hunger strike from 13 to 16 April 2007 because he was placed in smoking cells despite being a non-smoker; he ended his protest when a non\u2011smoking cell became available after refurbishment.","36.When he was detained in Gherla Prison, he complained about being placed with smokers and about overcrowding in prison, notably that he did not have 4 sq. m of personal living space in the cell. On 5 February 2007 his complaint was dismissed by the judge delegated by the court to supervise the observance of the prisoners\u2019 rights, under Law no. 275\/2006 on the execution of sentences (\u201cthe post-sentencing judge\u201d). The post-sentencing judge noted that there was no obligation in Romanian law to place a detainee in a non-smoking cell or to provide him with a certain amount of living space. According to the applicant, the cells were all dirty and infested with bugs.","37.According to information provided by the prison service, during his detention the applicant occupied altogether eleven cells in three prisons(Baia Mare, Gherla, and Jilava), sharing with between five and forty-three others; his personal living space was on average 1.91 sq. m at all times. In addition he spent three days in a cell alone in Baia Mare when he was on hunger strike, and two days alone in Gherla Prison infirmary; on those two occasions his living space was 16 sq. m.","38.The second applicant also described an episode where he was hit by a prison guard; he explained that he had got scared and become agitated because he had seen his brother suffering from withdrawal and was sure that his brother was about to die without anybody willing to come to his rescue. He pressed charges against the guard, and on 31 March 2006 the prosecutor decided not to prosecute.","39.He tried on two occasions to commit suicide by hanging himself (13September 2005 and 2 December 2005). As a consequence of his attempted suicide of 2 December 2005, the second applicant was handcuffed to his bed for a month, according to his statements. The prison service explained that on 2 December 2005 he had been handcuffed to his bed as a means of preventing him from repeating his suicide attempt; he had been kept thus handcuffed while he remained \u201cagitated and psychologically vulnerable\u201d. On 2 December 2005 he was seen by the prison doctor, who noted his agitation, lack of cooperation and headache, and concluded that he could be treated in the medical infirmary. He was not known to have a mental disorder, and no recurrence of the suicidal behaviour was recorded while he was in detention.","40.On 9 March 2006 the second applicant complained before the Cluj Court of Appeal, within the appeal proceedings on the merits of the accusations against him, about the conditions of his detention, in particular the fact that he shared a large dormitory with smokers. He requested to be medically examined in order to demonstrate the negative consequences of the passive smoking on his health. He also complained of lingering pain in his right leg on which he had fallen from a three-metre height on 2December 2005, when he had tried to hang himself from a suspended bar; he had sought medical examination, which he alleged had been refused by the prison doctors until 23 December 2005. The applicant made full statements about his attempted suicide on 2 December 2005, and described how he had been handcuffed to his bed and left without medical care.","He received no answer to these complaints."],"27416":["5.The applicants were born in 1983, 1985, 1937 and 1947 respectively and live in Villepinte, apart from the second applicant, who lives in Drancy. The second, third and fourth applicants are the first applicant\u2019s brother, mother and father, respectively.","A.The first applicant\u2019s arrest","6.During the afternoon of 30 November 2004 the first applicant, who was smoking a cigarette in the Mitry-Villeparisis railway station, was identity-checked by officers of the General Security Service (\u201cSUGE\u201d) of the French National Railway Company (\u201cSNCF\u201d).","7.Just before 8 p.m. on the same day two police officers from the Mitry Mory police station, S.D. and S.G., were called out to that railway station after a report that an individual had been throwing stones at the trains. Arriving at the railway station, they saw a man who did not correspond to the description provided, who appeared to be drunk, and who reacted aggressively when approached. They called for reinforcements just as five SUGE officers arrived on the scene. The individual in question, who was later identified as the first applicant, ran off towards an underground passageway.","8.The SUGE officers, who included L.P., Y.F. and O.D.B., stopped and questioned the first applicant. The latter put up no resistance to his arrest. The SUGE officers then took him outside the main entrance to the railway station had placed him against a wall.","9.The statements given by witnesses to that sc\u00e8ne diverge concerning the subsequent events (see paragraphs 15 to 18, 20 and 34 to 44 below).","10.The first applicant was forced to the ground by the SUGE officers, who handcuffed him behind his back, before frisking him. He was then placed in a police vehicle parked nearby. The operation ended at 7.59 p.m.","11.During his transport to and arrival at the police station, the first applicant complained of nausea, and had to be helped out of the vehicle by the police officers. The latter mentioned that he was bleeding profusely from the chin.","12.Having arrived in the police cells, the first applicant lost consciousness and went into a coma. A doctor present in the police station administered first aid, before the arrival of the fire brigade ambulance at 8.14 p.m. and then the emergency medical services (SMUR) at 8.45 p.m. He was then transferred to the Lagny-sur-Marne hospital, and later, to the Beaujon hospital in Clichy.","13.The first applicant was remanded in custody at 8.15 p.m. on charges of insulting members of the police force and deliberate violence against a public-service employee, although the measure could not be notified to him owing to his state of alcoholic intoxication, according to the police report. The police custody was terminated at 10.10 p.m. on the instructions of the State Prosecutor.","B.Flagrante delicto procedure","14.The duty officer at the Meaux public prosecutor\u2019s office was advised of the case at 8.40 p.m. He ordered the opening of a flagrante delicto procedure on charges of deliberate violence against persons performing public duties, assigning the task to the Versailles Regional Police Department (\u201cDRPJ\u201d).","15.The police and SUGE officers who had been involved or present during the first applicant\u2019s arrest were questioned. Their versions contradicted each other: the SNCF employees spoke of a model arrest, whereas some of the police officers described it as \u201crobust\u201d. Among the latter, N.T., D.F. and R.D. pointed out that they had seen a SUGE officer, identified as Y.F., kneeing the first applicant in the face while he was being held on the ground by two other officers. They added that, noticing that Y.F. was about to knee him again, police sergeant A.H. had restrained him by the leg and said \u201cthat\u2019ll do\u201d.","16.A.H. did not mention that fact during his first questioning. He was interviewed again, and he explained that when he had arrived at the railway station on the evening in question he had noted the presence of five SUGE officers surrounding the first applicant, who was waving his arms. One of them had attempted to take the latter by the arms, but he had brushed him off. The officer identified as Y.F. had replied \u201cdon\u2019t you hit me\u201d, and had become \u201cannoyed\u201d with the first applicant. With the help of three colleagues he had brought him to the ground. Given the applicant\u2019s refusal to allow himself to be handcuffed, he had struck him on the head with his left knee. A.H. said that he had then approached the scene. Seeing Y.F. moving his left leg back to knee him again, he had prevented him from doing so. When asked why he had not mentioned these facts in his first witness statement, the police officer stated that he had \u201cthought that it was for the person concerned to shoulder his responsibilities\u201d.","17.N.T. submitted that before being brought to the ground the first applicant had not been violent, but when an SUGE officer had touched him he had tried to remove his hand. One of the SUGE team had then, unsuccessfully, attempted to punch him in the face.","18.Some of the police and SUGE officers mentioned that the first applicant had had a cut on his chin before his arrest.","19.On 2 December 2004 L.P., Y.F. and O.D.B. were remanded in custody.","20.On 3 December 2004 the scene was reconstructed in the presence of two members of the prosecutor\u2019s office and the five SUGE officers and the six police officers who had been involved in the arrest. The SUGE officers said that the arrest had been effected without any particular difficulties, the first applicant having been handcuffed on the floor, emphasising that he had displayed no injuries on being handed over to the police officers. The latter presented a different version of events, explaining how the applicant had been kneed in the head.","21.Dr M.K., who had operated on the first applicant at the Beaujon hospital, told the investigators that the injuries noted might have been compatible with one very violent blow, such as a hard slap, a kick or a knee strike, a blow from a medium-weight blunt instrument, or even a heavy fall. He did not consider the injury compatible with a truncheon blow.","C.Medical examinations and treatment","22.At the Lagny-sur-Marne hospital, a brain scan showed an acute subdural haematoma of the left hemisphere. Blood tests showed alcohol levels of 1.51grams per litre of blood and the presence of active cannabinoids (THC), pointing to exposure to cannabis between 2 and 24 hours before the testing.","23.The first applicant was admitted to the Beaujon hospital on 1 December 2004 and immediately taken to the operating theatre, where he underwent emergency surgical evacuation of his haematoma. A control scan carried out the same day showed a residual subdural haematoma.","24.On 1 December 2004 a forensic doctor was called upon to examine the first applicant, and noted that he was in a stage-3 coma on the Glasgow Coma Scale (on which stage 0 corresponds to death and stage 15 to a wakeful state). The doctor described a temporo-parietal fracture on the left-hand side, a closed 3.4 centimetre-long wound on the left side of the chin, two haematomas on the left tibia and a scratch on the left cheek. He also mentioned a subdural haematoma of the left hemisphere which was extended and compressive and had been the reason for the applicant\u2019s emergency transfer to hospital.","25.A second scan carried out on 3 December 2004 showed an odontoid fracture associated with a fracture of the lateral mass of vertebra C2.","26.On 15 and 28 December 2004 the first applicant underwent further operations.","27.From 14 February to 12 December 2005 he was hospitalised at the Bouff\u00e9mont Functional Rehabilitation Centre.","28.The discharge assessment drawn up by the said Centre mentioned a large number of neurological after-effects, including the partial loss of active motor skills in all four limbs, and serious cognitive and behavioural disorders (disinhibition, maladjustment, inability to concentrate, temporal disorientation, demotivation and loss of initiative, and passive opposition).","29.On 12 December 2005, since his condition had not improved, the first applicant was transferred to another rehabilitation centre. On 26 June 2008 the first applicant\u2019s residual rate of permanent partial disability (IPP) was estimated at 95 %, given his lack of autonomy in respect of all the basic activities of everyday life. He was confined to a wheelchair and was unable to engage in any autonomous occupational activity.","D. Judicial investigation","30.On 3 December 2004 the Meaux Public Prosecutor requested the instigation of a judicial investigation against L.P., Y.F. and O.D.B. on charges of intentional violence having caused over eight days\u2019 total unfitness for work (ITT), aggravated by the following three circumstances: the violence had been jointly, by persons performing public duties, in a place used for acceding to public transport.","31.On the same day the three persons targeted by the request for an investigation were formally charged. L.P. and O.D.B. were placed under judicial supervision, while Y.F. was placed in preventive detention until 28 July 2005, when he would be released under judicial supervision.","32.The applicants, assisted by counsel, applied to join the proceedings as civil parties.","33.On 8 December 2006, in view of the evolution of the first applicant\u2019s state of health, the State Prosecutor requested further investigations, reclassifying the charges as intentional acts of violence have caused a permanent disability. The three SUGE officers were formally charged on this new basis.","1.Witness statements gathered","34.A large number of witnesses were heard by the investigators on letters rogatory, and some of them were directly questioned by the investigating judge.","35.Three train passengers present at the material time stated that they had not seen the first applicant being struck.","36.Two individuals who had been with the applicant on the day in question, S.M. and S.Gh., were also questioned. S.M. explained that during the afternoon he and the first applicant had drunk alcohol and had been fined for smoking in the railway station. They had then reasoned with a person who had been on the railway tracks throwing stones at the trains. S.M. pointed out that the first applicant had a swollen lip and small scars on his face, around the chin. While they had been together the first applicant had neither fallen nor bumped his head.","37.S.Gh. told the investigators that the first applicant had been \u201cshoved\u201d by one of the officers involved, who had forced him face-down on to the ground, without his head actually touching the floor. She added that when he had been on the ground an SUGE officer had kicked him, with medium force, on the head or his upper body, although she was unable to say whether the kick had landed on his head. She further stated that when the first applicant refused to get into the vehicle, one of the staff involved had hit him lightly on the back of the head or upper body with a black objet, possible a truncheon, but that the blow had not been violent. The investigating judge summoned S.Gh. four times to appear before him, but she did not attend. Moreover, having subsequently mentioned the violent acts during a TV interview, she had explained that \u201cshe had been all over the place\u201d, that she had been \u201ctaken by surprise\u201d and that she \u201chad overdone it a bitin front of the TV cameras\u201d.","38.Furthermore, on 9 May 2006 an SNCF employee informed the investigators that he had been confided in by a dog-handler, claiming that he had been talking to some of the first applicant\u2019s friends and had discovered that he had been fighting on the afternoon in question and that someone had smashed a bottle over his head. The employee explained that she had not spoken up earlier because her information was only second-hand. Furthermore, she had not considered the dog-handler particularly reliable, as he had previously given her information which she knew to be false. However, this witness statement could not be compared with other evidence or corroborated by the witness as he had died since the material time. On 26 May 2006 the police had telephoned the six dog-handlers who could have made the statements in question. The only one who had worked in the company in question at the material time had stated that he had not heard about the case and had never spoken to any friends of the victim, with whom he was not acquainted.","39.S.D. and S.G., the two police officers who had first arrived on the scene, gave statements. One said that the arrest had been carried out \u201crobustly\u201d and that the first applicant\u2019s head had possibly hit the ground, as he had \u201cfallen with his whole weight, all at once\u201d, and the other stated that the applicant had fallen \u201cto the ground heavily, face down\u201d, with his head hitting the floor. The latter added, before the investigating judge, that he was virtually sure that the applicant\u2019s head had hit the ground, even though his view was partially blocked by a vehicle. He further added that he had not seen the person being kneed.","40.The four police officers sent as reinforcements, D.F., N.T. R.D. and A.H., stated that they had witnessed a kneeing incident. R.D. affirmed that when the first applicant had been brought to the ground there had been a loud \u201cbump\u201d. A.H. went back on the statements made during the flagrante delicto procedure, informing the investigating judge that he did not know whether the applicant\u2019s head had \u201cbumped on the ground\u201d.","41.The two SUGE officers who had been present but had not taken part in the operation explained that there had been no violence, and one of them suggested that if there had been any blows they must have been delivered in the police car or the police station.","42.As regards the persons formally charged, O.D.B. stated that no blows had been delivered. He said that the episode during which the first applicant had been brought to the ground had been a \u201ctextbook example\u201d, explaining that there had been no violence, and that the person had just been placed on the ground. He was sure that his head had not hit the ground. He added that Y.F. had not kneed the first applicant, explaining to the investigating judge that in his view things had gone badly in the police station and the police officers were trying to \u201cshift the blame on to them\u201d. He added that the wound to the first applicant\u2019s chin after his arrival in the detention area bore no comparison to the scratch which they had noted earlier on. He considered that his colleague had used the level of force strictly necessary to bring the arrestee to the ground.","43.L.P. affirmed that while the first applicant had still been standing, he had deliberately punched Y.F. on the arm. The latter had then seized him by the sleeve to knock him off balance. The applicant had ended up on his knees, and had been laid out on his side and then on his stomach. O.D.B. and he had held him by the ankles while Y.F. was handcuffing him. L.P. stated that the first applicant had been brought to the ground quite normally and that he had neither fallen to the ground nor been struck. He justified the use of that technique by the fact that the arrestee had been struggling and making incoherent statements. He added that he had had traces of blood around his nose, something which he had already noticed when fining him during the afternoon. He told the investigating judge that the first applicant\u2019s head could not have hit the ground, after having stated while in custody that he had not been able to see his head when the person had been brought to the ground.","44.Finally, Y.F., a former trainer in the field of operational techniques, confirmed that he had fined the first applicant during the afternoon, without any further incidents occurring, even though the latter had already been consuming alcohol. He described the applicant\u2019s annoyance and disgraceful language when they had met up again later. He complained that he had been punched deliberately and violently on his right forearm. He had pulled at the first applicant\u2019s sleeve to bring him to his knees, and had then forced him to the ground with L.P.\u2019s help, laying him on his right side and then turning him on to his stomach. He had personally handcuffed the arrestee by placing his knees on his body, his left knee on the back and his right knee on the posterior. His colleagues had been holding the arrestee\u2019s legs. He specified that the latter had been \u201cbrought to the ground\u201d and not \u201cpushed to the ground\u201d. The applicant\u2019s head had not collided with anything and he had not been struck in any way, in the knowledge that he had had a slight cut on his chin and dried blood around his nose. Y.F. said that something must have happened at the police station or during his time in the police vehicle, because the injury to the chin which had been visible during the arrest had nothing in common with the wound which he had displayed at the police station; that wound had been four centimetres deep and bleeding, leaving a pool of blood. If the SUGE officers had noted such a wound on handing him over to the police, they would have immediately called an ambulance.","45.Y.F.\u2019s administrative file showed that he had repeatedly complained of abuse and threats.","46.Consultation of the SNCF operational handbooks had shown that the head was singled out as a part of the body which should never be struck.","47.No images of the handcuffing episode could be obtained from the CCTV footage at the railway station. On the other hand, the footage did show the identity check carried out in the afternoon and the attempts by the first applicant to calm down an individual standing on the railway tracks.","2.Expert reports","a)Expert report of 25 April 2005","48.On 29 December 2004 the investigating judge commissioned an expert report on the matter from Dr T., a forensic doctor, and Professor L, a brain surgeon. They submitted their report on 25 April 2005.","49.The reports concluded that the first applicant had had a subdural haematoma of the left hemisphere which had caused brain damage.","50.In view of the nature and consequences of that haematoma, the experts considered that the length of time required to constitute it had probably been less than thirty minutes from the time of the head injury, and could not have been less than fifteen minutes. Having regard to the timescale of the events and the witness statements, the experts stated that the shock could not have occurred during the few minutes\u2019 drive from the railway station to the police station, or on arrival at the latter. On the other hand, they found that the injuries could have been caused by the applicant being pushed to the ground, being kneed or falling full length during his arrest. Alcohol or drug consumption could not have had any direct and\/or definite influence on the traumatic brain injury.","b)Expert report of 24 January 2006","51.Dr G., a neurologist, and Ms D., a neuropsychologist, examined the first applicant on 3 January 2006. They submitted their report on 24 January 2006.","52.They noted a deficiency of all four limbs and a serious deterioration of the cognitive and mental functions. They concluded that the neurological condition was directly responsible for the first applicant\u2019s state of total dependency, and considered that it was too soon to determine the chances of consolidation but that the situation was unlikely to change greatly.","c)Expert report of 19 October 2006","53.On 26 June 2006 Dr G. and Dr S. examined the first applicant. In their report of 19 October 2006 they noted that he could neither stand nor walk, that he was completely dependent as regards everyday activities and should be placed under guardianship. His total unfitness for work was still being assessed.","54.They mentioned that the injuries observed could only have been the result of violent trauma, and that if they had been caused by being pushed to the ground, he must have been pushed extremely violently. The hyperextension of the cervical rachis and the fracture of the C2 vertebra could have been caused by a violent blow from a knee, but not the haemorrhagic lesions or the left temporal contusion, the latter having been caused either by direct blows to the skull or by the head violently hitting the ground. They confirmed that alcohol or drug consumption could not have been factors in the injuries, although they explained that the state of intoxication could have diminished the person\u2019s reactivity in attempting to limit the consequences of falling.","55.The experts considered that the timescale of the events as reported pointed to the conditions surrounding the arrest in the railway station as having very probably, indeed certainly, been the cause of the traumatic cranio-cerebral and rachidial lesions. They pointed out that they had no information at their disposal to rule out the possibility that the first applicant had sustained other violent attacks while in the police vehicle or at the police station, but added that if such violence had indeed occurred, it was conceivable that it had caused injuries. Nevertheless, the lapse of time between the arrest and the arrival at the police station had been so short that that hypothesis was \u201cimprobable\u201d.","56.They further explained that the bleeding in the chin area could not have been caused by the subdural haematoma, but might have resulted from the person having been violently pushed to the ground or having received any other type of blow.","57.The experts concluded that the first applicant suffered from an infirmity which would leave him with permanent motor, cognitive and mental after-effects.","d)Expert report of 9 March 2009 and reconstruction of 23 November 2007","58.On 6 September and 30 November 2007 the investigating judge appointed four experts, Dr G., Dr S. and Dr L., and also M.F., an expert in \u201cmartial arts, combat and self-defence sports and the ballistics of body movements and blows\u201d, to assist in the reconstruction of events and conduct a fresh medical examination of the first applicant. They were also mandated to determine whether the first applicant\u2019s statement as recorded on 22November2007 could be deemed reliable.","59.The reconstruction took place on 23 November 2007. Police officers S.D. and S.G. confirmed that when they had first encountered the first applicant he had been acting rather nervously, seemed to have consumed alcohol, displayed an injury on his chin, and was red in the face. The SUGE officers who had met S.D. and S.G. had informed them that they had already fined the applicant that afternoon. SUGE officer C.A. explained that since the police officers had informed them that they had been insulted the decision had been taken to arrest the person concerned and the SUGE officers had asked him to come with them. C.A. had put him in an armlock. For his part, Y.F. stated that he had seized his left sleeve.","60.According to the SUGE officers, they had taken the first applicant outside the railway station, and there had been some hesitation when S.D. had told them that this was not the man who had been throwing stones at the trains. O.D.B. pointed out that Y.F. had then released him and stepped back. Y.F. explained that the first applicant had then turned angrily to face him and punched him on the forearm. He had seized the applicant by the collar, forced him to his knees and placed him on his right side. He had then placed him face down on the ground and put his hands behind his back in order to handcuff him. After frisking him, he had taken the first applicant by the right arm, and the latter had stood up otherwise unaided.","61.A.H. confirmed that the applicant had made a gesture towards Y.F.\u2019s arm, and Y.F. had warned him: \u201cdon\u2019t you touch me\u201d. However, he explained that because he was resisting handcuffing, Y.F. had struck him with his left knee.","62.One of the other police officers, D.F., confirmed that he had seen the person being struck by Y.F.s left knee, while R.D. mentioned a blow from the right knee. N.T. confirmed the action described by A.H., although he was not sure which leg had been used.","63.The police officers added that the first applicant had been placed in the police vehicle and that when they had almost reached the police station he had said that he was going to vomit. They pointed out that the man had been very calm, but when he was about to leave the vehicle he said that he would need help because his knee hurt. D.G. had helped him out of the car, holding one of his legs. That was when the applicant\u2019s head had slid along the head-rest and hit the car doorframe. D.G., seeing that he had fainted, had asked a colleague to help him. Outside the vehicle the first applicant had vomited liquids and remained inert, mumbling rather than speaking. He had then been dragged into the sobering-up area.","64.The experts submitted their report on 9 March 2009. They observed that in Y.F.\u2019s version of events there had been no mention of blows or of the first applicant\u2019s head hitting the ground. They also noted that in A.H.\u2019s version, the blow was described as incapable of having had a major impact. They found that during the manoeuvre to bring the first applicant to the ground, he had been in a position to break his fall and, possibly, if he had been kneed, to protect himself. Moreover, they stated that if the kneeing incident was taken on board, the time which had elapsed between the latter and the arrival at the police station, when the first symptoms of the brain damage became evident, would have been between 2 minutes and 10 seconds and 3 minutes and 30 seconds. They concluded that in view of the minimum period of evolution (the \u201cresponse time\u201d) between the traumatic injury and the first symptoms, that is to say between fifteen and twenty minutes, the kneeing could not be deemed to have caused the brain injury.","65.The experts considered that the various statements by the persons charged and the witnesses, as well as the reconstructions of the different versions, were \u201ccompletely incompatible with the forensic medical findings as regards the nature and\/or seriousness of the injuries described in the various hospital and forensic reports\u201d, such injuries being \u201cnecessarily the outcome of violent traumatic injuries\u201d.","66.They pointed out that the observations made during the reconstruction meant that it was unlikely, or even impossible, that the fracture had occurred during the events that had taken place at the railway station or the police station, explaining that such a fracture usually caused serious neck pain and stiffness in the cervical rachis, which had not been noted by the victim, the witnesses or the participants.","67.As regards the hypothesis mentioned during the investigation to the effect that the first applicant might have been hit by a bottle during a fight that had taken place during the afternoon of 30 November 2004, the experts pointed out that they had not received any evidence to support that affirmation, but that a blow with a bottle could have caused an internal contusion which would not have produced any external symptoms on the scalp but would have caused a subdural haematoma such as that discovered on the first applicant\u2019s admission to hospital. The first manifestations felt by the first applicant on his way to the police station had most likely stemmed from just such a traumatic injury. The manifestations in question had therefore reflected the brain\u2019s intolerance of the mounting pressure exerted by the subdural haematoma, which had been tolerated for a few hours and had then decompensated during the transfer to the police station.","68.The experts emphasised that the lapse of time between the applicant\u2019s arrest by the SUGE brigade and the emergence of the traumatic brain injuries had been too short to conclude that the actions carried out and the blows struck by members of that brigade might have caused the brain damage. Furthermore, the actions of the SUGE officers, as studied in detail on the day of the reconstruction, could not have explained the intracranial lesions.","69.As regards the first applicant\u2019s condition, the experts considered that his residual rate of permanent partial disability (IPP) could be estimated at 95 %, given his lack of autonomy in respect of all the basic activities of everyday life and his inability to engage in any autonomous occupational activity. His suffering and disfigurement were estimated at 6\/7, and his loss of amenity and professional damage were declared absolute, total and definitive.","70.The experts observed that the first applicant had said that he had been \u201cattacked\u201d. They added, however, that any memory on the applicant\u2019s part had necessarily been \u201creconstructed\u201d, either through unintentional, spontaneous fabrication or by repeating something overheard from people around him and possibly deformed by himself. He could certainly have had no direct memories of the events.","E.Opinion of the National Security Ethics Committee","71.The National Security Ethics Committee, which had been contacted by two members of parliament concerning the circumstances of the first applicant\u2019s arrest, assessed the procedural documents and interviewed the SUGE officers, apart from the persons formally charged, and also the police officers. It adopted an opinion on 19 December 2005.","72.It first of all noted that when the applicant had been arrested in the underground carpark of the railway station he had not been accused of an offence, as the police officers had acknowledged that his profile did not match that of the person sought. It added that the two police officers who had initially been involved had pointed out that they had not wanted to arrest the first applicant, but simply to check his identity, while the head of the SUGE team had stated that he had stopped the applicant for questioning because he had thought that the police officers had been insulted and he had considered them as victims. The committee noted that the head of team had admitted that \u201cit was a bit topsy-turvy\u201d, and that on leaving the railway station he had been unable to understand why the officers had not handcuffed the man and taken him to the police station.","73.The committee observed that the arrest had been carried out in a confused and confusing manner. The SUGE officers had explained that they had decided to handcuff the first applicant because he had insulted them and had struck Y.F. on the forearm.","74.The committee noted that A.H. had partly confirmed that version, and pointed out that there had been a kind of confused \u201cstand-off\u201d between the SUGE and the police officers outside the railway station. A.H. had noted that the first applicant had been insulting the SUGE officers, that he had lunged at one of them, hitting him on the arm or the shoulder, and that the officer in question had said \u201cDon\u2019t you touch me!\u201d. After the applicant had been handcuffed, A.H. had decided to apprehend him on charges of violence against persons performing public duties, which violent acts he considered to have been committed in his presence.","75.The committee observed that S.G., who had taken the first applicant to the police station, had stated that he did not know the reason for the arrest.","76.The committee noted that even supposing that the head injury might have been caused by one of the SUGE officers, the police officers whom it had interviewed had provided no further information such as to establish its origin or the time of its causation. The only conclusions to be drawn from their statements were that the arrest had been violent, because the first applicant had initially resisted handcuffing.","77.The committee observed that the police and SUGE involvement in the case had been extremely confused. It stated that the police sergeant, who had been assisted by five police officers, ought to have taken control of the situation as soon as he arrived on the scene. He should have intervened between the SUGE officers and the first applicant, immediately placing the latter under his protection, and have asked the SUGE officers why he had been stopped and questioned, with a view to deciding on the appropriate action to take. The committee noted that instead of shouldering that responsibility, the police officers had passively looked on as the SUGE officers used force which the former\u2019s mere presence had rendered illegitimate.","78.The committee considered that the lawfulness of the apprehension had been highly questionable. Indeed, the first two police officers arriving on the scene had taken the view that the apprehension had not been justified by the first applicant\u2019s attitude outside the railway station. Interrogation of the various parties involved had not made clear whether a serious act of violence had been committed against Y.F. or whether the first applicant had merely pushed him away. The committee noted that the incident appeared in fact to have amounted to a mere scuffle to which Y.F. had reacted impulsively.","79.It further noted that the SUGE officers had imposed the decision to apprehend the first applicant on the police officers, who were not in control of the situation. The latter had merely passively accepted the applicant\u2019s handover in order to transport him to the police station. That confusion explained why the injury could not be imputed with any certainty to either of the services in question. The committee further stated that even supposing that the injury had been caused by the SUGE officers during the handcuffing operation, at a time when the first applicant should have been under police protection, it was surprising, at the very least, that none of the police officers present had been able to identify the act of violence which had occasioned the injury.","80.In the committee\u2019s view, the injury under the applicant\u2019s chin raised issues. Even supposing that it had already been there prior to the apprehension and that the wound had reopened, as the police officers affirmed, it pointed at the very least to a very rough mode of transport of an injured person. Lastly, the committee pointed out that it was not its task to issue an opinion on the origin of the head injury or to attribute it to either of the services. It added that the possibility of a joint police\/SUGE operation required the respective competences to be strictly defined. It should be reiterated that the arrival of the police removes the SUGE mandate, immediately placing the operation under the sole authority of the most senior police officer present. Moreover, SUGE officers should also be aware of the conditions for the lawfulness of in flagrante apprehensions and should in fact, like police personnel, undergo compulsory conflict management training.","81. Lastly, the committee decided to transmit its opinion to the public prosecutor for assessment of the expediency of prosecuting those concerned on charges of failure to assist a person in danger.","F.Outcome of the judicial investigation","82.On 15 February 2010 the investigating judge of the Meaux Regional Court issued a discontinuance order.","83.She considered that the serious brain damage suffered by the first applicant had originated in events preceding his questioning by the SUGE officers and his transport to the police station by the police officers. She observed that the investigation had failed to establish the precise circumstances under which the events had occurred and to identify the perpetrator. No further investigation had been possible because all the witnesses identified had been heard and the first applicant was no longer capable of providing further information on the series of events of which he had been the victim.","84.The investigating judge added that the circumstance surrounding the apprehension had been caused by the first applicant\u2019s insulting and violent behaviour. No proof had been provided of illegitimate violence, since it had transpired from the proceedings and the witness statements that the applicant\u2019s head had not hit the ground, and that even supposing that Y.F. had kneed him, such acts did not fall within the category of deliberate violence. The judge stated that the investigation had shown that, owing to the position in which Y.F. had been standing, the intensity of his action had necessarily been limited, forming part of an operational technique.","85.The applicants, all of whom had joined the proceedings as civil parties, appealed against the discontinuance decision, seeking:","- its annulment pursuant to Articles 184 and 802 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the grounds that it was identically worded to the public prosecutor\u2019s final submissions;","- the appointment of a panel of experts mandated to produce a fresh report under the supervision of a member of the Investigations Division, and;","- in the alternative, the committal of the defendants for trial by the criminal court for the acts of violence perpetrated against the first applicant.","86.By judgment of 3 September 2010 the Investigations Division of the Paris Court of Appeal dismissed all those requests. It held that the civil parties had sustained no damage as a result of the grounds of nullity on which they had relied, since they could have adduced their claims in adversarial proceedings before it; it also pointed out that the entire proceedings had been submitted to it and that it was empowered to deal with all aspects of the case. As regards the request for a new expert report, the Investigations Division noted that the first expert report had been drawn up by a panel of four experts with complementary specialities, who had all attended the extremely long and detailed reconstruction organised by the investigating judge, during which they had seen all those involved in the impugned events repeat several times the gestures which they had described, covering all the different versions presented. It held that another expert opinion, for which all this input could not be replicated, would be of no real value for establishing the truth, and that it was neither necessary nor practicable to repeat such a complex reconstruction, which had at no stage been criticised by the various parties involved in the proceedings. The Division added that in medical terms, the civil parties had provided no scientific evidence capable of contradicting the conclusions of the panel of experts, merely affirming that the extremely serious injuries sustained by the first applicant must have originated in the manner of his arrest.","87.As regards the violence in question, the Investigations Division noted that the first applicant had suddenly lost his temper and struck Y.F. violently on the arm, which had been a deliberate, aggressive act. They therefore considered that the SUGE officers\u2019 intervention to neutralise him had been amply justified, subject to the operation having taken place under appropriate conditions. It nevertheless noted that the operation seemed to have been more \u201crobust\u201d than the SUGE officers had admitted, the latter having spoken of a \u201ctextbook\u201d operation, which evoked a theoretical ideal and seemed \u201ctoo perfect\u201d. Furthermore, the other parties involved had described a swifter series of events than the \u201ctakedown\u201d in three separate stages described by Y.F. As regards the possibility that the first applicant had been kneed in the head, the Investigations Department noted divergences in the various witness statements, and concluded that some uncertainty remained as regards both whether such a blow from the knee had actually been administered and whether it had been intentional.","88.Finally, as regards the causal link between the arrest and the first applicant\u2019s injuries, the Investigations Division noted the general consensus that the applicant had been \u201cin good shape\u201d on being installed in the police vehicle after his handcuffing, and that neither his position in the vehicle nor the speed of transport had suggested that he had been the target of any violence at this stage of events. Referring to the reconstruction, the Investigations Division considered that by reprising all the descriptions of the actions by all those involved and taking on board the hypotheses least favourable to the SUGE officers in question, the experts had been able to ascertain that the arrestee\u2019s head had not hit the ground in any of the reconstructed actions, that the blow from the knee, if such a blow had ever actually occurred, would have affected the right craniofacial region, that if it had been struck as described it could only have had a minor impact and that the actions carried out could not explain the intracranial lesions noted, especially the cranial fracture on the left side of the head. The Court of Appeal further observed that the experts\u2019 findings had been very clear, considering it highly unlikely, or indeed impossible, that the fracture had been caused during the incidents at the railway station or at the police station.","89.The Division pointed out that the experts had extensively justified their change of mind on the basis of factors which they had noted from the reconstructions of all the different versions, which they had attended, and that the medical evidence gathered would appear to support the existence of a previous traumatic injury which had taken some time to manifest. Lastly, it noted that the previous findings concerning the first applicant\u2019s physical state during the afternoon had lent credence to that eventuality. Furthermore, the time taken for the symptoms to appear would have been incompatible per se with the short lapse of time between the arrest and the first symptoms, too soon after the operation to have been caused by it.","90.The Investigations Division concluded that the investigation had failed to gather sufficient evidence that a criminal offence had been committed.","91.On 27 September 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law. It held that the applicants could not complain about the reasons given for the discontinuance decision because, owing to the devolutive effect of the appeal, the Investigations Division had substituted its own reasoning for the original one. Moreover, it considered that that Division had analysed all the facts criticised in the complaint, answered all the main points set out in the civil parties\u2019 memorial and determined, on the basis of sufficient and non-contradictory grounds, that there was insufficient evidence that any individuals had committed the offence of collective assault having caused a permanent disability or any other offence.","92.In observations received by the registry of the Bobigny Compensation Board for Crime Victims (\u201cCIVI\u201d) on 16 March 2012, the Guarantee Fund against acts of terrorism and other criminal offences requested the reimbursement of provisional awards made to the first applicant to a total of 490,000 euros (EUR), under three CIVI decisions of 30 October 2006, 5 July 2007 and 8 December 2009.","..."],"27440":["5.The applicants were born in 1977, 1937 and 1938 respectively and live in Moscow. The second and third applicants are the parents of the first applicant.","A.The first applicant\u2019s placement and treatment in a psychiatric hospital","6.In 2004 the first applicant, who was suffering from tachycardia and severe headaches, was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia. In 2004\u201105 he underwent treatment in various hospitals in Moscow, without any tangible result.","7.In April 2005 his illness worsened.","8.On 25 May 2005 he called an ambulance and was taken to the neurology unit of Moscow City Clinical Hospital no. 6 (\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043a\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430 \u2116 6). The doctor in the admissions unit, however, refused to admit him, finding no pathology, and recommended outpatient treatment in a district polyclinic.","9.Desperate for relief, on the same day the first applicant cut the veins on his forearm. Another ambulance was called for him by the second and third applicants, and he was taken to N.V. Sklifosovsky Research Institute of Emergency Medicine (\u041d\u0418\u0418 \u0441\u043a\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0449\u0438 \u0438\u043c. \u041d.\u0412.\u0421\u043a\u043b\u0438\u0444\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e). After the first applicant was provided with emergency medical aid at the surgical unit, he was taken to somato\u2011psychiatric unit no.2 (\u041f\u0421\u041e-2, \u201cthe psychiatric hospital\u201d) of the Institute with a diagnosis of \u201cchronic somatoform pain disorder, personality disorder, continuous sluggish schizophrenia, cutting of left forearm, attempted suicide\u201d.","10.On 26 May 2005 the first applicant contacted his parents, asking them to take him home. When the parents arrived, they were not allowed to take him home and were asked to leave.","11.During the night of 26 to 27 May 2005 the first applicant alleged that he was beaten up. According to him, three nurses held his arms and two recovering patients hit him on the face and body. He was taken to his ward, and one of the nurses allegedly threw him on the bed with such force that his head hit the bedside table, following which he lost consciousness. When the first applicant recovered he found himself bleeding and strapped to the bed with a gag in his mouth. He was given no medical assistance.","12.The first applicant was subsequently allegedly warned by a doctor, L., that his parents would not be allowed to see him and that it would be put on record that he had himself initiated a brawl. Furthermore, he was allegedly warned that any complaints to the authorities, including the police, would be futile as he would be given a diagnosis which would show that his allegations could not be taken seriously.","13.The first applicant remained hospitalised until 9June 2005. He alleged that he was subjected to scientific research by being treated with Seroquel (athen new antipsychotic medication) and forbidden all contact with the outside world. He had blood tests every other day.","14.Some hours after the first applicant\u2019s discharge from the psychiatric hospital on 9June 2005, an ambulance was called for him at home due to his state of health. The ambulance doctor saw a haematoma under the first applicant\u2019s right eye, and bruises and contusions around his chest and waist. The first applicant was further diagnosed with hypertensive crisis and severe tachycardia. He was immediately hospitalised in Moscow City Clinical Hospital no.67 (\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043a\u043b\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0430 \u2116 67), where he remained until 5August 2005 and was diagnosed with \u201cdepressive hypochondriasis against the background of traumatic encephalopathy\u201d. The diagnosis of personality disorder was not confirmed.","B.The applicants\u2019 complaints","15.In October 2005 the applicants complained to the Russian Federation Ombudsman that the first applicant had been unlawfully committed and treated in the psychiatric hospital, and that he had been beaten by the hospital nurses with the assistance of two hospital patients. The applicants\u2019 complaint was referred to the Meshchanskiy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office, Moscow, from where it was referred on to the Meshchanskiy District Department of the Interior.","1.Criminal proceedings in connection with the alleged beatings of the first applicant (criminal case no. 82906)","16.After two refusals to institute criminal proceedings, on 2November 2006 criminal proceedings were instituted (criminal case no. 82906) under Article 116 of the Russian Criminal Code (Beatings).","17.On 15 November 2006 the first applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings.","18.On 16 March and 25 June 2007 an investigator from the Meshchanskiy District Department of the Interior investigation department suspended the proceedings on the grounds of an impossibility of identifying the alleged perpetrators.","19.On 19 March and 1 July 2007 respectively the Meshchanskiy Inter\u2011District Prosecutor\u2019s Office quashed the above decisions and remitted the case for additional investigation.","20.On 11 August 2007 the investigator discontinued the proceedings on the grounds of expiry of the procedural time-limit for prosecution.","21.On 30 August 2007, however, the above decision was set aside and the proceedings were reopened.","22.The proceedings were subsequently suspended on 14 January 2008 and 16 March 2009 and resumed again on unspecified dates.","23.In 2012 the applicants were informed that the proceedings had been discontinued on 25 November 2010 on the grounds of expiry of the procedural time-limit for prosecution.","24.On an unspecified date the decision of 25 November 2010 was set aside and the proceedings were reopened.","25.On 22 December 2012 the proceedings were again discontinued.","26.On 9 January 2013 the above decision was set aside and the case file material referred to the investigation department for additional investigation, which appears still to be pending.","2.Criminal proceedings in connection with the first applicant\u2019s placement in a psychiatric hospital and his stay there (criminal case no. 401966)","27.On 5 March 2007 the complaints concerning the first applicant\u2019s placement in the psychiatric hospital were removed from criminal case no.82906 for separate examination.","28.On 24 March 2007 an investigator from the Meshchanskiy Inter\u2011District Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings.","29.On 3 May 2007 the Moscow Preobrazhenskiy District Court found the above decision unlawful and groundless.","30.On 6 July 2007 the acting prosecutor of the Meshchanskiy Inter\u2011District Prosecutor\u2019s Office quashed the decision of 24March 2007 and ordered an additional inquiry.","31.On 12 October 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted (criminal case no. 401966) under Article128\u00a7 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (Unlawful Placement in a Psychiatric Hospital).","32.On 12 January, 5 March and 27 April 2008 the proceedings were suspended on the grounds of an impossibility of identifying those responsible.","33.However, on 5 February, 27 March and 27 April 2008 respectively the above decisions were quashed and additional investigations ordered.","34.In the meantime, on 18 April 2008 a forensic psychiatric examination was conducted which established that the first applicant\u2019s involuntary psychiatric hospitalisation on 25May 2005 had been justified (psychiatric pathology of an acute character accompanied by expressed depression with attempted suicide). It was further established, however, that his subsequent stay in the psychiatric ward had been unlawful. In particular, contrary to the provisions of the relevant domestic law (the Psychiatric Treatment Law of 2 July 1992), no report had been drawn up by a panel of psychiatrists in the forty-eight hours following the first applicant\u2019s involuntary hospitalisation on the need for a further stay in the psychiatric hospital, and no application had been made to the court by the head of the psychiatric hospital on the need for the first applicant\u2019s continued involuntary stay in the psychiatric hospital. It was further noted that the first applicant\u2019s mental health episodes between 27May and 9 June 2005 did not fall under the definition of a \u201csevere\u201d mental disorder or any other acute mental condition, and did not require involuntary psychiatric treatment.","35.In the absence of any meaningful investigation since the institution of the criminal proceedings, the applicants challenged the investigator before the court for failure to take action.","36.On 7 May 2008 Preobrazhenskiy District Court found the investigator\u2019s failure to take action unlawful (failure to identify and question witnesses and carry out other relevant investigative actions).","37.On 28 October 2008 the head of the psychiatric hospital, D., was involved in the proceedings as a defendant.","38.On the same day D. was questioned, and made the following statement:","\u201c... [Somato\u2011psychiatric] unit no.2 was staffed [at the material time] by only two attending doctors: a scientific associate, L., and an attending doctor whose last name I cannot remember. The question of assigning patients to a specific attending doctor was decided by E. E., who assigned [the first applicant] to L. as a scientific thematic patient (\u043d\u0430\u0443\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439) for research on the effects of the Seroquel medication ...","Scientific associates monitor only scientific research patients to study scientific subjects which involve research into new methods of treatment and the use of new drugs approved by the Ministry of Health, with a view to later disseminating these throughout the territory of the Russian Federation. Following the results of their research, a scientific associate writes an article about the work done and defends a dissertation based on their research material.\u201d","39.On 31 October 2008 the preliminary investigation was completed, and on 28 November 2008 a bill of indictment was submitted for approval to the Meshchanskiy Inter-District Prosecutor\u2019s Office.","40.On 9 December 2008, however, the case was returned for an additional investigation, as the prosecutor considered the charges brought against D. unsubstantiated.","41.On 5 February 2009 the qualification of the crime with which D. was charged was changed to Article 127 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code (Unlawful Deprivation of Liberty). The case-file material was sent to the Meshchanskiy District Department of the Interior for further investigation.","42.On 19 July 2009 an investigator from the Meshchanskiy District Department of the Interior discontinued the proceedings on the grounds of expiry of the procedural time-limit for prosecution.","43.It appears that subsequently the proceedings were reopened.","44.In 2012 the applicants were informed that on 26 November 2010 the proceedings had again been discontinued as time-barred.","51.The Nuremberg Code, formulated in August 1947 in Nuremberg, Germany, by American judges sitting in judgment of Nazi doctors accused of conducting human experiments in the concentration camps (the so-called Doctors\u2019 Trial) reads as follows:","\u201c1.The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.","This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.","The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.","2.The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.","3.The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.","4.The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.","5.No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.","6.The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.","7.Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.","8.The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.","9.During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.","10.During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and careful judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.\u201d","52.The Helsinki Declaration, adopted by the 18th World Medical Association\u2019s General Assembly in Finland in June 1964, with later amendments, states, inter alia:","\u201c20.The subjects must be volunteers and informed participants in the research project.","21.The right of research subjects to safeguard their integrity must always be respected. Every precaution should be taken to respect the privacy of the subject, the confidentiality of the patient\u2019s information and to minimize the impact of the study on the subject\u2019s physical and mental integrity and on the personality of the subject.","22.In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliations of the researcher, the anticipated benefits and potential risks of the study and the discomfort it may entail. The subject should be informed of the right to abstain from participation in the study or to withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal. After ensuring that the subject has understood the information, the physician should then obtain the subject\u2019s freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot be obtained in writing, the non\u2011written consent must be formally documented and witnessed.","23.When obtaining informed consent for the research project the physician should be particularly cautious if the subject is in a dependent relationship with the physician or may consent under duress. In that case the informed consent should be obtained by a well-informed physician who is not engaged in the investigation and who is completely independent of this relationship.","24.For a research subject who is legally incompetent, physically or mentally incapable of giving consent or is a legally incompetent minor, the investigator must obtain informed consent from the legally authorized representative in accordance with applicable law. These groups should not be included in research unless the research is necessary to promote the health of the population represented and this research cannot instead be performed on legally competent persons.","25.When a subject deemed legally incompetent, such as a minor child, is able to give assent to decisions about participation in research, the investigator must obtain that assent in addition to the consent of the legally authorized representative.","26.Research on individuals from whom it is not possible to obtain consent, including proxy or advance consent, should be done only if the physical\/mental condition that prevents obtaining informed consent is a necessary characteristic of the research population. The specific reasons for involving research subjects with a condition that renders them unable to give informed consent should be stated in the experimental protocol for consideration and approval of the review committee. The protocol should state that consent to remain in the research should be obtained as soon as possible from the individual or a legally authorized surrogate.\u201d","53.The United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care (A\/RES\/46\/119, 17 December 1991) read:","Principle 9Treatment","\u201c1.Every patient shall have the right to be treated in the least restrictive environment and with the least restrictive or intrusive treatment appropriate to the patient\u2019s health needs and the need to protect the physical safety of others.","...","3.Mental health care shall always be provided in accordance with applicable standards of ethics for mental health practitioners, including internationally accepted standards such as the Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the role of health personnel, particularly physicians, in the protection of prisoners and detainees against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. Mental health knowledge and skills shall never be abused.\u201d","Principle 10Medication","\u201c1.Medication shall meet the best health needs of the patient, shall be given to a patient only for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes and shall never be administered as a punishment or for the convenience of others. Subject to the provisions of paragraph15 of principle 11 below, mental health practitioners shall only administer medication of known or demonstrated efficacy ...\u201d","Principle 11Consent to treatment","\u201c...","15.Clinical trials and experimental treatment shall never be carried out on any patient without informed consent, except that a patient who is unable to give informed consent may be admitted to a clinical trial or given experimental treatment, but only with the approval of a competent, independent review body specifically constituted for this purpose ...\u201d","54.The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13December 2006 (Resolution A\/RES\/61\/106) and ratified by Russia on 25September 2012, provides:","Article 15Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment","\u201c1.No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his or her free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.","2. States Parties shall take all effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with others, from being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d","55.The Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine) (opened to signature at Oviedo on 4 April 1997), not yet ratified or signed by Russia, contains the following principles regarding consent and scientific research:","Chapter II \u2013 Consent","Article 5 \u2013 General rule","\u201cAn intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it.","This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.","The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.\u201d","Article 6 \u2013 Protection of persons not able to consent","\u201c1.Subject to Articles 17 and 20 below, an intervention may only be carried out on a person who does not have the capacity to consent, for his or her direct benefit.","2.Where, according to law, a minor does not have the capacity to consent to an intervention, the intervention may only be carried out with the authorisation of his or her representative or an authority or a person or body provided for by law.","The opinion of the minor shall be taken into consideration as an increasingly determining factor in proportion to his or her age and degree of maturity.","3.Where, according to law, an adult does not have the capacity to consent to an intervention because of a mental disability, a disease or for similar reasons, the intervention may only be carried out with the authorisation of his or her representative or an authority or a person or body provided for by law.","The individual concerned shall as far as possible take part in the authorisation procedure.","4.The representative, the authority, the person or the body mentioned in paragraphs2 and 3 above shall be given, under the same conditions, the information referred to in Article 5.","5.The authorisation referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above may be withdrawn at any time in the best interests of the person concerned.\u201d","Article 7 \u2013 Protection of persons who have a mental disorder","\u201cSubject to protective conditions prescribed by law, including supervisory, control and appeal procedures, a person who has a mental disorder of a serious nature may be subjected, without his or her consent, to an intervention aimed at treating his or her mental disorder only where, without such treatment, serious harm is likely to result to his or her health.","...\u201d","Chapter V \u2013 Scientific Research","Article 15 \u2013 General rule","\u201cScientific research in the field of biology and medicine shall be carried out freely, subject to the provisions of this Convention and the other legal provisions ensuring the protection of the human being.\u201d","Article 16 \u2013 Protection of persons undergoing research","\u201cResearch on a person may only be undertaken if all the following conditions are met:","i.there is no alternative of comparable effectiveness to research on humans;","ii.the risks which may be incurred by that person are not disproportionate to the potential benefits of the research;","iii.the research project has been approved by the competent body after independent examination of its scientific merit, including assessment of the importance of the aim of the research, and multidisciplinary review of its ethical acceptability;","iv.the persons undergoing research have been informed of their rights and the safeguards prescribed by law for their protection;","v.the necessary consent as provided for under Article 5 has been given expressly, specifically and is documented. Such consent may be freely withdrawn at any time.\u201d","Article 17 \u2013 Protection of persons not able to consent to research","\u201c1.Research on a person without the capacity to consent as stipulated in Article5 may be undertaken only if all the following conditions are met:","i.the conditions laid down in Article 16, sub-paragraphs i to iv, are fulfilled;","ii.the results of the research have the potential to produce real and direct benefit to his or her health;","iii.research of comparable effectiveness cannot be carried out on individuals capable of giving consent;","iv.the necessary authorisation provided for under Article 6 has been given specifically and in writing; and","v.the person concerned does not object.","2.Exceptionally and under the protective conditions prescribed by law, where the research has not the potential to produce results of direct benefit to the health of the person concerned, such research may be authorised subject to the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs i, iii, iv and v above, and to the following additional conditions:","i.the research has the aim of contributing, through significant improvement in the scientific understanding of the individual\u2019s condition, disease or disorder, to the ultimate attainment of results capable of conferring benefit to the person concerned or to other persons in the same age category or afflicted with the same disease or disorder or having the same condition;","ii.the research entails only minimal risk and minimal burden for the individual concerned.\u201d","56.For other relevant international and Council of Europe documents see Mifobova v. Russia, no. 5525\/11, \u00a7\u00a741-44, 5February 2015."],"27442":["6.The applicant was born in 1976 and is detained in correctional colony no. 2 in the Tatarstan Republic.","A.The applicant\u2019s state of health","7.Since 1999 the applicant has been suffering from progressive multiple sclerosis. He was designated with Category 1 disability as a result of that condition.","8.On 22 February 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of active membership of an organised criminal group between 1995 and 2005 and the murder or attempted murder of several people in 1999.","9.The applicant\u2019s health deteriorated significantly and rapidly in the detention facility, where his health complaints were not addressed in any way, as the facility did not have any medical specialists. In August 2012 the prison authorities recorded that the applicant\u2019s movement was impaired and that he was unable to walk without a cane.","10.In September 2012 the applicant suffered an epileptic seizure which resulted in paralysis of the left side of his body. Several days later an investigator authorised a forensic medical examination of the applicant to determine whether he was fit to stay in a detention facility. A medical examination, based, inter alia, on the results of an MRI exam performed by civilian experts from the Tatarstan Republic medical institute, led to the conclusion that the applicant was suffering from \u201ca serious condition preventing his detention\u201d. In particular, experts diagnosed him with progressive multiple sclerosis, left-sided hemiplegia (paralysis) in the cerebral spinal form, acute right-sided hemiparesis (muscle weakness of the right side of the body) with the persistent astheno-depressive syndrome, memory deterioration, partial atrophy of the visual nerves, symptomatic epilepsy with polymorphic partial motor and generalised attacks three to four times a month, arterial hypertension of the first degree, and light myopathy of both eyes. On 25September 2012 the applicant was released from detention.","11.On 29 May 2013 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment, to be served in a correctional facility under a strict regime. The trial court, however, decided that the applicant should not be placed in custody pending appeal proceedings. On 3 September 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment on appeal.","12.On 17September 2013 the applicant asked the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic to order a medical examination for him with a view to confirming that he was not fit for detention. The request was not processed.","13.The applicant was taken into custody on 8 October 2013. He was placed in a prison hospital in correctional colony no. 2 in the Tatarstan Republic.","14.In November 2013 the applicant underwent an MRI test and was examined by several doctors, including by a neurologist, from the prison hospital in correctional colony no. 2. Their decision issued on 23 November 2013 indicated that given the negative prognosis for and the severity of the applicant\u2019s condition, he should be sent for a forensic medical examination to determine whether he could be released early on health grounds. The doctors relied, inter alia, on the results of the MRI examination, which had shown that in comparison to the results of the previous MRI exam in September 2012 the applicant\u2019s illness had progressed significantly and demonstrated further negative dynamic. The applicant was informed by the prison administration that they would seek his immediate release on health grounds.","15.However, a week later the applicant was notified that an additional expert examination was to be performed. Two medical experts visited the applicant, spoke with him and informed him that his condition did not warrant release. On 20 January 2014 the applicant was served with a copy of an opinion by the two medical experts who had concluded that he did not suffer from any condition listed in Government Decree no.54 of 6February 2004 on illnesses warranting release on health grounds, as his condition had not yet reached the crucial stage which required early release.","16.Relying on a number of medical certificates and reports issued by medical specialists from civilian medical facilities, who had either treated him following his release from detention in September 2012 or had studied his medical history in 2013, the applicant argued that he was unable to care for himself and that he required constant assistance, care and medical treatment which the Russian penal system was not able to provide. In particular, a report issued in September 2013 by a neurologist from the Tatarstan Republican hospital indicated that the applicant had no movement on the left side of his body and could only partly move the fingers of his right hand and his right leg; he could not walk or sit without assistance; and he required assistance even if placed in a wheelchair. Another report indicated that the applicant was suffering from urethral dysfunction leading to involuntary urination, an additional element calling for constant care. The civilian doctors concluded that the stage of development of the applicant\u2019s illness was 9 (with death expected to occur according to that scale at stage10).","17.Having provided copies of his complaints to various Russian authorities, the applicant submitted that his requests for an independent medical examination to determine whether he could remain in detention, as well as his complaints about the lack of proper medical assistance, had gone unanswered.","18.The applicant argued that he spent his entire day in bed. Prison doctors, who had no proper training to deal with patients in his condition, came to see him only once every few days. He had not been bathed for months. He could not eat or drink unaided, so he received food once a day. He suffered from severe pain, as he could not defecate and the medical personnel only gave him an enema once every two weeks. He did not receive any treatment, and had not been seen in detention by specialists such as a neurologist.","B.The Rule 39 request","19.On 12 February 2014 the Court, in response to the applicant\u2019s request under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, decided to indicate to the Government that the applicant should be examined immediately by medical experts independent of the penal system, including by a neurologist and an epileptologist. The experts were to be asked whether the treatment and physical care the applicant was receiving was adequate for his condition, whether his current state of health was compatible with detention in the conditions of a correctional colony or a prison hospital, and lastly whether the applicant\u2019s current condition required him to be admitted to a specialised hospital or released. The Russian Government were also asked to ensure the applicant\u2019s immediate transfer to a specialised hospital if the medical experts concluded that he required to be admitted to such a hospital.","20.In response to the Court\u2019s request, the Government provided the Court with a typed copy of the applicant\u2019s medical history prepared by the detention authorities; certificates issued by the head of the applicant\u2019s correctional colony and the head of the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Tatarstan Republic; and a copy of the report drawn up on 25 December 2013 by a medical panel comprising the head, deputy head and senior inspector of the medical unit of the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Tatarstan Republic and a deputy head of the prison hospital of correctional colony no. 2, where the applicant was detained. Relying on those documents, the Government argued that the applicant was receiving adequate medical assistance and that the medical panel of the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Tatarstan Republic had concluded that \u201cthe degree of the manifestation of the applicant\u2019s condition (multiple sclerosis) did not [reach the level] which could be described as bodily function impairment\u201d warranting release in compliance with the Government\u2019s decree of 6 February 2004 which laid down a list of illnesses calling for inmates\u2019 early release.","21.The applicant commented on the Government\u2019s information, insisting that the medical assistance afforded to him was virtually non\u2011existent. He relied on his medical record, and stated that prior to the application of the interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court he had been prescribed over twenty different drugs, of which, as indicated in the record, he had only received five. At the same time the applicant argued that the medical record was a forgery, as he had in fact only received one drug. Following the application of the interim measure he had been allowed to obtain certain medication from his wife to treat the epilepsy. He further submitted that the prison hospital where he was an inmate did not have the necessary medical equipment. He had usually been taken to another hospital for examinations, or a specialist with the proper equipment had been allowed to visit him in the prison hospital. The prison hospital only employed a neurologist, a specialist who, according to her own assessment, did not have the skill to treat the applicant\u2019s complex condition. Despite the fact that the applicant\u2019s condition was progressing and that the prognosis for him was negative, the authorities had not taken any steps to alleviate his sufferings and safeguard his life and limb.","C.Developments following the application of Rule 39 and communication of the case to the Government","1.Developments","22.The applicant submitted that since March 2014 he had developed new health problems, but the medical staff of the prison hospital had failed to address the ongoing deterioration of his health. In particular, he had begun suffering from kidney pain, but no nephrologist was available in the prison hospital. On 18March 2014 the applicant was diagnosed with urinary tract infection, but no appropriate treatment followed. Several days later the applicant complained to an otolaryngologist of a purulent discharge from his left ear and severe pain. However, medical staff failed to comply with the otolaryngologist\u2019s recommendations.","23.At the request of the applicant\u2019s wife, on 18April 2014 he was examined by a panel consisting of the deputy head of the prison hospital and several prison doctors. The commission found that the applicant did not suffer from bodily function impairment warranting his release.","24.On several occasions the applicant\u2019s wife complained to the Prosecutor General and to the prison authorities, requesting an independent medical assessment. In their replies the authorities informed her that allegations of lack of adequate medical assistance had not been confirmed, and thus there were no grounds to order the applicant\u2019s medical examination.","25.However, on 29July 2014 a medical panel of the prison hospital, having confirmed the applicant\u2019s earlier diagnosis, recommended his early release. In August 2014 the applicant\u2019s wife lodged a motion for his release before the Privolzhskiy District Court of Kazan.","26.At the hearing held on 14November 2014 the District Court heard the applicant\u2019s attending prison doctor who stated that he had not and could not receive adequate treatment in respect of his multiple sclerosis in detention and that such treatment could only be provided in a specialised hospital, in particular in the Republican diagnostic centre of demyelinised illnesses. On the same day the District Court dismissed the motion for release. The applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed.","27.In the meantime, on 15 December 2014 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. 9 in the Chuvashia Republic to continue serving his sentence. Three days later, following a visual medical examination, he was admitted to medical unit no. 21 in the colony which was to determine the issue whether the applicant\u2019s condition called for his early release. According to the applicant, colony no. 9 did not employ a neurologist and had no means to deal with a patient of his health.","28.On 13 January 2015 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic quashed the decision of 14 November 2014 and sent the matter for a new examination to the District Court.","29.During the re-hearing on 19 February 2015 the Povolzhskiy District Court took note of the applicant\u2019s transfer to a new colony and decided that it no longer had territorial jurisdiction to examine the applicant\u2019s motion for release. The case was sent to the Tsivilsk Town Court in the Chuvashia Republic for further examination.","30.On 13 January 2015 a medical commission comprising three specialists from medical unit no. 21 issued a report finding that the applicant\u2019s condition made him eligible for an early release. That report was filed with the Tsivilsk Town Court which on 26February 2015 authorised the applicant\u2019s release, having relied on the report of 13 January 2015 and statements by the head of medical unit no. 21. The latter had testified to the gravity of the applicant\u2019s condition and the impossibility to provide him with adequate treatment or permanent general care and assistance in detention. The applicant was released on 11 March 2015 and taken by an ambulance to a hospital in Kazan.","2.Additional documents from the parties","31.The applicant provided the Court with expert opinions issued on 21March and 5August 2014 by neurologist M. from the Republican Medical Institute. Having examined the applicant and studied his medical file, the expert recorded negative dynamics in the applicant\u2019s neurological condition, and found that he had not received the drugs necessary to treat his multiple sclerosis. The doctor recommended that the applicant undergo specific treatment in the Institute or in foreign hospitals, and noted that the lack of such treatment could lead to irreversible deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health and eventually to his death.","32.The Government produced, in addition to the documents submitted by them in response to the Court\u2019s Rule 39 request, a number of certificates signed by the staff and administration of the prison hospital, as well as by a fellow inmate. According to those certificates, the applicant was provided with the necessary care in the hospital. Medical staff fed him three times a day, washed his face and ears every morning, cut his hair and nails, changed his bedding, and showered him once a week. Nurses gave him enemas and changed his catheter bag as often as necessary.","A.Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules, adopted on 11January 2006 at the 952nd meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies (\u201cthe European Prison Rules\u201d)","39.The European Prison Rules provide a framework of guiding principles for health services. The relevant extracts from the Rules read as follows:","\u201cHealth care","39.Prison authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care.","Organisation of prison health care","40.1Medical services in prison shall be organised in close relation with the general health administration of the community or nation.","40.2Health policy in prisons shall be integrated into, and compatible with, national health policy.","40.3Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.","40.4Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer.","40.5All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.","Medical and health care personnel","41.1Every prison shall have the services of at least one qualified general medical practitioner.","41.2Arrangements shall be made to ensure at all times that a qualified medical practitioner is available without delay in cases of urgency ...","41.4Every prison shall have personnel suitably trained in health care.","Duties of the medical practitioner","42.1A medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall see every prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is obviously unnecessary ...","42.3When examining a prisoner the medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall pay particular attention to ...","b.diagnosing physical or mental illness and taking all measures necessary for its treatment and for the continuation of existing medical treatment ...","43.1The medical practitioner shall have the care of the physical and mental health of the prisoners and shall see, under the conditions and with a frequency consistent with health care standards in the community, all sick prisoners, all who report illness or injury, and any prisoner to whom attention is specially directed ...","Health care provision","46.1Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialised institutions or to civilian hospitals when such treatment is not available in prison.","46.2Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities, they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide the prisoners referred to them with appropriate care and treatment.\u201d","B.3rd General Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (\u201cthe CPT Report\u201d)","40.The complexity and importance of health-care services in detention facilities was discussed by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture in its 3rd General Report (CPT\/Inf (93) 12 - Publication Date: 4June 1993). The following are extracts from the Report:","\u201c33.When entering prison, all prisoners should without delay be seen by a member of the establishment\u2019s health care service. In its reports to date the CPT has recommended that every newly arrived prisoner be properly interviewed and, if necessary, physically examined by a medical doctor as soon as possible after his admission. It should be added that in some countries, medical screening on arrival is carried out by a fully qualified nurse, who reports to a doctor. This latter approach could be considered as a more efficient use of available resources.","It is also desirable that a leaflet or booklet be handed to prisoners on their arrival, informing them of the existence and operation of the health care service and reminding them of basic measures of hygiene.","34.While in custody, prisoners should be able to have access to a doctor at any time, irrespective of their detention regime ... The health care service should be so organised as to enable requests to consult a doctor to be met without undue delay ...","35.A prison\u2019s health care service should at least be able to provide regular out\u2011patient consultations and emergency treatment (of course, in addition there may often be a hospital-type unit with beds) ... Further, prison doctors should be able to call upon the services of specialists.","As regards emergency treatment, a doctor should always be on call. Further, someone competent to provide first aid should always be present on prison premises, preferably someone with a recognised nursing qualification.","Out-patient treatment should be supervised, as appropriate, by health care staff; in many cases it is not sufficient for the provision of follow-up care to depend upon the initiative being taken by the prisoner.","36.The direct support of a fully-equipped hospital service should be available, in either a civil or prison hospital ...","38.A prison health care service should be able to provide medical treatment and nursing care, as well as appropriate diets, physiotherapy, rehabilitation or any other necessary special facility, in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by patients in the outside community. Provision in terms of medical, nursing and technical staff, as well as premises, installations and equipment, should be geared accordingly.","There should be appropriate supervision of the pharmacy and of the distribution of medicines. Further, the preparation of medicines should always be entrusted to qualified staff (pharmacist\/nurse, etc.) ...","39.A medical file should be compiled for each patient, containing diagnostic information as well as an ongoing record of the patient\u2019s evolution and of any special examinations he has undergone. In the event of a transfer, the file should be forwarded to the doctors in the receiving establishment.","Further, daily registers should be kept by health care teams, in which particular incidents relating to the patients should be mentioned. Such registers are useful in that they provide an overall view of the health care situation in the prison, at the same time as highlighting specific problems which may arise.","40.The smooth operation of a health care service presupposes that doctors and nursing staff are able to meet regularly and to form a working team under the authority of a senior doctor in charge of the service ...\u201d"],"27462":["1. The applicant, Ms Ebe Gigliola Giorgini, is an Italian national, who was born in 1933 and is under house arrest in Marina di Pietrasanta. She was represented before the Court by Mr D. Ammannato, a lawyer practising in Florence.","2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.","A. The circumstances of the case","1. First set of criminal proceedings","3. On 8 April 2008 the applicant was convicted of a number of criminal offences by the Forl\u00ec District Court. Such offences included criminal association, aggravated fraud, and ill-treatment.","4. On an unspecified date she lodged an appeal with the Bologna Court of Appeal.","5. On 22 June 2010 the Bologna Court of Appeal partly upheld and partly reversed the District Court \u2019 s judgment. The conviction for the offence of criminal association was upheld.","6. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation.","7. She states that on 4 July 2011 the President of Second Criminal Section of the Court of Cassation set the hearing for 15 November 2011.","8. On 24 October 2011 the National Criminal Lawyers \u2019 Association ( Unione Camere Penali italiane ) called a five-day strike, scheduled to run from 14 to 18 November 2011.","9. On 28 October 2011 the applicant filed additional written submissions with the court.","10. On 7 November 2011 the applicant \u2019 s counsel formally adhered to the strike and filed a notice to that effect with the Court of Cassation, having obtained the applicant \u2019 s consent in writing. For this reason, he was not present at the hearing of 15 November 2011.","11. It appears from the hearing record that the Prosecutor General requested that the Court of Cassation refrain from adjourning the hearing on account of the counsel \u2019 s absence. The court granted the prosecutor \u2019 s request and the hearing was held as scheduled.","12. In a judgment of 15 November 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant \u2019 s appeal.","2. Second set of criminal proceedings","13. On 9 June 2010 the Pistoia preliminary investigations judge ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention on suspicion that she had committed further offences. These included the offence of criminal association, of which the applicant was suspected of being the leader, promoter and organizer. The applicant was also suspected of having committed the offence of unauthorized practice of medicine. Specifically, she was suspected of providing medical advice and treatment, as well as prescribing drugs to adults and minors, and using her home as an unauthorized medical clinic. She was further suspected of fraud, aggravated by a number of factors including the exploitation of vulnerable individuals \u2019 pain and suffering, and the generation of ill-founded fears from which she profited. The preliminary investigations judge emphasised that the applicant had been previously convicted of similar offences.","14. It appears from the material in the case file that pre-trial detention had been requested on a number of grounds, namely the strong evidence against her, the seriousness of the suspected offences, and the significant risk that she might reoffend.","15. The applicant states that she was transferred to the Sollicciano correctional facility in Florence on 11 June 2010.","(a ) First request for modification of the detention order","16. On 21 July 2010 the applicant \u2019 s counsel lodged a request with the Pistoia preliminary investigations judge, seeking the replacement of the applicant \u2019 s detention with a more lenient custodial measure, such as house arrest. He argued that both her advanced age and allegedly critical state of health were incompatible with detention in prison.","17. On an unspecified date the judge ordered that she be examined by an independent medical expert with a view to determining whether this was the case.","18. In an order of 30 July 2010 the judge confirmed that the applicant would remain in custody, as the independent medical expert \u2019 s report had stated that her state of health was compatible with detention.","19. On 7 August 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Florence District Court on two main grounds. She contended that while under Article 275 \u00a7 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 37 below) the detention on remand of persons aged over seventy was only allowed if exceptional reasons warranting such a measure existed, in her case no such reasons could be detected. She further reiterated the argument that her advanced age and critical state of health were incompatible with detention in prison, contending that she suffered from life-threatening medical conditions she identified as cardiovascular disease, acute osteoporosis and diabetes. She also highlighted that she had undergone major surgical procedures in the past, including a gastrectomy, mastectomy, and hysterectomy, and suffered from anxiety disorder and glucose intolerance.","20. The Florence District Court, sitting as the authority with jurisdiction to decide on measures involving deprivation of liberty ( tribunale della libert\u00e0 e del riesame ), dismissed the applicant \u2019 s appeal on 1 October 2010. It found that the exceptional grounds for her to be detained on remand, as listed in the preliminary investigation judge \u2019 s order of 9 June 2010, still existed. It further pointed out that she had in the past been convicted of analogous offences and had, as soon as she had been released, resumed her criminal activity. As to the applicant \u2019 s health, the court drew on the expert medical report requested by the preliminary investigations judge to conclude that there was no incompatibility between it and her detention in a correctional facility. Referring to extracts from the report, the court observed that there was no evidence of an imminent risk of congestive heart failure or other life-threatening conditions, contrary to her contentions. It went on to acknowledge the expert \u2019 s finding that she had undergone several major surgical procedures in the past, but that these had allowed for the treatment of serious medical conditions, thus leading to an improvement in her clinical situation. Drawing on the report, it further concluded that the provision of special meals to meet her nutritional needs and the necessary drug therapy could be adequately taken care of in a correctional facility. It appears from the order that the court also examined medical reports submitted by the prosecutor and applicant \u2019 s counsel and took the latter into account when reaching its conclusions.","21. On 10 October 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation.","22. On 1 December 2010 she was committed for trial and the first hearing before the Pistoia District Court was scheduled for 22 March 2011. She was formally charged with all the suspected offences including criminal association, the unlawful practice of medicine, and aggravated fraud (see paragraph 7 above).","23. On 16 February 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible.","(b ) Second request for modification of the detention order","24. On 4 May 2011 the applicant \u2019 s counsel submitted a further request seeking the replacement of the applicant \u2019 s detention with house arrest, reiterating the argument that both her advanced age and state of health were incompatible with detention in prison. He relied, inter alia, on a medical certificate issued by the prison doctor on 5 April 2011, in which her clinical condition was described as \u201ccomplex and multifaceted\u201d and \u201cdifficult to manage\u201d in a regular correctional facility.","25. On an unspecified date the Pistoia District Court ordered a new medical examination with a view to assessing the compatibility of her state of health with detention.","26. On 5 May 2011 it dismissed the request for house arrest, having regard to the persistent danger that the applicant might reoffend. However, the court ordered that she be transferred to a correctional hospital ( centro clinico penitenziario ) in Pisa with a view to ensuring increased medical supervision and the provision of any necessary treatment, and preventing a further deterioration in her health. The court reached its conclusions by relying on a number of findings by the expert, who found that the gastrectomy performed in 1967 had left her with some long-term side effects, including insufficient absorption of calcium and vitamin D. He also noted with some concern that she had experienced height and weight loss and that her osteoporosis had worsened during the months spent in detention. In order to manage her condition effectively and prevent its deterioration, the expert noted that she would require small, frequent meals, a special diet enriched by dietary supplements, and some form of exercise. Finally, he pointed out a slight cerebral atrophy, coupled with a mild anxiety-depressive disorder.","27. On 10 May 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal, reiterating the incompatibility of her age and state of health with any form of detention, even in a correctional hospital.","28. On 20 June 2011 the Florence District Court, sitting as the authority with jurisdiction to decide on measures involving deprivation of liberty, placed the applicant under house arrest. It relied on the medical report submitted by the expert to the Pistoia District Court to conclude that an \u201cincompatibility in substance\u201d with detention existed in her case and that a less restrictive measure, such as house arrest, was preferable under the circumstances.","29. It ordered the applicant \u2019 s immediate release and set out the specific conditions of her house arrest, including the requirement that she stay in her home at all times, leave only with the authorities \u2019 prior permission, and refrain from contacting or interacting with anyone except her authorised cohabitees and medical staff.","30. On 23 June 2011 the public prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation.","31. On 19 October 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible.","(c) Third request for modification of the detention order","32. On 4 June 2012 the public prosecutor requested that the house arrest be substituted with detention on remand, as the applicant had breached its conditions. He provided evidence that, amongst other things, she had been in contact with several unauthorised individuals including co-defendants in the ongoing criminal proceedings and a number of her \u201cfollowers\u201d and \u201cadmirers\u201d.","33. On an unspecified date the Pistoia District Court ordered a new medical examination with a view to determining whether her state of health was compatible with detention.","34. On 6 July 2012 the Pistoia District Court granted the prosecutor \u2019 s request and remanded the applicant in custody, ordering that she be transferred at once to the correctional hospital in Pisa. It found that she had violated the terms of her house arrest, and that the situation which had arisen was conducive to her re-establishing the network which had supported her criminal activity. As to her health, the court drew on the medical report it had requested which stated that adequate monitoring and treatment of her medical conditions, as well as the provision of adequate nutrition in compliance with her special dietary needs, could be carried out in a correctional hospital. In particular, the expert noted that treatment of the applicant \u2019 s osteoporosis to prevent future damage to her bone structure would not in any way be hindered by her detention in such a facility. He added that while under house arrest, she had experienced three fractures, suggesting that the monitoring of her condition in a correctional hospital could be in no way considered inferior.","35. On 22 October 2012 the Pisa correctional hospital issued a medical certificate concerning the applicant \u2019 s state of health. It described her medical history and the outcome of various specialist consultations she had undergone in the facility in previous months. An orthopaedic specialist had confirmed her advanced osteoporosis and prescribed treatment, a cardiologist had reported good cardiac function, while an ophthalmologist had recommended that she undergo surgery for a cataract in her left eye. The report further contained a recommendation that the applicant undergo a colonoscopy. Concerns were raised regarding the difficulties encountered in the management of treatment and diagnostic tests which had required transporting her to external facilities. Both her cataract surgery and the colonoscopy had to be rescheduled due to the unavailability of police officers who should have escorted her to the external facilities. The doctors concluded that the continued detention of the applicant, albeit in a correctional hospital, could have resulted in the deterioration in her health.","36. On 18 December 2012 the applicant \u2019 s counsel submitted a request to the Florence Court of Appeal, seeking the substitution of the detention on remand with house arrest. He reiterated all the arguments raised at first instance and referred to extracts from the report issued by the correctional hospital on 22 October 2012.","37. The request was granted on the same day and the applicant was placed under house arrest.","38. According to the material in the case file, she is currently under house arrest, as the criminal proceedings against her are pending before the Court of Cassation.","B. Relevant domestic law and practice","Article 274 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure","39. Article 274 provides that a person may be detained pending trial:","\u201c(a) if detention is demanded by special and unavoidable requirements of the inquiry into the facts under investigation concerning a genuine and present danger for the production or authenticity of evidence and based on matters of fact which must, on pain of nullity, be expressly set out in the decision, which the judicial authority may take of its own motion...;","(b) if the accused has absconded or there is a real danger of his absconding, provided that the court considers that, if convicted, he will be liable to a prison sentence of more than two years;","(c) where, given the specific nature and circumstances of the offence and having regard to the character of the suspect or the accused as shown by his conduct, acts or criminal record, there is a genuine risk that he will commit a serious offence involving the use of weapons or other violent means against the person or an offence against the constitutional order or an offence relating to organised crime or a further offence of the same kind as that of which he is suspected or accused...\u201d","40. Under Article 275 \u00a7 4, individuals over the age of seventy may not be detained pending trial unless exceptional circumstances warrant the imposition of such a measure."],"27460":["1. The applicant was born in 1972. He is currently serving a prison sentence in \u015awinouj\u015bcie Remand Centre.","A. The circumstances of the case","2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:","1. The applicant \u2019 s medical condition and successive periods of detention","3. In 2005 the applicant suffered an acoustic shock. He was subsequently diagnosed as having a severe hearing impairment. An audiometric test carried out on 20 July 2005 confirmed 10 decibels hearing loss (dB HL) in his left ear and 80 dB HL in his right ear. Medical treatment he underwent in the Szczecin Military Hospital from 10 to 19 August 2005 did not result in an improvement of his condition. He was released from the hospital and further outpatient treatment was recommended.","4. Subsequent laryngological and surgical treatment and further consultations with a psychiatrist, neurologist and optician resulted in successive decisions to postpone the start of a seven-year prison sentence imposed on him by the \u015awinouj\u015bcie District Court on 15 May 2003. On 15 September 2005 the court postponed the start of his sentence until 15 March 2006 on health grounds (ref. no. VI Ko 199\/05). Having regard to the applicant \u2019 s medical records, it was of the view that serving the sentence would have been too harsh on him. On 25 May 2006 the court extended the period of postponement (ref. no. VI K 94\/06), referring to the applicant \u2019 s need to have further treatment.","5. He started his sentence on 10 July 2006.","6. The applicant was subsequently deprived of his liberty in a number of detention facilities, namely:","- \u015awinouj\u015bcie Remand Centre (from 10 July to 24 October 2006, 27 February to 21 March 2007, 18 July to 17 August 2007, 9 to 19 February 2010 and 18 November 2010 to 10 June 2011);","- Szczecin Remand Centre (from 24 October to 6 December 2006 and 17 January to 1 February 2007);","- Bydgoszcz Remand Centre (from 6 to 28 December 2006);","- Koronowo Prison (from 28 December 2006 to 17 January 2007);","- Goleni\u00f3w Prison (from 1 to 27 February 2007, 27 March to 18 July 2007, 17 August to 4 September 2008, 3 November 2008 to 5 February 2009 and 19 February to 18 November 2010);","- Katowice Remand Centre (from 5 to 17 September 2008);","- Nowy Wi\u015bnicz Prison (from 17 September 2008 to 28 October 2008);","- \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Remand Centre (from 29 October to 3 November 2008);","- Nowogard Prison (from 10 June to 10 November 2011).","7. The applicant was examined by doctors of various prisons \u2013 twice in 2006, on four occasions in 2007 and on nine occasions in 2008. The courts twice postponed the date on which he was to start serving his prison sentence.","2. The applicant \u2019 s efforts to obtain a hearing aid and applications for prison leave","8. On 31 August 2005 the applicant was provided with a medical prescription ( zlecenie lekarskie ) for a hearing aid for his right ear. Subsequently, on unspecified dates the competent court twice postponed the start of his prison sentence (see paragraph 7 above). While at liberty, he did not use a hearing aid and did not take any steps to obtain one.","9. On 22 June 2006 the applicant underwent another audiometric test, which gave similar results to the test on 20 July 2005 (see paragraph 6 above). At that time he had 75 dB hearing loss in his right ear. A subsequent medical certificate drawn up on 13 December 2006 demonstrated that his hearing had become worse, increasing to 80 dB hearing loss in his right ear and 30 dB hearing loss in his left ear.","10. On 31 March 2007 a laryngologist examined the applicant. He was informed that under Article 115 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, he could obtain a hearing aid at his own expense. Subsequently, he took steps to obtain a hearing aid without the help of the prison service. It appears that to that end he contacted the Institute of Physiology and Hearing Pathology ( Instytut Fizjologii i Patologii S\u0142uchu ) in Warsaw and had a medical appointment scheduled for 13 August 2007; however, he could not attend it as he was imprisoned at the time.","11. On 30 May 2007 he was registered for social insurance purposes as a person suffering from a moderate disability ( umiarkowany stopie\u0144 niepelnosprawno\u015bci ).","12. On 5 July 2007 the applicant requested the Penal Division of the Szczecin Regional Court (hereinafter \u201cthe penal court\u201d) to grant him short \u2011 term prison leave to attend the medical appointment scheduled for 13 August 2007 (see paragraph 13 above) and further medical check-ups at liberty. He did not make a formal request to attend the relevant hearing. He requested that a lawyer be appointed under the legal aid scheme to represent him before the court. He submitted that he did not feel mentally fit to argue his own case and that he had been undergoing psychiatric treatment for years.","13. On an unspecified date in August 2007 the court dismissed his request for legal aid.","14. On 16 November 2007 the Szczecin Regional Court informed the applicant that his application for prison leave would be examined at a hearing scheduled for 20 November 2007.","15. The hearing was held as planned, without him being present. The court dismissed his request for leave. It considered, with reference to the medical certificate, that his hearing impairment could be treated in prison, that his detention had not put his life directly at risk within the meaning of Article 150 \u00a7 2 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, and that the legal requirements for granting him leave had not been met.","16. The applicant appealed, submitting that he had been deprived of the right to argue his case before the court either in person or through a legal aid lawyer. He requested to be present at the appeal hearing.","17. On 17 January 2008 he was informed that an appeal hearing had been scheduled for 31 January 2008. On that date the Szczecin Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. He was not present at the hearing.","18. In its decision, the penal court referred to a medical certificate issued by a prison doctor on 7 August 2007. The court was of the view that, in the light of that certificate, the applicant \u2019 s condition could be successfully accommodated by the prison health care system. The court did not address the issue of the procedural shortcomings which had allegedly been committed by the Regional Court.","19. The applicant applied to the Polish Association of the Deaf to be provided with a hearing aid. The replacement hearing aid ( zast\u0119pczy aparat s\u0142uchowy ) was issued to him on 8 April 2008. He was entitled to use it until he was able to buy his own device, with the possibility of a partial refund by the National Health Fund.","20. The applicant secured a new date for a specialist medical consultation at the Institute of Physiology and Hearing Pathology on 7 April 2008, but he could not attend.","21. On 8 July 2008 the Szczecin Regional Court dismissed another request for prison leave on medical grounds. The court relied on the same reasoning and on the same 2007 medical certificate as in its January 2008 decision (see paragraph 21 above). The applicant appealed.","22. On 30 September 2008 the Szczecin Court of Appeal quashed the decision. On 8 October 2008 the applicant was granted legal aid for the purposes of his request for leave. Meanwhile, he was transferred to another prison in a different court circuit. Eventually, on 3 February 2009 the Szczecin Regional Court granted him six months \u2019 leave to allow him to obtain a hearing aid. He left prison on 5 February 2009.","23. During his leave, he asked the State Fund for the Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons ( Pa\u0144stwowy Fundusz Rehabilitacji Os\u00f3b Niepelnosprawnych ) and other organisations to finance the purchase of his hearing aid.","24. On 8 May 2009 the applicant was presented with an invoice from a private company that made hearing devices. The cost of a hearing aid fitted to his purposes was 1,888 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 500 euros (EUR)). He did not collect the hearing aid from the shop during his prison leave, because he could not afford to pay for it.","25. By a letter dated 12 May 2009 the \u015awinouj\u015bcie Family Assistance Centre ( Miejski O\u015brodek Pomocy Rodzinie ) informed him that they could not finance his hearing aid.","26. On 25 August 2009 the Szczecin Regional Court extended his leave for another six months until 5 February 2010 (ref. no. V Kow 1521\/09), as he had not managed to obtain a hearing aid within the period of leave previously granted to him. Subsequently, he obtained a left ear hearing aid. The total price of the aid with an ear insert was PLN 2,498 (approximately EUR 630). PLN 610 (approximately EUR 154) was refunded by the National Health Fund, while PLN 900 (approximately EUR 227) was refunded by the State Fund for the Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons. He paid approximately PLN 1,000 (approximately EUR 252) from his own means.","27. The applicant failed to report back to Goleni\u00f3w Prison at the end of his leave. He was arrested by the police and taken back there on 9 February 2010.","28. Once back in prison, he asked the prison authorities to provide him with a right ear hearing aid. They refused, referring to the principle that only people in employment were entitled to two hearing aids, including persons at liberty.","29. On 15 December 2010 a laryngologist issued an opinion that he should also be provided with a right ear hearing aid.","30. Subsequently, on 14 January 2011 the applicant applied to the Szczecin Regional Court for further prison leave (ref. no. V Kow 139\/11). He raised the issue of his hearing impairment. He submitted that he planned to undergo ear surgery and urological surgery. He was granted legal aid for the purposes of the proceedings. On 10 March 2011 the Szczecin Regional Court assigned a lawyer to represent him under the legal aid scheme.","31. On 5 April 2011 the Szczecin Regional Court refused his request for prison leave. The court referred to a medical certificate dated 1 March 2011, which indicated that he had been examined by laryngologists on several occasions, that he was suffering from hearing problems but had been using a hearing aid, that the certificate of 5 December 2010 had not recommended that it was absolutely necessary for him to also have a hearing aid for his right ear, and, lastly, that during the previous period of leave, he had committed another criminal offence and had not returned to prison on the due date.","The applicant was represented by the legal aid lawyer.","32. The applicant appealed and requested to be taken from prison to the appeal hearing. On 9 June 2011 the Szczecin Court of Appeal refused to allow his request. It was of the view that he had failed to refer to any circumstances that would justify his attendance in person, that the decision was to be taken on the basis of documents in his medical file, and that he was represented by a legal aid lawyer.","On the same date the court dismissed his appeal. It noted that it was not in dispute that he suffered from various ailments which necessitated medical care, but it was possible to provide treatment to him in prison. The court referred to a medical certificate and his laryngological consultations, none of which confirmed that he was in danger of becoming deaf. There was no need for him to be provided with a right ear hearing aid.","33. On 5 May 2011 the applicant was consulted by a laryngologist. The doctor was of the view that his very significant hearing loss made the use of a hearing aid for his right ear pointless. Furthermore, it was possible that the right ear hearing aid would interfere with the left ear hearing aid he had been using. The laryngologist did not recommend that he be provided with a hearing aid for his right ear.","34. As the laryngologists \u2019 opinions dated 15 December 2010 and 5 May 2011 were contradictory, another consultation was arranged on 29 August 2011 at the laryngological ward of the Pomeranian Medical University in Szczecin. Medication was prescribed as a result of this consultation. The conclusions of the opinion of 15 December 2010 as to the necessity of the applicant being fitted with a hearing aid for his right ear were confirmed.","35. On 30 August 2011 the applicant made another request to have a hearing aid provided by the penal authorities. The following day, after considering this oral request, the authorities decided to wait for the court \u2019 s decision as to the applicant \u2019 s possible prison leave.","36. On 8 November 2011 the Szczecin Regional Court granted six months \u2019 prison leave to the applicant (ref. no. V Kow 2435\/11 pr). He submitted, in support of his request, that because of his disability he had found it difficult to communicate with his fellow inmates and the prison guards, which had resulted in people being aggressive and intolerant towards him. He had been insulted and humiliated. Moreover, he could not attend the education classes offered in prison or fully engage in religious practices.","The court noted that the applicant was serving a six-year prison sentence. He suffered progressive hearing loss, atrophy of the hearing nerves, myopia, and hyperglyceridemia. He was afraid of losing his hearing and wanted to be treated. He had used a hearing aid since 2008, but his hearing had deteriorated. His hearing loss had caused him to have anxiety attacks and depressive thoughts. A detailed diagnosis of his hearing problems and surgical treatment, if necessary, was not possible within the confines of a prison.","37. On 10 November 2011 the applicant was provided with a right ear hearing aid paid for by the detention facility.","38. On 20 December 2012 a doctor working for the social insurance authorities declared the applicant partially unfit to work for the period ending 31 December 2013.","39. On 26 February 2013 the penal court granted the applicant further leave for the purposes of his medical treatment.","40. On 22 March 2013 he had an ear implant fitted during an operation in a civil hospital in Kajetany specialising in treating hearing disorders. In June 2013 the hospital scheduled twelve visits at three-month intervals, with the treatment ending on 20 March 2015, with a view to him having a clinical follow-up after each operation. On 26 September 2013 he attended a follow-up appointment at that hospital.","41. On 8 November 2013 he returned to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence. He submitted that the prison administration had not allowed him to attend a follow-up appointment scheduled for 27 November 2013.","3. Criminal investigation against the prison staff and administration","42. The applicant tried to institute criminal proceedings against the prison staff, alleging that they had failed to provide him with appropriate medical care.","43. On 14 August 2008 the Goleni\u00f3w District Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant against a decision by the Goleni\u00f3w District Prosecutor on 30 June 2008 ( Ds. 505\/08) refusing to open an inquiry into his allegations that the Goleni\u00f3w Prison doctor had put him directly at risk of severe health damage by refusing to authorise his diagnostic hearing tests and by failing to provide him with a hearing aid.","44. The prosecution authorities had found that the applicant had undergone medical tests in 2006. Since then, he had been under continuous medical care in prison. He was not considered to be at risk of suffering any damage to his health. It was also noted that the State was under an obligation to provide prisoners with only basic health care, and not to grant their ( often excessive ) wishes to receive specialist medical services and undergo unnecessary medical procedures.","45. On 10 March 2008 the \u015awinouj\u015bcie District Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against a decision taken by the District Prosecutor on 9 June 2007 ( Ds. 656\/07) discontinuing an investigation against the staff of the \u015awinouj\u015bcie Remand Centre who had allegedly put his life at risk by interrupting the medical treatment prescribed to him by the remand centre psychiatrist. It was established that the applicant \u2019 s psychiatric treatment had been temporarily interrupted because he had been moved to a smaller remand centre where, for reasons unspecified in the decision, his treatment could not be continued. However, this did not amount to a criminal offence. It was further held that a hearing aid was not absolutely necessary for the applicant. His hearing impairment made his detention more difficult, but it did not render it impossible or too harsh on him.","4. The applicant \u2019 s complaints to the penal authorities","46. By a letter dated 17 August 2007 the Szczecin Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service ( Okr\u0119gowy Inspektorat S\u0142u\u017cby Wi\u0119ziennej ) informed the applicant that complaints he had lodged on 27 July and 3 August 2008 concerning the administration of his medication, adequacy of his medical care and failure to provide him with a hearing aid had been declared ill \u2011 founded. It was established that (in the morning) a prison nurse and (in the evening) a prison guard administered psychotropic drugs to the applicant on prescription. He had received three injections, whereas the fourth injection, which he had asked for, was not required. The prison laryngologist had not considered it necessary for him to use a hearing aid. Accordingly, he had been informed that the device would not be financed by the prison health care system.","47. By a letter dated 30 June 2008 the governor of Goleni\u00f3w Prison informed the applicant that his complaint regarding the alleged irregularities in the administration of his medication had been considered ill-founded, as he had received it in a manner consistent with his prescription.","5. The applicant \u2019 s civil action against Goleni\u00f3w Prison \u2013 State Treasury","48. After lodging his application with the Court, on 14 July 1008 the applicant instituted a civil action against the State Treasury representing Goleni\u00f3w Prison (ref. no. I C 757\/08). Originally, his allegations concerned power cuts in the detention facility, being forced to take sleeping pills at 6. 30 p.m., the supposed presence of asbestos in the prison buildings, limited possibilities of employment, overcrowding and the lack of common space. During a hearing on 30 November 2011 the applicant stated that he was also claiming compensation for health damage he had sustained as a result of his irreversible hearing loss as well as the overall poor prison conditions.","49. The applicant \u2019 s claim concerned the period 1 February 2007 to 5 February 2009.","50. On 29 October 2009 an expert opinion prepared by a laryngologist was submitted to the court. The doctor stated that there was no doubt as to the applicant \u2019 s very significant hearing loss in his right ear, whereas an evaluation of the hearing loss in his left ear was more difficult and had not led to unequivocal results. The expert had regard to audiograms made on 13 December 2006, 16 July 2008, 29 August 2008, 8 December 2008, 12 February 2009 and 19 October 2009 and to a number of documents in the applicant \u2019 s medical records. There were discrepancies between results of different audiograms, as the applicant had over that time been examined by various people and with various apparatus. The applicant \u2019 s emotional state could also have had an impact on the results. Some results indicated a deterioration of his hearing, whereas other suggested an improvement from 2006 to 2009. It was noted that the applicant had been using a hearing aid since 4 April 2008.","The expert found that the applicant \u2019 s hearing without a hearing aid was \u201c socially efficient \u201d ( wydolne spo\u0142ecznie ), while with the aid it was good. He found that there were no grounds on which to establish that the applicant \u2019 s hearing had deteriorated as a consequence of his detention. He emphasised that usage of a hearing aid had no influence on the possibility of further deterioration as it neither cured nor prevented hearing loss; it only made the applicant \u2019 s social functioning more comfortable.","51. On 22 September 2010 the expert was questioned by the court, and upheld his conclusions.","52. On 29 December 2010 the Szczecin Regional Court was provided with an expert opinion by a psychiatrist concerning the applicant \u2019 s mental health. It was stated that it was not possible to carry out a full assessment without access to his medical records stored in the hospitals where he had been treated previously or without prior psychological tests. The applicant apparently suffered from various personality problems.","53. During the hearing on 30 November 2011 (see paragraph 51 above) the psychiatrist was questioned.","54. On 14 March 2012 the Szczecin Regional Court dismissed the applicant \u2019 s compensation claim, finding that there was no evidence to show that he had been attacked or ill-treated because of his bad hearing; that the medical reports had certified that he could have some difficulties following conversations held in a noisy room between a number of people; that his hearing was socially efficient; that there was no evidence to show that it had deteriorated during and because of his detention; that a hearing aid could assist him in everyday life but could not be regarded as treatment of his condition; and that the refusals to provide him with a hearing aid at the public \u2019 s expense did not result in the deterioration of his hearing, nor could be seen as humiliating or debasing treatment.","The court had regard to the applicant \u2019 s medical records, his correspondence with the Association of the Deaf, certain documents in the applicant \u2019 s prison records, the laryngologist \u2019 s opinion referred to above, and the testimony given by the prison laryngologist, E.P., the psychologist, the psychiatrist, the laryngologists and three other witnesses.","The applicant appealed.","55. On 29 June 2012 the Szczecin Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, fully sharing the findings and conclusions of the first-instance court.","B. Relevant domestic law","56. The provisions pertaining to medical care in detention facilities, and the relevant domestic law and practice are set out in the Court \u2019 s judgments in the cases of S\u0142awomir Musial v. Poland (no. 28300\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 48-61, 20 January 2009), and Kaprykowski v. Poland ( no. 23052\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 36-39, 3 February 2009 ). In particular, Article 115 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences ( Kodeks karny wykonawczy ) (\u201cthe Code\u201d) provides:","\u201c1. A sentenced person shall receive medical care, medication and sanitary items free of charge.","...","4. Medical care is provided, primarily, by health care establishments for persons serving prison sentences.","5. Health care establishments outside the prison system shall cooperate with the prison medical services in providing medical care to sentenced persons if necessary, in particular:","1) to provide immediate medical care because of a risk to the life or health of a sentenced person;","2) to provide specialist medical examinations, treatment or rehabilitation to a sentenced person;","3) to provide medical services to a sentenced person who has been granted prison leave or a temporary break in ... the sentence ...\u201d","57. On the basis of Article 115 \u00a7 10 of the Code, the Minister of Justice issued the Ordinance of 31 October 2003 on the detailed rules, scope and procedure relating to the provision of medical services to persons in confinement by health care establishments for persons deprived of liberty (Rozporz\u0105dzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwo\u015bci w sprawie szczeg\u00f3\u0142owych zasad, zakresu i trybu udzielania \u015bwiadcze\u0144 zdrowotnych osobom pozbawionym wolno\u015bci przez zak\u0142ady opieki zdrowotnej dla os\u00f3b pozbawionych wolno\u015bci). The Ordinance was in force from 17 December 2003 until 11 July 2010.","58. Health care establishments for persons deprived of their liberty provided, inter alia, medical examinations, treatment, preventive medical care, rehabilitation and nursing services (paragraph 1.1).","59. A person deprived of his or her liberty was subjected to preliminary and periodical medical examinations and check-ups (paragraph 2), and had to undergo preliminary medical examinations, such as a review of his or her medical history and a physical examination as soon as he or she was admitted to a detention establishment (paragraph 3). Moreover, no later than fourteen days from the admission date, a person deprived of his or her liberty had to have a chest X-ray and a dental examination.","60. Prison doctors were authorised to prescribe medical tests other than those mentioned above, if it was justified in the light of the health of the person deprived of his or her liberty (paragraph 3.5). Those tests, however, were not mandatory and could only be performed with a prisoner \u2019 s consent.","61. The Ordinance of 31 October 2003 was replaced by a largely similar text, the Ordinance of 23 December 2010, on the provision of medical services to persons in confinement by health care establishments for persons deprived of liberty (Rozporz\u0105dzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwo\u015bci z dnia 23 grudnia 2010 r. w sprawie udzielania \u015bwiadcze\u0144 zdrowotnych osobom pozbawionym wolno\u015bci przez zak\u0142ady opieki zdrowotnej dla os\u00f3b pozbawionych wolno\u015bci), which entered into force on 3 January 2011."],"27461":["1. The applicant, Ms Alisiya Yurieva Korpachyova-Hofbauer, is a Bulgarian national who was born in 1979 and lives in Wanfried, Germany. She was represented before the Court by her mother, Ms V. Shopova, who on 13 October 2014 was granted leave by the President of the Section under Rule 36 \u00a7 4 (a) of the Rules of Court to act on her daughter \u2019 s behalf in the proceedings before the Court.","2. The Bulgarian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms D. Dramova, of the Ministry of Justice.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and established by the Court, may be summarised as follows.","1. The applicant \u2019 s detention in Sveti Ivan Rilski State Psychiatric Hospital","4. On 6 February 2012 the applicant, who suffered from a schizoaffective disorder, attacked her mother with a knife in their home. The police, who had been called by the applicant \u2019 s mother, arrested the applicant and took her to a centre for psychiatric health in Sofia. She remained there until 22 February, when the Sofia District Court ordered her to be transferred to Sveti Ivan Rilski State Psychiatric Hospital in Novi Iskar for two months \u2019 compulsory treatment. The applicant appealed against that order, challenging in particular the court \u2019 s ruling as to the precise facility in which she was to be treated. Her mother, who was heard as a witness in the course of the appeal proceedings, also stated that she would prefer the applicant to be treated elsewhere, preferably as an outpatient. The Sofia City Court dismissed the appeal on 6 March 2012.","5. Sveti Ivan Rilski State Psychiatric Hospital, which is State-owned and operated, is situated at the outskirts of the town of Novi Iskar, at about one kilometre from the nearest neighbourhood, about eighteen kilometres from the centre of Sofia, and about four kilometres from Sofia \u2019 s ring road. It was created in 1949, using some of the premises of a nearby monastery, and consists of several buildings.","6. During the first week of her stay in that hospital, the applicant was placed under a \u201cheightened security regime\u201d, which meant she was not allowed to leave her ward unaccompanied. According to the hospital \u2019 s director, placing patients whose compulsory treatment had been ordered by a court under that regime was common practice as it allowed for an initial assessment of their condition.","7. After the first week the applicant \u2019 s regime was relaxed and she was allowed to move around the hospital grounds and take part in art therapy sessions. As her mental health improved \u2013 according to the Government as a result of the medication that she was given \u2013 her regime was relaxed even further, and between 15 and 17 March 2012 she was granted home leave. On 29 March 2012 her treatment continued on an outpatient basis, which meant that after that date she was only required to be present at the hospital during the day for medication and art therapy, but did not have to stay overnight.","8. The applicant \u2019 s compulsory treatment came to an end on 20 April 2012.","2. The conditions of the applicant \u2019 s detention in Sveti Ivan Rilski State Psychiatric Hospital","(a) The applicant \u2019 s allegations","9. The applicant submitted that during the first week of her stay in Sveti Ivan Rilski State Psychiatric Hospital she had been assaulted by another patient. In the course of the hearing of the applicant \u2019 s appeal against the Sofia District Court \u2019 s order for her compulsory treatment, the applicant \u2019 s mother gave evidence that the applicant had told her that on 29 February 2012 a newly arrived patient had assaulted her in the shower, pushing her in the chest. She had however not sustained any injuries as a result, and had not called for help, apparently because she had felt scared. When her mother had visited her the next day, 1 March, the two had brought the incident to the attention of three members of the nursing staff, who had advised the applicant to call for help if such an incident were to occur again. On the basis of that evidence, the appellate court accepted that an incident with another patient had taken place. However, it noted that the proper way to deal with such matters was not to seek transfer to another hospital but to inform the nursing staff and ask them to take steps to avert future incidents, which was exactly what had happened. In the course of the same hearing the applicant said that the temperature in the hospital was too low for her to feel comfortable and that as a result she had a sore throat.","10. According to the applicant, conditions in the hospital were quite poor, characterised by insufficient funding and staffing levels, inter-patient violence, low temperatures in winter and frequent flooding. The hospital \u2019 s director had herself said in media interviews that the premises were old and impractical, with broken and mouldy walls and broken tiles, and that there had been cases of violence, including on one occasion against the director herself.","(b) The Ombudsman \u2019 s 2012 report","11. In support of her allegations, the applicant referred to a report by the Ombudsman of the Republic of Bulgaria drawn up after members of his staff had inspected the hospital on 26 June 2012 in their capacity as designated national preventive mechanism under Article 17 of the 2002 Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ( 2375 United Nations Treaty Series 237 ), which entered into force in respect of Bulgaria on 1 July 2011.","12. The report began by noting that one of the hospital \u2019 s chief problems was its remoteness, which rendered access for patients \u2019 relatives difficult, especially in winter. The other big problem was that the premises and the hygienic and material conditions did not live up to the applicable medical standards. The buildings were old and in a \u201cdeplorable\u201d state of repair, despite partial renovation works carried out about a month before the inspection. The equipment was outdated and inadequate. As a result of a damaged dyke on the nearby Iskar River, the premises were flooded every year. The room in which food was being served to patients had leaks, mould on the ceiling and rusty equipment.","13. Patients were accommodated in rooms with three or four beds each. Each of the hospital \u2019 s wards housed about thirty-five patients and had two bathrooms and two toilets, found by the report to be \u201cutterly insufficient\u201d. Patients were allowed out of their rooms for one to one-and-a-half hours per day. Visits were permitted twice a week and had to take place in the yard, weather permitting. At the time of the inspection the hospital had one hundred and forty patients. Thirty-two of them were in the female ward, which was staffed by three medical doctors, one psychologist, eight nurses and ten orderlies. The hospital lacked almost all of the medical equipment required under the applicable regulations. It had never been audited, and did not properly record medical conditions other than the mental illnesses in connection with which the patients had been admitted. Patients who died in the hospital were not subjected to an autopsy, and patients who had to be restrained were not kept separate from other patients, as required under the applicable regulations.","14. In view of those findings, the report recommended that the hospital gradually be closed and transferred to new premises in Sofia.","15. In a letter to the Ombudsman dated 16 August 2014 in response to that recommendation, the Ministry of Health explained that the hospital \u2019 s possible relocation had been discussed on several occasions, but no decision had yet been taken.","(c) The 2014 audit report","16. Between 29 July and 1 August 2014 a team from the Ministry of Health audited the hospital, and on 18 August 2014 drew up a report. With regard to material conditions in the hospital, the audit report likewise noted that its premises were in a very poor state of repair and \u201cdangerous for the health and lives\u201d of patients and staff. It also noted that the buildings were regularly flooded, and that their foundations were not waterproof. Minor repair works such as repainting and a partial renovation of the roof had been carried out in 2012 and 2013.","17. The report, which also addressed the applicant \u2019 s situation, noted that the ward in which she had been kept had rooms with three or four beds each, and two bathrooms and toilets. The building, which had a local steam heating system, did not have proper isolation and could not be optimally heated. The nurses had kept records of room temperatures, taking the following readings at the time of the applicant \u2019 s stay: 17 degrees Celsius during the night of 23 February 2012, and 18 degrees Celsius during the nights of 25 February and 3 March 2012. The report also noted that in the applicant \u2019 s ward, patients were free to leave their rooms and move around. Those of them who, like the applicant initially, were placed under the \u201cheightened security regime\u201d were not allowed to leave the ward unaccompanied, in order to avoid acts of aggression, suicides or escapes, and were kept under constant supervision.","(d) Other information about conditions in the hospital","18. A report about the hospital aired by Darik Radio on 4 April 2011 and available online described derelict buildings with cracked walls, missing plaster and mould. According to that report, in winter temperature in some of the wards did not exceed 13 degrees Celsius. At the time of the journalist \u2019 s visit the hospital \u2019 s kitchen had been flooded. The poor state of the premises was also described in reports aired on 7 April 2011 by TV7 and on 24 January 2014 by Nova TV, also available online."],"27464":["5.The applicants were born in 1983, 1987 and 1988 respectively. MrKhlaifia (the \u201cfirst applicant\u201d) lives in Om Laarass (Tunisia); MrTabal and Mr Sfar (the \u201csecond applicant\u201d and the \u201cthird applicant\u201d) live in ElMahdia (Tunisia).","A.The applicants\u2019 arrival on the Italian coast and their removal to Tunisia","6.On 16 and 17 September 2011 the applicants \u2013 the first, then the second and third, respectively \u2013 left Tunisia with others on board rudimentary vessels heading for the Italian coast. After several hours at sea, their vessels were intercepted by the Italian coastguard, which escorted them to a port on the island of Lampedusa. The applicants arrived on the island on 17 and 18September 2011 respectively.","7.The applicants were transferred to an Early Reception and Aid Centre (Centro di Soccorso e Prima Accoglienza \u2013 \u201cCSPA\u201d) at Contrada Imbriacola where, after giving them first aid, the authorities proceeded with their identification.","8.They were accommodated in a part of the centre reserved for adult Tunisians. According to the applicants, they were held in an overcrowded and dirty area and were obliged to sleep on the floor because of the shortage of available beds and the poor quality of the mattresses. Meals were eaten outside, sitting on the ground. The centre was kept permanently under police surveillance, making any contact with the outside world impossible.","9.The applicants remained in that centre until 20September, when a violent revolt broke out among the migrants. The premises were gutted by fire and the applicants were taken to a sports complex on Lampedusa for the night. At dawn on 21September they managed, together with other migrants, to evade the police surveillance and walk to the village of Lampedusa. From there, with about 1,800 other migrants, they started a demonstration through the streets of the island. After being stopped by the police, the applicants were taken first back to the reception centre and then to Lampedusa airport.","10.On the morning of 22 September 2011 the applicants were flown to Palermo. After disembarking they were transferred to ships that were moored in the harbour there. The first applicant was placed on the Vincent, with some 190 individuals, while the second and third applicants were on board the Audace, holding about 150.","11.The applicants described the conditions as follows. All the migrants on each vessel were confined to the restaurant areas, access to the cabins being prohibited. They slept on the floor and had to wait several hours to use the toilets. They could only go outside onto the balconies twice a day for a few minutes at a time. They were allegedly insulted and ill-treated by the police who kept them under permanent surveillance and they claimed not to have received any information from the authorities.","12.The applicants remained on the ships until 27 and 29 September, respectively, when they were taken to Palermo airport pending removal.","13.Before being put on the aircraft, the migrants were received by the Tunisian Consul. According to the applicants, the Consul merely recorded their identities in accordance with agreements between Italy and Tunisia of April 2011 (see paragraphs 28-30 below).","14.On their application form the applicants claimed that at no time during their stay in Italy had they been issued with any document.","Annexed to their observations, the Government, however, produced three refusal-of-entry orders dated 27 and 29 September 2011 that had been issued against the applicants. Those orders, which were basically identical and drafted in Italian with a translation into Arabic, read as follows:","\u201cThe Commissioner of Police (Questore) for the Province of Agrigento","Having regard to the documents in the file, showing that","(1)on 17 [18] September 2011 members of the police force found in the province of Agrigento, near the border of island of Lampedusa, Mr [surname and forename] born ... on [date] ... Tunisian national ... not fully identified, being undocumented (sedicente);","(2)the alien entered the territory of the country by evading the border controls;","(3)the identification (rintraccio) of the alien took place on\/immediately after his\/her arrival on national territory, and precisely at: island of Lampedusa;","WHEREAS none of the cases [indicated in] Article 10 \u00a7 4 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 is at issue;","CONSIDERING that it is appropriate to proceed in accordance with Article 10 \u00a7 2 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998;","ORDERS","that the above-mentioned person be","REFUSED LEAVE TO ENTER AND RETURNED","INFORMS [AS FOLLOWS]","- An appeal may be lodged against the present order within a period of sixty days from the date of its service, with the Justice of the Peace of Agrigento.","- The lodging of an appeal does not suspend the enforcement (efficacia) of the present order.","- The director of the Migration Office will proceed, for the enforcement of the present order, with its service, together with a summary translation into a language spoken by the alien or into English, French or Spanish; and with its transmission to the diplomatic or consular delegation of the State of origin, as provided for by Article 2 \u00a7 7 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998; and with its registration under Article 10 \u00a7 6 of the said Legislative Decree.","To be escorted to the border at: Rome Fiumicino","[Issued at] Agrigento [on] 27[29]\/09\/2011 on behalf of the Commissioner of Police"," [Signature]\u201d","15.These orders were accompanied by a record of service, each with the same date, also drafted in Italian with an Arabic translation. In the space reserved for the applicants\u2019 signatures, both documents contain the handwritten indication \u201c[the person] refused to sign or to receive a copy\u201d (si rifiuta di firmare e ricevere copia).","16.On their arrival at Tunis airport, the applicants were released.","B.Decision of the Palermo preliminary investigations judge","17.Anti-racism associations filed a complaint about the treatment to which the migrants had been subjected, after 20September 2011, on board the ships Audace, Vincent and Fantasy.","18.Criminal proceedings for abuse of power and unlawful arrest (Articles 323 and 606 of the Criminal Code) were opened against a person or persons unknown. On 3 April 2012 the public prosecutor sought to have the charges dropped.","19.In a decision of 1 June 2012 the preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) of Palermo granted the public prosecutor\u2019s request.","20.In his reasoning the judge emphasised that the purpose of placing the migrants in the CSPA was to accommodate them and to cater for their hygiene-related needs for as long as was strictly necessary, before sending them to an Identification and Removal Centre (Centri di Identificazione ed Espulsione \u2013 \u201cCIE\u201d) or taking any measures in their favour. At the CSPA the migrants could obtain legal assistance and information about asylum application procedures.","The judge shared the public prosecutor\u2019s view that the interpretation of the conditions concerning the grounds for and duration of the confinement of migrants in a CSPA was sometimes vague. He found, however, that a range of factors were to be taken into consideration, leading to the conclusion that the facts of the case could not be characterised as a criminal offence (\u201cuna tendenziale forzatura dei requisiti della \u2018strumentalit\u00e0\u2019 e della \u2018ristrettezza temporale\u2019 \u00e8 spesso causata da una molteplicit\u00e0 di fattori che escludono con sicurezza la possibilit\u00e0 di configurare, in tali fattispecie, illeciti di rilievo penale\u201d).","He noted that the Office of the Commissioner of Police (Questura) of Agrigento had merely registered the presence of the migrants at the CSPA without taking any decisions ordering their placement.","21.According to the judge, the precarious balance on the island of Lampedusa had been upset on 20September 2011, when a group of Tunisians had carried out an arson attack, seriously damaging the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola and rendering it incapable of fulfilling its purpose of accommodating and assisting migrants. The authorities had then organised transfer by air and sea to evacuate migrants from Lampedusa. The following day, clashes had taken place in the island\u2019s port between the local population and a group of foreigners who had threatened to explode gas bottles. There had thus been a situation which was likely to degenerate, and which was covered by the notion of \u201cstate of necessity\u201d (stato di necessit\u00e0) as provided for in Article 54 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 32 below). It was thus an imperative, according to the judge, to organise the transfer of some of the migrants by using, among other means, the ships.","As to the fact that, in the emergency situation, no formal decision had been taken to place the migrants on board the ships, the judge found that this could not be regarded as an unlawful arrest and that the conditions for the migrants\u2019 transfer to CIEs were not satisfied. Firstly, the CIEs were overcrowded; secondly, the agreements with the Tunisian authorities suggested that their return was supposed to be prompt. The fact that a refusal-of-entry measure (respingimento) had been taken against the migrants, without judicial scrutiny, a few days after their arrival, was not unlawful in the judge\u2019s view. The calculation of a \u201creasonable time\u201d for the adoption of that measure and for the migrants\u2019 stay in the CSPA had to take account of logistical difficulties (state of the sea, distance between Lampedusa and Sicily) and of the number of migrants concerned. In those circumstances, the judge concluded, there had been no breach of the law.","Moreover, the judge was of the view that no malicious intent could be attributed to the authorities, whose conduct had been prompted first and foremost by the public interest. The migrants had not sustained any unfair harm (danno ingiusto).","22.In so far as the complainants had alleged that the way in which the migrants had been treated had been detrimental to their health, the judge noted that the investigations had found that nobody on the ships had applied for asylum. Those who, at the Lampedusa CSPA, had expressed an intention to do so, together with any vulnerable individuals, had been transferred to the centres of Trapani, Caltanissetta and Foggia. Unaccompanied minors had been placed in temporary accommodation and no pregnant women were transferred to the ships. The migrants on board had been able to receive medical assistance, hot water, electricity, meals and hot drinks. Moreover, as recorded in a press agency note of 25September 2011, a member of parliament had boarded one of the ships in the port of Palermo, and had observed that the migrants were in good health, that they were receiving assistance and were sleeping in cabins containing bed linen or reclinable chairs (poltrone reclinabili). Some of the Tunisians had been taken to hospital, others had been treated on board by medical staff. Accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (vice questore) and by police officers, the MP in question had talked with some of the migrants. He had thus been able to observe that they had access to prayer rooms, that the food was satisfactory (pasta, chicken, vegetables, fruits and water) and that the Civil Protection authority (Protezione civile) had provided them with clothing. Some of the migrants had complained of a lack of razors, but the MP had observed that this could be explained by a measure taken to prevent self-harm.","23.The judge noted that, even though the migrants had not been in custody or under arrest, a photograph published in a newspaper had shown one of them with his hands bound by black ribbons and in the company of a police officer. He had been part of a small group of individuals who, fearing immediate removal, had engaged in acts of self-harm and had caused damage to buses. In the judge\u2019s view, the restraint in question had been necessary to guarantee the physical well-being of the persons concerned and to avoid aggressive acts against police officers who were neither armed nor equipped with any means of coercion. In any event, the conduct of the police officers had been justified by a \u201cstate of necessity\u201d, within the meaning of Article 54 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 32 above).","24.In the light of the foregoing, the preliminary investigations judge took the view that the file contained no evidence of the physical and mental elements of the offences provided for in Articles 323 and 606 of the Criminal Code.","C.Decisions of the Agrigento Justice of the Peace","25.Two of the migrants against whom a refusal-of-entry order had been issued challenged those orders before the Justice of the Peace for Agrigento.","26.In two decisions (decreti) of 4 July and 30 October 2011, respectively, the Justice of the Peace annulled those orders.","In his reasoning the Justice of the Peace observed that the complainants had been found on Italian soil on 6May and 18September 2011, respectively, and that the orders at issue had been adopted only on 16 May and 24September 2011. Admittedly, Article 10 of Legislative Decree no.286 of 1998 (paragraph 27 below) did not indicate any time-frame for the adoption of such orders. Nevertheless, in his view, a measure which by its very nature restricted the freedom of the person concerned had to be taken within a reasonably short time after the identification (fermo) of the unlawful migrant. To find otherwise, concluded the judge, amounted to allowing de facto detention of the migrant in the absence of any reasoned decision of the authority, which would contravene the Constitution."],"27468":["A.Background to the case","5.The second applicant was born in 1976 and the first applicant in 2001 and they live in Zadar.","6.On 23 June 2001 the second applicant married I.M.","7.On 4 September 2001 the second applicant gave birth to the first applicant.","8.Relations between the spouses deteriorated, and in 2006 the second applicant brought a civil action against her husband seeking divorce, custody of, and maintenance for the first applicant. Her husband, I.M., filed a counterclaim, seeking custody of the first applicant.","9.In the period between 5 July 2006 and 7 March 2008 a total of eight criminal complaints were filed against the second applicant and I.M. Most of these complaints were filed against each other directly, but some were filed at the initiative of the police. Three of those eight complaints resulted in criminal proceedings being instituted (two against I.M. and one against both I.M. and the second applicant), the outcome of which is unknown. The remaining five criminal complaints were dismissed, including three in which it was alleged that criminal offences of child abuse and domestic violence had been committed against the first applicant.","10.By a judgment of 24 August 2007, the Zadar Municipal Court (Op\u0107inski sud u Zadru) (a) granted the second applicant and I.M. a divorce; (b) awarded I.M. custody of the first applicant; (c)granted the second applicant access (contact) rights; and (d) ordered the second applicant to make regular maintenance payments for the first applicant. In so deciding the court relied on the opinion of forensic experts in psychiatry and psychology obtained during the proceedings and on the recommendation of the Zadar Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Zadar, \u201cthe local social welfare centre\u201d) which participated in those proceedings as an intervener sui generis with a view to protecting the first applicant\u2019s interests. The judgment became final on 2 January 2008.","11.Previously, by a decision of 7 November 2006 the local social welfare centre had ordered a child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority in respect of the first applicant. The measure was imposed with a view to improving communication between the second applicant and I.M. regarding the first applicant, and also with a view to preventing her from being drawn into their conflict. The measure lasted until 31 August 2008, when it was discontinued. In its decision of 2 September 2008 the local social welfare centre stated, inter alia, the following:","\u201cThe measure only partly achieved its goal, in that contact with the mother has stabilised. The parents still do not communicate with each other and it is evident that the mother intends to continue with such behaviour. Furthermore, the mother\u2019s cooperation with the supervising officer is not adequate and it is evident that the measure has become futile.\u201d","B.The alleged abuse","12.The applicants submit that on 1February 2011 the first applicant\u2019s father I.M. hit her in the face and squeezed her throat while verbally abusing her.","13.The next day the second applicant took the first applicant to the police to report the incident. The police instructed them to see a doctor and accompanied them to the local hospital, where the first applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist, who diagnosed her with bruising of the eyeball and eye socket tissue. In particular, the ophthalmologist noted:","\u201cClinically discrete haematoma of the left lower eyelid, in resorption. The motility of the eyes is normal, no diplopia [double vision], no clinical signs of orbit fracture.","Pupils are normal, lenses [are] in place, transparent, fundus [is] normal on both sides.","Dg.: Contusio oc.sin.","Haematoma palp.inf.oc.sin.","Treatment: cold wraps [compresses] ... Into the eye: Effludimex sol ...","Dg:","S05.1. Bruising of the eyeball and the eye socket tissue\u201d","14.After examining the first applicant the ophthalmologist filled in a standard form to be submitted to the police, in which he indicated that the injury had been inflicted by a hard blow to the left eye, gave bruising of the left eyelid (haematoma palp.inf.oc.sin.) as his diagnosis, and described the injury as light.","15.The applicants then returned to the police, where they both gave statements. In her statement the first applicant mentioned other instances of physical and psychological violence by her father in the past three years. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with the first applicant reads as follows:","\u201cThis interview was conducted regarding the violent behaviour of the [child\u2019s] father I.M.","[The child] stated that yesterday around 4 p.m., when she was getting ready to visit her mother D.M., she wanted to take a picture frame containing a lock of her hair which her mum had had framed when she had had her first haircut. She put the picture frame underneath her jacket because she knew that her dad would not allow her to take that picture frame to her mum. Then his girlfriend I.P. saw that she had something under her jacket and asked what it was. She replied that it was nothing. Then her father came and took the picture frame from under her jacket and told her that they would talk about it when she came home in the evening.","...In the evening, around 8 p.m., mum took her back to her dad, who brought her into the room and called her a thief, hit her with his hand on the left eye, and started squeezing her neck and pushing her. During this she fell, but did not hurt herself because she fell on a bag which was on the floor. Then she vomited saliva because she felt nauseous from her father\u2019s squeezing her neck. Then [her father\u2019s partner] I.P. came and told her father to calm down, otherwise she [the first applicant] would vomit ... He then left and sat in the living room. She was very afraid and was crying, but nevertheless went to her room and did her homework for the next day. When she woke up in the morning she greeted her father with \u2018good morning\u2019 but he did not even look at her and just turned his head away. In the morning she felt slight pain under the left eye where her father had hit her. When she arrived at school she mentioned it to her teacher and her friends P. and A., because she felt the need to confide in someone.","Today she went to her mum and told her everything that happened that evening. She was also very hurt when her dad rudely [swore at] her. He often does that, and did so [also] yesterday evening. He also called her a \u2018cow\u2019 and told her she was stupid. Because of his rude language she cried a lot thereafter. Dad tells her from time to time [to go to hell] and she does not like swearing, especially when he mentions her mum while doing so. A few months ago the father told her that through his friends he would ensure that she never heard from or saw her mum. She is therefore very afraid of her dad because he can be dangerous. She had seen her dad beating her mum and was therefore afraid that he might beat her the same way too. She states that her father is often rude to her, yelling at her, forcing her to eat food she does not like, and when she does not, grabs her chin and shoves the food into her mouth, which makes her feel sick. He often takes away her mobile phone so she cannot call her mum, and she would like to be in contact with her mum. Once he hit her on the leg with a hairbrush when she would not allow him to brush her hair. He also grabs her arm and squeezes it so hard that she has bruises afterwards. She states that she is very afraid of her dad and would like to live with her mum. Tonight she definitely does not want to go with her father but wants to stay with her mum. She is afraid that her father will beat her and yell at her. He often threatens her by waving his hand at her and saying \u2018look at it, look at it\u2019, with the intention of hitting her if she does not listen to him. The father also threatens to cut off her hair, knowing that she likes [her] long hair. He threatens her with that when she is crying for her mum, bites her fingernails or asks for a mobile phone. Dad often tells her that she must not love her [maternal] grandmother, [her mother\u2019s partner] N. or his mum, whereas she loves them all.","She further states that each time her mum or [her mother\u2019s new partner] N. buys her something and she brings it to her father\u2019s home he throws all those things into the rubbish. Therefore, she wears the things her mum bought her only when she goes to her mum\u2019s place, as she is not allowed to wear them when she is at her dad\u2019s home.","Lastly, she states that she is very afraid of her dad and [particularly] ... that he might do something bad to her mum, because he constantly threatens to do so.","The interview was conducted in the presence of a social worker from the Zadar Social Welfare Centre V.C.\u201d","16.The same day the police interviewed I.M. and his partner I.P. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with I.M. reads as follows:","\u201cThe interview was conducted in the presence of his advocate B.Z., regarding the complaint that he had hit his minor daughter ... In that connection he stated the following:","...","[He says that his former wife] does not regularly pay maintenance for [their] daughter ... amounting to 800 Croatian kunas (HRK) per month and up to the present day owes [him] HRK 15,000.","[He submits that], sadly, [his former wife] manipulates their daughter ... and uses her so that she rejects everything that bears [his] surname. She even created a Facebook page for her under ... the surname of her current partner ...","As regards his relationship with his daughter ..., [he] states that he, as a parent who wants to teach his child to respect work and discipline, has his duties, and that the child has to have certain discipline, [for example] she must not lie to her parents, and may not do whatever she pleases. When [his daughter] comes back from school ... he requires her to do her homework and study. As regards food, [he] states that he wishes [his daughter] to eat healthy and varied food, with fruit and vegetables, rice and meat, and that she does not only eat pizzas, sandwiches and sweets. He also does not like to throw away food and prefers that it is eaten.","On 1 February 2011 around 3.50 p.m. [his daughter] was preparing to go to her mother and came into the kitchen to say goodbye. On that occasion [his partner] I.P. noticed that she had something under her jacket ... and asked what it was. [The daughter] replied that it was nothing, even though there was visibly something underneath it. He asked her to open her jacket. [Then they realised] that she had taken a glass picture frame containing the locks of her hair cut off when she was still a baby. [He] then asked her why she had not asked to take it instead of doing it the way she did, stealing from her own house. [The daughter] said that it was for her mum and that if she had asked him if she could take it he would not have allowed it. Then he told her to go to her mum and that they would talk about it later, when she came home.","[The daughter] came home at 8 p.m. and they continued their conversation because he wanted to tell her that what she had done was bad and that she should have asked instead of stealing things from the house and taking them to her mother. [His daughter] replied that she wanted [the picture frame] to be at her mother\u2019s place. [He] then reprimanded her for lying to him, saying that what she had done was sad or bad and that she always had to tell the truth because he did not tolerate lies and that all problems would be solved the way they had been solved so far. He admits that he is sometimes a strict parent but that he always behaves in a measured way and with [good] reason, and it is only ever exclusively done with a view to making her behave [better].","Today, on 2 February 2011 [his daughter] was at school in the morning and in the afternoon was having fun with [him] and his [partner] ... Nothing suggested that [she] was in any way distressed by the previous evening\u2019s events.","[He] emphasises that all this was fabricated by her mother ... who has a negative influence on [their daughter].\u201d","17.The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with I.M.\u2019s partner I.P. reads as follows:","\u201cThe interview was conducted regarding a complaint that I.M. had hit his minor daughter ... In that connection she stated the following:","On 1 February 2011 around 3.50 p.m. [her stepdaughter] was preparing to go to her mother and came into the kitchen to say goodbye to them. On that occasion [I.P.] noticed that she had something under her jacket ... and asked her what it was. [Her stepdaughter] replied that it was nothing, even though there was visibly something underneath her jacket. I.M. asked her to open her jacket. [Then they realised] that she had taken a glass picture frame containing locks of her hair cut off when she was a baby. [He] then asked [his daughter] why she had not asked to take it instead of doing it the way she did, stealing from her own house. [The stepdaughter] said that it was for her mum, and that if she had asked him for it he would not have allowed it. Then he told her to go to her mum and that they would talk about it later, when she came home.","[The stepdaughter] came home at 8 p.m. and she and her father continued their conversation, because he wanted to tell her that what she had done was bad and that she should have asked instead of stealing things from the house and taking them to her mother. [The stepdaughter] replied that she wanted [the picture frame] to be at her mother\u2019s place. I.M. then reprimanded her for lying to him, by saying that what she had done was sad or bad and that she always had to tell the truth because he did not tolerate lies and that all problems would be solved the way they had been solved so far. I.P. firmly states that on that occasion I.M. did not hit [his daughter], nor has she ever seen him hitting [her]. She says that I.M. has a temper and sometimes shouts when he considers that something is wrong, but that he is really not prone to physical violence or hitting the children. I.P. notes that [her stepdaughter] is generally very sensitive about her mother and immediately starts crying as regards anything related to her.\u201d","18.After the interviews, the first applicant was returned to her father I.M., following the intervention of an employee of the local social welfare centre.","19.On 19 February 2011 the first applicant was, at the initiative of the second applicant, examined by a psychiatrist at the Psychiatric Hospital for Children and Young People in Zagreb. The relevant part of the psychiatrist\u2019s observations reads as follows:","\u201cThe child was with the mother at the police station and reported the incident [of 1February 2011] because the mother, and also the child, claim that this was not the first time that the father has mistreated [the child], although not so much physically as psychologically ...","During the interview with the girl it is evident that the child gets very upset at the mention of the father, she is afraid of him, \u2018constantly thinks that he will hit her again and would like to stay with mum\u2019. Dad is allegedly constantly threatening that he will \u2018cut off her hair if she keeps crying and mentioning mum ...\u2019 he often swears and utters vulgar expressions against the mother;all this was allegedly reported to the police ... (the interview was conducted first with the mother alone and then with the girl, also alone; [the child] talks about it all through tears and while biting her fingernails) ....","The girl says that she remembers that \u2018she was asked when she was little with whom she wished to live and that she said with dad because she was told that she had to say that, now she regrets it\u2019 (she is crying all the time).","The girl otherwise appears to have good intellectual capacity; she functions well outside the family, and is an A-grade pupil. There are no signs of psychotic disorder, and the girl is emphatic in contact except when she gets upset and talks rapidly when the topic of the father and his relationship with her is raised (thus there is an impression of strong fear of the father).","Given the complexity of the family situation (the father has remarried and [the child] lives with him, his new wife, her daughter from her first marriage and two small half-sisters, while the mother also has a new partner with whom she has a small son) and the evident traumatisation of the child which has probably already lasted a long time, a psychiatric assessment of the child is recommended.","Until then ... I recommend taking the girl to a psychologist ...","Dg. Abused child, T 74.8\u201d","20.On 5 March 2011 the second applicant took the first applicant to a psychologist in Zagreb, who, inter alia, made the following observations:","\u201cThe interviews, which were conducted with the mother alone and separately with the girl, indicate that the child is afraid of her father because he psychologically and sometimes physically abuses her ...","The girl ... says that she would gladly live with mum if she could, and that dad speaks badly of mum ...","The results show that [the child] is emotionally attached to her mum and thinks that her dad does not love her, is afraid of him, does not trust him, and thinks that it is not fair that dad constantly yells at her even when she is not at fault. Her biggest wish is to live with her mum and her family, and she finds it difficult to return to her dad\u2019s home. She identifies with her mother and thinks that they are very much alike.","Findings: [The girl] is a traumatised child with well above-average mental abilities, strong self-control, neuroticism, depressive affect, hypersensitive, anxious with strong inferiority complex. Discrete tremor is diagnosed.","I recommend psychological and, if need be, psychiatric counselling.\u201d","21.On 30 March 2011 the Zadar Municipal State Attorney\u2019s Office (Op\u0107insko dr\u017eavno odvjetni\u0161tvo u Zadru, hereafter \u201cthe State Attorney\u201d) informed the second applicant that on the same day it had, concerning the incident of 1 February 2011, indicted I.M. before the Zadar Municipal Court for the criminal offence of bodily injury defined in Article98 of the Criminal Code (for a more detailed description of the course of those proceedings see paragraphs 35-51 below).","22.On the same day, 30 March 2011, the second applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Zadar Municipal Court seeking reversal of the custody arrangements set forth in that court\u2019s judgment of 24 August 2007 (see paragraph 10 above; for a more detailed description of the course of those proceedings see paragraphs 60-81 below).","23.On 22 April 2011 the second applicant took the first applicant back to the same psychologist (see paragraph 20 above). The psychiatrist made the following observations:","\u201c...The interview with [the child] was conducted without her mother\u2019s presence.","In contact silent, with depressive affect, cooperative, bites her fingernails, occasionally cries. We again had a conversation about the events of 1 February 2011 during which the child was psychologically and physically abused by her father, and which she in her mother\u2019s presence reported to the police.","[The child] says that that was not an isolated incident and that she is afraid of her father because she has continuously, from the moment she started living with him, been exposed to psychological and, from time to time, also physical abuse. She says that on multiple occasions he has threatened that he would hit her if she kept biting her fingernails and that he would take her mobile phone away. Previously she was more afraid of her father\u2019s physical violence than now, but her mother encourages her by telling her not to be afraid and to \u2018endure difficult moments\u2019. The child states that she does not like living with her father because he threatens her and tells her that he will beat her. She says that mum loves her more, does not threaten her and is good to her. She uses suppression and \u2018forgetting\u2019 as defence mechanisms ...","The child states that the father yells at her almost every day, swears, tells her that she is a \u2018stupid cow, pig, goat, thief, that she constantly defies him\u2019. She says that this offensive behaviour by her father is rarer since she reported him to the police.","[The child] says that the father has threatened her that he will, through \u2018his people\u2019, take care that she does not hear from or see her mother. He threatens her that he will cut off her hair if she cries for her mother.","The child alleges that her father forces her to eat so that she has to eat everything he puts on her plate and that she sometimes vomits because of that. If she refuses to eat everything the father holds her chin and \u2018shoves\u2019 the food in her mouth. If she resists, he smears the food over her face.","After she reported him to the police, the father controlled himself for a couple of days, and then again started yelling but then to a lesser degree. He no longer shoves food in her mouth, but she has to eat everything he puts on her plate. Sometimes she has to eat something that she does not like, which the mother never does to her.","[The child] is lonely at her father\u2019s home, because she spends time only with her half-sisters; her friends are not allowed to visit in case [the younger half-sister] gets sick. After school the father allows her to meet with friends for half an hour only. She visited one of her friends only once and she did not dare to ask the father for more visits. She thinks that her father is stricter with her than with her older half-sister.","I found out that the father speaks badly of the mother and her new partner in front of the child, that she has different clothes at her mother\u2019s and her father\u2019s places, and that the father threw the sneakers she got as a birthday present from her mother and her partner into the rubbish.","Asked about her father\u2019s wife, she says that she is better to her than her father: does not force her to eat, has never hit her, helps her with homework, and brushes her hair.","The child shows a strong desire to live with her mother because she is emotionally closer to her, and because the mother supports her in difficult moments. She has many friends in her mother\u2019s neighbourhood and is encouraged to spend time with them; she has fun and feels safe with her mother. Asked about [the behaviour of] her mother\u2019s partner towards her, the child says he is good to her and tries to cheer her up, buys her presents, and is fun and pleasant to talk to.","To the question whether, if she were to live with her mother, she would be allowed to see her father outside the visiting schedule ordered by the court, she says that it is certain that her mum would allow her to see her father whenever she wished to and states that \u2018she would like to move to her mum\u2019s [place] right away and forever\u2019.","Findings and recommendations: In order to prevent the development of irreversible psychopathological consequences due to continuous abuse, it is recommended that the child be immediately removed from the family where she currently lives and that custody be awarded to the mother.","Psychological and if need be, psychiatric follow-up is also recommended.\u201d","24.On 4 May 2011 the second applicant again took the first applicant to the police to report another instance of abuse by her father, who had allegedly pressured her to change her earlier statements made before the police and the experts. The relevant part of the police record of the interview conducted with the first applicant on that occasion reads as follows:","\u201cThis interview was conducted regarding inappropriate behaviour of the [child\u2019s] father I.M.","[The child] stated that a couple of days ago her dad\u2019s girlfriend I. asked her whether she had visited a certain lady in Zagreb with her mum. She had replied that she had, whereupon I. had asked her what she had talked about with that lady in Zagreb and why she had not said anything about [it] to her dad. She replied that she had forgotten to mention it. After that her father had called her on her mobile phone and asked her to come to his caf\u00e9 ... immediately. When she had arrived there he had started yelling at her and asking why she had been saying bad things about him and why she had not told him that she had been in Zagreb ... After that he had told her that she was lying like a dog and told her to get out of his sight.","... Afterwards her dad had kept asking her whether she really wanted to live with her mum and she always replied that she did. A couple of days ago he had told her that she would not live with her mum until she was eighteen years old.","[The child] also states that he said that he would report her mum for taking her to a doctor in Zagreb, and that she [the mother] would receive a criminal complaint for [having done] that. He [also] told her that he would now take her to a psychologist and to some other people where she would have to say that he had not hit her and that he was good to her.","Today he had again asked her whether she really wanted to live with her mum and she had again replied to him that she did want to live with her mum.","This interview was conducted in the presence of the [child\u2019s] mother ...\u201d","25.On 7 May 2011 the first applicant\u2019s father took her to a psychiatrist at the Polyclinic for the Protection of Children in Zagreb, who, after studying the opinions of 19 February, 5 March and 22 April 2011 (see paragraphs 19, 20 and 23 and above) and interviewing the first applicant, in his observations noted, inter alia, the following:","\u201cIt is evident that [the child] is very burdened by her parents\u2019 conflict and the inadequacy of their mutual communication, which frequently goes through her. The girl shows affection towards, rather than fear of, her father. However, when asked what happened [on 1 February 2011] she did not want to talk about it; she was visibly emotionally burdened so I did not insist on it. She freely expresses her dissatisfaction by saying that she does not like it when her father raises his voice. Asked when that happens, she replies: \u2018when I do something bad\u2019.","She is functioning well at school, says that she has many friends ... that at her mother\u2019s place she also has friends and likes to go there, but that she feels comfortable at home with her father because she gets on well with ... the daughter of her father\u2019s new partner ...","Her mental state is dominated by the emotional burden of her parents\u2019 conflict, high emotional tensions, the need to be close to her mother (whom she wishes to please by being with her) and, in her relationship with her father, by the conflict of loyalties she has been placed in.","I am of the opinion that the girl has been drawn into a conflict of loyalties and is very burdened by her parents\u2019 disagreements and conflict, which has resulted in high emotional pressure, anxiety and hypersensitivity.","I recommend that the parents undergo family counselling and possibly afterwards also family therapy together with [their daughter].\u201d","26.On 6 June 2011 the father took the first applicant back to the same psychiatrist who, in so far as relevant, noted:","\u201cThe interview with the girl was conducted alone. [The child] states that she feels good, that she cannot wait for school to end but that she has no difficulties in school. She gets on well with both her father\u2019s wife and her mother\u2019s partner, and regards her half-brother and half-sisters as real siblings. She is still sad about her parents\u2019 differences and their inability to adequately communicate [with each other] and their different parenting styles.\u201d","27.In the course of the above-mentioned custody proceedings (see paragraph 22 above) the court ordered a combined expert opinion from experts in psychiatry and psychology. Accordingly, the applicants and the first applicant\u2019s father were examined by forensic experts of this type at the Neuropsychiatric Hospital in Popova\u010da. As part of the preparation of their opinion each expert conducted interviews, inter alia, with the first applicant. In particular, on 1 July and 28 September 2011 the first applicant was interviewed by each expert; on 2September 2011 she was interviewed only by the expert in psychiatry. The interviews of 1 July 2011 were conducted without the first applicant\u2019s parents being present, that of 2 September 2011 in the presence of her mother (the second applicant), and those of 28 September 2011 in the presence of her father.","28.The relevant part of the record of the interview of 1 July 2011 with the expert in psychiatry reads as follows:","\u201c[The child] states that she always tells the truth, literally always, and that she feels her worst when she is told that she is a liar like her mum.","... She very clearly articulates her emotional bond and closeness with her mother and her wish to live with her. ...","[The child] states that she once attempted to talk with her father about living with her mother, but that the conversation ended quickly with him telling her that there would be no discussion about that and that she would stay with him until she was eighteen ... She says that her father is very strict and that he often shouts at and insults her, which makes her embarrassed and scared. The last time he attacked her, because of the picture [frame], I. [her father\u2019s partner] stopped him, and she felt nauseous ...","She says that she complained to her mother about her father, which was why she went to the police with her. She was particularly struck when the social worker came to the police [station] and talked to her mother; she heard the social worker say that unless they agreed on where [their daughter] was going to live she would be placed in a children\u2019s home. (The girl cries for a long time afterwards).","When asked how it is to live with her father, she states that she would prefer to live with her mother as she is closer to her ...\u201d","29.The relevant part of the record of the interview of 1 July 2011 with the expert in psychology reads as follows:","\u201cDad is so- so. When he is in a good mood, he is good. When he is not [in a good mood] he is not [good]. Once when he forced me to eat I vomited.\u2019 ...","\u2018Mum is great. Good, fair and does not hit me. She does not threaten me. I do not fight with her that much. I am calmer when I am with my mum, there are not that many fights, I am more relaxed.\u2019","... She said that she came to the expert assessment \u2018because of what dad did to me and because I want to live with my mum. I wanted ... He threatened me ...\u2019 She cried and indistinctly through tears says that her dad smeared food over her face as a joke so she felt ugly and embarrassed. \u2018He hit me once ... He said that he did not but that he only made a [threatening] gesture with his finger ...\u2019","After she calmed down we cameng back to the traumatic incident.","You started crying?","\u2018... He did this to me (she demonstrates with her hand round her neck). Dad hit me and I always cry so I almost vomited. [He squeezed me] this hard (she is touching her throat and chin) so that I almost vomited ...\u2019","\u2018[He called me a thief] and I said I was not and then he hit me near the eye (she shows the left temple) ... He asked me if I would do that again (she needs to be interrupted because she is speaking indistinctly while sobbing) ... [The next day] ... I told my mum what he had done to me. She told me that we could go to the police and there I told [them what happened] ... The first lady [the policewoman] there was good. The other [the social worker] pulled my hand while saying that I have to go to my dad. I did not want [to go]. She then told me that if mum gets into a fight with dad she will go to jail and I will go into a children\u2019s home (she is sobbing). I had to go with my father. Dad said that we would not talk about that ...\u2019","\u2018Yesterday he told me that he had never hit me and that he had not done anything to me and that I should tell the truth. But he did hit me. He also told me that when he smeared the food over my face it was a joke, but I felt embarrassed. He also told me that if I mentioned it he would call [the stepmother and stepsister] to say that it was a joke, which would make me look like a liar. I felt embarrassed and ugly then ...","\u2018He threatened to cut off my hair if did not stop biting my nails, and to take my mobile phone away.\u2019","\u2018Once we were in the car together ... he saw mum with [her new partner] in the next lane. He said that he would put both of them to jail and kill them. He swore at them a lot. He told them many bad things ... The next day or shortly afterwards he said that through his people he would ensure that my mum and me did not see or hear from each other.\u2019","\u2018I was at a doctor\u2019s in Zagreb some time ago. He asked me something about school but he seemed bad to me and I did not want to talk to him and I did not tell the truth. After a month we went to him again. I said I wanted to live with my mum but I did not mention that my dad had hit me. Then I was afraid of my dad, and still am because I knew he would say that he had not hit me ...\u2019","\u2018Once he hit me when I was little, I do not remember, once ...\u2019","\u2018He gets upset when I cannot eat something. When I say something [to justify myself] he asks why I defy him. He used to insult me. He called me a cow, stupid goat. He swore at me. He told me to go to hell ... he said that to me many times. He also told me to fuck off many times ... He told me that my mum was a whore (she is crying) ...","\u2018Mum tells me that I cannot do certain things. She does not threaten me. Sometimes she raises her voice, but she does it rarely and then I do not do it any more.\u201d","30.The relevant part of the record of the interview conducted on 2September 2011 with the expert in psychiatry reads as follows:","\u201cThis interview was conducted with the girl and the mother together in order to observe their mutual interaction. During the interview it is noticeable that the girl is somewhat more withdrawn and serious than during the previous interview ...","At some point the girl has a strong emotional reaction. The girl states (while crying) that she would like to celebrate her forthcoming birthday at her mum\u2019s place ... given that she celebrated her last birthday with her father. The mother did not manage to calm the girl completely or ease her frustration. Instead, she herself looked anxious and frustrated, almost lost.\u201d","31.The relevant part of the record of the interview of 28 September 2011 with the expert in psychiatry reads as follows:","\u201cThis interview was conducted with the girl and the father together in order to observe their mutual interaction. During the interview it is noticeable that the girl is somewhat more withdrawn and deep in her thoughts, and seems restrained ... Asked if she would like to change something, she says that she would like to live with her mum and that she wishes to be able to extend the time she spends with one parent when she wants to stay with that parent longer. While saying that the girl reacts emotionally (she is crying). In the course of it there is no mutual contact between the girl and her father; there is no eye contact, nor is the father trying to calm her. Each [keeps] to themselves, with their eyes fixed forward.\u201d","32.The relevant part of the record of the interview of 28 September 2011 with the expert in psychology reads as follows:","\u201cShe states in her father\u2019s presence: \u2018I would like to live with my mum and decide when visits should take place, to go with my mum or my dad (she is crying). Dadadds: \u2018That would be the best ...\u2019","To the direct question whether she asked her dad about it, she replies that she did not. She adds that once she asked her dad [about it] and that he said that she could not go to her mum ...\u201d","33.On 27 October 2014 the first applicant wrote the following in her school essay:","\u201c...they all think that they know me but they don\u2019t know even a third of me. They judge me by my success in school, but that isn\u2019t me. They don\u2019t know what is happening, they see me as a happy girl, but I am the opposite of that. I have lived with my dad since I was six years old, and from day one I wanted to go to [live with] my mum ... Dad tells me he won\u2019t let me go until I am 18 ... For some time already I have found comfort in cutting myself ... the scars are no longer visible, only when I play volleyball or some other ball game and when my arm turns red, then they are visible.\u201d","34.Alarmed by the first applicant\u2019s admission of self-harm in the school essay, on 22 November 2014 the second applicant took her to the same psychologist who had examined her on 5 March and 22 April 2011. In her observations the psychologist noted the following:","\u201c[The girl] came accompanied by her mother because the mother had learned of [her daughter\u2019s] self-harm, which [the girl] had written about in a school essay ... of 27 October 2014.","Interview:","Depressive, anxious at the beginning ... verbally fluent. We are talking in the absence of the mother.","After the her parents\u2019 divorce, [the girl] lived with her mother. She says that was the happiest period in her life. She had lived with her father since she was six [years old] ... Relations in the family she described as conflictual, she is afraid of her father. She describes emotional blackmail by her [paternal] grandmother and threats and emotional blackmail by her father, as well as occasional abuse by the father, on which there are medical and police reports. She states that when she was six, she [because of being] manipulated and intimidated by her father, stated during the [forensic] expert examination [in the course of divorce proceedings] that she wanted to live \u2018fifty-fifty\u2019 [when asked which parent she would like to live with]. She says that her dad told her to say that but that she did not know what it meant. Since the divorce became final she has lived with her father, and has suffered because she has a close and trusting relationship with her mother and her mother\u2019s partner. From that time on she has been expressing the wish to live with her mother, but despite all her statements [to that effect] ... the [relevant] authorities pay no heed ... Thanks to her mother\u2019s support and understanding she is still functional [that is she manages to live normally] but is unhappy because she cannot live with her mother.","She says that she is unhappy, that she does not understand why the [relevant] authorities are ignoring her, and that they do not understand how much they are abusing her by not taking appropriate measures.","In her school essay (which was presented) she mentions that she cut herself on the arms. Her friend helped her to deal with the scars. When asked why she did that, she replies that it was because she felt helpless in enduring the constant pressure in her father\u2019s family, constant conflicts, inability to manage her own time, and refusal to let her live with her mother, which would make her happy. Other behaviour mentioned in the essay points to the development of an obsessive-compulsive disorder, fear of the dark, anxious-depressive symptomatology, and emotional control disorder. These are not related to puberty but indicate post-traumatic stress symptomatology, emotional disorders caused by constant frustrations, and child abuse ...","The girl has for years been burdened by expert examinations, judicial proceedings, interviews at the social welfare centre, and the hope that someone will finally listen to her plea to live with her mother, because since the age of six she has been unhappy because she has to live with her father. She enjoys her mother\u2019s and her mother\u2019s partner\u2019s company, and they are supportive, but she is afraid that she will not be able to live with them for a long time yet. She is unhappy because her father constantly fights with her and does not want her to be happy (as she would be if she lived with her mother). She \u2018hates the situation she is in, where she is forced to live with her dad. She wants to become an advocate and she would never allow her child to suffer as she does because she is not allowed to choose with whom ... to live.\u2019","She is introverted, anxious ... Emotional suffering, distrust, depression, fear, guilt, reduced impulse control and problems with facing stress are diagnosed. These symptoms are related to inability to control her desires and to plan and organise. Despite previously established above-average cognitive capacities, a reduced level of openness and a need for new experiences is detected. This is probably because of continuing obstruction of her freedom of action. Despite constant obstructions she is still willing to fight for herself. She is empathic.","She has very developed defence mechanisms. However, symptoms of post-traumatic stress are also detected.","Conclusion:","Elements of strong psychological trauma are diagnosed (post-traumatic stress), which are, according to her statements, the result of frustration caused by the abuse by her father and the authorities who are ignoring her wish to live with her mother, and [which serve] to protect her from suffering and the feeling of helplessness, which she reduces by obsessive-compulsive disorder and by harming herself.\u201d","C.Criminal proceedings","1.Criminal proceedings for bodily injury","35.As already mentioned above (see paragraph 21), on 30 March 2011 the State Attorney indicted the first applicant\u2019s father before the Zadar Municipal Court for having committed the criminal offence of bodily injury defined in Article98 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 86 below) during the incident of 1February 2011.","36.On 19 April 2011 the court issued a penal order (kazneni nalog), finding him guilty as charged and imposing a fine of HRK 1,820.","37.On 4 May 2011 the first applicant\u2019s father challenged the penal order, arguing that the basis on which it had been issued was false. The court accordingly set aside the penal order, and the proceedings resumed under the rules of summary criminal procedure.","38.The hearing scheduled for 7 May 2013 was adjourned because neither the accused nor the summoned witnesses attended it.","39.At the hearing held on 6 June 2013 the first applicant\u2019s father pleaded not guilty and made a statement. He also proposed that several witnesses be heard. The applicants proposed that they themselves be heard.","40.At the hearing held on 23 July 2013 the court heard the second applicant, one of the police officers who had interviewed the applicants following the incident of 1 February 2011, the first applicant\u2019s schoolteacher, and Z.M., a psychologist who had acted as supervising officer during the implementation of the first child protection measure in respect of the supervision of the exercise of parental authority (see paragraph 11 above).","41.The police officer stated that she had not noticed any visible injuries on the first applicant during the interview with her the day after the incident of 1February 2011. The first applicant\u2019s schoolteacher had not seen any injuries either. He also testified that he had noticed that the first applicant had seemed sad the day after the incident and that he had talked to her about this; the first applicant had told him on that occasion that her father had not hit her. Z.M., who said that he had spoken with the first applicant some time after the incident in the capacity of a private individual and at her father\u2019s request, testified that the first applicant had told him that her father had yelled at her and that she had been afraid that he would hit her but that he had not. He also stated that as a school psychologist he knew very well how to recognise signs of abuse in children and that the first applicant had not shown such signs.","42.On 25 July 2013 the court decided to obtain an expert opinion from a medical expert on the first applicant\u2019s injuries.","43.The hearing scheduled for 18 September 2013 was adjourned because the summoned witnesses failed to attend it.","44.On 23 September 2013 the expert submitted his opinion, which stated that it was possible, but could not be determined with certainty, that the first applicant\u2019s injury had been sustained during the incident of l February 2011. The relevant part of his opinion states as follows:","\u201cThe following injury was established [at the time] by medical examination:","small haematoma of the left lower eyelid.","This injury constitutes a bodily injury.","The injury was inflicted by some hard and blunt object. It was inflicted by a single blow of low intensity.","The mechanism of the injury could correspond to the course of events as they were described to the doctor by the injured party during the examination (a blow with the hand to the eye)."," However, it is to be noted that the injury was described by the doctor who performed the examination as a haematoma in resorption, thus in [the process of] disappearing, fading. That normally happens after a certain period of time, for example, several days, after an injury. It would not be common for resorption to already be visible the day after the injury.","It follows from the above that the injury could have been inflicted during the incident in question, but that a causal link cannot be established with certainty.\u201d","45.At the hearing held on 24 October 2013 the court heard the other police officer who had interviewed the first applicant on 2 February 2011, the social worker who had been present during the interview with the police, and the doctor who had examined her on that day.","46.The police officer testified that the first applicant did indeed not want to return to her father and that the social worker from the local social welfare centre had indeed told her that they would have to temporarily place her in a children\u2019s home if she refused. She also testified that she had not seen any signs of injury on the first applicant. The social worker testified that she had not noticed any signs of injury on the first applicant either. She also stated that while it was true that the first applicant had not wanted to return to her father, she had changed her mind after they spoke, in the course of which she had not mentioned the alternative of sending the first applicant to a children\u2019s home. The doctor who examined the first applicant stated that resorption of a haematoma occurred more quickly in children and young people. While he excluded the possibility that the injury could have been caused by crying and rubbing the eyes he did not rule out the possibility that it had been caused by, for example, the first applicant being hit by the ball during her volleyball practice. The applicants\u2019 representative reiterated their proposal that the first applicant be heard.","47.In order to decide on that proposal, the court decided to consult the case file concerning the above-mentioned custody proceedings (see paragraph 22 above and 60-81 below). Eventually, the court decided to hear the first applicant via video link on 1 July 2014.","48.However, that hearing was adjourned because on 30 June 2014 the first applicant\u2019s father sought withdrawal of the trial judge; that application was dismissed by the court\u2019s president on 3 July 2014.","49.Since none of the courts in Zadar was equipped with a video link device, the court asked the police authorities to provide it. The police informed the court that it would make available a video-link device on 16October 2014. Accordingly, the examination of the first applicant was scheduled for that date.","50.However, on 14 October 2014 the police authorities informed the court that they would not be able to provide the device on 16 October 2014.","51.According to the Government, the proceedings are still pending, depending on the availability of the video link device.","2.The applicants\u2019 attempts to institute criminal proceedings against the first applicant\u2019s father for child abuse","52.Meanwhile, on 27 April 2011 the second applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the State Attorney against the first applicant\u2019s father accusing him of the criminal offence of child abuse as defined in Article 213 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 86 below). In particular, the second applicant argued that he had physically and psychologically abused the first applicant by: (a) in the period between February 2008 and April 2011, inter alia, swearing at her and calling her names, frequently forcing her to eat food she did not like, and force-feeding her when she refused, threatening to hit her, cut off her long hair and ensure that she never saw or heard from her mother, hitting her with a hairbrush on one occasion, among others, and (b) on 1February 2011 hitting the first applicant several times in the face and squeezing her throat while verbally abusing her, as a result of which she was later diagnosed by an ophthalmologist with bruising of the eyeballs and eye-socket tissue.","53.On 20 June 2011 the State Attorney asked the of the Zadar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zadru) investigating judge to: (a) question the suspect, (b) take statements from his partner and from the second applicant and her partner, and (c) order a combined expert opinion from experts in psychiatry and psychology.","54.On 29 September 2011 the State Attorney\u2019s Office itself ordered a combined expert opinion from certain court experts in psychiatry and psychology. On 4 October 2011 it set that order aside after finding that such a combined expert opinion had already been obtained in the context of the above-mentioned custody proceedings (see paragraph 22 above and paragraphs 60-81 below).","55.On 16 January 2012 the State Attorney dismissed the second applicant\u2019s criminal complaint, finding that there were not sufficient grounds to suspect that the first applicant\u2019s father had committed the criminal offence the second applicant had accused him of. In so doing the State Attorney\u2019s Office addressed only the part of her complaint concerning the alleged abuse of the first applicant in the period between February 2008 and April 2011, and not the part concerning the incident of 1 February 2011. After examining the statements made to the police by the suspect and his partner, the second applicant and her partner, psychiatrists\u2019 opinions of 19 February and 7 May 2011, the psychologist\u2019s opinion of 5 March 2011, and the combined expert opinion of 29December 2011 (see paragraphs 16-17, 19-20 and 25 above and paragraphs 69-70 below), the State Attorney gave the following reasons for his decision:","\u201cAnalysing the above facts, it follows that the suspect I.M.\u2019s conduct or the conduct of [the second applicant] cannot be regarded as conscious and deliberate emotional or physical child abuse, but rather as inadequate child-rearing practice [ parenting style] and reaction caused by parental conflict over child custody, persistence of long-lasting mutual unresolved conflicts, and limited parenting capacity ...","In view of the foregoing ... there is no reasonable suspicion that the suspect I.M. committed the criminal offence he is accused of ...\u201d","56.The first and second applicants then decided to take over the prosecution from the State Attorney as injured parties in the role of (subsidiary) prosecutors. As the Criminal Procedure Act requires that an accused be questioned before being indicted, on 25 January 2012 the applicants asked an investigating judge (sudac istrage) of the Zadar County Court to question the first applicant\u2019s father.","57.By a decision of 9 February 2012 the investigating judge dismissed the applicants\u2019 request, holding that the facts adduced by the applicants did not constitute the criminal offence of child abuse. In so doing he relied on the combined expert opinion of the forensic experts in psychiatry and psychology of 29December 2011 obtained in the custody proceedings (see paragraphs 69-70 below). The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:","\u201c... the conduct cannot be regarded as abuse [because the combined expert opinion] did not confirm the diagnosis of child abuse. This is very strongly indicated by the recommendation that changing the child\u2019s residence is not advisable. Had that diagnosis been established, the recommendation concerning the child\u2019s residence would have certainly been very different.\u201d","58.On 21 February 2012 a three-member panel of the Zadar County Court dismissed an appeal by the applicants against the decision of the investigating judge. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows:","\u201c[The child is under supervision] by the [local] social welfare centre. It is therefore evident that if the suspect had behaved in an unseemly or inappropriate manner towards her as a parent that the centre would have reacted. There must have been reasons why the father was awarded care of the child. If there is any change in circumstances that decision could also be changed. According to the expert opinion no elements of abuse were found ...\u201d","59.On 24 May 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared inadmissible a subsequent constitutional complaint by the applicants. It held that the contested decisions of the Zadar County Court were not susceptible to constitutional review. The Constitutional Court served its decision on the applicants\u2019 representative on 3 July 2012.","D.Custody proceedings","60.Meanwhile, on 30 March 2011 the second applicant brought a civil action in the Zadar Municipal Court against the first applicant\u2019s father with a view to altering the custody and contact arrangements ordered in the judgment of the same court of 24 August 2007 (see paragraph 10 above). In particular, she sought custody of the first applicant. At the same time the second applicant asked the court to issue a provisional measure whereby it would temporarily grant her custody of the first applicant pending the final outcome of the principal proceedings.","61.The court regarded the second applicant\u2019s civil action as an application for non-contentious proceedings, as it considered that the rules on non-contentious procedure rather than those on regular civil procedure should apply in such matters. It held hearings on 29 April and 16 May 2011.","62.The local social welfare centre participated in those proceedings as an intervener sui generis with a view to protecting the first applicant\u2019s interests.","63.At the hearing held on 29 April 2011, the second applicant\u2019s representative insisted on the provisional measure being issued. The representative of the local social welfare centre stated that the situation in the first applicant\u2019s family was very complex, that her parents had made numerous criminal complaints against each other, and that both parents should be assessed by forensic experts. He also stated that the centre could not at that time make a recommendation as regards the provisional measure requested, because such a recommendation could only be made after completion of the family-assessment procedure by a team of professionals employed at the centre. The second applicant\u2019s representative replied that the centre had been aware of the incident of 1 February 2011 but had taken no action to address the situation in the first applicant\u2019s family. She therefore insisted on pursuing the application for a provisional measure.","64.On 12 May 2011 the local social welfare centre submitted its report and recommendation to the court. In the course of their preparation of this report the centre interviewed the second applicant and the first applicant\u2019s father on 3and 4 May 2011, visited their homes and requested an opinion from the first applicant\u2019s school. The relevant part of the centre\u2019s report reads as follows.","\u201cThe allegations of the [child\u2019s parents] who accuse each other of child abuse are impossible to verify, nor can a straightforward conclusion be made only on the basis of interviews with them or on the basis of visits to their families.","There is an impression that the parents, burdened by their permanently strained relationship and their own need to live with the child, consciously or subconsciously place themselves and their needs first while disregarding the welfare and the needs of the child.","The child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority was previously ordered in respect of the parents during the divorce proceedings, from 7November 2006 to 31 August 2008.","Given that the already poor communication between the parents has worsened again, which brings about negative tensions which could be harmful for the child\u2019s emotional development, and having regard to the fact that they are again facing court proceedings, the centre is in the process of imposing the same measure with a view to protecting the rights and welfare of [the child] through which [the centre] shall monitor the mother\u2019s and the father\u2019s relationship with the child and [in the implementation of which] they will be advised how to improve communication between them and strengthen their parenting competencies.\u201d","65.The local social welfare centre recommended a combined expert assessment (psychiatric and psychological) of the first applicant and her parents with a view to establishing their parenting abilities and the possible consequences of their behaviour for her physical and mental development. They added that the first applicant\u2019s family situation was complex but that at that moment there was nothing to suggest that it was life-threatening. The relevant part of the local social welfare centre\u2019s recommendation reads as follows.","\u201cAfter conducting the family-assessment procedure ... it was established that the parents express opposing views as regards abuse and neglect of [their child]. [The mother] accuses the father of child abuse [in that] he is abusing the child physically and emotionally, obstructing her contact with the mother, and using inappropriate child-rearing methods. [The father] accuses [the mother] of neglecting the child\u2019s interests by her behaviour [in that] she does not pay child maintenance, does not come to school to consult with teachers or to parents\u2019 meetings and that the child is being manipulated by the mother ...","Having regard to the medical documentation at the disposal of the centre, the parties\u2019 submissions, visits made to [the father\u2019s and the mother\u2019s] homes and interviews with them, we recommend that the parents and the child undergo a combined [psychiatric and psychological] expert assessment in order to assess their fitness for further care of [their daughter] and the possible consequences of their behaviour for her psycho-physical development.","It is true that the family situation is complex. However, there is no impression that at present [the child\u2019s] life is at risk in her father\u2019s family.\u201d","66.By decisions of 16 May and 6 and 16 June 2011, the court ordered a combined expert opinion from forensic experts in psychiatry and psychology who were to assess (a) the parenting capacities of the second applicant and the first applicant\u2019s father, (b) the first applicant\u2019s condition, and (c) whether the first applicant had been exposed to abuse and, if so, by whom.","67.By a decision of 7 June 2011, the court refused to issue a provisional measure sought by the second applicant (see paragraph 60 above). In so deciding the court examined the ophthalmologist\u2019s report of 2February 2011, psychiatrists\u2019 opinions of 19 February and 7 May 2011, and psychologist\u2019s opinions of 5 March and 22 April 2011 (see paragraphs13\u201114, 19-20, 23 and 25 above). It also consulted the case file of the criminal proceedings in respect of the bodily injury, and examined the report and recommendation of the local social welfare centre of 12 May 2011 (see paragraphs 64-65 above). It found, in view of the conflicting opinions of the psychiatrists, the penal order against the first applicant\u2019s father which never became final, and the recommendation of the local social welfare centre, that at that point the allegations that the first applicant had been abused by her father were not plausible enough to justify her immediate temporary removal from his custody. In particular, the court held as follows:","\u201c... the case was not sufficiently plausibly made that such a measure was necessary to prevent violence or the risk of irreparable harm from materialising, given that at present it remains uncertain and disputed whether [the child] was subjected to abuse by her father or was being manipulated by her mother ...\u201d","68.On 2 March 2012 the Zadar County Court (\u017dupanijski sud u Zadru) dismissed an appeal by the second applicant and upheld the first-instance decision.","69.On 29 December 2011 the forensic experts submitted their opinion (see paragraph 66 above) to the Zadar Municipal Court. In their opinion the experts found that both the second applicant and the first applicant\u2019s father had limited parenting abilities and suffered from personality disorders (both of them were emotionally unstable and the first applicant\u2019s father was also narcissistic). As regards the first applicant, the experts found that she was emotionally traumatised by her parents\u2019 separation and their mutual conflict and lack of communication. Instead of shielding her from that conflict, her parents had placed her at the centre of it and manipulated her, sometimes up to the level of emotional abuse. The experts therefore recommended that the first applicant and her parents receive appropriate therapy. They further found that the first applicant was ambivalent towards her father and idealised her mother, whom she viewed as a \u201cfriend\u201d, and expressed the wish to live with her. The experts were of the opinion that this desire to be close to her mother could be achieved through (more) extensive contact between the first and the second applicant. If after one year of recommended therapy the first applicant still wished to live with her mother, they recommended that another combined expert opinion be obtained.","70.The experts did not reply to the court\u2019s question whether the first applicant had been exposed to abuse and, if so, by whom (see paragraph 66 above). Their conclusions were (a) that the first applicant should nevertheless continue living with her father for the time being while maintaining extensive contact with her mother; (b) that she and both her parents should undergo treatment and counselling; (c) that the supervision of the exercise of parental authority (the child protection measure imposed by the local social welfare centre, see paragraph82 below), should be continued; and (d) the first applicant and her parents should be reassessed after a year. In particular, the experts concluded as follows.","\u201cWe do not find [any] contraindications to [the child\u2019s living with her father. [Our] recommendation is that, for the time being it is not necessary or desirable to change the child\u2019s place of residence, that is to say [the child] should continue living with her father.\u201d","71.Following a request by the second applicant, by a decision of 27 July 2012, the Zadar Municipal Court appointed G.\u0160., a lawyer practising in Zadar, to act as a special representative for the first applicant and represent her interests in the proceedings, as required by Article 9, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children\u2019s Rights (see paragraph 98 below).","72.Following an appeal by the first applicant\u2019s father, on 26 October 2012 the Zadar County Court quashed that decision and remitted the case. It held that the first-instance court had failed to establish whether the interests of the first applicant were indeed in conflict with the interests of (one of) her parents, which was a necessary precondition for the appointment of a special representative.","73.By a decision of 13 November 2012, the local social welfare centre also appointed G.\u0160. to act as the first applicant\u2019s guardian ad litem pursuant to section 167 of the Family Act (see paragraph 84 below).","74.The Zadar Municipal Court held further hearings in the case on 6September and 11December 2012 and 8 March 2013.","75.At the last-mentioned hearing the court heard the experts who had prepared the combined expert opinion of 29 December 2011. Those experts stated, inter alia, (a) that their expert opinion had in the meantime become obsolete, because a year and two months had passed since they had prepared it; (b) that they had not replied to the court\u2019s question whether the first applicant had been exposed to abuse because it was the task of the judicial authorities and not theirs to make that assessment; and (c) that it would be irrelevant which parent the first applicant should live with if her parents both behaved better.","76.By a decision of 30 April 2013, the Zadar Municipal Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s application for the custody and contact arrangements stipulated in the judgment of 24 August 2007 to be reversed. The second applicant and the first applicant\u2019s guardian ad litem appealed.","77.On 15 November 2013 the Zadar County Court quashed the first-instance decision for incomplete facts and remitted the case to the lower court. It instructed the first-instance court to (a) inquire whether the first applicant\u2019s father\u2019s conviction for the criminal offence of bodily injury against her had become final; (b) assess whether the first applicant was able to understand the importance of the proceedings and, if so, allow her to express her opinion and take her testimony; (c) assess the need to appoint a special representative to the first applicant; and (d) obtain an opinion and recommendation from the local social welfare centre.","78.In the resumed proceedings, on 18 November 2013 the Zadar Municipal Court discontinued the non-contentious proceedings and decided that the proceedings would be continued under the rules of (regular) civil procedure. The court explained that the second applicant\u2019s application for reversal of the custody and contact arrangements set forth in its judgment of 24August 2007 (see paragraph 10 above) would, if agreed, necessarily entail a new decision on the payment of maintenance by the non-custodial parent, which was an issue that could not be decided in non-contentious but only in regular civil proceedings. That did not mean that procedural acts undertaken thus far had lost their validity or become irrelevant.","79.On 27 February 2014 the second applicant lodged a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, complaining of the length of the proceedings.","80.On 9 July 2014 the President of the Zadar Municipal Court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s request.","81.It would appear that the proceedings are currently again pending before the Zadar Municipal Court as the court of first instance.","E.Proceedings before the local social welfare centre","82.Following the incident of 1 February 2011, on 22September 2011 the local social welfare centre again (see paragraph 11 above) issued a decision ordering the child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority in respect of the first applicant. The measure was imposed for a period of one year and was, by the centre\u2019s decision of 1October 2012, further extended for another six months, until 31 March 2014, when it was discontinued.","83.In her final report of 30March 2014 the supervising officer (a psychologist) summarised the results of the measure in the following terms:","\u201cThe aim of the measure was to encourage appropriate parental behaviour with a view to preventing and minimising the negative effects of [their] conflictual relationship on the child\u2019s psycho-physical development ... in that sense it was only a question of creating preconditions for adequate communication between the parents, so that currently there is no open conflict (but only because the parents avoid it). In particular, the parents are observing the visiting schedule. They have made concessions to each other from time to time. However, the parents are still in conflict, they still do not communicate, and the majority of their communication goes through the child or through text messages. It is precisely in this way that they are disregarding [her] needs and forcing [her] to deal with something with which she should not be dealing at her age (or at any other age for that matter). Both parents think they are doing what is best for their child, while forgetting that their conflict is the major obstacle to the normal psycho-physical development and functioning of their child ... [The mother] thinks that the child should be with her and that the wish of the child, who also expresses the wish to be with her, should be respected. [The father] thinks that that his role is to protect the child from the mother\u2019s negative influence and ensure stability for her. Those views are O.K., but the only question is how much each of them negatively affects the child by fighting for their own position? For a compromise people need to be ready to partially abandon their position, but they are not ready to do so. In my view, both parents have a good relationship with the child; they [both] try to spend quality time with her. They differ to some extent in their methods and parenting styles ([the mother\u2019s] is permissive and directed at [developing] a friendly relationship with her daughter, which may also be a strategy for \u2018winning\u2019 the child, whereas [the father] is more impulsive, with a tendency to give in, and is oriented towards the traditional role of the father, which would not be a problem if the two parents would cooperate ... Neither of them disputes that the role of the other parent is also important for the child, but they both find it important that the child lives with them, believing that in that way they would diminish the harmful influence \u2018the other parent has on the child\u2019. This means that the main problem is unresolved parental conflict, and the parents should probably work on that outside the [social welfare] centre. When they are able to talk to each other, and when they realise why and which of their actions are harmful for [the child] (and stem from their personal conflict) then they will be able to function better. In that regard I think that the supervision measure cannot provide a better solution to the problems they have.\u201d","1.Rights and duties of the child","Section 88","\u201cParents and other family members must not subject the child to degrading treatment, psychological or physical violence or abuse.\u201d","Section 89","\u201c(1)The child is entitled to seek protection of his or her rights before the relevant authorities, which must inform the social welfare centre thereof.","(2)The child is entitled to a special guardian in cases specified by this Act.","(3)The special guardian shall be appointed by the social welfare centre in cases where another authority is deciding on the infringement of the child\u2019s right, and by the court when the social welfare centre is competent to decide on a right of the child.","(4)The special guardian shall submit a report on the representation of the child at the request of, and within the time-limit set forth by, the authority that appointed him or her.","(5)In proceedings involving decisions on the child\u2019s right or interest the child is entitled to be informed in an appropriate way of the relevant circumstances of the case, obtain advice and express his or her views, and to be informed of the possible consequences of [those] views. The [child\u2019s] views shall be given due weight in accordance with his or her age and maturity.\u201d","2.Parental responsibility","Section 102","\u201cThe court shall, upon application by the parent, the child or the social welfare centre, issue a new decision on custody and access rights, and if need be on other elements of parental responsibility, if substantially changed circumstances so require.\u201d","3.Measures for the protection of the rights and welfare of the child","Section 109","\u201c(1)The social welfare centre shall order supervision of the exercise of parental authority when the errors and omissions are various and frequent or when the parents need special assistance in bringing up their child.","(2)...","(3)The programme of supervision may entail referring the child to a children\u2019s home for a half day or for a full day, or referring the parents and the child to medical and other institutions for treatment and other professional assistance.","(4)The supervision shall be ordered for a minimum period of six months ...\u201d","Fifth part","GUARDIANSHIP","Section 167","\u201cIn order to protect certain personal and pecuniary rights and interests the social welfare centre shall appoint a special guardian ... ...","6.... in other cases where the interests of the child conflict with those of the parents.\u201d","Eighth part","JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS","Section 263","\u201c(1)The provisions of this part of the Act determine the rules by which the courts shall proceed in special civil [contentious] and non-contentious proceedings and special enforcement and security proceedings when deciding in matrimonial, family and other matters regulated by this Act.","(2)The proceedings referred to in paragraph 1 of this section shall be urgent.\u201d","Section 269(2)","\u201cIn order to pursue his or her rights or interests, the court shall in [personal] status matters, in accordance with his or her age and maturity and [having regard to the child\u2019s] welfare, allow the child to express his or her views before the social welfare centre or before the court.\u201d","3.Proceedings concerning custody, parental responsibility or child protection measures","Section 295","\u201c(1)Before reaching a decision on custody or parental responsibility, the court shall obtain a report and recommendation of a social welfare centre.","(2)The social welfare centre must within thirty days submit to the court the report and recommendation referred to in paragraph 1 of this section.","(3)...\u201d","2.Relevant case-law","85.In its judgment no. G\u017e-994\/11-3 of 17 March 2011 the Bjelovar County Court held as follows:","\u201cWhen the child has gone to live of his or her own free will with the other parent (the father), who was equally as fit to take care of the child as the parent (the mother) with whom the child had lived thus far, and the child is, having regard to his or her age and maturity, capable of forming his or her own opinion and expressing views on issues that concern him or her, then these circumstances may justify a reversal of an earlier custody decision.\u201d","B.The Criminal Code","1.Relevant provisions","86.The relevant provision of the Criminal Code (Kazneni zakon, Official Gazette no. 110\/97 with subsequent amendments), which was in force from 1January 1998 to 31 December 2012, reads as follows:","Article 8","\u201c(1)Criminal proceedings in respect of criminal offences shall be instituted by the State Attorney\u2019s Office in the interest of the Republic of Croatia and its citizens.","(2)It may be exceptionally provided by law that criminal proceedings in respect of certain criminal offences should be instituted upon a private bill of indictment or that the State Attorney\u2019s Office should institute criminal proceedings at the initiative of [a victim].\u201d","CHAPTER TEN (X)","CRIMINAL OFFENCES AGAINST LIFE AND LIMB","Bodily injury","Article 98","\u201cWhoever inflicts bodily injury on another person or impairs another person\u2019s health shall be fined or punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year.\u201d","Instituting criminal proceedings for criminal offences of bodily injury","Article 102","\u201cCriminal proceedings for the offence of bodily injury (Article 98), unless committed against a child or a minor, shall be instituted upon a private bill of indictment.\u201d","CHAPTER SIXTEEN (XVI)","CRIMINAL OFFENCES AGAINST MARRIAGE, THE FAMILY AND JUVENILES","Neglect or abuse of a child or a minor","Article 213","\u201c(1)A parent, adoptive parent, guardian or other individual who grossly neglects their duties to care for or raise a child or minor shall be punished by imprisonment of six months to five years.","(2)The penalty referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be imposed on a parent, adoptive parent, guardian or other individual who abuses a child or minor, forces [the child] to perform work unsuitable for his or her age, or to work excessively, or to beg, or out of greed induces [the child] to behave in a manner harmful to his or her development, or by [engaging in] dangerous activities or in some other way puts [the child] in danger.\u201d","Domestic violence","Article 215a","\u201cA family member who by violence, abuse or particularly offensive behaviour places another member of the family in a humiliating position shall be punished by imprisonment of six months to five years.\u201d","2.Legal commentary","87.According to Croatian legal scholars, abuse, as a constitutive element of a number of criminal offences, including the offence of child abuse, is defined as \u201cdeliberate infliction of physical or mental discomfort or pain of significant intensity\u201d (see \u017deljko Horvati\u0107 (ed.), Rje\u010dnik kaznenog prava [The Dictionary of Criminal Law], Masmedia, Zagreb, 2002, p. 664) or \u201c... deliberate infliction of mental or physical discomfort of significant degree. What constitutes a \u2018significant degree\u2019 of physical or mental discomfort is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In making that assessment the court will often require an opinion from an expert in psychiatry\u201d (see Ana Gara\u010di\u0107, Kazneni zakon u sudskoj praksi \u2013 Posebni dio [Criminal Code in Judicial Practice \u2013 Special Part], Organizator, Zagreb, 2009, pp. 375-376).","88.As regards the criminal offence of domestic violence Croatian legal scholars have expressed the following view (see op. cit., pp. 285-286):","\u201c[The perpetrator\u2019s conduct] is defined alternatively as violence, abuse or particularly offensive behaviour. Violence is to be understood in a wider sense [that is] as an application of physical force against the physical integrity of another family member, psychological coercion, or serious psychological maltreatment, but also as coercion directed at objects if the family member perceives this as physical coercion. Violence is normally not an isolated and single incident, but entails a number of instances and is characterised by continuous activity. Abuse is very deliberate infliction of physical or mental pain of great intensity, short of bodily injury. Abuse within a family may be physical, psychological or emotional, or sexual ... Particularly offensive behaviour entails the perpetrator\u2019s manifest contempt for, and ruthlessness and arrogance against, another family member ... For the offence to be committed it is necessary for the family member to be put into a humiliating position as a result of the perpetrator\u2019s conduct. This is a position which offends honour and reputation, human dignity, and self-esteem. Putting a family member in a humiliating position is regarded as the objective element of the crime ... which does not have to be accompanied by the perpetrator\u2019s mens rea. However, the intent of the perpetrator must correspond to his or her conduct ...\u201d","C.Protection against Domestic Violence Act","89.The Protection against Domestic Violence Act (Zakon o za\u0161titi od nasilja u obitelji, Official Gazette no. 137\/09 with subsequent amendments), inter alia, defines the minor offence of domestic violence and provides sanctions which may be imposed to those convicted of that offence.","90.Section 20 provides that where the minor offence of domestic violence has been committed against a child, the court may impose either a fine of at least HRK 7,000 or a prison sentence of at least forty-five days. In cases of recidivism the court may impose a fine of at least HRK 15,000 or a prison sentence of at least sixty days. The maximum fine of HRK 50,000 and the maximum prison sentence of ninety days are prescribed by the Minor Offences Act (Prekr\u0161ajni zakon, Official Gazette no. 107\/07 with subsequent amendments).","91.Sections 11-19 of the Protection against Domestic Violence Act provide for various protective measures the court may impose in addition to, or independently of, the penalties listed in section20, even before the institution of minor offences proceedings. Section 12 provides for the protective measure of compulsory psycho-social treatment.","D.The Courts Act 2013","92.Under the Courts Act 2013 (Zakon o sudovima, Official Gazette no.28\/13), which entered into force on 14March 2013, a party to pending judicial proceedings who considers that those proceedings have been unduly protracted has the right to lodge an acceleratory remedy, namely a \u201crequest for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time\u201d and to request that the president of the same court before which those proceedings are pending expedite them by setting a time-limit of a maximum of six months within which the judge sitting in the case must render a decision. A party whose request is not decided upon within sixty days or whose request is dismissed may lodge an appeal with the president of the immediately higher court.","93.In addition, a further, combined compensatory-acceleratory remedy, namely a \u201crequest for payment of appropriate compensation\u201d, is also available, but only in cases where the judge sitting in the case did not comply with the time-limit for deciding the case specified by the court president when granting the request for the acceleratory remedy."],"27474":["7.The applicant was born in 1988.","8.On 27 December 2011 the applicant applied for asylum and a residence permit in Sweden and claimed that she had arrived in Sweden on 11 December the same year. In an interview with the Migration Board (Migrationsverket), at which she was informed that a search in the European asylum fingerprint database EURODAC had revealed that she had applied for asylum in the Netherlands in December 2006, the applicant stated that she had arrived in Sweden in 2007 from the Netherlands and had remained illegally in Sweden since then. She had been afraid to contact the Swedish authorities since she did not want to be returned to the Netherlands as she would be sent onwards to Italy where she had no housing or opportunity to support herself. She wanted to remain in Sweden where cousins of hers were living.","9.As the applicant had applied for asylum in the Netherlands \u2013 under a different name and birth date \u2013 the Migration Board requested that that country take her back in accordance with the Dublin Regulation. The Dutch authorities refused, however, as she had previously applied for asylum in Italy, under a slightly different name than that given to the Board. The Italian authorities were then requested to take back the applicant. The Italian authorities did not reply to the request within the prescribed time-limit and were consequently, under Article 20(1)(c) of the Regulation, considered to have agreed to receive her. Accordingly, on 24 April 2012, the Migration Board dismissed the asylum application and decided to transfer the applicant to Italy.","10.However, the decision became time-barred before the transfer could be realised. On 30 November 2012 the applicant therefore applied for asylum and a residence permit in Sweden again. At an asylum interview in January 2013, which lasted for two and a half hours, she submitted essentially the following. In November 2004 her family had forced her to marry an older man against her will. At the time she had for about a year had a secret relationship with a boy from school. This relationship was revealed a few days after the forced marriage when the applicant and her boyfriend had tried to escape from Mogadishu together. They had been detected by her uncles when they had been sitting on the loading platform of a truck. Both she and her boyfriend had been beaten and thrown off the truck. She had sustained injuries to her hips and had been hospitalised for a few months. Thereafter she had lived at home until August 2005 when her father had considered that her health condition permitted her to move in with her husband. She had then contacted her boyfriend and they had fled together, first to Ethiopia and then to Sudan and eventually to Libya in order to take a boat to Italy. However, the boat had sunk and the boyfriend had died. Later, while in Sweden, she had learned that her father had died in 2010 and her mother in 2011. If returned to Somalia, the applicant claimed that she would have to return to the man whom she had been forced to marry, unless she were sentenced to death for fleeing the marriage and the country. These threats would be carried out by her uncles. The applicant further asserted that she lacked a male support network in Somalia and therefore risked being sexually assaulted. As a single woman, she would further not be able to rent accommodation or otherwise organise her life and would risk becoming a social outcast. She also invoked the generally dire humanitarian situation in Somalia and, in particular, claimed that she was unlikely to find the help still needed for her injured hips.","11.On 8 March 2013 the Migration Board rejected the applicant\u2019s application for asylum and ordered her deportation to Somalia. At the outset, the Board found that she had failed to substantiate her identity, noting in particular that she had not submitted any identification papers and had previously applied for asylum in the Netherlands and Italy under different identities. However, it found it plausible that the applicant originated from Mogadishu. Noting that she had arrived in Sweden in 2007 but had not applied for asylum until the end of 2011 \u2013 and had thus not reported a need for protection during a period of more than four years \u2013 the Board called into question whether she had felt a real need for protection. Turning to the substantive allegations presented by the applicant in support of her application, the Board considered that they were marred with credibility issues. For example, in her initial asylum application in 2011, she had stated that she was unmarried. Only during the asylum investigation following her renewed application in November 2012 had she claimed that she had married in Somalia in November 2004. The Board found that the applicant had failed to provide a sufficient explanation for this, particularly given that this was a crucial part of her story. Furthermore, in 2011 she had only invoked the armed conflict in the country as grounds for asylum and had stated that she could not remember how she had sustained the hip injury since she had been very young at the time. She had then also said that she had stayed with a female friend in Mogadishu before leaving the country whereas she later claimed that she had lived with her parents and siblings.","The Board concluded that the applicant had failed to make plausible that she had been subjected to any ill-treatment by her relatives in Somalia and consequently had failed to show that she would lack a male support network there. It noted that, according to the applicant, her brother and uncles still lived in Mogadishu. Moreover, the Board examined the general situation in Mogadishu and the particular situation of women, based on information gathered at a fact-finding mission to the city in June 2012 and further information obtained thereafter, and considered that the circumstances were not of such severity that the applicant would be unable to return there, taking into account the finding that she had a male network to protect her. In this connection, the Board also noted that the applicant had not lived in a refugee camp before leaving the country and had not claimed that she would risk doing so upon return.","12.The applicant appealed to the Migration Court (Migrations-domstolen), maintaining her claims and adding, inter alia, the following. The security situation in Mogadishu was still very unstable and the particular situation of women in Somalia was extremely severe. She further asserted that, as her situation in Italy had been difficult, it was understandable that she had decided to apply for asylum under another identity in the Netherlands, in order to avoid being sent back. This had also been the reason why she had decided to stay illegally in Sweden. Moreover, she stated that the Migration Board had misunderstood her; she had stayed with a female friend in Sweden, not in Somalia where she had lived with her family. Furthermore, in her view, she was not married since she had not consented to the marriage or been present at the marriage ceremony. She submitted an x-ray image of her hip prostheses to show that she had been assaulted and injured.","13.On 4 June 2013 the Migration Court rejected the appeal, agreeing with the Migration Board\u2019s reasoning and findings. The court subscribed to all the misgivings concerning credibility expressed by the Board. It added that, whereas the applicant initially had claimed to have been forcibly married in 2004, in a later submission to the Board she had stated that this had been decided by her father and her uncles in 2010. Since the applicant was in general not credible, the court did not believe her statement that she lacked a male support network in Somalia. Moreover, it considered that the submitted x-ray image did not show that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in her home country.","14.By a decision of 15 July 2013 the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrations\u00f6verdomstolen) refused leave to appeal.","15.Subsequently, the applicant requested that the Migration Board re-examine her case, claiming that there were impediments to the enforcement of the deportation order. She stated that she had recently found out that her uncle, who had previously physically assaulted her, had now joined al-Shabaab, and that he had killed her sister and forced her brother to join al-Shabaab. Thus, if returned to Somalia, she would risk being stoned to death by her uncle.","16.On 7 September 2013 the Migration Board rejected the petition, finding that no new circumstances justifying a reconsideration had been presented. It held that the alleged threats stemming from the applicant\u2019s uncles had already been examined by the Board and the Migration Court and that, given her lack of credibility, a mere statement from her about her uncle\u2019s actions was not sufficient to assume that she would risk being stoned upon return. The applicant did not appeal against the Board\u2019s decision.","A.Danish Immigration Service and Norwegian Landinfo","23.The Danish Immigration Service and the Norwegian Landinfo have issued three reports in 2013 and 2014 on the situation in south and central Somalia, including Mogadishu: Update on Security and Human Rights Issues in South-Central Somalia, Including Mogadishu (published in January 2013), Security and Protection in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia (May 2013) and Update on Security and Protection Issues in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia (March 2014). The reports are based on their fact-finding missions to Nairobi and Mogadishu in October 2012, April\/May 2013 and November 2013, respectively, during which they consulted national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations, including United Nations agencies, and individuals, most of whom wished to remain anonymous.","24.The May 2013 report cited the United Nations Department of Security and Safety (UNDSS), Mogadishu, as saying that al-Shabaab had withdrawn from Mogadishu in August 2011 but the withdrawal had only been completed by the end of May 2012. Armed attacks continued, however, and the UNDSS stated that al-Shabaab was not trying to retake Mogadishu but was using the attacks as a form of harassment and as a reminder of its presence. The usual courses of action were hit-and-run attacks, hand grenade attacks and targeted killings. There were also occasional mortar and other indirect fire attacks. The report further referred to several international NGOs which echoed the statements by the UNDSS. Thus, there had been improvements in the security situation for people in Mogadishu after al-Shabaab had left in August 2011: there was no armed struggle and no frontline in the city, people could move freely around and they had full access to all districts. However, there were still threats: the influence of al-Shabaab was not visible but the organisation was able to undertake attacks all over the city. It mainly targeted members of the government and Parliament, soldiers of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF), police, people working for international organisations, people suspected of spying for the government and al-Shabaab deserters. Al-Shabaab did not kill civilians deliberately or indiscriminately, but when staging large-scale attacks it did not mind if civilians were killed. One NGO described the situation of civilians thus: \u201c[T]he risks involved in living in Mogadishu are basically a question of being at the wrong place at the wrong time, but being increasingly desperate al-Shabaab wants to send the message that Mogadishu is not safe\u201d.","25.These assessments on the security situation in Mogadishu were confirmed in the March 2014 report. The UNDSS explained that there had been an overall improvement in terms of the Somali forces expanding their reach in Mogadishu, but that the city remained very fragmented. An international NGO stated that security had improved since April 2013 in certain areas of south and central Somalia, but that there were still security-related issues which directly affected all government people, government affiliates, international employees, contractors who dealt with the international community and UN staff as well as many others. Although al-Shabaab was not in control of any part of Mogadishu it could still reach all over the city. The targeted killings continued and there were criminal actions as well. Another international NGO said that the security situation in Mogadishu had gradually improved during the preceding two years but was still not good.","26.All three Danish\/Norwegian reports mentioned that it was very difficult, if not impossible, to present figures on civilian casualties, as no system of monitoring had yet been put in place. However, an international organisation as well as NGOs referred to in the first report believed that there had been a decrease in the number of civilian casualties in Mogadishu compared to the preceding few years. This decrease was reportedly due to front-line fighting having moved out of Mogadishu. There were fewer mass-casualty attacks and killings, in particular due to the cessation of shelling in Mogadishu. Still, civilian casualties remained a daily occurrence, principally due to assassinations, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks, and reactions to these attacks by armed forces. In January 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that there had been an increase in the number of attacks by al-Shabaab since the Danish\/Norwegian report from May 2013, including in places where civilians gathered, i.e. markets, hotels and public places. The UNDSS held that there had been an increase of targeted killings of ordinary civilians, which could be due to their being easier to hit than high-ranking personalities and other high-profiled persons who were surrounded by more security. An international agency and an international NGO stated, however, that al-Shabaab did not deliberately kill ordinary civilians, but continued to target mainly the police force, the military and security forces as well as politicians. Al-Shabaab\u2019s strategy was to prevent progress and normalisation of life, not to kill civilians. Several organisations and individuals interviewed pointed out that it was sometimes difficult to know who were behind the attacks in Mogadishu; the perpetrators were not always al-Shabaab but could also be other actors such as criminals, political rivals and disgruntled people. As stated by the UNDSS in the May 2013 report, SNAF soldiers also committed crimes against civilians and there existed so-called District Commissioners who collected a \u201ctax\u201d which was basically protection money.","27.In regard to the situation for women, the May 2013 report included testimony that sexual and gender-based violence had increased manifold during the preceding year. While verified reports showed an overall improvement in security for ordinary people, sexual and gender-based violence was a very serious issue and could even be increasing due to the liberation of areas under the control of al-Shabaab. The UNHCR in Mogadishu stated that in light of the prevalence of gender-based violence, female heads of households or single women, without access to nuclear family and clan protection mechanisms, as well as children were at a heightened risk of violations. The third Danish\/Norwegian report referred to the Human Rights Watch which in its 2014 World Report, published in January 2014, had expressed that Somali women and girls faced alarming levels of sexual violence throughout the country. Internally displaced women and girls were particularly vulnerable to rape by armed men including government soldiers and militia members. Security forces had also threatened individuals who had reported rape, and service providers. The Mogadishu-based NGO Somali Women Development Center (SWDC) stated, however, that there had been a remarkable change in Mogadishu between May and November 2013. Through improved opportunities for the government to secure peace, security for ordinary residents in Mogadishu had improved considerably. People now trusted the police and the National Intelligence and Security Agency and were enjoying increased freedom of movement and security. The SWDC emphasised that women had complete freedom of movement in all locations in Mogadishu except for the large Bakara market where al-Shabaab was present. They could drive a car, go to the local market and move around by themselves and faced no harassment at checkpoints.","28.On the issue of returns to Mogadishu and south and central Somalia, the May 2013 report referred to a commentator from UNHCR who stated that many people from the diaspora were returning and there was in general no discrimination on the ground of belonging to the returning diaspora. Other commentators expressed differing views on the attitude of those who had stayed behind towards the returning diaspora; while some interviewees focused on the benefits of investments, modernisation and new skills that the diaspora brought with them, others mentioned that there was friction between the two groups, as the diaspora were seen as competitors taking jobs from locals and causing prices on goods and properties to increase and as they did not comply with certain local customs. Apparently, however, in so far as there was tension, it had not been violent. A representative of a diaspora organisation in Mogadishu stated that most returnees were resourceful people who saw opportunities in the city; allegedly, it would be extremely difficult to return to Mogadishu if one had nobody to rely on there. An international NGO referred to in the January 2013 report explained that people returning from the diaspora would need to make sure that they had the support from their family, i.e. a father, mother, brother, sister or uncle, as they could not count on their clan to support them. These sentiments were generally confirmed in the March 2014 report. An international NGO explained that persons from Mogadishu with relatives living in the city would be accommodated by their families. Support from the host community should also be considered. It was added that Somali families were extended families with even fourth and fifth cousins being counted in. Nevertheless, some people interviewed stated that there was increasing local resentment against the returning diaspora and heightened security concerns among the returnees. The report further quoted al-Shabaab commander Ali Mohamed Hussein who, in an announcement of 29 December 2013, had proclaimed that the returnees would be killed and fought against in the same manner that al-Shabaab used against the Somali government. Hussein also warned Somalis to stay away from government buildings, public venues frequented by government officials, and from foreign aid agencies and their workers, as they would all be targeted in the organisation\u2019s attacks.","B.Swedish Migration Board","29.The Swedish Migration Board carried out a fact-finding mission to Nairobi in October 2013 with the aim of updating information about the situation in Somalia. In its report The Security Situation in South and Central Somalia (S\u00e4kerhetssituationen i s\u00f6dra och centrala Somalia), dated 20 January 2014, it noted, inter alia, the following about areas not under the control of al-Shabaab (thus including Mogadishu):","\u201cThe security situation is affected by the good supply of weapons, religious extremists and persons who could be labeled warlords but could also be clan leaders in combination with mafia-style organized criminality. They also have their own militias who rape, extort and set up illegal check points. In areas with a strong presence of AMISOM or the Ethiopian army, the situation regarding human rights is considerably better than in areas controlled by Al Shabaab. Although the SNAF is less arbitrary in their behavior than Al Shabaab it is still uncertain if the authorities such as the police and the courts are at all functioning. The forces are not paid in time, or not at all, and those who are in the forces are not always from the same clan as the locals. It can be questioned to what extent the SNAF is multi-clan. The discipline is bad and the SNAF-soldiers rob and rape civilians and are sometimes involved in shoot-outs among themselves. A rumour that you cooperate with Al Shabaab could be enough to be killed by someone on the government\u2019s side of the conflict. [The Migration Board] was told examples from Mogadishu where the chain of command from the government to the police as well as within the police did not work, neither did the clan system. Solving these issues can be done with the help of influential people\u2019s own militias. Other militias allied with the SFG [Somali Federal Government] in one way or another, are clan based. Those engaged in these militias regard this first and foremost as a job, and children, most over 15 years of age, are in the ranks. Recruitments to all militias has gone down during 2013.\u201d","A new fact-finding mission to Nairobi and Mogadishu was undertaken in October 2014 and, on 29 April 2015, the Migration Board issued an updated report with the same name, The Security Situation in South and Central Somalia. It contained the following information:","\u201cAl Shabaab is just outside the cities they have been driven out from and are able to infiltrate the cities, primarily at night, but also perform attacks in the cities. Even though Al Shabaab has had military setbacks, their presence in cities is still considerable for many people. It is difficult for the citizens to know who is a member of Al Shabaab and who is not, which makes it difficult for the locals to relate to Al Shabaab\u2019s covert presence.","SFG has influence in the areas Al Shabaab no longer control. However, the influence is quite frail and the cities are characterized by rivalry among different groups on site. At times, this has in some places led to heavy fighting, e.g. fighting between clan militias around Marka. The fact that Al Shabaab is driven out of a city does not mean that long-standing conflicts between local groups or in relation to SFG in Mogadishu are solved. There are many layers of the conflict, which might appear on clan level or between other groupings such as businessmen. There is reason to believe that even if attempts are made from SFG, with support from the international community, it is a very slow process before SFG in fact has established administrations and can exercise effective control over the territory in S\/C Somalia.","It is worth noting that SFG and SNAF need the support from AMISOM to be able to militarily hold the cities. As Al Shabaab still control the rural areas around the cities, some cities become isolated in the sense that it is not possible for SFG or representatives from the international community to get there by road. Some of these cities lack an airstrip.\u201d","30.Based on observations from the fact-finding mission in October 2013, the Migration Board, on 20 January 2014, issued the report Women in Somalia (Kvinnor i Somalia). It stated, inter alia, the following:","\u201cWithin the Somali clan system a woman has to be represented by a man when decision is to be made within Xeer (customary law). It is always the man who decides for the woman. If there are no close male relatives, another older male relative can speak for and decide for the woman. A male network, meaning men who can speak for the woman within Xeer, cannot exactly be defined. It varies how closely related the woman and the man are, but also with the type of relationship they have. As a frame for what to consider as a male network one could besides the father and the husband also include paternal grandfathers, paternal uncles, brothers, sons and cousins on the father\u2019s side provided they are adults and have a closer relationship with the woman than what could be the case with more distant relatives. The man also has to be in the same geographic location as the woman.","[The Migration Board] assesses that a woman in lack of a male network, living with her diya-paying sub-clan, and who has been subjected to violence can be represented by a man in her diya-paying sub-clan in negotiations within Xeer. The probability that this will occur increases with each of the following factors; the diya-paying sub-clan is in their place of residence, the diya-paying sub-clan is not in minority at the place they reside, the diya-paying sub-clan is in a rural area. If the man who negotiates for the woman is not within the woman\u2019s male network but is another man in the diya-paying sub-clan the risk increases that the negotiations are conducted in the interest of the diya-paying sub-clan rather than the woman\u2019s. [The Migration Board] would like to stress that the above applies to cases where a woman without a male network lives with her sub-clan. If the woman lacks a male network and is in another place than her diya-paying sub-clan she will lack access to Xeer.","It is reported that women are abused by different military forces, in this context meaning the SNAF, AMISOM and different clan militias. SNAF soldiers are responsible for many abuses but even AMISOM soldiers are a threat to women. It is reported from Mogadishu that AMISOM soldiers abuse women sexually. The woman is called into the base under the pretext she is going to get a job, e.g. as a cleaner, but [is] instead assigned to a specific man for sexual services. A woman who becomes pregnant is usually thrown out by her husband and will lose her older children to her husband. Her clan will in most cases not defend her in such a situation. There are women\u2019s shelters in Mogadishu and Afgooye where a woman can stay for six months and where there is access to medical and psychosocial support. They have access to skills development with the aim that the women are able to support themselves. The women live community based in order to get a network that can provide some support and are if possible placed where there clan, but not their sub-clan, lives.\u201d","C.United Kingdom Upper Tribunal and Home Office","31.In MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC), a country guidance determination published on 20 October 2014, the United Kingdom Upper Tribunal addressed the current situation in Mogadishu. It heard three expert witnesses and had regard to oral and written submissions on behalf of three (male) appellants as well as a very substantial body of documentary evidence. It made the following assessment of the level of risk for \u201cordinary civilians\u201d:","\u201c397.Therefore, the key question to be addressed is whether the violent attacks that continue to be carried out by Al Shabaab in Mogadishu against carefully selected targets are at a level that means that there is for persons facing return to Mogadishu a risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the [Convention] or a serious and individual threat to a civilian\u2019s life or person by reason of the indiscriminate nature of those attacks carried out by Al Shabaab as they continue to prosecute their campaign against carefully selected targets in the city. As we have explained, the statistical information concerning casualty levels arising from those attacks is deficient and unreliable. Thus, our assessment must be made upon the evidence as a whole.","398.Gone are the indiscriminate bombardments and military offences causing an unacceptable number of civilian casualties spoken of by the [European Court of Human Rights] in Sufi and Elmi. This has contributed to the reduction in population movement in and from Mogadishu that we accept is now being seen, with \u201chuge\u201d numbers of people returning to the city. Nor can it be said that the nature of the conflict is unpredictable. Given the careful selection of targets by Al Shabaab, their frequent announcements reported in the media explaining why those targets have been selected it is entirely predictable which areas of the city, and which establishments or compounds within them, represent a greater risk for citizens moving about the city. We do not suggest, though, that the location of all such attacks can be anticipated and so avoided, simply that certain obvious areas and establishments representing clearly enhanced risk of an Al Shabaab attack can be generally avoided.","399.Drawing all of this together, and taking together all we have discussed, including:","a.the scale of returns to Mogadishu indicating that people who know the city well are \u201cvoting with their feet\u201d;","b.the scale of inward investment and the \u201ceconomic boom\u201d indicating that individual entrepreneurs, as well as international agencies, consider investments to be appropriate;","c.the reduction in civilian casualties indicated by the imperfect statistical information;","d.the durability of the withdrawal from formal presence of Al Shabaab from the city;","e.the continued absence, generally, of the use of artillery or shelling within the city;","f.the transparently clear targeting strategy of Al Shabaab that does not include civilians, specifically, or diaspora returnees;","g.the opportunity to take some reasonable steps to reduce exposure to risk;","h.the absence of any risk of forced recruitment to Al Shabaab;","and notwithstanding our acceptance of the continued level of violent attacks that are being carried out in Mogadishu by Al Shabaab, we conclude that, absent some aspect of a person\u2019s profile making him of particular adverse interest to Al Shabaab or to the authorities as a possible supporter of Al Shabaab, there is not a general risk for a civilian, simply by being present in the city, of serious harm as a result of indiscriminate violence. Nor is it established that there are substantial grounds for believing that a person returning to Mogadishu would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the [Convention].\u201d","32.On the basis of all the evidence before it, the Upper Tribunal gave the following country guidance:","\u201c...","(ii)Generally, a person who is \u201can ordinary civilian\u201d (i.e. not associated with the security forces; any aspect of government or official administration or any NGO or international organisation) on returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will face no real risk of persecution or risk of harm such as to require protection under Article 3 of the [Convention] or Article 15(c) of the [European Union] Qualification Directive. In particular, he will not be at real risk simply on account of having lived in a European location for a period of time [or] being viewed with suspicion either by the authorities as a possible supporter of Al Shabaab or by Al Shabaab as an apostate or someone whose Islamic integrity has been compromised by living in a Western country.","(iii)There has been durable change in the sense that the Al Shabaab withdrawal from Mogadishu is complete and there is no real prospect of a re-established presence within the city. That was not the case at the time of the country guidance given by the Tribunal in [AMM and others (conflict \u2013 humanitarian crisis \u2013 returnees \u2013 FGM) Somalia CG [2011] UKUT 00445 (IAC), published on 28 November 2011].","(iv)The level of civilian casualties, excluding non-military casualties that clearly fall within Al Shabaab target groups such as politicians, police officers, government officials and those associated with NGOs and international organisations, cannot be precisely established by the statistical evidence which is incomplete and unreliable. However, it is established by the evidence considered as a whole that there has been a reduction in the level of civilian casualties since 2011, largely due to the cessation of confrontational warfare within the city and Al Shabaab\u2019s resort to asymmetrical warfare on carefully selected targets. The present level of casualties does not amount to a sufficient risk to ordinary civilians such as to represent an Article 15(c) risk.","(v)It is open to an ordinary citizen of Mogadishu to reduce further still his personal exposure to the risk of \u201ccollateral damage\u201d in being caught up in an Al Shabaab attack that was not targeted at him by avoiding areas and establishments that are clearly identifiable as likely Al Shabaab targets, and it is not unreasonable for him to do so.","(vi)There is no real risk of forced recruitment to Al Shabaab for civilian citizens of Mogadishu, including for recent returnees from the West.","(vii)A person returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will look to his nuclear family, if he has one living in the city, for assistance in re-establishing himself and securing a livelihood. Although a returnee may also seek assistance from his clan members who are not close relatives, such help is only likely to be forthcoming for majority clan members, as minority clans may have little to offer.","(viii)The significance of clan membership in Mogadishu has changed. Clans now provide, potentially, social support mechanisms and assist with access to livelihoods, performing less of a protection function than previously. There are no clan militias in Mogadishu, no clan violence, and no clan based discriminatory treatment, even for minority clan members.","(ix)If it is accepted that a person facing a return to Mogadishu after a period of absence has no nuclear family or close relatives in the city to assist him in re-establishing himself on return, there will need to be a careful assessment of all of the circumstances. These considerations will include, but are not limited to:","\uf09fcircumstances in Mogadishu before departure;","\uf09flength of absence from Mogadishu;","\uf09ffamily or clan associations to call upon in Mogadishu;","\uf09faccess to financial resources;","\uf09fprospects of securing a livelihood, whether that be employment or self employment;","\uf09favailability of remittances from abroad;","\uf09fmeans of support during the time spent in the United Kingdom;","\uf09fwhy his ability to fund the journey to the West no longer enables an appellant to secure financial support on return.","(x)Put another way, it will be for the person facing return to explain why he would not be able to access the economic opportunities that have been produced by the economic boom, especially as there is evidence to the effect that returnees are taking jobs at the expense of those who have never been away.","(xi)It will, therefore, only be those with no clan or family support who will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which is acceptable in humanitarian protection terms.","...\u201d","33.In February 2015 the Home Office issued a Country Information and Guidance report entitled Somalia: Women Fearing Gender-Based Harm\/Violence. In regard to south and central Somalia, including Mogadishu, the report stated, inter alia, the following:","\u201cThere is generalised and widespread discrimination towards women in Somalia. Sexual and gender-based violence \u2013 including domestic violence, rape, sexual abuse, exploitation and trafficking \u2013 is widespread and committed with impunity by a range of actors including government security forces, members of armed opposition groups, militias, family and community actors and AMISOM peacekeepers. Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) women, especially those from minority clans, are particularly exposed to sexual and gender-based violence.","...","Being female does not on its own establish a need for international protection. The general level of discrimination against women in Somalia does not in itself amount to persecution. However women who are without family\/friend\/clan connections or are without resources are in general likely to be at risk of sexual and gender based violence on return. Each case must be determined on its own facts. Factors to be taken into account include: access to family networks or clan protection and support, age, health, economic status, family responsibilities, connections with the diaspora (which can be material both in terms of income and ability to find work with reference to the diaspora driven economic upsurge) and other individual circumstances of the person.\u201d","34.As to whether there was effective protection for women, the report concluded:","\u201cThroughout south and central Somalia (including Mogadishu) there are structural weakness of the security services, including serious capacity and infrastructure gaps, logistical challenges, indiscipline, weak command and impunity for human rights abuses. This is alongside a largely non-functioning legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, and the widespread existence of corruption in state institutions. Moreover impunity for gender-based violence is widespread. Traditional laws, often used instead of weak state judiciary, discriminate against women and girls, and girls are often forced to marry the perpetrator. Prosecutions and convictions for rape and other forms of sexual violence are rare in Somalia, where survivors not only experience fear and shame in reporting such crimes, but at times face greater abuse and stigmatisation if they do report the attack. Somali police, rather than proactively investigate criminal complaints, often demand that victims of any crime do the legwork in the investigation, from locating witnesses to establishing who the suspects are. The inability and unwillingness of the Somali authorities to impartially investigate cases of sexual violence and bring perpetrators to justice leaves survivors further isolated. This means that, in general, a woman fearing sexual or gender based violence is unlikely to be able to access effective protection from the state.\u201d","D.UNHCR","35.On 17 January 2014 the UNHCR issued the report International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing Southern and Central Somalia as an interim update of its 2010 eligibility guidelines concerning asylum seekers from Somalia. On the security situation and its impact on civilians in Mogadishu and other areas under control of the Somali Federal Government, the UNHCR noted:","\u201cMogadishu has been nominally under the control of government forces, supported by AMISOM, since August 2011. While the security situation in Mogadishu has improved since then, with a reduction of open conflict and signs of a resumption of economic activity in the city, Al-Shabaab retains the ability to stage lethal attacks even in the most heavily guarded parts of the city, with civilians reportedly bearing the brunt of its attacks. The SFG is reported to be failing to provide much of its population with basic security. Thus the reality on the ground, as reported by observers, remains that civilians are injured and killed every week in targeted attacks by gunmen, or attacks by IEDs and grenades.","...","... Even though there was less outright fighting in Mogadishu in 2013 compared to previous years, the toll of injured and dead civilians from grenade attacks and bombings reportedly went up in 2013. Observers consider that Al-Shabaab strikes have evolved, from the laying of roadside bombs intended to hit vehicles of passing government officials and AMISOM convoys, to ramming vehicles laden with explosives into security gates of buildings housing government institutions or international organizations, before gunmen with explosives strapped to their bodies storm the premises. In addition, targeted killings\/assassinations are reported to have continued.","...","Further, a reported lack of authority, discipline and control of government forces and allied armed groups means that government forces often fail to provide protection or security for civilians and are themselves a source of insecurity. Security agencies, such as the police and intelligence services, are, according to reports, frequently infiltrated by common criminal, radical, or insurgent elements. ...\u201d","36.On the need of protection for Somalis returning or moving to Mogadishu, the UNHCR stated as follows:","\u201cFor Somalis in Mogadishu, it is very difficult to survive without a support network, and newcomers to the city, particularly when they do not belong to the clans or nuclear families established in the district in question, or when they originate from an area formerly or presently controlled by an insurgent group, face a precarious existence in the capital. Somalis from the diaspora who have returned to Mogadishu in the course of 2013 are reported to belong to the more affluent sectors of society, with resources and economic and political connections. Many are reported to have a residence status abroad to fall back on in case of need. ... Due in part to the return of wealthy Somalis from the diaspora, rents in Mogadishu have reached an all-time high, as a result of which some persons are being forced to move to overcrowded IDP camps because they cannot afford the new prices quoted by landlords.\u201d","37.For the individual assessment of asylum applications of persons from Mogadishu and other areas of south and central Somalia, the UNHCR identified the following potential risk profiles:","\u201c1.Individuals associated with, or (perceived as) supportive of the SFG and the international community, including the AMISOM forces;","2.Individuals (perceived as) contravening Islamic Sharia and decrees imposed by Al-Shabaab, including converts from Islam, other \u201capostates\u201d and moderate Islamic scholars who have criticized Al-Shabaab extremism;","3.Individuals (perceived as) opposing the SFG and related interests and individuals (suspected of) supporting armed anti-Government groups;","4.Individuals in certain professions such as journalists, members of the judiciary, humanitarian workers and human rights activists, teachers and staff of educational facilities, business people and other people (perceived to be) of means;","5.Individuals (at risk of being) forcibly recruited;","6.Members of minority groups such as members of the Christian religious minority and members of minority clans;","7.Individuals belonging to a clan engaged in a blood feud;","8.Women and girls;","9.Children;","10.Victims and persons at risk of trafficking;","11.Sexual and\/or gender non-conforming persons (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) individuals);","12.Persons with a mental disability or suffering from mental illness.\u201d","E.United Nations","38.The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported in a Humanitarian Bulletin Somalia, published on 17 October 2014, the following on gender-based violence in Somalia:","\u201dWomen and girls in Somalia continue to be at high risk of gender-based violence. In the first six months of 2014, over 1,000 cases were reported in Mogadishu alone according to the Somalia Gender-Based Violence Working Group. The actual number of violations is believed to be higher as most survivors do not report these crimes due to fear of social stigma and reprisals from perpetrators. Decades of conflict, erosion of social protection mechanisms, and food insecurity have increased the vulnerability and women and girls are exposed to rape, intimate partner violence, sexual abuse and exploitation particularly during conflict and displacement. At the same time, prevention programmes and medical, psychosocial and legal response services are limited and under resourced. About 22,000 survivors of violations have been provided with psychosocial support by aid workers in 2014. Across Somalia, the majority of cases of sexual violence reported have been rape followed by physical assault, and the majority of survivors have been females from displaced communities.","Impunity is widespread. Traditional laws, often used instead of weak state judiciary, discriminate against women and girls, and for girls may often result in being married off to the perpetrator. The perpetrators of gender-based violence include people from within the displaced community, from host community, as well as from the armed forces. Efforts are needed to hold perpetrators accountable and prioritize the zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse. Furthermore, it is crucial that safe and accessible services are available for survivors including medical assistance and psychosocial support. The Federal Government of Somalia is drafting a Sexual Offenses Bill, which when enacted would act as legal framework to protect women, girls and children from these violations, particularly sexual violence.\u201d","39.On 12 May 2015 the Secretary-General of the United Nations published his latest report on the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), covering major developments occurring from 1 January to 30 April 2015. On the security developments, in particular in Mogadishu, the report contained, inter alia, the following:","\u201cThe security situation remained volatile with sporadic attacks and continued use of suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu and the regions. ...","In Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab attacks continued. Casualties included government officials, civilians and security personnel. ...\u201d","40.On the issue of sexual and gender-based violence, the report gave the following account:","\u201cSexual violence continues to be reported in Somalia in 2015 at about the same rate as in 2014. According to UNHCR, in January and February 2015, over 200 cases of rape were reported, mainly in Banaadir Region, and incidents of sexual violence were reported in Bay and Juba Hoose regions. The main perpetrators were reported as unidentified armed men. There were also reports implicating the Somali national army and police force, Al-Shabaab, and some AMISOM contingents. The survivors are mostly women and girls who were displaced from their areas of origin, members of minority clans being at greatest risk.\u201d"],"27485":["5.In March 2002, criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant in absentia for being a member of the PKK (the Workers\u2019 Party of Kurdistan), an illegal armed organisation. In the indictment, the public prosecutor relied on, among others, incriminating statements by certain accused persons who, in their statements to the police, had maintained that the applicant had been involved in a number of terrorist activities since 1991. ARed Notice was accordingly issued in respect of the applicant via Interpol.","6.On an unspecified date the applicant was arrested in Syria. After being detained in the Damascus Security Headquarters, allegedly for twenty-three days, the applicant was handed over to the Turkish authorities on 15August 2003. The medical report issued at the beginning of the applicant\u2019s custody indicated no signs of ill-treatment.","7.On 18 August 2003 the applicant was questioned at the Erzurum Gendarmerie Command, in the absence of a lawyer. According to a form explaining arrested persons\u2019 rights, which the applicant had signed, he had been reminded of the charges against him, his right to a lawyer and his right to remain silent. The applicant refused legal assistance, and gave a detailed statement regarding his activities in the illegal organisation. He admitted that he had been a member of the PKK since 1989, maintained that he had been involved in several armed attacks and gave details about such events. He also stated that he had been acting as the Paris representative of the illegal organisation since 1994 and signed his statement as such.","8.On the same day, the applicant was examined at the hospital; no signs of ill-treatment were noted on his body. Subsequently, he was questioned by the Erzurum Public Prosecutor. The applicant refused legal assistance and confirmed this in his statement given to the gendarmerie. In this connection, he admitted to being a member of the PKK and participating in several terrorist activities between 1990 and 1998 and also being the Paris representative of the illegal organisation since 1999. He further admitted that he had been involved in some of the armed attacks with which he had been charged. These events were indicated by their location, nature and dates, which were between 1990 and 1998.","The applicant denied his participation in five terrorist attacks which had happened in1992.","9.Later on the same day, the applicant was taken to the Erzurum State Security Court. Before the court he expressed the wish to be represented by a lawyer, and stated that he would make further submissions once a lawyer had been appointed. The court remanded the applicant in pre-trial detention and allowed him time for the assignment of a representative until the next hearing to be held on 7 October 2003.","10.On 20 August 2003 the Erzurum Public Prosecutor lodged an additional indictment, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with seeking to destroy the constitutional order and unity of the Turkish State and to remove part of the country from the State\u2019s control.","11.On 9 December 2003, at the fifth court hearing, in the presence of his three lawyers, the applicant retracted the statements he had made to the gendarmerie and the public prosecutor, alleging that he had been under psychological pressure during his interrogation. He confessed to being a member of the PKK, but only in charge of the instruction of the members, and claimed that he had never taken part in any armed attack. He further submitted that he had been injured during an armed clash in November1992 and since then had been unable to use his right hand. In this connection he requested a medical report establishing that he was not able to hold a gun with his right hand. The prosecutor opposed this request by referring to the applicant\u2019s healthy physical appearance.","12.During the hearing the applicant\u2019s representatives contested the testimonies of other accused persons in different criminal proceedings indicating the applicant\u2019s involvement or responsibilities as a team leader, by alleging that such testimonies had been given only in order to benefit from legal provisions allowing reduction of sentences. The cross\u2011examination of these witnesses was not requested at any stage of the proceedings.","Again on the same day, the applicant made written submissions to the court and stated that he had signed his statement in custody without reading it.","13.On 27 February 2004 the Forensic Medicine Department of Erzurum Atat\u00fcrk University issued a report. It found loss of function in the applicant\u2019s right hand and concluded that the applicant would have serious difficulty in using a firearm with one hand. However, it was further reported that if his right hand were supported by other parts of his body he would be able to use a firearm.","14.On 4May 2004, at the ninth hearing, the applicant objected to the medical report, requesting a new report from the Istanbul Forensic Institute. The trial court refused this request, holding that a new medical report would not have any effect on the merits of the case and therefore was not necessary. In this connection, the court held that the illegal acts admitted by the applicant, which had been committed prior to November 1992, thus before his hand was injured, would suffice for charges to be brought against the applicant under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. It accordingly held that an additional expert report was not required.","15.At a hearing held on 24 August 2004, the applicant repeated his request for an additional medical report, and stated that during his interrogation by the gendarmes and the prosecutor he had felt fearful and anxious and had given his statements under pressure as a result of the conditions in which he had been detained in Syria. He repeated that the testimonies against him by persons accused of terrorism in different proceedings had been made only for collaborating and benefiting from lenient criminal provisions and could be dismissed once the medical report concerning his incapacity was established. The applicant\u2019s lawyers also based their arguments on the establishment of a new report.","16.In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Lawno.5190 of 16 June 2004. Accordingly, the case was transferred to the Erzurum Assize Court.","17.On 21 September 2004 the Erzurum Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. In a reasoned judgment, the court found it established that the applicant had been involved in at least 15 armed attacks committed prior to 1992, among the 59 incidents of which he was accused. It enumerated the acts to which the applicant had confessed while being questioned by the gendarmes and subsequently by the prosecutor, such as setting fire to threeprimary schools, the robbery of several village guards and clashes with security forces. These acts also corresponded chronologically with each other and with the numerous official documents related to these events. The court further held that these acts would suffice to convict the applicant under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and underlined that only after several hearings had he contested his initial statements, while choosing to accept his involvement in armed attacks in which terrorists had been killed and denying his implication in those in which members of the security forces had been killed. The court pointed out that the applicant\u2019s argument could not be considered credible in view of the chronology of the events. The court further stated that throughout the criminal proceedings the applicant had consistently and proudly stated that he was a member of the illegal organisation to the point of making propaganda for the organisation, and he had shown no remorse which would indicate the likelihood that he would not repeat such crimes. Finally, it indicated that the applicant even refused the possibility of using Lawno.4959 for rehabilitation (certain paragraphs of Article 4 of the cited law foresee sentences varying between 12 and 19 years of imprisonment in replacement of an \u201caggravated life sentence\u201d, according to the authenticity of information provided about the structure of a terrorist organisation or its activities) and accordingly sentenced him to \u201caggravated life imprisonment\u201d.","18.On 7 January 2005 the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction."],"27538":["5.The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Ukhta, the Komi Republic.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest and ensuing events","6.In April 2005 a jewellery shop and other premises in a commercial centre in the Sosnogorsk district of the Komi Republic were robbed; in the course of those events, a woman guard was attacked and suffered injuries. Investigator A., from the investigation unit of the Sosnogorsk police department, opened a criminal case into the robbery. On 15June 2005 the criminal proceedings were suspended for failure to establish the identity of a person to be charged.","7.On 25 August 2005 a certain R. reported to the police that her boyfriend B. had committed the robbery together with Zh. and the applicant. On the same day investigator A. reopened the criminal proceedings.","8.On 26 August 2005 the police arrested B., Zh. and the applicant. Investigator A. was present at the time of the arrest. The three men were taken to the Sosnogorsk police department of the Komi Republic (\u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0433. \u0421\u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438).","9.Police officers, in particular Z., the head of the criminal police division of the Sosnogorsk police department, interviewed the applicant about his involvement in the robbery. According to the applicant, they demanded that he confess to the robbery and G., an operative officer in the criminal investigation unit of the police department, punched and kicked him on different parts of his body. Fearing new violence, the applicant confessed to having participated in the crime as requested, and signed a record of his \u201csurrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) that had been drawn up by operative officer G. at Z.\u2019s request.","10.According to that record, on 26August 2005 in office no.12 of the Sosnogorsk police department police officer G. obtained from the applicant his confession to the crime, in accordance with Article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation (\u201cCCrP\u201d). In particular, the record stated that the applicant had assisted B. and Zh. by loading the property stolen from the shops into his car and transporting it; that he had confessed without any physical or psychological pressure being exerted on him; and that he had been informed of Article 51 of the Constitution. The record did not indicate the exact time when the confession was obtained and did not explain the meaning of Article 51 of the Constitution (concerning self-incrimination, see paragraphs 28, 47 and 49 below).","11.At Z.\u2019s request, the applicant wrote in the police station visitors\u2019 registration log that he had struck his own head against a wall, and that he had no complaints against the police officers.","12.At 2.57p.m. on the same day investigator A. drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect in the case.","13.On the same day the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility (IVS) at the Ukhta police department. According to the IVS records, on arrival he had bruises under his eyes, his lips were burst, his lower jaw was swollen on the left side, and he had bruises on his back and abrasions on his knees.","14.On 27 August 2005 the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the presence of a lawyer. He retracted the confession statement that he had given on the previous day, and explained that he had made the statement as a result of ill\u2011treatment by the police officers.","15.On 30 August 2005 a judge of the Sosnogorsk Town Court ordered that the applicant be detained on remand. In reply to the judge\u2019s question about the origin of his facial injuries, the applicant stated that he had been beaten up by operative officers from the police department. On the same day the applicant\u2019s legal-aid counsel, who was representing the applicant at the court hearing, lodged an application with the Sosnogorsk prosecutor in which he requested that an inquiry be conducted into the applicant\u2019s complaint and that those responsible for his ill\u2011treatment be prosecuted.","16.On 31 August 2005 the applicant was placed in pre\u2011trial detention facility SIZO 11\/2, where he was examined by a doctor and found to have bruising beneath his eyes, a swollen nasal bridge, two-centimetre abrasions on the right side of his forehead, hematoma on the left side of his lower jaw and abrasions on the small of his back and right knee (as recorded in a certificate of that detention facility dated 29 September 2005).","17.On 5 September 2005 the applicant\u2019s counsel requested investigatorA., who was in charge of the robbery case, to order a forensic medical examination (\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e\u2011\u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0430) of the applicant. The investigator rejected the request as irrelevant to the robbery case.","B.Criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment","1.Refusal to institute criminal proceedings","18.Following the application by the applicant\u2019s counsel (see paragraph15 above), investigator V. of the Sosnogorsk prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry into the alleged ill\u2011treatment of the applicant.","19.On 5 September 2005 the investigator ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant; this was carried out by the Ukhta Forensic Medical Bureau on 7 September 2005. The expert\u2019s report stated that the applicant had the following injuries: bruises measuring up to 1to3.5centimetres on the lower eyelids of both eyes, two abrasions measuring 4 to 0.6 and 1.5 to 0.2 centimetres on his back; and an abrasion measuring 0.6 to 0.5 centimetres on his right knee. The injuries could have been caused by impacts from blunt hard objects with a limited contact surface, in the period 8-12 days before the examination. They could not have been caused by a single impact as a result of a fall against a flat surface.","20.The investigator received \u201cexplanations\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) from investigator A. (responsible for the robbery case) and from the police officers who had taken the applicant to the police station and interviewed him about his involvement in the robbery. In particular, police officer G. stated that in the course of a \u201cconversation\u201d (\u0431\u0435\u0441\u0435\u0434\u0430) which he had had with the applicant, the latter had suddenly jumped to his feet and hit his head against the wall, as a result of which his nose had started bleeding. Police officer K. also stated that he had seen the applicant hitting his own head against the wall. Police officer Z. explained that in the course of his \u201cconversation\u201d with the applicant the latter had recounted the details of the robbery committed by him; that the applicant had explained that he had hit his own head against the wall and that he had no complaints against police officers; and that the applicant had entered this explanation in the police station visitors\u2019 registration log.","21.On 9 September 2005 investigator V. held that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, in particular the claims that he had been struck \u201cin his kidneys\u201d and pushed so that his face had hit the wall and he had fainted, had not been based on real facts and that no criminal case was to be opened against police officers G., Z., Ku., B. and M., pursuant to Article24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP (lack of the elements of a crime in the impugned acts).","2.Institution of criminal proceedings","22.On 5 December 2005 the Sosnogorsk prosecutor set aside the investigator\u2019s decision of 9 September 2005 as unlawful and unfounded, on the ground that the circumstances in which the applicant had received his injuries had not been reliably established. He referred to the description of the applicant\u2019s injuries on his arrival in the IVS (see paragraph 13 above) and the SIZO (see paragraph 16 above) and his examination by the forensic medical expert (see paragraph 19 above). He stated that the expert\u2019s suggestions as to how the injuries had been sustained made it doubtful that the applicant could have received his injuries as a result of a one-off impact by his face against a wall. The prosecutor further noted that the applicant had explained that he would most likely be able to identify the police officer who had beaten him at the police station. However, it was not possible to carry out an identification parade and a confrontation in a pre\u2011investigation inquiry. The prosecutor considered that it could not be ruled out that, after his arrest, the applicant had been subjected to acts of violence in order to make him confess to the crime. The applicant\u2019s version of his ill\u2011treatment by the police officers could only be verified by way of a full investigation. In order to do so it was necessary to open a criminal case, given that there was sufficient information disclosing elements of a crime under Article 286 \u00a73(a) of the Criminal Code (official misconduct with the use of violence). The prosecutor ordered that a criminal case be opened.","3.Termination of criminal proceedings","23.In the course of the ensuing investigation the police officers who had arrested the applicant were questioned as witnesses. The applicant was questioned as a victim. An additional forensic medical expert\u2019s report was obtained on 15February 2006. It reiterated the conclusions in the previous report (see paragraph 19 above).","24.On 4 March 2006 an investigator from the Sosnogorsk prosecutor\u2019s office terminated the proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the acts of the police officers, pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP.","25.On 30 June 2006 a deputy prosecutor of the Komi Republic set aside the investigator\u2019s decision and reopened the criminal proceedings. Three further decisions to terminate the proceedings were subsequently taken and then set aside as unfounded and based on an incomplete investigation. In one of the decisions, dated 24 November 2006, the deputy prosecutor ordered that the inconsistencies between the statements of the police officers and that of the applicant be eliminated and that identification parades and confrontations be held, if necessary. When questioned again as a victim, the applicant stated, inter alia, that he remembered that police officer G. had hit his head against the wall and started punching him \u201cin the kidneys\u201d (as stated in a decision to terminate the proceedings of 4January 2007).","26.The most recent decision to terminate the proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code in the acts of police officers G., Ku. and B. was taken on 1April 2007. The investigator concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegations had been refuted by police officers G. and K., who stated that the applicant had hit his own head against the wall; by the record of his surrender and confession and the forensic medical report of 15February 2006, in that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been sustained as a result of impacts from blunt hard objects with a limited contact surface. It does not appear from the decision that investigative acts such as identification parades and confrontations with the applicant\u2019s participation were carried out.","C.The applicant\u2019s trial","1.First instance","27.At a preliminary hearing held by the Sosnogorsk Town Court on 13April 2006 the applicant\u2019s counsel requested that the record of the applicant\u2019s surrender and confession of 26 August 2005, on which the prosecution relied, be excluded from evidence pursuant to Article75\u00a72(1) of the CCrP, as it had been obtained in the absence of a lawyer. The Town Court dismissed the request.","28.At his trial, the applicant pleaded his innocence and submitted that he had written his confession statement on the instructions of police officer Z. as a result of physical and psychological coercion by the police officers; in particular, police officer G. had beaten him \u201cin the kidneys and liver\u201d and his head had been struck against the wall so that he had fainted. He had not been informed of his right under Article51 of the Constitution not to give self\u2011incriminating statements, as that part of the record had been added by police officers at a later stage. The applicant asserted, in particular, that on the night of the robbery he had arrived at the commercial centre, by car and at B.\u2019s request, and had towed B.\u2019s car until its engine started, without knowing anything about the robbery. Two months later B. had offered him gold jewellery, allegedly belonging to B.\u2019s acquaintance, for sale. The applicant had returned some of the jewellery to B. and kept the rest for himself. He had understood from police officer Z. that the gold which he had received from B. had been stolen from the Sosnogorsk district commercial centre. He had therefore told Z. about the gold he had kept at his home.","29.The applicant\u2019s co-defendant Zh. pleaded his innocence, asserting that he had given self-incriminating statements as a result of his ill\u2011treatment by police officers, in particular by G., who had allegedly beaten him up, kicked him and burned his fingers with a cigarette; he also stated that after his arrest on 26 August 2005 he had seen the applicant, on his knees and bleeding, at the police station.","30.The applicant\u2019s co-defendant B. admitted before the trial court that he had committed the robbery together with a certain Ch., and stated that the applicant and Zh. were innocent. In particular, B. stated that on the night of the robbery he had called the applicant, asking him for help because his car had broken down; the applicant had arrived by car as requested, towed B.\u2019s car (with the stolen property inside) until the engine started and then left without knowing anything about the robbery. Two or three months later, since he was experiencing difficulties with storing and selling the stolen property, B. had asked the applicant to look after the gold jewellery and to buy some of it if he wished. The applicant had agreed. B. also stated that he had not given any self\u2011incriminating statements during the preliminary investigation, in spite of the physical violence used against him by the police officers, in particular by G.","31.The applicant\u2019s wife stated, among other things, that on the day of his arrest the applicant had been taken back to their home by the police officers in order for their flat to be searched. He had had an abrasion on his head, his lip was burst and his nose was swollen.","32.Police officer Z., examined by the trial court as a witness, stated that he and other police officers had arrested the applicant and his two co\u2011defendants after B.\u2019s girlfriend had reported their involvement in the robbery. At the police station he had talked to the applicant about the robbery several times. The applicant had confessed, named his accomplices and expressed his readiness to surrender the stolen gold. Z. had suggested that the applicant write a statement of his surrender and confession. The applicant had agreed and Z. had asked his subordinates to prepare the necessary document. No violence or threats had been used against the applicant.","33.Police officer G. stated that after the applicant\u2019s arrest he had taken the applicant to the police station. The applicant had been taken to Z.\u2019s office and later Z. had requested G. to obtain from the applicant a statement of his surrender and confession. The applicant had written down his statement and signed it. G. had not used any violence against the applicant. G. had come out of his office to register the statement with an officer on duty, while the applicant had stayed with police officer K. On returning to his office, G. had seen the applicant suddenly jump to his feet and strike his head against the wall. The applicant had fallen to his knees and started bleeding, \u201cprobably from his nose\u201d. K. had given him a towel and asked whether he needed a doctor. The applicant had answered negatively. Z. had then taken the applicant to his office again.","34.Police officer K. stated that the applicant had jumped to his feet and struck his forehead against the wall once and then had fallen to his knees. K. had wanted to call a doctor but the applicant had refused. He had given the applicant a towel because the applicant was bleeding. K. denied any violent behaviour on the part of the police officers.","35.Investigator A. stated that she had investigated the robbery case and had given instructions (\u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f) to the police officers in the criminal investigation unit of the Sosnogorsk police department. She had not instructed them to question the applicant or to collect a statement of his surrender and confession. Police officer G. had obtained the applicant\u2019s statement of his surrender and confession as a result of the applicant\u2019s free will. When questioning the applicant as a suspect (on 27August 2005, see paragraph 14 above) she had noticed his injuries and asked if he had needed medical assistance, but he had refused.","36.The applicant\u2019s counsel maintained before the trial court that the applicant\u2019s statement of his surrender and confession, which he had retracted on the following day when questioned for the first time in the presence of a lawyer, should be declared inadmissible evidence. She noted that investigator A. had drawn up the record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect on 26August 2005. However, for unknown reasons she had not questioned him as a suspect on the same day. Instead, the police officers had obtained the statement of his surrender and confession on their own initiative, without any such instruction from the investigator. They had done so using psychological and physical coercion, as confirmed, inter alia, by the statements of Zh. and the applicant\u2019s wife (see paragraphs29 and31above), the certificate from detention facility IZ-11\/2 (see paragraph16 above) and the forensic medical expert report of 7September 2005 (see paragraph 19 above). Furthermore, his confession statement had been obtained in the absence of a lawyer. Under Article 142 \u00a7 1 of the CCrP, a statement of one\u2019s surrender and confession was meant to be voluntary. Therefore, if obtained from a person arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime, any such statement should be subjected to particular scrutiny. Its voluntary nature was ensured through procedural guarantees under Articles 46 (\u201cThe suspect\u201d) and 51 (\u201cCompulsory participation of counsel for the defence\u201d) of the CCrP. Otherwise, such a confession statement should be declared inadmissible evidence in accordance with Article 75 \u00a7 2 (1) of the CCrP.","37.In its judgment of 6 December 2007 the Town Court held that the applicant\u2019s allegation that the statement of his surrender and confession had been given under duress was unsubstantiated. It relied on the statements by the police officers, denying any wrongdoing on their part (see paragraphs32-34 above), the investigative authority\u2019s most recent decision to terminate the criminal proceedings against them which, as the Town Court noted, had been taken in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and had not been revoked or quashed (see paragraph 26 above), and a report from an internal police inquiry which had dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment.","38.The Town Court held that it had critically assessed the applicant\u2019s statements at the trial and concluded that they represented the position of the defence, in that they were aimed at evading criminal responsibility. Those submissions had been refuted by his and Zh.\u2019s statements of surrender and confession, as well as by the statements by the following witnesses: B.\u2019s girlfriend, who had provided hearsay evidence about the applicant\u2019s involvement in the robbery; five police officers who had participated in the applicant\u2019s and his co-defendants\u2019 arrest or the operative follow-up, in particular Z., G., and K.; investigator A., in charge of the robbery case; Z.A., who had denied seeing the applicant in the porch of his building on the night of the robbery (where, according to her former boyfriend who had been heard by the court as a witness for the defence, she had spent time that evening), and her mother Z.E., who had stated that Z.A. had not gone out after 9p.m.; and Kh., who had been an attesting witness during the search at the applicant\u2019s home during which certain items were seized.","39.The Town Court held that it had based its judgment on the statements of surrender and confession given by the applicant and Zh., along with statements by the victims, the prosecution witnesses and other evidence. It found that on 12 April 2005 B., Zh. and the applicant had entered into a conspiracy to commit theft from the shops in the commercial centre. According to the roles agreed on between them, the applicant had remained on guard in his car outside the commercial centre, while B. and Zh. had entered while the centre was still open and had hidden there. During the night they had attacked a woman guard and tied her up. Then they had forced locks and stolen property, in particular jewellery and mobile phones. The applicant had helped them to carry the stolen property out and load it into his car, in which they all had left.","40.The Town Court convicted the applicant of high-value theft with unlawful entry, committed in conspiracy by a group of persons, and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. In sentencing the applicant the Town Court took into account information about his personality, in particular that he had received positive character references from his places of residence and employment, and that he had no criminal or administrative offences record. It considered his statement of surrender and confession, the fact that he had two minor children and that he had voluntarily surrendered the stolen gold jewellery, as well as his health condition, as mitigating circumstances. B. and Zh. were convicted of robbery with the use of violence and sentenced to nine years\u2019 and eight and a half years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. The Town Court granted the victims\u2019 civil actions and ordered the applicant and his co-defendants to pay 396,800Russian roubles (RUB) jointly in respect of pecuniary damage. The victims\u2019 remaining claims were to be examined in separate civil proceedings.","2.Appeal","41.The applicant and his counsel appealed against the judgment. His counsel argued, inter alia, that the trial court had based its judgment on inadmissible evidence, in particular the statement of the applicant\u2019s surrender and confession of 26 August 2005, which had been given by him as a result of ill-treatment by the police officers and in the absence of a lawyer. She reiterated the arguments put forward before the trial court (see paragraph36 above).","42.On 6 June 2008 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic examined the case on appeal. It endorsed in full the trial court\u2019s decision concerning the admissibility of the statement of the applicant\u2019s surrender and confession. It held, in particular, that the statement had been obtained in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Article 142\u00a71 of that Code, a statement of surrender and confession was a voluntary statement by a person about a crime committed by him. It had not therefore been necessary to have an instruction from an investigator in order to obtain it. The law did not provide for any additional requirements to such a statement, save that the individual concerned was to be warned of his or her criminal responsibility for deliberately giving false information. Therefore, the absence of a lawyer had not rendered the statement unlawful and had not violated the applicant\u2019s right to defend himself. He had been informed of his right under Article 51 of the Constitution, as confirmed by his signature on the record of his surrender and confession.","43.The Supreme Court of the Komi Republic further noted that the trial court had examined as witnesses all of the police officers who had seen the applicant at the police station with a view to verifying their implication in the alleged crime. They had all denied any wrongdoing. It had been established that, having written his confession, the applicant had suddenly jumped to his feet and hit his head against a wall. The Supreme Court also referred to the most recent decision by the investigative authority, dated 1April 2007, by which the criminal proceedings against the police officers had been terminated (see paragraph 26 above), and to the results of the internal police inquiry dismissing the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment (see paragraph 37 above). It upheld the judgment.","3.Supervisory review","44.The applicant\u2019s counsel unsuccessfully raised the issue of the admissibility of the record of the applicant\u2019s surrender and confession in her requests for supervisory review of the case before the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The former court rejected it for the same reasons as before (decision of a judge of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic of 5September 2008 dismissing the request, as endorsed by the President of that court on 27October 2008).","45.The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation similarly stated that the applicant\u2019s argument \u2013 that the statement of his surrender and confession had been obtained in the absence of a lawyer \u2013 lacked a basis in domestic law, and that the allegation of the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment at the hands of the police was unsubstantiated, as shown through its examination by the trial court which had heard the police officers, particularly Z., G. andB. (decision of a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 22 December 2008 dismissing the request for supervisory review, as endorsed by a Deputy President of the Supreme Court on 10March 2009)."],"27552":["6.The applicant was born in 1985 and lived in Sarov, in the Nizhniy Novgorod region.","A.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in police custody","7.An all-terrain vehicle and a car were stolen from private garages in Sarov in February and April 2008, respectively. An investigation unit at the Sarov police department (\u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0433. \u0421\u0430\u0440\u043e\u0432, \u201cthe Sarov UVD\u201d) instituted criminal proceedings into the thefts. The police had information about the applicant\u2019s involvement in the thefts.","8.At about 10.40 a.m. on 5 May 2008, V., an operative agent of the Sarov UVD, contacted the applicant by telephone and requested him to come to office no.320 at the Sarov police station at 2 p.m. for questioning. At 2p.m. on the same day the applicant arrived at the police station, as requested. He was accompanied by K., F., Zh. and P., who stayed outside awaiting his return. A police officer on duty registered the applicant\u2019s arrival at the police station at 2 p.m.","9.The applicant provided the following account of events at the police station. In office no. 320 police officer V. and the chief of the criminal investigation unit of the Sarov UVD, B., demanded that he confess to the thefts. Following his refusal, he was taken to a nearby office, shackled and beaten up by B., who kicked and punched him in the head, torso and extremities and jumped on his head, while V. was shouting threats at the applicant.Afterwards the applicant was kept in different offices of the criminal investigation unit. He was given no food or drink. He felt unwell and vomited blood. No medical help was provided to him despite his requests.","10.On 6May 2008 the applicant\u2019s wife lodged an application with the Sarov town prosecutor and the head of the Sarov town police department, complaining that the applicant was being held at the police station unlawfully, that he had a serious stomach ulcer condition and that a lack of food could cause bleeding. A lawyer appointed by the applicant\u2019s family was unable to locate him at the police station.","11.According to the police records, at midday on 6May 2008 investigatorK. of the Sarov UVD questioned the applicant as a witness in the theft case.","12.According to documents prepared by investigator K. and police officer V., at an unspecified time on the same day the investigator requested that the applicant, who was suspected of having committed the theft, be brought to the police station for investigative measures. Police officerV.reported that he had found the applicant in the street at 8p.m. and taken him to the police station at 8.15 p.m. on 6 May 2008.","13.At 8.20 p.m. on 6 May 2008 the investigator drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect in the criminal proceedings concerning the theft of the all-terrain vehicle.","14.At 8.55p.m. the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility at the Sarov UVD (\u201cIVS\u201d). The applicant\u2019s cellmate C. saw injuries on the applicant\u2019s head and learned from him that he had been beaten up by police officers in order to force him to confess to a crime.","15.At 9.15 p.m. an ambulance was called. An ambulance doctor diagnosed the applicant with a stomach ulcer. According to the IVS records, the applicant had abrasions on his arms.","16.On 7 May 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer visited the applicant in the IVS and photographed the injuries on his body. According to the applicant, he had bumps and bruises on his head and neck and was unable to hear well, and he also had bruises on his torso and extremities.","17.On 8 May 2008 the applicant was brought before a judge, who ordered that he be remanded in custody.","18.The applicant and a number of other persons were charged with the theft of the all\u2011terrain vehicle and the car.","B.Inquiry into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment","1.Investigative Committee\u2019s refusal to open criminal proceedings","19.On 7 May 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Sarov town prosecutor, alleging that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty on 5 and 6 May 2008 and ill-treated in police custody. He claimed that he could identify the police officers responsible for his ill-treatment. Similar complaints were also lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother, his wife and his lawyer.","20.On 8 May 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office forwarded the complaints to the Sarov Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee at the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office (the \u201cSarov Investigative Committee\u201d). On the same day the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a similar application with the Sarov Investigative Committee.","21.On 12 May 2008 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert. According to the expert\u2019s report (\u0430\u043a\u0442 \u0441\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e-\u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0441\u0432\u0438\u0434\u0435\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f) no. 572, the applicant had a bruise on his back measuring 3 to 4 cm, an abrasion measuring 4 to 10 cm on his left forearm and an endermic haemorrhage on his chest. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted by blunt objects on 5-6 May 2008.","22.On 14 May 2008 an investigator of the Sarov Investigative Committee received explanations by the applicant, who maintained his complaints. The applicant stated, in particular, that N.P., who had been held in the same office with his hands shackled, had witnessed the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment by police officer B. on 5 May 2008. According to explanations by police officers B. and V., in the course of operative-search activities the police had obtained information about the applicant\u2019s involvement in the theft of the all-terrain vehicle. V. had called the applicant on 5May 2008 and requested him to come to the police station for questioning by the investigator. They denied the applicant\u2019s allegations about his unlawful detention and ill-treatment, stating that he had been brought to the police station on 6 May 2008 at the investigator\u2019s request (see paragraph12 above). V. also stated that in the evening of 6 May 2008 N.P., another suspect in the thefts case, had been brought to the police station at the same time as the applicant, and that N.P. and the applicant had been held separately. N.P., whose explanations were also received by the investigator, stated that on the evening of 6 May 2008 he had gone to the police station for questioning and that he had not seen the applicant there.","23.On 22 May 2008 the investigator of the Sarov Investigative Committee ordered that no criminal proceedings be instituted in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints of unlawful detention and ill-treatment in view of the lack of constituent elements of a crime in the acts of police officers B. and V. and investigator K., pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d). He stated that there were no reasons to believe that the injuries recorded by the forensic medical expert had been sustained while the applicant had been held at the police station, as this had been denied by the police officers and N.P.","24.On 22July 2008 that decision was revoked by the Sarov Investigative Committee as the inquiry on which it was based was considered incomplete. The following day, a new decision not to open a criminal case was taken and on 6 August it was revoked for the same reason. Among those whose explanations were received by the investigator in the course of an additional inquiry were K. and F. (see paragraph 8 above). They stated that on 5 May 2008 they had gone to the police station with the applicant, Zh. and P. in the applicant\u2019s car, that they had seen the applicant, who had had no injuries at that time, enter the police station at 2 p.m. and had waited for him outside. At 3 or 4 p.m. on 5 May 2008, while waiting for the applicant, who had still not returned, F. had seen N.P. enter the police station at the request of police officer V. and another person.","25.A new decision not to open a criminal case was taken on 6October 2008. It was revoked on 20 October 2008 and a similar decision was taken on 6November 2008. The applicant, whose explanations were again sought by the investigator, stated that his ill-treatment by police officer B. on 5May 2008 had lasted for about an hour, between 4.30 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. On 25May 2009 the higher investigative committee at the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office set aside the decision of 6November 2008 on the grounds that it was based on an incomplete inquiry.","26.The most recent decision not to open a criminal case on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime in the acts of police officers B. and V. and investigator K. were missing was taken on 10June 2009 pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP. The same reasoning was given as in the initial decision of 22May 2008 and in the decisions which had been taken in the meantime. It was mainly based on the denial by the police officers and investigator K. that the applicant had been ill-treated and detained before 8.20 p.m. on 6 May 2008.","2.Domestic courts\u2019 review of the refusal to institute criminal proceedings under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure","27.The applicant appealed against the investigator\u2019s decision of 22May 2008 to the Sarov Town Court under Article 125 of the CCrP. On 1August 2008 the Town Court ruled that the application should not be examined, and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that on 22 July 2008 the Sarov Investigative Committee had revoked the investigator\u2019s decision.","28.Court appeals lodged by the applicant against the investigator\u2019s subsequent decisions of 23 July and 6 October 2008 were not examined for the same reason (the Town Court\u2019s decisions of 7 August and 20 October 2008).","29.On 6 March 2009 the Town Court examined the applicant\u2019s complaint seeking to have the failure by the head of the Sarov Investigative Committee to carry out an inquiry into an application lodged by the applicant\u2019s counsel on 22 January 2009 declared unlawful. It was alleged in that application that investigator K., police officer V. and others had forged the documents concerning the time at which the applicant had been taken into custody. The Town Court granted the applicant\u2019s request and declared the inactivity on the part of the head of the Sarov Investigative Committee unlawful.","30.On 3 August 2009 the Sarov Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the Sarov Investigative Committee\u2019s decision of 10 June 2009 (see paragraph 26 above), holding that the decision was lawful and well-grounded. On 15September 2009 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and fully endorsed the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decision."],"27555":["5.The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Krasnoyarsk.","A.Arrest and detention","6.On 13 August 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having attempted to sell a large quantity of heroin. Two days later the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk authorised his placement in custody for two months. The District Court reasoned that the applicant was being charged with a particularly serious criminal offence, which he had allegedly committed not long after having served a prison sentence after a previous conviction for a similar crime. The court also took into account the lack of a stable income as the applicant worked as an estate agent. These circumstances were interpreted by the District Court as evidence of the likelihood that the applicant might abscond, re-offend or pervert the course of justice. The applicant\u2019s arguments that he was employed, that he was the breadwinner for a child who was still a minor and that he had a permanent place of residence did not convince the court. Nor did the court find that the applicant\u2019s poor health warranted his release, given that he was able to receive professional medical assistance in detention.","7.The applicant did not appeal against the detention order.","8.On 15August 2012, the applicant was admitted to detention facility no. IZ-24\/1.","9.On 12 October 2012 the Sverdlovskiy District Court accepted the investigator\u2019s request for an extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 12December 2012. The court again found that, given his criminal history and the gravity of the charges, the applicant was likely to abscond, re-offend or tamper with witnesses. The District Court did not find any evidence indicating that the applicant was not fit to remain in custody or was not receiving the necessary medical assistance in detention.","10.The extension order of 12 October 2012 was upheld on appeal by the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court, which fully endorsed the District Court\u2019s arguments. The Regional Court also noted that the applicant and his lawyer failed to submit any evidence in support of their arguments alleging a lack of medical assistance in detention.","11.Another extension of the applicant\u2019s detention until 12February 2013 followed on 11 December 2012, when the Sverdlovskiy District Court found that the circumstances warranting his arrest persisted. The court once again dismissed the argument concerning the applicant\u2019s poor health and lack of proper medical assistance in detention.","12.On 10 January 2013 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal, having been fully convinced by the District Court\u2019s reasoning. As to the applicant\u2019s argument about his poor state of health, the Regional Court reasoned:","\u201cDespite the accused\u2019s argument, [the court] did not establish any circumstances related to his health or any other personal grounds precluding his detention in the conditions consistent with a temporary detention facility. Amongst the case-file materials there is no medical report showing that [the applicant] was suffering from a serious illness included in the List of Serious Illnesses precluding Detention of Suspects and Accused Persons, as adopted by decree of the Government of the Russian Federation on 14 January 2011. The [District Court] did not examine any such report when it issued its decision [of 11December 2012].","Moreover, [the applicant\u2019s] argument that he was suffering from a serious life-threatening illness was not supported by any evidence contained in the file, even though the defence would have had ample opportunity to provide such evidence if it had existed.","If a medical commission issues a medical report examining the necessity for [the applicant\u2019s] continued detention, an investigator will immediately examine that issue.\u201d","13.On 21 January 2013 the applicant was served with the bill of indictment, having been charged with the sale, on a number of occasions, of a particularly large quantity of drugs within an organised group for the purpose of subsequent resale.","14.On 5 February 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 11 May 2013, finding that the circumstances which had warranted the applicant\u2019s arrest had not changed. The Court once again found that, given his criminal history and the gravity of the current charges, the applicant was likely to abscond, re-offend or tamper with witnesses.","15.The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, but this was dismissed on 2 July 2013.","16.On 8 May 2013, the detention was further extended by the Leninskiy District Court until 11 July 2013. The court once again dismissed the argument concerning the applicant\u2019s poor health and relied on the gravity of the charges and the applicant\u2019s criminal record to support the finding of a risk of the applicant\u2019s re-offending.","17.On 10 July 2013 the Leninskiy District Court extended the detention until 13 August 2013. The reasoning employed by the court was similar to that of the previous detention orders.","18.On 7 August 2013 the applicant was released against an undertaking not to leave his town, having regard to the fact that the investigation was closed, the applicant completed the reading of the file and the case was remitted to the trial court. On 24 March 2014 he was convicted of four counts of drug trafficking committed with an organised group and involving a particularly large amount of drugs.","B.Applicant\u2019s state of health","19.In 2001 the applicant was diagnosed with an HIV infection.","20.A medical certificate issued on 18October 2012 by a physician from detention facility no. IZ-24\/1 where the applicant was detained indicated that the applicant was suffering from HIV infection in stage 4A, penile cancer of the first degree and chronic hepatitis C (HCV).","21.The applicant argued that upon his arrest on 13August2012 antiretroviral drugs had been taken from him. The Government disputed that allegation.","22.The Government provided the Court with handwritten and typed versions of the applicant\u2019s medical records, setting out the applicant\u2019s medical history and, in particular, the development of his HIV infection. On 16August 2012, that is on the day following his admission to detention facility no. IZ-24\/1, the applicant had been examined by a medical panel which had found him HIV-positive. On the following day the applicant had been prescribed Combivir, a fixed dose combination of the drugs lamivudine (Epivir) and zidovudine (Retrovir), and Kaletra, a fixed dose combination of lopinavir and ritonavir. The handwritten medical records show that during the entire period of his detention the applicant regularly received those drugs. He was also prescribed a special diet.","23.During his detention the applicant had been monitored regularly in relation to his HIV infection. The CD4 cell count tests carried out on 24October 2012, 28 March and 2 July 2013 had revealed a slight, but steady increase of CD4 cells to 579, 618, and 644 cells\/mm3, respectively.","24.On an unspecified date the applicant informed the medical personnel of the detention facility that in 2010 he had been diagnosed with penile cancer. On 25 April 2013 he was examined by the head of the medical department with regard to this complaint. The doctor did not detect any visible symptoms. However, the applicant was referred for examination by an oncologist and an infectious disease specialist at regional tuberculosis hospital no.1.","25.On 17 May 2013 the applicant was seen by the head of the oncological department at regional tuberculosis hospital no.1. The doctor suggested a biopsy, which the applicant refused to undergo.","26.The case file contains no information as to whether the applicant received any treatment in relation to his hepatitis C.","C.Complaints to the authorities","27.On 16 November 2012 the applicant complained to the Regional Prosecutor that antiretroviral drugs had been taken from him upon his arrest on 13August 2012.","28.The applicant also sent a written request to the Investigating Department of the Krasnoyarsk Region seeking a forensic medical expert examination to determine whether he was suffering from a condition which, under Russian penitentiary rules, would preclude his detention on remand.","29.On 6 December 2012 a deputy prosecutor of the Sverdlovsk District prosecutor\u2019s office sent a letter to the applicant informing him that the courts had already examined his arguments pertaining to his state of health while determining the issue of his further detention on remand. The deputy prosecutor pointed out that the courts had not established that the applicant was suffering from any serious illness precluding his detention on remand.","30.On 28 December 2012 the deputy prosecutor sent another letter to the applicant. The content of the letter was similar to that of the previous one.","A.Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules, adopted on 11January 2006 at the 952nd meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies (\u201cthe European Prison Rules\u201d)","44.The European Prison Rules provide a framework of guiding principles for health services. The relevant extracts from the Rules read:","\u201cHealth care","39.Prison authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care.","Organisation of prison health care","40.1Medical services in prison shall be organised in close relation with the general health administration of the community or nation.","40.2Health policy in prisons shall be integrated into, and compatible with, national health policy.","40.3Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.","40.4Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer.","40.5All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.","Medical and health care personnel","41.1Every prison shall have the services of at least one qualified general medical practitioner.","41.2Arrangements shall be made to ensure at all times that a qualified medical practitioner is available without delay in cases of urgency.","...","41.4Every prison shall have personnel suitably trained in health care.","Duties of the medical practitioner","42.1The medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall see every prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is obviously unnecessary.","...","42.3When examining a prisoner the medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall pay particular attention to:","..;","b.diagnosing physical or mental illness and taking all measures necessary for its treatment and for the continuation of existing medical treatment;","...","43.1The medical practitioner shall have the care of the physical and mental health of the prisoners and shall see, under the conditions and with a frequency consistent with health care standards in the community, all sick prisoners, all who report illness or injury and any prisoner to whom attention is specially directed.","...","Health care provision","46.1Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialised institutions or to civil hospitals when such treatment is not available in prison.","46.2Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities, they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide the prisoners referred to them with appropriate care and treatment.\u201d","B.3rd General Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (\u201cthe CPT Report\u201d)","45.The complexity and importance of health-care services in detention facilities was discussed by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture in its 3rd General Report (CPT\/Inf (93) 12 - Publication Date: 4June 1993). The following are extracts from the Report:","\u201c33.When entering prison, all prisoners should without delay be seen by a member of the establishment\u2019s health care service. In its reports to date the CPT has recommended that every newly arrived prisoner be properly interviewed and, if necessary, physically examined by a medical doctor as soon as possible after his admission. It should be added that in some countries, medical screening on arrival is carried out by a fully qualified nurse, who reports to a doctor. This latter approach could be considered as a more efficient use of available resources.","It is also desirable that a leaflet or booklet be handed to prisoners on their arrival, informing them of the existence and operation of the health care service and reminding them of basic measures of hygiene.","34.While in custody, prisoners should be able to have access to a doctor at any time, irrespective of their detention regime ... The health care service should be so organised as to enable requests to consult a doctor to be met without undue delay ...","35.A prison\u2019s health care service should at least be able to provide regular out-patient consultations and emergency treatment (of course, in addition there may often be a hospital-type unit with beds) ... Further, prison doctors should be able to call upon the services of specialists.","As regards emergency treatment, a doctor should always be on call. Further, someone competent to provide first aid should always be present on prison premises, preferably someone with a recognised nursing qualification.","Out-patient treatment should be supervised, as appropriate, by health care staff; in many cases it is not sufficient for the provision of follow-up care to depend upon the initiative being taken by the prisoner.","36.The direct support of a fully-equipped hospital service should be available, in either a civil or prison hospital ...","38.A prison health care service should be able to provide medical treatment and nursing care, as well as appropriate diets, physiotherapy, rehabilitation or any other necessary special facility, in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by patients in the outside community. Provision in terms of medical, nursing and technical staff, as well as premises, installations and equipment, should be geared accordingly.","There should be appropriate supervision of the pharmacy and of the distribution of medicines. Further, the preparation of medicines should always be entrusted to qualified staff (pharmacist\/nurse, etc.). ...","39.A medical file should be compiled for each patient, containing diagnostic information as well as an ongoing record of the patient\u2019s evolution and of any special examinations he has undergone. In the event of a transfer, the file should be forwarded to the doctors in the receiving establishment.","Further, daily registers should be kept by health care teams, in which particular incidents relating to the patients should be mentioned. Such registers are useful in that they provide an overall view of the health care situation in the prison, at the same time as highlighting specific problems which may arise.","40.The smooth operation of a health care service presupposes that doctors and nursing staff are able to meet regularly and to form a working team under the authority of a senior doctor in charge of the service. ...\u201d","\u0421.Guidelines issued by the World Health Organization","46.The Guidelines for Antiretroviral therapy for HIV infection in adults and adolescents issued by the World Health Organization (WHO) within the HIV\/AIDS programme, following revision in 2010, recommended the commencement of antiretroviral treatment in all patients with HIV of WHO clinical stage 3 or 4, irrespective of the CD4 count. This recommendation remained unchanged following the revision of the Guidelines in June 2013.","47.The Guidelines revised in 2010 also contained a note on coinfection with HIV and hepatitis C, which read:","\u201cHepatitis C (HCV) coinfection is significantly associated with increased risk of death and advanced liver disease in HIV-positive individuals. HIV infection accelerates HCV-related disease progression and mortality but the reciprocal effect of HCV on the rate of HIV disease progression remains difficult to quantify because of the heterogeneity of study results. A recent meta-analysis showed an increase in the overall risk of mortality but did not demonstrate an increased risk of AIDS-defining events among coinfected patients.","A major observational cohort study on the level of toxicities of specific ART regimens used for HIV\/HCV coinfection did not find significant differences. However, the systematic review on drug-drug interactions prepared for these guidelines found important pharmacological interactions between ribavirin and ABC, ATV, AZT, d4T and ddI that can increase the toxicity risk if these drugs are used concomitantly.","Many studies also suggest that the sustained viral response rates of HCV therapy in HIV coinfected individuals are significantly lower than in HCV-monoinfected patient but others have achieved higher rates in this population.","Considering the significant level of uncertainty on these topics and the importance of hepatitis C management in the context of HIV coinfection (an important gap highlighted by the guidelines panel group, particularly the representatives from the people living with HIV community), WHO is planning to revise the recommendations for the prevention and treatment of major HIV-related opportunistic infections and comorbidities, including hepatitis C. Furthermore, it is expected that the 2010 World Health Assembly will establish global policy recommendations for the management of viral hepatitis, which will increase support for an integrated approach to the prevention, treatment and care of HIV\/HCV coinfection.","Meanwhile, the initiation of ART in HIV\/HCV coinfected people should follow the same principles and recommendations as for its initiation in HIV-monoinfected individuals. However, patients should be closely monitored because of the increased risk of drug toxicities and drug interactions between some ARVs and anti-HCV drugs.\u201d","D.Guidelines on Penile Cancer issued by the European Association of Urology","48.The Guidelines on Penile Cancer issued by the European Association of Urology, the leading authority within Europe on urological practice, research and education, read, insofar as relevant:","\u201c6.2.1 Penile biopsy","There is no need for biopsy if:","\u2022there is no doubt about the diagnosis and\/or","\u2022treatment of the lymph nodes is postponed after treatment of the primary tumour and\/or after histological examination of the sentinel node(s).","There is a need for histological confirmation if:","\u2022there is doubt about the exact nature of the lesion (e.g. metastasis or melanoma) and\/or","\u2022treatment of the lymph nodes is based on preoperative histological information (risk-adapted strategy).","In these cases an adequate biopsy is advised.\u201d"],"27589":["6.The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in the town of Artyom, in the Primorye Region.","A.The applicant\u2019s background prior to his criminal prosecution","7.The applicant is a Kyrgyz national of Uzbek ethnic origin. He originally lived in the town of Osh in Kyrgyzstan.","8.In June 2010, which was a time of mass disorders and interethnic clashes in the region, the applicant had been the head of the territorial board of a municipal authority in which most residents were ethnic Uzbeks. He was, according to him, considered as a leader of the local Uzbek community.","9.After the clashes, the applicant had repeatedly been invited by the Kyrgyz investigative bodies for questioning as a witness.","10.In June 2011 the applicant learned that criminal proceedings had been opened against him (see paragraph 12 below). The applicant submits that law-enforcement officers started to extort money from him, threatening him with imprisonment. Due to this he moved to a different city in Kyrgyzstan, to his sister\u2019s home, where he stayed for several months.","11.Afterwards, in March 2012, the applicant left Kyrgyzstan for Russia. He settled in the Primorye Region, and after obtaining a work permit, worked as a sports instructor.","B.Criminal proceedings against the applicant in Kyrgyzstan and the ensuing extradition proceedings in Russia","12.On 16 June 2011 the Kyrgyz authorities charged the applicant with the commission of violent crimes in June 2010 (attempted murder, participation in mass disorders and unlawful firearms trafficking) and ordered his arrest. It appears that when the authorities eventually tried to execute the arrest order, the applicant had left the country (see paragraphs10 and 11 above). The applicant was therefore put on the international wanted list.","13.On 14 March 2013 the applicant was arrested in Russia and detained in custody pending extradition","14.On 5 April 2013 the Kyrgyz authorities lodged an extradition request with the Prosecutor General of Russia, asking that the applicant be extradited to Kyrgyzstan for prosecution and trial.","15.On 16 September 2013 the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office granted the extradition request and ordered the applicant\u2019s extradition.","16.The applicant appealed, arguing that due to his Uzbek ethnic origin the aforementioned decision would expose him to a serious risk of torture. The applicant supported his appeal through reference, inter alia, to various UN sources, NGOs\u2019 reports and the judgment of the Court in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev (see Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia, no.49747\/11, 16 October 2012).","17.On 1 November 2013 the Primorye Regional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal against the extradition order, giving the following reasoning:","\u201cThe charges pressed against [the applicant] [by Kyrgyz authorities] are criminal offences liable to punishment in Russia ... They are not time-barred ...","Pursuant to Article 464 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, an extradition request lodged by a foreign state in respect of a Russian citizen should be denied ...","It is apparent from the conclusions of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) for the Primorye Region that [the applicant] is not a Russian citizen. ... He holds a Kyrgyz passport ... and is a Kyrgyz national. ...","On 28 June 2013 the FMS for Prymorye Region rejected a request from [the applicant] for refugee status in Russia.","[The applicant\u2019s] allegations of persecution by the Kyrgyz authorities on false criminal charges on the basis of his [Uzbek] ethnic origin were addressed [within the refugee status procedure].","The lawfulness of the refusal [to grant the applicant refugee status in Russia] was confirmed by Russia\u2019s FMS on 24September 2013 ...","[The applicant\u2019s] argument [that] the decision to extradite him was taken before any judicial review of the refusal to grant him refugee status is groundless.","It is apparent from the evidential material gathered during the extradition check that [the applicant] arrived in Russia ... for employment purposes and that he had not been persecuted in Kyrgyzstan on racial, national or religious grounds ...","It is likewise apparent from the evidential material gathered during the extradition check that [the applicant] lodged his request for refugee status on 16 April 2013, while being held in custody following his arrest in Russia ... , [therefore] his appeal against the decision of the FMS did not prevent the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office from taking a decision concerning extradition, in line with ruling no. 11 of 14 June 2012 of the Plenary Session of the Russian Supreme Court ...","[The applicant] does not have immunity from prosecution [and] there are no grounds preventing his extradition.","The Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of Kyrgyzstan provided assurances that [in the event of extradition] [the applicant] would have the benefit of [legal assistance]; that he would not be extradited to a third State; that he would be prosecuted only for the offence for which he was being extradited; that [he] would not be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; that he was being prosecuted for an ordinary criminal offence devoid of any political character or discrimination on any grounds; that he would be able to freely leave Kyrgyzstan after he had stood trial and served a sentence; and that Russian diplomats would be allowed access to him.","It is apparent from the above guarantees that [the applicant] is being prosecuted for ordinary criminal offences; his prosecution is not politically motivated and is not connected with his [ethnic origin].","[The applicant\u2019s] allegations concerning his persecution on political grounds, lack of fair trial in Kyrgyzstan, and persecution of his family members by law-enforcement bodies in Kyrgyzstan are not supported by any objective data.","The court has established that [the applicant\u2019s] wife and daughter live in Kyrgyzstan, [that there is] no substantiated information concerning their alleged persecution by the Kyrgyz authorities, [and] that they do not travel outside the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. [The applicant himself] did not apply for refugee status until his arrest.","...The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have any information that would prevent [the applicant\u2019s] extradition to Kyrgyzstan.","Therefore, there are no grounds ... preventing [the applicant\u2019s] extradition to Kyrgyzstan for criminal prosecution.","The argument of [the applicant\u2019s] lawyer referring to international sources (report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on technical assistance and cooperation on human rights for Kyrgyzstan, report of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, International Crisis Group Kyrgyzstan report) to the effect that after the interethnic clashes in the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 the law\u2011enforcement bodies had subjected ethnic Uzbeks to torture and that there are grounds to believe that [the applicant] might be subjected to torture in the event of his extradition, is unsubstantiated. The aforementioned international documents describe the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, are unspecific and unsupported by evidence, and are countered by the guarantees offered by Kyrgyz Republic, which relate directly to the applicant and are sufficient to eliminate the risk of [the applicant\u2019s] being subjected to inhuman treatment.","[As to] the reference by the defence to ... the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev, [the case] has no connection with [the applicant\u2019s] case and cannot be taken into consideration.","...\u201d","18.The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Russia.","19.In the meantime, on 28 January 2014 the Court indicated to the Government, under Rule39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Kyrgyzstan or another country for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.","20.On 30 January 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 1November 2013 on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court:","\u201cThe court has taken into consideration the arguments of the defence and the documents submitted, including the concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture [dated December 2013] on Kyrgyzstan\u2019s second periodic report, in which the Committee expressed its deep concern with regard to apparent impunity regarding widespread acts of torture and ill-treatment that remained uninvestigated by the authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic ... and the report that the investigations, persecutions, convictions and punishments in connection with the events of June 2010 are mainly directed at persons of Uzbek ethnic origin.","At the same time, these circumstances cannot in themselves be considered to constitute sufficient grounds for refusing to extradite [the applicant] to the Kyrgyz Republic ...","Pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984, no State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture. For the purpose of determining whether such grounds exist, the competent authorities must take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.","...","The provisions of Article 3 of the Convention against Torture imply that it is necessary not only to verify the existence in the State concerned of gross and mass violations of human rights, but also the existence in that State of the likelihood that the individual concerned would personally be at risk of torture if returned to his or her country. That risk must be real, immediate and foreseeable.","According to the legal position of the UN Committee against Torture as outlined in a number of its decisions (...), the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not of itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the person in question would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced showing that the individual concerned would be personally at risk ...","The Committee ... noted that it is necessary to establish the existence of substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of torture if returned, and that such risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. The risk need not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present. In this regard the Committee has determined, in previous decisions, that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real and personal.","The evidential material submitted by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office \u2013 on the basis of which the decision to extradite [the applicant] was taken \u2013 does not contain any information demonstrating that [the latter] personally would be at risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the event of his extradition.","[A long passage on the guarantees provided by the Kyrgyz authorities].","Neither [the applicant] nor his lawyers provided any substantial evidence showing that [the former] was at risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the Kyrgyz authorities, or that he might be persecuted on grounds [such as] race, religion, national or social origin, or political opinion.","... [The applicant] does not belong to any political or other party, organisation or group that opposes [the present government of Kyrgyzstan].","While living in Kyrgyzstan [the applicant] was not subjected to any torture, inhuman or degrading treatment by the authorities; he arrived in Russia in March 2012, that is to say a year and nine months after the crimes of which he stands accused had been committed in June 2010. [The applicant\u2019s] wife and daughter remain in the Kyrgyz Republic.","No evidence has [therefore] been provided showing that [the applicant] or his relatives were persecuted by [the Kyrgyz] authorities.","[The applicant\u2019s] statement to the effect that he is a \u201cleader of Uzbek diaspora\u201d and belongs to the ethnic Uzbeks \u2013 which allegedly gives him reason to believe that he would be subjected to repressive criminal prosecution and unfair conviction \u2013 is an assumption unsupported by any evidence. It cannot therefore be considered to constitute sufficient grounds for concluding that he is personally at risk of being subjected to torture and other ill-treatment in the event of his extradition to Kyrgyzstan.","...\u201d","C.The applicant\u2019s detention","21.On 16 March 2013 the Artyom Town Court in the Primorye Region ordered the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition until 23 April 2013.","22.On 22 April 2013 the same court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 14September 2013. On the same day the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision. On 12 July 2013 the Primorye Regional Court upheld the extension order on appeal.","23.On 13 September 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 13 March 2014. On 19September 2013 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision. The appeal was dispatched by post on 20September 2013. The Leninskiy District Court received the applicant\u2019s appeal on 21October 2013. On 23October 2013 a copy of the appeal was forwarded to the applicant and the local prosecutor\u2019s office, and the latter was invited to submit comments by 28October 2013. On 31 October 2013 the Leninskiy District Court forwarded the case file to the Primorye Regional Court for examination. On 6November 2013 an appeal hearing was scheduled for 7November 2013 and the parties were informed accordingly. On 7November 2013 the Primorye Regional Court upheld the extension order of 13September 2013 on appeal.","24.On 7 March 2014 the deputy Prosecutor of the Primorye Region decided to release the applicant in the light of the decision of the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to the present case. The applicant was released on the same day.","D.Refugee proceedings","25.On 16 April 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status with Russia\u2019s FMS, alleging persecution on the grounds of ethnic origin.","26.On 28 June 2013 the FMS for the Primorye Region rejected the applicant\u2019s request, having found that the applicant had left his country of nationality for reasons falling outside the scope of section 1(1)(1) of the Refugee Act.","27.On 24 September 2013 Russia\u2019s FMS upheld the refusal of 28June 2013.","28.The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision before the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow. In his appeal he referred to reports concerning the widespread ill-treatment of Uzbek detainees in Kyrgyzstan, as confirmed by various UN sources, NGOs\u2019 reports and the judgment of the Court in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev.","29.On 22 January 2014 the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal against the FMS\u2019s decisions. The District Court considered that the applicant had failed to substantiate his fears of persecution in Kyrgyzstan and that his allegations that the criminal charges against him were unlawful fell outside the scope of the refugee status proceedings. The District Court pointed out that his application for refugee status contained no indications that he had been previously accused or convicted of a criminal offence, or that he had been a member of any political, religious or military organisations. It also took into account the fact that the applicant had not applied for refugee status until after his placement in detention.","30.In his appeal against the judgment of 22 January 2014 the applicant requested a rigorous examination of his arguments regarding the risk of ill\u2011treatment. He again referred to various reports by international organisations and reputable NGOs to support his position.","31.On 20 May 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal, reiterating the conclusions of the migration authorities and the first\u2011instance court.","E.Temporary asylum proceedings","32.On 25 April 2014 the FMS for the Primorye Region issued a decision granting the applicant temporary asylum in the Russian Federation until 25April 2015, referring to the existence of circumstances preventing the applicant\u2019s extradition, namely the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in the applicant\u2019s case before the Court and the impossibility of foreseeing the duration of those proceedings.","33.On 10 April 2015 the FMS for the Primorye Region extended the term of the temporary asylum granted to the applicant until 25April 2016, with reference to the same grounds.","43.For relevant reports and items of information, see Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia (cited above, \u00a7\u00a730-46) and Mamadaliyev v. Russia (no.5614\/13, \u00a7\u00a737-42, 24July 2014)."],"27591":["6.The applicants are Syrian nationals or had their habitual residence in Syria. At the time of lodging their applications they were detained at a detention centre for foreign nationals in the town of Maloyaroslavets, Kaluga Region (\u041e\u0421\u0423\u0421\u0412\u0418\u0413 \u2013 \u201cthe detention centre\u201d), run by the local Federal Migration Service (\u201cFMS\u201d).","A.The applicants\u2019 personal details","7.The applicant L.M. (application no.40081\/14) was born in 1988. He entered Russia on 9 February 2013. He was detained on 14 April 2014. He is a stateless Palestinian who had his habitual residence in Syria. He was not in possession of a valid national ID at the time of detention, and his identity was established by an immigration officer in Russia in 2014.","8.The applicant A.A. (application no.40088\/14) was born in 1987. He entered Russia on 21 April 2013. He was detained on 15 April 2014.","9.The applicant M.A. (application no.40127\/14) was born in 1994. He entered Russia on 21 April 2013. He was detained on 15 April 2014 and has a brother, Mr Akhmad A., who received temporary asylum in Russia and is married to a Russian national, Albina A.","B.The applicants\u2019 arrest and expulsion proceedings","10.On 14 and 15 April 2014 (see Appendix) the applicants were detained by the police and officers of the FMS at a clothing factory in Maloyaroslavets.","11.On 15 and 16 April 2014 (see Appendix) the Maloyaroslavets District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) examined the applicants\u2019 administrative files, found them guilty of administrative offences (breach of immigration rules and working without a permit) and ordered them to pay fines of between 2,000 and 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and their expulsion to Syria, in line with the procedure under Article 3.10\u00a71 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicants all stated in court that they feared for their lives if returned to Syria and referred to information about the ongoing and widespread conflict there. The court found these statements to be general in nature and unsupported by any relevant evidence. The applicants also referred to the absence of work in Syria and the fact that in Russia they had been able to work illegally. The District Court then focused on the economic motives of their arrival and illegal stay. Pending expulsion the court ordered their detention at the detention centre.","12.The lawyer representing the applicants before the Court lodged appeals for all three of them, describing in detail the general situation in Syria and the danger of returning there, and citing and attaching the relevant country reports produced by the UNHCR and FMS. She also cited a circular letter issued by the Federal Bailiff Service on 30 August 2013 to its regional branches, according to which no entry was possible into Syrian territory in view of the hostilities and problems that would arise with the execution of court judgments ordering expulsion there. The lawyer argued, in detail, that the decisions to expel the applicants could not be implemented; in such circumstances their detention lost any purpose and became indefinite. The lawyer further cited an FMS circular letter of 23 January 2013 entitled \u201cOn the situation in Syria and the work with persons originating from Syria\u201d, which stated that \u201cin the current difficult political situation, when the Syrian authorities are unable to provide effective protection of their citizens from the illegal actions of the armed opposition ... most of the applicants ... have fled the country as a result of the armed conflict. ... Individuals who cannot not safely return [to Syria] and have a well-founded fear of ill-treatment, including torture, should be given temporary asylum\u201d. The statements of appeal further referred to the fact that the applicants had sought asylum in Russia; their expulsion would therefore be contrary to the relevant legislation. The UNHCR Office in Moscow produced a letter to the Kaluga Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) in respect of L.M., reiterating its position in respect of returns to Syria and arguing that any decision relating to expulsion there while his asylum request was pending would be in breach of domestic and international legislation. Similar letters were produced in respect of the two other applicants. The applicants also referred to a decision of the Leningrad Regional Court taken earlier in 2014 relating to a Syrian national in a similar situation (see paragraph 72 below).","13.The Kaluga Regional Court rejected all three appeals on 27 May 2014, following which the expulsion orders entered into force. It stressed the applicants\u2019 illegal stay in Russia and their reference to economic difficulties as their reason for departure from their home country. It found that the alleged danger to the applicants\u2019 lives as a result of the ongoing conflict did not in itself constitute sufficient grounds to exclude expulsion in respect of those guilty of administrative offences in the sphere of immigration.","14.In respect of L.M., in a separate decision of the same date, the Regional Court refused to amend the expulsion order. The court noted that he had not applied for asylum in Russia until 21 May 2014, a fact which \u201cdid not affect the lawfulness of the decision taken by the District Court concerning the applicant\u2019s administrative offence and expulsion\u201d.","15.On 17 June 2014 the Kaluga Federal Bailiff Service asked the District Court to stay execution in respect of M.A., pointing out that the European Court of Human Rights had applied Rule 39 and therefore the expulsion could not be carried out at that time. On 30 June 2014 the District Court found that the Code of Administrative Offences did not provide for stays of expulsion as opposed to the payment of fines and dismissed the request.","16.On 4 July 2014 the District Court issued a similar decision in respect of L.M., pursuant to a request by the Bailiff Service on 1 July 2014. None of the parties were present at the hearing, including L.M.","17.It appears from the letter of 8 July 2014 sent by the Kaluga Federal Bailiff Service to the applicants\u2019 lawyer that it was unaware at that date of the District Court\u2019s decisions. From the same letter it appears that a similar request had been made for a stay of execution in respect of A.A.","C.A.A.\u2019s escape","18.Since 15 and 16 April 2014 the applicants have been detained at the detention centre.","19.According to the Government\u2019s observations received in December 2014, A.A. escaped on 25 August 2014. An internal report was prepared by the head of the Kaluga FMS the same day, describing the events as follows:","\u201cIn the early hours of 25 August 2014, between 3 and 4 a.m., a group of foreign nationals and stateless people detained pending administrative deportation from the [detention centre] escaped from the premises ... The group included ... [A.A.], a Syrian national, born on 15 January 1987 ... An investigation has established that the people used an unfinished ventilation shaft located between the ground and first floors of the building. Having reached the first floor, the people jumped out of the window onto a pile of construction rubbish and, having covered the surveillance devices ... with a blanket, left the grounds of the centre with the aid of construction materials stored in the courtyard.","The exact circumstances of the escape are being established. An internal investigation is being held in respect of the staff who had allowed the seven foreign nationals to escape.","The local police have been told to organise a search for the people who have escaped.\u201d","20.The applicants\u2019 representative claimed to have had no knowledge of the escape prior to receiving the Government\u2019s observations, expressing her concern that they had not submitted the information earlier, for example when making their observations of 2 September 2014.","21.In reply to the Court\u2019s further questions in this regard, in their observations of 24 April 2015 the Government explained that no administrative or criminal proceedings had been initiated, as an escape from a detention centre for foreign nationals pending deportation was not an offence under any legislation. While the police continued to search for the detainees, their whereabouts, including those of A.A., remained unknown.","22.The Government further submitted that since their observations had been based on the replies of the competent State authorities prepared on 4and 8 August 2014, no information about A.A.\u2019s escape had been provided at that stage. They also submitted that the detention centre had been under no obligation to inform detainees\u2019 representatives of the escape, hence why it had not done so in A.A.\u2019s case.","23.The applicants\u2019 representative confirmed that she had not been aware of A.A.\u2019s escape prior to the meeting with the two other applicants on 17December 2014 and submitted that she had no knowledge of A.A.\u2019s current whereabouts.","D.Proceedings for refugee and asylum status in Russia","1.A.A.\u2019s first application for asylum","24.From the documents submitted by the Government in December 2014, it appears that A.A. sought refugee status in Russia on 5 March 2014 by applying to the Moscow Region FMS. On 11 March 2014 this request was accepted for consideration on the merits and the applicant was questioned and issued with an appropriate document.","25.On 26 March 2014 A.A.\u2019s application for refugee status was dismissed. The decision of the FMS stated that he had submitted no information to support his claims of persecution in Syria. His family remained in that country and he could have used the \u201cinternal flight alternative\u201d to another part of Syria, or claimed asylum in a transit country. He reasoned his request to remain in Russia by his wish to work there and did not therefore fall under the definition of refugee.","26.The applicant did not obtain a copy of that decision and did not appeal against it.","2.The applicants\u2019 claims of asylum after arrest","27.After their arrest the three applicants applied for refugee status. They submitted the relevant applications to the local FMS in Kaluga; M.A. and A.A. on 14 May 2014 and L.M. on 21 May 2014.","28.On 28 May 2014 the three applicants also submitted requests for temporary asylum in Russia, which were drawn up in Russian and translated by Z.A.","29.In June 2014 the three applicants were questioned by the Kaluga FMS. They indicated that the reasons for their departure from Syria were the war and danger to their lives. A.A. stated that he was from Aleppo and had lost contact with his family, parents and siblings after his departure in 2013. M.A. stated that he had fled Aleppo after his neighbourhood had been taken over by \u201cterrorists\u201d who had killed dozens of people there, including his close male relatives, which he had witnessed. He had also lost contact with his family after December 2013. L.M. had been in Damascus but had no right of return as he was a stateless Palestinian. He had also lost contact with the members of his family who had remained in Syria. All applicants stressed that they were afraid to go back because of the hostilities which had caused their departure, and said that they feared being forcibly drafted into the armed forces.","30.On 16 June 2014 the Kaluga FMS decided that their applications for refugee status should be considered on the merits and issued appropriate certificates to them.","31.In parallel proceedings, also in June 2014, the three applicants were questioned by the FMS in order to obtain temporary asylum in Russia.","32.On 17 July 2014 L.M. signed a paper in Russian stating that he had asked for his request for \u201ctemporary asylum in Russia dated 28 May 2014\u201d not to be considered since he \u201cintended to return to his home in Syria\u201d. The paper was also signed by a translator, Z.A.","33.On the same date a similar paper was signed by A.A. which stated that \u201che and his wife intended to go to Turkey\u201d. The paper was also signed by Z.A.","34.According to the Government\u2019s observations of 3 December 2014, these requests served as the basis of the FMS decisions to terminate the proceedings in respect of these two applicants, both in respect of their request for refugee status and temporary asylum. No documents were submitted in this regard.","35.On 16 September 2014 the Kaluga FMS decided to refuse M.A.\u2019s request for refugee status. It considered that he faced no threat of persecution on the grounds set out in the Law on Refugees. On 17September 2014 the Kaluga FMS, for the same reasons, refused him temporary asylum.","36.On 28 November 2014 the Regional Court reviewed M.A.\u2019s appeal against the decision not to grant him temporary asylum. He was not taken to the trial even though the decision stated that he had been notified, and he did not have a representative. A representative of the FMS appeared before the court, which briefly restated the reasons for the FMS decision to refuse the applicant both refugee and temporary asylum status and confirmed that there were no reasons to regard him as in need of protection. Neither the general situation in Syria nor the applicant\u2019s submissions about the situation in Aleppo had been raised or discussed. This decision was sent to M.A. on 5December 2014. It is unclear if he appealed against it.","3.Next round of proceedings","37.On 30 September 2014 M.A. and L.M. submitted new written requests for refugee status, which were accepted for consideration by the Kaluga FMS on 7 October 2014. On 15 October 2014, however, both applicants signed papers in Russian stating that they had asked for their requests for \u201ctemporary asylum in Russia dated 28 September 2014\u201d not to be considered. The papers stated that they had been translated and written by Z.A.","38.The Government, in their observations of 2 December 2014, explained that the contradictory position taken by L.M. prevented the FMS from considering his new application on the merits. M.A.\u2019s new application was not considered either.","E.Conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention and access to representatives","39.The applicants submitted that severe restrictions had been placed on them meeting with their representatives. As a result, despite numerous attempts and complaints, M.A. and L.M. only had one meeting with them on 17 December 2014. M.A. had one meeting with his brother and Albina A. on 22 October 2014, which lasted about ten minutes. A.A. did not meet with a representative prior to his escape from the detention centre (see paragraphs 20-23 above).","40.The applicants submitted copies of their exchange with various officials in the Kaluga FMS and prosecutor\u2019s office regarding their detention and access to representatives. From these letters it appears that on several occasions the applicants\u2019 two lawyers, Ms Golovanchuk and MsYermolayeva, a lawyer of the Kaluga Bar Association, Mr P.K., a member of the Kaluga branch of the Human Rights Centre Memorial who had assisted the applicants with their complaints, MsLyubov M.-E., as well as M.A.\u2019s brother and his wife, wrote to these agencies regarding a lack of access to the detention centre and the conditions of detention of people detained there. Their exchanges may be summarised as follows.","1.Detention in April \u2013 October 2014","41.On 3 March 2014 the head of the detention centre responded to MsLyubov M.-E., stating that visits by lawyers and human rights defenders were possible daily between 11.30a.m. and 12.30p.m. On 14April 2014 the Kaluga FMS informed the regional prosecutor\u2019s office that visits by representatives, relatives and human rights defenders were possible upon the written request of detainees, or upon the written request of their representatives or human rights defenders if accompanied by a written request by the detainee for legal assistance from them. Visits outside of normal visiting hours had to be agreed in advance with the detention centre administration, to ensure the proper functioning of the centre. If a detainee requested in writing to be represented by anyone, the centre would consider the issue of ensuring a visit from the representative, accompanied by a notary, to certify a power of attorney.","42.On 25 April 2014 L.M.\u2019s lawyer wrote to the Kaluga regional prosecutor\u2019s office. She pointed out that the applicant had been refused access to his representatives, and that the conditions of detention at the detention centre were harsher than for people who had been detained on criminal charges. Detainees were kept in their rooms for most of the day; they had no means of communication with anybody and could not contact each other or their representatives. The letter further stressed the absence of any flight connection with Syria and the impossibility of expelling the applicant there.","43.On 17 May 2014 the Kaluga FMS informed the regional prosecutor\u2019s office that on 24 April 2014 Ms Lyubov M.-E. had asked to be allowed to meet with the three applicants and an Uzbek national, T. The staff of the centre had refused to allow her to meet with the applicants, since she had not had an interpreter present and could not communicate with them. She had attempted to pass documents in Russian to the applicants (complaints against the domestic court decisions) through T., but they had been found by the detention centre staff. Ms Lyubov M.-E. had been reminded to come back accompanied by an interpreter. Furthermore, the detainees had signed documents refusing to meet with Ms Lyubov M.-E. since she had asked them for money for her services.","44.On 26 May 2014 the head of the NGO Civic Assistance wrote to the Moscow FMS. She pointed out that the applicants\u2019 confinement in the detention centre appeared unlawful in the absence of any time-limit or purpose, since the expulsion could not be carried out. She further pointed to the fact that the applicants had submitted applications for temporary asylum, and that their conditions of detention were inhuman and degrading, since the food was of poor quality and they had little access to fresh air, outdoor exercise, meaningful activities or information. The letter further stated that the detention centre staff had threatened and harassed detainees, and that the applicants had been pressed to withdraw their applications for asylum. The letter also referred to the difficulties in meeting the inmates.","45.On 10 June 2014 the applicants\u2019 lawyers submitted a letter to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, with copies to the Kaluga regional prosecutor\u2019s office and FMS. They pointed out that the applicants\u2019 conditions of detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. M.A. had been diagnosed with pneumonia, but had not received adequate medical help. The applicants had been unable to meet with their relatives and representatives. The food was of poor quality, consisted mostly of cereals and was often served cold. The applicants complained that they had been harassed and threatened by the staff, threatened with reprisals if they complained, and encouraged to withdraw their applications for asylum and discharge their representatives. In the absence of any real possibility of expelling the applicants to Syria, their detention had turned into an open-ended punishment without any possibility of review.","46.On 11 June 2014 the Kaluga FMS wrote to the Kaluga regional ombudsman, noting that on 27 May 2014 the Regional Court had rejected the applicants\u2019 appeals (see paragraph 13 above) while they were assisted by a lawyer and interpreter. In their letter of 29 July 2014 the Kaluga FMS informed the regional prosecutor\u2019s office that the detainees\u2019 rights had not been infringed. The court hearing of 30 June 2014 relating to staying execution of the expulsion order (see paragraph 15 above) had not required the applicants\u2019 presence, and an interpreter had been invited to the detention centre on 17 July 2014, who had translated the court decision to the applicants. On the same day M.A. had decided to withdraw his application for temporary asylum and refuse any further assistance from Ms Lyubov M.-E., signing the relevant documents.","47.Writing to the applicants\u2019 lawyer on 29 July and 12 August and the regional prosecutor\u2019s office on 30 July 2014, the Kaluga FMS provided information about the medical assistance given to the applicants. In respect of M.A., the letters stated that he had been examined by a doctor upon arrival, that an interpreter had assisted him on 9 June 2014 in communicating with the detention centre doctor, who had administered treatment, and that on 14 and 25 June he had again been examined by a doctor and sent for a chest X-ray. His condition had been described as \u201csatisfactory\u201d and improved. The letters went on to state that the detention rooms had a ventilation system installed, that the shower and toilets, although not in the rooms, were undergoing renovation so that they would all be on one floor, that there was a courtyard for walks, and that the detention centre staff had treated detainees with respect and never allowed any behaviour which could escalate into arguments. The staff included a doctor, a psychologist and a medical disinfection specialist. On 17 July 2014 M.A. had signed a paper refusing any further assistance from MsLyubov M.-E. On the same day the remaining two applicants had also expressed their wish to withdraw their requests for asylum.","2.M.A.\u2019s meeting with his relatives on 22 October 2014","48.On 22 October 2014 M.A. signed a letter in Russian addressed to the Kaluga FMS stating that its officers had forced him to sign documents in Russian he could not understand and which, as it turned out, had cancelled his asylum request and prevented him meeting with his representative, MsLyubov M.-E. As a result, he had not met with her, and the only meeting he had attended had been with his brother and sister-in-law on 22October 2014, which had only lasted about ten minutes. The applicant further stated that he and L.M. were under constant surveillance, had received threats from the staff and were unable to write and send letters or make complaints. The treatment was allegedly because of their application to the Court. The papers signed by the applicants about their unwillingness to have their asylum requests considered had been obtained under duress and they had had no idea what they had signed. The applicant\u2019s requests to meet with his relatives and representatives had not been granted. He further complained that he had not been given any personal hygiene products and could not shave or cut his hair, and that he and L.M. were being kept in isolation and had very little contact with other detainees, allegedly because they had applied to the Court. They had also been told that their expulsion to Syria would take place anyway and that their complaints would have no effect. The letter ended with a request to be allowed unrestricted meetings with his relatives and representatives, including Ms Lyubov M.-E.","49.On 27 October 2014 Albina A., M.A.\u2019s sister-in-law, wrote to the Moscow-based human rights NGO Civic Assistance. On the same day she and her husband Mr Akhmad A., M.A.\u2019s brother, produced affidavits to the applicant\u2019s lawyers in Moscow. From these documents it appears that both brothers had left Aleppo in Syria because of the hostilities there, that their neighbourhood had been destroyed, that many of their relatives had been killed, and that they had no contact with the surviving family members. They had been unable to meet with M.A. at the detention centre, with the exception of one brief visit on 22 October 2014. The visit had lasted about ten minutes and a detention centre officer had been present. When M.A. had started to write down a complaint in Arabic, it had been taken away by the officer who had said that it was not allowed. M.A. had not been aware that he had signed a withdrawal of his asylum request prior to the meeting with his relatives. He had said that he had signed the papers under pressure from the FMS staff. His brother had managed to covertly obtain his signature on a complaint and a request to be allowed visit from his relatives and representative, Ms Lyubov M.-E. M.A. had also told them that on 21October he had been visited by an FMS officer from Kaluga (MsMarina Vladimirovna), accompanied by an interpreter, who had told him that he would be expelled to Syria as soon as his travel documents were issued by the Syrian Embassy.","50.On 27 October 2014 Mr P.K. of the Kaluga Bar Association submitted a complaint to the Kaluga regional prosecutor\u2019s office. He stated that he had arrived at the detention centre and had produced an order for representing M.A. and a copy of his bar membership card that day; however, its staff had refused to allow him to meet with his client, referring to the absence of any signed agreement to represent him or permission for the meeting issued by the Kaluga FMS. The FMS had further informed him that the review of his request would take a month. Mr P.K. referred to the provisions of domestic legislation which permitted a lawyer to meet with his client and asked for his client\u2019s right to legal aid to be restored.","3.M.A.\u2019s and L.M.\u2019s meeting with their representatives on 17December 2014","51.On 17 December 2014 lawyers Ms Golovanchuk and MsYermolayeva met with the two applicants and took affidavits from them regarding their detention and asylum request situation.","52.L.M. stated that he was detained in a spacious room with three other detainees; it had a toilet and running cold water. A hot shower could be taken daily on another floor upon request. The room was clean and had sufficient natural and artificial lighting, which was switched off during the night. There were no hygiene problems with insects and the bed linen was changed once a week. Detainees spent their time in their rooms, day and night, except when they went for walks. There were four nurses who administered medical treatment as necessary. He insisted that he wanted his asylum claim to be considered and unrestricted access and the ability to communicate with his representative, including in writing. When asked, L.M. stated that he had been assaulted by the staff on 27 August 2014 after some of the detainees had escaped; one of the wardens had twisted his hand painfully.","53.M.A. stated that while at the detention centre, he had been beaten twice, in July 2014, when the staff had found him to be in possession of the Koran, and on 25 August, when one of the Syrian detainees had escaped. He had been beaten so that he would disclose details about the escape. After the beatings he had stayed in bed for three days and could not eat. He stated that he had not been allowed to make complaints or send letters, and had been denied access to his representatives and relatives. He had not been allowed to attend the court hearing on 28 November 2014 (see paragraph 36 above) even though he had asked to. He also confirmed that he had wanted to meet with his representatives, including Ms Lyubov M.-E. and had expected his claim for asylum to be processed. He stated that the FMS staff had threatened him and told him that his complaints would not help and that he would be spending two years in prison anyway.","54.Following these submissions, on 17 December 2014 the applicants\u2019 lawyers wrote a letter to the Kaluga regional prosecutor\u2019s office pointing at the illegal nature of the applicants\u2019 detention, since their expulsion could not be carried out and there were no terms or possibility of review of the detention. They also stressed that the applicants\u2019 conditions of detention were similar to people in pre-trial detention, while the restrictions on visits and correspondence were illegal and in direct contradiction to the information contained in the letters from the detention centre administration. The letter stressed that the absence of contact with relatives, lawyers and representatives amounted in itself to inhuman treatment since it had serious psychological effects on the applicants.","55.On the same day M.A. signed a request addressed to the Kaluga FMS to be allowed meetings with his representatives, Ms Golovanchuk, MsYermolayeva and Ms Lyubov M.-E., as well as his brother MrAkhmadA. and sister-in-law Ms Albina A.","4.Information about the applicants\u2019 conditions of detention submitted by the Government","56.In reply to the Court\u2019s additional questions, in April 2015 the Government submitted more detailed information about the applicants\u2019 conditions of detention.","57.On 30 March 2014 the head of the Kaluga FMS ordered that meetings with people detained in the detention centre could be authorised for close relatives by its head upon presentation of documents proving they were related. Visits by representatives and human rights defenders could be authorised by the head of the Kaluga FMS, and the detainee could submit a written request to the head of the detention centre.","58.According to the detention centre\u2019s daily routine issued by its head on 15 November 2014, daily walks were to last no less than an hour per inmate. An hour a day was set aside for telephone contact and another hour between 11.30a.m. and 12.30p.m. for meetings with visitors and receiving parcels. An hour every day was set aside for meetings with the administration.","59.The Government submitted extracts from the applicants\u2019 medical files, from which it appears that they had been examined upon arrival at the centre and found to be in good health. A.A. had been treated for bronchitis and pneumonia in June 2014, and on 14 July 2014 his health was improving. He had also had an incident of high blood pressure on 10 June, which had been successfully treated. L.M. had been diagnosed with pulpitis and gastric problems and had received treatment. He had seen the doctor on five occasions between 10 May 2014 and 17 February 2015. M.A. had not consulted the medical staff.","60.According to the Government, L.M. and M.A. were detained in room no.15 on the first floor of the two-storey building, which measured 47square metres and accommodated six people. A toilet was accessible from the room, and there was a shared bathroom on the ground floor. The outdoor exercise yard measured 180 square metres. The Government provided photos of the rooms, sanitary facilities, canteen and the yard.","76.The 8th report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syria Arab Republic, established on 22 August 2011 by the UN Human Rights Council through Resolution S-17\/1 (A\/HRC\/27\/60, 13August 2014) states:","\u201cThe findings presented in the present report, based on 480 interviews and evidence collected between 20 January and 15 July 2014, establish that the conduct of the warring parties in the Syrian Arab Republic has caused civilians immeasurable suffering.","Government forces continued to perpetrate massacres and conduct widespread attacks on civilians, systematically committing murder, torture, rape and enforced disappearance amounting to crimes against humanity. Government forces have committed gross violations of human rights and the war crimes of murder, hostage\u2011taking, torture, rape and sexual violence, recruiting and using children in hostilities and targeting civilians. Government forces disregarded the special protection accorded to hospitals and medical and humanitarian personnel. Indiscriminate and disproportionate aerial bombardment and shelling led to mass civilian casualties and spread terror. Government forces used chlorine gas, an illegal weapon.","Non-State armed groups, named in the report, committed massacres and war crimes, including murder, execution without due process, torture, hostage-taking, violations of international humanitarian law tantamount to enforced disappearance, rape and sexual violence, recruiting and using children in hostilities and attacking protected objects. Medical and religious personnel and journalists were targeted. Armed groups besieged and indiscriminately shelled civilian neighbourhoods, in some instances spreading terror among civilians through the use of car bombings in civilian areas. Members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) committed torture, murder, acts tantamount to enforced disappearance, and forcible displacement as part of an attack on the civilian population in Aleppo and Ar Raqqah governorates, amounting to crimes against humanity.\u201d","77.Since March 2012 the UNHCR has issued several subsequent papers, including those entitled \u201cPosition on Returns to the Syrian Arabic Republic\u201d and, later, \u201cInternational Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic\u201d, with updates. The latest, \u201cUpdate III\u201d of 27 October 2014, states:","\u201c2.Nearly all parts of the country are now embroiled in violence, which is playing out between different actors in partially overlapping conflicts and is exacerbated by the participation of foreign fighters on all sides. Fighting between the Syrian government forces and an array of anti-government armed groups continues unabated. In parallel, the group \u201cIslamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham\u201d (hereafter ISIS) has consolidated control over significant areas in northern and north-eastern Syria and engages in frequent armed confrontations with anti-government armed groups, Kurdish forces (People\u2019s Protection Units, YPG) as well as government forces. The launch of airstrikes against ISIS targets as of 23 September 2014 has added an additional layer of complexity to the conflict. As international efforts to find a political solution to the Syria situation have so far not been successful, the conflict continues to cause further civilian casualties, displacement and destruction of the country\u2019s infrastructure. ...","Civilian Casualties","4.The number of persons killed as a result of the conflict has reportedly surpassed 191,000 by April 2014. The greatest number of documented deaths was recorded in the governorate of Rural Damascus, followed by Aleppo, Homs, Idlib, Dera\u2019a and Hama governorates. The deterioration of Syria\u2019s healthcare system has reportedly resulted in thousands of ordinarily preventable deaths from chronic diseases, premature deaths due to normally nonfatal infectious diseases, neonatal problems and malnutrition. In addition, the conflict has resulted in hundreds of thousands of people wounded, often resulting in long-term disabilities, and many more suffering from the psychological consequences of having been witness to violence, the loss of family members, displacement and deprivation.","Forced Displacement","5.The conflict in Syria has caused the largest refugee displacement crisis of our times, with Syrians now the world\u2019s largest refugee population under UNHCR\u2019s mandate. It continues to generate increasing levels of displacement each day with an average of 100,000 refugees arriving in host countries in the region every month in 2014. Since March 2014, the Syria conflict has resulted in nearly half of the population displaced, comprising 6.45 million inside Syria and over 3.2 million registered refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries. ...","Human Rights Situation and Violations of International Humanitarian Law","8.The protection situation in Syria has progressively and dramatically deteriorated. According to the UN Secretary-General, \u201c[T]he conflict continues to be characterized by horrendous violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, with a total disregard for humanity\u201d and the Independent Commission of Inquiry summarized in its most recent report the impact of the conduct of the warring parties on civilians as \u201cimmeasurable suffering\u201d. Parties to the conflict are reported to commit war crimes and gross violations of human rights, including acts amounting to crimes against humanity, with widespread impunity. ...","Access to Territory and the Right to Seek Asylum","21.UNHCR characterizes the flight of civilians from Syria as a refugee movement. Syrians, and Palestine refugees who had their former habitual residence in Syria, require international protection until such time as the security and human rights situation in Syria improves significantly and conditions for voluntary return in safety and dignity are met. ...","Assessing Individual Asylum Claims","26.While the majority of Syrians and others leaving the country remain in the region, the numbers of individuals who arrive in countries further afield and seek international protection are increasing. Their claims need to be assessed in fair and efficient procedures. UNHCR considers that most Syrians seeking international protection are likely to fulfil the requirements of the refugee definition contained in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, since they will have a well-founded fear of persecution linked to one of the Convention grounds. For many civilians who have fled Syria, the nexus to a 1951 Convention ground will lie in the direct or indirect, real or perceived association with one of the parties to the conflict. In order for an individual to meet the refugee criteria there is no requirement of having been individually targeted in the sense of having been \u201csingled out\u201d for persecution which already took place or being at risk thereof. Syrians and habitual residents of Syria who have fled may, for example, be at risk of persecution for reason of an imputed political opinion because of who controls the neighbourhood or village where they used to live, or because they belong to a religious or ethnic minority that is associated or perceived to be associated with a particular party to the conflict. In this regard, UNHCR welcomes the increased granting of refugee status to asylum-seekers from Syria by EU Member States in 2014, in comparison to 2013, when most EUMember States predominantly granted subsidiary protection to Syrians. ...","Returns, Moratorium on Forced Returns and Consideration of Sur Place Claims","30.As the situation in Syria is likely to remain uncertain for the near future, UNHCR welcomes the fact that several Governments have taken measures to suspend the forcible return of nationals or habitual residents of Syria, including those whose asylum claims have been rejected. Such measures should remain in place until further notice. ...","31.In light of the developments and changed circumstances in Syria, it may be appropriate to reopen case files of Syrians whose asylum claim were rejected in the past, to the extent that has not yet been done, so as to ensure that those who as a result of changed circumstances have a valid sur place claim have it appropriately adjudicated, enabling them to benefit from protection and entitlements flowing from refugee recognition.\u201d","78.The UNHCR report of 1 July 2014 entitled \u201cSyrian Refugees in Europe: What Europe Can Do to Ensure Protection and Solidarity\u201d says:","\u201cThe conflict in Syria has now entered its fourth year, and as the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, the number of people forcibly displaced has reached record levels. More than 2.8 million refugees are registered or awaiting registration in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, and over 6.5 million people are internally displaced in Syria. It is one of the largest humanitarian crises in recent history and more support will be needed as the countries hosting the vast majority of refugees struggle to deal with the impact of caring for so many. ...","Although, as noted, the responses and practices in relation to Syrians arriving in Europe have varied, some key trends can be identified. UNHCR has welcomed the positive protection practices of many European States with respect to Syrian nationals, including a de facto moratoria on returns to Syria, the decision to process Syrian claims in most countries, and high protection rates. ...","The protection and humanitarian situation of Palestinian refugees in Syria has continued to deteriorate, as nearly all the areas hosting large numbers of Palestinian refugees are directly affected by the conflict. Prior to the conflict, approximately 540,000 Palestine refugees were in Syria. UNRWA estimates that 63 percent of registered Palestinian refugees have been displaced either in Syria or to neighbouring countries. UNHCR has characterized the flight of civilians from Syria as a refugee movement and considers that Palestinian refugees who had their former habitual residence in Syria require international protection.\u201d","79.The Human Rights Watch World Report 2014 (31 January 2014) reported on Syria:","\u201cSince the beginning of the uprising security forces have subjected tens of thousands of people to arbitrary arrests, unlawful detentions, enforced disappearances, ill-treatment, and torture using an extensive network of detention facilities throughout Syria. Many detainees were young men in their 20s or 30s; but children, women, and elderly people were also detained.\u201d","80.The report \u201cCountry Information and Guidance, Syria: Security and humanitarian situation\u201d published by the UK Home Office in December 2014 states:","\u201c1.4 Policy Summary","Case-law has established that it is likely that a failed asylum seeker or forced returnee would, in general, on return to Syria face a real risk of arrest and detention and of serious mistreatment during that detention as a result of imputed political opinion. The position might be otherwise in the case of someone who, notwithstanding a failed claim for asylum, would still be perceived on return to Syria as a supporter of the Assad regime.","Most Syrian nationals are therefore likely to qualify for refugee protection unless excluded.","Where a person is excluded from refugee protection they will also be excluded from Humanitarian Protection but may be entitled to Discretionary leave or Restricted Leave.","The humanitarian crisis, which continues to deteriorate, is such that for most returnees removal would be a breach of Article 3 ECHR.","The level of indiscriminate violence in the main cities and areas of fighting in Syria is at such a level that substantial grounds exist for believing that a person, solely by being present there for any length of time, faces a real risk of harm which threatens their life or person.","Internal relocation within Syria to escape any risk from indiscriminate violence is extremely unlikely to be possible or reasonable because of the highly limited ability to move, and move safely, from one part of Syria to another part of the country and the unpredictability of the violence in areas of proposed relocation coupled with the humanitarian situation for those internally displaced.\u201d","81.In his twelfth report issued on 19 February 2015 on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2104) on Syria, the Secretary\u2011General of the United Nations observed, inter alia, that widespread conflict and high levels of violence continued throughout the country and that the conduct of the hostilities by all parties continued to be characterised by a widespread disregard for the rules of international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians.","IV.INFORMATION DOCUMENT ABOUT EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT IN KIM V. RUSSIA (No.44260\/13)","82.A document entitled \u201cCommunication from the Russian Federation concerning the case of Kim against Russian Federation (Application no.44260\/13) DH-DD(2015)527\u201d contained an action plan aimed at execution of the judgment which had found a breach of Article 3 and Article5 \u00a7 1(f) and 5 \u00a7 4 on account of the conditions of detention, detention itself and the absence of review during the two years pending the applicant R.A. Kim\u2019s expulsion. The Government indicated that the judgment had been translated into Russian and placed on several professional portals, including that of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, Ministry of the Interior and the Russian Supreme Court\u2019s intranet site, thus making it available to all the judges of general jurisdiction in the Russian Federation. The possibility of legislative amendments would be considered in December 2015."],"27610":["6.The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Szeged.","7.On 21 January 2011 around 4 a.m. the applicant and his girlfriend MsD.L. were about to leave a club in Szeged, when three men in their twenties, unknown to them, started to insult them. The three men made degrading comments about the applicant\u2019s Roma origin and about the physical appearance of his girlfriend.","8.Subsequently a fourth person, Mr E.D., appeared, presenting himself as a police officer. (In fact, he was a penitentiary officer.) When Mr E.D. was about to leave, the applicant questioned him about his attitude using offensive and vulgar language, upon which Mr E.D. turned back and got into a fight with the applicant, which ended due to the intervention of three persons, the applicant\u2019s acquaintances.","Following the fight, Mr E.D. called the police. Two officers arrived. The applicant, Mr E.D. and Ms D.L. were then escorted to the local police station. They were released the day after. Although both the applicant and Mr E.D. had visible injuries, only Mr E.D. underwent a medical examination. According to the medical findings, he had bruises on his temple and a haematoma around his right eye.","9.On 23 January 2011 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner, who found that he had bruises on his chest, back, neck and face.","10.On 1 February 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Szeged Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office against Mr E.D. He submitted that the three who had insulted him had shouted at him \u201cDirty gypsy, do you need a cigarette? Here is money!\u201d and thrown cigarettes and money at him. He also maintained that Mr E.D., who presented himself as a police officer upon his arrival at the scene, had asked the others whether \u201c[they] could not handle a dirty little gypsy\u201d and, turning to him, had called him a gypsy. He also gave a description of the injuries he had suffered.","Furthermore, the applicant explained that the day after the incident he had identified MrE.D. on a social network. He had extracted some of his posts and submitted them to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office.","11.In these posts, Mr E.D. commented that the night before he \u201chad been kicking in the head a gypsy lying on the ground when [he] was overcome by three of his buddies\u201d. In reply to favourable posts by other users, Mr E.D. posted an Internet link to a video clip containing a widely known excerpt from a feature film with overtly intolerant and explicitly racist language. He added that the list of the types of people loathed by the character speaking in the clip could be completed with \u201csome other types of rubbish living among us\u201d.","12.On 7 February 2011 the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office opened a criminal investigation against Mr E.D. for the offence of \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d within the meaning of section 170 (1) of the Criminal Code.","13.On 17 March 2011 the two police officers who had arrived at the scene were questioned, as well as Ms D.L. The latter corroborated the applicant\u2019s version of the events. The testimony of the police officers\u2019 did not contain any account of the incident; they had arrived at the scene only after the fight.","The applicant\u2019s three acquaintances, whose intervention had ended the fight, were not questioned, their identity remaining unknown to the prosecution. The applicant was questioned about their contact details, however the only information he could provide were their nicknames.","14.In parallel, the Szeged Public Prosecutor\u2019s office initiated an ex officio investigation into the same facts on charges of disorderly conduct (gar\u00e1zdas\u00e1g). On 5 July 2011 Mr E.D. was questioned as a suspect, where he stated that the applicant had provoked him. He admitted to having pushed the applicant away in self-defence, but claimed that he had neither hit nor insulted him. He maintained that he had made no statement concerning the applicant\u2019s Roma origin and that the fight had not taken place because the applicant\u2019s Roma origin but because he had been attacked by the latter. As regards his comments on a social network, Mr E.D. stated that he had posted them for no particular reason and specified that \u201cin fact [he] had not been kicking the boy\u2019s head ... had [he] done so the [applicant] would have suffered more serious injuries\u201d.","15.In a decision of 20 July 2011 the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the investigation into the offence of \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d, considering that there was no evidence substantiating that Mr E.D. had attacked the applicant out of racial hatred. Relying on the applicant\u2019s complaint, Ms D.L.\u2019s testimony, Mr E.D.\u2019s statement given as a suspect in the parallel proceedings and the medical evidence, the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office concluded that it could not be established who had provoked the fight and whether there was a causal link between the insults directed against the applicant and the fight.","The applicant filed a complaint against the discontinuation on 26July 2011.","16.On 8 August 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer was given the opportunity to study the case-file. On the same day she requested Mr E.D. to be heard as a suspect, or at least as a witness; she also requested a confrontation (szembes\u00edt\u00e9s) between the applicant and Mr E.D. This request was dismissed on the ground that Mr E.D. had already been heard as a suspect in the parallel proceedings on charges of disorderly conduct, and the records of his testimony were attached to the investigation file and used as documentary evidence.","On 16 August 2011 the applicant also challenged this decision and requested that further investigative measures to be taken.","17.On 8 September 2011 the Csongr\u00e1d County Regional Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office upheld the first-instance decision, considering that:","\u201cAccepting the background of the incident, as recounted by the victim and MsD.L., although it is likely that the action had racist motives, it cannot be proven sufficiently for establishing criminal responsibility \u2013 that is, unequivocally and beyond any doubt \u2013 that Mr E.D. ill-treated the applicant precisely because of his Roma origin. The racist motive cannot be established, in particular, since before the incident Mr E.D. had intended to leave the scene and only turned back because of the victim\u2019s reproach, and the only information about the start of the fight originates in the contradictory statements of the victim and Mr E.D. Neither the victim nor MsD.L. could provide further details as to the question whether after having turned back, Mr E.D. made any further racist comments before or during the fight. The Facebook post attached to the criminal complaint only reveals that Mr E.D. had insulted an unnamed and unidentifiable person of Roma origin the night before. It cannot be established unequivocally and beyond doubt, either from the post or from the subsequent messages, that [the insult] took place precisely because of the victim\u2019s Roma origin.","Based on the above reasons and considering all available information and evidence in their entirety, Mr E.D.\u2019s racist motive is probable at the maximum, but cannot be established beyond doubt.\u201d","As regards further investigative measures, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office stated that given the fundamental contradictions between the statements of MrE.D., the applicant and Ms D.L., a confrontation between them had no prospects of success. Furthermore, Mr E.D. had given a detailed account of the facts in his testimony given as a suspect in the parallel proceedings, which rendered futile his further questioning.","18.On 11 May 2012 Mr E.D. was convicted of disorderly conduct by the Szeged District Court for having got into a fight with the applicant and was placed on one-year probation.","21.A resource guide entitled Preventing and responding to hate crimes, published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) in 2009 contains the following relevant passages:","Chapter 2 \u2013 Recognizing hate crimes","\u201cThe most common flaw in the investigation of hate crimes is the refusal or failure of law enforcement bodies to identify a criminal act as a hate crime. Therefore, for police officers and for NGOs who receive complaints or interview victims, it is essential to have some criteria by which to evaluate whether a case might be a hate crime.","Hate crime indicators are objective facts that signal that a case may involve a hate crime. If such indicators exist, the incident should be recorded as a possible hate crime and should trigger further investigation about the motive for the crime. The existence of such indicators does not prove that the incident was a hate crime. The proof of hate motivation will come only after a thorough and complete investigation, with a result confirmed by a court.","Hate crime indicators can be useful for NGOs, as they form an objective and consistent factual basis upon which to advocate with police or other governmental agencies for treating incidents as possible hate crimes.","Hate Crime Indicators","National experts and law enforcement agencies have developed guidelines by which to identify hate crimes, including detailed lists of hate crime indicators. While these may vary, the most common indicators are listed below.","Victim and Witness Perception","The perception of the victim(s) is a primary indicator of bias motivation. These perceptions are based on the victim\u2019s own experience with prejudice, the circumstances of the attack, their identification of the attackers and many other factors. Sometimes, witnesses\u2019 perceptions can also provide strong indicators of the apparent motive of the perpetrator.","In some OSCE countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, any reported crime which a victim, witness or police officer believes to have been hate motivated must be recorded and investigated as a potential hate crime.","The Conduct of the Offender","Perpetrators of hate crimes frequently make their prejudices clear before, during or after the act. The crucial evidence in most hate crimes consists of the words or symbols used by the perpetrators themselves. Those who commit hate crimes generally want to send a message to their victims and to others and these messages, from shouted epithets to graffiti, are powerful evidence of motivation.","The Characteristics of the Victim and the Perpetrator","Although hate crimes are most commonly thought of as involving attacks on members of minorities, this is not always the case. Depending on local circumstances, some hate crimes involve minority-upon-minority attacks, and sometimes minority on majority \u2014 this usually happens in places where members of a minority in a larger territory are the majority locally. Some circumstances that may be indicative of a hate crime include:","\u2022\u2022 The \u201crace\u201d, religion, ethnicity\/national origin, disability status, gender, or sexual orientation of the victim differs from that of the offender;","\u2022\u2022 The victim is a member of a group that is overwhelmingly outnumbered by members of another group in the area where the incident occurred;","\u2022\u2022 The victim is a member of a community that is concentrated within particular areas and was attacked upon leaving that area;","\u2022\u2022 The incident occurred during an incursion by members of a majority group into an area that is predominately populated by members of minorities (this is a pattern reflecting the historical experience of pogroms, in which attacks were carried out on a minority population that was largely confined to a particular district neighbourhood);","\u2022\u2022 The victim is a member of a minority who is attacked by a group from members of a different population group; and","\u2022\u2022 There is historical animosity between the group of which the victim is a member and that of the offender.","Characteristics of a victim that may be indicators of hate crime include:","\u2022\u2022 The victim is identifiable as \u201cdifferent\u201d from the attackers and, often, from the majority community, by such factors as appearance, dress, language or religion;","\u2022\u2022 The victim is a prominent figure, such as a religious leader, rights activist or public spokesperson, in a community that has faced ongoing discrimination; and","\u2022\u2022 The victim was in the company of or married to a member of a minority group.","The characteristics, behavior and background of alleged offenders can also yield several potential indicators of hate motivation. For example:","\u2022\u2022 Statements, gestures or other behavior before, during or after the incident displaying prejudice or bias against the group or community to which the target or victim belongs;","\u2022\u2022 Clothing, tattoos or insignia representative of particular extremist movements, e.g., the use of swastikas or other Nazi insignia or paramilitary style uniforms;","\u2022\u2022 The offender\u2019s behavior (such as making Nazi salutes or attending rallies or protests organized by hate groups) suggests possible membership in a hate organization; and","\u2022\u2022 The offender has a history of previous crimes with a similar modus operandi and involving other victims from the same minority group or other minority groups","...","Previous Hate Crimes or Incident","Other indicators of hate crimes include:","\u2022\u2022 Previous similar incidents have occurred in the same area in which members of the same group were targeted;","\u2022\u2022 The victim or victims had received previous harassing or threatening mail or telephone calls based on membership in their group; and","\u2022\u2022 A previous incident or crime was reported that may have sparked a retaliatory hate crime against members of the group presumed responsible.","Mixed Motives","In investigating hate-motivated incidents and crimes, it is important to take into account all possible motives. For example, an incident in which a person is singled out for attack because of his or her identity may still be a hate crime even if the person is also robbed in the course of the incident. A question will arise as to whether the crime was motivated in whole or in part by prejudice and hatred; in some countries, if there is any mixed motive it will not be treated as a hate crime.","In many reported cases, individuals who have been targeted for attacks because of prejudice and hatred have also been victimized in other ways. The fact that they also had items of value stolen in the course of these attacks \u2013 a cell phone or money \u2013 is sometimes used to argue that the incident was not a hate crime. An important consideration is whether the particular individual was selected as a target because he or she was identified as a member of a particular ethnic, religious or other group.\u201d","22.The Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance covering the fifth monitoring cycle, issued on the 19 March 2015, contains the following passages:","3. Racist and homo\/transphobic violence","\u201c53. Racist and homo\/transphobic violence fall under Criminal Code Article 216 (violence towards members of a community). According to information provided by the authorities, between 2009 and 2013, there were 191 reported cases of alleged hate motivated violence; 94 of these resulted in convictions with 33 prison sentences handed out. The authorities informed ECRI that 54% of the victims of these offences were Roma, 8.5% were Jews and 17% involved violence against the Hungarian majority...","54. Racist violence against Roma has been described as one of the most important problems faced by Hungary today. This is committed both by extremist groups and by individuals motivated by racial hatred. Between January 2008 and September 2012, there were 61 separate attacks against Roma and\/or their property, with the use of Molotov cocktails, hand grenades and guns. The attacks took nine lives, including two minors and left dozens injured.\u201d","23.Relevant extracts from the thematic situation report of the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (\u201cFRA\u201d) entitled \u201cRacism, discrimination, intolerance, and extremism: learning from experiences in Greece and Hungary\u201d read as follows:","\u201cDuring FRA\u2019s meetings in Hungary, concerns were raised about how the police handle cases involving anti-Roma bias motivation. NEKI informed FRA, for example, that in an incident in May 2012 in Nagykanizsa, anti-Roma graffiti was recorded by the police merely as property damage, while the bias motivation was not taken into account. NEKI filed a complaint with the police, arguing that the incident should be prosecuted as a crime against the community. The police then investigated the incident as such, but as no offenders were found, the case was suspended.","A number of possible explanations were advanced by several of FRA\u2019s interlocutors as to why bias motivations are often overlooked by the police. Among these, the latent climate of intolerance and prejudice that also exists within the police force was mentioned.","Another contributing factor could be that proving hate crime is more complex, resource intensive and time consuming than proving other types of crime. Police officers are often focused on closing cases quickly rather than on investing considerable resources in identifying bias motivations.","Recognising bias motivation requires special knowledge and training, which police officers do not always have, as FRA learned from meetings with the police.\u201d","24.Relevant extracts from the Report by Nils Mui\u017enieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, following his visit to Hungary from 1 to 4 July 2014, read as follows:","\u201cDespite these positive steps, the Hungarian authorities have often been criticised for failing to identify and respond effectively to hate crimes, including by not investigating possible racial motivation. For the year 2013, the Hungarian authorities indicated that 48 cases of hate crimes (including cases of hate speech) were reported and 30 were prosecuted. This represents an increase in the number of such crimes reported from the 2009 figures (when 15 cases were reported and 18 prosecuted). However, these figures correspond only to the tip of the iceberg as it is generally agreed that the majority of hate crimes are not recorded as such by the police or are not even reported to the police, partly due to the lack of trust in this institution among members of minority groups. Among the reasons behind underqualification (the prosecution of a crime motivated by hate as a less severe crime) brought to the attention of the Commissioner feature: the lack of specialised guidelines and training for law enforcement officials; the workload and turnover of the few existing specialised hate crime police officers; and the underuse of available means to investigate hate crimes. It also appears that under pressure to deliver results, some public prosecutors may prefer pressing charges in respect of basic crimes as they are easier to substantiate. As concerns more specifically crimes committed by extremist groups, the need for a better co-operation between the police and the intelligence services has also been stressed. Finally, victims of hate crimes do not receive all the necessary and specialised legal and psychological support they need notably due to deficiencies in the public system of support for victims of crime.\u201d"],"27632":["6.The applicant was born in 1979 in the town of Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and lives in St Petersburg.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant in Kyrgyzstan and his arrest and detention in Russia","7.The applicant is an ethnic Uzbek. In June 2010 ethnic violence erupted in the town of Osh, where the applicant lived at the material time, during which around 400 people were killed.","8.On 15 July 2010 the applicant came to Russia, and has not returned to Kyrgyzstan since.","9.On 9April 2012 the police of the town of Osh charged the applicant in absentia with participation in the mass riots and several other offences.","10.On 10April 2012 the Osh Town Court issued an arrest warrant against the applicant, and on 20 April 2012 his name was put on the cross\u2011border wanted list.","11.On 23January 2013 the applicant was arrested in StPetersburg and remanded in custody two days later by a court order. His detention was extended several times.","12.On 7March 2014 the StPetersburg transport prosecutor noted the interim measure indicated by the Court and ordered the applicant\u2019s release from detention under the personal guarantee of his lawyer.","B.Extradition proceedings","13.On 11 February 2013 the Kyrgyzstan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office requested the applicant\u2019s extradition for prosecution for participation in mass riots in June 2010, intentional infliction of grievous bodily injury and use of violence against a police officer, car-jacking, and intentional destruction of property.","14.On 24 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted to the Prosecutor General of Russia a letter referring to reports of international organisations and the Court\u2019s case-law evidencing that there was a high risk that the applicant would be subjected to inhuman treatment if he were extradited.","15.On 24 July 2013 a deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation granted the request of the Kyrgyzstan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office for the applicant\u2019s extradition. He held that there were no grounds in Russian or international law for refusing to extradite the applicant.","16.The applicant appealed, maintaining that, as a member of the ethnic Uzbek community which was being persecuted and discriminated against, he ran a serious and real risk of being subjected to torture in detention.","17.On 6 November 2013 the StPetersburg City Court rejected that appeal, finding as follows:","\u201cTaking into account the materials submitted, there are no grounds under Article 464 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Russia that exclude the possibility of extraditing an individual ...","The applicant\u2019s argument that the extradition is unlawful because he has refugee proceedings pending is untenable, and the arguments about his possible persecution by the law-enforcement authorities of Kyrgyzstan because of his ethnic origin are unsubstantiated and do not constitute a ground to refuse the extradition. The information of [the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Russia] according to which the examination of the criminal case against [the applicant] by the authorities of Kyrgyzstan might be biased, is conjecture and is not based on any proof ...","The Prosecutor General of Kyrgyzstan has provided assurances that, according to the standards of international law and the criminal law of Kyrgyzstan, [the applicant] would be afforded all means of defence, including legal assistance, would not be handed to a third country without the approval of the Russian Prosecutor General, or charged with and convicted of any offence committed before the extradition and for which he was not extradited. He would not be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment ...","Furthermore, the requesting party provided assurances that, after [the applicant\u2019s] extradition to the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Russian diplomats would be allowed to visit [the applicant] in remand prisons to ensure respect for his rights ...","The evidence submitted by the defence, according to which persecution of ethnic Uzbeks in connection with the events of 2010 continues in Kyrgyzstan, concerns isolated cases and cannot be regarded as evidence that [the applicant] will be subjected to cruel treatment, bearing in mind that he is accused of an offence which is not political in nature; there are currently measures put in place by the authorities of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to remedy the violations of human rights disclosed by international organisations ... furthermore, the requesting party provided sufficient and real assurances that [the applicant\u2019s] right to a fair trial would be respected and that he would not be subjected to ill-treatment. The general situation in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was thoroughly analysed in the decision refusing [the applicant] refugee status by the StPetersburg Regional Office of the Federal Migration Service.\u201d","18.The applicant\u2019s lawyers appealed against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had failed to address their arguments concerning the risk that the applicant would be subjected to inhuman treatment if extradited.","19.By its final decision of 25February 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, having endorsed the lower court\u2019s reasoning, rejected the appeal.","C.Refugee status proceedings","20.On 6February 2013 the applicant asked the StPetersburg Regional Office of the Federal Migration Service to grant him refugee status. He pointed out that he feared returning to Kyrgyzstan, where he would face arbitrary prosecution and inhuman treatment.","21.On 29May 2013 the StPetersburg Regional Office of the Federal Migration Service refused the above request for lack of reasons which would justify the applicant\u2019s allegations. In particular, it found that the latter had referred to the events of 2010 as a pretext to avoid criminal prosecution. The Regional Office further analysed the situation in Kyrgyzstan on the basis of several news items of mainly Kyrgyz and Russian newspapers and information agencies. Referring to these items, it stated that \u201c... the situation in Kyrgyzstan had substantially changed, the inter-ethnic clashes had ceased, and the government was taking enhanced measures to protect citizens and to improve the social and economic situation in the country\u201d.","22.On 23August 2013 the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation upheld this decision. The applicant complained before the Moscow Basmanniy District Court.","23.On 3December 2013 the Basmanniy District Court dismissed the complaint. It endorsed the findings of the migration authorities and noted that the applicant was not a member of any political, religious, military or non-governmental organisations. Neither had he been persecuted or threatened by the authorities. Therefore, there was neither a threat to the applicant\u2019s life nor any medical indications indicating a need for urgent medical intervention.","24.On 20May 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 3December 2013 on appeal.","D.Temporary asylum proceedings","25.On 20September 2013 the applicant asked the St Petersburg Regional Office of the Federal Migration Service to provide him with temporary asylum in the Russian Federation.","26.On 26November 2013 his request was refused. According to the applicant, he was not informed of this decision.","27.On 5May 2014 the applicant lodged a new application for temporary asylum, which was dismissed on 1 August 2014.","28.On 1October 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an appeal against the decision of 1August 2014. However, the outcome of the appeal remains unknown.","30.For relevant international documents see Abdulkhakov v. Russia (cited above, \u00a7\u00a779\u201182 and 94).","31.For a number of relevant reports and items of information concerning Kyrgyzstan, see Khamrakulov v. Russia (no.68894\/13, \u00a7\u00a738\u201145, 16April 2015, with further references).","32.The Kyrgyzstan chapter of the 2015 World Report published by Human Rights Watch reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:","\u201cSince the outbreak of ethnic violence in June 2010, Kyrgyzstan\u2019s flawed justice process has produced long prison sentences for mostly ethnic Uzbeks after convictions marred by torture-tainted confessions and other due process violations. Seven further cases related to crimes committed during the violence are pending, including that of a man detained in July 2014. All defendants are ethnic Uzbeks, reinforcing concerns of judicial bias.","Impunity for violent physical and verbal attacks at some hearings continued in 2014, undermining defendants\u2019 fair trial rights. After a January hearing in the case of Mahamad Bizurukov, an ethnic Uzbek defendant standing trial for June 2010-related crimes, the United States embassy issued a statement expressing deep concern. ...","Although the government acknowledges that torture occurs in Kyrgyzstan, impunity for torture remains the norm. Criminal cases into allegations of ill-treatment or torture are rare, and investigations and trials are delayed or ineffective.","In its June concluding observations, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) expressed concern about \u201cwidespread torture and ill-treatment of children\u201d in detention and closed institutions and called for prompt and effective independent investigations.","According to statistics provided by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office to Golos Svobody, a local anti-torture group, authorities declined to open criminal investigations into 100 of 109 registered complaints of torture in the first half of 2014.","Monitors from the National Center for the Prevention of Torture encountered some problems accessing places of detention. After one incident in March, the center filed a complaint against the director of the Issyk Kul region temporary detention facility for refusing the monitors entry, but at time of writing the director had not been held accountable.\u201d"],"27627":["6.The applicant was born in 1970. According to the most recently available information, in June 2013 the applicant moved to the town of Illichivsk, Ukraine, after being released from detention. He did not inform the Court of his current whereabouts.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","7.According to the information submitted by the Government, on 21August 2006 the Illichivskyy Town Court conditionally sentenced the applicant to two years\u2019 imprisonment for drug-related offences. On the same day the same court remanded the applicant in custody pending trial, since the applicant was also suspected of committing a theft.","8.On 29 May 2007 the Illichivskyy Town Court sentenced the applicant to one year\u2019s imprisonment for theft.","9.On 25 June 2008 the same court convicted the applicant of inflicting grievous bodily harm and sentenced him to eight and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. Since the applicant had previous unserved convictions the total term was established as nine years\u2019 imprisonment.","B.The applicant\u2019s detention and medical treatment","10.According to the Government, the applicant tested positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (\u201cHIV\u201d) as early as 1996. According to the available information, while at liberty the applicant spent time in an infectious diseases department of a hospital (diagnosis unspecified) on one occasion on 18-22 September 2003.","11.On 30 December 2006 the applicant was arrested and placed in the Illichivskyy Pre-trial Detention Facility (\u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0442\u0438\u043c\u0447\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0442\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0406\u043b\u043b\u0456\u0447\u0456\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043c\u0456\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0434\u0456\u043b\u0443 \u0413\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0456\u043d\u043d\u044f \u041c\u0456\u043d\u0456\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0456\u0448\u043d\u0456\u0445 \u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u0432 \u041e\u0434\u0435\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456). The Government submitted that it was impossible to establish the exact period of the applicant\u2019s stay in that facility, since all the relevant documents had already been destroyed.","12.Between 15 January 2007 and 25 December 2008 the applicant was detained in the Izmayilskyy Temporary Detention Centre (\u0406\u0437\u043c\u0430\u0457\u043b\u044c\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u0438\u0439 \u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440) (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). He was also there between 10 March and 4 May 2009.","13.According to the Government, on 15 January 2007 the applicant was examined and it was established that he was \u201cpractically healthy\u201d. During his stay in the SIZO the applicant underwent examinations and received medical treatment as follows: on at least three occasions in 2007 and 2008 the applicant underwent chest X-rays (lungs and heart: no pathologies revealed) and had one blood test (RW, negative). In July and November 2008 he was also examined by a paramedic and diagnosed with prostatitis. The applicant was prescribed medication.","14.Between 26 December 2008 and 10 March 2009 the applicant was serving a sentence in Odessa Correctional Colony No. 14 (\u041e\u0434\u0435\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0430 \u0432\u0438\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0456\u044f \u211614). He was also there between 5 May 2009 and 5September 2012.","15.In Odessa Correctional Colony No. 14 the applicant received the following treatment: in March 2009 the applicant was examined and found to be \u201cpractically healthy\u201d. In December 2009 the applicant had a viral respiratory infection. In January and September 2011 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner. On a later date the applicant was diagnosed with thrombophlebitis and prescribed treatment. On two occasions, in 2011 and 2012, the applicant was X-rayed; no pathologies were found.","16.Between 23 November and 3 December 2011 the applicant was in a medical ward with a diagnosis of thrombophlebitis. In November 2011 the Odessa Colony\u2019s authorities enquired about the applicant\u2019s HIV status with the Odessa Regional State Sanitary-Epidemiological Service. On 23November 2011 the answer was received that the applicant had been diagnosed HIV-positive in 1996.","17.On 4 May 2012 the applicant was diagnosed HIV-positive by a general practitioner.","18.In July-August 2012 the applicant had numerous blood tests, including a CD4+ cell count with a result of 74 cells. On 12 August 2012 the applicant was diagnosed HIV-positive at clinical stage 4, with tuberculosis of the lymph glands and oropharyngeal candidiasis. It was noted that the applicant was in a critical condition. On 30 August 2012 the applicant was prescribed anti-tuberculosis treatment.","19.Between 7 September and 12 October 2012 the applicant was in the infectious diseases department of the Dariyivska Correctional Colony Hospital (\u0456\u043d\u0444\u0435\u043a\u0446\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0435 \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0434\u0456\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f \u043c\u0456\u0436\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u0431\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0442\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0444\u0456\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u043b\u0456\u043a\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0456 \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0414\u0430\u0440\u0456\u0457\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u0432\u0438\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0456\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0456\u0457 \u2116 10 \u0425\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043e\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456). The applicant underwent numerous blood and urine tests, X-rays and other tests needed for his tuberculosis diagnosis and treatment. He also had a CD4+cell count, with a result of 98 cells. The applicant was examined by doctors and prescribed treatment. Upon discharge from the department the applicant was diagnosed with HIV clinical stage 4, tuberculosis of the lymphatic glands, candidiasis, leycopenia, weight loss (8%), chronic hepatitis, and chronic pancreatitis. It was recommended that he consult an infectious diseases specialist in order to be prescribed antiretroviral therapy (\u201cART\u201d).","20.On 12 October 2012 the applicant arrived at the Interregional Specialised Tuberculosis Hospital of Goloprystanska Correctional Colony No.7 (\u043c\u0456\u0436\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u0430 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0456\u0430\u043b\u0456\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0442\u0443\u0431\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0443\u043b\u044c\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0456\u043a\u0430\u0440\u043d\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0413\u043e\u043b\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u0432\u0438\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0456\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0456\u0457 \u21167). He was diagnosed with tuberculosis of the peripheral lymph nodes, weight deficit of 8%, anaemia, leukopenia, chronic hepatitis in the unstable remission phase, and chronic pancreatitis in remission. There the applicant underwent various examinations and was prescribed treatment, in particular for his tuberculosis.","21.On 26 October 2012 the applicant was examined by an infectious diseases specialist and diagnosed with HIV at clinical stage 4 and tuberculosis of the peripheral lymph nodes. In November-December 2012 the applicant was examined by a surgeon, diagnosed with after-thrombophlebitis syndrome of both legs in oedema-ulcerous form and prescribed treatment. The applicant had further examinations and tests between November 2012 and January 2013. In particular, the applicant had a CD4 cell count on 21 November 2012 (44 cells, or 18.4%).","22. According to the Government, on 17December 2012 the applicant was examined by an infectious diseases specialist and requested ART, however, ART was not possible for lack of available medication. The Head of the Golaprystanska Colony requested a specialised public medical institution for Aids prevention and treatment based in Odessa to provide the necessary ART medication. By a letter dated 15January 2013, the request was refused on the ground that it was for the prison to provide such medication for inmates. It was also stated that once the applicant was released he would be provided with adequate medical assistance.","23.It appears from the available material in the case file that the medication for the applicant\u2019s antiretroviral therapy was eventually provided by an NGO in an amount enabling the treatment to last until February2013. Subsequently, the applicant has continued receiving the necessary medication.","24.On 4 and 25 February 2013 the Head of the Golaprystanska Correctional Colony lodged with the Golaprystanskyy District Court two requests under Article 84 of the Criminal Code for the applicant\u2019s release, stating that the applicant was suffering from Aids and had other serious health problems. The requests were based on the reports of a medical commission, according to which the applicant\u2019s diseases formed part of the list of health problems for which prison authorities could seek prisoners\u2019 release.","25.On 11 February and 11 March 2013 respectively the court refused both requests, principally on the grounds that the applicant had been repeatedly convicted of serious crimes (the most recent having been an assault on his mother resulting in her death) and while imprisoned he had been disciplined for violating prison regulations on twelve occasions, which demonstrated that he engaged in persistent anti-social behaviour and did not wish to improve. According to the court, the applicant continued to be a danger to society. In its decision of 11 February 2013, the court also noted that it did not follow from the prison governor\u2019s request that the applicant\u2019s Aids diagnosis had been established by the relevant specialist. Moreover, there is no information that the applicant has relatives or anyone close to him who could or would take care of him if he were at liberty.","26.On 15 March 2013 the applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count was 129.","27.On 25 March 2013 the Government submitted medical information, according to which the applicant\u2019s state of health was of medium severity. His HIV and tuberculosis diagnoses were confirmed, and it was noted that the applicant was also suffering from hyperthermia, chronic hepatitis, chronic pancreatitis, post-thrombophlebitic syndrome, anaemia, serious immunosuppression, weight loss, and diarrhoea. The applicant remained under constant supervision by tuberculosis and infectious diseases specialists at the Goloprystanska Colony, and received ART and anti-tuberculosis treatment and also symptomatic treatment and vitamins.","28.On 22 April 2013 the Goloprystanskyy District Court refused a new request from the head of the colony to release the applicant in view of his health condition. It was noted that the applicant had Aids and a number of serious health problems. The court, however, concluded that the applicant had numerous convictions for committing, inter alia, serious crimes. He has been reprimanded on numerous occasions while in detention. The court has already twice refused similar requests for release, and there was no evidence that the applicant\u2019s state of health had worsened in comparison to the time when the last request had been rejected.","29.On 20 June 2013 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal quashed this decision and decided to release the applicant in view of his serious health problems.","30.On 26 June 2013 the applicant was released."],"27625":["5.The applicant was born in 1975. According to the most recently available information, in September 2013 the applicant arrived at Buchanska Correctional Colony No. 85, Ukraine, to serve a sentence. He has not informed the Court of his current whereabouts.","A.Medical treatment in detention","6.For a number of years the applicant has been suffering from various health problems. In particular, in July 2009, apparently also while serving a sentence, he was hospitalised in Buchanska Correctional Colony No. 85 and later transferred to a tuberculosis hospital in Slavyanoserbska Correctional Colony No. 61. Since November 2009 the applicant has been registered with the Kyiv City Aids Prevention and Control Centre. It appears that in December 2011 the applicant had a CD4+ cell count, the result of this count being 23 cells. No more detailed information about his precise diagnosis or about any further events between 2009 and September 2012 is available.","7.According to the applicant, on 7 September 2012 he was arrested on suspicion of theft. In a letter to this Court of 21 June 2013 the applicant stated that at the moment of his arrest he had had the following illnesses: human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) at clinical stage 4, post-tuberculosis residual effects, oropharyngeal candidiasis, and chronic hepatitis type C.","8.The decision on the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was taken by a court on 10 September 2012. Between 27 September 2012 and 29September 2013 the applicant was detained in the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u041a\u0438\u0457\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u0438\u0439 \u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440) (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d).","9.On arrival at the SIZO the applicant underwent an initial medical examination. The Government submitted a copy of the applicant\u2019s initial medical examination card with the following information: height 1.77 m; weight 63 kg; blood pressure 125\/80; blood type (unclear handwriting); bodily injuries none; infectious diseases: pulmonary tuberculosis \u2013 2008, Botkin\u2019s disease, \u2013 \u201c-\u201d, and sexually transmitted diseases \u2013 \u201c-\u201d. It was noted that the applicant had \u201cno health complaints\u201d. The applicant also submitted during the examination that he was registered with the Kyiv City Aids Prevention and Control Centre.","10.According to the applicant, because of the deterioration of his health in November 2012 he was examined in the above Centre. The only document provided in support of this statement is an advisory opinion issued by the Centre \u201con request\u201d on 8 November 2012. The opinion stated, without noting when exactly the applicant had been examined, that the applicant had been diagnosed with HIV at clinical stage 4, post-tuberculosis residual changes, oropharyngeal candidiasis, and chronic viral hepatitis typeC. The opinion also cited the result of the applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count performed on 13 December 2011. It was recommended that the applicant take antiretroviral therapy (\u201cART\u201d) for life. In their submissions of 5July 2013 following the applicant\u2019s request under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court (see paragraph 4 above), the Government noted that on 8 November 2012 the applicant had been diagnosed as above.","11.On 10 December 2012 the applicant agreed to undergo an HIV test following his \u201crequest submitted to the SIZO doctors\u201d. According to the results of this test dated 12 December 2012, the applicant had HIV antibodies.","12.On 9 January 2013 the applicant underwent a biochemical blood analysis and a CD4+ cell count (the result of the count was 3 cells, or 0.5% (percentage of total lymphocytes)). The applicant was diagnosed with a high degree of immunological suppression and prescribed preventive anti-tuberculosis treatment.","13.On 14 February 2013 the applicant was placed in the infectious diseases ward of the SIZO. It was noted that the applicant\u2019s state of health was of \u201cmedium seriousness\u201d. He underwent an X-ray and various other examinations and was diagnosed with a tuberculosis relapse, extra-pulmonary tuberculosis, HIV infection at clinical stage 4, chronic hepatitis of the mixed type (toxic type and C type), and other diseases. The applicant was prescribed anti-tuberculosis treatment, detox and symptomatic treatment. The Government submitted that the applicant had received this treatment in full.","14.According to the available medical documents, between 14February and 12 June 2013 the applicant\u2019s weight dropped from 63 kg to 58 kg.","15.On 19 February 2013 the applicant was examined in the Kyiv City Anti-Tuberculosis Treatment Centre.","16.According to the medical file submitted by the Government, between 21 February and 2 July 2013 the applicant had consultations with SIZO doctors on the following dates: 21 and 28 February 2013; 7, 14, 21 and 28March 2013; 4, 11, 18 and 29 April 2013; 6, 8 and 16 May 2013; 4, 19, 21 and 26 June 2013; and 2 July 2013.","It was noted on some of those occasions that the applicant complained of general weakness but that his condition was stable. He \u201cbore the treatment in a satisfactory manner\u201d and after the applicant had started the ART (see paragraph 18 below) the consistent advice was that the ART should be continued. On several occasions the applicant was also prescribed various medication.","17.On 26 February 2013 the applicant was prescribed \u201ca preventive treatment\u201d. It was recommended that anti-tuberculosis treatment be continued in order to prepare the applicant for the ART.","18.In his letter of 23 July 2013 the applicant submitted that the ART had been prescribed to him in February 2013. In his further observations the applicant stated that the treatment had only been prescribed to him on 30March 2013. The exact date when the applicant started the ART is unclear.","19.On some occasions in March and April 2013 the applicant refused to take the ART. According to the applicant, the prescribed drugs did not agree with him.","20.On 26 April 2013 the applicant was prescribed the ART \u201cunder the TDF\/FTC (tenofovir\/emtricitabine +ztv) schema\u201d.","21.On 16 May 2013 the applicant consulted an infectious diseases specialist from Kyiv City Clinic No. 5, and was prescribed a diet and various medication. It was noted that the applicant had again stopped the ART.","22.On 14 June 2013 SIZO officials, at the request of the police, informed the police that the applicant\u2019s state of health was of \u201cmedium seriousness, with a tendency to deteriorate which might lead to a lethal outcome\u201d. They confirmed that, apart from the said diagnoses, the applicant was suffering from inflammation of the lymph nodes, dermatitis, intestinal dysbacteriosis, and other diseases. The applicant was receiving anti-tuberculosis treatment, ART and symptomatic treatment. It was stated that the applicant needed long-term medical treatment in a specialised medical facility. Consequently, they asked for the investigation to be speeded up and for the possibility of the applicant\u2019s release to be considered. The document was signed by the head of the SIZO and the head of the SIZO\u2019s medical department.","23.On the same date the criminal case against the applicant was transferred to a court for consideration on the merits.","24.On 18 June 2013 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the applicant\u2019s release before the national court.","25.Between 26 June and 5 July 2013 the applicant underwent a number of tests (blood and urine tests and X-ray examinations). In particular, on 3July 2013 a biochemical blood test and CD4+ cell count were performed. The increase in the CD4+ blood cells from 3 to 69 was established (from 0.5% to 4.5%). On 5 July 2013 an expert MTB\/RIF diagnostic test of the applicant\u2019s sputum for identification of Mycobacterium tuberculosis was carried out. The test was negative.","26.In his application form to this Court of 8 July 2013 the applicant stated that he was suffering from general weakness, intestinal pain, severe headache, increase in the number and size of mycotic ulcers on his body and face, liver and chest pain, haemorrhoids, diarrhoea, pain in the lymph glands, and severe shortness of breath. He also had severe pain in his left leg, had lost around 20 kilograms in weight, and had difficulty sleeping. His CD4+ cell count had, however increased. For the hepatitis C, ulcers and left leg problem there was no treatment at all.","27.On 11 July 2013 the SIZO administration informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the applicant was in the SIZO medical ward. He was receiving anti-tuberculosis treatment, ART and symptomatic treatment. The applicant underwent an X-ray examination, had various tests (complete blood count, biochemical blood test, blood sugar test, CD4+ cell count, and urine and sputum analyses) and had a number of consultations with infectious diseases and tuberculosis specialists. It was noted that the applicant\u2019s condition was stable and there was a positive dynamic. He did not need hospital treatment, but required monitoring by infectious diseases and tuberculosis specialists.","28.On the same date the Kagarlytskyy District Court, Kyiv Region, extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for two months. The applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s request for release on medical grounds was rejected by the court as not substantiated by appropriate documents. It also rejected the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s request for a medical examination for him.","29.The applicant stated that on 13 July 2013 an ambulance had been called for him. He was given painkillers on that occasion.","30.In a letter of 23 July 2013 to this Court the applicant stated that there had been no change in his medical treatment between 14 June and 23July 2013. According to him, the current treatment was not improving his health.","31.On 5 and 14 August 2013 the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist, who concluded that the applicant\u2019s condition was stable.","32.On 29 September 2013 the applicant was transferred to Buchanska Correctional Colony No. 85 to serve a sentence (the parties did not submit to the Court the details of the applicant\u2019s conviction). He was provided with ART medication for two months\u2019 treatment. On arrival at the Colony the applicant was examined by a doctor and diagnosed with HIV infection (IVclinical stage), hepatitis in the stage of remission, and post-tuberculosis residual changes (category 5.1).","33.On 10 October 2013 the applicant complained of fever, cough and abdominal pain. He was diagnosed with aggravation of his hepatitis, gastroduodenitis, and bronchitis, and was placed in a medical ward.","B.Alleged pressure on the applicant","34.According to the applicant, on 25 June and 3 July 2013 he was subjected to psychological pressure by the SIZO authorities and their medical staff, who shouted at the applicant, called him names and told him to sign a paper stating that he had refused ART treatment of his own volition and that he had no complaints. The material in the case file includes a copy of a handwritten note dated 3 July 2013 and signed by the applicant. The note says the following:","\u201cDespite the worsening of my state of health, the personnel of the SIZO medical ward are doing everything possible and I have no complaints about them\u201d.","35.On 4 July 2013 the applicant had a meeting with his lawyer. On the same date the applicant complained about the alleged pressure to the prosecutor\u2019s office. He stated that SIZO doctors and an unknown police officer had forced him to sign a paper \u201cthat he refused (or had refused)\u201d the ART and had no complaints. According to the applicant, he was threatened with being beaten, with being removed from the medical ward, with being placed in a disciplinary cell, and that other detainees would suffer because of him. The applicant stated that he had signed a paper stating that he had no complaints against the SIZO doctors.","36.By a letter of 8 July 2013 the Shevchenkivskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office sent the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s complaint to the Kyiv Department of the State Prison Service \u201cfor consideration\u201d.","37.On an unknown date a State Prison Service official informed the Head of the Kyiv Department of the State Prison Service that there had been \u201cno breaches of law by the staff on the medical ward or by the SIZO authorities\u201d. On 5 August 2013 this information was submitted to the prosecutor and to the applicant.","38.On 14 October 2013 the head of the SIZO medical ward informed the head of the SIZO that there had been no incidence of pressure being put on the applicant during the latter\u2019s stay there.","39.On the same date inmates B. and F. testified to the head of the SIZO that there had been no incidence of any kind of pressure being put on the applicant, and that he had always been provided with medical assistance when he requested it.","A.Health care in detention\/Transmissible diseases","1.Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 January 2006at the 952nd meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies)","48.The relevant part of the European Prison Rules provides as following:","\u201cHealth care","39.Prison authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care.","Organisation of prison health care","40.1Medical services in prison shall be organised in close relation with the general health administration of the community or nation.","40.2Health policy in prisons shall be integrated into, and compatible with, national health policy.","40.3Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.","40.4Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer.","40.5All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.","Medical and health care personnel","41.1Every prison shall have the services of at least one qualified general medical practitioner.","41.2Arrangements shall be made to ensure at all times that a qualified medical practitioner is available without delay in cases of urgency.","41.3Where prisons do not have a full-time medical practitioner, a part-time medical practitioner shall visit regularly.","...","Duties of the medical practitioner","42.1The medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall see every prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is obviously unnecessary.","42.2The medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall examine the prisoner if requested at release, and shall otherwise examine prisoners whenever necessary.","42.3When examining a prisoner the medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall pay particular attention to:","...","b.diagnosing physical or mental illness and taking all measures necessary for its treatment and for the continuation of existing medical treatment;","c.recording and reporting to the relevant authorities any sign or indication that prisoners may have been treated violently;","...","f.isolating prisoners suspected of infectious or contagious conditions for the period of infection and providing them with proper treatment;","g.ensuring that prisoners carrying the HIV virus are not isolated for that reason alone;","...","j.making arrangements with community agencies for the continuation of any necessary medical and psychiatric treatment after release, if prisoners give their consent to such arrangements.","43.1The medical practitioner shall have the care of the physical and mental health of the prisoners and shall see, under the conditions and with a frequency consistent with health care standards in the community, all sick prisoners, all who report illness or injury and any prisoner to whom attention is specially directed.","...","44.The medical practitioner or other competent authority shall regularly inspect, collect information by other means if appropriate, and advise the director upon:","a.the quantity, quality, preparation and serving of food and water;","b.the hygiene and cleanliness of the institution and prisoners;","c.the sanitation, heating, lighting and ventilation of the institution; and","d.the suitability and cleanliness of the prisoners\u2019 clothing and bedding.","45.1The director shall consider the reports and advice that the medical practitioner or other competent authority submits according to Rules 43 and 44 and, when in agreement with the recommendations made, shall take immediate steps to implement them.","45.2If the recommendations of the medical practitioner are not within the director\u2019s competence or if the director does not agree with them, the director shall immediately submit the advice of the medical practitioner and a personal report to higher authority.","Health care provision","46.1Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialised institutions or to civil hospitals, when such treatment is not available in prison.","46.2Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities, they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide the prisoners referred to them with appropriate care and treatment.\u201d","2.European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), 11th General Report, 2000","49.The relevant part of the Report reads as following:","\u201cThe spread of transmissible diseases and, in particular, of tuberculosis, hepatitis and HIV\/AIDS has become a major public health concern in a number of European countries. Although affecting the population at large, these diseases have emerged as a dramatic problem in certain prison systems. In this connection the CPT has, on a number of occasions, been obliged to express serious concerns about the inadequacy of the measures taken to tackle this problem. Further, material conditions under which prisoners are held have often been found to be such that they can only favour the spread of these diseases.","The CPT is aware that in periods of economic difficulties - such as those encountered today in many countries visited by the CPT - sacrifices have to be made, including in penitentiary establishments. However, regardless of the difficulties faced at any given time, the act of depriving a person of his liberty always entails a duty of care which calls for effective methods of prevention, screening, and treatment. Compliance with this duty by public authorities is all the more important when it is a question of care required to treat life-threatening diseases.","The use of up-to date methods for screening, the regular supply of medication and related materials, the availability of staff ensuring that prisoners take the prescribed medicines in the right doses and at the right intervals, and the provision when appropriate of special diets, constitute essential elements of an effective strategy to combat the above-mentioned diseases and to provide appropriate care to the prisoners concerned. Similarly, material conditions in accommodation for prisoners with transmissible diseases must be conducive to the improvement of their health; in addition to natural light and good ventilation, there must be satisfactory hygiene as well as an absence of overcrowding.","Further, the prisoners concerned should not be segregated from the rest of the prison population unless this is strictly necessary on medical or other grounds. In this connection, the CPT wishes to stress in particular that there is no medical justification for the segregation of prisoners solely on the grounds that they are HIV-positive.","In order to dispel misconceptions on these matters, it is incumbent on national authorities to ensure that there is a full educational programme about transmissible diseases for both prisoners and prison staff. Such a programme should address methods of transmission and means of protection as well as the application of adequate preventive measures. More particularly, the risks of HIV or hepatitis B\/C infection through sexual contacts and intravenous drug use should be highlighted and the role of body fluids as the carriers of HIV and hepatitis viruses explained.","It must also be stressed that appropriate information and counselling should be provided before and - in the case of a positive result - after any screening test. Further, it is axiomatic that patient-related information should be protected by medical confidentiality. As a matter of principle, any interventions in this area should be based on the informed consent of the persons concerned.","Moreover, for control of the above-mentioned diseases to be effective, all the ministries and agencies working in this field in a given country must ensure that they co-ordinate their efforts in the best possible way. In this respect the CPT wishes to stress that the continuation of treatment after release from prison must be guaranteed.\u201d","B.HIV\/Aids in Ukraine\/Conditions of detention","1.Ukraine Harmonised Aids Response Progress Reports","50.In order to monitor progress towards the targets set in the 2011 Political Declaration on HIV\/AIDS adopted at the United Nations General Assembly High Level Meeting on Aids, Ukraine submitted several official reports to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV\/AIDS Secretariat.","51.The Ukraine Harmonized AIDS Response Progress Report for the period between January 2010 and December 2011 contained the following information:"," \u201cUkraine is experiencing the most severe HIV epidemic in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries.","...","In 1987-2011 Ukraine officially registered 202,787 HIV infection cases among Ukrainian nationals, including 46,300 AIDS cases and 24,626 AIDS related deaths. The HIV epidemic continues to develop: starting from 1999 the number of new HIV cases remains on the rise. In 2011 Ukraine officially registered 21,177 new cases of HIV infection (46.2 per 100 thousand population) \u2013 this is the highest indicator value, registered from the time when HIV surveillance was first introduced in 1987.","...","In 2009-2011 HIV care indicators have shown a tendency to increase: 54.5%, 60.6%, 62.7%, respectively, however the HIV care coverage indicator remains insufficient (i.e., under 70%). Consequently one third of HIV positive individuals identified as a result of sero-epidemiological surveillance are not covered by HIV and clinical care (e.g., did not receive a test result, do not wish to enrol into medical care and so on), these patients remain source of infection which continues to drive the HIV epidemic.","...","Tuberculosis continues to be the most wide spread AIDS related disease in Ukraine; it is diagnosed in 5,745 cases (62.5%) out of 9,189 new AIDS cases.","Analysis of the HIV epidemic in Ukraine demonstrates that the infection weighs heavy on the country\u2019s health care system \u2013 the speed of HIV epidemic development surpasses the efforts to control and treat the infection, including provision of antiretroviral therapy (ARV) to all eligible patients.","...","As of 01.01.2012 Ukraine has 120,148 Ukrainian nationals in HIV care in health care facilities (264.3 per 100 thousand population), including correction facilities of the State Penitentiary Service of Ukraine, out of which 18,751 patients diagnosed with AIDS (41.2 per 100 thousand population).","...","In 2009 second generation surveillance was used for the first time to study HIV prevalence among inmates. Results show that in 2009 HIV prevalence among inmates was 15% (c.i. 13% \u2013 17%).","In 2011 the HIV prevalence study was organized again in the same correction facilities using methodology and sampling sizes of the previous study. In that period of time HIV prevalence rates remained practically the same: 13.7% (c.i. 11.8% \u2013 15.6%).\u201d","52.According to the Ukraine Harmonized AIDS Response Progress Report (reporting period: January, 2012 \u2013 December, 2013):","\u201cNowadays Ukraine takes one of the first places among European countries by the number of HIV-positive people. According to the estimated data, as of the beginning of 2013, 238 thousand of HIV-infected people aged 15 years and older have been living in the country.","...","...groups that have become more and more affected by HIV epidemic in recent years include ..., prisoners and detained persons.","...","During 2012-2013 98 000 people staying at institutions of the State Penitentiary Service of Ukraine ... were tested, which made it possible to increase the access to voluntary counselling and testing by several times \u2013 from 18,2 % in 2011 to 77,2 % in 2013. Achievement of such results became possible due to establishment of cooperation between non-governmental organizations and governmental institutions.\u201d","2.HIV\/AIDS treatment and care in Ukraine, the World Health Organisation (\u201cWHO\u201d)\/Regional office for Europe report, April 2013, part of the overall Ukrainian National AIDS program evaluation conducted in September 2012","53.The extracts from the report read as following:","\u201cPrisoners have rather high HIV prevalence: in 2011, 10% (2463 out of 23 779 tested were found HIV-infected). Since HIV testing in the prison system is client-initiated, it is not possible to evaluate coverage of prison populations under a provider-initiated HIV testing system.","HIV treatment in prisons is entirely financed by the Global Fund grant and is therefore not sustainable.","...","5.2. Human rights","Ukraine has adopted a comprehensive framework of international human rights instruments and standards for the promotion and protection of the fundamental rights of humans, including the right to health. Ukraine has endorsed national laws, policies and programmes related to health, many of which reflect international human rights instruments, including the National AIDS Law (2010) and the National AIDS Programme 2009-2013 - the strategy to achieve universal access. Despite positive steps towards strengthening legislative provisions for equal access to HIV treatment and care, serious discrepancies prevail in implementation. These are most evident in the lack of access to ARV medicines and associated laboratory monitoring for those who need it, which contravenes the fundamental human right to health, the constitutional right of all Ukrainians to health care free of charge (Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Art 49) and the right to free access to ART and treatment of opportunistic infections (National AIDS Law Art 15). Limited coverage of adequate testing, counselling and referral services, and periodic shortages of ARV medicines and commodities, result in lack of guaranteed access to and retention in ART for all those who are eligible. In addition, the lack of access to CD4 and VL tests presents barriers to timely enrolment for people who have been diagnosed with HIV. Consequently, many people initiate ART late in the course of the disease and are thus deprived of the optimal clinical benefits of ART. Continuing poor integration of services for key populations at risk of HIV and opportunistic infections, particularly PWID\u2014who not only constitute the population most at risk of HIV in Ukraine, but are also at increased risk of active TB and hepatitis B and C\u2014contributes to unequal access to life-saving services for those who need them most.\u201d","3.Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine carried out by the CPT from 9 to 21 October 2013","54.The relevant parts of the report provide as following:","\u201c142. ...Indeed, the provision of health care to inmates in Ukraine remains problematic, mainly due to the shortage of staff, facilities and resources. During the visit, the Committee\u2019s delegation again heard numerous complaints from prisoners in all the establishments visited concerning delays in access to doctors (in particular specialists), lack of medication, and the inadequate quality of care.","...","143. The health-care service of Kyiv SIZO comprised, in theory, 42 full-time posts (18 uniformed and 24 civilian); however, 12.5 of those posts were officially vacant (including four for uniformed and 8.5 for civilian personnel). In practice, the task of caring for the health needs of 2,618 inmates (including several dozens of patients in the medical unit) that the establishment was accommodating at the time of the delegation\u2019s visit rested on the shoulders of 12 doctors (who, however, jointly occupied the equivalent of 8.6 full-time posts) and 11 feldshers, working on the equivalent of four full-time posts. There was also a nurse, an X-ray technician, a laboratory technician, a pharmaceutical technician and two \u201cdisinfectors\u201d.","...","144. To sum up, the health-care staffing resources in the penitentiary establishments visited were generally not sufficient to adequately meet the needs of their respective prisoner populations, especially as regards the number of feldshers and nurses. This situation very much contributed to delays in access to health care and to numerous complaints from prisoners concerning its quality. Further, several vacancies (in particular, as regards medical specialists) additionally restricted prisoners\u2019 access to certain treatments.","...","151. In all the establishments visited, the delegation observed that the various medical records and other medical documentation were generally poorly kept, with very succinct, missing and\/or incoherent information...","159. ... Both the TB screening procedures (including systematic X-rays carried out prior to or upon admission and repeated subsequently at regular intervals, as well as laboratory sputum tests if required) and treatment appeared to be on the whole adequate, in line with the DOTS and DOTS+ protocols. In particular, the CPT\u2019s delegation noted an improvement at Kyiv SIZO, where second line anti-TB medication was now available.","... As for the living conditions in the TB units, the unit at Kyiv SIZO is of particular concern to the CPT: it was dilapidated, dark and poorly ventilated, and the walls in some of the cells which were dirty and affected by mold. The cells\u2019 equipment left much to be desired: worn-out beds, dirty bedding, (only) partially screened in-cell toilets. Conditions were also poor in the unit\u2019s shower facility...","160. Each of the establishments visited was also holding a number of HIV-positive prisoners, who were not segregated on the grounds of their medical condition. HIV tests were offered on a confidential and voluntary basis, and anti-retroviral treatment was available (likewise partially financed by donations from the Global Fund).\u201d","C.WHO Aids\/HIV related materials","55.The relevant parts of the WHO document \u201cWHO case definitions of HIV for surveillance and revised clinical staging and immunological classification of HIV-related disease in adults and children\u201d, 2006, read as follows:","\u201cThe pathogenesis of HIV infection is largely attributable to the decrease in the number of T cells (a specific type of lymphocyte) that bear the CD4 receptor (CD4+). The immune status of a child or adult living with HIV can be assessed by measuring the absolute number (per mm3) or percentage of CD4+ cells, and this is regarded as the standard way to assess and characterize the severity of HIV-related immunodeficiency. Progressive depletion of CD4+ T cells is associated with progression of HIV disease and an increased likelihood of opportunistic infections and other clinical events associated with HIV, including wasting and death.","...","The normal absolute CD4 count in adolescents and adults ranges from 500 to 1500 cells per mm3 of blood\u201d","56.Other relevant WHO materials on an immunological evaluation of patients and ART can be found in the judgment in the case of E.A. v. Russia (no. 44187\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 31-35, 23 May 2013)."],"27626":["5.The applicant was born in 1981. According to the most recently available information, in January 2014 the applicant was released from detention having served his sentence. He did not inform the Court of his current whereabouts.","6.According to the available medical documents, the applicant has been using drugs since 1996. In 1997 the applicant was diagnosed with hepatitis C and hepatic cirrhosis. The applicant has been HIV-positive since 2008. In 2008 he also had tuberculosis.","7.In March 2010 the applicant was taken into custody and placed in the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u041a\u0438\u0457\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u0438\u0439 \u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440) (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). On 13 July 2010 the Obolonskyy District Court, Kyiv, sentenced the applicant to five years\u2019 imprisonment for drug-related offences and theft. On 4 September 2010 the applicant was transferred to serve his sentence in the Bilotserkivska Correctional Colony No. 35. In May 2011 the applicant was diagnosed HIV-positive at clinical stage 4. On 24 May 2011 the applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count was 687 (16.3%). On 7 July 2011 the Irpinskyy Town Court released him from serving the remainder of his sentence in view of his poor state of health.","8.On 25 July 2011 the applicant was registered for regular medical checks at the Kyiv City Aids Centre.","9.On 1 February 2012 the Dniprovskyy District Court sentenced the applicant to four years\u2019 imprisonment for theft.","10.On 2 February 2012 the applicant was placed in the Kyiv SIZO. On arrival the applicant was examined by medical staff and had two chest X\u2011rays. It was recommended that the applicant consult a tuberculosis specialist.","11.On 8 February 2012 the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist and diagnosed with post-tuberculosis residual changes in the right lung.","12.On 16 or 20 March 2012 (relevant documents contain both dates) the applicant was placed in the SIZO medical ward. He stayed there until 18February 2013 with the following diagnoses: acute haemorrhoidal bleeding, haemorrhoids, chronic multiple drug use, HIV at clinical stage 3, oropharyngeal candidiasis, chronic secondary candidiasis, acute enterocolitis, chronic hepatitis, residual post-tuberculosis changes, liver cell failure, and other conditions. The applicant was prescribed various medication.","13.According to the Government, the applicant was examined by doctors in the SIZO medical ward on numerous occasions. In particular, on 22 March 2012 the applicant was examined by a surgeon and was examined by a general practitioner on the following dates: on 11, 16, 21 and 25 May 2012 with complaints of fever and weakness; on 18 and 22 June 2012 with complaints of fever and weakness; on 16 July 2012 with complaints of coughing with sputum, sweating, general weakness and fever; on 1, 3, 10, 15, 23 and 28 August 2012; on 4 and 10 September 2012; on 4, 10, 15, 22 and 29 October 2012; on 5, 9, 16, 23 and 29 November 2012; and on 5, 11, 18, 24 and 27 December 2012.","On the majority of those occasions it was decided to continue the prescribed treatment.","14.In addition to the above consultations, between March 2012 and 18February 2013 the applicant received the following medical care: on 10April 2012 the applicant had a chest X-ray and it was recommended that he see a tuberculosis specialist. Subsequently the applicant was examined and diagnosed with post-tuberculosis residual changes in the right lung. On 13 July 2012 he had another consultation with a tuberculosis specialist; on 24 October 2012 the applicant was examined by an infection diseases specialist and diagnosed, inter alia, with HIV at clinical stage 4. It was also suspected that the applicant had had a tuberculosis relapse, so an additional X-ray was recommended; on 7 November 2012 the applicant had an X-ray. On 14 November 2012 a tuberculosis specialist examined the applicant and concluded that there were no signs of active tuberculosis.","15.Between 18 April and 20 December 2012, according to the test results, the applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count dropped from 762 (18.4%) to 467 (14.3%).","16.Meanwhile, on 23 July 2012 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 1 February 2012 in the applicant\u2019s criminal case and remitted the case for a fresh court examination.On 3 September 2012 the Dniprovskyy District Court, Kyiv, found the applicant guilty of drug-related offences and theft, and sentenced him to two years\u2019 imprisonment.","17.On 14 January 2013 the applicant was examined in the Kyiv City Diagnostic Centre. Two days later the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist and diagnosed with tuberculosis. The applicant was prescribed anti-tuberculosis treatment.","18.On 23 January 2013 the applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count was 314.","19.On 25 and 30 January and 4 February 2013 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner. The prescribed treatment was continued.","20.On 5 February 2013 the applicant requested under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that the respondent Government be asked to secure an appropriate medical examination and treatment for him which, according to the applicant, was impossible in the Kyiv SIZO. On 7 February 2013 the Court refused the applicant\u2019s request.","21.On 11 February 2013 it was recommended by a tuberculosis specialist that the applicant be transferred to a specialised tuberculosis hospital.","22.On 18 February 2013 the applicant was transferred to Zhovtnevska Correctional Colony No. 17 (\u0416\u043e\u0432\u0442\u043d\u0435\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0430 \u0432\u0438\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0456\u044f \u211617). He arrived there on 21 February 2013 and was placed in a specialised tuberculosis hospital. Upon arrival the applicant complained of a cough with mucopurulent sputum, pain in the chest and armpits, headache, and abdominal pain and distension. It was concluded that the applicant\u2019s state of health was of medium severity. He underwent various blood, urine and sputum tests, X-rays and ultrasound examinations. On 21 and 22 February 2013 the applicant was examined by an otolaryngologist, a psychiatrist and a general practitioner. The applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis, HIV, encephalopathy, chronic hepatitis and other diseases. The applicant was prescribed anti-tuberculosis treatment.","23.The Government provided a detailed description of the examinations, prescriptions and treatment the applicant received in the hospital between February and October 2013. It included numerous X-rays, ultrasound examinations, blood, urine and sputum tests, examinations by hospital doctors and external specialists: a tuberculosis specialist (on 28February 2013 and 15 August 2013), an otolaryngologist (on 26 March 2013: the applicant was diagnosed with otitis), a psychiatrist (on 22February 2013: the applicant was diagnosed with opium narcotic addiction in remission); a dentist (3 April 2013), a general practitioner (on 13, 14, 19, 25 and 30 March 2013; on 1, 2, 3, 10, 12, 22, 26, 28 and 29 April 2013; on 7, 12 and 16 May 2013; on 1, 4, 15, 21 and 26 June 2013; and on 5, 8 and 17 July 2013); a surgeon (on 24 April 2013); a dermatologist (on 24 April 2013); an infectious diseases specialist from the Kharkiv Regional HIV\/Aids Centre, who prescribed antiretroviral therapy (\u201cART\u201d) for the applicant (22 July 2013); and a neuropathologist (on 13 August 2013).","24.On 3 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count was 477 (15.7%).","25.On 21 August 2013 the applicant started the ART.","26.On 4 September 2013 the applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count was 297 (12.1%).","27.On 20 September 2013 a tuberculosis specialist from the Kharkiv Medical Academy of Postgraduate Education concluded that the applicant\u2019s anti-tuberculosis treatment had been effective.","28.On 3 October 2013 the applicant was discharged from the hospital with the diagnosis of, inter alia, post-tuberculosis residual changes, HIV (clinical stage 4), chronic hepatitis in unstable remission, and chronic thrombophlebitis. The applicant was transferred to Buchanska Correctional Colony No. 85 (\u0411\u0443\u0447\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0430 \u0432\u0438\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0456\u044f \u211685) since his state of health had improved. He was provided with ART medication for two months.","29.According to the parties, while in the hospital the applicant also received various medication from his relatives.","30.The applicant spent the majority of the time between 1 November and 30 December 2013 in the Buchanska Correctional Colony Hospital. On 23 December 2013 the applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count was 314 (14.8%).","31.On 31 January 2014 the applicant was released, having served his sentence."],"27647":["5.The applicant was born in 1985. He resides in Germany.","6.At around 11 p.m. on 15 July 2005 an anti-tank mine exploded in the courtyard of a police station in Skopje, causing considerable material damage.","A.The events of 16 August 2005","7.On 16 August 2005 an investigating judge of the Skopje Court of First Instance (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) ordered (Kri.br.308\/2005 and ID.br.921\/05) a search of the home and other property belonging to the applicant\u2019s father and the father of F.R. (a co-defendant in the ensuing criminal proceedings, see paragraph 22 below), on account of a reasonable suspicion that relevant items of evidence relating to allegations of terrorism and trafficking in arms would be found.","8.The search was carried out at 9.30 a.m. on the same day, in the presence of the applicant\u2019s father and two neighbours, who acted as witnesses. According to the search record, which was signed by a police officer, the applicant\u2019s father and the witnesses, the following objects were found: a semi-automatic weapon; a case containing nine bullets; ten TNT bullets; a slow-burning fuse and a detonator; an audio tape; CDs; six photographs of the applicant and a piece of paper with a map drawn on it. At the request of the applicant\u2019s father, the search record indicated that he \u201cdoes not know the origin of the objects found\u201d, and at the request of the attending witnesses the record noted that they \u201chad no comments to make on the work of the police officers\u201d. A certificate of the seized objects was issued to the applicant\u2019s father, which the latter signed.","9.The police officer who had carried out the search submitted an official note, in which he listed all the above objects found in the house of the applicant\u2019s father. The note stated, inter alia:","\u201cThe wanted person [the applicant] was not found and according to his mother, he was on a visit, but (the mother) did not want to specify where.\u201d","10.The applicant\u2019s father was taken to a police station for an interview. On that occasion he denied that weapons found in his house belonged to him. He stated that it was possible that they belonged to the applicant, whom he had not seen since 14 August 2005 at 8 a.m., when he (the applicant) had left his house.","11.According to an official record (\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043d\u0438\u043a \u0437\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0440\u0436\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043b\u0438\u0446\u0435) of the Ministry of the Interior, a copy of which was included in the file, at 12.30 a.m. on 16 August 2005 the applicant, who had no previous criminal record, was arrested near a department store in a suburb of Skopje by R.J. and P.M., police officers. The record stated the following reasons for his arrest:","\u201c(since the applicant) was not in possession of any identification document and his suspicious movement in the vicinity of buildings which are targets for criminal offences (\u043e\u0431\u0458\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0438 \u043a\u043e\u0438 \u0441\u0435 \u0446\u0435\u043b \u043d\u0430 \u0438\u0437\u0432\u0440\u0448\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u0447\u043d\u043e \u0434\u0435\u043b\u043e).\u201d","12.At 12.45 a.m. he was taken to a police station, where he remained until 7 p.m. that day. As stated in the record, the applicant was informed about his rights; he waived the right to be represented by a lawyer; he had no visible injuries, nor were there any signs of illness, alcohol or drug addiction. The applicant signed all four pages of the record separately.","13.At 7 p.m. on 16 August 2005 the applicant was brought before the investigating judge under suspicion of having been involved in the incident of 15 July 2005. According to the court record of that date, which was duly signed by the applicant, he understood the charges against him; he had sufficient command of Macedonian; he had waived the right to an interpreter; and he had stated that he would testify in the absence of a lawyer. In the presence of the investigating judge and a public prosecutor, the applicant stated, inter alia:","\u201c... (referring to the request for investigation) it is true that at 11.15 p.m. on 15 July 2005 I placed an explosive device, namely a round anti-tank mine, together with a fuse and a detonator, in the western part of the courtyard of a police station, B.P... I placed the explosive device, lit the fuse with a lighter, and immediately ran home ... R.S. gave me this explosive ... F.R. was with me all the time ... he was also with me when R.S. gave me the anti-tank device ... I would like to underline that it was a slow-burning fuse which was six to seven metres long; it took a long time to burn and to detonate the device ... I would also like to note that F.R. knew that I was going to place this anti-tank device in B.P. police station. I told him that after we had obtained the device from R.S ... F.R and I agreed to a proposal by R.S. (that we place the device in front of a police station) and went towards Skopje by taxi ... I borrowed an old car from neighbour B., telling him that I wanted to drive around. He lent me the car, which was not registered, and I (with F.R.) took the device and placed it on the floor behind the driver\u2019s seat ... At 11.15 p.m. I left home and walked to this car; I took the anti-tank device ... and carried it as far as the B.P. police station, as I have described above, and then I detonated (the device). Some time after 10 pm. F.R. had called me to arrange to go and set up the device. Indeed, F.R. arrived ... and we both went to the car; we took the device together and we walked towards the B.P. police station. I was carrying the bag with the device. When I went into the police station F.R. left the scene: I do not know where he went. I went to the back of the police station and placed the device. Regarding weapons found in my house on the occasion of a search carried out by the police on 16August 2005, I had in my possession a semi-automatic weapon with nine bullets; I do not know anything about the ten explosive items, the fuse or the detonator. I had stolen the semi-automatic weapon and the bullets... five days before the explosion in the B.P. police station... I was not carrying the weapon when I placed the device, and the phone that I had in my possession was switched off.\u201d","14.On that day the investigating judge delivered several decisions, by means of which he appointed D.N., a lawyer, to represent the applicant; found of his own motion that the applicant\u2019s detention had been lawful; opened an investigation against the applicant, F.R. and R.S. (the latter was from Kosovo)[1]; he also ordered that they be detained on remand for thirty days. All the decisions contained an instruction on legal remedies. They were served on the applicant the same day. They were delivered to his lawyer the next day. No appeal was submitted against any of these decisions.","B.The events of 19 August 2005","1.The applicant\u2019s depositions taken by the investigating judge","15.On 19 August 2005, on the occasion of a regular visit of a judge responsible for the execution of sentences to Skopje detention centre, the applicant asked to give evidence before the investigating judge. On the same day, the investigating judge heard oral evidence from the applicant in the presence of the court-appointed lawyer and the public prosecutor. As indicated in the transcript of the hearing of that date, signed by the applicant, he stated, inter alia:","\u201cI called you because on 16 August 2005 I was beaten and intimidated by the police to force me to testify. I was under duress to testify and threatened with being killed after leaving the prison. All the names they mentioned are unknown to me. I know nothing about the case of which I am accused. I have never been in conflict with the police and I have no idea what a bomb is. Regarding the home search, this is false evidence. There were no weapons or explosives there. That\u2019s all. I agree to be represented by the court-appointed lawyer who is present at the moment. I would like to say that I have not been placed under any pressure by the court. I was just afraid and in a panic due to my previous stay in the police station. Actually, I was afraid when giving the statement ... I must say that everything I said on 16 August 2005 before the judge I was told to say by the police, and was put under strong pressure to do so. All the charges against me are false. I did not commit that crime.\u201d","16.Asked by the public prosecutor to explain why he had not told the investigating judge previously that he had been placed under pressure and beaten by the police, the applicant stated:","\u201cThey did beat me, and I was under strong pressure not to tell anything to the judge.\u201d","17.He further stated:","\u201cThey were beating me all the time while I was at the police (\u0434\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043a\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0432 \u0432\u043e \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0430). I had (visible) injuries, but I could not say anything to the judge, as the police had told me not to.\u201d","18.The investigating judge then requested the applicant to take off his clothes and show the injuries he had. As noted in the transcript, the investigating judge described the injuries as follows:","\u201cA yellow-brown bruise on the left upper arm, 7 cm long, in an irregular triangle shape; a dark-red bruise can be seen on the left buttock, 15 cm long, with an irregular rectangular shape. The accused complained of severe pain in his feet, but the court cannot see any injury there ... Light-yellow bruises on both left and right thighs, 15cm long with an irregular oval shape. No other injuries can be seen.\u201d","2.Expert examination of the applicant\u2019s injuries","19.On the same day the investigating judge ordered an immediate expert examination of the applicant to determine the type, origin and date of the injuries.","20.At 5 p.m. on that day two experts (Z.C. and G.P.) of the Forensic Institute (\u0418\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u0421\u0443\u0434\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u041c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0430) examined the applicant in the detention centre. In a detailed expert report dated 19 August 2005, the experts noted bruises (twenty-seven in number) on the applicant\u2019s back, chest, stomach, both arms and legs and the left buttock (no injuries were noted on the applicant\u2019s feet). According to the report, the bruises were mostly green and violet in colour. The report further explained that after seven days a bruise became green, and after two weeks yellow. It went on to state that:","\u201cHaving regard to (the applicant\u2019s) statement that he had sustained the injuries while he was detained in the police station on 16 August 2005, we can say that, given the noted characteristics of the (applicant\u2019s) injuries, especially their greenish colour, they (the injuries) could not have been inflicted on 16August 2005. This is because only three days have passed between then and 19 August 2005, the date of the medical examination, and bruises could not acquire such a greenish colour in only three days. More precisely, the injuries noted during the examination are older, and date from at least seven days before the examination.","Given their characteristics, the bruises are mostly external (\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0440\u0448\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438), except in the area of the left buttock, where there is more intensive bruising.\u201d","21.The medical report concluded that the injuries sustained by the applicant had been inflicted by a \u201cblunt dynamic force\u201d. As regards the injuries to the applicant\u2019s arms, the experts stated that they were the result of pressure exerted by parts of a body, including hands. While they could not determine the exact means by which the remaining injuries had been inflicted, they nevertheless specified that they had been caused by beatings. The injuries were to be regarded as bodily injuries.","C.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","22.On 9 September 2005 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment against the applicant and F.R. on terrorism charges. On 26September 2005 an indictment on the same charges was lodged against R.S.","1.Trial court hearings and depositions of the applicant and witnesses","23.At a hearing held on 8 November 2005 the trial court decided to consider both indictments in one set of proceedings. According to depositions taken on that date, the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer of his own choosing, stated, inter alia, that:","\u201cThe accusations described in the indictment, which I contest, are wrong. At about 10.45 p.m. on 12 August 2005, 300 metres in front of my house ... members of special (police) forces jumped on my back and put me in a car ... they took me to a forest, I do not know exactly where ... When they abducted me, there were fourteen or fifteen of them ... In the forest there was a change of driver, and they hooded me and drove me far away in a different direction. We arrived in a house, where they unhooded me; it was a luxurious house. I was told to sit on a chair; uniformed people wearing masks and others in plain clothes arrived. They asked me if I knew why I had been brought there, to which I replied that I had not done anything wrong. They started insulting me ... four people started beating me with plastic bottles and a rubber tube. I stayed in the house for three days. During that time, while my hands and legs were handcuffed, I was held under water in a swimming pool. A big man was trying to force me to confess about the police station, to which I replied \u2018to confess what about the police station?\u2019. When they took me out of the pool, other people continued beating me. They ordered me to admit that I had placed the bomb in the B.P. police station. I told them that I had not done that ... they also brought a dog into the house. The dog did nothing to me. They held me under water in the pool three or four more times ... I believe that we were in Veles ... The same uniformed men, who wore masks, brought me [near the department store in Skopje, see paragraph 11 above] and told me to go home. There were other people around. I was wet and could not walk. Men in plain clothes without uniforms or masks handcuffed me and took me to K. police station. They slapped me twice and started interrogating me about the bomb in B.P. police station. I told them that I knew nothing ... They asked me if I knew R.S. and F.R., and I said that I did not know them. I stayed in K. police station from 15 August to the night of 16 August, when they brought me before the investigating judge. I note that while I was in the house in Veles I was given a blank paper which I had to sign because they had beaten me. In Veles I think I signed three blank papers and I\u2019m sure that I saw those papers in the police station changing hands between police officers. The investigating judge also showed them to me. When the judge had them they were no longer blank, but I don\u2019t remember what was written on them. In Veles I was told to say \u2018admit that you placed the bomb and we will let you go, we will take you home\u2019.","On 16 August 2005 ... I could not tell the investigating judge that police officers had threatened me, because they had said they would kill my family. What I said to the investigating judge on 16 August 2005 was what I had been told to say by the police officers in Veles. What I said to the investigating judge was invented by the police officers ... I want to say that I was afraid because while in Veles I heard screams and voices saying \u2018we caught his father\u2019, so I was convinced that they had captured and tortured my father. I was further told by the police that they had apprehended and taken my father to P. police station, that they had found weapons in my house, and that my father had admitted that they belonged to him. That was a stratagem of the police.\u201d","24.The applicant further denied that he knew F.R. He said:","\u201cThis is the first time I have seen him. I do not know him; I do not know where he lives, I know nothing about him. I do not know R.S. nor have I ever heard about him ...\u201d","25.He further stated:","\u201cOn 16 August 2005 the investigating judge asked me about weapons, a gun, and some missiles. I was shocked. The investigating judge told me that all those items had been found in my house. I saw the certificate regarding items which had been seized. I do not know who signed it ... (after the certificate was shown to him): the investigating judge did not show this certificate to me. I saw it then for the first time. The signature on it does not belong to my father. The items that the judge read aloud from the certificate had not been found in my house ... [The accused was shown a note referring to Greater Albania and he said]: Maybe I wrote that, I do not remember. Maybe someone from the school wrote it. It was found in my house. I drew it, it was a game. The words that are on the map, I am confused; the words 2010 Jihad, Rida; the interpreter says that the following is written on the map: Greater Albania, Jihad, Ilirida State, Allah Aqbar ... maybe I found this map and maybe I drew it. I do not know what that map means, it was a game ...\u201d","26.The applicant denied that he had spoken on his mobile phone with F.R. and R.S. His phone had been seized by the police while he was in Veles. He confirmed that on 15 July 2005 he had been in possession of his mobile phone and denied that R.S. had called him that day. He further stated:","\u201c... that day (15 July 2005) ... when I was sitting with my friends, we heard an explosion. Everyone went outside to see what had happened. I had some visitors. Someone said a bridge had collapsed, later someone said that a missile had been launched against B.P. police station ... At 11 p.m., the time of the explosion, I was in my neighbourhood. When the explosion happened, I did not have my mobile phone - it was charging. When I arrived home, I saw that there were no missed calls.\u201d","27.Asked by the public prosecutor why he had not revealed, during his examination on 19 August 2005, that he had been abducted on 12August2005 and about the subsequent sequence of events, the applicant stated:","\u201cI did not tell the investigating judge, because I was told by police officers in Veles that I should not say anything. What I said today, I also said on 19August 2005, but the judge did not note it ... I signed the record (of 19 August 2005), but I did not read it. I do not know why the judge did not note down the whole event in Veles and then in K. police station ...\u201d","28.The applicant further named four individuals, including a certain A.A. and S.A., with whom he had allegedly been at the critical time on 15July 2005. In this connection he asked the court to examine those witnesses.","29.After the court read out his statement of 16 August 2005 given in the pre-trial proceedings, the applicant confirmed the part of that statement indicating that he had been threatened by the Intelligence Service to force him to make the statement.","30.The applicant\u2019s father stated that the police had searched his house in his absence and that he had been forced to sign the search record and the certificate of seized objects. He confirmed that the map of Greater Albania belonged to the applicant. Lastly, he stated that on 15 July 2005, at the time of the explosion, the applicant had been in the house.","31.At a hearing of 29 November 2005, the applicant was shown the map of Greater Albania, which the applicant confirmed that he had found at his school. He was further shown photographs of himself wearing a military uniform and carrying a machine gun. In this connection the applicant stated that the photographs had been taken on the occasion of a religious holiday when it had been possible, for a certain price, to be photographed wearing such a uniform.","32.The trial court also heard oral evidence by A.A. and S.A. A.A. stated, inter alia:","\u201cOn 15 July 2005, as on any other night, we met friends outside our doors, because it was very hot. That night [the applicant] was with us ... That night (the following were present) I, S., M.J., as well as A. ... At about 11 p.m. we were outside. At 11.20 p.m. or 11.30 p.m. we were all outside, including S.A. I want to say that many other people were there as well. Then, there was an explosion, everybody went out, we did not know what was going on. At the time of the explosion, [the applicant] was with us ... Ten minutes later someone came out of the house saying he had seen on television that a bomb had exploded at B.P. police station. We stayed there talking. [The applicant] was there as well. On 12 August 2005 we noticed that [the applicant] was absent. He was not there on the 13th either. On 13 August 2005 [the applicant\u2019s] father told us that [the applicant] had been arrested. There were rumours that he had been arrested in connection with the explosion at the police station. That is why I agreed to testify as a witness, to say that [the applicant] did not do it. No one asked me to testify. I volunteered to do it ... I gave a list of everyone who was there that night with [the applicant] to [the applicant\u2019s] father. I gave him that list after [the applicant] had been arrested ... We wanted to vouch that [the applicant] had been with us and that he had not done it.\u201d","33.On being asked by the public prosecutor how he remembered that the applicant had not been there on 12 August 2005, A.A. said:","\u201cSince [the applicant] was normally there every night and was not there that night, his friends were wondering where he was; his friends noticed his absence; I learned about it from them.\u201d","34.S.A. also confirmed that at the critical time on 15 July 2005 the applicant had been outside his house talking with other people. He stated, inter alia:","\u201cThat night [the applicant] was with us; he stayed out other nights as well, but I cannot say whether it was every night, because I go out only some nights ... I cannot say exactly whether it was 11 p.m. or 11.15 p.m. when we heard a very loud explosion ... We were standing in front of [the applicant\u2019s] house after midnight, until 1 a.m. ... (the applicant\u2019s) father asked me to testify as a witness... He asked me if I would like to testify in court that (the applicant) had been with us that night; I agreed.\u201d","35.On 27 December 2005 Z.C., the expert doctor who had carried out and signed the medical report regarding the applicant\u2019s injuries of 19August 2005 (see paragraph 20 above), gave oral evidence before the trial court in the presence of the accused and their representatives. He explained the recovery process of a bruise and its colour changes. He confirmed the veracity of the written report and that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted at least seven days (or two to three days more than that) before the date of examination.","36.The applicant\u2019s lawyer stated:","\u201cI do not contest the expert report regarding the injuries specified therein and their colour.\u201d","37.At a hearing on 12 January 2006 the public prosecutor made the charge specific, and also accused the applicant and F.R. of trafficking in arms.","2.The trial court\u2019s judgment","38.On 17 January 2006 the trial court convicted the applicant, F.R. and R.S. (in absentia) and sentenced them to eleven, ten and twelve years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. The applicant was found guilty of terrorism and trafficking in arms under Articles 313 and 396 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 50 and 51 below). The court further ordered confiscation of the semi-automatic weapon, nine bullets and ten explosive items from the applicant. The convicts were also ordered to compensate for the damage sustained. An indefinite expulsion order (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0443\u0432\u0430\u045a\u0435 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u0446 \u043e\u0434 \u0437\u0435\u043c\u0458\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0441\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0433\u0430\u0448) was issued in respect of R.S. The court established that the applicant and F.R., together with R.S., were responsible for the explosion of 15 July 2005 in the B.P. police station, the aim of which was to endanger the constitutional order and public safety.","39.In the judgment, which runs to thirty-one pages, the court reproduced and analysed the statements that the applicant had given in the pre-trial proceedings (16 and 19 August 2005) and at the trial (8November2005), as well as the medical report dated 19August 2005 and the oral evidence of the expert of 27 December 2005. Noting that the applicant\u2019s statements were inconsistent, the court gave weight to his confession statement of 16 August 2005, finding that it contained a clear, complete and logical description of the events of the critical date. It was given in accordance with the law: the applicant had been informed of his rights, and he had read the written transcript of the court hearing and had signed it. It held that that statement was consistent and reliable, because the applicant had given a chronological description of the events; he had also given a detailed description of the device, the place and the means by which he had detonated it, which corresponded to the experts\u2019 reports regarding the incident. The statement of 16 August 2005 was also corroborated with a detailed list of calls on the mobile phones confiscated from the convicted individuals, which confirmed that there had been intense communication between them before and after the incident.","40.The court further established that in the statement of 19 August 2005 the applicant had retracted his confession of 16 August 2005, which he had stated had been given under duress, namely that he had been beaten on that date by police while detained in the police station. On the basis of that testimony, the investigating judge had ordered an expert examination of the applicant. The experts, relying on medical science and practice, had established that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted at least seven days before the date of the examination (19 August 2005). Accordingly, the injuries had not been inflicted on 16 August 2005 when he had been arrested and detained; they had therefore not been inflicted by the police.","41.The court went on to say that after the expert examination the applicant had concocted another version of the events he had presented in his statement of 8 November 2005. In that statement the applicant had given another description of events, namely that he had not been detained on 16August 2005 and beaten up in the police station, but that on 12August 2005 the police had abducted and detained him in a luxurious house in Veles; that he had been held under water in a swimming pool; tied up; and beaten, to make him confess to the crime. The court held that nothing suggested, as implied by the defence, that there had been two periods of detention, the first unlawful (12-16 August) and the second (16August 2005), lawful. The court held, referring to the decision of the investigating judge (see paragraph 14 above), that the applicant had been detained on 16August 2005 in accordance with the law.","42.It further found that no evidence had been presented that the applicant had been arrested by the police on 12 August 2005 and ill-treated in a house in Veles. That version of events, according to the court, was fictional and invented in order to match the date when the injuries had been inflicted, as established in the expert report. The court held that the applicant\u2019s statements of 19 August and 8 November 2005 were inconsistent and implausible. In his testimony of 19 August 2005 the applicant had made no comment as regards his alleged abduction on 12August 2005 and interrogation in Veles. Contrary to the applicant\u2019s argument that he had been scared and confused when he had given his confession statement on 16August 2005, the court record of his questioning of that date suggested no disorder or lack of capacity for rational perception. Had the investigating judge noticed any indication of unsafety, fear, panic or lack of capacity on the part of the applicant, he would have terminated the questioning.","43.Lastly, the court concluded that the applicant\u2019s confession statement of 16 August 2005 coincided with the motives for committing the crime and the intention to provoke fear and unsafety. The drawing of the map of Greater Albania and photographs of himself wearing military uniform and carrying weapons found in the applicant\u2019s possession confirmed his political determination to create an imaginary, non-existent entity by 2010 through jihad. The court examined the evidence produced by A.A. and S.A., but dismissed it as unreliable, for the following reasons: the witnesses were neighbours of the applicant; the applicant\u2019s house was in the immediate vicinity of the B.P. police station where the explosive had been placed, which had allowed him to leave the scene without being noticed; they had been instructed to provide alibis, but their statements were incoherent.","3.Proceedings before Skopje Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court","44.The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Skopje Court of Appeal. He submitted, inter alia, that he had been convicted on the basis of unlawfully obtained evidence, namely his testimony of 16August 2005, which had been given under duress. That the applicant had been subjected to police brutality was confirmed by his injuries described in the expert report of 19 August 2005. Besides that medical evidence and his clear description of events as to what had happened between 12 and 16August 2005, he could not produce any other evidence to support his allegations of abduction and ill-treatment. He further complained that he had not been legally represented when he had given the statement of 16August 2005, notwithstanding that legal representation was obligatory. Lastly, he contested the lawfulness of the search of his father\u2019s house.","45.At a public session held on 2 June 2006, Skopje Court of Appeal, sitting in a five-judge panel, upheld the trial court\u2019s judgment and dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. The court stated:","\u201cThe complaints (that the applicant\u2019s conviction had been based on his confession statement given under duress) were the subject of a complete and careful review by the adjudicating panel, which found them unsubstantiated. The trial court did not commit a substantive violation of procedural rules ... since there had been no evidence that (the applicant\u2019s) statement of 16 August 2005 before the investigating judge had been given under duress; ill-treatment; physical assault; or threats. That this statement was lawful was explained by the trial court in detail (on ten pages)...","The trial court, after examining all three statements of (the applicant), gave weight to his statement of 16 August 2005 given before the investigating judge, as lawfully obtained and reliable evidence. The statement of 16 August 2005 is clear; it provides a reasonable description of the entire incident; it gives a chronological account of all details of the manner and place he had met the other two co-defendants; of all activities and preparations pre-dating the incident; of the means by which the crime had been committed; also a description of the device; the length of the fuse; the role of the co-defendants R.S. and F.R.... Details regarding the place where the device had been placed, which could have been known to the applicant as the perpetrator of the crime, matched the on-site examination report; there were also photographs, as well as the expert reports regarding the nature and description of the explosive device and the place where it had been placed...","(The applicant) gave his testimony of 16August 2005 before the investigating judge, the public prosecutor and a court interpreter, without the presence of the police; he was advised of all his rights under the Criminal Proceedings Act, including the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney; which (the applicant) waived. That he confessed to the crimes was not the result of external pressure or threats, but an act of acceptance and remorse for the unlawful actions.\u201d","46.As regards the right of the applicant to be legally represented at his questioning before the investigating judge on 16 August 2005, the court held that notwithstanding that he had been informed of his right to mount a defence, including the right to an attorney, he had clearly stated that he would give his testimony without a lawyer. He did not mention to the investigating judge that he was in any particular mental state or that he was otherwise unfit to testify. After the investigating judge had ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, a court-appointed lawyer was appointed (see paragraph 14 above). That had been done in compliance with section 66 of the Criminal Proceedings Act (see paragraph 53 below). The search warrants had been issued, and the search records had been duly signed by the applicant\u2019s father and the attending witnesses who had attested to the lawfulness of the search carried out in the house of the applicant\u2019s father (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above).","47.The applicant and F.R. appealed against these judgments by means of a request for extraordinary review of a final judgment, which the Supreme Court, with a judgment of 14 February 2007, allowed in part and dismissed the indictment regarding trafficking in arms, which, as found by the Supreme Court, had not been submitted in accordance with the law. The court upheld the lower courts\u2019 judgments in the remaining part and dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints that his conviction had been based on unlawfully obtained evidence (the statement of 16 August 2005) given allegedly under duress. The court ruled that the lower courts had examined, but nevertheless dismissed, that complaint, providing sufficient reasons for their judgments. The court concluded that the applicant\u2019s conviction had not been based solely on his testimony of 16 August 2005. It rested also on other documentary and verbal evidence, which had been communicated to the defence.","D.Criminal proceedings on account of alleged ill-treatment of the applicant","48.On 7 March 2007 the applicant lodged with the public prosecutor\u2019s office a criminal complaint in which he alleged that he had been subjected to police brutality. In the complaint the applicant outlined his statements given on 16 and 19 August and 8 November 2005, as well as the expert report regarding his injuries admitted in evidence in the criminal proceedings against him. He alleged that an unidentified perpetrator had tortured him. He attached a copy of the medical expert report and the court record of 19August 2005, as well as a copy of the trial court\u2019s judgment.","49.As no action was taken regarding his criminal complaint, on 25May2010 the applicant approached the public prosecutor\u2019s office, seeking that measures be taken to bring those responsible to justice, but he received no reply from the public prosecutor.","A.United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment","56.The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1984 (resolution 39\/46), provides, inter alia:","Article 15","\u201cEach State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.\u201d","B.Report to the Government of \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d on the visit to \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 12 to 19 July 2004, Strasbourg, 15November 2006","57.The relevant parts of the Report read as follows:","\u201ci. the case of A.A.","19.On 10 June 2003 A.A. was summoned to the Kumanovo Police Station for an official talk ... it has been confirmed that he was detained as from 10 am on 10June2003 ... The decision to remand A.A. in custody, which was dated 12June2003, expressly ordered that the remand imprisonment commence as from the day prior to the date of the decision (i.e., as from 11 June 2003) ... On 20 June 2003, representatives of the Ombudsman\u2019s office visited A.A. in Skopje Prison, following allegations made by the latter of ill-treatment by law enforcement officials and incommunicado detention during the four-day period from 8 to 12 June 2003. The Ombudsman\u2019s representatives observed the injuries displayed by A.A. and set out their conclusions concerning the case in a written document, which was also included in the court file. Their conclusions essentially confirmed A.A.\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment and incommunicado detention during the above-mentioned period ...","At various stages during his trial, A.A. and his lawyers stated that he was abducted in Kumanovo some days prior to 10 June 2003 by a group of persons thought to be UBK officers; the date cited most consistently was 8 June. According to the defendant, the officers - some of whom were masked - placed him in an automobile with no license plates, covered his head with a black bag, and then drove him to a house in a countryside location unknown to him, where he was punched, kicked, and beaten with baseball bats and metal rods and burned with a heated metal object in order to extract a confession. The alleged ill-treatment continued over several days, in different places (villas or cottages) in the countryside; he was forced to memorise a statement to be repeated to the investigating judge, before whom he was finally brought on 12 June 2003...","22.The judge who conducted A.A.\u2019s trial indicated to the delegation that \"nothing supported [A.A.\u2019s] allegations\" which, as he pointed out, were only first made at trial. Because those allegations had not been made at the defendant\u2019s first appearance before the investigating judge, he considered that they could not be followed up during the phase of the trial ...","ii. the case of R.B.","24.The case of R.B. contains elements which are strikingly similar to the case of A.A. According to information provided to a Commission of the Ministry of the Interior by R.B., he was abducted at 10 am on 23 May 2003 near Kumanovo Police Station by four or five persons who handcuffed him, covered his head with his jacket, and forced him into a vehicle. After a drive of some 2.5 hours, the party arrived at a certain unspecified building, where R.B. was held for five days. During that period, he was \u2018ill-treated and beaten on the body with thick wooden sticks\u2019.","26.The delegation discussed the case of R.B. as well as the report of the Commission of the Ministry of the Interior with judges from the Kumanovo Basic Court and the Prosecutor-General. It is clear from those discussions that judicial and prosecutorial authorities were aware of R.B.\u2019s allegations relating to the period between 23 and 29 May 2003 ... However, no action was taken to investigate R.B.\u2019s allegations and other information, even though there were indications of: ill-treatment by law enforcement officials, thought to be UBK officers; incommunicado detention in a clandestine location ...\u201d","43.The information gathered during the July 2004 visit, including as regards reports of incommunicado detention in clandestine locations, continues to raise questions regarding the compliance of UBK officers with the general legal and regulatory framework, despite assurances to the contrary given by the national authorities.\u201d","C.Report to the Government of \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d on the visit to \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), from 15 to 26 May 2006, Strasbourg, 13February 2008","58.The relevant parts of the Report read as follows:","\u201c2. Torture and other forms of ill-treatment","13.For many of the persons, the time of the alleged ill-treatment pre-dated the delegation\u2019s visit by several weeks and any marks which might have been caused by the ill-treatment alleged would almost certainly have healed in the meantime. However, in a number of cases, the delegation\u2019s doctors gathered medical evidence consistent with the allegations of ill-treatment either through an examination of the persons concerned or by consulting relevant medical records ...","iii)A third case concerns two persons (F.R. and F.H.) suspected at the time of having carried out the bombing of Bit Pazar Police Station on 15 July 2005. Both men alleged to have been held in unauthorised places of detention, during which time they claimed to have been severely ill-treated (see paragraph 32 in Section B below), before being transferred to police stations in Skopje, where they were ill-treated again. The description below relates to their alleged ill-treatment in Kisela Voda and Karpo\u0161 police stations, respectively...","\uf0d8 F.H. alleged that he was taken to Karpo\u0161 Police Station late on 15 August where he was subjected to punches and kicks, and spent the night handcuffed to a radiator (footnote no.10: On 17 August 2005 F.H. was examined by a doctor at Skopje Prison. His medical file noted: Haematoma under both elbows; haematoma on the left side of his back 8 \u00d7 3 cm. Haematoma in the back region; haematoma in the upper part of both legs (on each side); haematoma on both feet) ...","2. Unauthorised places of detention","31.In its 2004 visit report, the CPT indicated once more its concerns regarding incommunicado detention in clandestine locations and the lack of compliance by the UBK with the general legal and regulatory framework. The authorities, in their response, again reassured the Committee that the activities of the UBK were all undertaken in accordance with the law.","Nevertheless, the CPT\u2019s delegation received detailed information, including on the apparent location of such places, that the practice of the UBK of holding persons in incommunicado detention in clandestine locations did occur until at least 2004.","32.The delegation also heard more recent accounts, dating from August 2005, concerning the alleged detention in unauthorised locations of two persons, suspected at the time of being involved in the bombing of the Bit Pazar Police Station (see also paragraph 13, iii), above). Both alleged they were \u2018abducted\u2019 on the streets of Skopje by men dressed in civilian clothes. One alleged that he was picked up on 14 August and driven, with a bag over his head, to two different places in the countryside where he claimed to have been severely beaten and subjected to a mock execution and to electric shocks. He was then taken to Kisela Voda Police Station. The second person stated that he was bundled into a car by several officers on 12 August, had a paper bag placed over his head and was driven to a house. Over the course of some three days he was allegedly repeatedly beaten with a stick on his legs and buttocks, and had his penis slammed in a drawer; he also stated that he was thrown into a swimming pool while tied up. On 15 August he was driven back to Skopje blindfolded, released in Georgi Petrov suburb, and then immediately arrested by uniformed police officers, who took him to Karpo\u0161 Police Station.","Both men were admitted to Skopje Prison on 16 August 2005, where on the following day their injuries were recorded by the prison doctor (see footnotes 9 and 10 above). Their case was subsequently taken up by the Ombudsman\u2019s Office and, at the hearing concerning their Appeal on 5 June 2006, their lawyers contended that the statements they had made to the police had been extorted after several days of beatings.","33.In the light of the authorities\u2019 categorical denial of unauthorised detentions, the CPT is concerned that elements of the law enforcement agencies may be operating outside the chain of command and control of the Ministry of Interior. To allay such fears, the Committee would have expected the authorities to have initiated a thorough investigation into the above allegations. To date this has not been the case.\u201d","D.Response of the Government of \"the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\" to the report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) on its visit to \"the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\" from 15 to 26 May 2006, Strasbourg, 13February 2008","59.The relevant parts of the Response read as follows:","\u201c... In reference to the observations and the recommendations made by the Delegation of the CPT at the occasion of their visit to the Republic of Macedonia in May 2006, as stated in the letter of Ms Silvia Casale, former President of the CPT, sent on 24 November 2006, and also in the letter of 7May2007 of Mr. Mauro Palma, current President of the CPT, the competent authorities of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia are submitting their final responses:","The Ministry of Interior","As regards the CPT recommendation to conduct an independent investigation to examine the allegations of detention at secret locations, the Ministry of the Interior would like to underline that the conduct of an independent investigation regarding any complaint against unlawful or unprofessional conduct or violations of rules and regulations by officers of the Ministry of the Interior, of the Security and Counter Intelligence Department, is within the competencies of the Sector for Internal Control and Professional Standards.","Pursuing its competences and following the procedure envisaged in the Ministry\u2019s bylaws, the Sector for Internal Control processed the complaints by the persons F.H. and F.R. submitted through the National Ombudsman of the Republic of Macedonia against the official activities undertaken by authorized officers of the Ministry in apprehending and keeping the above mentioned persons in police custody.","After the conduct of the relevant procedure and after undertaking all measures and activities to establish the facts of the case, the Sector for Internal Control and Professional Standards concluded that in undertaking the official activities in respect of the persons F.H. and F.R. the authorized officers did not overstep their authorities, nor acted in contravention to the legal regulations, i.e. that the allegations contained in the application regarding this case, submitted to the National Ombudsman by the parents of the said persons are without any grounds.","This means that the investigation regarding this case has been indeed conducted by the relevant body of the Ministry of the Interior following the prescribed procedure.","The Security and Counter Intelligence Department once again categorically rejects any allegations of use of any secret locations for conduct of official activities. All facilities in which the officers of the Security and Counter Intelligence Department work are property of the Ministry of the Interior ...\u201d","E.\u201cHuman Rights Reports, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Macedonia\u201d, US State Department","1.Human Rights Report, March 8, 2006","60.The relevant parts of the Report read as follows:","\u201c... At year\u2019s end the ombudsman was investigating allegations that two ethnic Albanian suspects in a July 15 bomb attack on a Skopje police station were detained without proper legal authority; a PSU [Interior ministry\u2019s sector for internal control and professional standards] investigation determined there were no irregularities involved in the arrest and detention of the two men.\u201d","2.Human Rights Report, March 6, 2007","61.The relevant parts of the Report read as follows:","\u201c... Two ethnic Albanian suspects in a July 2005 bomb attack on a Skopje police station claimed they were detained without proper legal authority. The ombudsman\u2019s office reported that they were unable to file criminal charges with the public prosecutor\u2019s office regarding the allegations because the Ministry of Interior would not provide information on the identity of the officers involved in the alleged misconduct. A PSU investigation determined there were no irregularities involved in the arrest and detention of the two men.\u201d","F.\u201cAnnual Report on Human Rights in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001\u201d, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights","62.The relevant parts of the Report read as follows:","\u201cPolice overstepping their authority","The violation of legal provisions concerning police authority is still source of many problems in practice. On the one hand, the constitutional provisions follow the concept of human rights and freedoms in specifying the police powers regarding arrest, search, taping and questioning. On the other hand, laws and subordinated acts do not clearly define the police powers; there are no mechanisms for control and efficient punishment in case of violation of the procedure and rules. In such circumstances, the police feels as it is morally justified to reinstate (and violate) the law in view of a proclaimed aim to improve the discovery of crimes and their perpetrators.","The Macedonian police developed a practice, contrary to the constitutional provisions, to arrest suspects, carry out searches and seize objects without a court warrant. Similarly, the suspects are not brought before the court immediately, but, as a rule, they are withheld in the police, often more than twenty-four hours. The police also do not inform the suspects about their rights to remain silent and to have a lawyer before they are interviewed. Sometimes instructions are given in this direction, but in many cases they are incomplete and incorrect. There are more frequent cases of incommunicado detention of persons, namely arrest of persons and their detention at unknown locations, without their families or a lawyer being informed. The contested practice of scant police files concerning treatment with suspects became absurd, [namely there is] a complete absence of any record of persons who are arrested and held by the police. The absence of an adequate registration of detention in a police station generates other violations and impossibility to prove the overstepping by the police of their authority, especially regarding torture and inhuman treatment during arrest and [the suspects\u2019] detention in police station ...","It is of particular concern the involvement of members of (UBK) in the arrest and interview of terrorist suspects. They (UBK members) behave completely beyond prescribed police procedures.","There are no efficient legal means to combat unlawful and wrong police actions. It is not rare that cases in which suspects are beaten and threatened with a view of obtaining information or extracting a confession are not prosecuted. The police and the public prosecutor demonstrate high resistance to investigate overstepping by the police of their authority or they refuse to witness against their colleagues when the law is violated. Some overstepping of the authority is obviously tolerated, even supported by higher police authorities so that no disciplinary measures are taken against the perpetrators or such measures are inadequate to the gravity of the wrongdoing. In the last year, the fight against extremist and terrorist groups was used as an excuse for the erosion of the fundamental guarantees of freedoms and rights ...\u201d"],"27650":["1. The applicant, Mr A.M., is a Syrian national of Kurdish origin, who was born in 1993 and lives in Geneva. The President granted the applicant \u2019 s request for his identity not to be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 \u00a7 4 of the Rules of Court). The applicant was represented before the Court by Mr B. Wijkstrom, a lawyer practising in Geneva.","A. The circumstances of the case","2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.","3. The applicant arrived in Italy on an unknown date. His fingerprints were recorded in the EURODAC system on 17 December 2012. On 29 December 2012 the applicant entered Switzerland from Italy and sought asylum the same day. Soon after reaching Geneva, the applicant started to suffer from mental illness.","4. The applicant \u2019 s sister had arrived in Switzerland on 19 December 2012, had applied for asylum and had received a temporary permit which entitled her to remain on Swiss territory for the duration of her own asylum application. She was married to a man who had been granted temporary refugee status.","5. On 17 January 2013, the Swiss Federal Migration Office (\u201cFMO\u201d) requested that its Italian counterparts take charge of the applicant \u2019 s asylum request, pursuant to Article 10 \u00a7 1 of Regulation no. 343\/2003\/EC (the \u201cDublin Regulation\u201d). On 21 February 2013, the Italian immigration authorities explicitly accepted the FMO \u2019 s request. On 22 February 2013, the applicant \u2019 s asylum request was rejected by the FMO on the basis of the fact that he had entered Switzerland from another \u201cDublin\u201d State. The FMO refused the application of the humanitarian clause provided for in \u00a7 15 of the Dublin Regulation.","6. On 24 April 2013, the applicant was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and back pain. He was put on a course of weekly psychiatric sessions and was given an anti-depressant (Zoloft, 50mg\/day). According to the medical report, the stabilization of his psychological and social environment was a precondition for the successful outcome of the applicant \u2019 s therapy. According to a subsequent medical report, dated 6 June 2013, the applicant showed some risk of self-harm, which could go as far as suicide if he were returned to Italy, where he had been allegedly abused by the police. The report clearly stated, however, that the applicant \u2019 s death thoughts were passive and did not disclose any concrete plan (\u201c sans projet concret \u201d).","7. The applicant appealed against the decision of the FMO to the Federal Administrative Court. The appeal was rejected on 28 May 2013.","B. Relevant domestic law and relevant law of the European Union","8. The relevant domestic law is set out in the Court \u2019 s judgment in the case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 22-23 and 26-27, 4 November 2014).","9. The relevant instruments and principles of European Union law are set out in the same judgment (\u00a7\u00a7 28-36).","10. In particular, the Court recalls that the Dublin Regulation is applicable to Switzerland under the terms of the association agreement of 26 October 2004 between the Swiss Confederation and the European Community regarding criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland (OJ L 53 of 27 February 2008). The Dublin Regulation was recently replaced by Regulation (EU) No. 604\/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (the \u201cDublin III Regulation\u201d), which is designed to make the Dublin system more effective and to strengthen the legal safeguards for persons subject to the Dublin procedure.","11. The Dublin III Regulation entered into force on 1 January 2014 and was passed into law by the Swiss Federal Council on 7 March 2014.","C. The Italian context","12. A detailed description of the asylum procedure and the legal framework and organisation of the reception system for asylum seekers in Italy is also set out in the Tarakhel judgment ( \u00a7\u00a7 36-50)."],"27652":["1. The applicants are a mother, Ms J.A., born in 1963, and her two daughters R. and P., who were born in 1996 and 1999, respectively. All three applicants are Iranian nationals and are currently in the Netherlands. The President of the Section decided that the applicants \u2019 identity should not be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 \u00a7 4 of the Rules of Court). The applicants were represented before the Court by Ms I. Schalken, a lawyer practising in Apeldoorn.","2. The Dutch Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr R.A.A. B\u00f6cker, and Deputy Agent, Ms L. Egmond, both of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","4. On 25 November 2013, the applicants applied for asylum in the Netherlands. The examination and comparison of the applicants \u2019 fingerprints and the verification of their identity in the European Union Visa Information System by the Netherlands authorities disclosed that on 24 July 2013 the Italian mission in Teheran had issued them with a visa for Italy. On 2 9 November 2013, the Deputy Minister for Security and Justice ( Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie ) rejected the applicants \u2019 asylum requests, finding that, pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) no. 3 43\/2003 of 18 February 2003 (\u201cthe Dublin Regulation\u201d), Italy was responsible for the determination of the applicants \u2019 asylum request. The Minister rejected the applicants \u2019 argument that they risked treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention in Italy. The Minister also rejected as unsubstantiated the first applicant \u2019 s claim that she was dependent on the care of her sister who was living in the Netherlands since 1994.","5. The applicants \u2019 appeal against the decision of 29 November 2013 and the accompanying request for a provisional measure were rejected on 23 January 2014 by the provisional measures judge ( voorzieningenrechter ) of the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Zwolle, who upheld the Deputy Minister \u2019 s decision and reasoning. The provisional measures judge also rejected the first applicant \u2019 s argument that her medical situation did not allow her transfer to Italy, finding that the copy of her medical file submitted offered no concrete indication that in her case adequate treatment could not take place in Italy.","6. The applicants \u2019 further appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division ( Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak ) of the Council of State was rejected on 28 February 2014. The Division found that the appeal did not provide grounds for quashing the impugned ruling ( kan niet tot vernietiging van de aangevallen uitspraak leiden ). Having regard to section 91 \u00a7 2 of the Aliens Act 2000 ( Vreemdelingenwet 2000 ), no further reasoning was called for as the arguments submitted did not raise any questions requiring a determination in the interest of legal unity, legal development or legal protection in the general sense. No further appeal lay against this decision.","B. Events after the introduction of the application","7. The application was introduced to the Court on 17 March 2014 and, on the same day, the applicants requested the issue of an interim measure within the meaning of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.","8. On 2 April 2014, the President of the Section decided to adjourn the determination of the Rule 39 request pending the submission of factual information by the Government under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (a) of the Rules of Court concerning certain practical aspects of the applicants \u2019 transfer to Italy.","9. The Government submitted their answers on 15 April 2014. A copy was transmitted for information to the applicants.","10. On 16 April 2014, the applicants were notified by the Departure and Repatriation Service ( Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek ) of the Ministry of Security and Justice that their transfer to Italy had been scheduled for 22 April 2014.","11. On 17 April 2014, the President of the Section decided, under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court, to indicate to the Netherlands Government that it was desirable in the interest of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court not to remove the applicants to Italy until further notice. The President also decided under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (a) to put additional factual questions to the Government about practical aspects of the applicants \u2019 removal to Italy.","12. The Government submitted their answers on 9 May 2014 and the applicant \u2019 s written comments in reply were submitted on 10 June 2014.","13. On 3 December 2014, additional factual questions were put to the Government concerning the practical effects given to the Court \u2019 s judgment of 4 November 2014 in the case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).","14. In their reply of 7 January 2015, the Government indicated that, following the Tarakhel judgment and where a case concerned a transfer of a family with minor children to Italy, the Netherlands authorities would only transfer such a family after guarantees had been obtained from the Italian authorities that the family would remain together and that information was available about the specific facility where the family was to be accommodated, in order to guarantee that the conditions there were suited to the age of the children. For this reason, the actual transfer to Italy was announced ten to fifteen days beforehand in order to give the Italian authorities the opportunity to provide information on the specific facility where the family was to be accommodated, to guarantee that the conditions in this facility were suitable and to guarantee that the family would not be split up. If these guarantees were not received within the time- limit for transfers as laid down in the Dublin Regulation, the persons involved would be channelled into the Netherlands asylum procedure. However, as long as a Rule 39 indication was in place, the Government was not in a position to commence the preparations for the applicants \u2019 transfer to Italy.","15. The applicants \u2019 comments in reply were submitted on 3 February 2015. They stated that no such guarantees had been obtained yet in respect of their transfer to Italy but that, in their view, such guarantees should be obtained before taking the actual transfer decision and not shortly before a scheduled transfer date.","16. Having noted these submissions, the Chamber decided on 24 March 2015 to lift the Rule 39 indication.","17. By letter of 5 August 2015, the Government submitted a copy of a circular letter dated 8 June 2015 and sent by the Dublin Unit of the Italian Ministry of the Interior ( Ministero dell Interno ) to the Dublin Units of the other member States of the European Union, in which the Italian Dublin Unit set out the new policy of the Italian authorities on transfers to Italy of families with small children. In its relevant part, the Netherlands Government \u2019 s letter reads as follows:","\u201c A new policy was considered necessary in view of the fact that reception facilities, specifically reserved for such families, frequently remained unavailed of as a result of families having left for an unknown destination prior to transfer, or having obtained a court order barring their transfer. In order to safeguard appropriate facilities where families may stay together, the Italian authorities earmarked a total of 161 places, distributed over twenty-nine projects under the System for Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR). The authorities confirmed that this number will be extended should the need arise. As may be inferred from the letter of 8 June, this comprehensive guarantee is intended to avoid the need for guarantees in specific cases.","The Dutch Dublin-Unit will continue to inform its Italian counterpart at an early stage of an intended transfer of a family with minor children. On 13 July 2015, the Dutch, German and Swiss migration liaison officers to Italy issued a report on SPRAR in general, including on the requirements the accommodations must fulfil, and on two projects they had visited on the invitation of the Italian Government. It is understood that later this year also the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) will report on the matter.","The Government is of the opinion that the new Italian policy will adequately safeguard that families with minor children are kept together in accommodations appropriate to their needs. \u201d","18. On 21 August 2015, the applicants informed the Court that they had been notified on 11 August 2015 that they should report to the police for the purpose of their placement in aliens \u2019 detention ( vreemdelingenbewaring ) for the purpose of their transfer to Italy. They further requested the issue of an interim measure within the meaning of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.","19. On 25 August 2015, the President of the Section decided to adjourn the determination of the applicants \u2019 fresh Rule 39 request pending the submission of factual information by the Government under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (a) of the Rules of Court concerning certain practical aspects of the applicants \u2019 transfer to Italy.","20. The Government submitted their replies on 27 August 2015. They informed the Court that the applicants \u2019 removal had been scheduled for 9 September 2015, that the Italian authorities had been informed that the transfer concerned a single mother with one adult and one minor daughter. They further submitted a copy of the standard form \u2013 prescribed under Article 31 of Regulation (EU) no. 604\/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the member States by a third-country national or a stateless person \u2013 in which the Italian authorities had been notified on 4 August 2015 of the applicants \u2019 transfer to Italy. Under the heading \u201cState of health of the person(s) to be transferred\u201d the following is stated:","\u201cPlease note that this concerns a mother with two daughters, of which one is a minor ( Tarakhel ). The mother did not sign a declaration of consent to give you any information, however due to vital interest I would like to inform you that she has threatened with suicide concerning the transfer. She is not co-operative and will be escorted. She has explained that her daughters do not have any health issues.\u201d","21. The applicants \u2019 comments on the Government \u2019 s submissions of 5 and 27 August 2015 were submitted on 31 August 2015. They considered that the new policy set out in the circular letter sent by the Italian authorities on 5 June 2015 only contained guarantees of a general nature and that it was likely that the 161 places referred to in that letter would be far from enough. They submitted that no individual guarantees had been obtained and that it had not been guaranteed that the first applicant would be provided with adequate mental health care. They further informed the Court that the second and third applicants were attending school in the Netherlands and that, in their opinion, a transfer to Italy would not be in their interest.","22. Having noted the parties \u2019 submissions, the President of the Section decided on 31 August 2015 to reject the applicants \u2019 fresh Rule 39 request.","C. Relevant law and practice","23. The relevant European, Italian and Netherlands law, instruments, principles and practice in respect of asylum proceedings, reception of asylum - seekers and transfers of asylum - seekers under the Dublin Regulation have recently been summarised in Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 28-48 ); Hussein Diirshi v. the Netherlands and Italy and 3 other applications (( dec. ), nos. 2314\/10, 18324\/10, 47851\/10 & 51377\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 98-117, 10 September 2013); Halimi v. Austria and Italy (( dec. ), no. 53852\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 21-25 and \u00a7\u00a7 29-36, 18 June 2013); Abubeker v. Austria and Italy ( dec. ), no. 73874\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 31-34 and 37 \u2011 41, 18 June 2013); Daybetgova and Magomedova v. Austria (( dec. ), no. 6198\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 25 29 and \u00a7\u00a7 32-39, 4 June 2013); and Mohammed Hussein v. the Netherlands and Italy (( dec. ), no. 27725\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 25-28 and 33-50, 2 April 2013)."],"27667":["5.The applicant is a Russian national who was born in 1960 and lived before his arrest in Vatazhnoe, a village in the Astrakhan region.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","1.Covert operation","6.On or around 22 December 2003 the applicant sold drugs to B. and O.","7.On 1 March 2004 B. and O. sold a quantity of those drugs to Su., a police officer taking part in an undercover operation.","8.In March 2004 the Voronezh branch of the Federal Drug Control Service (\u201cFSKN\u201d) instituted criminal proceedings against B. and O. When questioned they submitted that they had purchased drugs from the applicant, who lived in Astrakhan.","9.On 20 May 2004 the FSKN instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and ordered a \u201ctest purchase\u201d from him, to be carried out with the help of B. and two undercover police officers, Sh. and P.","10.The covert operation took place between 3 and 5 June 2004 in a hotel in Astrakhan, where Sh. had booked a room. Audio recording devices were installed in the room and the hotel was placed under surveillance. The applicant alleged that during the operation the police had poisoned him with an unknown substance, which had resulted in him being admitted to a prison hospital.","2.The applicant\u2019s arrest, personal search and questioning as a suspect","11.According to the arrest record drafted at 3.30 p.m. on 5 June 2004, police arrested the applicant in the hallway of the eighth floor of the hotel on the grounds that \u201cwitnesses and eyewitnesses indicated that the applicant had committed a criminal offence\u201d. The record also indicated that immediately after his arrest the applicant had been apprised of his right to be assisted by counsel and that he had been searched. The search and its results were described as follows:","\u201c... Mr Chukayev was asked to hand over of his own free will any powerful narcotic substances ... he had been keeping on himself unlawfully, money acquired illegally... In reply to the investigator\u2019s request, Mr Chukayev explained that he had none of those things except money, which he had made illegally from selling a narcotic substance, heroin, in a quantity of approximately 38-50 grams. He also explained that the money he had made illegally was in his bag, and submitted that he wished to give it [to the investigator] of his own free will. As a result of the personal search, MrChukayev took the money out of his bag voluntarily ...\u201d","12.According to the applicant, investigator L. refused to provide him with a lawyer immediately after his arrest on the grounds that no investigating activities were being carried out in respect of him, therefore he did not need a lawyer. The applicant also stated that he had not been questioned on the day of his arrest.","13.According to the arrest record, which he had signed, the applicant had made no comments concerning its contents or any other matters, and his wife had been notified of his arrest over the telephone.","14.Following the personal search, the investigator seized other money found in his pockets along with his identity papers, mobile phone and some other items. The personal search was photographed.","15.On the same day the investigator ordered fingerprint and palm print chemical expert reports. The applicant\u2019s fingerprints and palm prints were taken. The applicant alleged that he had not been informed of the request for these reports or their results. He had only learnt of the expert analyses while reviewing the criminal case file in March 2005.","16.On 6 June 2004 the investigator started questioning the applicant as a suspect. According to the interrogation report, lawyer Or. was present during questioning. The applicant alleged that he had refused to give a statement for health reasons, whereas the interrogation report stated that he had invoked his right not to incriminate himself and refused to testify. According to the interrogation report, which he had signed, the applicant had no comments concerning its contents or any other matters.","3.The applicant\u2019s placement in detention and the charges against him","17.On 6 June 2004 the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) remanded the applicant in custody. He alleged that counsel Or. had not represented him properly at that hearing. His detention was extended on several subsequent occasions. He remained in detention until his conviction on 14 October 2005.","18.On 11 June 2004 the applicant was charged with drug offences and questioned in the presence of counsel I. It is apparent from the record of that interview duly signed by him that he had understood the charges against him and denied all of them. He refused to make a statement.","19.On 16 August 2004 new charges were brought against the applicant in the presence of his counsel. He was charged with two counts of drug trafficking, namely unlawfully acquiring, transporting and possessing drugs with intent to sell, and selling drugs to B. and O. in December 2003 and Sh. on 5 June 2004.","4.Return of the case to the prosecution","20.On 17 February 2005 the District Court returned the criminal case to the prosecutor because the applicant had not had sufficient time to review the criminal case file. In March 2005 he finished doing so.","5.The trial and the applicant\u2019s conviction for drug offences","21.The trial took place in the District Court between April and October2005. The applicant was represented by counsel M. and I. The court heard him and several witnesses, and examined the pre-trial statements of absent witnesses as well as physical evidence.","(a)The applicant\u2019s testimony","22.The applicant denied all the charges against him. He testified, in particular, that he had met B. in November 2003 and had helped him to buy fish wholesale. On 5 June 2004 they had met because B. had brought some money he had owed him and had wanted to arrange another purchase of fish from him with Sh.","(b)Witness statements in court as to the first set of charges","23.During the examination of the first set of charges against the applicant, namely unlawfully acquiring and possessing drugs and selling drugs to B. and O. in December 2003, the District Court heard, and the applicant questioned, O., Av., Le., Sv., Iv. and Yu. as witnesses.","(i)Statements by witness O.","24.Witness O. testified that in November 2003 he and B. had gone to Astrakhan from Voronezh and had bought fish from the applicant. Later, the applicant had contacted them and said that he could supply more fish. They had gone to Astrakhan again, where B. had bought drugs from someone. At the end of the investigation of the criminal case against him and B., the police had asked them, in exchange for a more lenient sentence, to go to Astrakhan again and incite the applicant to sell them drugs. He had refused, whereas B. had agreed.","25.O.\u2019s testimony in court contradicted his earlier statements made during the pre-trial investigation and the prosecutor asked to have his pre\u2011trial statement read out in court. The applicant did not object to this request and it was granted.","26.It was apparent from O.\u2019s pre-trial statement that he and his business partner B. had been buying fish in Astrakhan and selling it in Voronezh. In November 2003, during their stay in Astrakhan, B. had met the applicant, who had promised to help them purchase some fish. In December 2003 they had again been in Astrakhan, where they had bought heroin from the applicant and transported it to Voronezh.","(ii)Statements by police officers Av., Le., Sv. and attesting witnesses Iv. and Yu.","27.Witness Av., a police officer, testified that he had taken part in the planning of the covert operation in June 2004 and had been present at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest and personal search. He had heard the applicant say at the time of his arrest that he had made money from selling drugs.","28.Witnesses Le. and Sv., police officers from the Voronezh police department, submitted that they had taken part in B. and O.\u2019s arrest in March 2004 after they had tried to sell drugs to an undercover police officer.","29.Witness Iv. submitted that in March 2004 police had asked him to be an attesting witness during a search of B.\u2019s apartment in Voronezh.","30.Witness Yu. submitted that in March 2004 police had asked him to be an attesting witness in the covert operation.","(c)Pre-trial witness statements as to the first set of charges","31.The prosecutor submitted two requests to have B. summoned as a witness; however, according to medical documents submitted to the District Court, B. could not attend the hearing because he had a serious oncological condition (cancer) and accompanying speech problems. The District Court then granted the prosecutor\u2019s request, despite the applicant\u2019s objections, to have B.\u2019s pre-trial statement read out and admitted as evidence.","32. Witness B. testified in his pre-trial statement that his business partner O. had introduced him to the applicant in November 2003. The applicant had agreed to be an intermediary in his business, which involved supplying fish in Voronezh. On or around 15 December 2003 B. and O. had come to Astrakhan to buy fish. The applicant, however, had not had enough fish for them. B. had serious financial difficulties so O. had suggested buying drugs from the applicant. O. had assured B. that he had an established drug distribution network in Voronezh and that he would help B. to sell drugs within three days to resolve his financial troubles. That had been the first time B. had learnt that the applicant sold drugs. On or around 18 December 2003 the applicant had sold 1.5 kilograms of heroin to B. and O. They had then transported it to Voronezh. The police had arrested them there when they had been trying to sell heroin.","33.The District Court also read out and admitted pre-trial statements of five prosecution witnesses as evidence.","34.Witness R. testified in his statement that in March 2004 he had organised and supervised the covert operation during which B. and O. had sold drugs to undercover officer Su.","35.Witness Su. testified that he had gone undercover to buy drugs from B. and O. during the covert operation in March 2004. He described the manner in which it had been carried out.","36. Attesting witnesses M., D. and Z. testified in their statements that in March 2004 the police had asked them to serve as attesting witnesses in the undercover operation, during which they had observed the manner in which the test purchase had been carried out in respect of B. and O.","(d)Witness statements in court as to the second set of charges","37.During the examination of the second set of charges against the applicant the District Court questioned three police officers (Sh., K. and Sha.) and two attesting witnesses.","38.Witness Sh. submitted that in June 2005 he had taken part in the test purchase from the applicant. B. had identified the applicant as the dealer. During the covert operation he and B. had met the applicant several times in the hotel room. At their last meeting the applicant had sold Sh. about 50grams of heroin.","39.Witness K. testified that he had been responsible for monitoring the undercover operation in respect of the applicant in the summer of 2004.","40.Witness Sha. testified that he had arrested the applicant immediately after the test purchase, and that he had said at the time of his arrest that he had made money from selling drugs.","41.Witnesses Shi. and Ba. testified that the police had asked them to serve as attesting witnesses in the undercover operation, during which they had observed the manner in which the test purchase had been carried out in respect of the applicant.","(e)Witness pre-trial statements as to the second set of charges","42.The District Court also read out a pre-trial statement of absent witness B.","43.B. testified that he had agreed to take part in the test purchase from the applicant. A police officer, Sh., had been designated as the buyer. In late May B. had called the applicant to inform him that he had already sold the drugs to a certain person, someone who was interested in buying more drugs from him, but as wished to do so in person he would come to Astrakhan. The applicant had agreed and said that he would arrange the deal.","44.B. then described in detail how the covert operation had been carried out between 2 and 5 June 2004. In particular, he had called the applicant several times over those days to arrange a meeting with him. On 3June2004 the applicant had come to their hotel and B. had introduced him to Sh., who had asked the applicant to supply him with 2 kilograms of heroin and discussed other terms of the deal. The applicant had said that he could only get 1.2 kilograms of heroin and they had agreed to meet the following day. On 4 June 2004 the applicant had come to their hotel and said that he had contacted the dealers and that they would call him back. They had all stayed in the hotel room until the applicant had received a telephone call. The applicant told them that he would bring the heroin the next day. On 5 June2004 the applicant had come to their hotel with about 38grams of heroin. When Sh. had asked him about the remaining amount, the applicant had explained that he could bring more in two days. However, he had 9 grams on him for personal use so Sh. had agreed to buy that too. Sh. had handed money over to the applicant, who had said that he would go downstairs to get change. When he had left the room he had been arrested by the police.","(f)The applicant\u2019s conviction","45.On 14 October 2005 the District Court sentenced the applicant to nine years\u2019 imprisonment, after finding him guilty of drug offences, in particular the sale of drugs to B. and O. in December 2003 and Sh. on 5June 2004. The court admitted the following material as evidence:","(i)the statements made during trial by O., Av., Le., Sv., Iv. and Yu. and the pre-trial statements of B., R., Su., M., D. and Z;","(ii)the statements made during trial by Sh., K., Sha., Shi. and Ba. and the pre-trial statement of B.","(iii)a record of the examination of the banknotes used to buy drugs from the applicant;","(iv)the test purchase record;","(v)the arrest record of 5 June 2004;","(vi)a transcript of the audio recording made in the course of the test purchase;","(vii)forensic chemical examination reports of substances seized at the crime scene;","(viii)a forensic examination report of the applicant\u2019s palm prints.","46.The court did not examine the forensic report of the applicant\u2019s fingerprints or admit it as evidence.","47.The forensic examination report of the applicant\u2019s palm prints showed that the applicant had had no drug residue on his palms.","48.The District Court did not use the applicant\u2019s interrogation report of 6 June 2004 as evidence.","49.In his appeal against the conviction the applicant complained, among other things, that the trial court had not ensured the presence of a key prosecution witness, B.","50.On 2 March 2006 the Astrakhan Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. It held that according to medical certificates, B. was suffering from cancer and could not speak. The trial court had therefore lawfully decided that his situation could be considered to be \u201cother exceptional circumstances\u201d which had prevented him from appearing at the hearing, and that his testimony could be read out in accordance with Article 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 77 below).","6.Supervisory review proceedings","(a)First set of supervisory review proceedings","51.On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant applied to the Presidium of the Regional Court for a supervisory review of his conviction.","52.On 29 August 2006 it examined the applicant\u2019s case by way of supervisory review. Neither the applicant nor his counsel were present at that hearing. The Presidium amended the judgment of 14 October 2005 as upheld on 2 March 2006 in so far as the applicant\u2019s actions on 5 June 2004 had been classed as a drug offence, and held that his actions should have been classed as an attempt to commit a drug offence. It upheld the remainder of the judgment of 14October 2005.","(b)Second set of supervisory review proceedings","53.On 6 March 2009 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (\u201cthe Supreme Court\u201d) referred the case to the Presidium of the Supreme Court for examination on the merits, at the request of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.","54.On 2 April 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 29August 2006 by way of supervisory review, on the grounds that the applicant had not been duly informed of the date of the hearing, and had therefore been unable to attend. It remitted the case to the Presidium of the Regional Court for fresh examination.","(c)Third set of supervisory review proceedings","55.On 19 May 2009 the applicant requested the Presidium of the Regional Court (\u201cthe Presidium\u201d) to provide him with legal aid counsel for the hearing before it. He claimed that he had insufficient means to pay for a lawyer.","56.On 2 June 2009 the Presidium examined the criminal case against the applicant by way of supervisory review. He was present at the hearing and was assisted by legal aid counselK.","57.The applicant objected to the panel of the Presidium on the grounds that it had already examined his case by way of supervisory review on 29August 2006. The Presidium dismissed this objection, finding that the decision of 29 August 2006 had been quashed on procedural grounds. There was therefore no reason to exclude these judges from the new examination of the case.","58.The applicant submitted on the merits of the case that at the time of his arrest he had not been informed of his rights or provided with a lawyer and that the record of his arrest had been forged. He also had not received a copy of the arrest record or been able to question key prosecution witness B. at the trial.","59.Having examined the case file, the Presidium found that the applicant\u2019s grounds of appeal were unsubstantiated. In particular, it held that the arrest record of 5 June 2004 had been duly authenticated and signed by the applicant, who had been informed of his rights, including the right to be represented by counsel. He did not however request that counsel be instructed or make any comments in the record. The Presidium also noted that statements by prosecution witnesses had been read out at trial in accordance with the law.","60.The Presidium amended the judgment of 14October 2005 as upheld on 2 March 2006, held that the applicant\u2019s actions on 5 June 2004 should have been classed as an attempt to commit a drug offence, and upheld the remainder of the judgment of 14 October 2005.","61.By a decision issued on the same day the Presidium ordered the recovery of counsel\u2019s fees in the amount of 1,485.85 Russian roubles (RUB) (about 30euros (EUR)) from the applicant for the representation in the supervisory review proceedings.","B.Conditions of detention","62.In the course of the criminal proceedings the applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-30\/1 in Astrakhan during the following periods:","(a)between 6 and 9 June 2004;","(b)between 9 July and 16 December 2004;","(c)between 28 December 2004 and 11 April 2006; and","(d)between 27 February and 26 March 2008.","63.During the first three periods the applicant was detained in different cells. All of them were overcrowded and infested with insects. They measured about 25 square metres each and contained six bunk beds. He did not have an individual sleeping place and inmates had to take turns to sleep. Some cells were not equipped with ventilation system, while in others it was not working. The electric lighting was always on. The toilet was not separated from the rest of the cells.","64.During his last period of detention the applicant was detained in cell5 located in the basement. He was not provided with any bedding or cooking utensils. Remand prison officers told him that he should have brought his own bedding. The cell was very cold and damp. Since he did not have any bedding he was obliged to sleep in his clothes. The windows were closed all the time and let in no daylight. The cell was never ventilated. The toilet was in the corner of the cell and offered no privacy. The dining table was very close to the toilet. The cell was infested with insects. Detainees could take a fifteen-minute shower once a week.","C.The applicant\u2019s correspondence with the Court","65.On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred to correctional colony IK-2 in the Astrakhan region to serve his sentence. It appears that in 2010 he was transferred to correctional colony IK-6, also in the Astrakhan region.","66.The applicant submitted that the authorities of IK-2 and IK-6 had opened and read a number of the Court\u2019s letters to him, in particular one dated 13 September 2006 acknowledging receipt of his application and giving him further information on the conduct of the proceedings before the Court, and others dated 21 November 2006, 15 January, 20 February, 22and 29 May 2007, and 26 February 2008. The applicant provided the Court with copies of these letters. All of them had been stamped by the colony authorities.","67.The applicant also submitted that the colony authorities had delayed in sending the Court\u2019s letters to him.","68.The Government claimed that during his detention in IK-2 and IK-6 the applicant had sent one letter to the Court and had received 11 letters from the Court. The receipt and dispatch of letters had been properly recorded in the prison log book. Some letters addressed to the applicant had been opened for registration purposes only. They had not been censored and had been handed over to the applicant in their entirety. One letter had been forwarded to the applicant after a four-day delay due to an omission by one of the prison employees who had been duly reprimanded in the intervening period."],"27693":["1. The applicant, Ms A.T.H., was born in 1979 in Ethiopia and is currently living in the Netherlands. She was represented before the Court by Ms S. den Boer, a lawyer practising in Eindhoven.","2. The Netherlands Government were represented by their Agent, Mr R.A.A. B\u00f6cker, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Italian Government, who had been invited to intervene under Rule 44 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court, were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Spatafora, and their co-Agent, Ms P. Accardo.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The following summary of the facts of the case is based on the submissions of the applicant and on the replies received from the Governments of the Netherlands and Italy to factual questions put to them under Rule 49 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Rules of Court.","4. The applicant claims to be a national of Eritrea because both her parents were nationals of that country. She had lived in Ethiopia all her life when she left that country in 1999, out of fear of deportation to Eritrea, where she would have to undertake military service. Subsequently, having stayed for some time in Sudan and Libya, the applicant arrived in Italy on 2 October 2007, where she applied for asylum under another identity. She was granted a residence permit in Italy which was valid for one year until 26 November 2008 and was later extended for another three years until 7 April 2012. However, she left Italy for the Netherlands in 2009 because, having been granted a residence permit, she purportedly received no other support. She was not provided with (money for) food or medical assistance, and was forced to live on the street. Allegedly, she applied to State authorities and human rights organisations for help on a number of occasions, but without success.","5. At the time of her entry to the Netherlands in 2009, the applicant was pregnant. She was subsequently diagnosed as being HIV-positive.","6. The applicant applied for asylum in the Netherlands on 2 October 2009.","7. On 11 February 2010 the applicant gave birth to a daughter in the Netherlands.","8. On 14 April 2010 the Minister of Justice ( Minister van Justitie ) rejected the applicant \u2019 s request, finding Italy responsible for the determination of her asylum application, pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) no. 343\/2003 of 18 February 2003 (\u201cthe Dublin Regulation\u201d). The Minister dismissed the applicant \u2019 s claim that, given her appalling living conditions in Italy between 2007 and 2009, she would risk treatment contrary to Article 3 if returned to Italy, considering that that claim remained wholly unsubstantiated. The general reports relied on by the applicant, which contained negative accounts of the situation of asylum-seekers in Italy, were not considered specific facts and circumstances relating to her individual case such as to form a basis for assuming that Italy would not comply with its obligations flowing from the Convention. Lastly, the applicant \u2019 s contention that her medical situation did not allow her transfer to Italy was rejected by the Minister, who considered that the applicant was not receiving any specialist medical treatment in the Netherlands and that, moreover, it had not been alleged or demonstrated that adequate medical treatment would not be made available to her in Italy.","9. An appeal by the applicant against the Minister \u2019 s decision was rejected by the Regional Court ( rechtbank ) of The Hague sitting in Maastricht on 7 July 2010. It upheld the Minister \u2019 s decision and reasoning.","10. A further appeal, together with a request for a provisional measure ( voorlopige voorziening ) staying her removal, was lodged by the applicant with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division ( Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak ) of the Council of State. On 23 September 2010 the President of the Division granted the request for a provisional measure, deferring the applicant \u2019 s transfer to Italy pending the outcome of the further appeal proceedings.","11. On 14 July 2011 the Division allowed the further appeal. It quashed the judgment of 7 July 2010, as well as the Minister \u2019 s decision, as it found that he had failed to have due regard to the general reports submitted by the applicant concerning the situation of asylum-seekers in Italy, which might be relevant to the applicant \u2019 s individual case. As to the merits of the case, the Division found that the reports submitted by the applicant were insufficient to assume that her transfer to Italy would result in a violation of Article 3 due to the general living conditions of asylum-seekers in that country. Furthermore, as the applicant had been granted a residence permit in Italy earlier, she was not at risk of expulsion to her country of origin. The Division ordered that the legal consequences of the refusal of the applicant \u2019 s asylum request should be maintained.","12. No further appeal lay against that decision. On an unspecified date the applicant was informed that she and her child would be placed in an aliens \u2019 detention centre ( vreemdelingenbewaring ) for removal purposes.","B. Events after the lodging of the application","13. The application was lodged with the Court on 26 August 2011, and on the same day the applicant asked the Court to issue an interim measure within the meaning of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.","14. On 31 August 2011, in reply to questions put to them under Rule 49 \u00a7 3 (a), the Netherlands Government informed the Court of practical aspects of the applicant \u2019 s scheduled transfer to Italy. A copy of that reply was sent to the applicant for information.","15. On 31 August 2011 the President of the Section decided, under Rule 39, to indicate to the Netherlands Government that it was desirable, in the interests of the parties and of the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, not to expel the applicant to Italy for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.","16. On 18 January 2012 the President of the Section decided that the Government of Italy should be invited, under Rule 44 \u00a7 3, to answer factual questions about the applicant \u2019 s situation in Italy when she had lived there previously and about the general accommodation, subsistence and medical care offered to asylum-seekers in Italy.","17. The Government of Italy submitted their answers on 12 March 2012. The applicant \u2019 s comments in reply were received on 25 April 2012. Additional information was received from the Government of Italy on 15 October 2013. A copy was sent to the Netherlands Government and the applicant for information.","18. On 3 December 2014 additional factual questions were put to the Netherlands Government about the practical effects given to the Court \u2019 s judgment of 4 November 2014 in the case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).","19. In their reply of 7 January 2015, the Netherlands Government indicated that \u2013 following the Tarakhel judgment and where a case concerned the transfer of a family with minor children to Italy \u2013 the Netherlands authorities would only transfer such a family after guarantees had been obtained from the Italian authorities that the family would remain together, and where information was available about the specific facility where the family was to be accommodated, in order to guarantee that the conditions there were age-appropriate in respect of the children. For this reason, the actual transfer to Italy would be announced ten to fifteen days beforehand, in order to give the Italian authorities the opportunity to provide information on the specific facility where the family was to be accommodated, to guarantee that the conditions in this facility were suitable, and to guarantee that the family would not be split up. If these guarantees were not received within the time-limit for transfers, as laid down in the Dublin Regulation, the persons involved would be channelled into the Netherlands asylum procedure. However, as long as a Rule 39 indication was in place, the Government were not in a position to commence the preparations for the applicant \u2019 s transfer to Italy.","20. The applicant \u2019 s comments in reply were submitted on 27 February 2015. Having noted those submissions, the Chamber decided to lift the Rule 39 indication on 24 March 2015.","21. By letter of 5 August 2015 the Netherlands Government submitted a copy of a circular letter dated 8 June 2015 and sent by the Dublin Unit of the Italian Ministry of the Interior ( Ministero dell Interno ) to the Dublin Units of the other member States of the European Union, in which the Italian Dublin Unit set out the new policy of the Italian authorities on transfers to Italy of families with small children. The relevant part of the Netherlands Government \u2019 s letter reads:","\u201cA new policy was considered necessary in view of the fact that reception facilities, specifically reserved for such families, frequently remained unavailed of as a result of families having left for an unknown destination prior to transfer, or having obtained a court order barring their transfer. In order to safeguard appropriate facilities where families may stay together, the Italian authorities earmarked a total of 161 places, distributed over twenty-nine projects under the System for Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR). The authorities confirmed that this number will be extended should the need arise. As may be inferred from the letter of 8 June, this comprehensive guarantee is intended to avoid the need for guarantees in specific cases.","The Dutch Dublin-Unit will continue to inform its Italian counterpart at an early stage of an intended transfer of a family with minor children. On 13 July 2015, the Dutch, German and Swiss migration liaison officers to Italy issued a report on SPRAR in general, including on the requirements the accommodations must fulfil, and on two projects they had visited on the invitation of the Italian Government. It is understood that later this year also the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) will report on the matter.","The Government is of the opinion that the new Italian policy will adequately safeguard that families with minor children are kept together in accommodations appropriate to their needs.\u201d","22. On 31 August 2015 the Netherlands Government informed the Court that the applicant \u2019 s transfer to Italy under the Dublin Regulation had been scheduled for 7 September 2015, that the Italian authorities had been informed that the transfer concerned a single mother with a minor child, and that, with the applicant \u2019 s permission, due reference had been made to her medical condition and the treatment required. They also submitted a copy of a letter of 4 May 2015 from the Head of Office of the Italian Ministry of the Interior, Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration, received by the Dublin Unit of the Netherlands Immigration and Naturalisation Service ( Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst ) via e-mail as a document titled \u201c Tarakhel Garanzie \u2013 [the applicant \u2019 s name]\u201d. The letter stated, inter alia, \u201cWe assure you that, after the transfer to Italy, this family group will be accommodated in a manner adapted to the age of the children and the family members will be kept together\u201d. The letter enclosed a note from the Ministry of the Interior, detailing a reception project regarding the transfer of the applicant and her child.","23. The Netherlands Government further submitted a copy of the standard form \u2013 prescribed under Article 31 of Regulation (EU) no. 604\/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 \u2013 by which the Italian authorities had been notified on 19 August 2015 of the applicant \u2019 s transfer to Italy, scheduled for 7 September 2015. It was indicated in that form that the applicant had health problems and that a medical report was attached to the form. The Netherlands official completing the form also noted:","\u201c Since this transfer concerns a mother with a minor child, I assume this family will be accommodated in one of the centres included in the list of SPRAR-projects as mentioned in the annex to your letter dated 8 June 2015.\u201d","24. The applicant \u2019 s comments on the Government \u2019 s submissions of 5 and 31 August 2015 were submitted on 2 September 2015. On the same day she asked the Court to issue a fresh indication under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, submitting that the information provided by the Netherlands Government contained only general guarantees, which were insufficient to ensure that she and her child would be provided with suitable accommodation and adequate medical care in Italy, emphasising her special needs as a HIV-positive person. The applicant further contended that the 161 places in SPRAR projects which were earmarked for families with minor children were far from sufficient, taking into account the high number of migrants having arrived in Italy in 2015. The applicant argued that, without individual and specific guarantees, she ran a considerable risk of ending up living on the streets, without the special care she and her child needed.","25. Having noted the parties \u2019 submissions, on 3 September 2015 the President of the Section decided to reject the applicant \u2019 s fresh Rule 39 request.","26. No further information about the current whereabouts of the applicant and her child has been submitted.","C. Relevant law and practice","27. The relevant European, Italian and Netherlands law, instruments, principles and practice in respect of asylum proceedings, reception of asylum-seekers and transfers of asylum-seekers under the Dublin Regulation have recently been summarised in Tarakhel v. Switzerland (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 28-48); Hussein Diirshi v. the Netherlands and Italy and 3 other applications ((dec.), nos. 2314\/10, 18324\/10, 47851\/10 & 51377\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 98 \u2011 117, 10 September 2013); Halimi v. Austria and Italy ((dec.), no. 53852\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 21-25 and \u00a7\u00a7 29-36, 18 June 2013); Abubeker v. Austria and Italy (dec.), no. 73874\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 31-34 and \u00a7\u00a7 37-41, 18 June 2013); Daybetgova and Magomedova v. Austria ((dec.), no. 6198\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 25-29 and 32-39, 4 June 2013); and Mohammed Hussein v. the Netherlands and Italy ((dec.), no. 27725\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 25-28 and 33-50, 2 April 2013).","28. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) estimated that in 2013 a total of 120,000 (between 110,000 and 140,000) persons aged 15 or more with HIV or AIDS were living in Italy, of whom 13,000 (between 11,000 and 15,000) were women. According to a comparative study carried out by the HUMA Network (Health for Undocumented Migrants and Asylum Seekers) \u2013 covering 16 European Union member States and published in November 2010 \u2013 on the question of whether undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers are entitled to access health care in the European Union, asylum-seekers in Italy are entitled to access health care on equal grounds as Italian nationals with regard to coverage and conditions. The same applies for unaccompanied children.","29. An information brochure on access to the Italian National Health Service by non-EU nationals, published (in English, among other languages) by the National Institute for Health, Migration and Poverty ( Istituto Nazionale Salute, Migrazione e Povert\u00e0 ) of the Italian Ministry of Health, and provided to asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants, states that asylum-seekers have a statutory right to registration in the National Health Service (SSN) system and to be provided with an SSN health insurance card. It further reads:","\u201cAsylum or international protection seekers are exempted from the co-pay fee following the statement of indigence. This principle is valid up to six months following the submittal of the asylum application. As of the seventh month, asylum seekers are entitled to work. In order to notify their status of unemployment, they need to register with the Employment Office and obtain the exemption card for low-income reasons.\u201d"],"27728":["5.The applicant was (to her knowledge) born in 1996 and at the time of the introduction of the application was detained in Lyster Barracks, \u0126al Far.","A.Background to the case","6.The applicant entered Malta in an irregular manner by boat on 27May 2012. Upon arrival, she was registered by the immigration police, given an identification number (12H-006), and presented with two documents in English, one containing a Return Decision and the other a Removal Order.","7.The Return Decision stated that she was a prohibited immigrant by virtue of Article5 of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) because she was in Malta \u201cwithout means of subsistence and liable to become a charge on public funds\u201d. The Return Decision also informed the applicant that her stay was being terminated and that she had the possibility to apply for a period of voluntary departure. The Removal Order was based on the consideration that the applicant\u2019s request for a period of voluntary departure had been rejected. It informed the applicant that she would remain in custody until removal was effected, and that an entry ban would be issued against her. The two documents further informed the applicant of her right to appeal against the Decision and Order before the Immigration Appeals Board (\u201cthe IAB\u201d) within three working days.","8.According to the applicant, the contents of the decision in English were not explained to her, although she could not understand the language. According to the Government, in practice the immigration police inform the migrants verbally in English about their right to appeal, and the migrants translate for each other.","9.The applicant was further provided with an information leaflet entitled \u201cYour entitlements, responsibilities and obligations while in detention\u201d in Arabic, a language she did not understand. According to the Government the applicant did not request a booklet in another language.","10.In accordance with Article 14(2) of the Immigration Act (see Relevant domestic law), the applicant was detained in Lyster Barracks.","B.Initial proceedings","11.During the registration process upon her arrival, in the absence of an interpreter, the applicant\u2019s age was recorded as twenty-six (born 1986). She claims to have told the authorities that she was sixteen years old. According to the Government, it emerged from the authorities\u2019 records (not submitted to the Court) that the applicant declared that she was born in 1986.","12.On 30 May 2012 the applicant appealed against the Removal Order and Return Decision. By the date of the introduction of the application (4February 2013), no date had been set for her appeal hearing by the IAB.","C.Asylum proceedings","13.A few days following her arrival the applicant was called for an information session provided by the staff of the Office of the Refugee Commissioner. She was assisted in submitting the Preliminary Questionnaire (PQ), thereby registering her wish to apply for asylum under Article 8 of the Refugees Act, Chapter 420 of the Laws of Malta(see Relevant domestic law below). She stated on the form that she was sixteen years old.","D.The AWAS Age-Assessment Procedure","14.On an unspecified date some two months after her arrival in Malta, the applicant was called for an interview with a member of Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (AWAS) staff, who informed her that as she had claimed to be sixteen years old she would be interviewed by three members of AWAS staff with a view to assessing the veracity of her claim that she was a minor.","15.About a week later, three people from AWAS interviewed her. During the interview a male detainee provided interpretation services. After the interview they informed her that as they could not confirm her minor age through the interview they would send her for a further age verification (FAV) test - an X-ray of the bones of the wrist. The applicant was taken for the FAV test about two months after her interview, on 5 October 2012.","16.At the beginning of November, as the applicant had not received any decision from the AAT, she asked a woman from AWAS (who was visiting the detention centre to conduct interviews with other detainees who had health problems) whether she knew anything about her case. The woman told her that her X-ray was being assessed and if she was found to be a minor she would be released soon. Some three weeks later, on 22November 2012, some other people from AWAS went to the centre and told her that according to the test she was not a minor but an adult. During the latter meeting a fellow (female) detainee provided translation.","17.By the date of the lodging of the application the applicant had not received a written decision informing her of the outcome of the age assessment procedure. According to the Government a decision on the applicant\u2019s age was taken on 14 January 2013; no date was submitted regarding notification. The Government submitted that since no care order was issued the applicant was obviously not a minor.","E.Conditions of detention","18.The applicant was detained in Hermes Block in Lyster Barracks (see paragraph10 above), in conditions which she considered prison-like and basic. The Government contested this allegation.","19.She explained that the Block is divided into five self-contained zones (one on the ground floor, two on the first floor and two on the second floor) and four of the zones (B,C,D,E) were virtually identical. For the first few days of her detention she had been held in Zone E which at the time accommodated families (i.e. couples with or without children), and then she was moved to Zones C and D with other single women.","20.These zones contained a number of dormitories (containing bunk beds but no lockers or cupboards for personal belongings), ten showers and toilets, a small kitchen with one or two hot plates and a fridge (no further storage for food, which was stored in open boxes accessible to insects, was available), and a common room with six basic metal tables and benches screwed to the ground, together with a television. Blankets hanging from bunk beds were the only means of privacy.","21.Access to the zones was through metal gates which were kept locked all day, and detainees could leave the zone for one and a half hours per day, which they could spend in a small dusty yard. Windows were barred and most of them glazed with opaque Perspex (which was removed in the summer months for air, though they then let air through in the cold winter months). On the one hand, in summer the facility was often crowded and the heat would become oppressive despite the presence of ceiling fans. On the other hand, in winter it was unbearably cold as the facility was not heated and, moreover, was exposed to the elements as there were no adjoining buildings.","22.The applicant considered that the facility was shared by too many people \u2013 in summer the applicant\u2019s dormitory (one out of three in the zone) was shared by twenty women \u2013 and agreement amongst so many different persons having cultural and linguistic differences was difficult. However, at the time of the introduction of the application, the applicant was in less crowded conditions, sharing an entire zone with only twenty-five other women, most of whom were Eritrean and Somali.","23.The applicant noted that since her arrival she had only been provided with two bed sheets, a small towel, a blanket, a T-shirt, one pillow and a pillow case, a few items of underwear and a pair of flip-flops, as well as a plastic plate, cup, and set of cutlery. Other items of clothing were distributed sporadically. She stated that she was never provided with a quilt, a bra or running shoes. While toilet paper was distributed on a monthly basis, certain basic items such as sanitary pads were missing. In winter detainees were not systematically provided with warm clothes and closed shoes, which were distributed according to what was received by way of donation and which was not sufficient to supply the needs of all detainees. Although blankets were distributed to everyone, the building was not heated and winter months were unbearably cold.","24.Detainees had little to do all day, and only limited access to open air. In particular, the applicant noted that she was let out into the small dirty yard for the first time only after a few months of detention. While in the yard, other male detainees called out names and picked on the women from the windows of their rooms overlooking the yard. The applicant referred to the report \u201cNot here to stay: Report of the International Commission of Jurists on its visit to Malta on 26 \u2013 30 September 2011\u201d, May 2012 (see paragraph 45 below).","25.She also noted that although telephone cards were distributed (each of 5 Euro (EUR)), the credit they contained was often insufficient to make long distance calls and no cheaper ways of keeping contact with the family or outside world were available as they had no internet access. By the time she lodged her application she had received EUR 25 in credit. The applicant also considered inappropriate that detainees were given the same soap to use for their bodies, hair, clothes and floor. The applicant further made reference to an incident with a detention officer who had pushed her down the stairs and tried to forcefully resuscitate her by slapping her and grabbing different parts of her face leaving her in pain \u2013 she, however, admitted that she could not recognise the officer in question and that she had feared reprisal had she reported the matter.","26.Furthermore, as could be seen from the results of the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Europe study on detention of vulnerable asylum seekers, the physical conditions of detention and their impact on the physical and mental well-being of detainees were exacerbated by other factors[1]. These factors included: length of detention, lack of constructive activities to occupy detainees, overcrowding, limited access to open air, difficulties in communication with staff and with other detainees, and lack of information about one\u2019s situation. Moreover, there was a lack of any real possibility of obtaining effective redress and inmates knew that detention was not serving any useful purpose and was in no way proportionate to the aim to be achieved.","27.The applicant submitted that all of those objective factors had had a particular impact on her because of her personal circumstances, particularly her young age, her inability to communicate in anything but Somali and the fact that as a young woman she was detained in a facility administered almost exclusively by men.","F.Latest developments","28.On 24 January 2013 the applicant was called for an interview with the Refugee Commissioner. By means of a decision of the Refugee Commissioner of 2 February 2013, the applicant was granted subsidiary protection in Malta. She was notified of this decision and released on 7February 2013.","40.The Report to the Maltese Government on the visit to Malta carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 26 to 30 September 2011, published on 4 July 2013, in so far as relevant in connection with Lyster Barracks, reads as follows:","\u201c44. At the time of the visit, Lyster Detention Centre was accommodating 248foreign nationals (including 89 women), in five different detention units.","In keeping with the Government\u2019s Detention Policy, no unaccompanied minors were held in either of the two detention centres visited. Upon issuance of a care order by the Minister of Social Policy, unaccompanied minors were always transferred to a juvenile institution. Single women were always accommodated separately from male detainees.","47. More generally, the CPT has serious misgivings about the fact that female detainees at Lyster Detention Centre were frequently supervised exclusively by male detention officers, since only one female officer was employed by the Detention Service at the time of the visit.","The CPT recommends that the Maltese authorities take steps as a matter of priority to ensure the presence of at least one female officer around the clock at Lyster Detention Centre.","48. As was the case in 2008, a number of detainees complained about disrespectful behaviour and racist remarks by detention officers (in particular in the Warehouses at Safi Detention Centre). The CPT reiterates its recommendation that the Maltese authorities remind all members of staff working in detention centres for foreigners that such behaviour is not acceptable and will be punished accordingly.","55. At both Lyster [and Safi Detention Centres], material conditions have improved since the 2008 visit. In particular, at Lyster Barracks, these improvements are significant: the Hermes Block, which had been in a very poor state of repair at the time of the 2008 visit, had been completely refurbished and the Tent Compound, which had also been criticised by the Committee in the report on the 2008 visit, had been dismantled. At Safi Barracks, additional renovation work had been carried out in Block B. It is noteworthy that all foreign nationals received personal hygiene products on a regular basis and were also supplied with clothes and footwear.","...","56. At Lyster Detention Centre, the situation had clearly improved as regards activities. Each zone comprised a communal room, and groups of detainees could attend English-language courses which were organised by an NGO (usually, three times a week for two hours per group). Further, single women and couples were provided with food so that they could prepare meals themselves in a kitchenette. Every day, detainees could go outside and play football or volleyball in a rather small yard for a total of two hours.","...","60. As regards contact with the outside world, the CPT welcomes the fact that, in both detention centres visited, foreign nationals could receive telephone calls from the outside. They were also were provided with telephone cards free of charge on a regular basis, although these were limited to a total of 5\u20ac every two months.\u201d","41.In so far as relevant, extracts from a report by Human Rights Watch in 2012 called \u201cBoat-ride to Detention\u201d, reads as follows:","\u201cChildren lack adequate information about the age determination process (including whether documents are accepted and whether there is an appeal). Some migrants who request an age determination procedure are seemingly ignored: interviewees reported telling authorities they were minors but never receiving age determination. Other children never request an age determination because they lack information on the procedure.\u201d","\u201cThe government should do more to provide children with reliable information about the age determination procedure. Children receive no guidance on the content of the procedure, whether documents will be useful, or whether they can appeal. Malta has taken considerable steps in providing information to migrants about the process for asylum, including by conducting information sessions to every incoming migrant. It could easily do the same for the age determination process.\u201d","42.A 2014 report issued by Aditus, a local NGO entitled \u201cUnaccompanied Minor Asylum-Seekers in Malta: a technical Report on Ages Assessment and Guardianship Procedures, reads as follows:","\u201cThe procedural information provided to persons undergoing age assessment is extremely limited which further excludes the applicant from active participation in the process.\u201d","\u201cUnder the old procedure [2012] persons were not adequately informed of the possibility of appeal... persons were also typically not informed of the reasons for a negative decision.\u201d","\u201cMost experts agree that age assessment is not a determination of chronological age but rather an educated guess. There are risks that due to the inaccuracy of age assessment techniques, persons claiming to be minors may have their age mis\u2011assessed.\u201d","43.The 9th General report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the \u201cCPT\u201d) on the CPT\u2019s activities covering the period 1January to 31 December 1998, at point 26, reads as follows:","\u201cMixed gender staffing is another safeguard against ill-treatment in places of detention, in particular where juveniles are concerned. The presence of both male and female staff can have a beneficial effect in terms of both the custodial ethos and in fostering a degree of normality in a place of detention.","Mixed gender staffing also allows for appropriate staff deployment when carrying out gender sensitive tasks, such as searches. In this respect, the CPT wishes to stress that, regardless of their age, persons deprived of their liberty should only be searched by staff of the same gender and that any search which requires an inmate to undress should be conducted out of the sight of custodial staff of the opposite gender; these principles apply a fortiori in respect of juveniles.\u201d","44.Rule 53 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, reads as follows:","\u201c(1) In an institution for both men and women, the part of the institution set aside for women shall be under the authority of a responsible woman officer who shall have the custody of the keys of all that part of the institution.","(2) No male member of the staff shall enter the part of the institution set aside for women unless accompanied by a woman officer.","(3) Women prisoners shall be attended and supervised only by women officers. This does not, however, preclude male members of the staff, particularly doctors and teachers, from carrying out their professional duties in institutions or parts of institutions set aside for women.\u201d","45.The report \u201cNot here to stay: Report of the International Commission of Jurists on its visit to Malta on 26 \u2013 30 September 2011\u201d, May 2012, pointed out, inter alia, that:","\u201cThe ICJ delegation found a lack of leisure facilities in all three detention facilities visited. ... In the Lyster Barracks there was also a small recreation yard, but without direct access from the detention section. Detainees had two hours per day of \u201cair\u201d in the courtyard. They reportedly seldom received visits from outside, apart from the occasional NGO.\u201d"],"27743":["A.The applicant\u2019s background prior to his criminal prosecution","6.The applicant is a Kyrgyz national of Uzbek ethnic origin. He was born on 1 September 1988 and resided in the town of Osh in Kyrgyzstan. After mass disorder and inter-ethnic clashes in the region in June 2010, he fled to Russia, together with many other ethnic Uzbeks, for fear of ethnic\u2011motivated violence. It appears that his next of kin remain in Kyrgyzstan.","7.In August 2010 the applicant arrived in Russia and received a temporary residence permit for the period from 3 December 2010 to 3December 2013.","B.Criminal proceedings against the applicant in Kyrgyzstan and the ensuing extradition proceedings in Russia","8.After the applicant\u2019s departure from Kyrgyzstan, on 25 June 2010 the Kyrgyz authorities charged him in absentia with involvement in riots accompanied by violence, inter-ethnic clashes, arson, use of firearms and destruction of property on 17 June 2010 in the city of Osh, Kyrgyz Republic. The applicant was also alleged to have kidnapped someone.","9.On an unspecified date in 2010 the applicant was put on a list of fugitives in Kyrgyzstan; on 12 February 2011 he was put on a list of fugitives in Russia as well.","10.On 29 October 2012, while travelling by train in Russia, the applicant was arrested by the transport police. He denied his involvement in the 2010 events. On 31 October 2012, the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court of St Petersburg ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a month. His detention was subsequently extended numerous times.","11.The Kyrgyz authorities confirmed their intention to seek the applicant\u2019s extradition. On 23 November 2012, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the Russian Federation received a request from the Kyrgyz Republic seeking the applicant\u2019s extradition. On 13August2013 it granted the request.","12.The applicant and his counsel appealed against the extradition order claiming, in particular, that he would face a risk of torture and ill\u2011treatment since ethnic Uzbeks were a particularly vulnerable group following the June2010 violence in the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. On 26November 2013 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the extradition order, finding it unlawful, and released the applicant. It appears that the applicant is currently at large.","13.On 25 February 2014 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the ruling of the St Petersburg City Court of 26 November 2013 and upheld the extradition order. In its decision of 25 February 2014 the Supreme Court held, in particular, as follows:","\u201c... the conclusion of the lower court that the prosecutor\u2019s office failed to examine the question of the risk of unacceptable treatment in the Kyrgyz Republic in the event of [the applicant\u2019s] extradition does not fit the case-file materials. The Prosecutor General\u2019s office of the Kyrgyz Republic has given guarantees to the effect that [the applicant] would only be prosecuted in respect of the crimes indicated in the initial extradition request and the behaviour of a general criminal character. They guaranteed that he would not be prosecuted on the basis of political or discriminatory reasons, including motives based on his origins, social background, the office he may have occupied, the pecuniary situation, gender, race, ethnicity, language, convictions and relations to religion, that [the applicant] would be given all possibilities to defend himself, that he would not be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and that if he was convicted and after having served the sentence he would be able to leave the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic freely. The materials submitted by the defence ... do not undermine the real guarantees provided by the Kyrgyz Republic in respect of [the applicant] and are sufficient to exclude any risk of his cruel treatment ...\u201d","14.According to the Russian Government, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the Kyrgyz Republic gave all necessary guarantees that the applicant\u2019s criminal prosecution would be carried out in strict compliance with the national law and the international obligations of the Kyrgyz Republic. Among other things, it guaranteed that the applicant would not be subjected to torture or other cruel, humiliating or degrading treatment; he would be guaranteed the right to defence, and Russian diplomatic staff would be given an opportunity to visit him in the detention facility.","C.Temporary asylum proceedings","15.On 7 November 2012, while in detention, the applicant applied to the Federal Migration Service for refugee status. He claimed, among other things, that a criminal case had been opened against him exclusively because of his ethnic origin and that he would face a real risk of ill\u2011treatment if he were sent back to Kyrgyzstan.","16.Following the examination of the applicant\u2019s asylum request, by its decision of 19 March 2013 the Department of the Federal Migration Service for St Petersburg and Leningrad region refused to grant refugee status to the applicant as he did not meet the necessary criteria defined by the national law. The Federal Migration Service of Russia took a final administrative decision on the matter on 7 October 2013, stating as follows:","\u201c... the basic criterion for granting a person temporary asylum is the presence of a well-founded suspicion that if returned to his\/her home country, that person could become a victim of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","The analysis of the decision of the migration authorities in charge of St Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, the materials of the applicant\u2019s personal case file, the information communicated by the applicant, as well as the available information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian and the Federal Migration Service of Russia concerning the situation in Kyrgyzstan has shown that the migration authorities in charge of St Petersburg and the Leningrad Region have fully examined all the circumstances of the case and lawfully concluded that there were no humanitarian reasons compelling the authorities to grant the applicant a possibility to remain temporarily on the territory of the Russian Federation.","According to the information submitted by the Prosecutor General\u2019s office, an agreement has now been reached with the Kyrgyz authorities which enables officials at the Embassy of the Russian Federation to monitor the compliance by the authorities of Kyrgyzstan with the standards of international law in respects of persons extradited to the Kyrgyz Republic.","The monitoring has established that the decision of the UFMS in charge of StPetersburg and the Leningrad Region to refuse to grant the applicant temporary asylum on the territory of the Russian Federation did not breach the legislation on refugees. The decision ... is lawful, justified and should be upheld.\u201d","17.The applicant\u2019s representatives appealed against the decision of 7October 2013. By a final decision of 28 July 2014 the Moscow City Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal.","The documents concerning Kyrgyzstan","19.For a number of relevant reports and items of information, see Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia (no. 49747\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 30-46, 16October 2012).","20.In April 2012 Kyrgyzstan submitted its Second report on implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, for the period from 1999 to 2011 (CAT\/C\/KGZ\/2). It reads as follows:","\u201c6.The concept of \u2018torture\u2019 was introduced into the Criminal Code in 2003, when the Code was amended with article 305-1, entitled \u2018Torture\u2019, which reads as follows:","\u2018The deliberate infliction of physical or mental suffering on any person for the purpose of extracting information or a confession, punishing a person for an act the person has committed or of which he or she is suspected, as well as for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person to commit certain actions, when such acts are committed by an official or by any other person with the knowledge or consent of an official, shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty of 3 to 5 years, with or without disqualification to hold certain posts for 1 to 3 years.\u2019","...","15.Under article 24 of the Constitution, everyone has the right to freedom and security of person. No one may be arrested for more than 48 hours without a judicial order, and every person under arrest must urgently, and in any case within 48 hours of the arrest, be presented before a court so as to ascertain whether the arrest is legal. Every arrested person has the right to verify the legality of the arrest in accordance with the procedures and time frames established by law. In the absence of justification for an arrest, the person in question must be released immediately.","16.In all cases, arrested persons must be informed immediately of the reasons for their arrest. Their rights must be explained to them and ensured, including the right to a medical examination and to receive the assistance of a physician. From the actual moment of arrest, the security of arrested persons is ensured; they are provided with the opportunity to defend themselves on their own, to have the qualified legal assistance of a lawyer and to be defended by a defence lawyer ...\u201d","21.The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination considered the fifth to seventh periodic reports of Kyrgyzstan and in February 2013 made the following concluding observations (CERD\/C\/KGZ\/CO\/5-7):","\u201c6.The Committee notes with concern that, according to the State party\u2019s report (CERD\/C\/KGZ\/5-7, para. 12) and other reports, Uzbeks were the main victims of the June 2010 events but were also the most prosecuted and condemned. While noting that the State party itself has recognized this situation and is considering ways to correct it, the Committee remains deeply concerned about reports of biased attitudes based on ethnicity in investigations, prosecutions, condemnations and sanctions imposed on those charged and convicted in relation to the June 2010 events, who were mostly of Uzbek origin. The Committee is also concerned about information provided in the State party\u2019s report relating to evidence of coercion to confess to crimes that the persons did not commit, pressure on relatives by representatives of law enforcement agencies, denial of procedural rights ..., violations of court procedures, threats and insults to the accused and their counsel, attempts to attack the accused and his relatives which according to the State party resulted in a violation of the right to a fair trial ...","[T]he Committee recommends that the State party in the context of the reform of its judicial system:","(a)Initiate or set up a mechanism to review all cases of persons condemned in connection with the June 2010 events, from the point of view of respecting all necessary guarantees for a fair trial;","(b)Investigate, prosecute and condemn, as appropriate, all persons responsible for human rights violations during the June 2010 events, irrespective of their ethnic origin and their status; ...","7.While noting information provided by the State party, the Committee remains concerned at reports that a great number of persons, mostly from minority groups, in particular Uzbeks, have been detained and have been subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment on the basis of their ethnicity following the June 2010 events. The Committee is also concerned at information that women from minority groups were victims of acts of violence, including rape, during, and in the aftermath of the June 2010 events. The Committee is particularly concerned that all such acts have not yet been investigated and those responsible have not been prosecuted and punished (arts. 5 and 6).","In line with its general recommendation No. 31 (2005), the Committee recommends that the State party, without any distinction based on the ethnic origin of the victims, take appropriate measures to:","(a)Register and document all cases of torture, ill-treatment and violence against women from minority groups, including rape;","(b)Conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations;","(c) Prosecute and punish those responsible, including police or security forces; ...\u201d","22.The UN Committee against Torture considered Kyrgyzstan\u2019s second periodic report and in December 2013 issued concluding observations (CAT\/C\/KGZ\/CO\/2), which read, in so far as relevant, as follows:","\u201cImpunity for, and failure to investigate, widespread acts of torture and ill\u2011treatment","5.The Committee is deeply concerned about the ongoing and widespread practice of torture and ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, in particular while in police custody to extract confessions. These confirm the findings of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (A\/HRC\/19\/61\/Add.2, paras.37 et seq.), and of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (A\/HRC\/20\/12, paras.40\u201341). While the Kyrgyz delegation acknowledged that torture is practised in the country, and affirmed its commitment to combat it, the Committee remains seriously concerned about the substantial gap between the legislative framework and its practical implementation, as evidenced partly by the lack of cases during the reporting period in which State officials have been prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for torture (arts.2, 4, 12 and 16).","6.The Committee is gravely concerned at the State party\u2019s persistent pattern of failure to conduct prompt, impartial and full investigations into the many allegations of torture and ill-treatment and to prosecute alleged perpetrators, which has led to serious underreporting by victims of torture and ill-treatment, and impunity for State officials allegedly responsible (arts.2, 11, 12, 13 and 16).","In particular, the Committee is concerned about:","(a)The lack of an independent and effective mechanism for receiving complaints and conducting impartial and full investigations into allegations of torture. Serious conflicts of interest appear to prevent existing mechanisms from undertaking effective, impartial investigations into complaints received;","(b)Barriers at the pre-investigation stage, particularly with regard to forensic medical examinations, which in many cases are not carried out promptly following allegations of abuse, are performed by medical professionals who lack independence, and\/or are conducted in the presence of other public officials, leading to the failure of the medical personnel to adequately record detainees\u2019 injuries, and consequently to investigators\u2019 failure to open formal investigations into allegations of torture, for lack of evidence;","(c)The apparent practice by investigators of valuing the testimonies of individuals implicated in torture over those of complainants, and of dismissing complaints summarily; and","(d)The failure of the judiciary to effectively investigate torture allegations raised by criminal defendants and their lawyers in court. Various sources report that judges commonly ignore information alleging the use of torture, including reports from independent medical examinations.","...","7.The Committee remains seriously concerned by the State party\u2019s response to the allegations of torture in individual cases brought to the attention of the Committee, and particularly by the State party\u2019s authorities\u2019 refusal to carry out full investigations into many allegations of torture on the grounds that preliminary enquiries revealed no basis for opening a full investigation. The Committee is gravely concerned by the case of Azimjan Askarov, an ethnic Uzbek human rights defender prosecuted on criminal charges in connection with the death of a police officer in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, which has been raised by several Special Rapporteurs, including the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders (A\/HRC\/22\/47\/Add.4, para.248; A\/HRC\/19\/55\/Add.2, para.212). Mr.Askarov has alleged that he was beaten severely by police on numerous occasions immediately following his detention and throughout the course of the criminal proceedings against him, and that he was subjected to repeated violations of procedural safeguards such as prompt access to a lawyer and to an effective, independent medical examination. The Committee notes that independent forensic medical examinations appear to have substantiated Mr.Askarov\u2019s allegations of torture in police custody, and have confirmed resulting injuries including persistent visual loss, traumatic brain injury, and spinal injury. Information before the Committee suggests that Mr.Askarov\u2019s complaints of torture have been raised on numerous occasions with the Prosecutor\u2019s office, as well as with the Kyrgyz Ombudsman\u2019s office, and with Bazar-Korgon District Court, the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court. To date, however, the State party\u2019s authorities have declined to open a full investigation into his claims, relying on allegedly coerced statements made by Mr.Askarov while in police custody that he had no complaints. The Committee understands that the State party is presently considering the possibility of further investigating these claims. The Committee is concerned by the State party\u2019s refusal to undertake full investigations into allegations of torture regarding other cases raised during the review, including those of Nargiza Turdieva and Dilmurat Khaidarov (arts.2, 12, 13 and 16).","...","8.The Committee remains concerned at the lack of full and effective investigations into the numerous allegations that members of the law enforcement bodies committed torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary detention and excessive use of force during and following the inter-ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. The Committee is concerned by reports that investigations, prosecutions, condemnations and sanctions imposed in relation to the June 2010 events were mostly directed against persons of Uzbek origin, as noted by sources including the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in 2013 (CERD\/C\/KGZ\/CO\/5-7, paras.6\u20137). The Committee further regrets the lack of information provided by the State party on the outcome of the review of 995criminal cases relating to the June 2010 violence (arts.4, 12, 13 and 16).","...","Coerced confessions","13.The Committee is seriously concerned at numerous, consistent and credible reports that the use of forced confessions as evidence in courts is widespread. While noting that the use of evidence obtained through unlawful means is prohibited by law, it is deeply concerned that in practice there is a heavy reliance on confessions within the criminal justice system. The Committee is further concerned at reports that judges have frequently declined to act on allegations made by criminal defendants in court, or to allow the introduction into evidence of independent medical reports that would tend to confirm the defendant\u2019s claims of torture for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The Committee regrets the lack of information provided by the State party on cases in which judges or prosecutors have initiated investigations into torture claims raised by criminal defendants in court, and is alarmed that no official has been prosecuted and punished for torture even in the single case brought to its attention in which a conviction obtained by torture was excluded from evidence by a court \u2013 that of Farrukh Gapiurov, who was acquitted by the Osh Municipal Court of involvement in the June 2010 violence (arts.2 and 15).\u201d","23.The Kyrgyzstan chapter of the 2013 Annual Report by Amnesty International, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:","\u201cTorture and other ill-treatment remained pervasive throughout the country and law enforcement and judicial authorities failed to act on such allegations. The authorities continued to fail to impartially and effectively investigate the June 2010 violence and its aftermath and provide justice for the thousands of victims of serious crimes and human rights violations, including crimes against humanity. Ethnic Uzbeks continued to be targeted disproportionately for detention and prosecution in relation to the June2010 violence.","...","The Osh City Prosecutor stated in April that out of 105 cases which had gone to trial in relation to the June 2010 violence, only two resulted in acquittals. Only one of those cases involved an ethnic Uzbek, Farrukh Gapirov, the son of human rights defender Ravshan Gapirov. He was released after the appeal court found his conviction had been based on his confession which had been obtained under torture. However, no criminal investigation against the police officers responsible for his torture was initiated.","By contrast, the first \u2013 and, to date, the only \u2013 known conviction of ethnic Kyrgyz for the murder of ethnic Uzbeks in the course of the June 2010 violence was overturned.\u201d","24.Human Rights Watch\u2019s \u201cWorld Report 2013: Kyrgyzstan\u201d contains the following findings concerning the situation in Kyrgyzstan in 2012:","\u201cKyrgyzstan has failed to adequately address abuses in the south, in particular against ethnic Uzbeks, undermining long-term efforts to promote stability and reconciliation following inter-ethnic clashes in June 2010 that killed more than 400people. Despite an uneasy calm in southern Kyrgyzstan, ethnic Uzbeks are still subjected to arbitrary detention, torture, and extortion, without redress.","...","Local human rights non-governmental organizations reported that the overall number of reported incidents of arbitrary detention and ill-treatment in police custody continued to decrease in 2012 in the south, although they still document new cases. Groups also reported the growing problem of law enforcement extorting money, in particular from ethnic Uzbeks, threatening criminal prosecution related to the June2010 events. Victims of extortion rarely report incidents for fear of reprisals.","Investigations into the June 2010 violence have stalled. Trials of mostly ethnic Uzbeks connected to the violence continued to take place in violation of international fair trial standards, including the trials of Mahamad Bizurukov and Shamshidin Niyazaliev, each of whom was sentenced to life in prison in October2012.","Lawyers in southern Kyrgyzstan continued to be harassed in 2012 for defending ethnic Uzbek clients who were charged with involvement in the June 2010 violence, perpetuating a hostile and violent environment that undermined defendants\u2019 fair trial rights. On January 20, a group of persons in Jalalabad verbally and physically attacked a lawyer defending the ethnic Uzbek owner of an Uzbek-language television station. No one has been held accountable for such violence against lawyers.","...","In hearings related to the June 2010 violence, judges continue to dismiss, ignore, or fail to order investigations into torture allegations. In a rare exception, four police officers were charged with torture after the August 2011 death of Usmonzhon Kholmirzaev, an ethnic Uzbek, who succumbed to internal injuries after he was beaten by police in custody. Repeated delays in proceedings have meant that over a year later, the trial has yet to conclude. In June, after Abdugafur Abdurakhmanov, an ethnic Uzbek serving a life sentence in relation to the June 2010 violence, died in prison, authorities did not open an investigation, alleging he committed suicide.\u201d","25.In its report \u201cKyrgyzstan: 3 Years After Violence, a Mockery of Justice\u201d issued in June 2013, Human Rights Watch observed, among other things, the following:","\u201cCriminal investigations into the June 2010 violence have been marred by widespread arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment, including torture. Unchecked courtroom violence and other egregious violations of defendants\u2019 rights have blocked the accused from presenting a meaningful defense. Human Rights Watch has documented how investigations disproportionately and unjustly targeted ethnic Uzbeks, and how this group has a heightened risk of torture in custody.","...","The ethnic clashes erupted in southern Kyrgyzstan on June 10, 2010. The violence, which lasted four days, left more than 400 people dead and nearly 2,000 houses destroyed. Horrific crimes were committed against both ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. However, while ethnic Uzbeks suffered the majority of casualties and destroyed homes, the majority of those prosecuted for homicide have been ethnic Uzbeks.","...","Human Rights Watch\u2019s research from 2010-2013 in southern Kyrgyzstan found that prosecutorial authorities have repeatedly refused to investigate serious and credible allegations of torture. Courts have relied heavily on confessions allegedly extracted under torture to sentence defendants to long prison terms.\u201d","26.The Kyrgyzstan chapter of the 2014 World Report published by Human Rights Watch reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:","\u201cShortcomings in law enforcement and the judiciary contribute to the persistence of grave abuses in connection to the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June2010. Ethnic Uzbeks and other minorities remain especially vulnerable. Courtroom attacks on lawyers and defendants, particularly in cases related to the June2010 events, occur with impunity.","Government officials and civil society representatives formed a national center for the prevention of torture in 2013. In practice, ill-treatment and torture remain pervasive in places of detention, and impunity for torture is the norm.","...","Three years on, justice for crimes committed during the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 remains elusive. The flawed justice process has produced long prison sentences for mostly ethnic Uzbeks after convictions marred by torture\u2011tainted confessions and other due process violations. Authorities have not reviewed convictions where defendants alleged torture or other glaring violations of fair trial standards. At least nine ethnic Uzbeks continue to languish in pretrial detention, some for a third year. New convictions in August 2013 of three ethnic Uzbeks in Osh, and pending extradition orders of at least six others in Russia again point to judicial bias against ethnic Uzbeks.","The authorities failed to tackle the acute problem of courtroom violence by audiences in trials across Kyrgyzstan, including at the trial of three opposition members of parliament in June, perpetuating an environment that undermines defendants\u2019 fair trial rights. Lawyers were harassed or beaten in court in 2013, including for defending ethnic Uzbek clients in June 2010 cases. Mahamad Bizurukov, an ethnic Uzbek defendant, and his lawyers have been subjected to repeated threats, harassment, and physical attacks for two years, most recently in September 2013, with no accountability for perpetrators.","...","Despite the adoption of a national torture prevention mechanism in 2012, and the organization of a related National Center for the Prevention of Torture in 2013, authorities often refuse to investigate allegations of torture and perpetrators go unpunished. On rare occasions when charges are filed against police, investigations, and court proceedings are unduly protracted.","A telling example is the criminal case against four police officers following the August 2011 death of an ethnic Uzbek detained on charges related to the June 2010 ethnic violence. Usmonjon Kholmirzaev died several days after his release without charge, apparently from injuries he sustained from beatings in custody. The prosecution has been subjected to repeated delays over the last two years and no one has yet been held accountable for his death.","In July 2013, Nurkamil Ismailov was found dead in a temporary detention facility in southern Kyrgyzstan after police detained him for disorderly conduct. Authorities alleged he committed suicide by hanging himself with his t-shirt. The Jalalabad-based human rights group Spravedlivost intervened after which authorities opened a criminal investigation on charges of negligence. In September, Ismailov\u2019s relative and the police settled out of court for an undisclosed sum, with no admission of liability.\u201d"],"27796":["6.The applicant was born in 1973 and until his arrest lived in the town of Volzhskiy, Volgograd Region.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","1.Criminal proceedings in 2007-2009. Release on 15 May 2013","7.On 16 October 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted drug trafficking and placed in custody. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial.","8.On 28 May 2008 the Volzhsk Town Court (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) convicted the applicant of attempted drug trafficking and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment in a high-security correctional colony. The court noted that the term of the applicant\u2019s detention was to be calculated with effect from the date of his arrest on 16 October 2007.","9.On 9 September 2008 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the sentence on appeal. It mentioned, inter alia, that at the time of the hearing the applicant was detained in temporary detention facility no. IZ-34\/5 in the town of Leninsk in the Volgograd Region.","10.The applicant asked the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court to re-examine his case by way of a supervisory review. In February and March 2009 the applicant submitted additional observations to the Presidium, which were dispatched from facility no. IZ-34\/5. The application for supervisory review was rejected.","11.The applicant\u2019s request for a re-examination of his case by way of a supervisory review was, however, granted by the Supreme Court of Russia, which on 13 January 2010 reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to five years and six months\u2019 imprisonment.","12.Having served his sentence in full, the applicant was released from detention on 15 May 2013.","2.Criminal proceedings in 2013. Applicant\u2019s death on 11October 2014","13.On 15 July 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of another episode of attempted drug trafficking.","14.On 27 September 2013 the Town Court convicted the applicant of attempted drug trafficking and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment in a high-security correctional colony.","15.On 11 October 2014 the applicant died in detention.","B.Applicant\u2019s detention, state of health and medical treatment","1.Detention from 18 October 2007 to 27 June 2009 in a temporary detention facility","16.The applicant and the Government offered different versions of the applicant\u2019s detention and treatment in the temporary detention facility.","17.According to the applicant, from 18 October 2007 to 27 June2009 he was detained mostly in facility no. IZ-34\/5. His letters to the Court dated 13 May and 7 December 2008 and 26 August 2009 were dispatched from that facility. A letter from the Court dated 8 June 2009 was sent to and received by the applicant in the same facility.","18.The applicant also submitted that on several occasions he had been transported to court hearings and to penal medical institution no. LIU-15 in Volgograd (\u201cinstitution no. LIU-15\u201d) and that he had spent very short periods, in transit, in temporary detention facility no. IZ-34\/1 of the town of Volgograd. In particular, the applicant had been sent to institution no.LIU\u201115 in 2008, where he had undergone successful treatment for tuberculosis. A chest X-ray examination on 14 January 2008 indicated that his tuberculosis had been cured, although extensive calcification and fibrosis remained in his lungs. On 17 January 2008 a medical commission confirmed his recovery. The applicant was prescribed anti-relapse treatment, but this was never provided to him after his return to the temporary detention facility.","19.The applicant filed a number of complaints \u2012 for instance with the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Volgograd Region \u2012 arguing that he had not been afforded adequate medical treatment in facility no. IZ-34\/5.On 31March 2008 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office re-directed the applicant\u2019s claim to the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Volgograd Region. A month later the authorities rejected the applicant\u2019s claim as ill-founded. They confirmed that from 18 October 2007 he had been detained in facility no.IZ-34\/5. Referring to the decision of the medical commission on 17January 2008, the authorities held that the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis had been fully cured.","20. The Government, relying on a certificate issued on 18 December 2013 by the head of facility no. IZ-34\/1, asserted that from 15 July 2007 to 22 October 2009 the applicant had been detained in that facility. In their observations of 31 January 2014, however, the Government mentioned the applicant\u2019s detention in facility no. IZ-34\/5, but did not provide any further details.","21.Despite the Court\u2019s request for the applicant\u2019s entire medical file, the Government submitted no medical documents dating from the period after his arrest and up until 29 October 2009. They merely noted that the applicant had contracted hepatitis C and tuberculosis before his arrest. The applicant did not dispute that submission.","2.Detention from 27 June to 29 October 2012 in a correctional colony","22.On 27 June 2009 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. IK-154\/9 of the Volgograd Region.","23.According to the applicant, the medical service in the colony was very poor. The colony did not employ a tuberculosis specialist and the detainees\u2019 access to drugs, which were often out of stock, was limited. The applicant only received basic anti-fever medication.","24.The Government did not provide any information regarding the medical assistance afforded to the applicant in colony no. IK-154\/9 and did not submit his medical record or any medical certificates from his time there.","25.On 29 October 2012, after the applicant complained of coughing up blood, he was transferred to institution no. LIU-15.","3.Detention from 29 October 2012 to 15 May 2013 in institution no.LIU-15","26.The Government provided the Court with copies of the applicant\u2019s medical documents for the period 29 October 2012 to 15 May 2013.","27.The medical records show that on admission to institution no.LIU\u201115 the applicant had undergone a general medical examination, a chest X-ray examination and a clinical blood test. A sputum culture test was performed the next day. The applicant was diagnosed with recurrent smear-positive infiltrative tuberculosis of the upper lobe of his left lung at the stage of lung tissue destruction caused by mycobacterium tuberculosis (\u201cMBT\u201d). He was prescribed protiocomb, a complex medicine containing protionamide, pyrazinamide, ethambutol hydrochloride, lomefloxacin hydrochloride and vitamin B6.","28.On 6 November 2012 the applicant was tested for HIV, syphilis, hepatitis B and C. The test confirmed his hepatitis C infection, but no antibodies associated with the other infections were found.","29.A week later the applicant again underwent a chest X-ray examination. It revealed that the cavity in the lung had decreased in size, and some negative changes in the lung tissues had progressed further.","30.On 20 November 2012 the applicant was examined by a doctor, who noted in the \u201cepicrisis\u201d (medical report issued on the applicant\u2019s discharge) that no significant changes in the applicant\u2019s health had occurred and prescribed continued treatment with protiocomb and ciprofloxacin, an antibiotic used to treat a number of bacterial infections.","31.On 1 December 2012 the applicant\u2019s treatment was modified. He was prescribed a combination of anti-tuberculosis drugs and injections. A chest X-ray examination on 19 December 2012 showed no changes in the applicant\u2019s lungs.","32.The applicant sent an application to the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of the town of Volgograd seeking early release on medical grounds. That request was dismissed on 27 December 2012 upon the court\u2019s finding that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not warrant his release from detention.","33.In February 2013 the applicant\u2019s blood was twice taken for testing and his liver function was tested for the first time. On three further occasions in the same month the institution carried out a sputum culture test and also performed the first drug susceptibility test. The test was smear-positive. It revealed that the MBT was resistant to streptomycin. On 13 and 19 February 2013 the applicant underwent a chest X-ray examination and a tomography examination. They showed no changes. The treatment regimen was modified. The applicant was prescribed, among other medicines, pyrazinamide, ethambutol, prothionamide, cycloserine, rifampicin and isoniazid.","34.As follows from the epicrisis of 27February 2013 and a \u201cregime violation record\u201d dated 6 March 2013 signed by two deputy heads of institution no. LIU-15 and the head of the detention ward, the applicant refused to take the drugs pyrazinamide, ethambutol, prothionamide and cycloserine \u2012 citing their adverse effects on his health through inducing negative development of his hepatitis C \u2012 and claiming that doctors should first treat his hepatitis. According to the same record, the applicant also refused to give a written explanation of the reasons for his refusal.","35.On 15 March 2013 the applicant\u2019s X-ray examination established increased infiltration of the left lung tissue. According to a medical certificate dated 20 March 2013, his health had deteriorated due to his consistent refusal to take the prescribed medicines.","36.According to an extract from the applicant\u2019s medical history, on an unspecified date he agreed to take isoniazid, rifampicin and capreomycin on condition that he would be provided with hepatoprotectors.","37.On 15 May 2013 the applicant was released from detention with a diagnosis of infiltrative contagious tuberculosis of the left lung at the stage of lung tissue destruction.","4.Treatment in a civilian hospital from 27 May to 15 July 2013","38. From 27 May to 15 July 2013 the applicant received in-patient medical treatment in a civilian anti-tuberculosis hospital, where he was diagnosed with active chronic fibrous-cavernous pulmonary tuberculosis at the stage of infiltration with bacilli emission, as well as hepatitis C. There is no information in the Court\u2019s possession concerning the details of the applicant\u2019s treatment during that period.","5.Detention from 15 July to 21 October 2013 in temporary detention facilities","39.The parties did not provide the Court with any information about the applicant\u2019s detention and treatment after his renewed arrest on 15July 2013. The applicant\u2019s letters to Ms Yusupova submitted to the Court indicate that between 16 July and 21 October 2013 he was detained in facilities nos. 34\/5 and 34\/1, that he had no access to medical treatment, and that institution no.LIU-15 had refused to admit him for treatment before his conviction.","40.On 18 October 2013 the applicant underwent a chest X-ray examination which indicated negative changes in his right lung. The volume of his left lung had decreased, its tissue was infiltrated and it contained a number of cavities.","6.Detention from 21 October 2013 to 11 October 2014 in institution no.LIU-15","41.Following the fresh conviction, on 21October 2013 the applicant was admitted to institution no. LIU-15. He was examined by a doctor, who diagnosed him with hepatitis C and MBT positive infiltrative tuberculosis of the left lung at the stage of tissue destruction. The doctor ordered blood, urine, sputum culture and drug susceptibility tests and an electrocardiogram examination. The applicant was prescribed a long list of medicines, including capreomycin, isoniazid, ethambutol and hepatoprotectors.","42.A week later, after the results of the tests had been received, the applicant\u2019s treatment was slightly modifed to include ofloxacin.","43.In the first half of November 2013 the applicant was examined on four occasions by doctors, who recommended continuing the prescribed treatment.","44.On 14 November the applicant\u2019s electrocardiogram examination revealed that he had mitral insufficiency.","45.A medical record drawn up on 14 November 2013 by the applicant\u2019s attending doctor indicated that the applicant had refused to take tuberculosis medicines on that date. The following entries in the applicant\u2019s medical record dated 19, 21, 25, 27 and 29 November do not contain any similar information. The Government did not submit any other document (for instance, a regime violation record) showing that the applicant had refused to continue the treatment.","46.On 6 December 2013 a medical commission examined the applicant and established no significant changes in his condition. The most recent entry in the medical record, made on 16 December 2013, showed no significant development in his health.","47.No further information about the applicant\u2019s treatment was provided after 16December 2013.","48.The applicant was certified as having second-degree disability on 1May 2014.","49. A medical panel examined the applicant on 15 August 2014 with the aim of determining whether his state of health warranted early release. The panel stated that the applicant was suffering from multi-drug resistant progressive tuberculosis aggravated by cavernosal fibrosis of the lungs and cardiopulmonary decompensation in the third stage. The applicant\u2019s left lung was completely destroyed by the infection. The panel concluded that his state of health could warrant his release on parole.","50.On 11 October 2014 the applicant died from tuberculosis in institution no. LIU-15.","C.The applicant\u2019s relationship with Ms Yusupova","51.The documents from the case-file, including a court judgment, indicate that the applicant was not married. According to certificate no.35\/6\/9-\u042e-1\u0413\u0420 issued by institution no. LIU-15 on 20 October 2014, when being asked about his relatives, the applicant stated that he had a partner, Ms Yusupova. The authorities noted that statement in the applicant\u2019s personal file and allowed Ms Yusupova to visit him in detention as his de facto wife. By a telegram on 11 October 2014 the authorities informed Ms Yusupova of the applicant\u2019s death, addressing her as his wife.","52.According to Ms Yusupova\u2019s submissions, which were not contested by the Government, she was in a close family-like relationship with the applicant from 2010 until his death in detention. She visited him on many occasions, sent him letters and parcels. In 2013 when the applicant was released from detention they lived together and ran a common household.","53.Ms Yusupova submitted that she had had intense and intimate correspondence with the applicant before his death. She provided the Court with two letters sent to her by the applicant in September 2013 to confirm that they had shared strong feelings for each other.","54.On 11 September 2013 the applicant formally authorised MsYusupova to withdraw money from his bank account.In his letter to the Court on 1 March 2014 the applicant expressly asked the Court to award her non-pecuniary damage if he died.","A.Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules, adopted on 11January 2006 at the 952nd meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies (\u201cthe European Prison Rules\u201d)","61.The European Prison Rules provide a framework of guiding principles for health services. The relevant extracts from the Rules read as follows:","\u201cHealth care","39. Prison authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care.","Organisation of prison health care","40.1 Medical services in prison shall be organised in close relation with the general health administration of the community or nation.","40.2 Health policy in prisons shall be integrated into, and compatible with, national health policy.","40.3 Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.","40.4 Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer.","40.5 All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.","Medical and health care personnel","41.1 Every prison shall have the services of at least one qualified general medical practitioner.","41.2 Arrangements shall be made to ensure at all times that a qualified medical practitioner is available without delay in cases of urgency ...","41.4 Every prison shall have personnel suitably trained in health care.","Duties of the medical practitioner","42.1 A medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall see every prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is obviously unnecessary ...","42.3 When examining a prisoner the medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall pay particular attention to ...","b. diagnosing physical or mental illness and taking all measures necessary for its treatment and for the continuation of existing medical treatment ...","43.1 The medical practitioner shall have the care of the physical and mental health of the prisoners and shall see, under the conditions and with a frequency consistent with health care standards in the community, all sick prisoners, all who report illness or injury, and any prisoner to whom attention is specially directed ...","Health care provision","46.1 Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialised institutions or to civilian hospitals when such treatment is not available in prison.","46.2 Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities, they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide the prisoners referred to them with appropriate care and treatment.\u201d","B.3rd General Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (\u201cthe CPT Report\u201d )","62.The complexity and importance of health-care services in detention facilities was discussed by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture in its 3rd General Report (CPT\/Inf (93) 12 - Publication Date: 4June 1993). The following are extracts from the Report:","\u201c33. When entering prison, all prisoners should without delay be seen by a member of the establishment\u2019s health care service. In its reports to date the CPT has recommended that every newly arrived prisoner be properly interviewed and, if necessary, physically examined by a medical doctor as soon as possible after his admission. It should be added that in some countries, medical screening on arrival is carried out by a fully qualified nurse, who reports to a doctor. This latter approach could be considered as a more efficient use of available resources.","It is also desirable that a leaflet or booklet be handed to prisoners on their arrival, informing them of the existence and operation of the health care service and reminding them of basic measures of hygiene.","34. While in custody, prisoners should be able to have access to a doctor at any time, irrespective of their detention regime ... The health care service should be so organised as to enable requests to consult a doctor to be met without undue delay ...","35. A prison\u2019s health care service should at least be able to provide regular out-patient consultations and emergency treatment (of course, in addition there may often be a hospital-type unit with beds) ... Further, prison doctors should be able to call upon the services of specialists.","As regards emergency treatment, a doctor should always be on call. Further, someone competent to provide first aid should always be present on prison premises, preferably someone with a recognised nursing qualification.","Out-patient treatment should be supervised, as appropriate, by health care staff; in many cases it is not sufficient for the provision of follow-up care to depend upon the initiative being taken by the prisoner.","36. The direct support of a fully-equipped hospital service should be available, in either a civilian or prison hospital ...","38. A prison health care service should be able to provide medical treatment and nursing care, as well as appropriate diets, physiotherapy, rehabilitation or any other necessary special facility, in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by patients in the outside community. Provision in terms of medical, nursing and technical staff, as well as premises, installations and equipment, should be geared accordingly.","There should be appropriate supervision of the pharmacy and of the distribution of medicines. Further, the preparation of medicines should always be entrusted to qualified staff (pharmacist\/nurse, etc.) ...","39. A medical file should be compiled for each patient, containing diagnostic information as well as an ongoing record of the patient\u2019s evolution and of any special examinations he has undergone. In the event of a transfer, the file should be forwarded to the doctors in the receiving establishment.","Further, daily registers should be kept by health care teams, in which particular incidents relating to the patients should be mentioned. Such registers are useful in that they provide an overall view of the health care situation in the prison, at the same time as highlighting specific problems which may arise.","40. The smooth operation of a health care service presupposes that doctors and nursing staff are able to meet regularly and to form a working team under the authority of a senior doctor in charge of the service ...\u201d","C.General guidelines for multidrug resistant tuberculosis treatment of patients suffering from liver diseases","63.The following are extracts from the \u201cTreatment of Tuberculosis: Guidelines\u201d, fourth edition, World Health Organisation, 2009,","\u201c3.6. Previous tuberculosis (\u201cTB\u201d) treatment is a strong determinant of drug resistance, and previously treated patients comprise a significant proportion (13%) of the global TB notifica\u00adtions in 2007.","Of all the forms of drug resistance, it is most critical to detect multidrug resistance (\u201cMDR\u201d) because it makes regimens with first-line drugs much less effective and resistance can be further amplified. Prompt identification of MDR and initiation of MDR treatment with second-line drugs gives a better chance of cure and prevents the development and spread of further resistance...","3.7. Standard regimes for previously treated patients","The Global Plan to Stop TB 2006\u20132015 sets a target of all previously treated patients having access to [drug susceptibility testing] at the beginning of treatment by 2015. The purpose is to identify MDR as early as possible so that appropriate treatment can be given...","Recommendation 7.1","Specimens for culture and drug susceptibility testing (DST) should be obtained from all previously treated TB patients at or before the start of treatment. DST should be performed for at least isoniazid and rifampicin...","Recommendation 7.2","In settings where rapid molecular-based DST is available, the results should guide the choice of regimen...","...","8.4 Treatment regimens in special situations","8.4.2 In patients with unstable or advanced liver disease, liver function tests should be done at the start of treatment, if possible... The more unstable or severe the liver disease is, the fewer hepatotoxic drugs should be used...","Clinical monitoring (and liver function tests, if possible) of all patients with pre-existing liver disease should be performed during treatment.\u201d"],"27793":["6.The applicant was born in 1954 and until his arrest lived in StPetersburg. He is currently serving his sentence in a correctional colony in the Arkhangelsk Region.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","7. The applicant was arrested on 31 July 2010 on suspicion of aggravated kidnapping, extortion and conspiracy. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial.","8.On 22 June 2012 the Leningrad Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment in a high\u2011security correctional colony with the release to be followed by a year\u2011long restriction of liberty.","9.On 8November 2012 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction on appeal.","B.Applicant\u2019s detention, state of health and medical treatment","10.The parties provided the Court with the applicant\u2019s medical documents, including his clinical records, discharge summaries, and expert opinions.","11.The medical records show that the applicant had a long history of cerebral diseases as a result of having sustained a head injury in 1997 that developed into traumatic cystic arachnoiditis. Two years later he underwent a tomography examination which confirmed the presence of a growing liquor cyst located in the right frontotemporal part of the brain. The cyst impacted on his acoustic and visual nerves. The examination also revealed moderate internal hydrocephalus. In the recommendations written on 11May 2000, the applicant\u2019s doctor noted that a nuclear magnetic resonance examination, an electroencephalography examination and a liquor analysis were required to properly diagnose the applicant\u2019s condition. He further observed that, in the absence of any treatment, it would be reasonable to perform urgent cerebral bypass surgery in order to prevent the applicant from going irreversibly blind. Nothing in the medical documents submitted suggests that the applicant had had any recourse to specific medical assistance or examinations regarding his cerebral problems during the ten years preceding his arrest.","12.After the arrest the applicant was taken to temporary detention facility no. IZ-47\/1 in St Petersburg (\u201cfacility no. IZ-47\/1\u201d). On admission to that facility the resident prison doctor performed a general medical check-up of the applicant, having noted in the medical file that he had a brain cyst. The doctor concluded that the applicant was \u201csomatically healthy\u201d and was therefore fit to remain in the conditions provided by the detention facility.","13.On 23 September and 26 October 2010 the applicant was seen by a neurologist. In the absence of any medical documents the prison doctor was only able to perform a visual examination of the applicant. He diagnosed the applicant with hydrocephalus and recommended that an X-ray examination of the skull be carried out to make the correct diagnosis.","14.In January 2011 the applicant\u2019s medical file was supplemented with his old clinical records from a civilian hospital and the prison doctor examined him anew, paying regard to the additional medical information. He confirmed the diagnosis made in 2000 and recommended a consultation with an ophthalmologist. The applicant was prescribed drug therapy for a month.","15.An ophthalmologist diagnosed the applicant with angiopathy.","16.In February 2011 the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis. He was immediately transferred to prison hospital no. 2 in St Petersburg, where the disease was successfully treated. The applicant was discharged from hospital with the doctors\u2019 attestation of his full recovery from the infection.","17.On 8 April 2011 the applicant was sent to Gaaza prison hospital in StPetersburg for an in-depth medical examination. He underwent a large variety of diagnostic procedures, including a magnetic resonance tomography of the brain and cervical vertebrae performed in a Russian civilian hospital, the Mariinskiy Hospital of St Petersburg. The tests showed that the applicant had a liquor cyst in the right frontotemporal part of the brain and that he suffered from vicarious hydrocephalus of mixed genesis and encephalopathy at the initial stage. In addition, doctors were able to establish that the applicant\u2019s cervical vertebrae had several herniated disks and perineural cysts.","18.Following completion of the diagnostic cycle, the applicant was released from the hospital and sent back to the detention facility. Discharge summaries issued on 15 April 2011 contained a recommendation of supervision by a prison doctor and regular consultations with a neurologist.","19.In September 2011 the applicant complained about headaches to the attending prison doctor. In response it was recommended that he undergo an additional neurological medical examination in Gaaza prison hospital. However, the hospital refused to admit him because it did not employ a suitably qualified medical specialist, such as a brain surgeon.","20.In October 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer contacted Dr K. from the neurosurgical department of the Scientific Research Institute for Emergency Treatment, who agreed to study the applicant\u2019s clinical records and give his opinion about the state of the applicant\u2019s health at a court hearing on 4October 2011, where he saw the applicant for the first time. At the hearing the doctor stated that the computer tomography performed on the applicant in 2000 had indicated a brain oedema at the base of the skull. He insisted that any change of the applicant\u2019s lifestyle could induce complications related to the brain oedema and also seizures. Surgery was required to treat the cyst. However, Dr K. concluded that the applicant\u2019s spinal problems were even more serious, as they could leave the applicant entirely paralysed. Nevertheless, the doctor noted that surgery would be only required if the applicant\u2019s health were to deteriorate. The doctor recommended chondroprotective therapy and cerebral bypass surgery for the applicant. He was also to wear a cervical collar.","21.The applicant also provided the Court with a certificate issued in November 2011 by Dr T., the head of the hospital where the applicant had received medical treatment in 1997-1998. Dr T. argued that the applicant\u2019s condition called for permanent medical supervision by a neurologist and neurosurgeon so that the applicant could be subjected to urgent surgical intervention should the need arise. In Dr T.\u2019s opinion, a detention facility was ill equipped to guarantee such supervision. The applicant also argued that his transfer to a northerly region in which to serve out his sentence had run contrary to the recommendations of his doctor and might have resulted in serious complications of his illness. Finally, he alleged that he lacked effective remedies whereby to complain about the poor quality of his medical treatment.","22.On 1 December 2011 in response to a request from the applicant\u2019s lawyer, a medical expert commission assessed the applicant\u2019s health and checked for the existence of medical grounds warranting his release from detention. The commission observed that the applicant had received out\u2011patient treatment and that he had no focal brain injuries, epileptic seizures or significant limitations of his day-to-day activity. Taking account of the results of his dynamic medical examinations, the doctors concluded that the applicant was in satisfactory health and that there were no medical grounds warranting his release from detention.","23.On 5 April 2012 Dr K. visually examined the applicant. No recommendations were made.","24.On 4 December 2012 the applicant was examined by a neurologist to whom he complained about headaches, vomiting and vertigo. The doctor recommended drug therapy based on vasobral, piracetam, and vinpocetine. The following visit in January 2013 by the neurologist resulted in a modification of the drug regimen.","25.On 20 February 2013 a prison doctor approved the applicant\u2019s transfer to a correctional colony, finding him fit to make the journey.","26.The applicant arrived on 4 March 2013 at correctional colony no.IK\u201142\/4 in the Astrakhan Region (\u201ccolony no. IK-42\/4\u201d), where he was seen by the colony doctor, who noted that the applicant had been suffering from brain cyst. At the end of April 2013 the doctor recommended the applicant\u2019s transfer to a hospital for further assessment. No urgency was warranted.","27.On 25 July 2013 Dr K. drafted another report, assessing the applicant\u2019s condition on the basis of his medical records and the results of his examination on 5 April 2012. Dr K. concluded that his recommendations had not been complied with and that the applicant\u2019s cyst had increased. He stressed that the appropriate treatment could only be ensured in a specialised medical institution, not least because the requisite dynamic monitoring of the applicant\u2019s condition using computer and magnetic resonance tomography examinations needed to be performed every eight months. Lastly, the doctor emphasised that the applicant\u2019s detention in a northerly region could lead to a further deterioration in his health by inducing epileptic seizures and brain ischemia, thus putting his life at risk.","28.On 8 August 2013 the authorities transferred the applicant to a prison hospital in the Arkhangelsk Region. Following a number of tests, a medical panel declared that the applicant was not suffering from any disability. The applicant was discharged from the hospital with the recommendation that he be re-admitted for further treatment in June 2014.","29.The last two entries in the applicant\u2019s clinical records are illegible. The parties did not provide the Court with any additional information on the state of his health.","A.Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules, adopted on 11January 2006 at the 952nd meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies (\u201cthe European Prison Rules\u201d)","35.The European Prison Rules provide a framework of guiding principles for health services. The relevant extracts from the Rules read as follows:","\u201cHealth care","39. Prison authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care.","Organisation of prison health care","40.1 Medical services in prison shall be organised in close relation with the general health administration of the community or nation.","40.2 Health policy in prisons shall be integrated into, and compatible with, national health policy.","40.3 Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.","40.4 Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer.","40.5 All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.","Medical and health care personnel","41.1 Every prison shall have the services of at least one qualified general medical practitioner.","41.2 Arrangements shall be made to ensure at all times that a qualified medical practitioner is available without delay in cases of urgency ...","41.4 Every prison shall have personnel suitably trained in health care.","Duties of the medical practitioner","42.1 A medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall see every prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is obviously unnecessary ...","42.3 When examining a prisoner the medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall pay particular attention to ...","b. diagnosing physical or mental illness and taking all measures necessary for its treatment and for the continuation of existing medical treatment ...","43.1 The medical practitioner shall have the care of the physical and mental health of the prisoners and shall see, under the conditions and with a frequency consistent with health care standards in the community, all sick prisoners, all who report illness or injury, and any prisoner to whom attention is specially directed ...","Health care provision","46.1 Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialised institutions or to civilian hospitals when such treatment is not available in prison.","46.2 Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities, they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide the prisoners referred to them with appropriate care and treatment.\u201d","B.3rd General Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (\u201c the CPT Report\u201d )","36.The complexity and importance of health-care services in detention facilities was discussed by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture in its 3rd General Report (CPT\/Inf (93) 12 - Publication Date: 4June 1993). The following are extracts from the Report:","\u201c33. When entering prison, all prisoners should without delay be seen by a member of the establishment\u2019s health care service. In its reports to date the CPT has recommended that every newly arrived prisoner be properly interviewed and, if necessary, physically examined by a medical doctor as soon as possible after his admission. It should be added that in some countries, medical screening on arrival is carried out by a fully qualified nurse, who reports to a doctor. This latter approach could be considered as a more efficient use of available resources.","It is also desirable that a leaflet or booklet be handed to prisoners on their arrival, informing them of the existence and operation of the health care service and reminding them of basic measures of hygiene.","34. While in custody, prisoners should be able to have access to a doctor at any time, irrespective of their detention regime ... The health care service should be so organised as to enable requests to consult a doctor to be met without undue delay ...","35. A prison\u2019s health care service should at least be able to provide regular out\u2011patient consultations and emergency treatment (of course, in addition there may often be a hospital-type unit with beds) ... Further, prison doctors should be able to call upon the services of specialists.","As regards emergency treatment, a doctor should always be on call. Further, someone competent to provide first aid should always be present on prison premises, preferably someone with a recognised nursing qualification.","Out-patient treatment should be supervised, as appropriate, by health care staff; in many cases it is not sufficient for the provision of follow-up care to depend upon the initiative being taken by the prisoner.","36. The direct support of a fully-equipped hospital service should be available, in either a civilian or prison hospital ...","38. A prison health care service should be able to provide medical treatment and nursing care, as well as appropriate diets, physiotherapy, rehabilitation or any other necessary special facility, in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by patients in the outside community. Provision in terms of medical, nursing and technical staff, as well as premises, installations and equipment, should be geared accordingly.","There should be appropriate supervision of the pharmacy and of the distribution of medicines. Further, the preparation of medicines should always be entrusted to qualified staff (pharmacist\/nurse, etc.) ...","39. A medical file should be compiled for each patient, containing diagnostic information as well as an ongoing record of the patient\u2019s evolution and of any special examinations he has undergone. In the event of a transfer, the file should be forwarded to the doctors in the receiving establishment.","Further, daily registers should be kept by health care teams, in which particular incidents relating to the patients should be mentioned. Such registers are useful in that they provide an overall view of the health care situation in the prison, at the same time as highlighting specific problems which may arise.","40. The smooth operation of a health care service presupposes that doctors and nursing staff are able to meet regularly and to form a working team under the authority of a senior doctor in charge of the service ...\u201d"],"27794":["5.The applicant was born in 1963 and is currently in detention in Wronki.","6. The applicant has been serving a prison sentence in Wronki Prison since 31 March 2010.","7.On 19 September 2010 he brought a civil compensation claim before the Szamotu\u0142y District Court. He claimed that the conditions of detention in many of his cells in Wronki Prison were so bad as to amount to a breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. He referred to the fact that the cells were not properly heated in the autumn and winter and had no proper ventilation in the summer, meaning that the prisoners suffered from intense levels of heat. The windows were old and the frames leaked. He further submitted that the toilet facilities were only separated from the cells by a low fibreboard partition, which made even a minimum level of privacy impossible for him.","8.On 21 June 2011 the Szamotu\u0142y District Court refused a request by the applicant to gather evidence by producing photographs and carrying out an on-the-spot inspection of the cells concerned. It closed the hearing and gave judgment, dismissing the applicant\u2019s claim in its entirety.","The court established, referring to evidence submitted by the State Treasury, acting as the legal representative for Wronki Prison, that prisoners had access to sports, cultural and educational activities and medical care. They were provided with personal hygiene items and had appropriate food. Those factors, seen as a whole, alleviated the harm which was an inherent part and consequence of serving prison sentences.","The court further found that the toilet facilities in the applicant\u2019s cells were indeed separated off by fibreboard partitions. This did not provide full privacy, but was sufficient to ensure that the prisoners were out of sight of others when they used the toilet. There was a WC and a washbasin in each toilet facility.","As regards the applicant\u2019s allegations of inadequate ventilation and insufficient heating in the cells, the court found that the cells were well lit and properly ventilated; the windows had been repaired and the heaters had been changed and worked properly. As regards the alleged lack of light, the court found that the applicant had been granted special permission to use an additional reading lamp.","The court was of the view that the State Treasury had not acted unlawfully and that there had been no intention to act in bad faith or to cause harm or damage to the applicant. In the absence of unlawfulness no breach of personal rights could be found. In any event, the conditions in Wronki Prison were not so harsh as to amount to a breach of personal rights.","9.The applicant appealed, arguing that the court had failed to establish the facts of the case correctly, in the main because it had refused to gather evidence in the form of photographs, film or an inspection of the cells. The judgment had therefore been based on insufficient factual findings. Furthermore, in so far as the court had referred to the general conditions in which the applicant served his sentence (quality of the food, medical care, access to cultural and sports activities), those factors had not constituted the basis of his claim. He had complained neither about poor food quality nor about insufficient access to cultural and sports activities. The grounds of his claim had fundamentally related to the sanitary conditions in the cells and, in particular, a lack of privacy when using the toilet. This lack of privacy had been explicitly confirmed by the first-instance court. He reiterated that the lack of a proper divide between the toilets and the cell amounted to a breach of his personal rights and dignity. He further indicated that some of the cells at the prison had toilet facilities that were properly separated from the rest of the cell by normal walls and a door.","10.By a judgment of 6 December 2011 the Pozna\u0144 Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, fully accepting the findings of fact made by the first\u2011instance court and that court\u2019s legal assessment of those facts. In particular, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the nuisance caused by the manner in which cells were fitted with toilet facilities, namely by way of fibreboard partitions, did not exceed the normal difficulties and harm which were inherent in serving a prison sentence."],"27807":["5.The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Voronezh (Voronezh Region).","A.The alleged ill-treatment and the death of the applicant\u2019s son","1.The version of events submitted by the applicant","6.On 9 September 2009, between 10 and 11 a.m., the applicant\u2019s son, MrSergey Lykov, and his friend P. were stopped by police officers at a bus stop in Voronezh. They were given no reasons. Sergey Lykov and P. were then taken to the premises of department no. 6 of the Voronezh Region criminal police (\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e-\u0440\u043e\u0437\u044b\u0441\u043a\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c \u21166 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0433\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u043f\u043e \u0412\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0436\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438) (hereafter, \u201cthe police station\u201d).","7.Inside that police station, a police officer, S., ordered the other police officers present to undress MrLykov and P. and to bind their hands and feet with adhesive tape. S. began punching MrLykov and P. on the head, urging them to confess to all the thefts that they had committed. Faced with their silence, S. and another police officer began to hit each of their heads violently against the ground, as well as against a cupboard and a table. After 15 minutes they stopped striking them and S. ordered one of the police officers to \u201cgive [P.] a fashionable haircut\u201d by cutting locks of his hair with a knife. S. and other police officers then placed plastic bags around the heads of Mr Lykov and P. to suffocate them. Faced with the repeated nature of these actions, Sergey Lykov, who was exhausted, asked S. to tell him what he wanted to know. S. again asked him to confess to the alleged thefts. Mr Lykov then admitted that they had burgled an apartment in 2007. S. ordered the police officers to take Sergey Lykov to another room.","8.The police officers continued to torture P. with electricity. A few minutes later the police officer returned Sergey Lykov to the office. According to P., Sergey Lykov was \u201cin a bad way\u201d, although he had no obvious physical injuries. P. was taken to another office, where he began writing a confession. While he was writing, he heard Sergey Lykov betin to cry out. According to P., his cries lasted a good hour. Shortly afterwards a police officer came into the room where P. was being held and told him that they were going to the scene of the 2007 burglary. P. stated that Sergey Lykov was not with them during this visit and that he had not seen him again afterwards. P. was finally taken to a temporary detention centre, where he was examined by a doctor who noted several physical injuries (bruises and grazing on his arm). P. learned later that Mr Lykov had thrown himself out of a window.","2.The version of events submitted by the Government","9.On 7 September 2009 a decision (\u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0435) was issued ordering P.\u2019s arrest for the purpose of questioning him as a witness.","10.On 9September 2009 police officers found P. in a street in Voronezh, in the company of Sergey Lykov. They asked the two friends to accompany them to the police station. Mr Lykov was invited for the purpose, in particular, of \u201cprovid[ing] useful information\u201d, in line with section11 \u00a7 4 of the Police Act of 18April 1991, then in force. Sergey Lykov accepted the invitation of his own free will.","11.After discussions with police officer T. at the police station, Sergey Lykov decided to confess to a theft purportedly committed on 4September 2009, and provided a written statement to that effect. T. informed Mr Lykov of his constitutional right not to incriminate himself.","12.At 6.50 p.m., after having finished writing his confession, Sergey Lykov suddenly threw himself out of the open window of T.\u2019s office, which was on the fifth floor.","3.Subsequent events","13.At 7.50 p.m. Mr Lykov arrived at hospital with an emergency medical assistance team. He died at 1.10 a.m. on 10 September 2009.","14.Sergey Lykov\u2019s cousin I., who had had no news of him, carried out a search and on 10September 2009 she finally found his corpse in the Voronezh morgue. After examining the body, I. noted that it had signs of numerous physical injuries, in particular a haematoma above the left eyebrow, facial injuries and haematomas on the wrists.","15.On 13 September 2009 I. wrote to the Prosecutor General of Russia, requesting that an investigation be opened into the death of Sergey Lykov. She informed the Prosecutor that her cousin had been arrested on 9September 2009 while he was with his friend P.","16.On 22 September 2009 police officer B. from the Tsentralny district police station in Voronezh issued a decision refusing to open a criminal investigation into the supposed theft, on the street, of a mobile telephone, to which Sergey Lykov had confessed: B. noted that the avowed offence of theft had never been recorded in the registers of complaints by victims of offences, which were held by the police.","B.The preliminary investigation into the death of Sergey Lykov","1.The first part of the investigation","17.One hour after the incident (at 8 p.m.), an investigator, Ya., from the Voronezh Leninskiy district Investigation Committee arrived on the scene and examined the premises, in particular Office no. 55, from where Mr Lykov had fallen. The investigator seized from the scene a gas mask and a telephone, as well as the sheet of paper with SergeyLykov\u2019s written confession. She indicated that she had not found traces of blood in the office, but only on the grass area below the window.","18.By a decision of 21 September 2009, investigator L. from the same department refused to open a criminal investigation into the victim\u2019s death. Referring to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, he concluded that no offence had been committed.","19.The investigator summarised the explanations provided by police officer T., who stated that:","\u2013at 3 p.m. on 9 September 2009 Sergey Lykov and his friend P. had been taken to the police station by police officers S. and F.; the second individual (P.) was being sought on suspicion of theft;","\u2013 during an interview between T. and Mr Lykov, the latter had confessed voluntarily to a theft. Although he had started writing a confession, Mr Lykov suddenly stood up and climbed onto a chair, then onto a table which was beside the open window, and then finally jumped from this window;","\u2013T. had rushed to prevent him from jumping, but he was too late;","\u2013no police officer had struck Sergey Lykov or had forced him to confess to the offence. According to T., Sergey Lykov had no physical injuries;","\u2013during the interview Mr Lykov had been calm, but he complained to T. that his life was difficult, since he had to care for his ill mother.","20.The investigator also summarised the explanation provided by police officer Sa., who stated that:","\u2013at 2 p.m on 9 September 2009 while on patrol in the city, he and two other police officers had seen two individuals on a scooter. Since they had information that an individual suspected of theft was moving about on a scooter, they had stopped the persons concerned for an identity check. They had invited Sergey Lykov and P. to accompany them to the police station and they had agreed;","\u2013on arrival at the police station, Mr Lykov and P. had been separated. Sa. and F. had interviewed P., while T. had had a conversation with Mr Lykov;","\u2013on entering T.\u2019s office at a later point, Sa. was able to note that Sergey Lykov was not handcuffed and had not been struck. He had heard Mr Lykov confess to the theft of a mobile telephone;","\u2013he had not heard Sergey Lykov complain of ill-treatment of any kind;","\u2013 later he had learnt that Mr Lykov had attempted to take his own life.","21.The investigator also noted that in response to his questions, police officer S. had denied any involvement in ill-treatment of Sergey Lykov.","22.At the same time, the investigator noted the statements made by P., to the effect that:","\u2013between noon and 1 p.m. on 9 September 2009 he and Sergey Lykov had been in the city centre when police officers approached, introduced themselves and asked him [and Sergey Lykov] them to accompany them to the police station. They had agreed;","\u2013at the police station, he and Sergey Lykov had been separated and placed in different offices. Shortly afterwards, when passing in the corridor, he had seen Sergey Lykov sitting at a table writing something. He had not seen Sergey Lykov being struck, had not heard him crying out, and had not noticed any physical injury on his person;","\u2013he had heard Sergey Lykov complain of heart pains, but never refer to an intention to commit suicide.","23.The investigator took note of the statements by the applicant, and also of close relatives of the victim, to the effect that he had never expressed thoughts of suicide.","24.The investigator noted the presence in the case file of the written confession drawn up by Mr Lykov shortly before his death.","25.Relying on the information communicated by the hospital in which Mr Lykov had been treated after his fall, the investigator established that death had resulted from Mr Lykov\u2019s fall from the fifth floor. No injuries indicating kicks or punches, or the use of handcuffs, had been found on the corpse.","26.Lastly, the investigator noted the contents of the report from the on-site inspection conducted on 9September 2009 (see paragraph 17 above).","27.On 28June 2010 the decision of 21 September 2009 was set aside by a hierarchically superior civil servant, who ordered an additional investigation, noting, in particular, that it was necessary to:","\u2013find witnesses who could confirm that Sergey Lykov had suicidal thoughts;","\u2013verify that the police officers who had taken Sergey Lykov to the police station had acted in accordance with the law;","\u2013consider whether the police officers who had not ensured the victim\u2019s safety inside the police station bore any criminal liability.","28.In the meantime, on 27October 2009 an autopsy of the body was carried out on the orders of investigator L. and a forensic report was drawn up. In that document, the forensic medical expert noted that death had resulted from multiple fractures to the head, chest and spine, and to the base and dome of the skull. According to the expert, the location of the injuries identified, and the preponderance of internal over external injuries, led to the conclusion that those injuries had originated in [Mr Lykov\u2019s] fall from the fifth floor. The expert concluded that there was no cause-and-effect relationship between the other injuries (hematomas and scratches on the trunk and the lower and upper limbs, namely a hematoma in the fold of the right elbow measuring 4 x 3cm; a scratch on the right forearm measuring 6 x 0.7 cm; a 4.5 x 2cm hematoma on the right carpus; a hematoma on the left shoulder measuring 18 x 14 cm, on which there were scratches of 5 x 2.5 cm; a hematoma on the left knee measuring 7 x 6 cm, on which there was a scratch of 1.5 x 1cm; and an oval-shaped scratch on the left ankle measuring 2 x 1.5 cm) and the death. As to the question of whether there were traces of a struggle or self-defence, the doctor indicated that it was generally accepted in forensic medicine that injuries to the arms and wrists were to be classified in that way. Thus, he noted the presence of a bruise on the right carpus and a scratch on the right forearm. He added that he was unable to ascertain how those injuries had been sustained. Lastly, the doctor noted that the corpse had been deposited in the morgue unclothed.","2.The second part of the investigation","29.By a decision of 8July 2010, investigator Ko. from the same department again refused to open a criminal investigation.","In his reasoning, he quoted from the statements given by police officers T., Sa. and S., by witness P., and also by the applicant and the deceased\u2019s close relatives, already cited in the decision of 21September 2009 (see paragraph 18 above).","30.The investigator also questioned certain individuals who had got to know Sergey Lykov in a caf\u00e9 where they drank alcoholic beverages together. Those persons explained that when Sergey Lykov drank alcohol he became talkative and that, in this intoxicated state, he complained about a lack of money and difficulties with his invalid mother. He had also confided to his companions that he had committed thefts and that, were he arrested, he \u201cwould harm himself\u201d.","31.The investigator also noted a directive, classified as secret, for the attention of police officers. According to that directive, the police were not personally responsible for the life and health of individuals who had freely consented to attend a police station for an interview, \u201cexcept in the event of violation of the rights and freedoms of citizens proclaimed in the Russian Constitution\u201d. Regard being had to that directive and the facts noted, the investigator concluded that officer T. could not be held responsible for the offence of negligence.","32.The investigator concluded that Sergey Lykov\u2019s death had been the result of a voluntary act on the latter\u2019s part. In consequence, the investigator refused to open a criminal investigation against the police officers F., B., Sa. and T. for an abuse of power, on the grounds, firstly, that Sergey Lykov\u2019s arrest had not been illegal, and, secondly, that the police officers had not ill-treated him. He also concluded that there were no grounds for prosecuting the police officers for homicide, assault or incitement to suicide, given that Sergey Lykov\u2019s death \u201chad not been violent\u201d.","33.On 11February 2011 the applicant lodged a judicial appeal against that decision. She complained, inter alia, that her son had been placed in detention without this fact being properly recorded, and that, in consequence, her son had been deprived of legal assistance. Equally, she submitted that the investigation carried out had been incomplete and focused on a hypothesis that was favourable to the police officers. She criticised the investigative authorities for failing to conduct a forensic examination of the gas mask seized in the police station in order to obtain genetic material, including perhaps that of her son. According to the applicant, a handwriting expert\u2019s report should also have been commissioned in order to determine her son\u2019s psychological state when he wrote the confession. Further, referring to the autopsy report, which stated that the corpse had injuries that could be interpreted as traces of a struggle or self-defence, the applicant accused the authorities of failing to explain the origin of those injuries, and the cause of her son\u2019s death.","34.On 18 April 2011 the Leninskiy District Court of Voronezh upheld the contested decision. In its reasoning, the court reiterated the arguments set out in the investigator\u2019s decision and considered that the investigation had been complete and thorough. In response to the applicant\u2019s arguments, the court expressed the opinion that a handwriting analysis was unnecessary, since the deceased\u2019s family had confirmed the handwriting\u2019s authenticity. Equally, a DNA examination of samples from the gas mask was unnecessary, since Sergey Lykov\u2019s death had not resulted from suffocation. Thus, the court concluded that there was no evidence in support of the idea that the deceased had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police officers or that he had been arrested or detained unlawfully.","35.On 11 August 2011 the Voronezh Regional Court upheld the decision, on appeal, for the same reasons.","36.On 11 October 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer sent a letter to the head of the Investigation Committee of Russia, asking him to open a new criminal investigation into the death of Mr Lykov and to entrust this investigation to the department for investigations into offences committed by State employees of the armed forces, a department that was part of the Investigation Committee of Russia in the Tsentralny federal constituency. The lawyer expressed the fear that if the requested investigation were to be carried out by investigators from the Voronezh regional department of the Investigation Committee, that investigation would be ineffective. She argued that, without having available to them locally-based agents to gather the necessary information, the investigators from the latter department would have no choice but to use officers from the Ministry of the Interior, among whom might be those involved in the victim\u2019s death.","37.On 14 November 2012 the Voronezh regional department of the Investigation Committee dismissed that request, considering that the decision of 8July 2010 had been in accordance with the law and that there were no grounds for revoking it and opening a criminal investigation.","C.Witness statements by P. and the events concerning him","38.On 10September 2009, the day after his arrest, P. was taken to a temporary detention centre (\u201cIVS\u201d). During his admission, a doctor\u2019s assistant noted the following physical injuries: a bruise on the left shoulder-blade, scratches on the elbows and knees, and a bruise on the right ear. The medical assistant drew up a report recording the injuries and noting that they were the result of a road-traffic accident that had occurred on 9September 2009. The medical examination was carried out in the presence of police officers who had participated in the beating. According to P., it was the police officers who provided the medical assistant with the road-accident version of events, while he himself, for fear of reprisals, had been obliged to confirm it.","39.On 11September 2009 P. was transferred to remand prison no. 1 in Voronezh. On admission, he was examined by a doctor who found the same injuries as those observed in the IVS.","40.On an unspecified date in September 2009 P. lodged a complaint about the alleged ill-treatment at the police station. According to P., this complaint led to him being taken on the following day to the police station, where he was beating in reprisal. Then \u2013 again according to his submissions \u2013, P. withdrew his complaint in fear for his life when investigator Ya. came to the remand prison to question him about the circumstances of the ill-treatment. According to P., in response to his question about possible consequences for the police officers involved in beating Mr Lykov and himself, investigator Ya. replied that, in any event, there had been none.","41.On 5 October 2009 inspector Ya. from the Voronezh regional department of the Investigation Committee issued a decision refusing to open a criminal investigation. She recounted the explanation provided by police officer Sa., who had denied any ill-treatment, and, noting P.\u2019s withdrawal of his complaint, concluded that no ill-treatment had occurred.","42.In the meantime, the criminal investigation against P. continued, and resulted in an examination on the merits by the Voronezh regional Court.At the public hearing on 1February 2011 P. made a statement. He withdrew the account given by him in the context of the investigation into the death of Sergey Lykov. P. described the events of 9September 2009 as they are set out in paragraphs 6-8 of the present judgment. He added that police officer S. had threatened him if he were to withdraw his confession to the thefts or make statements about the events surrounding the arrest and death of Mr Lykov. He added that S. had beaten him again prior to the court hearing concerning his placement in pre-trial detention, in order to prevent him lodging a complaint before the judge. He also alleged that he had been subjected to unprovoked attacks by the administration of the remand prison in which he was detained. P.asked to be placed under protection in his capacity as a witness of the ill-treatment inflicted on Sergey Lykov by police officers. He also asked that criminal proceedings be brought against police officer S. for abuse of power and for the murder of Mr Lykov. P. suggested that the criminal investigation into the death be reopened.","43.The judge ordered that P.\u2019s written statement be included in the case file. With regard to P.\u2019s requests in respect of S. and Mr Lykov, the judge replied that the latter\u2019s death was unrelated to the ongoing trial; as for S., he was not a party to the trial proceedings. In consequence, she dismissed those requests.","44.At one of the subsequent hearings P. complained that, after the above statement, the remand prison\u2019s administration threatened him.","45.On 30 June 2011 the prosecutor for the Leninskiy district of Voronezh set aside the decision refusing to open a criminal investigation in respect of P.\u2019s supposed torturers. The prosecutor ordered an additional investigation. The Court has not been informed of the outcome of this investigation.","46.After serving his sentence, P. was released. He submits that he has received several threats in connection with the present case. For fear of reprisals, he moved to Sweden. In his letter of 20 April 2014 to the Investigation Committee, sent from abroad, P. offered to act as a witness, but he was never questioned.","D.Events occurring after the application was communicated to the Government","47.On 23 December 2013 a hierarchically superior State employee in the Voronezh regional department of the Investigation Committee set aside the decision of 8July 2010, noting that the department had received new information concerning the death of Sergey Lykov from the European Court of Human Rights. He ordered an additional investigation, in particular so that P. could be questioned and his allegations of ill-treatment verified.","48.On 10 January 2014 the deputy head of the Voronezh regional department of the Investigation Committee ordered the opening of a criminal investigation within the meaning of Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In his reasoning, he noted that Ms Lykova\u2019s application, which was being examined by the European Court of Human Rights, contained elements suggesting that Mr Lykov had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police officers.","49.On 16 January 2014 investigator L. from the Investigation Committee ordered a second forensic medical report, to answer, inter alia, the following questions: whether Mr Lykov\u2019s body showed injuries and, if so, where; if the body showed injuries resulting from a struggle, ill-treatment, the use of handcuffs or restraint of the upper or lower limbs using adhesive tape; and whether there were signs of electrocution. The Government have not indicated whether that medical report was drawn up. In any event, no expert report was added to their observations.","50.The investigator questioned police officers Sa. and F.; the first reiterated the explanation he had provided in 2009 (see paragraph 17 above), and the second gave similar explanations. The investigator also questioned a certain V., who allegedly stated that he occasionally drank alcoholic beverages in Sergey Lykov\u2019s company and indicated that the latter was a drug addict who committed thefts to obtain money, and that he had spoken to him about his difficulties with his invalid mother. According to V., Sergey had confided in him that, if he were arrested, he \u201cwould harm himself\u201d.","51.The investigator questioned the deceased\u2019s grandmother and cousin, who stated that, to their knowledge, Sergey did not take drugs, did not abuse alcohol, and had never expressed thoughts of suicide.","52.On 13 January 2014 the investigator issued a decision granting the applicant victim status.","E.The internal investigation within the Ministry of the Interior","53.On 27 October 2009, at the close of an internal investigation into the police officers\u2019 conduct, the Internal Security Service of the Voronezh regional department drew up a report; its conclusions can be summarised as follows: referring to the decision of 21 September 2009 (see paragraph17 above), the regional department considered that Sergey Lykov had indeed taken his own life and that no fault on the part of the police officers had been established. At the same time, the Service described as a lack of professionalism the fact that police officer T. had not taken sufficient care in controlling Mr Lykov\u2019s conduct, a shortcoming that had enabled the latter individual to throw himself from the window."],"27847":["5.The applicants were born in 1988 and 1992 and were at the time of the introduction of the application detained in Hermes Block, Lyster Barracks Detention Centre, in Hal Far.","A.Background to the case","1.Ms Moxamed Ismaacil","6.Ms Moxamed Ismaacil, the first applicant, entered Malta in an irregular manner by boat on 16 August 2012. Upon arrival, she was registered by the immigration police and given an identification number(12U-007).","7.At that point she was presented with two documents, one containing a Return Decision and the other a Removal Order (no copies available). According to the first applicant, the contents of the decision in English were not explained to her, although she could not understand the language. According to the Government, in practice the immigration police inform the migrants verbally in English about their right to appeal and the migrants translate for each other.","8.The first applicant was further provided with an information leaflet entitled \u201cYour entitlements, responsibilities and obligations while in detention\u201d. She claimed that the document was provided in a language she could not understand. According to the Government she did not request a booklet in another language.","9.In accordance with Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act(see Relevant domestic law), the first applicant was detained. She was initially detained in Zone D and later moved to an unspecified Zone in Lyster Barracks.","2.Ms Abdirahman Warsame","10.Ms Abdirahman Warsame, the second applicant, also entered Malta in an irregular manner by boat on 16 August 2012. Upon arrival, she was registered by the immigration police and given an identification number(12U-009).","11.She was then presented with two documents in English, one containing a Return Decision and the other a Removal Order. The Return Decision stated that she was a prohibited immigrant by virtue of Article5 of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) because she was in Malta \u201cwithout means of subsistence and liable to become a charge on public funds\u201d. The Return Decision also informed the applicant that her stay was being terminated and of the possibility to apply for a period of voluntary departure. The Removal Order was based on the consideration that the applicant\u2019s request for a period of voluntary departure had been rejected. It informed the second applicant that she would remain in custody until removal is affected and that an entry ban would be issued against her. The two documents further informed her of the right to appeal against the Decision and Order before the Immigration Appeals Board (\u201cthe IAB\u201d) within three working days. According to the Government, in practice the immigration police inform the migrants verbally in English about their right to appeal and the migrants translate for each other.","12.She was further provided with an information leaflet entitled \u201cYour entitlements, responsibilities and obligations while in detention\u201d. None of these documents, in English, were explained to Ms Abdirahman Warsame who could not understand the language. According to the Government the second applicant did not request a booklet in another language.","13.In accordance with Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act (see Relevant domestic law), the second applicant was detained. She was detained in Lyster Barracks (Zone unspecified).","B.Asylum proceedings","14.A few days following their arrival both the applicants were called for an information session provided by the Staff of the Office of the Refugee Commissioner. They were assisted in submitting the Preliminary Questionnaire (PQ), thereby registering their wish to apply for asylum under Article 8 of the Refugees Act, Chapter 420 of the Laws of Malta (see Relevant domestic law below).","15.Two months later, on 2 and 9 November 2012 respectively, they were called for a refugee status determination interview. By decisions of 19January 2013, communicated to the applicants on 31 January 2013, the Refugee Commissioner (RC) rejected their applications on the basis that they had failed to substantiate their claim that they were born and lived in Halane village, in Qoryooley district, in Lower Shabelle Region, in southern Somalia. Thus, they did not fulfil the eligibility criteria for either refugee status or subsidiary protection.","16.On 7 February 2013, with the aid of lawyers from the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) the applicants appealed against the decisions. The Refugee Appeals Board (RAB) informed the applicants that they had until 18March 2013 to present submissions. This time-limit was extended and appeal submissions were lodged in April 2013.","17.By the date their application was lodged with this Court, that is eleven months and three weeks from the date of their arrival, no decision had been issued. The applicants were hoping to be released on the lapse of twelve months from their arrival as per normal domestic practice.","C.Conditions of detention","1.Ms Moxamed Ismaacil","18.Ms Moxamed Ismaacil, the first applicant, was initially detained in Zone D and later moved to an unspecified Zone in Lyster Barracks, in conditions which she considered prison-like and basic, although she considered Zone D to be better than the latter unspecified Zone. She explained that the place was overcrowded and noisy, and it was hard to keep it clean. There were twenty people in one dormitory and ninety-five people in the zone, with only one fridge. In summer the heat was unbearable and in winter it was too cold. They were fed the same food every day, and only allowed one hour of sunshine per day. She maintained that male detainees held in the upper floors often abused them verbally. Other factors which she considered had to be taken into consideration were her young age, her inability to communicate in any language except for Somali, and the fact that the detention centre was staffed exclusively by men. She further noted the absence of access to effective medical care, given that no interpreters were available. She had visited the clinic in the detention centre several times because she was sick, and was repeatedly told to drink water and take paracetamol tablets. Often no doctors were available and it was the soldiers at the detention centre who decided whether the issue warranted emergency treatment.","2.Ms Abdirahman Warsame","19.Ms Abdirahman Warsame explained that she endured the same circumstances mentioned above by Ms Moxamed Ismaacil. She added that she was depressed and that she often felt upset and agitated, at times she would stop drinking and eating and then lose consciousness. Despite her gastric pains, no special diet was provided for her and the doctors only administered paracetamol, to the extent that she started vomiting blood. In June 2013 she was hospitalized for a week. She alleges that she had become very weak physically and started suffering from memory loss.","D.Latest developments","1.Ms Moxamed Ismaacil","20.Ms Moxamed Ismaacil was released from detention on 14August 2013. At the time she was still waiting for the outcome of her appeal before the RAB. Her appeal was eventually rejected on 15 October 2013.","2.Ms Abdirahman Warsame","21.Ms Abdirahman Warsame was also released from detention on 14August 2013. At the time she was still waiting for the outcome of her appeal before the RAB. Her appeal was eventually rejected on 14 July 2014.","23. The Report to the Maltese Government on the visit to Malta carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 26 to 30 September 2011, published on 4 July 2013, in so far as relevant in connection with Lyster Barracks, reads as follows:","\u201c44.At the time of the visit, Lyster Detention Centre was accommodating 248foreign nationals (including 89 women), in five different detention units.","...","47. More generally, the CPT has serious misgivings about the fact that female detainees at Lyster Detention Centre were frequently supervised exclusively by male detention officers, since only one female officer was employed by the Detention Service at the time of the visit.","The CPT recommends that the Maltese authorities take steps as a matter of priority to ensure the presence of at least one female officer around the clock at Lyster Detention Centre.","48. As was the case in 2008, a number of detainees complained about disrespectful behaviour and racist remarks by detention officers (in particular in the Warehouses at Safi Detention Centre). The CPT reiterates its recommendation that the Maltese authorities remind all members of staff working in detention centres for foreigners that such behaviour is not acceptable and will be punished accordingly.","55. At both Lyster [and Safi Detention Centres], material conditions have improved since the 2008 visit. In particular, at Lyster Barracks, these improvements are significant: the Hermes Block, which had been in a very poor state of repair at the time of the 2008 visit, had been completely refurbished and the Tent Compound, which had also been criticised by the Committee in the report on the 2008 visit, had been dismantled. At Safi Barracks, additional renovation work had been carried out in Block B. It is noteworthy that all foreign nationals received personal hygiene products on a regular basis and were also supplied with clothes and footwear.","...","56. At Lyster Detention Centre, the situation had clearly improved as regards activities. Each zone comprised a communal room, and groups of detainees could attend English-language courses which were organised by an NGO (usually, three times a week for two hours per group). Further, single women and couples were provided with food so that they could prepare meals themselves in a kitchenette. Every day, detainees could go outside and play football or volleyball in a rather small yard for a total of two hours.","...","60. As regards contact with the outside world, the CPT welcomes the fact that, in both detention centres visited, foreign nationals could receive telephone calls from the outside. They were also were provided with telephone cards free of charge on a regular basis, although these were limited to a total of 5\u20ac every two months.","61. That said, at Lyster Detention Centre, a number of detainees who had family members or friends in Malta complained about the fact that they were not allowed to receive any visits, but that \u201cvisitors\u201d could only come to the centre on Sundays to deliver parcels to staff at the gate for the attention of a detainee. This state of affairs was subsequently confirmed by staff.","The CPT calls upon the Maltese authorities to take steps to ensure that foreign nationals are allowed to receive visits on a regular basis and that specific facilities are set up for that purpose. Relevant information on the visiting arrangements should also be included in the information brochure \u201cYour Entitlements, Responsibilities and Obligations while in Detention\u201d which is given to detainees.","62. In the report on the 2008 visit, the CPT invited the Maltese authorities to consider adding the Committee to the list of international bodies to\/from which detainees could send\/receive letters confidentially (and without bearing the cost of postage). Regrettably, the authorities had not taken any steps to this end, despite their commitment given in their response to the above-mentioned report. During consultations with the delegation, the Commander of the Detention Service affirmed to the delegation that appropriate steps would be taken without delay. The Committee would like to receive updated information on this point.\u201d","24.The 9th General report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the \u201cCPT\u201d) on the CPT\u2019s activities covering the period 1January to 31 December 1998, at point 26, reads as follows:","\u201cMixed gender staffing is another safeguard against ill-treatment in places of detention, in particular where juveniles are concerned. The presence of both male and female staff can have a beneficial effect in terms of both the custodial ethos and in fostering a degree of normality in a place of detention.","Mixed gender staffing also allows for appropriate staff deployment when carrying out gender sensitive tasks, such as searches. In this respect, the CPT wishes to stress that, regardless of their age, persons deprived of their liberty should only be searched by staff of the same gender and that any search which requires an inmate to undress should be conducted out of the sight of custodial staff of the opposite gender; these principles apply a fortiori in respect of juveniles.\u201d","25.Rule 53 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, reads as follows:","\u201c(1) In an institution for both men and women, the part of the institution set aside for women shall be under the authority of a responsible woman officer who shall have the custody of the keys of all that part of the institution.","(2) No male member of the staff shall enter the part of the institution set aside for women unless accompanied by a woman officer.","(3) Women prisoners shall be attended and supervised only by women officers. This does not, however, preclude male members of the staff, particularly doctors and teachers, from carrying out their professional duties in institutions or parts of institutions set aside for women.\u201d","26.The report \u201cNot here to stay: Report of the International Commission of Jurists on its visit to Malta on 26 \u2013 30 September 2011\u201d, May 2012, pointed out, inter alia, that:","\u201cThe ICJ delegation found a lack of leisure facilities in all three detention facilities visited. ... In the Lyster Barracks there was also a small recreation yard, but without direct access from the detention section. Detainees had two hours per day of \u201cair\u201d in the courtyard. They reportedly seldom received visits from outside, apart from the occasional NGO.\u201d","27.Bridging Borders, a JRS Malta report on the implementation of a project to provide shelter and psychosocial support to vulnerable asylum seekers between June 2011 and June 2012, highlights the fact that not all medication prescribed by medical personnel in detention is provided free by the Government health service. In fact the said report notes that during the lifetime of the project the organisation purchased medication for 130detainees.","28.Care in Captivity, a more recent JRS Malta report on the provision of care for detained asylum seekers experiencing mental health problems (research period December 2013 to June 2014), documented several obstacles to quality healthcare including: lack of availability of interpreters; lack of attendance for follow-up appointments following discharge to detention (in seven out of seventy-four cases); and failure to dispense prescribed psychotropic medication in some cases. It held that:","\u201cIn this regard, the current system where, after discharge from the ASU ward, the responsibility for continuity of care, in terms of attendance of hospital appointments and dispensation of medication, falls under detention health care providers and custodial staff appears not to be operating effectively.\u201d"],"27897":["6.The applicant was born in 1991. He is currently detained in a special facility for temporary detention of foreign nationals in Moscow.","A.Background events","7.The applicant is an ethnic Uzbek who lived in Jalal-Abad Region, Kyrgyzstan. In June 2010 the region was a scene of mass disorders and inter-ethnic clashes between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.","8.In June 2010 the applicant was present at the barricades raised by ethnic Uzbeks near Suzak village. On 12 June 2010 he was wounded by a Molotov cocktail and was admitted to hospital on account of severe burns. He was released from hospital on 24 June 2010.","9.Eventually the applicant fled Kyrgyzstan to Russia, together with many other ethnic Uzbeks, to avoid ethnically motivated violence.","10.In 2012 the Kyrgyz authorities opened a criminal case against the applicant charging him with a number of violent crimes allegedly committed in the course of the riots of June 2010. On 26 June 2012 the Suzak District Court in the Jalal-Abad region ordered in absentia the applicant\u2019s detention.","B.The applicant\u2019s arrest and subsequent proceedings","1.The applicant\u2019s detention and the expulsion proceedings","11.On 27 January 2015 the applicant was arrested in Moscow because he was not carrying an identity document. He was placed in the Special Facility for the Temporary Detention of Foreign Nationals, Moscow (\u201cthe detention centre for aliens\u201d), run by the Russian Federal Migration Authority (\u201cthe FMS\u201d).","12.On 28 January 2015 the Gagarinskiy District Court, Moscow (\u201cthe district court\u201d) found the applicant guilty of an administrative offence punishable under Article18.8\u00a73 (\u201cbreach of rules on entry and stay of foreign nationals in Moscow, St Petersburg, the Moscow Region and the Leningrad Region\u201d) of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences (\u201cthe CAO\u201d) and sentenced him as follows: \u201c[...] a punishment in the form of an administrative fine in the amount of 5,000Russian roubles (RUB) [combined] with administrative removal and placement in the centre for detention of foreign nationals, [where he will remain] until the entry into force of that decision and until administrative removal from the Russian Federation under Article 32.10 of the Code of Administrative Offences\u201d.","13.On 4 February 2015 the applicant appealed against the District Court\u2019s decision arguing that in Kyrgyzstan he would be subjected to ill\u2011treatment like many other ethnic Uzbeks. It appears that the appeal documentation reached the District Court on 12 February 2015. The appeal hearing was scheduled for 10March 2015 but was then postponed until 20March 2015.","14.On 10 March 2015 the Court granted the applicant\u2019s request for interim measures and indicated to the Government that the applicant should not be expelled or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Kyrgyzstan or another country for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.","15.On 12 March 2015 the applicant\u2019s relatives were told by the officials of the detention centre for aliens that the applicant would be expelled from Russia on that day. At about 8.30 p.m. the applicant contacted his lawyer stating that he was in Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow. At 9.30 p.m. the lawyer arrived at the airport and was informed by the border control personnel that the applicant had not boarded the plane scheduled for Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. State bailiffs informed the lawyer that the applicant had been brought to Sheremetyevo but had later been returned to the detention centre for aliens. At 10 p.m. a duty officer of the detention centre confirmed to the lawyer that the applicant was back in the facility.","16.On 20 March 2015 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe Appeal Court\u201d) upheld the District Court\u2019s decision of 28 January 2015 on appeal. The Appeal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations of the risk of ill\u2011treatment stating that \u201cthe documents submitted by the [applicant\u2019s] defence d[id] not demonstrate a breach of rights and freedoms of the person in question\u201d and reasoned that \u201c[a]ssessment of actions by law-enforcement agencies of a foreign State, as well as of [legal] acts carried out by them f[ell] outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court examining a case concerning an administrative offence committed in the Russian Federation by a foreign national\u201d.","17.On 10 April 2015 the Government informed the Court that \u201cthe proceedings on the administrative removal of the applicant have been suspended\u201d and that the applicant \u201ccontinues to be held in the detention centre for foreign nationals of the Moscow department of the Federal Migration Service\u201d (\u201cthe Moscow FMS\u201d).","2.Application for refugee status","18.On 4 February 2015 the applicant applied for refugee status arguing that in Kyrgyzstan he would face persecution based on his ethnic origin.","19.On 12 March 2015 the Moscow FMS dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for refugee status. The parties have not provided the Court with a copy of the decision.","20.The applicant challenged the decision before the Basmannyy District Court, Moscow. The proceedings are pending.","C.Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant and subsequent events","21.According to the applicant, on 24 February 2015 he was severely beaten by officers of a special police squad in the detention centre for aliens. He received rubber-truncheon blows to his back, buttocks and heels.","22.The applicant notified his lawyer accordingly and provided mobile phone photos of his injured back.","23.On 25 February 2015 two lawyers visited the applicant along with several other persons awaiting expulsion in the detention centre for aliens. The applicant and other detainees informed them that regular beatings of detainees had begun on 17 February 2015 following unsuccessful suicide attempts by several inmates. The applicant claimed that the officers of the special police squad had beaten him on 24 February 2015 with rubber truncheons on his back, heels and buttocks.","24.On 26 February 2015 the lawyers reported the beatings to the main investigative department of the Moscow Investigative Committee. They emphasised that the medical staff of the detention centre had refused to enter the detainees\u2019 injuries into the medical logs. The lawyers requested that the beatings of the detainees, including the applicant, be investigated. In support of their request they enclosed, among other things, the applicant\u2019s photos showing injuries to his back.","25.On 19 March 2015 the lawyers\u2019 complaint was forwarded to the Troitskiy district investigation department of the Moscow Investigative Committee.","26.It appears that no investigation into the applicant\u2019s alleged beatings in the detention centre for aliens has been instituted.","37.For a number of relevant reports and further information, see Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia (no. 49747\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 30-46, 16 October 2012), and Kadirzhanov and Mamashev v. Russia (nos. 42351\/13 and 47823\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 72-77, 17 July 2014).","38.The Kyrgyzstan chapter of \u201cAmnesty International Report 2014\/15: The State of The World\u2019s Human Rights\u201d, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:","\u201cThe authorities failed to take effective measures to address allegations of torture and other ill-treatment and bring perpetrators to justice. No impartial and effective investigation took place into human rights violations, including crimes against humanity, committed during the June 2010 violence and its aftermath. MPs initiated draft laws that if adopted would have a negative impact on civil society. Prisoner of conscience Azimjan Askarov remained in detention.","TORTURE AND OTHER ILL-TREATMENT","Torture and other ill-treatment persisted despite a programme of independent monitoring of places of detention and the establishment of the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. On 20December 2013, the UN Committee against Torture issued its concluding observations on the second periodic report on Kyrgyzstan. The Committee expressed grave concern \u201cabout the ongoing and widespread practice of torture and ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, in particular while in police custody to extract confessions\u201d. On 23 April 2014, the UN Human Rights Committee considered the second periodic report of the Kyrgyz Republic.","Both Committees highlighted the failure of the authorities to promptly, impartially and fully investigate allegations of torture and other ill-treatment and to prosecute perpetrators. They expressed concern about the lack of a full and effective investigation into the June 2010 violence.1 The Committees also urged Kyrgyzstan to address these concerns by taking immediate and effective measures to prevent acts of torture and ill-treatment, by tackling impunity, prosecuting perpetrators and conducting investigations into all allegations of torture and other ill-treatment, including in cases related to the June 2010 violence.","On 16 June 2014, the Jalal-Abad regional human rights organization Spravedlivost (Justice) recorded two incidents of torture during a monitoring visit to the Jalal-Abad temporary detention centre. A medical practitioner, who was part of the monitoring group, documented the signs of torture. One detainee alleged that police officers had beaten him with hands and fists and a book, and put a plastic bag over his head. He was handcuffed to a radiator until the next day. He suffered concussion as a result of the ill-treatment. Another detainee alleged that police officers hit him in the larynx, kicked him in the stomach and beat his head with a book. Spravedlivost submitted complaints to the Jalal-Abad city prosecutor. After conducting an initial check and ordering two forensic medical examinations, the city prosecutor nevertheless refused to open criminal investigations into these allegations.","In 2014 the European Court of Human Rights issued three judgments against Russia, in which it stated that if ethnic Uzbek applicants were to be extradited to Kyrgyzstan, they would be at risk of torture or other ill-treatment.","IMPUNITY","Criminal investigations into allegations of torture were rare. In the first half of 2014, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office registered 109 complaints, but only in nine cases were criminal investigations initiated; of these only three went to trial. Trials were ongoing at the end of the year.","The media reported that on 26 November 2013, the Sverdlovsk District Court of Bishkek handed down the first ever conviction for torture under Article 305-1 of the Criminal Code. Police officer Adilet Motuev was sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. The Court found that he had illegally brought a man to a police station after accusing him of stealing a mobile phone. Adilet Motuev threatened the man and forced him to confess to the theft by squeezing the handcuffs and putting a plastic bag on his head and suffocating him. However, in 2014 the Court of Second Instance acquitted Adilet Motuev of all torture charges and changed the sentence to two years\u2019 imprisonment for unauthorized conduct of an investigation.","The authorities failed to take any steps to fairly and effectively investigate the June 2010 violence and its aftermath in the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad. Lawyers defending ethnic Uzbeks detained in the context of the violence continued to be targeted for their work, threatened and physically attacked, even in the courtroom, with no accountability for the perpetrators.\u201d","39.The Kyrgyzstan chapter of Human Rights Watch\u2019s \u201cWorld Report 2015\u201d reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:","\u201cSince the outbreak of ethnic violence in June 2010, Kyrgyzstan\u2019s flawed justice process has produced long prison sentences for mostly ethnic Uzbeks after convictions marred by torture-tainted confessions and other due process violations. Seven further cases related to crimes committed during the violence are pending, including that of a man detained in July 2014. All defendants are ethnic Uzbeks, reinforcing concerns of judicial bias.","Impunity for violent physical and verbal attacks at some hearings continued in 2014, undermining defendants\u2019 fair trial rights. After a January hearing in the case of Mahamad Bizurukov, an ethnic Uzbek defendant standing trial for June 2010-related crimes, the United States embassy issued a statement expressing deep concern.","...","Although the government acknowledges that torture occurs in Kyrgyzstan, impunity for torture remains the norm. Criminal cases into allegations of ill-treatment or torture are rare, and investigations and trials are delayed or ineffective.","In its June concluding observations, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) expressed concern about \u201cwidespread torture and ill-treatment of children\u201d in detention and closed institutions and called for prompt and effective independent investigations.","According to statistics provided by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office to Golos Svobody, a local anti-torture group, authorities declined to open criminal investigations into 100 of 109 registered complaints of torture in the first half of 2014.","Monitors from the National Center for the Prevention of Torture encountered some problems accessing places of detention. After one incident in March, the center filed a complaint against the director of the Issyk Kul region temporary detention facility for refusing the monitors entry, but at time of writing the director had not been held accountable.\u201d"],"27919":["5.The applicant was born in 1956 and is currently detained in Giurgiu Prison.","6.For the last nine years the applicant had been convicted several times and he had been detained in various prisons. For certain periods of time he had been held in the Jilava and Rahova prison hospitals.","7.On 1 November 2007 the applicant was convicted by the Arad County Court on two counts of robbery and theft and was sentenced to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. The court also ordered the applicant\u2019s committal to the psychiatric section of the Bucharest Jilava Prison Hospital until his recovery.","A.Conditions of detention","1.The applicant\u2019s account","8.In his application forms and letters sent to the Court since 2009, the applicant complained of the severe overcrowding he had had to endure in Gala\u0163i Prison, where thirteen to fifteen detainees were held in a cell of between 20 and 24 sq. m, as well as in Rahova and Jilava Prisons.","9.The applicant also alleged that the quality of food and drinking water had been very poor in these prisons, that he had not always been served a diet in accordance with his Muslim religious beliefs and that most of the time he had been starving as the portions had not been sufficient.","10.In all three prisons hot water had only been provided for short periods of time in which there had not been enough time to brush his teeth. Furthermore, in Jilava Prison there had not been enough cold water provided.","11.The applicant further alleged that, although he had no financial resources and had had no family to help him, the prison authorities in all three prisons had failed to provide him with the necessary clothes, toilet paper, soap or toiletries to brush his teeth.","2.The Government\u2019s account","(a)Gala\u0163i Prison","12.In Gala\u0163i Prison the applicant was held for almost eight months in sixdifferent cells including in the infirmary and the \u201chunger strike\u201d (refuz de hran\u0103) cell. The cells in this prison are approximately 24 sq. m with a maximum of fifteen beds. The applicant shared the cells with a maximum of eleven other prisoners (2.1 sq. m of space per person, including the space occupied by beds and other furniture).","13.Cold water was available at various intervals for a total of sevenhours per day and was not available between 9 p.m. and 6:30 a.m. The quality of the drinking water was certified by the Gala\u0163i Public Health Authority.","14.The applicant received a diet in accordance with his religious beliefs and the composition of the daily menu was in line with the regulations.","15.Toiletries were provided as the budget allowed. During the period of almost eight months that the applicant spent in Gala\u0163i Prison he received the following: two tubes of toothpaste, six razors, four tubes of shaving cream, nine bars of poor quality soap, six rolls of toilet paper, two toothbrushes and washing powder.","16.Throughout his detention in Gala\u0163i Prison the applicant received no visits and was considered unfit for work. He did not have any income.","(b)Rahova Prison","17.The applicant was held in Rahova Prison for six months and fourdays. He was placed in cells measuring 21 sq. m which he shared with nine other prisoners (2.1 sq. m of space per person including beds and other furniture). The cells had bathrooms equipped with two sinks, a shower and a toilet. Cold water was constantly available and hot water was twice per week following a schedule.","18.Food was prepared in accordance with the standards and regulations. Renovation of the food preparation and storage areas were under way when the Government\u2019s observations were being submitted.","19.The Government submitted that upon their placement in a detention facility, prisoners received one set of bed linen.","20.Throughout his detention in Rahova Prison the applicant received no visits, was considered unfit for work and did not have any income.","(c)Jilava Prison","21.The applicant was detained in Jilava Prison for twenty-two days. For a few days he shared a cell measuring 40.28 sq. m with twenty-seven prisoners; there were thirty beds as well as other items of furniture (1.43 sq. m of space per person including beds and other furniture). This cell was equipped with two toilets and two sinks where cold water was constantly available. The rest of the time he was held in the infirmary where he had approximately 6 sq. m of personal space.","22.Hot water was provided in common shower facilities according to a pre-established schedule for two hours on Mondays and Fridays for half of the prison and Tuesdays and Saturdays for the other half. In one of the infirmary wards, where the applicant spent fourteen days, two showers with hot water were available for up to seven prisoners, for the same periods as the general schedule (two hours per week).","23.During the twenty-two days he spent in this prison, the applicant received one roll of toilet paper, a razor and one tube of shaving cream.","24.The Government alleged that on 17 May 2013 the applicant also received clothing that he could use during his stay in this prison but they submitted no documents in support of this claim.","25.The applicant received the \u201cMuslim menu\u201d in accordance with the internal regulations.","26.The applicant had access to the exercise yard for six hours per day.","27.Throughout his detention in Jilava Prison the applicant received no visits and did not have any income.","28.On 11 June 2013 the applicant was transferred to Giurgiu Prison.","3.The applicant\u2019s complaints about the conditions of detention","29.The applicant lodged numerous complaints with the prison authorities or the post-sentencing judge outlining his dissatisfaction with the overcrowding, the poor quality of the drinking water or the quality and quantity of the food he received. He asked on several occasions to be placed in a single occupancy cell and to be given certain foods such as fried eggs or fried potatoes.","30.These complaints were always rejected as being ill-founded.","31.On 30 September 2009, the Bucharest District Court rejected with final effect the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the lack of adequate provision of drinking water in Jilava Prison, reasoning that this situation was a result of budgetary constraints. Another complaint lodged with the delegate judge while the applicant was being held in Rahova Prison has on its reverse side the note \u201cTransferred\u201d.","32.The complaints about overcrowding were always solved with the conclusion that the assignment of detainees to sections and cells was a function of the prison\u2019s administration and placement in individual cells was not possible and was not allowed by law.","33.On several occasions the applicant complained to the post-sentencing judge that the food served in prison was of very poor quality and the portions were not adequate. All his complaints were rejected as ill-founded as the post-sentencing judge considered that the applicant\u2019s allegations had been contradicted by the information submitted by the authorities of the prisons concerned.","34.On 7 March 2013 while he was held in Rahova Prison the applicant requested one pair of shoes, two pairs of socks and one tracksuit. A note on the request says that it shall be examined depending on stocks, but there is no subsequent mention of whether the applicant received any of the items requested.","B.Medical treatment","1.The applicant\u2019s medical condition and treatment","35.On July 2009, following a dental examination in Rahova Prison Hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with periodontitis (I and II degree) and frontal, lateral and terminal edentulism. The doctor prescribed specific periodontitis treatment, a mobile prosthesis and a liquid or semi-liquid diet until the installation of the prosthesis.","36.Since then, the applicant had been taken to see a dentist on numerous occasions upon his requests following bouts of inflammation of the gums or pain. He was consistently prescribed symptomatic treatment with antibiotic or anti-inflammatory drugs. On these occasions the doctors would repeat the prescription for a liquid or semi-liquid diet.","37.In November 2009 the applicant was diagnosed with chronic generalised marginal periodontitis and was prescribed antibiotics, anti-inflammatory drugs and hygienisation of the oral cavity by a dentist within the prison system. On the same occasion he was also diagnosed with inflammation of the salivary glands and surgery was prescribed, which was performed on 28 March 2013.","38.On 11 May 2010 the applicant was diagnosed with a duodenal ulcer and on 11 August 2011 with chronic gastroduodenitis.","39.On 21 July 2011 during a medical examination in Gala\u0163i Prison the applicant, who had been previously diagnosed with several personality disorders, was diagnosed as showing symptoms of paranoia; it was recommended that he be committed to the psychiatric section of the Poarta Alb\u0103 Prison Hospital.","40.Between 15 and 19 October 2012 the applicant was hospitalised for an acute inflammation of the salivary glands and generalised stomatitis. He was released with a prescription to eat liquid and semi-liquid food, to brush his teeth three times per day, to take antibiotics and to use mouthwash.","41.The applicant had one tooth extracted on 29 November 2012.","42.On 24 February 2014 the applicant was taken to the prison hospital with congestion and swelling of the gums. He was diagnosed with, among other conditions, chronic acute otitis, generalised stomatitis, chronic apical periodontitis, neurovegetative disorders, conjunctivitis and spondylosis.","43.On several occasions the applicant was taken to prison hospitals or to the emergency unit of public hospitals with a broken nose or ribs after having been assaulted by other prisoners.","44.Throughout his detention the applicant refused treatment with drugs or, on a few occasions, to be transported to Rahova Prison Hospital for conditions not related to his dental problems. In November 2011 the applicant, who was in a nervous state, refused to be seen by the prison dentist. On 3 February 2014 the applicant refused to have a tooth extracted.","2.Complaints lodged by the applicant concerning his dental problems","45.On 15 October 2009 the applicant complained before the prison authorities and the post-sentencing judge that he was not receiving the liquid and semi-liquid diet prescribed by the doctor. On 3 November 2009 the post-sentencing judge in Rahova Prison rejected the complaint, agreeing with the prison authorities that there was no prescription from a doctor for such a diet in the applicant\u2019s medical file. Another similar complaint lodged by the applicant in January 2013 had been rejected by the post-sentencing judge for the same reason.","46.On 21 May 2012, in August 2012 and on 10 September 2012 the applicant complained to the prison administration that he had toothache and that he could not eat as he had not been given a liquid diet, as requested. No replies to these complaints could be found in the applicant\u2019s prison file submitted by the Government.","47.In January 2013 the applicant complained before the post-sentencing judge of the poor quality of the food served in prison; the vegetables were undercooked; he received bones without meat. He further complained that he had not been given the liquid diet prescribed by the doctors and that he had thus constantly received food that he could not chew and eat. The prison administration averred before the judge that no special diet had been prescribed to the applicant by a doctor and that the food served in prison was in accordance with the regulations and within the limits of the budget of 4.06 Romanian lei per prisoner per day (approximately 1 euro). On 8January 2013 the post-sentencing judge rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint as ill-founded, considering that the food received by the applicant had been in accordance with the regulations and the budget.","48.In March 2013 the applicant complained again before the post-sentencing judge. He alleged that, due to his dental problems, he could not eat the food served in prison. He mentioned that the meat was not cooked through and very often during transport he had received raw, unsliced bacon and biscuits that he could not eat. On 21 March 2013 the post-sentencing judge rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint because the facts described by him had been refuted by the prison authorities. At that time, no doctor had prescribed that the applicant be given a liquid or semi-liquid diet. On 14 May 2013 the Bucharest District Court rejected this complaint with final effect holding that the prison menus were prepared and administered in accordance with the internal regulations and within the limits of the budget.","49.On 16 and 25 June, 23 December 2013 and 12 and 24 March 2014 the applicant complained to the prison administration of toothache and requested treatment for his periodontitis. The authorities replied to these complaints that the doctor was on holiday and that an appointment would be scheduled in the future.","C.Alleged ill-treatment by a prison guard","50.According to the applicant, on 14 February 2013 when he was being transported to an infirmary outside the prison, he was ill-treated by a prison guard escorting him.","51.Immediately after the incident the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the prison guard for ill-treatment and abusive behaviour.","52.On 27 November 2013 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Bucharest District Court issued a decision not to commence criminal proceedings in the case. According to a copy of the prison\u2019s correspondence logbook, as submitted by the Government, the applicant received a copy of the decision on 12 December 2013.","53.The applicant did not contest this decision before the superior prosecutor as provided for by the Criminal Procedure Code."],"27924":["5.The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Baku.","6.The applicant is a mathematician and physicist who worked at the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1981 to 1993. He then became involved in the political and social life of the country. He also worked as editor-in-chief of the Talishi Sedo, a bilingual Azerbaijani-Talish newspaper, and was chairman of the Talish Cultural Centre. He has been chairman of the Committee for Rehabilitation of Detainees since 2009.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest and alleged ill-treatment by the police","1.The applicant\u2019s version of events","7.At around noon on 21 June 2012, when the applicant was on his way home, six or seven plain-clothes police officers assaulted him near the Neftchilar metro station in Baku. Without showing their official identification, they restrained the applicant\u2019s arms and began to hit him below the knees. They kicked him in the lower part of his right ribcage and then slipped narcotic substances into his right trouser pocket. They handcuffed him and dragged him into their car, where they continued to beat him. In the car they started to insult him, making comments about his ethnic origin, and threatened him on account of a video recording he had uploaded to the YouTube online video platform.","8.The police officers did not inform the applicant of the reasons for his arrest. Indeed, the applicant did not even realise that he had been arrested by the police until he was taken to the Narcotics Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (\u201cthe NDMIA\u201d).","9.A search of the applicant was conducted at the NDMIA. According to the record (no. 7\/32-130 dated 21 June 2012) of operational measures and the seizure of physical evidence (\u0259m\u0259liyyat t\u0259dbirinin ke\u00e7irilm\u0259si v\u0259 maddi s\u00fcbutun g\u00f6t\u00fcr\u00fclm\u0259si bar\u0259d\u0259 protokol) drawn up by a police investigator, the search was carried out from 1.45 to 2p.m. on 21June 2012 in the presence of the applicant, three police officers and two attesting witnesses. It appears from the record that the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. During the search, 5 grams of a substance similar to heroin was found in his right trouser pocket.","10.At 2 p.m. on 21 June 2012 a police investigator drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest.","11.On the same day a search was carried out in the applicant\u2019s flat without a court order. According to the search record, it was conducted from 6.10 to 7.55 p.m. on 21 June 2012 in the presence of the applicant, six police officers and two attesting witnesses. It appears from the record that the applicant was not represented by a lawyer and the two attesting witnesses were the same persons who had previously participated in the search at the NDMIA. During the search, narcotic substances similar to heroin were found. The applicant made a written comment in the record that the narcotic substances did not belong to him.","12.According to the applicant, on 21 and 22 June 2012 he was detained in handcuffs and was deprived of food and water.","2.The Government\u2019s version of events","13.The Government submitted that on 21 June 2012, during the applicant\u2019s arrest and afterwards at the police station, he was not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment by the police.","B.The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention and criminal conviction","14.On 22 June 2012 the applicant was charged under Article 234.4.3 (illegal preparation, production, possession, storage, transportation and sale of a large quantity of narcotic substances) of the Criminal Code.","15.On the same day the Nizami District Court, relying on the official charge brought against the applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s request to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody (h\u0259bs q\u0259timkan t\u0259dbiri), ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for a period of three months. The court justified the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by the gravity of the charge, the fact that the applicant was charged with a criminal offence punishable by more than five years\u2019 imprisonment, and the likelihood that if released he might abscond from the investigation.","16.On 14 August 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the detention order of 22June 2012.","17.In the meantime, on 3 July 2012 the applicant was charged with new criminal offences under Articles 274 (high treason) and 283.2.2 (incitement to ethnic, racial, social or religious hatred and hostility) of the Criminal Code.","18.On 17 August 2012 the applicant applied to the Nasimi District Court to be placed under house arrest instead of pre-trial detention. He claimed, in particular, that his detention had not been justified and that there was no reason for his continued detention.","19.On 1 September 2012 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the application as unsubstantiated.","20.On 10 September 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant. It found that if he was placed under house arrest, the applicant might abscond from the investigation and obstruct the investigation by influencing those involved in the proceedings.","21.On 15 September 2012 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for a period of four months.","22.On 20 September 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 15 September 2012.","23.On 27 September 2013 the Baku Assize Court found the applicant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment.","24.On 25 December 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. It was further upheld on 25 June 2014 by the Supreme Court.","C.Criminal inquiry concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment","25.At 8.30 p.m. on 21 June 2012 an investigator at the Nizami District Police Office questioned the applicant as a suspect. It appears from the record of the questioning that the applicant complained of ill-treatment during his arrest by the police. He stated in this connection that on his way home at around noon on 21 June 2012 near the Neftchilar metro station in Baku, two cars stopped next to him and six or seven plain-clothes police officers assaulted him. They dragged him into one of the cars without showing their official identification and began to beat him up. He did not realise that he had been arrested by the police until he was taken to the NDMIA. The applicant further stated that the narcotic substances found on him and in his flat had been planted by the police. He pointed out that his arrest was related to his political and social activities, as he was editor\u2011in\u2011chief of the Talishi Sedo newspaper and was involved in defending political prisoners\u2019 human rights.","26.On the same day the investigator ordered a forensic examination of the applicant.","27.On 22 June 2012 the applicant was examined by a forensic expert. His report (no. 554 dated 23 June 2012) stated that the applicant had complained of having been beaten up by the police during his arrest on 21June 2012. The expert noticed abrasions on the applicant\u2019s left calf and right thigh, and concluded that they could have been inflicted on 21 June 2012. The relevant part of the forensic report reads as follows:","\u201cQuestions addressed to the forensic expert:","1.What kind of injuries are there on the body of citizen H. Mammadov?","2. What are their characteristics and location?","3. On which part of the body, in which circumstances and with which instrument were the injuries inflicted? Could these injuries have been sustained as a result of an assault?","4. What is the degree of gravity of the injuries?","Initial information:","...","H. Mammadov submitted in his statement that on 21 June 2012 police officers arrested him and dragged him into a car where they hit him on various parts of his body.","On 22 June H. Mammadov was subjected to a forensic examination. According to him, at around noon on 21 June 2012 six or seven plain-clothes police officers arrested him near his place of residence. They kicked and punched him as they put him in the car and whilst in the car. He did not ask for medical help. He complains of pain in the location of his injuries.","Objective examination:","1.The person examined is a man of medium height, normal build and well fed.","2.There are two abrasions (s\u0131yr\u0131q), measuring 1.7x0.5 cm and 1.8x0.2 cm, 4 cm apart, on the middle of the outer side of the left calf (bald\u0131r). The surface of the abrasions is covered with a red scab and is situated below the level of healthy skin tissue. There is an analogical abrasion, measuring 1.0x0.1 cm, on the middle of the outer side of the right thigh (bud). No other injuries were noticed on the body.","Conclusion","Relying on the forensic examination of H. Mammadov, born in 1959 and the initial information, and in reply to the questions addressed in the decision, I conclude as follows:","1.The following injuries were noticed on the body of citizen H. Mammadov: abrasions on the left calf and on the right thigh.","2.The above-mentioned injuries were caused by a hard blunt object(s). They could have been inflicted in the circumstances and at the time indicated in the descriptive part of the decision, namely on 21 June 2012. The degree of the injuries has not been determined because they are not injuries causing harm to health.\u201d","28.The applicant was not provided with a copy of the forensic report.","29.It appears from the case file that on 22 June 2012 the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment was transferred to the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office.","30.On 29 June 2012 an investigator at the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office questioned the applicant about his ill-treatment by the police. The applicant reiterated his previous statement, pointing out that at around noon on 21 June 2012 he had been beaten up during his arrest by six or seven plain-clothes police officers. He further stated that these police officers had also participated in the search at the NDMIA on 21 June 2012 and that the name of one of them was Q.","31.It appears from the documents submitted by the Government that on 31 July 2012 the Head of the Serious Crimes Department of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office asked the Deputy Prosecutor General to order the examination of the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment received by the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office.","32.On 6 and 9 August 2012 an investigator at the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office separately questioned four police officers, including Q., who had participated in the arrest and search. The wording of their statements was identical. They each claimed that they had not used physical force against the applicant during his arrest.","33.On 13 and 14 August 2012 the investigator separately questioned three police officers who had been on guard duty at the temporary detention centre when the applicant had been taken there following his arrest. Their statements were also identical, each claiming that, when the applicant had been taken to the temporary detention centre, he had not complained of ill\u2011treatment.","34.On 15 August 2012 the applicant was questioned by the investigator and reiterated that he had been beaten up during his arrest. In reply to the investigator\u2019s question concerning the fact that the police officers who had participated in his arrest had denied the allegation of ill-treatment, the applicant stated that they had lied in their statements.","35.On the same day the investigator examined the clothes that the applicant had been wearing on the day of his arrest. The investigator found that the clothes were not damaged.","36.On 17 August 2012 the investigator ordered an additional examination of the applicant by a forensic commission. In particular, he asked the experts to establish whether the injuries found on the applicant\u2019s body could have resulted from his body coming into contact with \u201csharp parts of the vehicle\u201d (avtomobilin \u00e7\u0131x\u0131nt\u0131 hiss\u0259l\u0259ri) during his arrest.","37.On 23 August 2012 the applicant was examined by two experts who issuedforensic report no. 213 on 24 August 2012. According to the forensic report, the applicant complained of having been beaten up during his arrest on 21 June 2012. The experts confirmed the existence of injuries on the applicant\u2019s body, but concluded that they had resulted from the applicant\u2019s body coming into contact with \u201cangular protruding parts of the vehicle\u201d (avtomobilin qabar\u0131q tinli hiss\u0259l\u0259ri) during his arrest. The relevant part of the forensic report reads as follows:","\u201cInformation about the case:","...","1.The person examined is a man of medium height, normal build and well fed.","2.There is brown-grey pigmentation in the shape of a strip, measuring 1.4x0.3 cm, on the middle of his outer left calf. No injury or trace of injury was noticed on other parts of his body.","Conclusion","Relying on the forensic examination of H. Mammadov, born in 1959, the facts indicated in the descriptive part of the decision, the observations indicated in forensic report no. 554 in respect of him and in reply to the questions addressed in the decision, the commission of experts concludes as follows:","1.There are two abrasions on the middle of the outer side of his left calf and one abrasion on the middle outer side of his right thigh.","2. The above-mentioned injuries were caused by a hard blunt object(s). They could have been inflicted at the time indicated in the descriptive part of the decision, namely on 21 June 2012. The degree of the injuries has not been determined because they are not injuries causing harm to health.","3. Taking into consideration the characteristics (morphological particularities) and location of the injuries found on the outer sides of the left calf and of the right thigh of H. Mammadov, and the fact that such injuries could not have been inflicted by another person or other persons in the passenger compartment of a car, it is refuted that these injuries could have been inflicted in the circumstances described in the statement of H. Mammadov.","3.1. It therefore results from the above-mentioned observations that the injuries found on the outer sides of the left calf and of the right thigh of H. Mammadov were caused by contact of the examined lower parts of his body with angular protruding parts of the vehicle when he was put in the car.","4. No injury or trace of injury corresponding to the circumstances described in H.Mammadov\u2019s explanation and statements that he was beaten in the head, neck and chest in the passenger compartment of the vehicle was noticed either during the initial forensic examination dated 22 June 2012 or during the additional commission forensic examination of 23 August 2012.\u201d","38.The applicant was not provided with a copy of forensic report no.213.","39.On 27 August 2012 the Deputy Prosecutor General refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment. The prosecutor concluded that it had not been established that the applicant had been beaten up during his arrest. In this connection, he relied on the conclusions of the forensic report of 24 August 2012, the statements from four police officers who had participated in the applicant\u2019s arrest and from three police officers who had been on guard duty at the temporary detention centre on 21 June 2012. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:","\u201cQ. also stated that when they arrested H. Mammadov on the territory of the Nizami District they had shown their official identification and had not used any violence against him.","The police officers of the NDMIA (A.X., C.M. and Q.H.) who had been questioned during the inquiry made statements similar to that of Q., pointing out that H.Mammadov had not been subjected to violence during his arrest and search.","...","It appears from forensic report no. 554 dated 23 June 2012 issued by ... that H.Mammadov sustained abrasions on his left calf and right thigh. Their degree of gravity has not been determined because they are not injuries causing harm to health.","On 17 August 2012 a decision ordering an additional commission forensic examination was adopted. It appears from forensic report no. 213 dated 24 August 2012 in respect of H. Mammadov issued by ... that the injuries found on the outer sides of the left calf and of the right thigh of H. Mammadov were caused by contact of the examined lower parts of his body with angular protruding parts of the vehicle when he was put in the car. No injury or trace of injury corresponding to the circumstances described in H. Mammadov\u2019s statement that he had been beaten in the head, neck and chest in the passenger compartment of the vehicle was noticed either during the initial forensic examination dated 22 June 2012 or during the additional commission forensic examination of 23 August 2012.","...","After having comparatively analysed the facts of the case with the material collected during the inquiry, I therefore conclude that the allegations of H. Mammadov ... that the injuries found on his body were caused on 21 June 2012 when he was beaten up and was subjected to physical force during his arrest by police officers are not proven.","Accordingly, as the allegations that H. Mammadov was beaten up and subjected to physical force during his arrest by police officers of the NDMIA are not proven, no criminal act was committed. In accordance with Article 39.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, institution of criminal proceedings should be refused.\u201d","40.It appears from the document submitted by the Government that the investigator in charge of the case sent a copy of the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 27 August 2012 to the detention centre where the applicant was detained at that time. Although the document was signed by the investigator, it was not dated. Moreover, the date on which it was sent was not indicated on the document.","41.In the meantime, on 6 July 2012, having received no response from the investigating authorities concerning his complaint of ill-treatment, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Nasimi District Court concerning the investigating authorities\u2019 failure to investigate his complaint of ill-treatment. The applicant asked the court to find a violation of his right protected under Article 3 of the Convention.","42.In support of his complaint, he submitted that on 21 June 2012, without showing their official identification, six or seven plain-clothes police officers had assaulted him near the Neftchilar metro station in Baku. They restrained his arms and began to strike him in below the knees. They kicked him in the lower part of his right ribcage and then slipped narcotic substances into his right trouser pocket. They then dragged him into their car where they continued to beat him. In the car they started to insult him, making comments about his ethnic origin, and threatened him on account of a video recording he had uploaded to the YouTube online video platform.","43.On 29 August 2012 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court held that a criminal inquiry had already been carried out in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment and by a decision of 27 August 2012 the Deputy Prosecutor General had refused to institute criminal proceedings. The court further held that as the prosecutor\u2019s decision was still in force, it could not deliver a new decision in this connection. The applicant could, however, lodge a complaint against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 27 August 2012.","44.Following the delivery of the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 29August 2012, the applicant learned about the existence of the Deputy Prosecutor General\u2019s decision of 27August 2012 refusing to institute criminal proceedings in respect of his complaint of ill-treatment. The court also provided him for the first time with copies of the forensic reports of 23June 2012 and of 24 August 2012.","45.On 14 September 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 29 August 2012.","46.On an unspecified date in October 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the court against the Deputy Prosecutor General\u2019s decision of 27 August 2012 refusing to institute criminal proceedings. He reiterated his previous complaints concerning his ill-treatment by the police during his arrest and complained about the ineffectiveness of the criminal inquiry. In this connection, he disputed the conclusions of the additional forensic report of 24 August 2012. He asked the court to quash the prosecutor\u2019s decision and declare it unlawful. He also asked the court to hear the experts who had conducted his forensic examinations and the police officers who had participated in his arrest.","47.On 8 November 2012 the Sabail District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding the prosecutor\u2019s decision justified. The court, however, made no mention of the applicant\u2019s particular requests that it hear the experts and the police officers. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:","\u201cHaving examined the allegations that the complainant H. Mammadov was subjected to ill-treatment by police officers during his arrest and that he was beaten up and subjected to degrading treatment when he was taken to the NDMIA, the court considers that a thorough investigation in this respect was conducted by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan in accordance with the current legislation and the requirements of the international treaties. All possible measures were taken during this investigation; the persons who had been involved in the complainant\u2019s arrest and had been in contact with him immediately after his arrest were questioned; a forensic examination and an additional commission forensic examination were carried out; however, the collected material did not prove the allegations indicated in the complaint.","In these circumstances, the court considers that it was not possible to collect sufficient evidence which could constitute the basis for instituting criminal proceedings in connection with the injuries sustained by H. Mammadov on 21 June 2012.","Therefore, taking into consideration the collected material and the evidence examined at the court hearing, the court considers that the decision of 27 August 2012 refusing to institute criminal proceedings adopted within his competence by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Azerbaijan ... was justified and H.Mamadov\u2019s application for its quashing should be dismissed.\u201d","48.On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints.","49.On 19 November 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first\u2011instance court\u2019s decision. The appellate court\u2019s decision was identical in its wording to the Sabail District Court\u2019s decision of 8 November 2012.","D.Examination of the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations","50.It appears from the applicant\u2019s observations submitted to the Court in reply to the Government\u2019s observations that the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations (\u201cthe Working Group on Arbitrary Detention\u201d) delivered its opinion no.59\/2013 concerning the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention on 22 November 2013. The relevant part of the opinion reads as follows:","\u201c2.The Working Group regards deprivation of liberty as arbitrary in the following cases:","(a) When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the deprivation of liberty (as when a person is kept in detention after the completion of his or her sentence or despite an amnesty law applicable to the detainee) (category I);","(b) When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, insofar as States parties are concerned, by articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (category II);","(c) When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);","(d) When asylum seekers, immigrants or refugees are subjected to prolonged administrative custody without the possibility of administrative or judicial review or remedy (category IV);","(e) When the deprivation of liberty constitutes a violation of international law for reasons of discrimination based on birth; national, ethnic or social origin; language; religion; economic condition; political or other opinion; gender; sexual orientation; or disability or other status, and which aims towards or can result in ignoring the equality of human rights (category V).","Submissions","Communication from the source","3.The case summarized below was reported to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.","4.Hilal Mammadov, born in XXXX in Astara Rayon, Azerbaijan, is an Azerbaijani journalist and a defender of minority rights. Since 9 June 2012, he has been the editor\u2011in-chief of the Baku-based newspaper Tolishi Sado (The Voice of Talysh), the only newspaper printed in the minority Talysh language.","5.The source informs the Working Group that the Talysh people are an ethnic minority residing in southern Azerbaijan.","6.On 21 June 2012, Mr. Mammadov was arrested by the Nasimi District Police pursuant to article 234.4.3 of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan in relation to illegal manufacture, purchase, storage, transfer, transport or sale of drugs in a large quantity. According to the source, the authorities alleged that they had seized five grams of heroin from his person, and approximately 30 grams from his place of residence.","7.On 22 June 2012, the Nasimi District Court (Baku City) sentenced Mr.Mammadov to three months\u2019 detention. Mr. Mammadov appealed the sentence and requested to be permitted to serve the term under house arrest. On 10 September 2012, the Baku Appeal Court upheld the original decision, denying him provisional release. Mr. Mammadov remains in detention to this day.","...","17.On 28 November 2012, Mr. Mammadov\u2019s lawyers reported that, following the completion of the investigation into the criminal charges against him, Mr. Mammadov was charged under article 274 (high treason), article 283.2.2 (incitement to national, racial or religious hostility) and articles 234.4.3 (illegal manufacturing, purchase, storage, transportation, transfer or selling of narcotics and psychotropic substances) of the Criminal Code.","18.On 21 December 2012, the hearing of Mr. Mammadov\u2019s criminal charges was reportedly transferred to the Baku Grave Crimes Court. A preparatory session defining the procedural issues of the case took place on 9 January 2013. On that date, Mr. Mammadov\u2019s lawyer reportedly submitted two motions: one requesting an audio\u2011visual recording of the hearing; and another requesting that his client be allowed to sit beside his lawyer rather than behind secure bars. The source informs the Working Group that both motions were rejected.","19.The source was informed by the Human Rights Centre of Azerbaijan that Mr.Mammadov had been beaten and injured by his cellmate in a Kurdakhani prison on 26, 28 and 29 November 2012. The source reports that Mr. Mammadov was placed in the cell two weeks prior to the attacks. Mr. Mammadov\u2019s lawyers had requested on several occasions that he be removed from the cell as his cellmate\u2019s behaviour was aggressive to the point of preventing him from sleeping at night. Those requests were all ignored. On 29 November 2012, his cellmate was transferred to the medical unit of the prison hospital for treatment of his reportedly severe mental illness.","20.The source considers the ongoing harassment of Mr. Mammadov as an attempt to silence his efforts to report on human rights violations. The source points out that Mr. Mammadov\u2019s arrest came shortly before the first edition of the Tolishi Sado newspaper under his authority as editor-in-chief was due to be published (at the end of June 2012). He was arrested after posting music and a video clip on the Internet which attracted attention to the Talysh culture.","21. The source submits that Mr. Mammadov faces imprisonment sentences ranging up to life for trumped-up charges brought against him successively in June and July 2012, and most recently in November 2012.","22.The source signals its concern with regard to Mr. Mammadov\u2019s conditions of detention in the light of the fate that befell Novruzali Mammadov, the former editor\u2011in-chief of the Tolishi Sado newspaper, who was allegedly subjected to similar acts of harassment and arbitrary detention in 2007, and who died in custody on 17August 2009.","23.The source concludes that the detention of Hilal Mammadov is arbitrary and considers it an obvious attempt to silence his efforts to report on human rights violations. Furthermore, his rights to legal protection have been violated.","24.The source further expresses its fears for the physical and psychological integrity of Mr. Mammadov.","Response from the Government","...","Discussion","61.The Working Group was informed that Mr. Mammadov has been sentenced to five years in prison for criminal offences relating to \u201cillegal selling of drugs\u201d, \u201chigh treason\u201d and \u201cincitement to national, racial, social and religious hatred and hostility\u201d under articles 234.4.3, 274 and 283 respectively of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.","62.The source alleged that the authorities fabricated the case against Mr.Mammadov due to his human rights work and support for the minority Talysh population.","63.The source informed the Working Group that Mr. Mammadov was a consultant with the Institute for Democracy and Peace and editor-in-chief of Tolishi Sado, the only newspaper in the minority Talysh language in Azerbaijan. Mr. Mammadov was also head of the Committee for the Defence of Novruzali Mammadov, a prominent Talysh scientist and human rights activist and former editor-in-chief of Tolishi Sado, who was charged in June 2008 with espionage, subsequently sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, and who died in prison in 2009.","64.Hilal Mammadov was arrested on 21 June 2012 for alleged possession of heroin. On 3 July 2012 and 23 November 2012, he was also charged with treason and incitement of national, racial, social and religious hatred and hostility. His hearing in the Baku Grave Crimes Court began on 29 January 2013; he was convicted of the charges brought against him and sentenced on 27 September 2013.","65.In its response, the Government set out the case for the prosecution and the court\u2019s judgment. However, the Working Group is of the view that the Government did not provide a satisfactory explanation as to the allegations put forward by the source concerning the arbitrary character of the charges against Mr. Mammadov and his subsequent conviction.","66.The information provided by the source and the Government to the Working Group indicates that the charges of treason and incitement of national, racial, social and religious hatred and hostility are based on Mr. Mammadov\u2019s legitimate exercise of the right of freedom of expression under article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As such, the Working Group considers that the deprivation of liberty of HilalMammadov falls within category II of the arbitrary detention categories referred to by the Working Group when considering cases submitted to it.","67.Furthermore, the Working Group is of the view that the response from the Government does not adequately address the source\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment to which Mr. Mammadov has been subjected in detention, its concerns for his health, nor the groundless rejection of his application for an audio-visual recording of the hearing.","68.The Working Group finds that these violations of international law relating to the right of a fair trial are of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty of HilalMammadov an arbitrary character. As such, the Working Group considers that Mr.Mammadov\u2019s detention falls within category III of the arbitrary detention categories referred to by the Working Group when considering cases submitted to it.","Disposition","69.In the light of the foregoing, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention renders the following opinion:","The detention of Hilal Mammadov is arbitrary, being in contravention of articles 9,11 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9, 12 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It falls within categories IIand III of the arbitrary detention categories referred to by the Working Group when considering cases submitted to it.","70.Consequent upon the opinion rendered, the Working Group requests the Government of Azerbaijan to remedy the situation of Mr. Mammadov and bring it into conformity with the standards and principles set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.","71.Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, the Working Group is of the view that the adequate remedy would be to immediately release Mr. Mammadov and accord him an enforceable right to compensation in accordance with article 9, paragraph 5, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\u201d","E.The applicant\u2019s contacts with his representative, Mr Bagirov","51.The applicant\u2019s representative, Mr Bagirov, was an advocate and a member of the Azerbaijani Bar Association (\u201cthe ABA\u201d). He was affiliated to Law Office no. 6 in Baku.","52.In November 2014 disciplinary proceedings were instituted against Mr Bagirov by the ABA on the basis of a letter dated 25 September 2014 from a judge of the Shaki Court of Appeal. In his letter the judge informed the ABA that Mr Bagirov had breached the ethical rules of conduct for advocates at the court hearings held in September 2014 before the Shaki Court of Appeal within the criminal proceedings against I.M.","53.On 10 December 2014 the Collegium of the ABA held a meeting at which it examined the complaint against Mr Bagirov. Following the meeting, the Collegium of the ABA held that Mr Bagirov had breached the ethical rules of conduct for advocates because at the court hearing he had made the following remark about the judicial system: \u201cLike State, like court ... If there were justice in Azerbaijan, Judge R.H. would not deliver unfair and partial judgments, nor would an individual like him be a judge\u201d (\u201cBel\u0259 d\u00f6vl\u0259tin bel\u0259 d\u0259 m\u0259hk\u0259m\u0259si olacaq ... Az\u0259rbaycanda \u0259dal\u0259t olsayd\u0131, hakim R.H. \u0259dal\u0259tsiz v\u0259 q\u0259r\u0259zli h\u00f6km \u00e7\u0131xarmaz, n\u0259 d\u0259 onun kimisi hakim i\u015fl\u0259m\u0259zdi\u201d). On the same day the Collegium of the ABA decided to refer MrBagirov\u2019s case to a court with a view to his disbarment. It also decided to suspend his activity as an advocate (v\u0259killik f\u0259aliyy\u0259ti) pending a decision by the court.","54.It appears from documents submitted to the Court that, following the suspension of Mr Bagirov\u2019s activity as an advocate, the domestic authorities no longer allowed him to meet the applicant in the prison.","55.On 29 March 2015 Mr Bagirov sent a letter to the Head of the Prison Service of the Ministry of Justice asking for a meeting with his six clients held in detention, including the applicant. He specified in his letter that he was the representative of those individuals before the Court and requested a meeting with them in connection with their pending cases before the Court. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows:","\u201cI am writing to inform you that I represent before the European Court of Human Rights the following persons who are detained in the penal facilities and temporary detention centres under your authority.","I ask you to allow a meeting with these persons in connection with the progress of their cases based on their applications (the numbers of the applications are mentioned below) lodged with the European Court.","1. Mammadov Hilal Alif oglu (penal facility no. 17; application no. 81553\/12)","...","Attachment: Copies of the letters from the European Court and the Azerbaijani Government concerning these persons.\u201d","56.A copy of the letter was also sent to the Head of the Serious Crimes Department of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office.","57.By a letter of 14 April 2015, the Deputy Head of the Prison Service refused to allow Mr Bagirov to meet the applicant in the prison. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows:","\u201cYour request for the organisation of a meeting in the penal facilities and detention centres with the persons detained in the penal facilities and the convicted inmates in order to provide them with advocacy services has been examined.","It is explained that, as your advocacy activity at Law Office no. 6 has been suspended by decision no. 29 of 10 December 2014 of the Bar Association of the Republic of Azerbaijan and you have been disbarred, and that you can no longer practise as an advocate in court and investigation proceedings from that date, it is impossible to grant you access to the penal establishments as counsel.\u201d"],"27934":["5.The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Naro-Fominsk in the Moscow region. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-4 detention facility in the village of Udarnyy in the Republic of Mordovia.","A.Background events","6.At 8.20 p.m. on 6 March 2004 Ms E. was robbed in the street and was stabbed through the heart. She died of the wound shortly afterwards. The assailant took a mobile phone and 2,500 Russian roubles (RUB) from the victim\u2019s purse.","7.The Naro-Fominsk town prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe town prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) instituted a criminal investigation into E.\u2019s killing. Having obtained from the mobile phone operator the call logs in respect of the victim\u2019s phone, the investigators established that at 9.50 pm on 6 March 2004 a phone call had been made to a number belonging to Ms A. from E.\u2019s phone using the applicant\u2019s SIM card.","B.The applicant\u2019s arrest","1.The applicant\u2019s account","8.At 11 a.m. on 18 March 2004 the police arrived at the applicant\u2019s flat and ordered him to follow them to the police station.","9.Once at the police station, the applicant explained that on 6 March 2004 he had bought a used mobile phone from a stranger because a friend of his had earlier expressed an interest in purchasing a second-hand phone. In order to test the phone, he had inserted his SIM card and made a call to his then girlfriend, Ms A. He also claimed that on the same day he had played slot machines and won RUB 2,500. Then the officers questioning him showed him a call log from Ms E.\u2019s phone, informed him of the killing and suggested that he confess to mitigate his sentence. The applicant refused to admit to the crime.","10.The officers proceeded to hit and kick him on his head, chest and flanks. The applicant fainted several times. The beatings went on for twelve hours. Eventually the applicant gave in and agreed to write down a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439), as dictated by the officers, admitting to the robbery and murder of Ms E.","11.An investigator of the town prosecutor\u2019s office, Mr A., questioned the applicant as a suspect and later went to the applicant\u2019s flat to seize a few items including the mobile phone contract for the applicant\u2019s SIM card.","12.The applicant was not provided with legal assistance on 18 March 2004.","2.The Government\u2019s account","13.The applicant was brought to the police station at 10 p.m. on 18March 2004. Upon arrival the police officers asked him how he had obtained Ms E.\u2019s phone and then showed him the call log. The applicant looked at the log and then asked the officers to leave him alone in the room. He then wrote a statement of surrender and confession describing the circumstances of the crime. No physical force was applied to the applicant.","14.In the Government\u2019s submission, on 18 March 2004 the applicant complained to the town prosecutor\u2019s office; however, he did not raise the issue of ill-treatment.","15.At 12.30 p.m. on 19 March 2004 an arrest record was drawn up. It contained a handwritten note by the applicant that read as follows: \u201c[I] agree with the arrest, rights are understood, [I have] no statement to make\u201d.","16.A handwritten statement signed by the applicant and dated 19March2004 affirmed that the applicant\u2019s rights had been explained to him; that he did not require legal assistance; that the \u201cbodily injuries visible at [that] moment on [his] face and body [had been] inflicted on 11 March 2004 by [his] roommate Dima\u201d; and that police officers had not used force against him.","C.Criminal proceedings against the applicant and complaints about the alleged ill-treatment","17.Between 12.40 a.m and 2.55 a.m on 19 March 2004 the applicant was questioned without a lawyer present.","18.In the early morning on 19 March 2004 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention centre (\u0418\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f, hereinafter \u201cIVS\u201d). According to the Government, when placed in the IVS, the applicant did not make any health\u2011related complaints. He had a bruise under his right eye. An entry in the IVS logbook was made by an ambulance doctor stating that the applicant was \u201cin a post-epileptic-fit state\u201d.","19.Between 11.10 a.m. and 12.50 p.m. on 19 March 2004 the applicant was questioned in the presence of Mr B., a legal-aid lawyer. According to the Government, in the course of the interview he described how he had committed the crime. The record of the interview reads that the applicant found the knife used as the murder weapon at a market after a fire.","20.On 20 or 22 March 2004[1] the investigators carried out an investigative re-enactment. In the applicant\u2019s submission, the re-enactment was limited to bringing him to the crime scene and photographing him there. According to the Government, during the visit the applicant confirmed his statement made in the presence of the lawyer in the course of the second interview of 19 March 2004. He also selected a knife similar to that used to stab Ms E. from a selection of four knives available at a local shop.","21.On 20 March 2004 a judge of the Naro-Fominsk Town Court (\u201cthe Town Court\u201d) placed the applicant in custody. The applicant complained to the judge about his ill-treatment; she refused to take note of the allegations, however, stating that they could be examined in the course of the trial against the applicant.","22.On 25 March 2004 the applicant was formally charged with murder and robbery. He retracted his confession.","23.On 26 March 2004 the police transported the applicant to a remand prison. However, the staff on duty refused to admit the applicant as he had visible injuries. The applicant was returned to the IVS. On 29 March 2004 the police again tried to transfer him to the remand prison and were refused for the second time.","24.On 30 March 2004 the police brought the applicant to the Naro\u2011Fominsk polyclinic where he underwent an X-ray examination which showed that there were fractures to three ribs with signs that the bones were beginning to heal. The following day the applicant was admitted to the remand prison.","25.According to the applicant, once in the remand prison, he complained about his ill\u2011treatment to the town prosecutor\u2019s office.","26.According to the Government, the applicant raised the ill-treatment complaint on 17June2004. The town prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry on the basis of the complaint.","27.On 18 June 2004 Mr A., an investigator with the town prosecutor\u2019s office, refused to initiate criminal proceedings into the alleged ill-treatment. He observed that upon arrival at the IVS the applicant had had a bruise under his right eye and yet had made no complaints about his state of health, and noted that, according to the IVS logbook, an ambulance had been called for the applicant on account of an epileptic fit.","28.On an unspecified date the criminal case against the applicant was submitted for trial before the Moscow Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d).","29.The applicant first took cognisance of the decision of 18 June 2004 on 29 June 2004 while studying the case file in the criminal case against him.","30.The applicant complained about the town prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s refusal of 18 June 2004 to the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, which forwarded it for examination by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Moscow region. The latter forwarded the complaint to the town prosecutor\u2019s office (against which the complaint was directed). The applicant received no reply.","31.The applicant did not attempt to institute any judicial review proceedings, considering that they would be futile on account of the judge\u2019s reply of 20March 2004.","32.On 27 July 2004 the Regional Court scheduled a trial hearing on 9August2004.","33.The applicant raised the matter of ill-treatment before the Regional Court at his trial.","34.On 20 October 2004 the Regional Court ordered an expert medical examination of the X-ray of 30 March 2004. It can be seen from the trial record of that date that N. informed the judge that he was not an expert in interpreting X\u2011rays and asked for a period of two weeks to consult a colleague; the judge acceded to the request. On 4 November 2004 N. drew up a report stating that the rib fractures had been caused by blunt objects; by 30March 2004 the knitting together of the fractures had commenced; the fractures had been \u201cconsiderably old\u201d and \u201cno injuries corresponding to [those of] 11 and 18 March 2004 [had been] identified\u201d. The judge rejected the applicant\u2019s request for another expert report.","35.The Regional Court dismissed the record of the first interview of 19March 2004 as inadmissible evidence for the reason that the interview had been conducted without a lawyer present.","36.On 3 December 2004 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and murder and sentenced him to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment. The court referred to the applicant\u2019s pre-trial confession, the record of his questioning by the investigator, his statements at the investigative re\u2011enactment and other physical evidence.","37.The trial judge also examined in detail the evidence presented by the parties in relation to the allegation of ill\u2011treatment, including the decision of 18 June 2004 and the expert medical report ordered in respect of the X-ray. The judge also heard evidence from an expert, N., as well as investigator MrA. and several police officers. The judge refused to examine the IVS logbook which, according to the applicant, would support his assertion that there were injuries. Instead, the judge examined a letter from the deputy director of the IVS, according to which on his arrival there the applicant only had had a black eye which he had explained as having received before the arrest. The deputy director had also noted that the logbook entry concerning the call for an ambulance had been made for another person. The judge dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment and declared the relevant evidence (the confession statement, the interview record and the investigative re-enactment record) admissible.","38.On 6 December 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating the issue of his confession under duress without a lawyer present, as well as the weakness of the prosecution\u2019s case against him. He insisted on his innocence.","39.On 14 December 2004 the applicant lodged an additional appeal in which he claimed that the Regional Court had wrongly considered his previous conviction as an aggravating factor and yet had chosen to regard the surrender and confession as a mitigating factor. He asked for the first\u2011instance judgment to be quashed on the grounds given in his appeal of 6 December 2004.","40.On the same date the applicant (through his counsel) lodged an appeal in which he insisted that the statement of surrender and confession had not been genuine as he had been forcibly brought to the police station and detained there for twelve hours with no access to a lawyer.","41.On 16 March 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the first\u2011instance judgment in a summary fashion.","42.The applicant further unsuccessfully sought supervisory review of his conviction.","43.On 5 April 2005 the applicant sent another complaint to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, which was forwarded to the town prosecutor\u2019s office.","44.On 12 May 2005 the deputy town prosecutor quashed the decision of 18 June 2004 and issued an instruction to carry out an additional pre\u2011investigation inquiry.","45.On 15 May 2005 S., an investigator with the town prosecutor\u2019s office, refused to institute an investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. He found it established that on 12 March 2004 a police officer in Naro-Fominsk had received a report of a violent fight; on 13 March 2004 he had invited the applicant to come in for a \u201cpreventative talk\u201d and had noticed two bruises under the applicant\u2019s eyes. S. concluded that the bruise under the applicant\u2019s right eye had been a result of the injury inflicted long before the arrest. He also pointed out that the Regional Court had \u201ccarefully examined\u201d the applicant\u2019s version of ill-treatment by police officers. The issue of the fractured ribs was not examined.","European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d)","47.The CPT Standards 2002 (revised in 2011) (CPT\/Inf\/E (2002) 1\u2011Rev. 2011) contain the following provisions (Extract from the 2nd General Report [CPT\/Inf (92) 3]):","\u201c36.The CPT attaches particular importance to three rights for persons detained by the police: the right of the person concerned to have the fact of his detention notified to a third party of his choice (family member, friend, consulate), the right of access to a lawyer, and the right to request a medical examination by a doctor of his choice (in addition to any medical examination carried out by a doctor called by the police authorities).[2] They are, in the CPT\u2019s opinion, three fundamental safeguards against the ill-treatment of detained persons which should apply as from the very outset of deprivation of liberty, regardless of how it may be described under the legal system concerned (apprehension, arrest, etc.).","37.Persons taken into police custody should be expressly informed without delay of all their rights, including those referred to in paragraph 36. Further, any possibilities offered to the authorities to delay the exercise of one or other of the latter rights in order to protect the interests of justice should be clearly defined and their application strictly limited in time. As regards more particularly the rights of access to a lawyer and to request a medical examination by a doctor other than one called by the police, systems whereby, exceptionally, lawyers and doctors can be chosen from pre\u2011established lists drawn up in agreement with the relevant professional organisations should remove any need to delay the exercise of these rights.","38.Access to a lawyer for persons in police custody should include the right to contact and to be visited by the lawyer (in both cases under conditions guaranteeing the confidentiality of their discussions) as well as, in principle, the right for the person concerned to have the lawyer present during interrogation.","As regards the medical examination of persons in police custody, all such examinations should be conducted out of the hearing, and preferably out of the sight, of police officers. Further, the results of every examination as well as relevant statements by the detainee and the doctor\u2019s conclusions should be formally recorded by the doctor and made available to the detainee and his lawyer.\u201d","48.The relevant part of the CPT\u2019s country report, following its visit to the Russian Federation of 21 May to 4 June 2012 (CPT\/Inf (2013) 41), reads as follows:","\u201c39. As repeatedly stressed by the CPT in the past, the prompt and proper medical examination of persons admitted to IVS establishments is essential, in particular in order to facilitate any subsequent investigative measures related to allegations of ill\u2011treatment.","The Committee once again calls upon the Russian authorities to take immediate steps to ensure that:","-all persons admitted to IVS establishments are properly interviewed and physically examined by qualified health-care staff on the day of their admission or the following day; the same approach should be adopted each time a person returns to an IVS cell after having been taken out by operational officers (even for a short period of time);","-all medical examinations (whether they are carried out in hospitals or in law enforcement facilities) are conducted out of the hearing and \u2013 unless the health-care professional concerned expressly requests otherwise in a given case \u2013 out of the sight of law enforcement officials;","-the record drawn up following the medical examination of a detained person in a hospital or law enforcement establishment contains: (i) a full account of statements made by the person concerned which are relevant to the medical examination (including his\/her description of his\/her state of health and any allegations of ill-treatment), (ii) a full account of objective medical findings based on a thorough examination, and (iii) as far as possible, the health-care professional\u2019s conclusions as to the consistency between injuries observed and any allegations of ill-treatment made by the person concerned;","-whenever injuries are recorded which are consistent with allegations of ill-treatment made by a detained person (or which, even in the absence of allegations, are indicative of ill-treatment), the record is systematically brought to the attention of the competent investigative authorities, regardless of the wishes of the person concerned. Detained persons and their lawyers should be entitled to receive a copy of that record at the same time.\u201d"],"27943":["5.The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Kyiv.","A.Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant\u2019s son in detention, the corresponding investigation and related events","6.On 26 December 2009 the applicant\u2019s twenty-five-year-old son, K., was arrested by the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy District Police Department on suspicion of robbery.","7.On 27 December 2009 K. underwent a medical examination, which did not reveal any injuries.","8.On 29 December 2009 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court (\u201cthe Shevchenkivskyy Court\u201d) remanded him in custody pending trial.","9.On 30 December 2009 K. was placed in the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d).","10.On 22 March 2010 he complained to the court that the investigator had subjected him to physical and psychological pressure in order to make him confess to a crime which he had not committed. His complaint was referred to the Shevchenkivskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d).","11.At 9.30 a.m. on 10 April 2010 K. was admitted to Kyiv City Emergency Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a closed abdominal injury, rupture of the spleen, retroperitoneal haematoma, a closed chest injury, laceration (tissue rupture) of the right lung, left-sided pneumonia, post-traumatic anaemia, and fourth-degree haemorrhagic shock (the most serious on a scale of one to four, entailing critical blood loss of over 40%).","12.On 10 and 12 April 2010 K. underwent surgery twice in respect of the above-mentioned injuries and his spleen was removed.","13.On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the prosecuting authorities that her son had been physically assaulted in the SIZO on 8 April 2010.","14.On 23 April 2010 the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against police officers in respect of K.\u2019s ill-treatment for lack of corpus delicti in respect of their actions.","15.On 28 April 2010 K. was discharged from hospital and placed in the SIZO\u2019s medical unit, where he remained until 18 June 2010.","16.On 3 June 2010 the Kyiv City Police Department completed the internal investigation in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the alleged ill-treatment of her son and found it to be without any basis.","17.On 8 June 2010 the newspaper \u201cSegodnya\u201d, issued in the Kyiv region, published an article under the headline \u201cA bad [police] station\u201d (\u00ab\u041d\u0435\u0445\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0448\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u043e\u043a\u00bb) about the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant\u2019s son in the Shevchenkivskyy police station in spring 2010. The author relied, in particular, on the statements of one of K.\u2019s cell-mates. A similar article titled \u201cAnother incident in the Shevchenkivskyy police station\u201d (\u00ab\u041d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0435 \u0427\u041f \u0432 \u0428\u0435\u0432\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0420\u0423\u0412\u0414\u00bb) appeared in the internet media outlet \u201cLevyy Bereg\u201d.","18.On 10 June 2010 the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office overruled its decision of 23 April 2010 and decided that further investigation was required. More specifically, K. had to be questioned as to who exactly had subjected him to ill-treatment in the SIZO in April 2010.","19.On 10 June 2010 the investigator also questioned the applicant\u2019s son. K.contended that on 26December 2009, when he was arrested, police officers had hit him in the stomach. He further stated that the investigator dealing with his case had also hit him in the stomach once in March 2010. According to K., these two beatings had necessitated his urgent medical treatment on 10 April 2010. K. said that he did not understand why his mother had stated that he had been subjected to ill-treatment on 8 April 2010 (see paragraph 13 above).","20.On 21 June 2010 the investigator who was in charge of K.\u2019s criminal case was also questioned. He denied ever having seen K. in March 2010, let alone having physically assaulted him.","21.On 8 July 2010 the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office once again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers in question, having found no evidence of criminal conduct. The decision not to prosecute noted that K. had not complained of any ill-treatment during his detention, and that his medical examination on 27 December 2009 had not revealed any injuries (see paragraph 7 above). Following his hospitalisation on 10April 2010, K. had mentioned to a doctor that he had been physically assaulted some three days earlier, and the doctor had then stated to the investigator that K.\u2019s injuries had been sustained no more than two days before his admission to hospital. According to his medical file, K.\u2019s injuries had originated from blows to his back with blunt objects one to twelve hours prior to his admission to hospital (that is, during the night of 9 to 10April 2010). On the basis of the above information, the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office concluded that the allegation regarding K.\u2019s ill\u2011treatment was unsubstantiated.","22.On 3 August 2010 an official of the Kyiv City Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d), to which the investigation had been transferred meanwhile for an unknown reason, also questioned K. This time, he stated that he had only been ill-treated on 26December 2009, but never thereafter.","23.On 25 August 2010 eleven inmates with whom K. had shared a cell in the SIZO were also questioned. They said that he had felt unwell on the night of 9 to 10April 2010, and that an ambulance had been called for him on the morning of 10April 2010. They also submitted that nobody had been violent towards him or had put him under any psychological pressure.","24.On 9 September 2010 the SIZO\u2019s medical assistant (\u0444\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0434\u0448\u0435\u0440), who had been on duty at the time of the events, was questioned as part of the investigation. He stated that he had been called to cell no. 36, where K. had been held, at 8.45 a.m. on 10 April 2010. K. had complained of weakness, vertigo and blurred vision. He had not alleged any ill-treatment and a visual examination had not revealed any injuries. He had had low blood pressure. The medical assistant said that he had provided K. with the necessary medical assistance and had reported the matter to the doctor on duty. The doctor on duty at the time of the events made a similar statement.","25.On 22 October 2010 an official from the Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office questioned the ambulance paramedics who had been called to assist K. They did not remember the circumstances.","26.On 4 November 2010 the Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office questioned K. again. He stated that Shevchenkivskyy police officers had physically assaulted him following his arrest on 26December 2009. He considered that the sudden deterioration in his health on 10 April 2010 had been the consequence of that ill-treatment.","27.From 8 November 2010 to 28 January 2011 a forensic medical expert evaluation of K.\u2019s medical file was carried out, with a view to clarifying exactly how and when he had sustained his injuries and how serious those injuries had been. The expert concluded that K. had sustained an insignificant spleen trauma about a month prior to undergoing surgery, on around 10 March 2010. More specifically, he had sustained a splenic parenchyma rupture which had presented no major danger and would have healed normally. However, about twelve hours before surgery (at about 4a.m. on 10 April 2010) K. had sustained a serious non-penetrating stomach injury resulting from a blow to the left side of his back with a blunt object. As a result, he had sustained a haemoperitoneum, a partial rupture of the diaphragm and trauma of the spleen.","28.On 29 December 2010 the applicant\u2019s son signed a form of authority, authorising Mr Zarutskyy (the lawyer who represented the applicant before the Court \u2013 see paragraph 2 above) to represent him in proceedings before the Court. He did not, however, lodge an application with the Court on that occasion. According to the applicant, her son did intend to lodge an application regarding both his ill-treatment and the investigation into that allegation.","29.In February 2011 K.\u2019s lawyer challenged the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 8July 2010 (see paragraph 21 above) with the Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office and before the Shevchenkivskyy Court. He submitted, in particular, that the origin of K.\u2019s injuries while he had been under the authorities\u2019 control had never been explained.","30.On 10 March 2011 the Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office, relying on the findings of the forensic medical expert report of 28 January 2011 (see paragraph 26 above), opened a criminal case in respect of unidentified individuals who had caused K. grievous bodily harm. The investigation was entrusted to the Shevchenkivskyy Police Department.","31.On 7 July 2011 the Shevchenkivskyy Court quashed the decision of the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office of 8July 2010 and remitted the case for additional investigation.","32.Between 31 May and 25 August 2011 another forensic medical expert evaluation was carried out. It confirmed the findings of the earlier expert report of 28 January 2011 (see paragraph 27 above), but added that a fall could not be ruled out as a possible cause of the injuries.","33.On 26 August 2011 the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office issued another refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers in question for lack of corpus delicti in their actions.","34.On 30 September 2011 K. was assigned victim status in the criminal investigation launched on 10 March 2011. On the same date the investigator of the Shevchenkivskyy Police Department questioned him. K.maintained his earlier version of events, namely that his ill-treatment had consisted of the following two episodes: Shevchenkivskyy police officers physically assaulting him following his arrest on 26 December 2009, and the investigator in charge hitting him once in the stomach at the end of March2010.","35.On 30 September 2011 the SIZO administration sent to the investigator the list of the staff members who had been on duty during the night of 9 to 10 April 2010. As regards the list of K.\u2019s cell-mates at the time, the administration informed the investigator that no records were kept in that regard.","36.On 7 November 2011 K., who had been transferred from the SIZO to a civilian hospital and who was suffering from HIV, tuberculosis and a number of concomitant diseases, died (see paragraphs 43-51 below).","37.On an unspecified date in November 2011 the applicant was granted status as K.\u2019s successor in the criminal investigation into his ill-treatment. She was represented by the same lawyer who had earlier represented K.","38.On 9 December 2011 the Chief of the Shevchenkivskyy Police Department informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the investigation, which had been initiated on 10March 2011 (see paragraph 30 above), was ongoing.","39.On 30 March 2012 the applicant enquired with the Shevchenkivskyy Police Department about the progress of the investigation.","40.On 31 July 2012 the Kyiv City Investigation Department informed her that the investigator in charge had been disciplined for his failure to respond to the above inquiry.","41.It is not clear whether any investigative measures were implemented between 2012 and 2014.","42.On 7 March 2014 the investigator of the Shevchenkivskyy Police Department made an entry in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations about the assault on K. causing grievous bodily harm. That constituted a new procedure for initiating a pre-trial investigation under the new Code of Criminal Procedure with effect from 19 November 2012.","B.Other issues relating to the health of the applicant\u2019s son and the medical care provided for him in detention","43.Between 14 and 17 May, and 18 and 23 June 2010, when he was a detainee in the SIZO, K. was examined at the Kyiv City AIDS Centre at his request. He tested positive for HIV on both occasions.","44.According to the information submitted by the Government, between 24 June 2010 and 20 April 2011 K.\u2019s health remained stable and he did not seek medical assistance.","45.On 20 April 2011 K. had his lungs X-rayed and was diagnosed, for the first time, with tuberculosis of the right lung. It was unclear how advanced the tuberculosis was. According to the Government, he was prescribed preventive treatment for two to three months.","46.On 23 May 2011 K.\u2019s lawyer enquired with the management of the SIZO about his client\u2019s condition. He asked, in particular, for clarification as to whether K. had been diagnosed with tuberculosis while in detention, and requested copies of the relevant documents.","47.On 8 June 2011 the SIZO deputy governor and the chief of the medical unit replied that, following a planned X-ray that day, K. had been diagnosed with infiltrative tuberculosis of the right lung and had been transferred to the SIZO\u2019s medical unit for treatment. In another letter (dated 28 November 2011) from the SIZO management to the applicant\u2019s lawyer (see also paragraph 52 below), it was stated that on 8June 2011 K. was also diagnosed as having HIV, chronic gastritis, hepatitis in remission and a drug addiction. In addition, he was classed as being in recovery following the removal of his spleen.","48.According to an extract from K.\u2019s medical records, he was examined repeatedly by the SIZO\u2019s doctors between June and October 2011. Each record begins with the statement that K.\u2019s complaints remained the same, without specifying of what he complained. The records of 28July and 9September 2011 further note that K. complained of weakness. Furthermore, it was recorded that K. had complained of periodic coughing with purulent sputum during his examinations on 7July and 15October 2011. From 18 October 2011 onwards adeterioration in K.\u2019s health was noted. On 20 October 2011 an ambulance was called for him.","49.As indicated in the letter sent by the SIZO management on 28November 2011 in reply to the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s inquiry of 13October 2011, K. had an X-ray which revealed that the treatment of his tuberculosis was evolving positively. A decision was made to continue that treatment.","50.On 20 October 2011 K. was taken to Kyiv City Hospital no. 5, where the following diagnoses were made: infiltrative tuberculosis of the right lung, HIV in an unclear phase, meningitis caused by HIV, chronic hepatitis and gastritis in remission. K. was also classed as being in recovery following the removal of his spleen.","51.On 7 November 2011 K. died in the hospital.","52.In a letter of 28 November 2011 to the applicant\u2019s lawyer the SIZO management noted that they had previously asked the Kyiv City Court of Appeal, which was dealing with the criminal case against K., to either accelerate the examination of that case or release K. on health grounds. However, they had not received any reply.","C.Investigation into the death of the applicant\u2019s son","53.On 8 November 2011 the investigator of the Svyatoshynskyy District Police Department inspected K.\u2019s body in the hospital. According to the report on \u201cthe inspection of the scene of the incident\u201d, there was no indication of a violent death.","54.On the same date, the applicant asked the police to transfer the body to a mortuary, with a view to establishing the cause of death.","55.According to K.\u2019s death certificate, which was issued on 10November 2011, his death had been caused by acute heart failure, HIV and multiple concomitant illnesses.","56.The autopsy report, which was also issued on 10 November 2011, specified that the immediate causes of death had been a brain tumour, pulmonary and heart failure resulting from \u201cexpress autointoxication following cryptococcal meningoencephalitis, macrofocal overwhelming subtotal bilateral pneumonia and focal pulmonary tuberculosis of a person suffering from HIV and drug addiction\u201d. The report also noted that K. had had \u201cshock kidneys\u201d, cachexia, oropharyngeal candidiasis, and albuminous degeneration of the tissues of the kidneys, cardiac muscle and liver.","57.The applicant made a complaint to the prosecuting authorities regarding her son\u2019s premature death and requested an investigation.","58.On 16 November 2011 the Svyatoshynskyy District Police Department refused to open a criminal investigation into the matter, having concluded that there was no indication of a criminal offence.","59.On 23 December 2011 the Svyatoshynskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office overruled that decision on the grounds that it was based on a superficial investigation.","60.On 31 December 2011 the investigator once again refused to open a criminal case in relation to K.\u2019s death. Relying on the scene inspection report of 8 November 2011 and the death certificate of 10 November 2011 (see paragraphs 53 and 55 above), he considered that there was no third-party involvement in the death.","61.On 16 July 2012 the applicant complained to the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office about the ineffectiveness of the investigation. In particular, she submitted that the adequacy and appropriateness of the medical care provided for her son had never been assessed. She noted that there had been no medical monitoring or treatment of K. as regards his HIV. Furthermore, while the HIV diagnosis presupposed a high risk of tuberculosis, K. had not had an X-ray until almost a year after he had tested positive for HIV. The applicant also complained that the intervals between the X-ray sessions had been unreasonably long. Thus, after his X-ray on 6June 2011 K. had subsequently not had an X-ray until 13October 2011, whereas a repeat X-ray should have been performed within a two-month time period. Furthermore, although K.\u2019s treatment for tuberculosis had been unsuccessful, it had been continued, and his resistance to the medications prescribed had never been verified. Lastly, the applicant complained that the authorities had not provided her with all the information concerning her son\u2019s health while he had still been alive, despite the numerous inquiries made by her lawyer. In particular, she had only found out about her son\u2019s HIV after his death.","62.On 20 July 2012 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office forwarded the above complaint to the Kyiv Prosecutor\u2019s Office.","63.On 15 August 2012 the Svyatoshynskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office wrote to the applicant saying that her complaint concerning her son\u2019s death and the allegedly inadequate medical care he had received had already been investigated. As a result, it had been decided on 31 December 2011 that there were no grounds for opening a criminal case (see paragraph60 above). It remained open to the applicant to challenge that decision.","64.There is no information in the case file about any subsequent developments."],"27969":["THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE","5.The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Orsk, the Orenburg region.","A.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in police custody","1.The applicant\u2019s account of events at the Sovetskiy district police department","6.The applicant received a summons from investigator K. to attend office no.44 at the Sovetskiy district police department of the town of Orsk (\u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0434\u0435\u043b \u0421\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430 \u0433.\u041e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0430) at 11 a.m. on 15February 2005. The summons contained no further details. At 11 a.m. on 15February 2005 the applicant, who was 17 years old at the time, arrived at the police station, as requested, together with his father and his friend MsL. A police officer on duty registered their arrival at the police station. Investigator K. was absent and the applicant was asked to wait. Police officer M. took the applicant to his office.","7.At some point the applicant\u2019s father was asked to participate in an investigative measure. When this was finished he could not locate the applicant at the police station. He and Ms L. were requested by police officer M. to leave the building. They remained outside near the main entrance waiting for the applicant. At some point they were told that the applicant was no longer in the police station. They left at about 7p.m. As the applicant did not appear at home his parents enquired about his whereabouts at the Sovetskiy district police department, by telephone and in person. After many unsuccessful attempts they were finally told that the applicant had gone to police station no. 2 together with police officer Sh. and that he had stayed there until 8p.m.","8.According to the applicant, police officer Sh. took him to an experts\u2019 room where he was photographed and fingerprinted. Then, shortly after 3p.m., Sh. led him out of the police station from a back door in the experts\u2019 room and took him to Orsk police department no. 2 in a police car for questioning.According to the police station logbook, the applicant left the Sovetskiy district police station at 3.20 p.m. on 15 February 2005.","2.The applicant\u2019s account of events at Orsk police department no. 2","9.The applicant provided the following account of events at police department no. 2. The head of the police department, P., and police officer E. interviewed him about his alleged involvement in thefts from certain shops. The applicant denied involvement in the thefts. E. shackled the applicant\u2019s hands behind his back, told him \u201cto sit on the floor with his legs crossed in front of him\u201d, tied his legs with a rope, \u201cthrew the rope across the neck to the back\u201d, \u201chung it on a chair and pulled it\u201d. The applicant felt severe pain in his back.","10.At some point operative police officer K. came in and interviewed the applicant. When P. and E. both came out K. untied the applicant\u2019s legs and demanded that the applicant write a statement of \u201csurrender and confession\u201d. The applicant maintained his refusal. K. opened the door and called E. The applicant \u201cunderstood that he would be tortured again\u201d. He ran up and hit his head against the glass door of a bookcase. The glass broke and the applicant received cuts on his face above the left eyebrow and on his head.","11.Then E. tied the applicant\u2019s hands and legs behind his back, passed a metal bar under the rope and hung him on the bar, the ends of which were put on the table and the back of a chair. The applicant had been hanging in that position for about eight minutes when somebody took the bar off and asked E. to untie the applicant. E. refused.","12.At some point E. came out and the applicant was untied and the handcuffs were removed from him. K. demanded again that the applicant write a statement of \u201csurrender and confession\u201d. The applicant started writing the statement as requested. P. came in together with lawyer S. who offered his services as counsel for the applicant\u2019s defence. The applicant refused because he wished to be represented by a lawyer of his own choice.","13.Reluctant to continue writing the confession statement, the applicant was taken by E., who was allegedly drunk, to his office. An ambulance, which had been called after the incident with the broken glass, arrived and the applicant was examined by the ambulance medical assistant, who provided him with first aid and left.","14.Thereafter the applicant was questioned by two police officers, who were also drunk. One of them hit the applicant several times on both ears simultaneously with the palms of his hands. The other police officer punched him in the head.","15.Then E. tied the applicant up and hung him on the bar again. The applicant saw blood dripping from his head to the floor.","16.Police officer B. untied the applicant and demanded that he finish writing the statement of \u201csurrender and confession\u201d. The applicant did so and was allowed by P. to leave. The applicant went home, which was about three kilometres away, on foot.","3.The applicant\u2019s hospitalisation","17.At about 9.40 p.m. the applicant arrived home. At 11.05 p.m. he was hospitalised. According to the medical records of town hospital no. 2, where he stayed for in-patient treatment until 4 March 2005, at the time of his admission the applicant was complaining of headache, nausea, vomiting and giddiness. He explained that he had been beaten up by police officers three hours previously. He had an abrasion up to 2 cm long over the left eyebrow and bruises on his scalp. He was diagnosed with an abrasion on the left superciliary arch, contusions of the soft tissues of the head and concussion.","4.Police records","18.The evidence in the case file indicates that police officer E. drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s being \u201cconveyed\u201d (\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) to the police station. According to that record, at 7 p.m. on 15 February 2005 the applicant was brought to the police station \u201cfor examination\u201d (\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0431\u0438\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e) and searched in the presence of attesting witnesses V. and Sh. It was stated in the record, which was signed by police officer E., the two attesting witnesses and the applicant, that the applicant, a \u201cviolator\u201d, had been informed of the rights and obligations of a person against whom administrative proceedings were initiated. The record contained no further details.","B.Inquiry into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment and detention","1.Refusal to open a criminal investigation","19.On 15 February 2005 the Orsk police department was alerted by the town hospital that the applicant had been taken to hospital with injuries allegedly inflicted by police officers.","20.On 17 February 2005 the Orsk Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office received information about the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by police officers.","21.On 21 February 2005 the applicant\u2019s father complained to the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office that the applicant had been the victim of police officers\u2019 unlawful actions. On 4 March 2005 he lodged a similar complaint with the Orenburg regional prosecutor\u2019s office.","22.The Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a preliminary inquiry. Its investigator B. received explanations from a number of persons, including the following persons.","(a)Explanations received by the investigating authority","23.On 18 February 2005 lawyer S. stated that on 15 February 2005, some time after 7.20 p.m. [the head of the police department] P. had asked him to be present at an investigative measure as counsel for the defence of the applicant, who was suspected of having committed a crime. S. had seen coagulated blood on the applicant\u2019s eyebrow and on his head. S. had asked the operative officers to leave the office and asked the applicant about the origin of his injuries. The applicant had explained that he himself had hit his head against a bookcase. S. had offered his services as counsel for his defence. The applicant refused, as he wanted lawyer Z. to defend him.","24.On 22 February 2005 police officer E. stated that he had left work at 6.50p.m. on 15February 2005. At a bus stop he had seen the applicant who had been suspected of having committed thefts from two shops. E. had taken the applicant to the police station, where he had invited two attesting witnesses so that a record could be drawn up about the applicant\u2019s being conveyed to the police station and searched. In the presence of the attesting witnesses the applicant had jumped from his chair and hit his head against the glass door of a bookcase. The glass had broken and the applicant had received cuts on his eyebrow and head. E. had provided the applicant with first aid, had drawn up the record of his being conveyed to the police station, and had transferred him to operative officer K. Some twenty minutes later K. had brought the applicant back, as the applicant was complaining of feeling unwell. E. had called an ambulance. The ambulance staff had provided the applicant with first aid. E. denied any use of force or psychological pressure in relation to the applicant.","25.On 22 February 2005 the head of the police department P. stated that at 7-7.30 p.m. on 15 February 2005 he had been informed that the applicant had been brought to the police station on suspicion of having committed a theft. P. gave statements similar to those by E. about the applicant hitting the bookcase with his head. According to P., the applicant had stayed at the police station for one hour and had left at about 8 p.m. None of his subordinates had committed any unlawful actions in relation to the applicant.","26.On 24 February 2005 attesting witnesses V. and Sh. stated that at about 7p.m. they had been invited to be present as attesting witnesses at the applicant\u2019s search. After being searched the applicant had jumped to his feet, run up and hit his head against a bookcase. The glass of the bookcase had broken and the applicant had cut his eyebrow. Two police officers had been present during the incident.","27.On 3 March 2005 police officer Sh. stated that on 15 February 2005 at the Sovetskiy district police station he had taken the applicant to the experts\u2019 room, where the applicant had been fingerprinted and photographed, and then to the exit. Sh. denied having taken the applicant to police station no. 2.","28.On 5 March 2005 operative officer K. stated that the police had had information, notably explanations by an eyewitness to a theft at a certain shop, that the applicant could have been involved in the theft. K. had interviewed the applicant, who had been known to the police on account of thefts previously committed by him, at about 7 p.m. on 15 February 2005, after the incident with the broken glass. The applicant had confessed to the theft and had written a statement. After that E. had called the ambulance as the applicant was complaining of a headache. K. denied any use of force in relation to the applicant.","29.On 11 March 2005 investigator G. stated that she had requested that the applicant be summoned to the police station for an identity parade in a criminal case concerning assault and battery. On 15 February 2005 she had carried out the identity parade with the participation of the applicant\u2019s father. As the applicant\u2019s lawyer had not appeared she had cancelled the identity parade in which the applicant was to have participated. The applicant had left her office together with police officer Sh.","30.Expert M. stated that in the afternoon of 15 February 2005 police officer Sh. had brought the applicant to the experts\u2019 room. The applicant had been fingerprinted and photographed. M. confirmed that there was another exit from the building through the experts\u2019 room. He stated, however, that Sh. and the applicant had left through another, \u201cnormal\u201d door, through which they had arrived.","31.The applicant gave a description of his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 9-16 above). He stated that he had hit his head against the bookcase in order to stop the ill-treatment. He also stated that police officer E. had threatened to kill him if he told the ambulance staff about the ill\u2011treatment. When left with lawyer S. in private he had told him about the ill\u2011treatment and forced confession.","32.The applicant\u2019s father and Ms L. gave statements about their visit to the police station on 15 February 2005 (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above).","(b)Forensic medical expert\u2019s opinion","33.On 14 March 2005 investigator B. ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant, which was carried out by expert B. on 17March 2005. The expert was requested to determine the degree of harm to the health of the applicant, who had allegedly been beaten up by police officers on 15February 2005. The applicant complained of recurring headaches. He had a scar over the left eyebrow. Expert B. also examined his medical records from the town hospital (see paragraph 17 above). In his report no.892 the expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries, notably the concussion, the wound over the left eyebrow and the bruises on the scalp, had been inflicted by hard blunt objects shortly before he was hospitalised. The injuries were qualified as light damage to health as they had caused short-term health disorder.","(c)Decision of 17 March 2005","34.On 17March 2005 investigator B. ordered that by virtue of Article24\u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d) no criminal proceedings were to be instituted in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint, in view of the absence of constituent elements of a crime under Article 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of power) in the acts of police officers Sh. (as well as under Article 301 of the Criminal Code, unlawful arrest or detention), P., K., E. (also under Article 302 of the Criminal Code, coercion to obtain statements), and four others.","35.On 21 March 2005 a deputy prosecutor of the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office overturned the investigator\u2019s decision, as the inquiry on which it was based was considered incomplete, and ordered an additional inquiry.","(d)Additional explanations received by the investigating authority","36.Investigator B. received the following additional explanations.","37.On 22 March 2005 N., a medical assistant, stated that at 7.30 p.m. an ambulance had been called by police station no. 2. She and G., a junior nurse, had gone to the police station. She had found the applicant in a room with two police officers, who had explained to her that the applicant had hit the glass with his head and broken it. She had examined the applicant, who had cuts over the left eyebrow and on the head. Her examination had not revealed any obvious signs of concussion. The applicant had taken off his clothes. She had not seen any visible injuries on his body.","38.On 23 March 2005 junior nurse G. gave similar explanations. She noted that the applicant had been in a room with two police officers, one of whom had later come out. Then medical assistant N. had examined the applicant.","39.On 23 and 24 March 2005 Ya. and V. stated that in February 2005 they had undergone in\u2011patient treatment at the town hospital and had been in the same ward as the applicant, who had told them that he had been ill\u2011treated at the police station. Ya. understood that police officers had handcuffed the applicant and hung him and afterwards hit his head against the wall. According to V., police officers had handcuffed the applicant and hung him, and then either he himself had hit the bookcase with his head or police officers had hit his head against the bookcase.","40.The applicant\u2019s schoolteacher, I., characterised the applicant as sly, deceitful and shifty.","41.Forensic medical expert B. stated that he did not consider it possible to establish reliably how the applicant had received concussion. It could have been the result either of the applicant\u2019s hitting the bookcase with his head or of being punched on the head.","(e)Decision of 24 March 2005","42.On 24 March 2005, on the basis of the results of the inquiry, investigator B. again refused to open a criminal case under Article24\u00a71(2) of the CCrP, on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime in the acts of police officers Sh., P., K., E. and four others were absent. As before, the investigator referred to a crime under Article286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of power), as well as Article 301 of the Criminal Code (unlawful arrest or detention) in relation to Sh., and Article 302 of the Criminal Code (coercion to obtain statements) in relation to P., K. and E.. The investigator found that the applicant had been at the Sovetskiy district police department from 11 a.m. until 3.20p.m. on 15February 2005 for an identity parade in a criminal case concerning assault and battery, and that at about 7p.m. on the same day police officer E. had taken him to police station no. 2 on suspicion of theft. The investigator held that the results of the inquiry had showed that the applicant\u2019s injuries were self-inflicted, as a result of his hitting the bookcase with his head, and that the allegations of ill-treatment by police officers were devoid of any foundation.","2.Domestic courts\u2019 review of the refusal to open a criminal investigation under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure","43.The applicant\u2019s father appealed against the investigator\u2019s decision of 24March 2005. He complained, in particular, that the investigator had never held an identity parade in order to identify the two unknown police officers who had delivered blows to the applicant\u2019s head.","44.On 20 May 2005 the Orsk Sovetskiy District Court, sitting in a single-judge formation, heard the applicant\u2019s father, his representative and a deputy prosecutor of the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office, and examined the evidence of the inquiry carried out by the investigator. It was satisfied that the inquiry had been comprehensive and thorough, and that the investigator\u2019s assessment of its results had been impartial, reasoned and logical. It dismissed the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s appeal. It noted that an identity parade could only be held once a criminal case had been opened, which was not the case in the present proceedings.","45.The applicant\u2019s father appealed against the District Court\u2019s decision. On 16June 2005 the Orenburg Regional Court dismissed his appeal and fully endorsed the first-instance court\u2019s findings. It held, inter alia, that the evidence of the inquiry had reliably shown that on 15 February 2005 the applicant had not been arrested as a suspect in a criminal case."],"27996":["6.The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Chelyabinsk.","A.The applicant\u2019s state of health","7.In 2012 the applicant, while serving a prison sentence, was diagnosed with lymphoma. He was admitted to prison hospital no.3 of the Chelyabinsk Region and underwent two courses of chemotherapy.","8.In December 2012 a court authorised the applicant\u2019s early release on health grounds. He was then monitored by an oncologist in a civil hospital, having continued with chemotherapy. The Government submitted that in May 2013 the applicant had undergone an in-depth examination in the oncology department of the Chelyabinsk regional hospital, where he was diagnosed with lymphoproliferative disorder affecting the cervical, axillary, mediastinal and retroperitoneal lymph nodes. The applicant did not complete the medical examinations or treatment, including chemotherapy. He was arrested on 10 September 2013.","9.By judgments of 30September 2013, 22November 2013, and 16December 2013 the applicant was convicted of fraud, robbery and theft respectively. He was sent to serve his sentence in detention facility no.3. On 3March 2014 he was transferred to the prison tuberculosis hospital.","10.On 13March 2014 a medical panel, comprising the deputy head of the prison tuberculosis hospital and doctors from the same hospital, examined the applicant and diagnosed him with progressive non-Hodgkin lymphoma in acute III B stage, with lesions of the cervical, axillary and abdominal lymph nodes. The panel concluded that the applicant was eligible for early release as he suffered from malignant formations of lymphatic and haematogenous tissues, a disease included in the List of serious illnesses precluding the serving of sentences in correctional institutions, as provided for by Decree no. 54 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 6February 2004 (hereinafter \u201cthe List\u201d).","11.On 10 April 2014, with reference to the conclusions of the medical panel, the applicant made an application for early release. On 26May 2014 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk dismissed the application. Having accepted that the applicant\u2019s illness was included in the List, and describing his condition as \u201cstable [but] serious\u201d, the court, nevertheless, found that the drugs necessary for his treatment were available in the prison tuberculosis hospital, and that the applicant was undergoing the necessary medical procedures. The court further pointed out that it was not clear who would take care of the applicant in the event of his release from prison. The applicant did not appeal against the decision.","12.On 30June 2014 the applicant\u2019s sister gave a written undertaking to take care of the applicant should he be released.","13.According to a certificate issued by the prison tuberculosis hospital at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the drugs necessary for the applicant\u2019s chemotherapy were unavailable at the hospital.","14.On 1July 2014 the medical panel from the prison tuberculosis hospital again examined the applicant. The diagnosis was that the applicant had progressive non-Hodgkin lymphoma in acute IV B stage with lesions of the abdominal lymph nodes. It was once again noted that the applicant was eligible for release on health grounds.","15.The applicant made another application for release at the end of July 2014. He submitted that his disease had progressed to its final stage and that he had relatives who could take care of him.","16.On 12September 2014 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court held a hearing. B., a doctor from the prison tuberculosis hospital, testified that the applicant needed chemotherapy and radiation therapy, but was unable to receive such treatment in detention since the necessary equipment was unavailable at the hospital.On the same date the District Court dismissed the application for release once again, noting that the applicant had a tendency to reoffend and concluding that he was receiving adequate medical care in detention.","17.The applicant appealed.","B.Rule 39 request","18.In October 2014 the applicant asked the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and to authorise his immediate release from detention as an interim measure. The applicant claimed that he was not receiving the necessary medical assistance and treatment in detention, despite his suffering from a life-threatening and rapidly progressing illness. He relied on a certificate from the prison hospital confirming the absence of drugs for his chemotherapy (see paragraph 13 above).","19.On 16 October 2014 the Court decided to indicate to the Russian Government, under Rule 39, that it was desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant be immediately examined by medical experts, including an oncologist, independent from the prison system with a view to determining: (1) whether the treatment he was receiving in detention was adequate for his condition; (2) whether his current state of health was compatible with detention in the conditions of a correctional colony or prison hospital; and (3) whether his current condition required his placement in a specialised hospital or release. The Russian Government were also asked to ensure the applicant\u2019s immediate transfer to a specialised hospital if the medical experts concluded that the applicant required placement in such a hospital.","20.On 7 November 2014 the Government responded to the Court\u2019s letter of 17October 2014, submitting the following documents:","-a handwritten copy of the applicant\u2019s medical history drawn up during his detention. The history included a form for consent to treatment, signed by the applicant. It also contained a detailed schedule showing the daily intake of drugs by the applicant. As appears from that document, he received basic analgesic and anti-inflammatory drugs, antihistamines, sleeping pills, antidepressants, antiemetics and neuroleptics.","-certificates issued by the acting head of the prison tuberculosis hospital, indicating that the applicant had not been provided with chemotherapy for his lymphoma as he had not consented to that treatment when it had been offered to him, in March and June 2014. According to the acting head of the hospital, the applicant had refused to make a written statement to that effect. The certificate also indicated that an oncologist had examined the applicant four times, once in March and September 2014 and twice in October 2014. At the end of October 2014 the applicant\u2019s condition was considered to be serious: he was suffering severe pain and increasing asthenia, had coughed blood, and his lymph nodes continued to grow. In another certificate, the acting head of the hospital stressed that the applicant was suffering from a life-threatening oncological disease, particularly taking into account the advanced stage of his illness. In addition, in a separate certificate, the acting head of the hospital noted that the prison tuberculosis hospital where the applicant was detained employed an oncologist and had the necessary medicines for the applicant\u2019s treatment.","-copies of the applicant\u2019s complaints to various Russian officials, including the Chelyabinsk regional ombudsman, the Prosecutor General\u2019s office, the regional department for the execution of sentences and the acting head of the prison tuberculosis hospital, about the poor quality of his medical care in detention. The complaints also contained a request for a medical examination and for his early release on health grounds.","21.The Government also answered the three questions which, in its letter of 17 October 2014, the Court had asked them to refer to independent medical experts. In particular, in their answer to the first question concerning the adequacy of the applicant\u2019s treatment, the Government stressed that the applicant had regularly undergone in-patient treatment and examinations in relation to his oncological illness. They noted that the applicant\u2019s condition was considered to be moderately serious and stressed that in March and June 2014 he had failed to consent to the cancer treatment. They further directed the Court to the documents enclosed with their reply (see paragraph20 above).","22.In their response to the second question about the compatibility of the applicant\u2019s state of health with the conditions of the correctional colony and prison hospital, the Government emphasised that the applicant\u2019s hospital employed the necessary specialists, and had the necessary equipment and drugs to treat him. They further noted that the applicant was in pain and was weak, that he occasionally coughed blood and that his lymph nodes continued to grow. The Government continued by indicating that he would be provided with chemotherapy as soon as the general blood test results allowed and the applicant consented.","23.In replying to the third question as to whether the applicant needed to be transferred to a specialised hospital or be released, the Government observed that the applicant\u2019s oncological illness was incurable and could lead to his death. They relied on the two reports issued by the doctors from the prison tuberculosis hospital on 13 March and 1 July 2014, according to which the applicant was suffering from a condition included in the list of serious illnesses precluding the serving of sentences in correctional institutions, as provided for by Decree no. 54 of the Government of the Russian Federation. However, the Russian courts had refused to release the applicant on health grounds. Another examination of the applicant by the hospital medical panel had been scheduled for November 2014.","C.Developments after the application of the interim measure","24.The applicant informed the Court that on 28November 2014, acting upon his appeal, the Chelyabinsk Regional Court had quashed the decision of 12September 2014 and ordered his release. With reference to B.\u2019s testimony, the Regional Court held that the District Court\u2019s findings as to the adequacy of the treatment received by the applicant in the hospital were not in accordance with the established facts. It also pointed to the District Court\u2019s failure to comment on the undertaking by the applicant\u2019s sister to take care of the applicant after his release.","25.On an unspecified date after 28 November 2014 the applicant was released."],"28027":["6.The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Chi\u0219in\u0103u.","A.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment","7.The applicant was serving a sentence of eleven years\u2019 imprisonment in Prison no. 13 in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. On 28 October 2006 he and five other detainees were in cell no. 20, reserved for the medical treatment of detainees with mental problems. Three of them, including the applicant, had a Category 2 disability. The applicant\u2019s diagnosis was, inter alia, personality disorder.","8.At around 3 p.m. several men entered the cell to search for prohibited items. Some of the men wore dark masks and they were armed with rubber truncheons and metal shields. They ordered everyone out. According to the applicant, the masked men shouted at the detainees and insulted them, while hitting and pushing them. The Government dispute that any force was used or that there was any improper behaviour on the part of the men who had entered the cell. While in the corridor the detainees were ordered to stand with their faces to the wall. The search lasted for approximately half an hour. One prison officer recorded the events on video.","9.The detainees were then ordered back into the cell. According to the applicant, when he saw their possessions, including food brought to them by their relatives, medication and documents, scattered on the floor and in total disorder, he declared that he would return to the cell only after a prosecutor or a representative of the prison administration had made a report on the search and the disorder caused. He was then hit and thrown to the floor, kicked in the stomach, and the cell door was slammed with force while his foot was between the door and the doorpost, causing him great pain. His reading glasses fell to the ground and were smashed by one of the masked men. The Government submitted that no force had been used and that the cell had been left in good order.","10.After the search the applicant complained about his swollen foot and was taken by ambulance to a hospital in Chi\u0219in\u0103u at around 7 p.m. The doctor who examined him in that hospital diagnosed him with contusion of the soft tissues of the right ankle and a suspected fracture of the bone. His foot was then put in plaster.","B.Investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment","1.Complaints about ill-treatment","11.On 31 October 2006 the applicant complained about ill-treatment to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the military prosecutor\u2019s office and other State authorities. Four other detainees who had been held in the same cell made similar complaints.","12.On 28 November 2006 the applicant was examined by another doctor, who confirmed the diagnosis of a broken bone and found a haematoma on his right foot, corresponding to signs of violence and leading to long-lasting health problems (over twenty-one days). Further forensic examinations were carried out on 1 and 28 December 2006 and 3 May 2007. According to the applicant, these certificates confirmed that he had suffered an injury to his right foot. According to the Government, a further forensic examination carried out on 31 October 2007 contradicted the results of the previous ones, finding no conclusive evidence that the applicant had had a broken bone. The parties did not submit full copies of the last three reports mentioned above.","13.On 6 December 2006 a prosecutor from the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided not to start a criminal investigation into the complaints made by the applicant and other detainees.","14.On 8 December 2006 a prosecutor from the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Prosecutor\u2019s Office started a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations.","15.Between 28 November and 5 December 2007 several individuals, members of the \u201cPantera\u201d special forces battalion who had taken part in the action of 28October 2006, were charged with exceeding their powers by using excessive force against the applicant.","2.Discontinuation of the criminal investigation","16.On 15 February 2008 a prosecutor from the Chi\u0219in\u0103u Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the criminal investigation. He found that on 28 October 2006 the applicant had disobeyed lawful orders of the prison staff during the search of his cell, acted provocatively, and refused to return to his cell. He had had to be taken there by force. Moreover, it could not be ruled out that he had caused injuries to himself in order to subsequently accuse the authorities of ill-treatment. The prosecutor noted that the applicant and four other detainees in cell no. 20 had confirmed, in their complaints and statements made to the investigator during the criminal investigation, that the masked men who had entered the cell on 28 October 2006 had caused great disorder, had insulted the detainees, and had hit them with rubber truncheons.","17.According to the statement of detainee S.B., on 28 October 2006 the detainees were taken out of cell no. 20 and ordered to stand facing the wall for approximately half an hour while their cell was being searched. They were then moved back to their cell, again by force. S.B. witnessed one of the masked officers slamming the cell door and crushing the applicant\u2019s foot, threatening to break his hands if he continued to write complaints. Having watched the videotape of the search, S.B. submitted that the filming was selective, not showing the acts of violence in order to shield those who had carried them out from responsibility. At the end of the search the leader of the masked men did not identify himself and did not fill in any report about the incident.","18.Detainees A.G., V.Z. and B.I. made similar statements, each declaring that he had been personally hit and insulted and that the applicant\u2019s foot had been shut in the cell door. The applicant\u2019s statement was similar to those of the other detainees. He added that the video footage shown to him was only about six minutes long, while the entire event had lasted for approximately thirty minutes. Moreover, the various parts of the film were clearly not in chronological order.","19.One detainee, (V.S.), who had been taking his daily exercise during the search, confirmed seeing upon his return great disorder in the cell, with all the food and personal items broken up and thrown to the ground, and the detainees cleaning up the mess and complaining about being hit during the search.","20.Another witness, a member of the prison staff (I.V.), stated that he did not see any violence towards the detainees or any disorder being created in cell no. 20 during the search of 28 October 2006. Another member of the prison staff (P.P.), who was the head of the medical unit of Prison no.13, stated that after the search on 28 October 2006 he saw disorder in cell no. 20, but did not see any food on the ground. The search lasted for approximately thirty minutes. He did not see the detainees re-enter their cell, but heard the conflict between the applicant and the masked men. He did not see any violence being used, but could admit that force had been used. Later on the applicant complained of pain in his foot and was taken to the emergency hospital, from which he returned with his foot in plaster.","21.According to witness A.P., who worked as a nurse in Prison no. 13, on 28October 2006 she came to work at 4 p.m. and was called to cell no. 20, where the applicant was complaining of sharp pain in his foot. He was then taken to hospital by ambulance and returned with his foot in plaster. The cell was in disorder; the patients were agitated and were asking for urgent medical assistance for the applicant. During the initial examination A.P. found that the applicant\u2019s foot was seriously swollen. He then told her that he had been hit by the officers during the search.","22.Witness E.B., a medical assistant in Prison no. 13, stated that she had not seen any of the events and had only heard the noise. She was later told by A.P. that after the search the applicant had asked for medical assistance to treat his foot.","23.According to witness P.C., a supervisor in Prison no. 13, on 28October 2006 he was informed that someone was asking for medical assistance in cell no. 20, and sent A.P. there. When he himself entered the cell P.C. saw personal belongings and food scattered on the ground. The applicant then told him that the masked men had caused the disorder and had beaten them up, and that his foot hurt as a result of that beating. He also declared that during that day the applicant had not made any complaints about his state of health, but immediately after the search had complained of sharp pain in the foot. He was limping when he was taken to the ambulance.","24.According to witness M.M., a feldsher (paramedic) in Prison no. 13, on 28 October 2006 at 5 p.m he saw the applicant, who complained that he had been beaten up earlier, during the search. M.M. did not see any visible injury on the applicant\u2019s body; the applicant could move his feet freely, but his right foot was swollen in the ankle area. The applicant limped when taken to the ambulance.","25.Three witnesses (A.V., O.H., and V.D.), all members of the prison staff, declared that they did not witness any violence against the detainees, or any disorder in cell no. 20.","26.(V.N.) stated that he had filmed \u201ccertain parts of the search\u201d on a video recorder, using an 8 mm video cassette. He had not witnessed any disorder or violence towards the detainees.","27.Witnesses V.B. and I.I., who coordinated the actions of the various groups of prison staff and the Pantera special forces regiment (the masked men), declared that after the search their teams did not report having used force on anyone or having had any exceptional situation to deal with. Only the applicant had been uncooperative, but he was eventually persuaded to return to the cell without using force.","28.The prosecutor\u2019s decision further analysed several reports in the file, including a report confirming the destruction of the applicant\u2019s reading glasses. A video filmed by V.N. during the event, lasting for six minutes and thirty-six seconds and registered on a compact disk, showed the detainees leaving their cell voluntarily; the presence in the cell of masked men; the applicant\u2019s request to be allowed to take his belongings with him and the refusal of that request; it showed various objects in the cell and the presence in it of detainee V.Z. The cell was in good order. The next scene showed the applicant refusing to comply with I.V.\u2019s order to return to the cell. The next scene showed the applicant sitting on the ground and asking for a prosecutor to be called, affirming that he would not move until the prosecutor saw what had happened to the food and belongings in the cell and a report was made about the event. The last scene showed the cell door being closed. Someone could be heard hitting the door from the inside and the applicant\u2019s voice shouting \u201cI\u2019m going to kill myself, I\u2019m going to cut myself\u201d and \u201cwhere is the map with documents, they took my map with documents\u201d.","29.The prosecutor found that the video recording did not prove that violence had been used, and that the sound of the cell door being struck, heard at the end of the recording, allowed the supposition that the injury to the applicant\u2019s foot could have been self-inflicted.","3.The reopening of the investigation and its final discontinuation","30.On 10 March 2008 the deputy Prosecutor General quashed the decision of 15February 2008 and ordered a more thorough investigation.","31.On 17 April 2008 a prosecutor discontinued the criminal investigation, essentially for the same reasons as those mentioned in the decision of 15 February 2008.","32.By a final decision of 12 August 2008 an investigating judge of the Buiucani District Court upheld the decision of 17 April 2008. The judge found that while the law allowed complaints about violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, the applicant\u2019s complaint concerned the admissibility and evaluation of evidence obtained in criminal proceedings. However, the investigating judge did not have the competence to evaluate evidence in a criminal or civil trial.","33.The applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal (recurs \u00een anulare) to the Supreme Court of Justice, and asked for the decision of 12 August 2008 to be quashed.","34.On 1 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected his request, finding that the Buiucani District Court had adopted a lawful decision after analysing the evidence in the file."],"28029":["5.The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Shadrinsk.","6.On 20 August 2003 the Shadrinsk Town Court of the Kurgan Region convicted him of murder and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. On 29 October 2003 the Kurgan Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal.","7.The applicant is HIV-positive and at the material time also suffered from tuberculosis and hepatitis.","A.The applicant\u2019s detention in a medical facility","8.On 25 December 2008 the applicant was transferred to the LIU OF\u201173\/3 medical facility (\u043b\u0435\u0447\u0435\u0431\u043d\u043e-\u0438\u0441\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u0447\u0440\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) in the Kurgan Region and was detained in the following wards:","(a)quarantine ward 24 from 25 to 30 December 2008 and from 18 to 30June 2009;","(b)ward 25 from 30 December 2008 to 28 May 2009 and from 30 June to 21 September 2009; and","(c)ward 26 from 21 September to 3 November 2009.","9.According to the applicant, the wards were severely overcrowded. For instance, ward 25 measured approximately 80 square metres, was equipped with fifteen two-tier bunk beds and housed twenty-seven inmates. Passages between the beds, lengthwise, were as narrow as fifty centimetres and were used by four inmates. The wards were poorly lit as the windows were covered with louvre shutters blocking access to natural light.","10.According to the Government, ward 24 measured 61.49 square metres, had sixteen sleeping places and accommodated up to sixteen inmates. Ward 25 measured 67.5 square metres, was equipped with thirteen two-tier bunk beds and housed up to twenty-six inmates. Finally, ward 28 measured 49.4 square metres and accommodated fifteen inmates. The applicant was provided with an individual sleeping place at all times. All wards had access to natural light.","11.In support of their submissions, the Government provided original floor plans and ward population registers containing information about the exact number of inmates in each ward for the whole period the applicant was in the LIU OF-73\/3 facility. They also submitted a prosecutor\u2019s report dated 11 October 2010 regarding the conditions there. It indicated, in particular, that windows in all wards were fitted with metal louvre shutters.","B.Alleged restrictions on family visits","12.On 9 February 2009 the medical facility authorities issued an order introducing visiting fees for inmates and their families. The calculation table annexed to the order specified that a fee of 320 Russian roubles (approximately 9 euros) per day per person would be payable, covering maintenance charges, prison staff salaries, the depreciation of visiting room equipment, bed linen and cleaning products.","13.On 14 April 2009 the director of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences sent a letter to the heads of Russian penal facilities, reminding them that charging visitors and detainees for family visits was in breach of Article 89 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 17 below) and that facility administrations must bear the costs of providing rooms for long-term visits. Only additional services are payable by detainees in accordance with the Internal Regulations of Correctional Facilities (see paragraph 20 below).","14.On 22 April 2009 the applicant was authorised to see his two daughters on a long-term family visit. He calculated that a three-day visit from them would cost RUB 1,920, which was far beyond their means. His daughters did visit him, but stayed only one day instead of the expected three, as they did not have enough money on them to stay any longer.","15.On 22 August 2009 the applicant\u2019s daughters visited their father again, this time free of charge.","C.Alleged opening of the applicant\u2019s correspondence","16.On 29 April 2010 the applicant received a letter from the Court dated 19March 2010 in the correspondence department of the OF-73\/2 correctional facility, to which he had been transferred in February 2010. It was handed over to him in an open envelope and he was told to sign a copy which had been attached to his personal file."],"28032":["5.The applicant was born in 1997 and lives in Deva.","A.Alleged sexual abuse of the applicant","6.At the time of the events, the eleven-year-old applicant was living with her family in a small village and often used to go to play with two girls from a neighbouring family at their house. The girls, F.C.B. and M.S.B., were about the same age as the applicant. The neighbours\u2019 family (the B.family) had ten children and were also accommodating a relative of theirs, J.V., a fifty-two-year-old man who was unemployed and lived in the family\u2019s vacant cattle stable.","7.According to the statement made by the applicant later to the police, in August 2008 and then again in December 2008, J.V. had dragged her by force while she was playing with her girlfriends at the neighbours\u2019 house, had taken her to an empty room in the house or into the barn and had raped her while holding her down and keeping his hand over her mouth in order to prevent her from screaming. The applicant also stated to the police that between August 2008 and February 2009 she had been raped in similar circumstances by four of the neighbours\u2019 sons and their friend G.I.","8.On 10 March 2009 the applicant\u2019s mother noticed that the applicant did not get her monthly period and had a talk with her. She told her mother that she had been sexually abused by J.V. and the other boys. She said that she had been ashamed to talk about what happened and also afraid to tell her parents sooner because J.V. had threatened that he would beat her if she told anyone.","9.As a result of the sexual abuse, the applicant became pregnant and, with her parents\u2019 approval, she later underwent a surgical termination of the pregnancy.","B.Criminal investigation and trial","10.On 10 March 2009 the applicant\u2019s parents lodged a complaint against the alleged perpetrators with the local police and an investigation was started against J.V. and the four brothers F.B., A.B., G.B. and P.B. No proceedings were opened with respect to G.I., who was under fourteen and hence not criminally liable.","11. On the same day the five suspects were called into the police station for questioning. F.B. declared that on 22 December 2008, when the applicant was visiting her friends, he had asked her to have sex with him and she had accepted. P.B. declared that it had been J.V. who insistently told him to have sex with the applicant.","12.On 11 March 2009 a forensic report found that no traces of violence had been detected on the applicant\u2019s body.","13.During the investigation J.V. declared that the applicant had provoked him to have sex with her as she was always scantily dressed. He further stated that it was she who had come to him and had asked him to have sex with her the first time, in August or September 2008. He alleged that the applicant had told him that she had had sex before with the boys from the B. family.","14.The applicant declared before the police that she had been forced by J.V. to have sex with him on several occasions, alleging that he had threatened that he would beat her if she told anyone. The other boys had also forced her to have sex with them, telling her that it was J.V. who had told them what to do.","15.On 22 April2009 the Deva Police sent the file to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Hunedoara County Court in order to pursue the investigation into rape. The judiciary police officer making the request held that, even if the perpetrators\u2019 statements were to be accepted as truthful, the victim\u2019s age (eleven at the time of the first sexual act) precluded the existence of legally valid consent as she could not have freely expressed her will.","16.On 7 July 2009, at the request of the Hunedoara County Police, the Hunedoara County Forensic Institute issued a forensic psychiatric report on the applicant. The report held that the applicant was suffering from post-traumatic stress and stated that:","\u201cConcerning the specific circumstances in which the criminal acts were committed, the minor speaks with shame about what happened. She has a vivid memory of the events. ... She says that she did not tell anyone about the incidents sooner because she feared for her safety and the safety of her family members.\u201d","The report concluded that the applicant had difficulties in foreseeing the consequences of her actions and had insufficient discernment due to her age.","17.F.B. declared before the prosecutor that he had had sex with the applicant once on 22 December 2008. A.B. declared that he had had sex with the applicant in the autumn of 2008. G.B. declared that he had had sex with the applicant once in April and then again in October 2008. P.B. stated that he had had sex with the applicant on one occasion in the autumn of 2008. The applicant had asked him to have sex with her, and when he had refused - because he had never done this before - it was she who got undressed and climbed onto him. He further mentioned that he had used a condom that he had in his pocket. They all declared that it was the applicant who had taken the initiative each time and that it had happened because she displayed a provocative attitude, being scantily dressed most of the time. Each brother stated that the applicant had told him that she had had sex before, either with one of the other brothers or with J.V.","18.When questioned during the investigation, F.C.B. and M.S.B. declared that the applicant had told them she had had an intimate relationship with J.V. and that they had never seen him taking the applicant by force while they were playing. They also stated that the applicant often came to their house scantily dressed and that their brothers C.B. and A.B. had told them that the applicant had provoked them and \u201cjumped onto them\u201d.","19.On 10 December 2009 the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Hunedoara County Court issued an indictment decision with respect to J.V. for the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor on repeated occasions. F.B., A.B., G.B. and P.B. were given administrative fines for the same crime. From the statements of the perpetrators and the two sisters, the prosecutor held as proved the fact that the applicant had gone to the neighbours\u2019 house scantily dressed and had had a sexual relationship with J.V. The prosecutor therefore concluded that from the documents in the file it was not proved beyond doubt that the applicant had not given her consent to the sexual acts.","20.The applicant\u2019s complaint against the prosecutor\u2019s decision concerning the four brothers and G.I. was rejected by the superior prosecutor and subsequently by the courts.","21.On 20 April 2010 J.V. was found guilty by the Deva District Court ofsexual intercourse with a minor and was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant was awarded 10,000 Romanian lei (ROL) by way of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage (approximately 2,000 euros (EUR)).","22.During the proceedings the applicant\u2019s representative requested the perpetrator\u2019s conviction for rape. She submitted to the file a copy of a judgment issued on 10 November 2009 by the Bac\u0103u Court of Appeal which held that a girl aged ten years and eight months could not understand what a sexual act meant sufficiently well to give her consent to it.","23.The applicant declared before the court that J.V. had forced her to have sex with him and had threatened to beat her if she told anyone. She was afraid of him because he could become violent when he was drunk. The other boys had also threatened to beat her and once A.B. had threatened her with a knife.","24.In reaching its decision, after also hearing statements from J.V. and the witnesses F.C.B. and M.S.B., the Deva District Court firstly observed that the forensic certificate stated that no signs of violence had been detected on the victim\u2019s body. The court further noted that it was apparent from the statements of J.V. and the other perpetrators who had not been indicted by the prosecutor that the applicant had always taken the initiative for the sexual acts and she had been in the habit of provoking both J.V. and the other boys to have sex with her. As regards the content of the above-mentioned statements, the court considered \u201crelevant\u201d the fact that the applicant was scantily dressed and that even after she had allegedly been sexually abused she went on playing with her girlfriends. The court considered that:","\u201cIf sexual intercourse had taken place by force or by taking advantage of the victim\u2019s lack of capacity to defend herself or to express her will, it is certain that [she] would not have continued her previous practice [going to play with the neighbours\u2019 daughters]\u201d.","25.The applicant, represented by her lawyer, appealed against the judgment of the Deva District Court, requesting that J.V. be convicted of rape and that the amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage be increased to ROL 50,000. The applicant\u2019s representative submitted that the decision of the first instance court had not been impartial since it had been based only on the statement of the accused, together with statements by the other perpetrators and two witnesses \u2013 all related to the accused. Furthermore, since the minimum age of consent to a sexual act was set by law at fifteen, the applicant \u2012 who was only eleven at the time of the incidents \u2012 could not have expressed valid consent and the sexual abuse committed against her could therefore only be classified as rape. In addition, the applicant\u2019s representative complained that the forensic psychiatric report of 7 July 2009, which declared that the victim lacked capacity to express valid consent and was suffering from post-traumatic stress, had not been taken into consideration by the first instance court.","26.The Hunedoara County Court decided to allow the applicant\u2019s appeal, holding that:","\u201cAccording to the provisions of Article 197 of the Criminal Code, the crime of rape is \u2018Sexual intercourse of any kind with a person ... taking advantage of the [person\u2019s] lack of capacity to defend herself or to express her will [original emphasis]...\u2019.","At the time when the accused had sexual intercourse with the victim, she was eleven years old. In Romanian law, there is an absolute presumption that any person below fourteen completely lacks capacity. Therefore, before the age of fourteen, the minor cannot express a valid consent, being in a position of inability to express [his\/her] will in a valid manner...\u201d","27.Taking these arguments into account, on 4 November 2010 the Hunedoara County Court convicted J.V. of rape and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment. The court applied a sentence below the minimum provided for by law for the crime of rape against a person under fifteen, finding mitigating circumstances due to the defendant\u2019s good behaviour prior to the commission of the crime on trial. The court also held that it was not necessary to increase the amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage awarded by the first instance court.","28.The applicant\u2019s representative submitted an appeal on points of law (recurs) against the judgment of 4 November 2010, requesting an increase in the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage and that a more severe sentence be imposed on the defendant. J.V. also contested the judgment, requesting a conviction for the crime to which he had confessed, namely sexual intercourse with a minor.","29.On 21 March 2011 the Alba Iulia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law submitted by J.V. and upheld with final effect the judgment of the Deva District Court of 20 April 2010. The Alba Iulia Court of Appeal based its verdict on the statements given by J.V., F.C.B. and M.S.B. as well as the account of the events given by the other perpetrators. Based on these testimonies and the fact that the victim had not told her parents about the alleged abuse, the court drew the conclusion that the instances of sexual intercourse had always been initiated by the applicant and dismissed the theory that the victim might have lacked capacity to express her will. The findings of the forensic psychiatric report of 7 July 2009 were not mentioned or discussed in any way by the court.","The court of appeal explained as follows:","\u201cThe court considers that the crime of rape is committed by constraint - physical or moral - or by taking advantage of the victim\u2019s lack of capacity to express his\/her will, more specifically rape is a sexual intercourse committed without consent. On the other hand, the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor, as provided by Article 198 of the Criminal Code, means engaging in a sexual intercourse with a minor under 15, but with the minor\u2019s consent. ...","\u201cThe presumption of lack of capacity applies only to minors who are under fourteen and have committed a crime, but with respect to the crime provided by Article 198 of the Criminal Code, the minor [the applicant] is the victim and not the perpetrator.\u201d","A.Council of Europe Sources","38.The Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse obliges its signatories to take the necessary legislative or other measures to prevent all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children. The Convention entered into force on 1 July 2010. Romania ratified the Convention on 28 June 2013. The relevant parts of Chapter VI, \u201cSubstantive criminal law\u201d read:","Article 18 \u2013 Sexual abuse","\u201c1.Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conduct is criminalised:","a.engaging in sexual activities with a child who, according to the relevant provisions of national law, has not reached the legal age for sexual activities;","b.engaging in sexual activities with a child where: - use is made of coercion, force or threats; or - abuse is made of a recognised position of trust, authority or influence over the child, including within the family; or - abuse is made of a particularly vulnerable situation of the child, notably because of a mental or physical disability or a situation of dependence.","2.For the purpose of paragraph 1 above, each Party shall decide the age below which it is prohibited to engage in sexual activities with a child.","3.The provisions of paragraph 1.a are not intended to govern consensual sexual activities between minors.\u201d","39.The Explanatory Report to the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, of which the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe took note on 12 July 2007, provides as follows in its relevant parts:","\u201c3.... It is also recognised that children usually experience extreme difficulties in telling anyone about being sexually abused because very often they are violated by a person in their close social or family circle or because they are threatened. ...","7.Compliance with the CRC [UN Convention on the Rights of the Child] and its Protocols is monitored by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which has come to the conclusion that children in Europe are not sufficiently protected against sexual exploitation and abuse. In particular the Committee underlines the lack of exhaustive national criminal legislation in this field in the State Parties, ...\u201d","40.On 5 May 2011 the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which entered into force on 1 August 2014. The Convention was signed by Romania on 27 June 2014, but has not yet been ratified. The Convention provides as follows in its relevant parts:","Article 36 \u2013 Sexual violence, including rape","\u201c1Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conducts are criminalised:","aengaging in non\u2010consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body of another person with any bodily part or object;","bengaging in other non\u2010consensual acts of a sexual nature with a person;","ccausing another person to engage in non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a third person.","2Consent must be given voluntarily as the result of the person\u2019s free will assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. ...\u201d","Article 49 \u2013 General obligations","\u201c1Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue delay while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages of the criminal proceedings.","2Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures, in conformity with the fundamental principles of human rights and having regard to the gendered understanding of violence, to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of offences established in accordance with this Convention.\u201d","Article 54 \u2013 Investigations and evidence","\u201cParties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that, in any civil or criminal proceedings, evidence relating to the sexual history and conduct of the victim shall be permitted only when it is relevant and necessary.\u201d","Article 56 \u2013 Measures of protection","\u201c2A child victim and child witness of violence against women and domestic violence shall be afforded, where appropriate, special protection measures taking into account the best interests of the child.\u201d","41.The Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice adopted on 17 November 2010 provide the following:","\u201c1.Member States should guarantee the effective implementation of the right of children to have their best interests be a primary consideration in all matters involving or affecting them....","17.A common assessment framework should be established for professionals working with or for children (such as lawyers, psychologists, physicians, police, immigration officials, social workers and mediators) in proceedings or interventions that involve or affect children to provide any necessary support to those taking decisions, enabling them to best serve children\u2019s interests in a given case.\u201d","42.Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the protection of women against violence recommends that member States adopt and implement, in the manner most appropriate to each country\u2019s national circumstances, a series of measures to combat violence against women. Paragraph 35 of the appendix to the recommendation states that, in the field of criminal law, member States should, inter alia:","\u201c\u2013penalise any sexual act committed against non-consenting persons, even if they do not show signs of resistance; ...","\u2013penalise any abuse of the position of a perpetrator, and in particular of an adult vis-\u00e0-vis a child.\u201d","B.Other European Sources","43.Directive 2011\/93\/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography provides as follows in its preamble:","\u201c(6)Serious criminal offences such as the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography require a comprehensive approach covering the prosecution of offenders, the protection of child victims, and prevention of the phenomenon. The child\u2019s best interests must be a primary consideration when carrying out any measures to combat these offences in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.\u201d","The Directive also provides in Article 20 paragraph 3 letter c) that interviews with the child victim of sexual abuse are to be carried out by or through professionals trained for this purpose.","44.A detailed description of the legal provisions and practice in certain European countries concerning the notion of consent in the context of the crime of rape can be found in M.C. v. Bulgaria (no. 39272\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 88-100, 4 March 2004).","C.United Nations Sources","45.The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989, has binding force under international law on the Contracting States, including all of the member States of the Council of Europe. The Convention was ratified by Romania on 28 September 1990. The relevant Articles read:","Article 19","\u201c1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.","2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement.\u201d","Article 34","\u201cStates Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent:","(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;","(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices;...\u201d","46.The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General comment No. 13 (2011) on the right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence recommends that:","\u201cInvestigation of instances of violence, whether reported by the child, a representative or an external party, must be undertaken by qualified professionals who have received role-specific and comprehensive training, and require a child rights-based and child-sensitive approach. Rigorous but child-sensitive investigation procedures will help to ensure that violence is correctly identified and help provide evidence for administrative, civil, child-protection and criminal proceedings. (...) Towards this end, all parties are obliged to invite and give due weight to the child\u2019s views.\u201d"],"28034":["5.The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently serving a sentence in prison no. 100.","A.Criminal proceedings and the applicant\u2019s detention","6.On 1 April 2000 criminal proceedings were instituted in Donetsk in connection with a robbery committed in Dzerzhinsk.","7.On 2 June 2000 criminal proceedings were instituted in Kharkiv in connection with a robbery committed on the Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk-Simferopol road.","8.On 9 August 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted in Yevpatoriya in connection with a murder and attempted murder committed in the course of an armed robbery (\u201cthe murder proceedings\u201d).","9.On 30 October 2001 the Chervonodzerzhynskiy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) granted the prosecutor\u2019s request to put the applicant, a former police officer, on remand as a suspect in the criminal proceedings concerning the robbery on the Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk-Simferopol road. The District Court held that, as the applicant was suspected of having committed a serious crime and had absconded during the investigation, his detention was necessary to prevent him from reoffending. The court also noted that the applicant\u2019s personality was to be taken into consideration, without giving any further details. On the same date, the applicant\u2019s name was put on a wanted list.","10.On 11 November 2001 the applicant was arrested in accordance with the District Court decision of 30 October 2001. He submitted that he had presented himself to the police voluntarily once he had become aware that he was wanted. On the same day, he drafted a \u201cstatement of voluntary surrender\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u044e) in which he confessed to committing, as part of a criminal group, a number of armed robberies on the Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk-Simferopol road, as well as one in the town of Yevpatoriya. He stated that, in the course of the latter, he had used a firearm against the victim. The applicant also provided more details in writing about the above crimes and his acquaintance with his accomplices and informed the police about two other armed robberies which he and his accomplices had committed in the town of Dzerzhynsk, as well as about other crimes of which he was aware.","11.On 12November 2001 the applicant was charged with armed robbery and questioned. Before being questioned he was informed of his procedural rights but signed a waiver of his right to legal assistance. He made similar statements to those given to the police the day before, including about the shooting incident in Yevpatoriya. On the same day, he familiarised himself with the decision of 30October 2001, against which he was entitled to appeal. He did not appeal against the decision.","12.On 13 November 2001, in the absence of a lawyer, the applicant was questioned in the context of the robbery proceedings. The Government submitted \u2013 and this is not contested by the applicant \u2013 that the applicant again waived his right to a lawyer, having once again been informed of his rights. During the questioning, the applicant, apart from giving information on the robberies, reiterated his statements regarding the shooting which had occurred in Yevpatoriya. He was further questioned in that regard.","13.On 21 November 2001 a lawyer, D., was appointed to represent the applicant. On the same day, in the absence of a lawyer, the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the murder proceedings. He admitted to shooting a victim in the course of the armed robbery but denied that he had done so intentionally.","14.On 22 November 2001, in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant was charged with murder and attempted murder, and questioned as an accused. He admitted his guilt in respect of the armed robbery but denied the murder charges. A reconstruction of the crime scene was carried out.","15.On 12 December 2001 the applicant was charged with armed robbery causing grievous bodily harm. He waived his right to a lawyer during questioning.","16.On 13 December 2001 the applicant was charged with premeditated armed robbery as part of a criminal group. He again waived his right to a lawyer.","17.On 4 January 2002 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to four months. The applicant did not appeal against this decision.","18.On 8 February 2002 the criminal proceedings concerning robberies on the Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk-Simferopol road were joined with the murder proceedings.","19.On 7 March 2002 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, having heard the investigator and the prosecutor, and referring to \u201cthe applicant\u2019s personality\u201d, albeit without assessing it, the seriousness of the charges against him, and the need for additional time to conduct the necessary investigative measures, extended the applicant\u2019s detention to six months. The decision was not amenable to appeal.","20.On 12 March 2002 B. was appointed as the applicant\u2019s lawyer.","21.On 4 April 2002 the criminal proceedings regarding the robberies in Dzerzhynsk were joined with the other proceedings against the applicant.","22.On 8 April 2002 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal, having heard the investigator and the prosecutor, extended the applicant\u2019s detention to nine months on the same grounds as those in its ruling of 7 March 2002. The decision was not amenable to appeal.","23.On 10 July 2002 L. replaced B. as the applicant\u2019s lawyer. On the same day, the applicant was charged with a number of crimes, including banditry, several counts of armed robbery, premeditated murder and attempted murder, and questioned. He pleaded not guilty as charged and refused to give further testimonies.","24.On 18 November 2002 amended charges were brought against the applicant and he was questioned again.","25.On 28 December 2002 the applicant was granted access to the case file. According to the Government, no investigative measures were conducted that day.","26.After the investigation had been completed the case was referred to the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d), acting as a first-instance court, for trial. The decision to do so was not amenable to appeal.","27.On 12 June 2003 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to change his preventive measure to a non-custodial one.","28.On 17 December 2003 the Court of Appeal remitted the case for additional investigation, holding that the applicant\u2019s rights of defence had been breached. It found, inter alia, that the applicant had officially been charged with offences other than those considered by the trial court. It further established that on 10 July, 18 November and 28 December 2002 investigative measures had been carried out in the absence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, contrary to the requirements of domestic law. The court also decided, without giving reasons or setting a time-limit, that the applicant would remain in detention. The applicant appealed in cassation against that decision and requested, inter alia, that the preventive measure, namely the detention ordered be lifted.","29.On 29 April 2004 the Supreme Court heard the applicant\u2019s appeal in the presence of the prosecutor. It upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal of 17December 2003 and stated, without giving any reasons, that there were no grounds for changing or discontinuing the preventive measure imposed on the applicant.","30.On 2 August 2004 V. was appointed as the applicant\u2019s lawyer.","31.On 6 August 2004, in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant was charged with a number of criminal offences, including banditry, several counts of armed robbery, premeditated murder and attempted murder, and questioned. He admitted to his acquaintance with the co-accused, but pleaded not guilty on all charges.","32.On 20 August 2004, in the presence of his lawyer, amended charges were brought against the applicant. The latter refused to sign or receive copies of the relevant papers as he disagreed with the charges. During further questioning he pleaded not guilty and refused to give any testimony.","33.On 27 August 2004 the applicant and his lawyer were granted access to the case file, and on 3 September 2004 the case was referred for trial.","34.On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged a request for release with the Court of Appeal.","35.On 6 October 2005 the Court of Appeal, having acquitted the applicant on four of the eight charges for lack of proof, found him guilty of banditry, several counts of armed robbery, intentional murder and attempted murder. It sentenced him to life imprisonment with confiscation of all his property. The court based its findings to a large extent on the testimonies of the applicant and his co-defendants given during the pre-trial investigation, having found them to be corroborated by a number of other pieces of evidence. In the part of the judgment which concerns the murder charges, the court referred, in particular, to the \u201ctestimonies given by the applicant as a suspect and an accused, including in the presence of a lawyer\u201d. It further dismissed as ill-founded the applicant\u2019s complaints that his rights of defence had been violated and his requests to declare inadmissible his statements obtained in the absence of a lawyer. In this context, when finding the applicant guilty of armed robberies, the court held that, having been informed of his procedural rights, the applicant had voluntarily waived his right to legal representation and that such a waiver had been lawfully accepted by the investigative authorities as robbery charges could not lead to a life sentence. It further held that during questioning on the murder, the applicant had been legally represented and had made his statements in the presence of a lawyer.","36.In addition, the Court of Appeal gave a separate ruling by which it declared inadmissible a number of pieces of evidence related to different charges against the applicant and his co-defendants, as the evidence had been obtained in violation of the defendants\u2019 rights of defence. In particular, as far as the applicant was concerned, apart from the evidence which had been found inadmissible on 17 December 2003, the court further excluded from the body of evidence some of the testimonies given by the applicant on 8 and 9 January 2002. It held that, even though the applicant had allegedly confessed to murdering five people shortly after his arrest, he had nevertheless been questioned as a witness, in the absence of a lawyer.","37.The applicant appealed in cassation against the judgment of 6October 2005. He stated in particular that there had been insufficient evidence to prove his guilt; he had been ill-treated by the police; on a number of occasions during the pre-trial investigation he had been questioned in the absence of a lawyer and that evidence obtained in violation of his rights of defence had nevertheless been used to secure his conviction.","38.On 19 October 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine held a hearing in the presence of the prosecutor, the applicant and his sister \u2013 who acted as his representative. On the same day, it upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction of 6October 2005. It dismissed as unsubstantiated his complaints that his rights of defence had been violated at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, holding that those complaints had been duly examined and dismissed by the Court of Appeal. It also dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment by the police.","B.Conditions of detention in SIZOs nos. 27 and 5","1.The applicant\u2019s account","39.Between 28 July and 13 October 2004 the applicant was held in the Kharkiv pre-trial detention centre no. 27 (\u201cKharkiv SIZO\u201d), in cell no. 537. He submitted that his cell had been overcrowded: it had measured 16 square metres, contained eight beds for ten people, and detainees had had to take turns to sleep. He also alleged that some of the cellmates had been suffering from tuberculosis. In this context, he submitted written statements made by his cellmates K., G., K.I., P. and O.","40.The applicant\u2019s sister complained to the Governor of Kharkiv SIZO about the conditions of her brother\u2019s detention. By a letter dated 13 June 2005 the Governor informed her that the cell in question had been designed to accommodate eight people and that no more than eight inmates had been held in that cell during the applicant\u2019s detention. The Governor further informed her that, according to medical documents concerning K., G., K.I., P. and O., none of them had been suffering from an active form of tuberculosis. He stated that the applicant had never been in contact with anyone suffering from such a disease whilst in Kharkiv SIZO.","41.After his conviction on 6 October 2005, the applicant was transferred to the high-security wing of the Donetsk pre-trial detention centre no. 5 (\u201cDonetsk SIZO\u201d). According to the applicant, he was handcuffed whenever he left his cell, including during daily walks and meetings with his relatives.","2.The Government\u2019s account","42.In Kharkiv SIZO the applicant was held in cells nos. 27 and 537 measuring 24.2 square metres each, designed to accommodate eight detainees. The cells were equipped with a dining table, a bench, a washstand and a toilet, which was separated from the living area by a brick partition. There was natural ventilation and light through windows; artificial lighting allowed inmates to read and write without damaging their eyesight. The temperature in the cells was between 18oC and 20oC. Running water was constantly available in the cells. All detainees were provided with bed linen and clothes in accordance with domestic standards.","43.As regards the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had shared his cell with persons suffering from tuberculosis, the Government pointed out that the domestic legislation provided that persons suffering from that disease should be kept separately from healthy detainees. The Government could not provide any information about the applicant\u2019s cellmates and their state of health, however, because the time-limit for keeping the relevant documents had expired and the records had been destroyed. They noted that the applicant had not complained that his state of health had worsened in detention.","44.Whenever the applicant was taken out of his cell and escorted within the Donetsk SIZO, handcuffs were used pursuant to the relevant domestic legislation. The Government contested the applicant\u2019s statement that he had been handcuffed during his daily walks and meetings with relatives, as the former was prohibited by the relevant domestic regulations.","52.The relevant extracts from the Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) from 9 to 21 October 2005 read as follows:","\u201c... The CPT also recommends that the Ukrainian authorities review as soon as possible the norms fixed by legislation for living space per prisoner, ensuring that these are at least 4 m\u00b2 in all the establishments under the authority of the Department for the Enforcement of Sentences. ...\u201d","\u201c... whereas the unacceptable practice of systematic handcuffing whenever a prisoner was taken out of a cell has at last been abolished for women, the Ukrainian authorities have still not ceased this practice for men ...\u201d","\u201c... recommendations ... :","-the practice of systematically handcuffing male life-sentenced prisoners whenever they are taken out of their cell to cease with immediate effect; ...\u201d"],"28052":["6.The applicant was born in 1978 and until his arrest lived in Krasnoyarsk. He is currently serving a sentence in a correctional colony in the Krasnoyarsk Region.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","7.On 13 December 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated kidnapping, murder, fraud and conspiracy.","8.On 27 December 2007 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to twenty-four years and eleven months\u2019 imprisonment. The first seven years were to be served in a prison and the remaining term in a high-security correctional colony.","9.On 24 December 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld his conviction and sentence on appeal.","B.The applicant\u2019s health and treatment","1.The applicant\u2019s health before his arrest","10.The parties provided the Court with the applicant\u2019s medical documents, including clinical records, discharge summaries and expert reports. Parts of the clinical records drawn up during his detention and submitted to the Court by the Government are illegible.","11.On several occasions before his arrest the applicant underwent inpatient and outpatient treatment in civilian hospitals. Between 1999 and 2001 he was treated for cerebral concussion, cerebral contusion, vertebral contusion, knee pain and a duodenal ulcer.","2.Remand prison","12.After his arrest on 13 December 2005 the applicant was taken to a police detention facility in Krasnoyarsk. Two days later he was transferred to remand prison no. 24\/1 (\u201cthe remand prison\u201d), also in Krasnoyarsk, where resident doctors carried out a general check-up, noting in the medical file that he had sustained a brain injury and suffered from a duodenal ulcer. The doctors found him fit for detention, noting that detention in northerly regions should be avoided.","13.According to the applicant, in 2005 and in 2006 he complained to the prison doctor about various health problems, including stomach pain, but his complaints remained unnoticed by the authorities. His medical records for the period between 2005 and 2007 did not contain any entries regarding his complaints, medical examinations or treatment in that period.","14.On 16 June 2007 the prison doctor saw the applicant after he complained of stomach pain and deteriorating eyesight. He diagnosed the applicant with a duodenal ulcer in the acute phase and myopia, but did not prescribe any treatment. He noted that a specific endoscopy was to be performed.","15.On 19 July and 13 and 16 August 2007 the trial court adjourned its hearings in the applicant\u2019s case as he did not feel well and had complained of severe stomach pain. The court asked the detention authorities to submit detailed information on his actual state of health.","16.In August 2007 the applicant received injections of drotaverine allegedly provided by his mother, a retired doctor, to relieve his stomach pain. On 21 August 2007, at a court\u2019s request, a deputy head of the prison medical ward examined the applicant and observed that he was receiving treatment for an acute duodenal ulcer. In addition, he noted that the applicant was to be transported to Regional Tuberculosis Hospital no.1 (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d) for the fibrogastroduodenoscopy ordered in June 2007.","17.On 19 October 2007 the applicant was taken to the prison hospital. Multiple tests performed there led to him being diagnosed with first-stage myopia, a duodenal ulcer in remission and duodenitis associated with cicatricial deformation of the duodenum bulb. Omeprazole was prescribed. Insofar as the submitted medical records could be deciphered, the applicant did not receive the prescribed treatment.","18.In March 2009 the applicant was transported to the prison hospital for the second time. This time the doctors prescribed him medication for his myopia and neurological symptoms resulting from the trauma in 1999. The medical records did not contain any information on the actual intake of drugs by the applicant.","19.In October 2009 the applicant\u2019s stomach pain came back. A fibrogastroduodenoscopy showed that he suffered from duodenitis with cicatricial deformation of the duodenum bulb and antral gastritis. The resident doctor saw him in October 2009 and January 2010, prescribing him drug treatment and a special diet. The applicant\u2019s medical records do not contain any information indicating that the doctor\u2019s recommendations were followed.","20.On 19 March 2010 the applicant underwent an in-depth medical examination in the prison hospital. It showed that in addition to his peptic problems, erosive duodenitis and antral gastritis, the applicant had developed first-stage sensorineural hearing loss and his myopia had progressed slightly. A drug programme and special diet were recommended. According to the applicant, the recommendation was not followed by the authorities. His medical documents contain no entries in this regard.","21.In early April 2010 the court had to adjourn several hearings in the applicant\u2019s criminal case owing to his severe stomach pain. It ordered the detention authorities to provide him with anti-ulcer treatment. At the end of that month the applicant was examined in a civilian hospital, which diagnosed him with an aggravated ulcer and acute gastritis. Inpatient treatment was prescribed. The authorities did not admit him for it.","22.The next recurrence of the applicant\u2019s ulcer occurred in autumn 2010. According to the medical records, the applicant did not receive any drugs at that time. An examination on 21 December 2010 showed that his ulcer had grown and the duodenitis and gastric disease had progressed further. A civilian doctor who visited him recommended inpatient treatment, but he remained in the remand prison. The resident doctor prescribed drug treatment in December 2010 and January and March 2011. However, the medical records contain no information concerning the actual provision of the prescribed drugs to the applicant. According to him, only one of the drugs was made available to him. His mother sent him the required drugs in June 2011 to enable him to receive at least some relief.","23.A new acute stomach pain attack occurred in December 2011. The applicant was immediately taken to the prison hospital for an X-ray examination and a surgical consultation. The surgeon concluded that the applicant\u2019s condition did not call for surgery. Over the next few days the applicant was diagnosed with duodenitis and recurring acute gastritis which had passed to the chronic stage. Drug treatment was prescribed, but the Court was not given any records showing that he actually received it.","24.In the meantime the applicant started complaining of mild knee pain and impeded nasal breathing allegedly caused by a broken nose in 2006 while in detention on remand. He stated that he had received some medication for knee pain, but had not undergone any septal surgery.","25.In the beginning of 2012 the applicant underwent a magnetic resonance imaging scan of the brain and spine in a civilian hospital. He paid for the scan himself, which revealed the presence of Schmorl\u2019s nodes, protruded discs, spondylarthrosis and a haemangioma in one of the spinal discs. It also indicated moderate changes within local tissue associated with a cerebrospinal fluid cyst in the arachnoid membrane of the brain. These diagnoses were confirmed by the prison doctor, who found that the applicant\u2019s condition did not call for surgical treatment.","26.The applicant was sent to a prison to serve his sentence.","3.Prison","27.On 23 October 2012 the applicant arrived at the prison in Minusinsk in the Krasnoyarsk Region (\u201cthe prison\u201d).On admission he was seen by a prison doctor, who considered him to be in satisfactory health. He was included on a list of detainees subject to regular medical check-ups and enhanced medical attention.","28.The next day he was diagnosed with acute gastritis and degenerative disc disease. He was prescribed a fibrogastroduodenoscopy and several drugs, including nonsteroidal anti\u2011inflammatory medication and medication to treat his gastritis. He refused to comply with the doctors\u2019 recommendations pertaining to the endoscopy and anti-inflammatory drugs, insisting that they would lead to a further deterioration of his ulcer. He nevertheless took the medication prescribed for gastritis treatment. According to the medical records, the ulcer treatment continued for the following few months.","29.In the meantime, an independent medical specialist and neurologist, DrM., assessed the applicant\u2019s health and prepared a report on 5November 2012. It stated that he should be admitted to a neurological or neurosurgical medical facility, where his spinal problems could be treated with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medication, neuromuscular blocking agents and painkillers. The doctor gave detailed recommendations concerning the applicant\u2019s treatment.","30.On 29 November 2012 the prison doctor prescribed the applicant vitamin injections and pain-relief ointment to treat his spinal problems. Several days later the doctor authorised an additional hour\u2019s rest from physical activity and prescribed nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medication, spasm relief analgesics and omeprazole for his peptic problems.","31.In the absence of any positive developments, in January 2013 the doctor amended the spinal treatment and introduced a stronger anti\u2011inflammatory drug.","32.In March 2013 the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital. Tests showed that his conditions had not progressed. The gastritis and duodenal ulcer were in remission. The applicant was prescribed omeprazole and sucralfate-based medication. According to an entry made in his medical history on 26 March 2013, his attending doctor recommended testing for the bacteria \u041delicobacter pylori (\u201cH.pylori\u201d). The test was never performed.","33.After the applicant\u2019s return to the prison his treatment continued in line with the recommendations of the prison hospital doctors. He received meloxicam and omeprazole. However, in May 2013 his duodenal ulcer again worsened. The acute phase lasted about two months.","34.On 17 July 2013 the applicant was examined by a number of medical specialists from a mobile prison hospital. He was diagnosed with a duodenal ulcer in remission, chronic gastritis, erosive duodenitis, osteoarthritis of the left knee, Raynaud\u2019s syndrome, degenerative disc disease, acute back pain and second-stage myopia. He was prescribed drug treatment. The records do not indicate that he received all of the prescribed medications.","35.On 7 August 2013 the prison authorities received a parcel of medication from the applicant\u2019s mother. He was treated with those drugs until 30 August 2013, when he was sent to a correctional colony.","4.Correctional colony","36.On 11 September 2013 the applicant arrived at correctional colony no. 288\/17 in Krasnoyarsk. He complained to the resident doctor of nausea and was diagnosed with an ulcer and degenerative disc disease. He was put on a list of detainees for close medical supervision. The doctor noted that the applicant required anti-recurrence ulcer treatment and in-depth examinations every six months, recording that it was necessary for him to be placed on a special diet when the ulcer recurred.","37.On 18 September 2013 the applicant was seen by doctors from the mobile prison hospital and underwent a fibrogastroduodenoscopy. It revealed that he had antral gastritis. According to him, his mother bought him medication for the ulcer treatment and sent it to the correctional colony.","38.In November 2013 the applicant had another severe attack of stomach and back pain. The prison doctor prescribed him drugs, injections of painkillers and vitamins. According to the Government, he refused to take one of the drugs, a nonsteroidal anti\u2011inflammatory. He disputed that allegation.","5.Court proceedings pertaining to the quality of the applicant\u2019s treatment","39.On 30 August 2013 the applicant filed a complaint against the prison administration, arguing that his treatment fell short of the requirements of Russian law. He stressed that the authorities had failed to properly treat his conditions.","40.On 16 October 2013 the Minusinsk Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint, finding that the authorities had provided him with adequate treatment. According to the court, he was regularly seen by a doctor and prescribed medication, including anti-inflammatory drugs and painkillers. They were given to the applicant as prescribed. His condition remained stable between 23 October 2012 and 30August 2013.","41.On 17 March 2014 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.","A.Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the European Prison Rules, adopted on 11January 2006 at the 952nd meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies","50.The European Prison Rules provide a framework of guiding principles for health services. The relevant extracts read as follows:","\u201cHealth care","39. Prison authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care.","Organisation of prison health care","40.1 Medical services in prison shall be organised in close relation with the general health administration of the community or nation.","40.2 Health policy in prisons shall be integrated into, and compatible with, national health policy.","40.3 Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.","40.4 Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer.","40.5 All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.","Medical and health care personnel","41.1 Every prison shall have the services of at least one qualified general medical practitioner.","41.2 Arrangements shall be made to ensure at all times that a qualified medical practitioner is available without delay in cases of urgency ...","41.4 Every prison shall have personnel suitably trained in health care.","Duties of the medical practitioner","42.1 A medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall see every prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is obviously unnecessary ...","42.3 When examining a prisoner the medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall pay particular attention to ...","b. diagnosing physical or mental illness and taking all measures necessary for its treatment and for the continuation of existing medical treatment ...","43.1 The medical practitioner shall have the care of the physical and mental health of the prisoners and shall see, under the conditions and with a frequency consistent with health care standards in the community, all sick prisoners, all who report illness or injury, and any prisoner to whom attention is specially directed ...","Health care provision","46.1 Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialised institutions or to civilian hospitals when such treatment is not available in prison.","46.2 Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities, they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide the prisoners referred to them with appropriate care and treatment.\u201d","B.3rd General Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT)","51.The complexity and importance of health-care services in detention facilities was discussed by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture in its 3rd General Report (CPT\/Inf (93) 12 - Publication Date: 4June 1993). The following are extracts from the Report:","\u201c33. When entering prison, all prisoners should without delay be seen by a member of the establishment\u2019s health care service. In its reports to date the CPT has recommended that every newly arrived prisoner be properly interviewed and, if necessary, physically examined by a medical doctor as soon as possible after his admission. It should be added that in some countries, medical screening on arrival is carried out by a fully qualified nurse, who reports to a doctor. This latter approach could be considered as a more efficient use of available resources.","It is also desirable that a leaflet or booklet be handed to prisoners on their arrival, informing them of the existence and operation of the health care service and reminding them of basic measures of hygiene.","34. While in custody, prisoners should be able to have access to a doctor at any time, irrespective of their detention regime ... The health care service should be so organised as to enable requests to consult a doctor to be met without undue delay ...","35. A prison\u2019s health care service should at least be able to provide regular out\u2011patient consultations and emergency treatment (of course, in addition there may often be a hospital-type unit with beds) ... Further, prison doctors should be able to call upon the services of specialists.","As regards emergency treatment, a doctor should always be on call. Further, someone competent to provide first aid should always be present on prison premises, preferably someone with a recognised nursing qualification.","Out-patient treatment should be supervised, as appropriate, by health care staff; in many cases it is not sufficient for the provision of follow-up care to depend upon the initiative being taken by the prisoner.","36. The direct support of a fully-equipped hospital service should be available, in either a civilian or prison hospital ...","38. A prison health care service should be able to provide medical treatment and nursing care, as well as appropriate diets, physiotherapy, rehabilitation or any other necessary special facility, in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by patients in the outside community. Provision in terms of medical, nursing and technical staff, as well as premises, installations and equipment, should be geared accordingly.","There should be appropriate supervision of the pharmacy and of the distribution of medicines. Further, the preparation of medicines should always be entrusted to qualified staff (pharmacist\/nurse, etc.) ...","39. A medical file should be compiled for each patient, containing diagnostic information as well as an ongoing record of the patient\u2019s evolution and of any special examinations he has undergone. In the event of a transfer, the file should be forwarded to the doctors in the receiving establishment.","Further, daily registers should be kept by health care teams, in which particular incidents relating to the patients should be mentioned. Such registers are useful in that they provide an overall view of the health care situation in the prison, at the same time as highlighting specific problems which may arise.","40. The smooth operation of a health care service presupposes that doctors and nursing staff are able to meet regularly and to form a working team under the authority of a senior doctor in charge of the service ...\u201d"],"28050":["6.The applicant was born in 1949 in the Khabarovsk Region. He is serving his prison sentence in a correctional colony in the village of Kochubeyevskoe, Stavropol Region.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","7.On 9 March 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated murder, robbery and firearms possession. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial.","8.On 28 July 2006 the Stavropol Regional Court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to nineteen years\u2019 imprisonment in a correctional colony.","B.The applicant\u2019s state of health and conditions of his detention","9.On 10 February 2010 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in correctional colony no.IK-17\/1 in the village of Kochubeyevskoe, Stavropol Region (\u201cthe correctional colony\u201d).","10.When the applicant arrived at the colony the resident doctor noted that he had a first-degree disability: he was totally blind as a result of mature cataracts in both eyes. His blindness, which had developed during his detention, meant that he was unable to move around alone. In addition, he was suffering from coronary disease, hypertension, gallstones and chronic pancreatitis. He was included on a list of detainees requiring enhanced medical attention.","11.The applicant was assigned to colony unit no. 10 for special-needs detainees, which comprised a separate dormitory. It housed forty-six detainees with various disabilities or serious illnesses. The unit had a dormitory measuring 149.6 square metres, a dining room, a toilet, showers, and several offices for administrative and medical personnel. A large part of the dormitory floor area was taken up by furniture such as bunk beds, bedside tables and chairs. According to a certificate issued by the correctional colony on 13 October 2014, each detainee was afforded 2.82 square metres of living space. As is apparent from the documents and photographs submitted by the Government, the premises were not adapted for visually impaired or blind persons.","12. The authorities assigned another inmate with cardiac problems to assist the applicant with his basic needs. The inmate did not receive any remuneration for the assistance he provided to the applicant. He helped the applicant to move around the dormitory and to take showers, and guided him in the dining room. The applicant had no prison work; he remained in the unit throughout the day.","13.According to the applicant, he faced particular difficulties in orientating himself in the correctional colony. He regularly stumbled over objects, slipped and fell. Such helplessness induced anguish and despair. In 2011 he was diagnosed as having an emotionally unstable personality disorder.","14.On 21 February 2011 and 19 November 2012 a medical commission confirmed the applicant\u2019s disability. They recommended that the authorities provide him with a walking stick, a white cane, a player for audiobooks designed for blind people, a vocal clinical thermometer and a vocal tonometer. The recommendations were never enforced. According to two entries in his medical record, on 30 November 2011 and 23 January2013 officials asked the applicant whether he wished to receive those items. The applicant allegedly refused, but did not agree to make a written note to that effect in the medical record.","15.In September 2014 the inmate who had been assisting the applicant was released from detention and the applicant was left to fend for himself. According to a certificate issued by the authorities, he refused the assistance of other inmates.","C.Application for release on health grounds","16.On 8 February 2013 the applicant asked for a medical examination to determine whether his state of health warranted his early release.","17.On 5 April 2013 a medical commission held that as blindness was one of the diseases listed in Government Decree no.54 of 6 February2004 that may warrant release from a correctional institution, the applicant could be relieved from serving his sentence.","18.Relying on the conclusion of the medical commission, the applicant lodged an application with the Kochubeevskoe District Court, Stavropol Region, for release on health grounds. On 16 April 2013 the District Court dismissed the application. Referring to Ruling no. 21 of the Supreme Court of Russia dated 20 December 2011 (see paragraph 26 below), the court noted that the fact that the applicant\u2019s illness was included in the list provided for by Government Decree no. 54 did not automatically mean that he would be released. The court cited the gravity of the crimes committed by the applicant and the length of the prison term he had yet to serve. Taking those two factors into account, the court concluded that the applicant should remain in the correctional colony. The Stavropol Regional Court upheld that judgment on appeal.","19.On 10 July 2014 the Supreme Court of Russia rejected a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant without examining it on the merits. It found that the applicant had failed to lodge the appeal within the statutory time\u2011limit.","27.The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 2006. Russia ratified the Convention on 25 September 2012. It did not ratify the Optional Protocol.","Article 1 of the Convention provides:","\u201cThe purpose of the present Convention is to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.","Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.\u201d","The relevant part of Article 14 provides:","\u201c2. States Parties shall ensure that if persons with disabilities are deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of this Convention, including by provision of reasonable accommodation.\u201d","The relevant part of Article 15 provides:","\u201c2. States Parties shall take all effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with others, from being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d","The requirements regulating personal mobility are laid down in Article20, which reads as follows:","\u201cStates Parties shall take effective measures to ensure personal mobility with the greatest possible independence for persons with disabilities, including by:","Facilitating the personal mobility of persons with disabilities in the manner and at the time of their choice, and at affordable cost;","Facilitating access by persons with disabilities to quality mobility aids, devices, assistive technologies and forms of live assistance and intermediaries, including by making them available at affordable cost;","Providing training in mobility skills to persons with disabilities and to specialist staff working with persons with disabilities;","Encouraging entities that produce mobility aids, devices and assistive technologies to take into account all aspects of mobility for persons with disabilities.\u201d","28.In his Interim Report of 28 July 2008 (A\/63\/175), the then UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr Manfred Nowak, stated as follows:","\u201c50. ... Persons with disabilities often find themselves in [situations of powerlessness], for instance when they are deprived of their liberty in prisons or other places ... In a given context, the particular disability of an individual may render him or her more likely to be in a dependant situation and make him or her an easier target of abuse ...","...","53. States have the further obligation to ensure that treatment or conditions in detention do not directly or indirectly discriminate against persons with disabilities. If such discriminatory treatment inflicts severe pain or suffering, it may constitute torture or other form of ill-treatment. ...","54. The Special Rapporteur notes that under article 14, paragraph 2, of the CRPD, States have the obligation to ensure that persons deprived of their liberty are entitled to \u2018provision of reasonable accommodation\u2019. This implies an obligation to make appropriate modifications in the procedures and physical facilities of detention centres ... to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the same rights and fundamental freedoms as others, when such adjustments do not impose disproportionate or undue burden. The denial or lack of reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities may create detention ... conditions that amount to ill-treatment and torture.\u201d","29.The relevant extracts from the 3rd General Report (CPT\/Inf (93)12; 4 June 1993) by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) read as follows:","e. Humanitarian assistance","\u201c64. Certain specific categories of particularly vulnerable prisoners can be identified. Prison health care services should pay especial attention to their needs.\u201d","...","iv) prisoners unsuited for continued detention","\u201c70. Typical examples of this kind of prisoner are those who are the subject of a short\u2011term fatal prognosis, who are suffering from a serious disease which cannot be properly treated in prison conditions, who are severely handicapped or of advanced age. The continued detention of such persons in a prison environment can create an intolerable situation. In cases of this type, it lies with the prison doctor to draw up a report for the responsible authority, with a view to suitable alternative arrangements being made.","...\u201d","g. Professional competence","\u201c76. To ensure the presence of an adequate number of staff, nurses are frequently assisted by medical orderlies, some of whom are recruited from among the prison officers. At the various levels, the necessary experience should be passed on by the qualified staff and periodically updated.","Sometimes prisoners themselves are allowed to act as medical orderlies. No doubt, such an approach can have the advantage of providing a certain number of prisoners with a useful job. Nevertheless, it should be seen as a last resort. Further, prisoners should never be involved in the distribution of medicines.","77. Finally, the CPT would suggest that the specific features of the provision of health care in a prison environment may justify the introduction of a recognised professional speciality, both for doctors and for nurses, on the basis of postgraduate training and regular in-service training.\u201d","30.Recommendation no. R (98) 7 of the Committee of Ministers of 8April 1998 concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison, provides, in so far as relevant:","III. The organisation of health care in prison with specific reference to the management of certain common problems","C. Persons unsuited to continued detention: serious physical handicap, advanced age, short term fatal prognosis","\u201c50. Prisoners with serious physical handicaps and those of advanced age should be accommodated in such a way as to allow as normal a life as possible and should not be segregated from the general prison population. Structural alterations should be effected to assist the wheelchair-bound and handicapped on lines similar to those in the outside environment. ...\u201d","31.Recommendation CM\/Rec (2012) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of 12 April 2012 on the European Code of Ethics for Prison Staff, provides, in particular:","IV. Guidelines for prison staff conduct","D. Care and assistance","\u201c19. Prison staff shall be sensitive to the special needs of individuals, such as ... disabled prisoners, and any prisoner who might be vulnerable for other reasons, and make every effort to provide for their needs.","20. Prison staff shall ensure the full protection of the health of persons in their custody and, in particular, shall take immediate action to secure medical attention whenever required.","21. Prison staff shall provide for the safety, hygiene and appropriate nourishment of persons in the course of their custody. They shall make every effort to ensure that conditions in prison comply with the requirements of relevant international standards, in particular the European Prison Rules.","22. Prison staff shall work towards facilitating the social reintegration of prisoners through a programme of constructive activities, individual interaction and assistance.\u201d"],"28049":["6.The applicant was born in 1964 and, until his arrest, lived in StPetersburg.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","7.On 26 June 2010 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated kidnapping and extortion committed within an organised criminal group and with the use of firearms. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial.","8.On 22 June 2012 the Leningrad Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine years\u2019 imprisonment in a high-security correctional colony.","9.The Supreme Court of Russia upheld the sentence on appeal on 8November 2012.","B.Applicant\u2019s detention, state of health and medical treatment","10.The parties provided the Court with extensive medical evidence, including the applicant\u2019s clinical records, medical certificates, expert reports, and opinions by various medical specialists.","11.The evidence shows that the applicant had a long history of heart and kidney diseases. In 2007 he suffered a stroke, closed craniocerebral injury and cerebral contusion. The following year he suffered a myocardial infarction and was admitted to a hospital for in-patient treatment. A medical examination carried out by the hospital revealed a deterioration in the functioning of his kidney. He was prescribed a basic drug regimen, which was supervised by a cardiologist and a nephrologist. Upon discharge from the hospital, his state of health was considered satisfactory.","12.After the applicant\u2019s arrest he was taken to a temporary detention centre in the town of Vsevolzhk, and six days later, on 2 July 2010, to temporary detention facility no. IZ-47\/1 in St Petersburg (\u201cfacility no.IZ\u201147\/1\u201d). On admission to the detention facility, the applicant underwent a general medical check-up performed by the prison doctor, who concluded that he was \u201csomatically healthy\u201d. Eleven days later he underwent an electrocardiogram, which revealed hypertrophy of the left ventricle of his heart and myocardium insufficiency. The prison doctor recommended in-patient care.","13.On 16 July 2010 the applicant was transferred from the detention facility to hospital no. 2 of medical ward no. 78 of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (\u201cprison hospital no. 2\u201d). An electrocardiogram and blood and urine tests were performed in the hospital, leading to diagnosis of third-stage hypertension, third-stage arterial hypertension, coronary disease, first\u2011degree angina pectoris, sclerotic kidney, fourth-stage chronic kidney disease, and chronic renal insufficiency of the second degree. He was prescribed drug therapy comprising enalapril, aspirin, spironolactone and other medication.","14.On the day following his admission to the hospital, the applicant made a written refusal to receive injections of hypotensive medication, arguing that they could lead to a sharp drop in his blood pressure.","15.The applicant\u2019s clinical records show that he received drug treatment for hypertension in the hospital. His blood pressure and body temperature were regularly monitored.","16.On 13 August 2010 the applicant was discharged from the hospital and transferred to facility no. IZ-47\/1. The discharge certificate indicated that his treatment had not produced the expected results, with the applicant\u2019s arterial blood pressure remaining at a high level. It recommended a consultation with a cardiologist and a nephrologist in order to adjust his treatment.","17.Two months later, on 13 October 2010, the applicant was taken to hospital no. 1 of medical ward no. 78 of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (\u201cprison hospital no. 1\u201d), where he was examined by several doctors, including a cardiologist and a nephrologist. He underwent several medical examinations, which revealed that his angina pectoris had progressed to the third stage. He was also diagnosed with first\u2011degree encephalopathy of mixed genesis. His antihypertensive drugs regimen was adjusted accordingly. The doctors recommended regular monitoring of his blood pressure, creatinine and urea levels. The applicant was certified as having a third-degree disability on 2December 2010.","18.In December 2010, the applicant\u2019s wife, anticipating his discharge from the hospital, complained to the head of the Regional Department of the Federal Service for Execution of Sentences in St Petersburg and Leningrad Region and to the Investigative Committee of the Leningrad Region that the applicant\u2019s medical treatment had been inadequate and about his impending transfer from the hospital to a temporary detention facility. On 18January 2011 the Investigative Committee dismissed the complaint. The complaint to the Regional Department of the Federal Service for Execution of Sentences was also unsuccessful.","19.On 3 December 2010 the applicant was sent back to facility no.IZ\u201147\/1. He was seen by a therapist. His treatment continued as prescribed in the hospital.","20.On 14 December 2010 an independent cardiologist, Dr F., chosen by the applicant\u2019s wife, issued a report assessing the quality of the applicant\u2019s treatment in detention. He observed that the applicant\u2019s health, and in particular his heart condition, had deteriorated while in detention. He noted that after the arrest the applicant had not been given medication or appropriate dietary nutrition. Serious emotional conditions aggravated by the incarceration had also contributed to the deterioration of his health and increased the risk of a stroke, fatal heart attack or kidney failure. Dr F. recommended dietary nutrition, basic treatment and regular monitoring of the applicant with a view to adjusting his drug therapy if necessary. These and the subsequent recommendations of Dr F. were submitted to the authorities by the applicant\u2019s lawyer or wife and appear to have been included in his medical file.","21.On 14 January 2011 a prison doctor ordered the applicant\u2019s medical examination. A week later the applicant underwent a biochemical blood test and a urine test. His diagnosis was re-confirmed and the doctor recommended continuing his treatment with hypotensive drugs.","22.On 21 February 2011 Dr F. prepared a new report pertaining to the quality of the applicant\u2019s treatment. He suggested that the applicant\u2019s hypertension may have become drug-resistant and that a kidney tomography examination with a contrast agent was necessary in order to choose the correct treatment regimen.","23.A week later the applicant was taken back to prison hospital no. 2. A number of medical examinations and tests revealed that he was also suffering from renal hypoplasia and chronic latent pyelonephritis.","24.The applicant subsequently acquired an acute respiratory infection and was prescribed treatment for it. This led to a change in his hypertension therapy, primarily by decreasing the dosage and excluding certain drugs. His angina pectoris attacks became worse, and he was transferred to hospital no.1 where his condition was brought under control. He was given, among other drugs, high dosages of anticoagulants. He was discharged from the hospital on 22 March 2011 on condition that he remained on the prescribed drug regimen and that his blood pressure and creatinine and urea levels were regularly monitored.","25.From 22 March to 14 April 2011 the applicant was held in facility no. IZ-47\/1. The records submitted to the Court do not indicate what drugs or other treatment the applicant received during this period.","26.In the meantime, in March 2011 Dr F. studied the applicant\u2019s clinical records and recommended that he undergo a coronary angiography examination, as well as haemodialysis to define the correct treatment and to prevent possible progress of his kidney disease.","27.On 14 April 2011 the applicant was taken back to hospital no. 2 with a view to adjusting his treatment.","28.Four days later Dr F., an independent nephrologist, Dr G., and the head of the prison hospital examined the applicant in the hospital. They recorded a further deterioration of his heart and kidney functions and suggested that his treatment with anticoagulants might be incorrect given the high risk of heart failure or internal hemorrhage. The doctors recommended that he undergo a coronary angiography examination and a renal tomography or Doppler ultrasound examination.","29.Another examination of the applicant by Dr F. and an independent cardiologist, Dr M., on 22 April 2011 led to the following opinion: the applicant had received adequate hypotensive therapy, which had nevertheless resulted in the aggravation of his hypercreatinemia. They observed that the coronary disease had started prevailing over the remaining diseases and suggested that the applicant\u2019s therapy should be based on regular treatment with anti-aggregants, nitrates and statins. The doctors stressed that there was a high risk of the applicant\u2019s condition deteriorating and leading to his death as a result of heart failure, a stroke or myocardial infarction, should prison medical personnel fail to perform a coronary angiography examination or surgery.","30.On 18 May 2011 the applicant was discharged from the hospital and transferred to temporary detention facility no. IZ-47\/4 in St Petersburg (\u201cfacility no. IZ-47\/4\u201d).","31.On the following day the investigative authorities ordered the applicant\u2019s expert examination. A medical commission was to answer several questions, including whether the applicant\u2019s diseases posed a threat to his life and whether his further detention was compatible with his condition. According to expert report no. 200\/K of 27 May 2011, the applicant was suffering from third-degree hypertension, third-stage arterial hypertension, chronic heart insufficiency of the second degree, first-degree chronic venous insufficiency, chronic coronary disease, second-degree angina pectoris, sclerotic kidney, second-stage chronic renal insufficiency, the initial stage of cerebral atherosclerosis, and dyscirculatory encephalopathy of the first degree. The commission stated that those illnesses required constant monitoring and adequate drug therapy. Any breach of his treatment regimen could induce life-threatening complications. The commission nevertheless concluded that the applicant\u2019s condition did not warrant his release from detention.","32.At the end of May 2011 the applicant wrote a note refusing two injections and intravenous therapy and stating that he had lost trust in the attending medical personnel.On one occasion in June 2011 he refused to take a certain medicine, having noted that he had already taken similar drugs earlier that day.","33.On 1 July 2011 the applicant was examined by Dr F., who observed that the authorities had failed to give him necessary drugs and that the applicant\u2019s relatives had had to step in and supply the prescribed medication. He nevertheless noted positive changes in his state of health. DrF. again strongly insisted that the applicant needed to undergo a coronary angiography examination.","34.The applicant\u2019s wife complained to the Representative of the Russian President in the North-West Federal Circuit of the applicant\u2019s poor treatment in detention. The complaint was to no avail. She also complained to the St Petersburg Ombudsman. On 26 July 2011 the Ombudsman recommended that the applicant\u2019s wife complain before the courts, apply for the applicant\u2019s early release on medical grounds, or complain to the administration of the detention facility.","35.On 11 and 25 August 2011 Dr F. and a doctor from facility no.IZ\u201147\/4 examined the applicant. In their joint report they noted that for a considerable amount of time the applicant had not received even basic vital medication because none had been available in the detention facility. In particular, the applicant did not receive spironolactone, aliskiren, clopidogrel and isosorbide mononitrate. Only the latter drug was substituted with analogous medication. The applicant\u2019s hypertension and coronary disease had deteriorated. The two doctors therefore recommended his admission to hospital.","36.On 19 September 2011 the applicant was examined by Dr G., who found that his kidney disease had progressed to stage three. The doctor stressed that an angiography examination at that stage of the development of the applicant\u2019s illness posed a risk of irreparable damage to the applicant\u2019s kidneys. However, the risk of heart failure was even higher, and therefore an angiogram was vital.","37.On 8 October 2011 the applicant was transferred to the Mariinskiy Hospital of St Petersburg for a coronary angiography examination. He underwent a number of tests in the hospital. A coronary angiography examination performed on 8 December 2011 revealed up to 75% arterial stenosis. The discharge certificate of 13 December 2011 prescribed the installation of a coronary stent. The surgery was to be performed in due course.","38.On 19 December 2011 the applicant was admitted to prison hospital no. 2, where he underwent various medical tests and examinations.","39. In a report prepared after the applicant\u2019s examination on 20January 2012, Dr F. and the head of the prison hospital stated that he had not received any statins. The absence of this drug had caused an increase in the applicant\u2019s cholesterol level and deterioration in the lipid metabolism indices. In addition, the doctors observed that the applicant\u2019s renal protective therapy had been insufficient and his blood pressure had not been monitored regularly. As a result, his kidney disease had progressed.","40.On 26 April 2012 in the course of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the trial court ordered his expert examination with a view to updating the information about his state of health, particularly in the light of the results of his coronary angiography examination. In a report issued on 29May 2012 experts confirmed that there was a high risk of heart complications, including lethal ones. They noted that the applicant\u2019s state of health called for vascular surgery, drug treatment and the limitation of stress.","41. On 16 June 2012 the applicant was discharged from the hospital for a \u201cbreach of regimen\u201d, namely his refusal to be examined by two doctors. He continued his treatment as an outpatient.","42.On 14 December 2012 the applicant was readmitted to prison hospital no. 1.","43.In January 2013 Dr G. and Dr F. again assessed the quality of the medical treatment provided to the applicant. They concluded that he had received adequate treatment, that he was in need of endovascular surgery and that his impending transfer to a correctional colony would be incompatible with his state of health.","44.The applicant spent another month in hospital no. 2.","45.On 18 March 2013 the applicant was sent to a correctional colony in the Mordoviya Republic to serve his sentence.","46.Meanwhile, on 1 April 2013 the applicant\u2019s wife complained to the Prosecutor General, the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences, medical ward no. 78 and other authorities of the continuous failure to properly diagnose and treat her husband. She received no response.","47.On 12 April 2013, after several weeks on the road, the applicant reached correctional colony no. IK-385\/5 (\u201ccolony no. 385\/5\u201d). On admission he was seen by a doctor who confirmed his diagnoses and prescribed clinical blood and urine tests, an electrocardiogram, and examinations by a therapist, a cardiologist and a psychiatrist. Five days later, the applicant was prescribed basic drugs for coronary heart disease and hypertension. On 23 April 2013 he was examined by a psychiatrist, who did not find any acute pathology.","48. The applicant was admitted to prison hospital no. 21, where he spent the first two weeks of June 2013. He was seen by a doctor and again underwent various medical examinations, including blood and urine tests, electrocardiography and ultrasound tests. His diagnoses were confirmed and dietary nutrition and a specific drug regimen were prescribed.","49.From 13 August to 27 September 2013 the applicant was admitted to medical ward no. 13 of the correctional colony. A doctor monitored his health and adjusted his treatment regimen.","50.The applicant spent the entire month of October 2013 in transit between several detention facilities. At that time he contracted acute pharyngitis, which was successfully treated.","51.On 30 October 2013 the applicant\u2019s health significantly deteriorated and he was admitted to the therapeutic department of medical ward no.13. Tests revealed that he had kidney stones and a benign liver tumour. The applicant\u2019s drug regimen was amended. His condition was considered to have been stabilised.","52.The discharge report issued to the applicant upon his discharge from the medical ward on 22 November 2013 indicated that he was to consult a heart surgeon and a nephrologist.","53.According to the applicant, following his discharge from the ward he was immediately sent to Saransk for the recommended examinations. The journey took over two weeks.","54.On 6 December 2013 a nephrologist and a heart surgeon examined the applicant and diagnosed him with second-degree chronic renal insufficiency, coronary disease, third-degree angina pectoris and atherosclerosis of the arterial vessels. Symptomatic treatment was prescribed for his kidney disease. A coronary angiography examination was also to be performed. In addition, the neurologist noted that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not require haemodialysis.","55.On 24 January 2014 the applicant underwent a coronary angiography examination in Saransk Town hospital. It revealed up to 75% arterial stenosis with an unstable atherosclerosis plaque. Doctors authorised and immediately performed an urgent coronary angioplasty and a coronary stent was installed. The surgery was successful.","A.Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules, adopted on 11January 2006 at the 952nd meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies (\u201cthe European Prison Rules\u201d)","62.The European Prison Rules provide a framework of guiding principles for health services. The relevant extracts from the Rules read as follows:","\u201cHealth care","39. Prison authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care.","Organisation of prison health care","40.1 Medical services in prison shall be organised in close relation with the general health administration of the community or nation.","40.2 Health policy in prisons shall be integrated into, and compatible with, national health policy.","40.3 Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.","40.4 Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer.","40.5 All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.","Medical and health care personnel","41.1 Every prison shall have the services of at least one qualified general medical practitioner.","41.2 Arrangements shall be made to ensure at all times that a qualified medical practitioner is available without delay in cases of urgency ...","41.4 Every prison shall have personnel suitably trained in health care.","Duties of the medical practitioner","42.1 A medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall see every prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is obviously unnecessary ...","42.3 When examining a prisoner the medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall pay particular attention to ...","b. diagnosing physical or mental illness and taking all measures necessary for its treatment and for the continuation of existing medical treatment ...","43.1 The medical practitioner shall have the care of the physical and mental health of the prisoners and shall see, under the conditions and with a frequency consistent with health care standards in the community, all sick prisoners, all who report illness or injury, and any prisoner to whom attention is specially directed ...","Health care provision","46.1 Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialised institutions or to civilian hospitals when such treatment is not available in prison.","46.2 Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities, they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide the prisoners referred to them with appropriate care and treatment.\u201d","B.3rd General Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (\u201c the CPT Report\u201d )","63.The complexity and importance of health-care services in detention facilities was discussed by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture in its 3rd General Report (CPT\/Inf (93) 12 - Publication Date: 4June 1993). The following are extracts from the Report:","\u201c33. When entering prison, all prisoners should without delay be seen by a member of the establishment\u2019s health care service. In its reports to date the CPT has recommended that every newly arrived prisoner be properly interviewed and, if necessary, physically examined by a medical doctor as soon as possible after his admission. It should be added that in some countries, medical screening on arrival is carried out by a fully qualified nurse, who reports to a doctor. This latter approach could be considered as a more efficient use of available resources.","It is also desirable that a leaflet or booklet be handed to prisoners on their arrival, informing them of the existence and operation of the health care service and reminding them of basic measures of hygiene.","34. While in custody, prisoners should be able to have access to a doctor at any time, irrespective of their detention regime ... The health care service should be so organised as to enable requests to consult a doctor to be met without undue delay ...","35. A prison\u2019s health care service should at least be able to provide regular out\u2011patient consultations and emergency treatment (of course, in addition there may often be a hospital-type unit with beds) ... Further, prison doctors should be able to call upon the services of specialists.","As regards emergency treatment, a doctor should always be on call. Further, someone competent to provide first aid should always be present on prison premises, preferably someone with a recognised nursing qualification.","Out-patient treatment should be supervised, as appropriate, by health care staff; in many cases it is not sufficient for the provision of follow-up care to depend upon the initiative being taken by the prisoner.","36. The direct support of a fully-equipped hospital service should be available, in either a civil or prison hospital ...","38. A prison health care service should be able to provide medical treatment and nursing care, as well as appropriate diets, physiotherapy, rehabilitation or any other necessary special facility, in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by patients in the outside community. Provision in terms of medical, nursing and technical staff, as well as premises, installations and equipment, should be geared accordingly.","There should be appropriate supervision of the pharmacy and of the distribution of medicines. Further, the preparation of medicines should always be entrusted to qualified staff (pharmacist\/nurse, etc.) ...","39. A medical file should be compiled for each patient, containing diagnostic information as well as an ongoing record of the patient\u2019s evolution and of any special examinations he has undergone. In the event of a transfer, the file should be forwarded to the doctors in the receiving establishment.","Further, daily registers should be kept by health care teams, in which particular incidents relating to the patients should be mentioned. Such registers are useful in that they provide an overall view of the health care situation in the prison, at the same time as highlighting specific problems which may arise.","40. The smooth operation of a health care service presupposes that doctors and nursing staff are able to meet regularly and to form a working team under the authority of a senior doctor in charge of the service ...\u201d"],"28055":["9.The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Novosibirsk.","A.The applicant\u2019s background and medical condition","10.At some point before September 2004, the applicant\u2019s parents were deprived of their parental responsibility; the applicant was placed in a local orphanage until his grandfather was assigned as his guardian in October2004 and the applicant was placed with him. On 28 February 2005 the grandfather\u2019s guardianship was revoked, but he was reinstated as guardian at the beginning of 2006.","11.From 2002 to 2005, the applicant allegedly committed offences prohibited by the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, including disorderly acts, aggravated robbery and extortion, alone or in a group of minors. Since he was under the age of criminal responsibility, no criminal proceedings were instituted against him but he was the subject of five pre-investigation inquiries and placed under the supervision of the Juveniles Inspectorate within the Department of the Interior of the Sovetskiy district of Novosibirsk (\u201cthe Juveniles Inspectorate\u201d). Moreover, following the fourth inquiry, he was placed in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders on 21 September 2004 for thirty days.","12.According to the applicant\u2019s medical records, he suffered from an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (a mental and neurobehavioural disorder characterised by either substantial attention difficulties or hyperactivity and impulsiveness, or a combination of the two \u2013 ADHD) and a neurogenic bladder causing enuresis (a disorder involving urinary incontinence).","13.On 27 December 2004 and 19 January 2005 he was examined by a neurologist and a psychiatrist. He was prescribed medication, regular supervision by a neurologist and a psychiatrist and regular psychological counselling.","B.The pre-investigation inquiry regarding the applicant","14.On 3 January 2005 the applicant, who at that time was 12 years old, was at the home of his nine-year old neighbour S. when the latter\u2019s mother, MsS., called the police, who came and took the applicant to the police station of the Sovetskiy district of Novosibirsk. He was not informed of the reasons for his arrest.","15.According to the applicant, he was put in a cell that had no windows and the lights in the cell were turned off. After he had spent around an hour in the dark, he was questioned by a police officer. The police officer told him that S. had accused him of extortion. He urged the applicant to confess, saying that, if he did so, he would be released immediately, whereas if he refused, he would be placed in custody. The applicant signed a confession statement. The police officer then immediately telephoned the applicant\u2019s grandfather to tell him that the applicant was at the police station and could be taken home. When his grandfather arrived at the police station, the applicant retracted his confession and protested his innocence.","16.The Government disputed the applicant\u2019s account of the events at the police station. They submitted that the applicant had been asked to give an \u201cexplanation\u201d rather than being formally questioned, that he had been interviewed by a police officer who had pedagogical training, and that he had been apprised of his right to remain silent. He had not been subjected to any pressure or intimidation. His grandfather had been present during the interview.","17.On the same day, the applicant\u2019s grandfather signed a written statement describing the applicant\u2019s character and way of life. He stated that, two days earlier, he had seen the applicant in possession of some money. When asked where the money had come from, the applicant had said that his father had given it to him.","18.S. and his mother were also heard by the police regarding the incident; they claimed that on two occasions, on 27 December 2004 and 3January 2005, the applicant had extorted 1,000 roubles (RUB) from S., threatening him with violence if he did not hand over the money.","19.On 12 January 2005 the Juveniles Inspectorate refused to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant. Relying on the applicant\u2019s confession and the statements of S. and S.\u2019s mother, it found it to be established that on 27December 2004 and 3January 2005 the applicant had extorted money from S. His actions therefore contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion, punishable under Article 163 of the Criminal Code. However, given that the applicant was below the statutory age of criminal responsibility, he could not be prosecuted for his actions.","20.On 3 February 2005 the applicant\u2019s grandfather complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Sovetskiy district of Novosibirsk that the applicant, a minor suffering from a psychological disorder, had been intimidated and then questioned in the absence of his guardian and that his confession had been obtained under duress. The grandfather requested that the confession statement be declared inadmissible as evidence, and that the pre-investigation inquiry be closed on account of lack of evidence of an offence, rather than the applicant\u2019s age.","21.On 8 June 2005 the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Sovetskiy district of Novosibirsk quashed the decision of 12 January 2005, finding that the pre\u2011investigation inquiry had been incomplete. It ordered a further pre-investigation inquiry.","22.On 6 July 2005 the Juveniles Inspectorate again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant, for the same reasons as before.","23.During the following months, the applicant\u2019s grandfather lodged several complaints with prosecutors\u2019 offices of various levels, asking for a fresh examination of the case against the applicant. He complained that the applicant\u2019s confession had been obtained as a result of intimidation by the police; in particular, he had been placed in a dark cell for an hour and he had then been questioned by a police officer in the absence of a guardian, psychologist or teacher. The police officer had coerced the applicant into signing the confession statement without the benefit of legal advice. He had then issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings on the ground that the applicant had not reached the statutory age of criminal responsibility, while stating at the same time that the applicant\u2019s involvement in extortion had been established.","24.By letters of 4 August, 9 November and 16 December 2005, the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Sovetskiy district of Novosibirsk and the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Novosibirsk region replied that no criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicant on the ground of his age. He therefore did not have the status of a suspect or a defendant. On 3January 2005 he had been asked to give an \u201cexplanation\u201d rather than been questioned by the police. In those circumstances the participation of a lawyer, psychologist or teacher had not been mandatory. There was no evidence that the applicant had been held in a dark cell before the interview, and he had had to wait no more than ten minutes for an officer from the Juveniles Inspectorate to arrive and interview him. That the applicant had committed extortion had been established on the basis of the statements of S. and S.\u2019s mother and the applicant\u2019s admission of guilt during the interview of 3January 2005.","C.The detention order","25.On 10 February 2005 the head of the Sovetskiy district Police Department of Novosibirsk asked the Sovetskiy District Court of Novosibirsk to order the applicant\u2019s placement in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders.","26.On 21 February 2005 the Sovetskiy District Court held a hearing which the applicant and his grandfather attended and at which they submitted medical certificates confirming that the applicant suffered from a psychological disorder and enuresis.","27.On the same day, the court delivered its judgment in which it ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days. It held as follows.","\u201cThe head of the Sovetskiy district Police Department of Novosibirsk has applied to the court with a request to place [the applicant], who has been registered with the [Juveniles] Inspectorate as a delinquent minor since 4 January 2002, in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days.","On 14 May 2003 [the applicant] committed an offence proscribed by Article 161 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. A criminal case was not opened because he had not reached the age of criminal responsibility.","On 24 July 2003 [the applicant] again committed an offence proscribed by Article213 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. A criminal case was not opened because he had not reached the age of criminal responsibility.","On 27 August 2004 [the applicant] again committed a criminal offence under Article161 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. A criminal case was not opened because he had not reached the age of criminal responsibility. [The applicant] was placed in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days.","The minor lives in unfavourable family conditions in which his grandfather is responsible for his upbringing in so far as possible; [the applicant\u2019s] parents are alcoholics and have a negative influence on their son. Before [the grandfather] was given guardianship status, [the applicant] had lived in an orphanage and studied in school no. 61. At the material time he studied in school no. 163, often played truant from school, and stopped attending school entirely from December onwards. Given that the requisite control over him is absent, the minor spends the major part of his day on the streets, committing socially dangerous offences.","On 27 December 2004 [the applicant] committed another offence proscribed by Article 163 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation; a criminal case was not opened because he had not reached the age of criminal responsibility.","Taking the above-mentioned circumstances into account, [the head of the Police Department] considers it necessary to place [the applicant] in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for a period of thirty days to prevent his further unlawful actions.","The representative of the Juveniles Inspectorate supported the request made by the head of the Police Department and explained that [the applicant\u2019s] guardian had requested in writing that his guardianship rights be lifted and the [Inspectorate] had accepted that request.","[The applicant] refused to provide any explanations.","The [applicant\u2019s] representative [the grandfather] objected to [the applicant\u2019s] placement in the temporary detention centre, having noted that [the applicant] had not committed a criminal offence on 27 December 2004 as he had been with [the grandfather] at a doctor\u2019s surgery for an examination at that time.","The lawyer, Ms [R.], asked the court to dismiss the request of the head of the Police Department.","The prosecutor asked the court to accept the request and to place [the applicant] in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, taking into account that the documents presented by [the applicant\u2019s] guardian did not confirm that [the applicant] had been at a doctor\u2019s surgery on 27 December 2004 at 1 p.m. or that he had been unable to commit the criminal offence, particularly taking into account the [applicant\u2019s] personality and the fact that he had already committed a number of offences.","Having heard the parties to the proceedings and examined the materials submitted by them, the court considers that the request must be allowed for the following reasons: [the applicant] is registered in the database of [the Juvenile Department of the police]; he was previously placed in the [temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders] for behaviour correction but did not draw the proper conclusions and committed further delinquent acts; the preventive measures put in place by the [Juveniles] Inspectorate and by the guardian have not produced results, which shows that [the applicant] has not learnt his lesson. [The applicant] must be placed in the [temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders] for thirty days for behaviour correction.","The case-file materials examined by the court confirm that [the applicant] committed a socially dangerous offence: a complaint by Ms [S.] shows that on 27December 2004, at approximately 1 p.m., [the applicant] extorted 1,000 roubles from her son [S.] in a yard; he accompanied those actions with threats of violence. On 3 January 2005 [the applicant] again came to their house and again extorted 1,000roubles from her son, having again threatened the son with violence. Explanations by [S.] indicate that on 27 December 2004, at approximately 1 p.m., [the applicant] told [S.] to give him 1,000 roubles in a yard; he accompanied those actions with threats of violence and [S.] gave him the money. On 3 January 2005 [the applicant] again came to their house and requested 1,000 roubles from [S.], having again threatened him with violence. [S.] complained to his mother, who called the police.","The court takes into account that those circumstances are corroborated by the statement made by [the applicant], who did not deny that he had received money from [S.] on 27 December 2004, as the latter had been afraid of the applicant. [The applicant] also did not deny that he had come to [S.\u2019s] house on 3 January 2005. A criminal case in respect of the events on 27 December 2004 and 3 January 2005 was not opened as the applicant had not reached the age of criminal responsibility.","Having taken these circumstances into account, the court finds unsubstantiated and far-fetched the explanations by the applicant\u2019s guardian that [the applicant] did not commit the offences on 27 December 2004 and 3 January 2005.","Having regard to the above-mentioned facts and ruling under section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act, the court grants the request of the head of the Police Department and decides to place the applicant in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days.\u201d","D.Detention in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders","28.On 21 February 2005 the applicant was placed in the Novosibirsk temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, where he remained until 23March 2005.","1.The applicant\u2019s description of the conditions of detention in the centre","29.According to the applicant, he had shared his bedroom in the centre with seven other inmates. The lights were kept on all night.","30.During the day inmates were forbidden to lie on their beds or to enter the bedroom. They had to spend the whole day in a large empty room which contained no furniture or sports equipment. On a few occasions they were given a chess set and other board games. They were allowed to go out into the yard only twice during the applicant\u2019s thirty-day stay in the centre.","31.Inmates had classes twice a week for around three hours. They had mathematics and Russian grammar classes only. They were not taught any other courses from the officially-approved secondary-school curriculum. Around twenty children of different ages and school levels were taught together in one class.","32.The supervisors applied collective punishment to the inmates. If one of them committed a breach of the centre\u2019s strict regime, all inmates were forced to stand in a line against the wall without moving, talking or being allowed to sit down. Given that many inmates were psychologically unstable and unruly, because of their socially disadvantaged background, such punishment was applied every day and often lasted for hours.","33.Inmates were not allowed to leave the room where they were assembled. They had to ask for the supervisor\u2019s permission to go to the toilet, and were accompanied there in groups of three. They therefore had to wait until such a group was formed before being able to go to the toilet. Given that the applicant suffered from enuresis, the fact that he could not go to the toilet as often as he needed caused him bladder pain and psychological suffering. If his requests for permission to go to the toilet became too frequent, the supervisors punished him by making him do particularly arduous cleaning work.","34.Although the applicant\u2019s grandfather had informed the staff of the centre of the applicant\u2019s enuresis and his ADHD, the applicant did not receive any treatment.","2.The Government\u2019s description of the conditions of detention","35.According to the Government, each bedroom in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders measured seventeensquare metres and was equipped with four beds. Access to the bathrooms and toilets situated on each floor was not limited.","36.The centre had a dining room where meals were served five times a day. There was also a games room and a sports room. Audio and video equipment, educational games and works of fiction were available.","37.The supervisors carried out \u201cpreventive work\u201d with each inmate of the centre and could apply incentive measures or punitive measures in the form of oral reprimands. Corporal punishment was not used; nor were juvenile inmates ever required to do hard or dirty work.","38.The centre\u2019s medical unit had all the necessary equipment and medicine. It could be seen from the staff list of the centre submitted by the Government that the medical unit was staffed by a paediatrician, two nurses and a psychologist. According to the Government, each child was examined by the paediatrician on his admission and every day thereafter. Treatment was prescribed when necessary. It could be seen from the temporary detention centre\u2019s \u201caccounting and statistical record\u201d concerning the applicant that he had not informed the doctor of his enuresis.","39.The applicant\u2019s personal file, containing, in particular, the information on his medical condition on admission, the preventive work carried out and the punishments applied to him, had been destroyed on 17January 2008 after the expiry of the statutory time-limit on storage, in accordance with Order no. 215 of the Ministry of the Interior of 2 April 2004 (see paragraph 73 below). However, the Government stated that the applicant\u2019s \u201caccounting and statistical record\u201d, referred to above, had been retained since its storage period was unlimited in accordance with Order no.215 (see paragraph 74 below).","40.According to the Government, the applicant\u2019s other medical records and logbooks at the temporary detention centre had been destroyed as soon as they were no longer needed, without any records being compiled in this respect. This had been possible because there had been no regulations on storing such documents until Order no. 340 of the Ministry of the Interior had come into force on 12May 2006 (which provided that medical records were to be stored for three years).","41.However, the Government submitted a written statement by a supervisor at the detention centre dated 23 December 2010. She confirmed the Government\u2019s description of the conditions of detention in the centre. She also stated that one of the supervisors was always present in the room with the inmates, which ensured continuity of the educational process. Teachers from the neighbouring school regularly came to the centre so that the inmates could follow the secondary-school curriculum. After their release from the centre, they received an education progress record. She stated that she did not remember the applicant but asserted that she had not received any requests or complaints from him or from any other inmate.","42.The Government also submitted a copy of an agreement of 1September 2004 between the detention centre and secondary school no. 15 whereby the school undertook to organise secondary-school courses in the centre in accordance with a curriculum developed by the centre. A copy of an undated two-week curriculum was produced by the Government. It included four classes per day on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays.","E.The applicant\u2019s medical condition after release from the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders","43.On 23 March 2005 the applicant was released from the detention centre. On the following day he was taken to hospital, where he received treatment for neurosis and ADHD. He remained at the hospital until at least 21 April 2005.","44.On 31 August 2005 the applicant was placed in an orphanage and, according to an extract from the applicant\u2019s medical record drawn up at the orphanage, he was on the run between 14 September and 11 October 2005 and again between 13 and 23 October 2005.","45.On 1 November 2005 he was transferred to a children\u2019s psychiatric hospital, where he remained until 27 December 2005. At some point after that, he was returned to his grandfather who had been reinstated as his guardian.","46.On 4 October 2005 the applicant\u2019s grandfather complained to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office that the applicant, who suffered from a mental disorder, had not received any medical treatment in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, which had caused a deterioration in his condition; nor had he been provided with any educational courses. He reiterated his complaints to the prosecution authorities in a letter dated 30November 2005. The prosecutor\u2019s office of the Sovetskiy district of Novosibirsk sent a reply to the applicant\u2019s grandfather on 9 November 2005 and the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Novosibirsk region sent a reply on 16December 2005, however, both of these dealt exclusively with the procedural issues related to the applicant\u2019s case (see paragraph 24 above) and did not contain any answer to the grandfather\u2019s complaints in so far as they related to the applicant\u2019s health and the conditions of detention.","F.The applicant\u2019s appeals against the detention order","47.Meanwhile, on 2 March 2005, the applicant\u2019s grandfather appealed against the detention order of 21 February 2005. He submitted, firstly, that the detention was unlawful because the Minors Act did not permit detention for \u201cbehaviour correction\u201d. Secondly, he complained that he had not been informed of the decision of 12 January 2005 refusing to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant and had therefore been deprived of an opportunity to appeal against it. He further submitted that the court\u2019s finding that the applicant had committed an offence had been based on the statements of S. and his mother and the applicant\u2019s confession statement. However, the applicant had made his confession statement in the absence of his guardian. Nor had a teacher been present. No teacher had been present during the questioning of S. either. Their statements were therefore inadmissible as evidence. Moreover, S. and his mother had not attended the court hearing and had not been heard by the court. Nor had the court verified the applicant\u2019s alibi. Lastly, the applicant\u2019s grandfather complained that the court had not taken into account the applicant\u2019s frail health and had not verified whether his medical condition was compatible with detention.","48.On 21 March 2005 the Novosibirsk Regional Court quashed the detention order of 21 February 2005 on appeal. It found that behaviour correction was not among the grounds listed in section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act for placing a minor in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. Detention for behaviour correction therefore had no basis in domestic law. Moreover, the District Court had not stated reasons why it considered it necessary to detain the applicant. The mere fact that the applicant had committed an offence for which he was not liable to prosecution because of his age could not justify his detention. Such detention would be permissible only if one of the additional conditions listed in section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act (see paragraph 66 below) was met. The Regional Court remitted the case to the District Court for fresh examination.","49.On 11 April 2005 the Sovetskiy District Court discontinued the proceedings because the head of the Sovetskiy district Police Department of Novosibirsk had withdrawn his request for the placement of the applicant in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. The applicant and his grandfather were not informed of the date of the hearing.","50.On 22 March 2006 the applicant\u2019s grandfather lodged an application for supervisory review of the decision of 11 April 2005. He complained that, as a result of the discontinuation of the proceedings, the applicant had been deprived of an opportunity to prove his innocence in respect of the offence for which he had already unlawfully served a term of detention in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders.","51.On 3 April 2006 the President of the Novosibirsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 11 April 2005. He found, firstly, that, in accordance with section 31.2(3) of the Minors Act, a judge examining a request for the placement of a minor in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders had the power either to grant or to reject the request. He had no power to discontinue the proceedings. Secondly, the applicant and his guardian had not been informed of the date of the hearing and had therefore been deprived of an opportunity to make submissions on the issue of the discontinuation of the proceedings.","52.On 17 April 2006 the Prosecutor of the Novosibirsk region lodged an application for supervisory review of the Regional Court\u2019s decision of 21March 2005.","53.On 12 May 2006 the Presidium of the Novosibirsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 21 March 2005, finding that it had been adopted by an unlawful composition of judges. It remitted the case for a fresh examination on appeal.","54.On 29 May 2006 the President of the Novosibirsk Regional Court held a fresh appeal hearing and upheld the decision of 21 February 2005 ordering the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. He found that the applicant had committed a delinquent act punishable under Article 163 of the Criminal Code but that no criminal proceedings had been instituted against him because he had not reached the statutory age of criminal responsibility. He belonged to a \u201cproblem family\u201d; his parents had been deprived of parental responsibility and he was cared for by his grandfather. He played truant from school and spent most of the time on the streets or in a computer club. In those circumstances, it had been necessary, in accordance with section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act, to place him in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days to prevent him from committing further delinquent acts. The fact that the District Court had referred to \u201cbehaviour correction\u201d as a ground for detention had not made the detention order of 21 February 2005 unlawful. The applicant\u2019s detention had been justified by other grounds. Nor could the detention order of 21 February 2005 be quashed on account of the applicant\u2019s frail health, given that it had already been enforced in March2005.","A.Council of Europe","77.The relevant parts of Recommendation No. R (87) 20 on social reactions to juvenile delinquency, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 September 1987, state as follows.","\u201c... Considering that young people are developing beings and in consequence all measures taken in their respect should have an educational character;","Considering that social reactions to juvenile delinquency should take account of the personality and specific needs of minors and that the latter need specialised interventions and, where appropriate, specialised treatment based in particular on the principles embodied in the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child;","...","Convinced that minors must be afforded the same procedural guarantees as adults; ...","Recommends the governments of member states to review, if necessary, their legislation and practice with a view:","...","III.Proceedings against minors","4.to ensuring that minors are tried more rapidly, avoiding undue delay, so as to ensure effective educational action;","...","8.to reinforcing the legal position of minors throughout the proceedings, including the police investigation, by recognising, inter alia:","\u2013the presumption of innocence;","\u2013the right to the assistance of a counsel who may, if necessary, be officially appointed and paid by the state;","\u2013the right to the presence of parents or of another legal representative who should be informed from the beginning of the proceedings;","\u2013the right of minors to call, interrogate and confront witnesses;","...","\u2013the right to appeal;","\u2013the right to apply for a review of the measures ordered;","...\u201d","78.Recommendation Rec(2003)20 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning new ways of dealing with juvenile delinquency and the role of juvenile justice, adopted on 24 September 2003, in so far as relevant, reads as follows.","\u201c15.Where juveniles are detained in police custody, account should be taken of their status as a minor, their age and their vulnerability and level of maturity. They should be promptly informed of their rights and safeguards in a manner that ensures their full understanding. While being questioned by the police they should, in principle, be accompanied by their parent\/legal guardian or other appropriate adult. They should also have the right of access to a lawyer and a doctor. ...\u201d","79.Recommendation CM\/Rec(2008)11 on the European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 5 November 2008, provides, inter alia, as follows.","\u201cPart I \u2013 Basic principles, scope and definitions","...","2.The sanctions or measures that may be imposed on juveniles, as well as the manner of their implementation, shall be specified by law and based on the principles of social integration and education and of the prevention of re-offending.","...","5.The imposition and implementation of sanctions or measures shall be based on the best interests of the juvenile offenders, limited by the gravity of the offences committed (principle of proportionality) and take account of their age, physical and mental well-being, development, capacities and personal circumstances (principle of individualisation) as ascertained when necessary by psychological, psychiatric or social inquiry reports.","...","7.Sanctions or measures shall not humiliate or degrade the juveniles subject to them.","8.Sanctions or measures shall not be implemented in a manner that aggravates their afflictive character or poses an undue risk of physical or mental harm.","...","10.Deprivation of liberty of a juvenile shall be a measure of last resort and imposed and implemented for the shortest period possible. Special efforts must be undertaken to avoid pre-trial detention.","...","13.Any justice system dealing with juveniles shall ensure their effective participation in the proceedings concerning the imposition as well as the implementation of sanctions or measures. Juveniles shall not have fewer legal rights and safeguards than those provided to adult offenders by the general rules of criminal procedure.","14.Any justice system dealing with juveniles shall take due account of the rights and responsibilities of the parents and legal guardians and shall as far as possible involve them in the proceedings and the execution of sanctions or measures, except if this is not in the best interests of the juvenile. ...","...","21.For the purpose of these rules:","...","21.5.\u2019deprivation of liberty\u2019 means any form of placement in an institution by decision of a judicial or administrative authority, from which the juvenile is not permitted to leave at will;","...","Part III \u2013 Deprivation of liberty","...","49.1.Deprivation of liberty shall be implemented only for the purpose for which it is imposed and in a manner that does not aggravate the suffering inherent to it.","...","50.1.Juveniles deprived of their liberty shall be guaranteed a variety of meaningful activities and interventions according to an individual overall plan that aims at progression through less restrictive regimes and preparation for release and reintegration into society. These activities and interventions shall foster their physical and mental health, self-respect and sense of responsibility and develop attitudes and skills that will prevent them from re-offending.","...","56.Juveniles deprived of liberty shall be sent to institutions with the least restrictive level of security to hold them safely.","57.Juveniles who are suffering from mental illness and who are to be deprived of their liberty shall be held in mental health institutions."," ...","62.2.At admission, the following details shall be recorded immediately concerning each juvenile:","...","g.subject to the requirements of medical confidentiality, any information about the juvenile\u2019s risk of self-harm or a health condition that is relevant to the physical and mental well-being of the juvenile or to that of others.","...","62.5.As soon as possible after admission, the juvenile shall be medically examined, a medical record shall be opened and treatment of any illness or injury shall be initiated.","...","65.2.Juveniles shall have ready access to sanitary facilities that are hygienic and respect privacy.","...","69.2.The health of juveniles deprived of their liberty shall be safeguarded according to recognised medical standards applicable to juveniles in the wider community."," ...","73.Particular attention shall be paid to the needs of:","...","d.juveniles with physical and mental health problems;","...","77.Regime activities shall aim at education, personal and social development, vocational training, rehabilitation and preparation for release ...","...","78.3.Where it is not possible for juveniles to attend local schools or training centres outside the institution, education and training shall take place within the institution, but under the auspices of external educational and vocational training agencies.","...","78.5.Juveniles in detention shall be integrated into the educational and vocational training system of the country so that after their release they may continue their education and vocational training without difficulty.","...","81.All juveniles deprived of their liberty shall be allowed to exercise regularly for at least two hours every day, of which at least one hour shall be in the open air, if the weather permits.","...","94.1.Disciplinary procedures shall be mechanisms of last resort. Restorative conflict resolution and educational interaction with the aim of norm validation shall be given priority over formal disciplinary hearings and punishments.","...","95.1.Disciplinary punishments shall be selected, as far as possible, for their educational impact. They shall not be heavier than justified by the seriousness of the offence.","95.2.Collective punishment, corporal punishment, punishment by placing in a dark cell, and all other forms of inhuman and degrading punishment shall be prohibited.","...","Part IV \u2013 Legal advice and assistance","120.1.Juveniles and their parents or legal guardians are entitled to legal advice and assistance in all matters related to the imposition and implementation of sanctions or measures.","120.2.The competent authorities shall provide juveniles with reasonable facilities for gaining effective and confidential access to such advice and assistance, including unrestricted and unsupervised visits by legal advisors.","120.3.The state shall provide free legal aid to juveniles, their parents or legal guardians when the interests of justice so require.","...\u201d","80.The Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child friendly justice, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17November 2010, state, in so far as relevant, the following.","\u201cII.Definitions","For the purposes of these guidelines on child friendly justice (hereafter \u201cthe guidelines\u201d):","...","c.\u2019child-friendly justice\u2019 refers to justice systems which guarantee the respect and the effective implementation of all children\u2019s rights at the highest attainable level, bearing in mind the principles listed below and giving due consideration to the child\u2019s level of maturity and understanding and the circumstances of the case. It is, in particular, justice that is accessible, age appropriate, speedy, diligent, adapted to and focused on the needs and rights of the child, respecting the rights of the child including the rights to due process, to participate in and to understand the proceedings, to respect for private and family life and to integrity and dignity.","III.Fundamental principles","...","E.Rule of law","1.The rule of law principle should apply fully to children as it does to adults.","2.Elements of due process such as the principles of legality and proportionality, the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, the right to legal advice, the right to access to courts and the right to appeal, should be guaranteed for children as they are for adults and should not be minimised or denied under the pretext of the child\u2019s best interests. This applies to all judicial and non-judicial and administrative proceedings. ...","IV.Child-friendly justice before, during and after judicial proceedings","...","19.Any form of deprivation of liberty of children should be a measure of last resort and be for the shortest appropriate period of time.","...","21.Given the vulnerability of children deprived of liberty, the importance of family ties and promoting the reintegration into society, competent authorities should ensure respect and actively support the fulfilment of the rights of the child as set out in universal and European instruments. In addition to other rights, children in particular should have the right to:","...","b.receive appropriate education, vocational guidance and training, medical care, and enjoy freedom of thought, conscience and religion and access to leisure, including physical education and sport;","...","B.Child-friendly justice before judicial proceedings","...","26.Alternatives to court proceedings should guarantee an equivalent level of legal safeguards. Respect for children\u2019s rights as described in these guidelines and in all relevant legal instruments on the rights of the child should be guaranteed to the same extent in both in-court and out-of-court proceedings.","C.Children and the police","27.Police should respect the personal rights and dignity of all children and have regard to their vulnerability, i.e. take account of their age and maturity and any special needs of those who may be under a physical or mental disability or have communication difficulties.","28.Whenever a child is apprehended by the police, the child should be informed in a manner and in language that is appropriate to his or her age and level of understanding of the reason for which he or she has been taken into custody. Children should be provided with access to a lawyer and be given the opportunity to contact their parents or a person whom they trust.","29.Save in exceptional circumstances, the parent(s) should be informed of the child\u2019s presence in the police station, given details of the reason why the child has been taken into custody and be asked to come to the station.","30.A child who has been taken into custody should not be questioned in respect of criminal behaviour, or asked to make or sign a statement concerning such involvement, except in the presence of a lawyer or one of the child\u2019s parents or, if no parent is available, another person whom the child trusts. ...\u201d","B.United Nations","81.The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ( adopted on 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 \u2013 \u201cthe CRC\u201d) sets out the fundamental principle of the best interests of the child in Article 3, which reads as follows.","\u201c1.In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.","2.States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.","3.States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.\u201d","82.In so far as relevant to the present case, the CRC further states as follows.","Article 23","\u201c1.States Parties recognize that a mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy a full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and facilitate the child\u2019s active participation in the community.","2.States Parties recognize the right of the disabled child to special care ...","...\u201d","Article 37","\u201cStates Parties shall ensure that:","(a)No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ...","(b)No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time;","(c)Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age. ...","(d)Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action.\u201d","Article 40","\u201c1.States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child\u2019s sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child\u2019s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child\u2019s age and the desirability of promoting the child\u2019s reintegration and the child\u2019s assuming a constructive role in society.","2.To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of international instruments, States Parties shall, in particular, ensure that:","...","(b)Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least the following guarantees:","(i)To be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law;","(ii)To be informed promptly and directly of the charges against him or her, and, if appropriate, through his or her parents or legal guardians, and to have legal or other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of his or her defence;","(iii)To have the matter determined without delay by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body in a fair hearing according to law, in the presence of legal or other appropriate assistance and, unless it is considered not to be in the best interest of the child, in particular, taking into account his or her age or situation, his or her parents or legal guardians;","(iv)Not to be compelled to give testimony or to confess guilt; to examine or have examined adverse witnesses and to obtain the participation and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under conditions of equality;","(v)If considered to have infringed the penal law, to have this decision and any measures imposed in consequence thereof reviewed by a higher competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body according to law;","...\u201d","83.General Comment No. 9 (2006) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (27 February 2007, UN Doc. CRC\/C\/GC\/9), contains, inter alia, the following recommendations.","\u201c73.In the light of article 2 States parties have the obligation to ensure that children with disabilities who are in conflict with the law (as described in article 40, paragraph1) will be protected not only by the provisions of the Convention which specifically relate to juvenile justice (arts. 40, 37 and 39) but by all other relevant provisions and guarantees contained in the Convention, for example in the area of health care and education. In addition, States parties should take where necessary specific measures to ensure that children with disabilities de facto are protected by and do benefit from the rights mentioned above.","74.With reference to the rights enshrined in article 23 and given the high level of vulnerability of children with disabilities, the Committee recommends \u2013 in addition to the general recommendation made in paragraph 73 above \u2013 that the following elements of the treatment of children with disabilities (allegedly) in conflict with the law be taken into account:","a)A child with disability who comes in conflict with the law should be interviewed using appropriate languages and otherwise dealt with by professionals such as police officers, attorneys\/advocates\/social workers, prosecutors and\/or judges, who have received proper training in this regard;","b)Governments should develop and implement alternative measures with a variety and a flexibility that allow for an adjustment of the measure to the individual capacities and abilities of the child in order to avoid the use of judicial proceedings. Children with disabilities in conflict with the law should be dealt with as much as possible without resorting to formal\/legal procedures. Such procedures should only be considered when necessary in the interest of public order. In those cases special efforts have to be made to inform the child about the juvenile justice procedure and his or her rights therein;","c)Children with disabilities in conflict with the law should not be placed in a regular juvenile detention centre by way of pre-trial detention nor by way of a punishment. Deprivation of liberty should only be applied if necessary with a view to providing the child with adequate treatment for addressing his or her problems which have resulted in the commission of a crime and the child should be placed in an institution that has the specially trained staff and other facilities to provide this specific treatment. In making such decisions the competent authority should make sure that the human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected.\u201d","84.General Comment No. 10 (2007) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (25 April 2007, UN Doc. CRC\/C\/GC\/10), includes the following recommendations.","\u201c33.... In this regard, State parties should inform the Committee in their reports in specific detail how children below the [minimum age of criminal responsibility] set in their laws are treated when they are recognized as having infringed the penal law, or are alleged as or accused of having done so, and what kinds of legal safeguards are in place to ensure that their treatment is as fair and just as that of children at or above [the minimum age of criminal responsibility].","...","49.The child must be guaranteed legal or other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of his\/her defence. CRC does require that the child be provided with assistance, which is not necessarily under all circumstances legal but it must be appropriate. It is left to the discretion of the States parties to determine how this assistance is provided but it should be free of charge. ...","...","52.... decisions without delay should be the result of a process in which the human rights of the child and legal safeguards are fully respected. In this decision-making process without delay, the legal or other appropriate assistance must be present. This presence should not be limited to the trial before the court or other judicial body, but also applies to all other stages of the process, beginning with the interviewing (interrogation) of the child by the police.","...","56.In line with article 14 (3) (g) of ICCPR, CRC requires that a child be not compelled to give testimony or to confess or acknowledge guilt ...","57.... The term \u2018compelled\u2019 should be interpreted in a broad manner and not be limited to physical force or other clear violations of human rights. The age of the child, the child\u2019s development, the length of the interrogation, the child\u2019s lack of understanding, the fear of unknown consequences or of a suggested possibility of imprisonment may lead him\/her to a confession that is not true. That may become even more likely if rewards are promised such as: \u2018You can go home as soon as you have given us the true story\u2019, or lighter sanctions or release are promised.","58.The child being questioned must have access to a legal or other appropriate representative, and must be able to request the presence of his\/her parent(s) during questioning. There must be independent scrutiny of the methods of interrogation to ensure that the evidence is voluntary and not coerced, given the totality of the circumstances, and is reliable. The court or other judicial body, when considering the voluntary nature and reliability of an admission or confession by a child, must take into account the age of the child, the length of custody and interrogation, and the presence of legal or other counsel, parent(s), or independent representatives of the child. ...\u201d","85.General Comment No. 35 of the Human Rights Committee (16December 2014, UN Doc. CCPR\/C\/GC\/35), comprises the following remarks concerning Article 9 (Liberty and security of person) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.","\u201c28.For some categories of vulnerable persons, directly informing the person arrested is required but not sufficient. When children are arrested, notice of the arrest and the reasons for it should also be provided directly to their parents, guardians, or legal representatives. ...","...","62.Article24, paragraph 1, of the Covenant entitles every child \u2018to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State\u2019. That article entails the adoption of special measures to protect the personal liberty and security of every child, in addition to the measures generally required by article 9 for everyone. A child may be deprived of liberty only as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time. In addition to the other requirements applicable to each category of deprivation of liberty, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in every decision to initiate or continue the deprivation. ... The child has a right to be heard, directly or through legal or other appropriate assistance, in relation to any decision regarding a deprivation of liberty, and the procedures employed should be child-appropriate. ...\u201d","86.The relevant parts of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (\u201cthe Beijing Rules\u201d), adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1985 (UN Doc. A\/RES\/40\/33), state the following.","\u201c5.Aims of juvenile justice","5.1The juvenile justice system shall emphasize the well-being of the juvenile and shall ensure that any reaction to juvenile offenders shall always be in proportion to the circumstances of both the offenders and the offence.","...","7.Rights of juveniles","7.1Basic procedural safeguards such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be notified of the charges, the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, the right to the presence of a parent or guardian, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the right to appeal to a higher authority shall be guaranteed at all stages of proceedings.","...","10.Initial contact","10.1Upon the apprehension of a juvenile, her or his parents or guardian shall be immediately notified of such apprehension, and, where such immediate notification is not possible, the parents or guardian shall be notified within the shortest possible time thereafter.","...","10.3Contacts between the law enforcement agencies and a juvenile offender shall be managed in such a way as to respect the legal status of the juvenile, promote the well-being of the juvenile and avoid harm to her or him, with due regard to the circumstances of the case.","...","17.Guiding principles in adjudication and disposition","17.1The disposition of the competent authority shall be guided by the following principles:","...","(b)Restrictions on the personal liberty of the juvenile shall be imposed only after careful consideration and shall be limited to the possible minimum;","(c)Deprivation of personal liberty shall not be imposed unless the juvenile is adjudicated of a serious act involving violence against another person or of persistence in committing other serious offences and unless there is no other appropriate response;","...","Commentary","...","Rule 17.1 (b) implies that strictly punitive approaches are not appropriate. Whereas in adult cases, and possibly also in cases of severe offences by juveniles, just desert and retributive sanctions might be considered to have some merit, in juvenile cases such considerations should always be outweighed by the interest of safeguarding the well-being and the future of the young person.","...","19.Least possible use of institutionalization","19.1The placement of a juvenile in an institution shall always be a disposition of last resort and for the minimum necessary period.","Commentary","...","Rule 19 aims at restricting institutionalization in two regards: in quantity (\u2018last resort\u2019) and in time (\u2018minimum necessary period\u2019). Rule 19 reflects one of the basic guiding principles of resolution 4 of the Sixth United Nations Congress: a juvenile offender should not be incarcerated unless there is no other appropriate response. ... In fact, priority should be given to \u2018open\u2019 over \u2018closed\u2019 institutions. Furthermore, any facility should be of a correctional or educational rather than of a prison type.","...","26.Objectives of institutional treatment","...","26.2Juveniles in institutions shall receive care, protection and all necessary assistance \u2013 social, educational, vocational, psychological, medical and physical \u2013 that they may require because of their age, sex and personality and in the interest of their wholesome development.","...\u201d","87.The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (\u201cthe Havana Rules\u201d), adopted by General Assembly Resolution 45\/113 of 14December 1990, include the following provisions.","\u201cI.Fundamental perspectives","...","2.Juveniles should only be deprived of their liberty in accordance with the principles and procedures set forth in these Rules and in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules). Deprivation of the liberty of a juvenile should be a disposition of last resort and for the minimum necessary period and should be limited to exceptional cases. The length of the sanction should be determined by the judicial authority, without precluding the possibility of his or her early release.","...","II.Scope and application of the rules","11.For the purposes of the Rules, the following definitions should apply:","...","(b)The deprivation of liberty means any form of detention or imprisonment or the placement of a person in a public or private custodial setting, from which this person is not permitted to leave at will, by order of any judicial, administrative or other public authority.","...","IV.The management of juvenile facilities","...","B.Admission, registration, movement and transfer","21.In every place where juveniles are detained, a complete and secure record of the following information should be kept concerning each juvenile received:","...","(e)Details of known physical and mental health problems, including drug and alcohol abuse.","...","C.Classification and placement","27.As soon as possible after the moment of admission, each juvenile should be interviewed, and a psychological and social report identifying any factors relevant to the specific type and level of care and programme required by the juvenile should be prepared. This report, together with the report prepared by a medical officer who has examined the juvenile upon admission, should be forwarded to the director for purposes of determining the most appropriate placement for the juvenile within the facility and the specific type and level of care and programme required and to be pursued. ...","28.The detention of juveniles should only take place under conditions that take full account of their particular needs, status and special requirements according to their age, personality, sex and type of offence, as well as mental and physical health, and which ensure their protection from harmful influences and risk situations. The principal criterion for the separation of different categories of juveniles deprived of their liberty should be the provision of the type of care best suited to the particular needs of the individuals concerned and the protection of their physical, mental and moral integrity and well-being.","...","D.Physical environment and accommodation","31.Juveniles deprived of their liberty have the right to facilities and services that meet all the requirements of health and human dignity.","32.The design of detention facilities for juveniles and the physical environment should be in keeping with the rehabilitative aim of residential treatment, with due regard to the need of the juvenile for privacy, sensory stimuli, opportunities for association with peers and participation in sports, physical exercise and leisure-time activities. ...","...","34.Sanitary installations should be so located and of a sufficient standard to enable every juvenile to comply, as required, with their physical needs in privacy and in a clean and decent manner.","...","E.Education, vocational training and work","38.Every juvenile of compulsory school age has the right to education suited to his or her needs and abilities and designed to prepare him or her for return to society. Such education should be provided outside the detention facility in community schools wherever possible and, in any case, by qualified teachers through programmes integrated with the education system of the country so that, after release, juveniles may continue their education without difficulty. ...","...","H.Medical care","49.Every juvenile shall receive adequate medical care, both preventive and remedial, including dental, ophthalmological and mental health care, as well as pharmaceutical products and special diets as medically indicated. ...","50.Every juvenile has a right to be examined by a physician immediately upon admission to a detention facility, for the purpose of recording any evidence of prior ill-treatment and identifying any physical or mental condition requiring medical attention.","51.The medical services provided to juveniles should seek to detect and should treat any physical or mental illness, substance abuse or other condition that may hinder the integration of the juvenile into society. Every detention facility for juveniles should have immediate access to adequate medical facilities and equipment appropriate to the number and requirements of its residents and staff trained in preventive health care and the handling of medical emergencies. Every juvenile who is ill, who complains of illness or who demonstrates symptoms of physical or mental difficulties, should be examined promptly by a medical officer.","52.Any medical officer who has reason to believe that the physical or mental health of a juvenile has been or will be injuriously affected by continued detention, a hunger strike or any condition of detention should report this fact immediately to the director of the detention facility in question and to the independent authority responsible for safeguarding the well-being of the juvenile.","53.A juvenile who is suffering from mental illness should be treated in a specialized institution under independent medical management. Steps should be taken, by arrangement with appropriate agencies, to ensure any necessary continuation of mental health care after release.","...","L.Disciplinary procedures","66.Any disciplinary measures and procedures should maintain the interest of safety and an ordered community life and should be consistent with the upholding of the inherent dignity of the juvenile and the fundamental objective of institutional care, namely, instilling a sense of justice, self-respect and respect for the basic rights of every person.","67.All disciplinary measures constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment shall be strictly prohibited, including corporal punishment, placement in a dark cell, closed or solitary confinement or any other punishment that may compromise the physical or mental health of the juvenile concerned. The reduction of diet and the restriction or denial of contact with family members should be prohibited for any purpose. Labour should always be viewed as an educational tool and a means of promoting the self-respect of the juvenile in preparing him or her for return to the community and should not be imposed as a disciplinary sanction. No juvenile should be sanctioned more than once for the same disciplinary infraction. Collective sanctions should be prohibited.","...\u201d","88.The United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (\u201cthe Riyadh Guidelines\u201d), adopted by General Assembly Resolution 45\/112 of 14December 1990, include the following provision.","\u201c46.The institutionalization of young persons should be a measure of last resort and for the minimum necessary period, and the best interests of the young person should be of paramount importance. Criteria authorizing formal intervention of this type should be strictly defined and limited to the following situations: (a) where the child or young person has suffered harm that has been inflicted by the parents or guardians; (b) where the child or young person has been sexually, physically or emotionally abused by the parents or guardians; (c) where the child or young person has been neglected, abandoned or exploited by the parents or guardians; (d) where the child or young person is threatened by physical or moral danger due to the behaviour of the parents or guardians; and (e) where a serious physical or psychological danger to the child or young person has manifested itself in his or her own behaviour and neither the parents, the guardians, the juvenile himself or herself nor non-residential community services can meet the danger by means other than institutionalization.\u201d","89.In its Concluding Observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of the Russian Federation of 25 February 2014 (UN Doc. CRC\/C\/RUS\/CO\/4-5), the Committee on the Rights of the Child \u201curged the State party to establish a juvenile justice system in full compliance with the Convention, in particular Articles 37, 39 and 40, and with other relevant standards\u201d. It further recommended that the Russian Federation \u201cprevent the unlawful detention of children and ensure that legal safeguards are guaranteed for children detained\u201d. Articles 37 and 40 of the CRC relates to children in conflict with the law (see paragraph 82 above) while Article 39 concerns the rights of children who are victims of crimes."],"28057":["7.The applicants are a mother and child born in 1990 and 2012 respectively.","A.Background facts","8.On 16 January 2012 the first applicant, who was in the fifth month of pregnancy, was detained by the police on suspicion of robbery.","9.On 26 January 2012 the Dzerzhynskyy District Court of Kharkiv (\u201cthe Dzerzhynskyy Court\u201d) ordered her pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial.","10.On the same date she was placed in the Kharkiv SIZO.","B.Conditions of the first applicant\u2019s stay in the maternity hospital","11.On 22 May 2012 the first applicant was taken to Kharkiv Maternity Hospital no. 7 (\u201cthe maternity hospital\u201d).","12.On the same date she gave birth to the second applicant. He measured 49 cm and weighed 2.9 kg.","13.Three female security officers guarded the first applicant in the hospital. According to her, they stayed on the ward at all times. The Government submitted that they had left the ward during the delivery.","14.The first applicant alleged she had been continuously shackled to her hospital bed or to a gynaecological examination chair, the only exception being during the delivery when the shackles had been removed. It is not clear from her submissions exactly how she had been shackled; on one occasion, she submitted that after the delivery she had had her foot shackled to the bed. At the same time, she submitted that the guards had only removed the shackles from her wrists for breastfeeding.","15.According to the Government, the first applicant was never handcuffed or shackled in the maternity hospital.","16.On 25 May 2012 the applicants were discharged.","17.On 12 November 2012 the first applicant wrote in a statement for the SIZO administration (see paragraphs 41 and 76) that the maternity hospital staff had treated her well, that she had not been handcuffed or shackled, and that the two female security officers who had been on her ward had been helping her take care of the baby.","18.In December 2012 and January 2013 the prosecution authorities questioned some maternity hospital staff and the security officers who had guarded the first applicant with a view to verifying her allegations, particularly as regards her shackling (see also paragraphs 76-82 below).","19.On 21 December 2012 the chief doctor of the maternity hospital wrote to the governor of the Kharkiv SIZO, in reply to an enquiry by the latter, to say that during her stay in the maternity hospital the first applicant had been guarded by SIZO officers at all times, that the officers in question had not been on the delivery ward, and that the first applicant had not been handcuffed or shackled during the delivery.","20.On 24 December 2012 the chief obstetrician, Ms Ti., gave a written statement to the prosecution authorities. She submitted that the first applicant had been shackled by the wrists to the gynaecological examination chair during her examinations both in the admissions unit and later in the obstetric unit, and that it was usual practice for detainees to be shackled and guarded by three guards.","21.Two other obstetricians, Ms F. and MsS., and a nurse, MsTo., made similar statements. Ms F. submitted that she could not remember any details regarding the second applicant\u2019s delivery. MsTo. specified that the first applicant had not been shackled during the delivery or subsequently during breastfeeding.","22.The chief doctor of the neonatal unit MsVl. also submitted that the first applicant had been shackled to a gynaecological examination chair. Furthermore, she indicated that two guards had been staying on the ward near the applicants, with a third near the door.","23.The security officers who had guarded the first applicant denied that she had been handcuffed or shackled in hospital.","24.The applicant\u2019s lawyer enquired with a former nurse, Ms P., about the conditions faced by women in detention during delivery, with reference to her related work experience. On 7 February 2013 MsP. wrote to him indicating that she had indeed worked as a nurse at Donetsk Regional Childcare and Maternal Health Centre from 1996 to 2005, and that in 2004 or 2005 a detained woman had been shackled to her bed during her baby\u2019s delivery there.","C.Conditions of detention in the Kharkiv SIZO","1.Physical conditions of detention","25.While the first applicant was held in several different cells in the SIZO, her application form referred only to the conditions of her detention with her baby in cell no. 408, in which she had been held from 14 March to 8November 2012. The summary of facts below therefore only concerns that cell.","(a)The first applicant\u2019s account","26.The cell, situated in a semi-basement, was cold and damp. There was no hot water and only an irregular supply of cold water. The first applicant therefore rarely had the opportunity to take a shower and bath her new-born son. She also had to store cold water in plastic bottles for her own use. She boiled water on a defective electric cooker in a kettle, which she had to borrow from the administration and which was provided to her for no longer than fifteen minutes each time. The toilet and shower were in a niche not separated from the living area. The toilet was often blocked. There was no baby changing table or cot in the cell.","27.The first applicant was not provided with any baby hygiene products. Nor did she receive nutrition suitable to her needs. On the days of court hearings her only meal was breakfast, which consisted of bread and tea. No packed lunches were provided to her.","28.The applicants were able to have outdoor walks of about ten minutes per day, but not every day, in a communal walking area.","29.Lastly, one of the inmates she shared with was HIV positive.","(b)The Government\u2019s account","30.Cell no. 408 was a high-comfort cell designed for pregnant women and women with children. It was located on the ground floor, measured fifty-two square metres and could accommodate up to six people. The first applicant shared it with two or sometimes three inmates.","31.The cell had three windows measuring over eight square metres in total. There was hot and cold water, as well as a drinking water cooler with a capacity of ten litres.","32.Furthermore, there were all the necessary furniture and facilities such as air conditioning, a refrigerator, an electric stove, a baby cot and a pram. There was also a supply of nappies and hygiene products. The toilet and shower were separated from the living area.","33.The first applicant was provided with adequate nutrition in accordance with the applicable standards (the total energy value of her daily meals being 3,284 kilocalories). She received three hot meals per day with the exception of hearing days, when she missed lunch. She breastfed her son and refused the baby food provided by the SIZO. There were no restrictions on food or other parcels she received from her relatives.","34.The applicants had a daily two-hour walk in a specially designated area.","35.They never shared a cell with inmates with HIV.","36.The Government provided four colour photographs of cell no.408, showing a spacious and light room in a visually good state of repair. There were three large windows with sheer curtains. The cell had a washbasin. There was also a lavatory with a bidet and a shower cubicle, both separated from the living area by opaque glass doors. Also on the photographs were a wardrobe, two beds with bedside cabinets, a cot, a table with two stools, a baby stool, a shelf with some tableware, a microwave, a television and a baby changing table.","37.Another photograph showed a walking area for detained mothers with babies, with a flowerbed and a wall with a nature mural. The first applicant and her baby were on the photograph, as well as another woman with a pram.","(c)Other detainees\u2019 accounts and relevant information","38.On 1 and 2 February 2012 the local sanitary and epidemiological service inspected the SIZO in the context of an unspecified investigation. It observed that there was a special cell for women with babies, with all the essential amenities. It was noted in the report that there had been no pregnant inmates or inmates with babies in the SIZO at the time of the inspection.","39.On 24 May 2012 the sanitary and epidemiological service also inspected the drinking water in the SIZO to check that it complied with the relevant standards. Noirregularities were found.","40.On 22 October 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the Agent of the Government that there had been no complaints from the first applicant regarding the conditions of detention or the second applicant\u2019s medical care in the SIZO.","41.On 12 November 2012 the first applicant wrote a statement giving a detailed description of her cell in the SIZO similar to that submitted by the Government (see paragraphs 30-37 above). The last paragraph also concerned her stay in the maternity hospital (see paragraph17 above).","42.On 13 November 2012 one of the SIZO staff wrote to the State Prisons Service to say that the first applicant\u2019s statement had been made freely.","43.During her detention in the Kharkiv SIZO the first applicant received about thirty food parcels from her mother, often with basic foodstuffs such as bread, butter, tea, sugar and milk.","44.The first applicant lodged numerous requests for release with the trial court dealing with her criminal case, subject to an undertaking not to abscond (dated 6 July, 6, 26 and 31 August, 3September and 9October 2012). She alleged, in particular, that the conditions in the SIZO were not adequate for her baby. The court rejected those requests.","45.The applicants\u2019 case received some media coverage. For example, in November 2012 the article \u201cBaby as a victim of inhuman treatment\u201d was published online by the Kharkiv Human Rights Group. In December 2012 a television programme was broadcast, in which the first applicant and the State authorities gave accounts, particularly as regards the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention in the SIZO. The parties did not submit to the Court a copy of the relevant article or video footage or a transcript of the television programme.","46.On 12 December 2012 one of the detainees, Ms B., wrote a statement addressed to the head of the local department of the State Prisons Service. She submitted that in November 2012 she had been held in the same cell as the first applicant and had been satisfied with the conditions of detention there. It was noted in the statement that there had been large windows in the cell, a shower cubicle with hot and cold water and all the necessary furniture and appliances, including a refrigerator and a television.","47.On 19 December 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Department of the State Prisons Service issued a memorandum stating that the first applicant had not submitted any complaints during her detention in the Kharkiv SIZO.","48.The case file contains three statements by detainee MsM. concerning the conditions of detention in the SIZO. She wrote two of them while detained there (on an unspecified date and on 25December 2012), and a third on 30 January 2013 when she had already begun serving her prison sentence elsewhere. In the first two statements Ms M. described the conditions of her detention in cell no. 408 as quite satisfactory and comfortable. Her account was similar to that given by the Government (see paragraphs 30-32 above). The first two statements also contained critical remarks regarding the first applicant claiming, in particular, that she had displayed a careless attitude towards her baby and had acted in bad faith in applying to the Court. In her third statement, Ms M. stated that the food in the SIZO had been poor. More specifically, the bread had been stale and the meat had been tinged blue. She also submitted that there had been no hot water in cell no.408. Lastly, she submitted that on two occasions she had witnessed the first applicant requesting medical care for her baby when he had had stomachache, but her requests had been ignored.","49.On 28 December 2012 a former detainee, Ms Sa., wrote a statement for the first applicant\u2019s lawyer and had it certified by a notary. She stated that she had shared cell no.408 with the first applicant from an unspecified date in March to 19April 2012. Ms Sa. had been pregnant at the time. She described the conditions of their detention as follows. The cell was located in a semi-basement and inmates saw practically no daylight. The windows were so high that they could not be opened without the assistance of a guard. There were about seven inmates in the cell, some of them with HIV and some suffering from other illnesses. The toilet was separated from the living area by a waist-high wall and leaked. As a result, there was always a bad smell. The shower also leaked and the cubicle door was broken. It was so humid in the cell that the plaster had fallen off the ceiling and the walls were covered in mould. The cell was infested with mice and lice. There were no household appliances like a kettle or microwave. Nor were there any beds or bedside cabinets as shown by the State Prisons Service on television (see paragraph 45 above). Ms Sa. specified that in fact none of the detainees had ever been held in the cell presented by the authorities on television. There was no hot water and the pressure in the cold water taps was so low that inmates had to store water for their own use. Furthermore, the SIZO administration did not provide them with any tableware. Their daily walk lasted only twenty minutes and took place in a small walking area covered with bars. Furthermore, according to Ms Sa., the food in the SIZO was neither fresh nor tasty. Lastly, she stated that she had been shackled to her bed when undergoing some treatment in the maternity hospital in Kharkiv while pregnant.","50.On an unspecified date Ms Ve., who had also shared cell no.408 with the first applicant (the exact period is unknown), wrote a statement about the conditions of detention there. Her description was similar to that given by Ms Sa. as regards the leaking toilet, high humidity levels, lack of hot water and irregular supply of cold water, as well as the duration and conditions of the daily outdoor walks and poor nutrition.","2.Medical care for the second applicant","51.On 25 May 2012 the applicants were discharged from the maternity hospital. The second applicant was found to be in good health.","52.According to a letter from its chief doctor to the first applicant\u2019s lawyer dated 12 December 2012, on 25 May 2012 the second applicant was transferred to Children\u2019s Hospital no. 19 (\u201cthe children\u2019s hospital\u201d). All the other relevant documents in the case file indicate that on 25May 2012 both applicants were taken to the Kharkiv SIZO.","53.As submitted by the first applicant and noted in a letter by the chief doctor of the children\u2019s hospital to the first applicant\u2019s lawyer dated 6September 2012, a paediatrician from that hospital had examined the second applicant on 28May 2012. The baby was found to be in good health but to have phimosis (a condition of the penis where the foreskin cannot be fully retracted).","54.However, according to the second applicant\u2019s medical file kept by the SIZO, the first time a paediatrician of the children\u2019s hospital examined him was on 31May 2012. He was found to be in an adaptation period and the first applicant received advice regarding childcare.","55.According to the second applicant\u2019s medical file, on 12June 2012 he was examined again by a paediatrician, who diagnosed him with intestinal colic and recommended Espumisan, massage, feeding on demand and outdoor walks. The doctor also suspected that the boy had a patent (open) foramen ovale (PFO; the foramen ovale allows blood circulation in the fetal heart and closes in most individuals at birth).","56.The second applicant\u2019s next medical examination appears to have taken place on 20 July 2012. It was noted in his medical file that the paediatrician had given advice to the first applicant regarding feeding and care.","57.The first applicant denied that any of the examinations following that on 28 May 2012 had taken place. She alleged that her baby had not been examined by a paediatrician until 10 September 2012. She submitted that the records of her son\u2019s earlier examinations in the medical file had been forged. According to her, the first page of that book referred to an examination on 10 September 2012, whereas the records of his earlier examinations had been written on separate pages and subsequently glued into the file. The case file as it stands before the Court contains a separate copy of each page of the file, which makes it impossible to verify the first applicant\u2019s allegation.","58.On 28 August 2012 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the Kharkiv SIZO administration to provide him with details of when the second applicant had been examined by a paediatrician and whether the conditions of detention had been appropriate for such a small baby. He also requested copies of the relevant documents.","59.On 4 September 2012 the SIZO administration replied that it would be able to provide comprehensive information on the second applicant\u2019s health after a complete medical examination in the children\u2019s hospital, which was due to take place.","60.On 31 August 2012 the first applicant asked the judge dealing with her case to order a medical examination of her son \u201cgiven that the SIZO administration [was] ignoring her requests to that effect\u201d. It appears that her request was rejected.","61.On 6 September 2012 the chief doctor of the children\u2019s hospital wrote to the first applicant\u2019s lawyer in reply to an enquiry by him dated 5September 2012. He said that with no paediatrician at the Kharkiv SIZO, a paediatrician from that hospital monitored babies born there. He also indicated that the second applicant had been examined by the hospital paediatrician on 28 May 2012 (see also paragraph 53 above). In so far as the lawyer enquired about the baby\u2019s medical condition at the material time, the chief doctor stated that it was impossible to provide him with such information because the first applicant had not requested any medical care for him until then.","62.On 10 September 2012 a dermatologist, cardiologist, ear, nose and throat specialist, neurologist and paediatrician all examined the second applicant. He was found to have allergic dermatitis, dysplastic cardiomyopathy and phimosis. Furthermore, the patent foramen ovale diagnosis had been called into question (see paragraph 55 above). The doctors concluded that the second applicant did not require any medical treatment, but recommended that the mother follow a hypoallergenic diet.","63.According to the first applicant, the examination was carried out in the context of custody proceedings initiated by the second applicant\u2019s stepfather. She specified that it had been done with her consent so that the second applicant could be taken from the SIZO, where he was not receiving adequate care.","64.On 14September 2012 the SIZO sent a copy of the second applicant\u2019s medical file to the applicants\u2019 representative, further to a request made by him on 28August 2012 (see paragraph 58 above).","65.On 18 October 2012 the chief doctor of the children\u2019s hospital wrote to the first applicant\u2019s lawyer, in reply to an enquiry made on 10October 2012, to say that hospital was in charge of the medical supervision of children in the Kharkiv SIZO where needed, subject to the SIZO administration making the relevant application. It was also noted that the second applicant required an additional examination in the regional cardiology centre, and that the children\u2019s hospital had already requested the SIZO administration\u2019s cooperation in that regard.","66.On 19 October 2012 a paediatrician and a cardiologist examined the second applicant again. He was diagnosed with a patent foramen ovale (a heart condition, see paragraph 55 above for further details) and an additional examination was recommended.","67.On the same date the second applicant underwent an echocardiogram and was found to be healthy.","68.On 14 November 2012 the first applicant refused to allow her son to undergo a paediatrician examination, which she had been offered.","69.The following day the first applicant was released (see also paragraph75 below).","70.On 30 November 2012 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer enquired with the children\u2019s hospital whether it had kept a medical file in respect of the second applicant and whether he had been vaccinated during his stay with the first applicant in the SIZO.","71.On 4 December 2012 the chief doctor replied that the children\u2019s hospital provided medical care to children residing permanently in its catchment area. As regards children residing there temporarily, a written application by one of the parents was required. The first applicant had never submitted such an application. Accordingly, the hospital had not opened a medical file in respect of the second applicant. At the same time, its doctors had examined him when requested by the SIZO administration. The results of each examination had been reflected in the medical file provided by the SIZO. In so far as the second applicant\u2019s vaccinations were concerned, it was noted that he had always been brought for examinations without his mother, and without her consent no vaccinations had been given.","D.The first applicant\u2019s placement in a metal cage during court hearings","72.On 12 April, 17 May, 15 June, 2 and 31 August and 15November 2012 the first applicant participated in court hearings, during which she was held in a metal cage. Her requests not to be placed in a cage were rejected.","73.On 14 March 2013 the judge of the Dzerzhynskyy Court, who had been in charge of the first applicant\u2019s case, wrote to the Agent of the Government, in reply to the latter\u2019s request, to say that the first applicant had indeed been held in a metal cage in the courtroom during hearings. The judge emphasised that it was a legal requirement to place criminal defendants in a metal cage and there were no exceptions to this rule. Furthermore, he considered that allowing the first applicant to remain outside the cage in the courtroom would have been equal to her temporary release, contrary to the custodial preventive measure applied.","74.On 15 March 2013 the Ministry of the Interior confirmed once again to the Agent of the Government that the first applicant had been held in a metal cage in the courtroom during hearings. It further specified that the second applicant had remained with the SIZO medical specialist outside the cage and had been passed to her for breastfeeding when requested.","E.The first applicant\u2019s complaints after her release and their investigation","75.On 15 November 2012 the first applicant was released on an undertaking not to abscond.","76.On 25 December 2012 she complained to the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office that she had been shackled to her bed in the maternity hospital at all times, including during the delivery. She also complained that the conditions of detention and nutrition in the SIZO had been inadequate. Lastly, the first applicant alleged that the statement she had written on 12November 2012 expressing her satisfaction with the conditions of detention had been made under psychological pressure (see paragraphs 17 and 41 above).","77.On 27 December 2012 the State Prisons Service completed the internal investigation it had undertaken following the media coverage of the applicants\u2019 case (see paragraph 45 above). The first applicant\u2019s allegations were dismissed as unsubstantiated.","78.On 2 January 2013 the first applicant complained to the Kharkiv Zhovtnevyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe Zhovtnevyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u201d) that she had not been provided with adequate medical care during her pregnancy and the delivery; that she had been shackled by her wrists and feet to a gynaecological examination chair or her bed in the maternity hospital at all times, including during the delivery; that the conditions of her detention in the Kharkiv SIZO had been poor; and that neither she nor her baby had received adequate medical care there. On the same date her complaint was registered in the Integrated Register of Pre-trial Investigations and the investigation was started.","79.On 18 January 2013 the Zhovtnevyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered a forensic medical examination of the case material with a view to establishing: (i)whether the first applicant had any injuries and, if so, how they had been caused; (ii) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the first applicant had been handcuffed or shackled between 26January and 15November 2012; (iii)whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the applicants had not been provided with adequate or sufficient medical care in the Kharkiv SIZO; (iv) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the applicants had not been provided with adequate or sufficient medical care in the maternity hospital; and (v) if the applicants had not received adequate or sufficient medical care, whether this had had any negative impact on their health.","80.The aforementioned examination continued from 18January to 26March 2013. The answers in the report to all five questions were negative.","81.On 1 April 2013 the Zhovtnevyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the criminal investigation for lack of evidence of a criminal offence.","82.Also in April 2013 the State Prisons Service, following an enquiry by the Government\u2019s Agent, undertook an internal investigation as regards the lawfulness of the second applicant\u2019s detention in the SIZO. On 22April 2013 it was completed, with the conclusion that there had been no violation. It was noted in the report that, although in August2012 the first applicant had verbally expressed her intention to transfer the custody of her baby to her mother, she had later changed her mind as she had been breastfeeding.","A.United Nations documents","89.The relevant provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) read as follows:","Article 12","\u201c... States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.\u201d","90.The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) provides, in so far as relevant:","Preamble","\u201c... Bearing in mind that the need to extend particular care to the child has been stated in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 and in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly on 20November 1959 and recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular in articles 23 and 24), in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular in article 10) and in the statutes and relevant instruments of specialized agencies and international organizations concerned with the welfare of children,","Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, \u2018the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth\u2019,","...\u201d","Article 3","\u201c1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.","2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being ...\u201d","91.The relevant parts of the Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (2011) read as follows:","\u201cThe General Assembly,","...","Recalling further its resolution 58\/183 of 22 December 2003, in which it invited Governments, relevant international and regional bodies, national human rights institutions and non-governmental organizations to devote increased attention to the issue of women in prison, including the children of women in prison, with a view to identifying the key problems and the ways in which they can be addressed ...\u201d","Rule 33","\u201c...","3. Where children are allowed to stay with their mothers in prison, awareness\u2011raising on child development and basic training on the health care of children shall also be provided to prison staff, in order for them to respond appropriately in times of need and emergencies.","...\u201d","Rule 48","\u201c1. Pregnant or breastfeeding women prisoners shall receive advice on their health and diet under a programme to be drawn up and monitored by a qualified health practitioner. Adequate and timely food, a healthy environment and regular exercise opportunities shall be provided free of charge for pregnant women, babies, children and breastfeeding mothers.","2. Women prisoners shall not be discouraged from breastfeeding their children, unless there are specific health reasons to do so.","3. The medical and nutritional needs of women prisoners who have recently given birth, but whose babies are not with them in prison, shall be included in treatment programmes.\u201d","Rule 49","\u201cDecisions to allow children to stay with their mothers in prison shall be based on the best interests of the children. Children in prison with their mothers shall never be treated as prisoners.\u201d","Rule 50","\u201cWomen prisoners whose children are in prison with them shall be provided with the maximum possible opportunities to spend time with their children.\u201d","Rule 51","\u201c1. Children living with their mothers in prison shall be provided with ongoing health-care services and their development shall be monitored by specialists, in collaboration with community health services.","2. The environment provided for such children\u2019s upbringing shall be as close as possible to that of a child outside prison.\u201d","92.According to the recommendations of the World Health Organisation (\u201ctheWHO\u201d) which were adopted following its Joint Interregional Conference on Appropriate Technology for Birth (Fortaleza, Brazil, 22-26April 1985), the healthy newborn must remain with the mother whenever both their conditions permit it. The WHO recommendations on postnatal care of the mother and newborn 2013 also state that the mother and baby should not be separated and should stay in the same room 24 hours a day.","B.Council of Europe documents","93.The Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment (CPT) Standards (document no.CPT\/Inf\/E (2002) 1 - Rev. 2015, p. 45) contain the following relevant provisions:","Health care services in prisons","Extract from the 3rd General Report [CPT\/Inf (93) 12]","\u201c64. Certain specific categories of particularly vulnerable prisoners can be identified. Prison health care services should pay especial attention to their needs.","i) mother and child","65. It is a generally accepted principle that children should not be born in prison, and the CPT\u2019s experience is that this principle is respected.","66. A mother and child should be allowed to stay together for at least a certain period of time. If the mother and child are together in prison, they should be placed in conditions providing them with the equivalent of a creche and the support of staff specialised in post-natal care and nursery nursing. ...\u201d","VI. Women deprived of their liberty","Extract from the 10th General Report [CPT\/Inf (2000) 13]","Ante natal and post-natal care","\u201c26. Every effort should be made to meet the specific dietary needs of pregnant women prisoners, who should be offered a high protein diet, rich in fresh fruit and vegetables.","27. It is axiomatic that babies should not be born in prison, and the usual practice in Council of Europe member States seems to be, at an appropriate moment, to transfer pregnant women prisoners to outside hospitals.","Nevertheless, from time to time, the CPT encounters examples of pregnant women being shackled or otherwise restrained to beds or other items of furniture during gynaecological examinations and\/or delivery. Such an approach is completely unacceptable, and could certainly be qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment. Other means of meeting security needs can and should be found.","28. Many women in prison are primary carers for children or others, whose welfare may be adversely affected by their imprisonment.","One particularly problematic issue in this context is whether - and, if so, for how long - it should be possible for babies and young children to remain in prison with their mothers. This is a difficult question to answer given that, on the one hand, prisons clearly do not provide an appropriate environment for babies and young children while, on the other hand, the forcible separation of mothers and infants is highly undesirable.","29. In the view of the CPT, the governing principle in all cases must be the welfare of the child. This implies in particular that any ante and post-natal care provided in custody should be equivalent to that available in the outside community. Where babies and young children are held in custodial settings, their treatment should be supervised by specialists in social work and child development. The goal should be to produce a child-centred environment, free from the visible trappings of incarceration, such as uniforms and jangling keys.","Arrangements should also be made to ensure that the movement and cognitive skills of babies held in prison develop normally. In particular, they should have adequate play and exercise facilities within the prison and, wherever possible, the opportunity to leave the establishment and experience ordinary life outside its walls.","Facilitating child-minding by family members outside the establishment can also help to ensure that the burden of child-rearing is shared (for example, by the child\u2019s father). Where this is not possible, consideration should be given to providing access to creche-type facilities. Such arrangements can enable women prisoners to participate in work and other activities inside the prison to a greater extent than might otherwise be possible.\u201d","94.The Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine carried out by the CPT from 29 November to 6 December 2011 (CPT\/Inf (2012) 30) reads as follows:","\u201c43. The delegation gained a generally positive impression of the material conditions in the units for juveniles at the [SIZO] in ... Kharkiv.","However, conditions of detention were quite simply appalling in many of the other detention units of the [SIZO]. Numerous cells were in a poor state of repair and had only very limited access to natural light. In addition, the CPT is concerned about the severe overcrowding observed in a number of detention units of [the establishment]. At the time of the visit, the [...] Kharkiv SIZO [was accommodating] 3,415 prisoners (official capacity: 2,808 places).\u201d"],"28076":["8.The first applicant was born in 1992, the second applicant in 1995, and the third applicant in 1993. They are female and reside in Latvia.","9.The relevant facts of the case as submitted by the parties and emerging from the documents furnished to the Court may be summarised as follows.","10.From a young age the applicants trained in modern pentathlon. In 2007 they enrolled in a State sports school in Riga.","11.According to their submission, the first and third applicants commenced training with the sports school\u2019s coach O.B. in summer 2008 and the second applicant was coached by him during the summer of 2009.","12.In addition to the above-mentioned training, O.B. organised sports summer camps on the school\u2019s campus, which the first and third applicants attended in 2008 and all the applicants attended in 2009.","13.At the time of the events in issue, the applicants were under eighteen years of age.","A.The investigation into the applicants\u2019 allegations","1.Opening of the investigation","14.On 4 January 2010 the mother of the first and second applicants submitted a complaint to the State police alleging that the coach, O.B., had sexually abused her daughters.","15.The same day the police opened a criminal investigation under section 162 of the Criminal Law (Krimin\u0101llikums) (sexual abuse (pave\u0161ana netikl\u012bb\u0101)) with respect to the period between summer 2008 and September2009.","16.In the course of investigation the police took statements from various individuals, including the applicants and their parents, and O.B.\u2019s former students and their parents.","2.Police investigation","(a)Statement made by the first and second applicants\u2019 mother","17.On 4 January 2010 the mother stated that she had learnt from her daughters that O.B. had requested that after training they attend the sauna fully undressed. The coach had explained that wearing clothes was unhealthy. The second applicant had refused. However, other girls between thirteen and sixteen years of age, including the first applicant, had attended the sauna naked. The mother named the girls who had attended the sauna naked.","18.On one occasion when the second applicant had been in the sauna half-undressed, O.B. had entered the sauna and had told her that she was still little, thereby embarrassing her.","19.On another occasion, after the sauna O.B. had massaged the first applicant while touching her intimate body parts.","20.He had furthermore watched the girls changing and had touched their intimate body parts.","21.The first and second applicants\u2019 mother submitted with regard to the third applicant that she had travelled with O.B. to a competition in Lithuania, where he had pressurised her to share the same bed. The third applicant however had refused.","(b)The applicants\u2019 statements","22.On 5 and 14 January 2010 the police took statements from the three applicants, who were granted the status of injured parties in the proceedings. The police took an additional statement from the third applicant on 1April2010 and from the second applicant on 6 April 2010.","(i)Sauna and massages","23.The applicants stated that the sauna sessions took place after training around twice a week. The second applicant had attended the sauna only twice.","24.Having arrived for the sauna, the first and second applicants had seen the other girls undressing fully. The other girls had told that it had been O.B.\u2019s request that the sauna be attended naked. O.B. had said that it was very healthy to attend the sauna in that way.","25.At the beginning, the first applicant had felt shy. Yet, as she had seen the other girls attending the sauna naked, she had started doing so. For the same reason, the third applicant had also started going to the sauna naked.","26.The second applicant had removed only the top part of her swimsuit and had entered the sauna. Suddenly O.B., wearing shorts and a cap, had entered, which had startled the second applicant. She therefore had covered herself with her hands, to which O.B. had reacted by telling the other girls to look at how little she still was and saying that the other girls were already grown up and therefore naked. The second time, she had attended the sauna wrapped in a towel.","27.According to the applicants\u2019 account, even though girls had been in the sauna naked, O.B. \u2013 dressed in shorts \u2013 had come in and massaged them using a special bath brush (a birch \u201cbesom\u201d for a steam bath, used to swat or massage the body during a steam-bath procedure). Although the second applicant had refused that massage, she had witnessed O.B. asking the other girls to lie on their back and then massaging them. The second applicant had seen O.B. telling the third applicant to go to the sauna, and that he would come to massage her. The third applicant had listened to him. The second applicant stated as follows:","\u201c... when [O.B.] was massaging [the girls] in the sauna, he did not touch [their] intimate body parts, [he] touched [their] bodies only with the bath brush, [he] did not touch [them] with [his] hands.\u201d","28.The second applicant had told the other girls that the above\u2011mentioned practice was not normal. However, they had responded that, as it had been requested by the coach, it had to be complied with. The first and third applicants stated that O.B. had been their trainer and teacher, whom they had to obey. The second applicant, however, considered that there had been a possibility to refuse. To her mind the other girls had attended the sauna as they had not wished to disobey O.B. They had practically worshipped him, and had listened to everything he said.","29.From the documents furnished to the Court it appears that the applicants gave the police the names of the other girls who had attended the sauna, A.F., A.B. \u2013 who appears to have been a relative of O.B. \u2013 and V.A. The third applicant indicated that V.A. had rarely been to the sauna. According to the second applicant\u2019s account, there had been another girl, K.D.","30.The first applicant also recounted an occasion when she had experienced pain in her leg. O.B. had told her that he would give a massage and after the sauna had laid her on a bed and massaged her while she had been wearing only underpants. O.B. had touched the lower part of her stomach.","(ii)Changing room","31.The applicants stated that there had been times when O.B. had entered the girls\u2019 changing room as if looking for someone. When passing by them he had \u2013 as if accidently \u2013 touched the girls\u2019 intimate body parts. The second applicant stated that he had also tried to touch her, which she had prevented.","(iii)Trip to Lithuania","32.The first applicant stated that she had heard that in November 2009 the third applicant and some boys had travelled with O.B. to a competition in Lithuania. There he had told the third applicant that she would sleep with him in the same bed. The third applicant had gone to a separate bed to sleep and O.B., while drunk, had entered the room and had pulled at the children\u2019s legs, including those of the third applicant.","33.The third applicant also gave evidence regarding the trip to Lithuania with O.B. and the other two boys, whose names she provided.","34.At a hotel O.B. had told her that she would sleep with him in the same bed. She had spoken to one of the boys and had taken one of the single beds. At around 10 p.m. O.B. had returned to the hotel room drunk. After some time he had gone to sleep. The third applicant had felt afraid that O.B. might do something bad to her.","35.During all three days of the competition, O.B. had consumed alcohol, even though he had also been driving a vehicle.","(c)Psychologist\u2019s report","36.In April and May 2010 the police ordered a psychologist\u2019s report regarding the applicants.","37.During the psychologist\u2019s examination the first applicant commented that she had been surprised that the sauna had to be attended and that girls had attended it naked and that O.B. would enter and massage them with a besom, which had not seemed normal and had been unpleasant. However, the first applicant had felt afraid to tell her parents. O.B. had often touched her body, putting his arm around her waist, sitting her on his lap and hugging her, and also during massages. On one occasion during a massage he had touched her between her legs. The first applicant had been confused as to whether the coach\u2019s behaviour had been normal or bad. She had not wished to tell O.B. anything bad as he had helped her a lot. However, at the workplace he had almost always been under the influence of alcohol. When any of the girls had not wished to sit on his lap, he would use force to pull them down.","38.The second applicant likewise told the psychologist that she had been very surprised about all the girls attending the sauna naked and O.B. entering and massaging them with a besom. She had tried to persuade the girls that it was not normal and had gone to the sauna dressed in a swimsuit. O.B. had ridiculed her about it in front of the other girls, saying that she was so shy because she was little. Also, the coach had always been trying to touch her, and to put his arm around her waist. It had been unpleasant and she had tried to avoid him. The second applicant had gone to the sauna twice. She had gradually started telling her parents about O.B.\u2019s behaviour.","39.The third applicant did not wish to speak about the events in issue. Thoughts about O.B.\u2019s behaviour caused negative emotions in her and she was trying to forget it. She confirmed her earlier testimonies. The psychologist noted her statements to the police of 14 January and 1April2010. Concerning the sauna sessions, the third applicant had not found it normal that the sauna needed to be attended naked. However, she had started doing the same as the other students. The report referred to the applicant\u2019s character report from her previous school, which stated that on 1September2009 the applicant had been observed in a tense condition, unwilling to participate in extracurricular activities, in low spirits and suffering from loss of concentration. Suddenly in the mid-December 2009 she had decided to change school.","40.According to the psychologist\u2019s report, the three applicants had been able to understand the nature and meaning of actions directed towards them.","41.However, the first applicant\u2019s ability to object could have been diminished due to personality traits such as a difficulty in saying \u201cno\u201d and in objecting, especially to older persons, and the wish to avoid conflict situations and to maintain a friendly relationship with everyone. The third applicant\u2019s ability to resist could have been diminished by personality traits such as a difficulty in expressing her own opinion where it contradicted the expectations of others, in assessing her own attitude and feelings with regard to events, judging what is right and what is not, an insecurity in communication, and the wish to avoid conflict situations and to maintain a friendly relationship with everyone. With regard to the second applicant, the psychologist\u2019s report stated that she had been able to exhibit resistance appropriate to the situation.","42.The report noted that the events in issue had caused the first applicant unpleasant feelings, insecurity, and anger and had made her distrustful in her communication with other coaches and with older men. With regard to the second applicant the report stated that she had retained anger, and had felt offended and guilty. The third applicant had been in low spirits, unable to concentrate, tense, and unwilling to participate in extracurricular activities, but this had lessened over time. She had felt offended. She still retained shame, anger, unpleasant thoughts and memories about the coach\u2019s conduct.","43.The report concluded that the alleged conduct of the coach had not caused the applicants to suffer psychological trauma. Owing to their psychological condition, however, the applicants\u2019 participation in a trial or confrontation was not recommended.","(d)The coach, O.B.","44.On 27 January 2010 the police apprehended and questioned O.B. as a suspect.","45.According to O.B., girls had entered the sauna either wrapped in towels or wearing swimsuits. He had not entered the sauna with naked girls. They had exited the sauna dressed. O.B. would ask a particular child whether they required a massage. If the child responded in affirmative he would enter the sauna and massage the child with a besom.","46.In the sauna O.B. had massaged the first and third applicants at their request. He continued that during the massage they had been fully naked. No complaints however had been made. He had massaged by first lifting up one or both legs and massaging them and had then moved on to massage their arms. He had not touched the girls\u2019 intimate body parts. He had known that touching breasts during massage was unhealthy. He had not known how it had come about that girls had been in the sauna naked. He had not told them that they needed to attend the sauna in that way.","47.O.B. stated that in summer 2009 he had massaged the first applicant on her hip muscle. It had been hurting and she had asked him to massage it.","48.On 29 January 2010 the police released O.B. subject to his not changing his place of residence and complying with a prohibition on approaching the applicants or the sports school.","(e)Third applicant\u2019s mother","49.On 21 January 2010 the mother of the third applicant gave evidence. In September 2009 her daughter had told her that girls attended the sauna naked together with O.B., who himself had been dressed in shorts. She had also mentioned a trip to Lithuania during which O.B. had touched her leg and she had run into the bathroom.","(f)O.B.\u2019s students and their parents","50.Of the other students mentioned by the applicants, it appears that the police interviewed V.A. on 14 January 2010 and her mother on 19January 2010. Also, K.D.\u2019s statement was taken on 13August 2010 and her mother\u2019s had been taken on 1 February 2010.","51.In particular, V.A. stated that she did not like the sauna. She had attended it only twice. Girls had attended the sauna naked and O.B. had massaged them. She had had good relations with O.B. According to V.A.\u2019s mother, V.A. did not like the sauna in principle and it was unlikely that she had often attended it.","52.According to K.D.\u2019s account of events, she had trained with O.B. until 2008. He had been a good coach (the copy of K.D.\u2019s statement furnished to the Court by the Government in some parts was illegible). At a sports camp in summer 2005 her mother had gone into the sauna together with the girls. K.D. had told her that, as a sports doctor, O.B. would usually massage them. The mother had asked her: \u201c...but how, naked?\u201d Her daughter had replied that they would cover their bodies up with towels. Therefore the mother had understood that O.B. had not massaged them naked.","53.With regard to the other students referred to by the applicants, the police interviewed the mother of A.F. on 15 January 2010. The latter stated that her daughter had not paid any attention to attending the sauna naked as she had trained with O.B. from a young age. She had seen the other girls undressing for the sauna and had followed their example. A.F. had stated that the coach had not harassed them. In the view of A.F.\u2019s mother, O.B. should not have allowed the girls to attend the sauna undressed and should have informed the parents. She stated that she would allow A.F. to be questioned only on a prosecutor\u2019s authorisation.","54.On 25 January 2010, the police questioned D.B. \u2013 who had been referred to by the first and second applicants\u2019 mother \u2013 and D.B.\u2019s mother. D.B. had trained with O.B. between 2005 and 2008. From a copy of D.B.\u2019s statement furnished to the Court by the Government it appears that she stated:","\u201c... at the beginning [students] were going to the sauna in swimsuits, but [O.B.] said that [they] should not be shy and should attend the sauna without swimsuits in order for the body to relax fully. [D.B.] had started to take massages naked, as had the other girls.\u201d","D.B. had not found it inappropriate, because the coach had entered the sauna only in order to demonstrate how to massage using a besom. Neither D.B. nor her mother had any complaints to lodge against him.","55.Between January and August 2010 the police also took other statements.","56.It emerges that the police interviewed a parent of one of O.B.\u2019s students at the time of the investigation; specifically, on 3 February 2010 they questioned A.K., whose son, V.K., trained with O.B. He did not have any complaints concerning the coach and did not know any details about the situation in issue.","57.The police also questioned numerous former students of the coach. On 28 January 2010 J.R. gave evidence that she had been coached by O.B. until 2004. She described him positively. With regard to O.B.\u2019s massaging naked girls in the sauna, she believed that he had done it through ignorance or a lack of understanding about the situation. But at the same time, he had done it in order to prepare aspiring athletes. She did not believe that he had had a sexual purpose. Parents of O.B.\u2019s former students, J.P., J.A., and I.S.H., and also N.I. \u2013 who had herself trained with O.B. between 1991 and 1992 \u2013 described O.B. as a very good coach. I.S.H. had learnt from her son that boys had taken sauna massages wearing swimming trunks. Two other former students of O.B., A.D. \u2013 coached between 1994 and 2001 \u2013 and J.M., described O.B. as a very good coach.","(g)Other witnesses","58.On 1 February 2010 the doctor L.G. submitted evidence that the sauna was one of the most important renewal procedures after training. However, if a male was present in the sauna together with girls, it was recommended that they all wear swimwear.","3.Closure of the investigation","59.On 18 October 2010 the investigator, T.M., terminated the investigation.","60.In her decision T.M. cited the evidence collected. She concluded that the investigation had revealed that the sauna sessions had been voluntary. Girls had attended the sauna fully undressed, either on their own initiative or because that had been the practice by others. As explained by O.B., sauna sessions were healthy and necessary after training. He had massaged students at their request. During massages they had been undressed but O.B. had had no interest in the girls. He had merely assisted with the massages.","61.T.M. could not establish that O.B. had acted with a sexual purpose, an element required under section 162 of the Criminal Law (sexual abuse). For that reason and referring to the principle of in dubio pro reo T.M. closed the investigation against O.B. for the lack of elements of crime.","4.First-level prosecution review","(a)Appeal against closure of the investigation","62.On 29 October 2010 the applicants\u2019 parents appealed to the prosecutor\u2019s office against the termination decision. In November2010 they supplemented the appeal.","63.They claimed that the applicants\u2019 allegations had been ignored. The first applicant had indicated that O.B. had touched her intimate body parts; according to the second applicant, O.B. had ridiculed her in front of the other girls with regard to undressing in sauna; and the third applicant had recounted her experience in Lithuania. The allegation that O.B. had entered the changing rooms had not been addressed.","64.Contrary to the parents\u2019 request, the students who had travelled to Lithuania together with O.B. and the third applicant had not been questioned. The statements of children present in the sauna had not been taken.","65.The parents contended that their reference to a recognised trainer who maintained that sauna sessions harmed the health of athletes under the age of eighteen had been neglected. They named a witness in that regard and asked that a statement be taken from him. They also requested that the first applicant\u2019s current coach and the school psychologist be interviewed.","66.They furnished the report by the psychologist, K.V., to the effect that the first and second applicants had suffered psychological trauma. The appeal therefore sought the commissioning of another expert report.","(b)Appeal decision","67.On 1 December 2010 the prosecutor I.G. dismissed the appeal.","68.She reasoned that the applicants had been questioned thoroughly. Sixteen of O.B.\u2019s former students, and their parents had been interviewed, as had two further witnesses as regards the usefulness of sauna.","69.Endorsing the investigator\u2019s conclusion, I.G. stated that the investigation had not shown that O.B. had acted with a sexual purpose. All the witnesses had stated that O.B. had never touched students\u2019 naked body parts other than with a besom and when massaging parts causing pain. Accordingly, the elements of crime under section 162 of the Criminal Law (sexual abuse) were not present. Nor could the elements under section 174 of the Law (cruelty and violence against a minor) be identified. None of O.B.\u2019s students had stated that O.B. had treated his students in a cruel or violent way. The phrase he had used [with regard to the second applicant] had not reached that threshold.","70.I.G. dismissed the parents\u2019 requests that further evidence be collected. Likewise, the report of the psychologist, K.V. concerning the first and second applicants could not be included in the investigation file as it had already been closed.","5.Second-level prosecution review","(a)Appeal to a higher prosecutor","71.On 13 December 2010 the applicants\u2019 parents appealed against the aforementioned decision to a higher prosecutor. In January 2011 they supplemented the appeal.","72.They disputed the conclusion that the element of a sexual purpose had not been present. In particular, they noted that according to the first applicant O.B. had touched the lower part of her stomach, the area between her legs, and her breasts during massages. The second applicant had told of O.B. ridiculing her in front of the other girls regarding undressing for the sauna. The third applicant\u2019s account regarding the events in Lithuania had been ignored and other students who had been present on the trip to Lithuania had not been interviewed. No consideration had been given to the allegation of O.B. entering changing rooms and, as if by accident, touching girls\u2019 breasts.","73.The appeal referred to the report by the psychologist, K.V., stating that the first applicant exhibited symptoms associated with violence or serious psychological trauma.","(b)Higher prosecutor\u2019s decision","74.On 14 January 2011 the higher prosecutor, E.B., dismissed the appeal.","75.He endorsed the findings of the lower prosecutor, including the view that O.B. had regarded sauna sessions as beneficial to athletes\u2019 health and had offered them to his students for this reason. Attendance of the sauna had been voluntary. Students had been naked because that had been the practice of the other students. Sometimes O.B. had entered the sauna but in order to perform massages only.","76.With regard to the episode in Lithuania, E.B. deemed that the third applicant\u2019s allegation had not in itself revealed that a crime had been committed and statements from students present were therefore unnecessary. The investigation had been thorough and no further investigative actions were required.","6.Highest-level prosecution review","(a)Appeal to chief prosecutor","77.On 26 January 2011 the applicants\u2019 parents lodged an appeal against the aforementioned decision to the chief prosecutor, V.O.","78.They maintained their previous requests and arguments, including the contention that the girls had attended the sauna naked because O.B., using his coach\u2019s authority, had convinced them that wearing swimsuits was harmful to health. Initially all the applicants had been wearing swimsuits but the other girls had told them that O.B. had insisted on their being undressed.","79.No regard therefore had been given to the claim that the first and third applicants had undressed due to pressure from O.B.","80.That aspect and the reasons which had led children to undress for the sauna had not been investigated. Even though the testimonies of other parents stated that their children had also attended the sauna naked, these children had not been interviewed.","81.Furthermore, according to boys coached by O.B. they had not been asked to attend the sauna undressed, which, in the parents\u2019 submission, signalled that O.B. had been interested in naked girls. None of the other coaches at the sports school had massaged their students in the sauna, especially not naked. Moreover, O.B. had been in the habit of entering the sauna without the applicants\u2019 permission.","82.The parents further argued that the lower prosecutor had referred to the allegation that during a massage O.B. had touched the first applicant between her legs without specifying further detail, even though the first applicant had specifically stated that the coach had touched her intimate body parts. The first applicant had spoken about it to the psychologist, who had affirmed that she had been speaking the truth.","(b)Final appeal decision","83.On 28 February 2011 the chief prosecutor, V.O., dismissed the appeal and affirmed the closure of investigation.","84.V.O. endorsed the lower prosecutor\u2019s findings. With regard to the parents\u2019 request for the hearing of further witnesses, V.O. stated as follows:","\u201c[A]fter having assessed [the applicants\u2019] testimonies in that part, no grounds exist to conclude that a crime has been committed. Moreover, in these testimonies [the applicants] gave no evidence on the circumstances mentioned in the appeal in question.\u201d","85.No appeal lay against the aforementioned decision.","B.Attempts to reopen the investigation","86.On 17 June 2011 the mother of the first and second applicants, arguing that the report by the psychologist, K.V., constituted newly discovered facts, asked the State police to reopen the investigation. She stated that K.V. had concluded that the first applicant had suffered psychological trauma.","87.By a final decision of 1 September 2011 that request was dismissed.","88.On 22 November 2011 the mother of the third applicant, arguing that the report of the psychologist, K.V., constituted newly discovered facts, asked the police to reopen the investigation. According to K.V.\u2019s report, the third applicant exhibited possible post-traumatic stress symptoms.","89.By a final decision of 6 February 2012 that request was dismissed.","C.Civil proceedings","1.First instance proceedings","90.In the meantime, on 20 April 2011 a compensation claim against O.B. was lodged on behalf of the applicants before the Riga City Vidzeme District Court (R\u012bgas pils\u0113tas Vidzemes priek\u0161pils\u0113tas tiesa).","91.Relying on Article 92 of the Constitution (Satversme) (right to compensation) and section 1635 of the Civil Law (Civillikums) (right to compensation), it was requested that O.B. pay compensation of 3,000Latvian lati (LVL) (roughly corresponding to 4,286 euros (EUR)) with regard to the first and the third applicants and LVL1,000 (roughly corresponding to EUR 1,428) with regard to the second applicant.","92.On 30 October 2013 the District Court delivered its judgment.","93.According to the District Court, it was not disputed that the first and third applicants had started to train with O.B. in June 2009 and the second applicant in August 2009 (sic). The first and second applicants had trained with him until September 2009 and the third applicant until November2009.","94.It was established that O.B. had recommended sauna sessions to his students. It was not, however, established that O.B. had psychologically influenced the applicants with regard to attending the sauna. At the same time, the District Court continued, it was not proved that the sauna sessions had been necessary in order to achieve good results in sports without harming health. They had not been included in the training programme. It was not proved that either the applicants or their parents had consented to the coach\u2019s presence in the sauna together with naked girls. The applicants had been minors and therefore unable to fully understand or assess the situation. They had trusted and obeyed a person of the age of majority and could not have fully protected themselves against interference with their privacy.","95.According to generally accepted ethical norms, it was not a tradition in the society of the region to appear naked \u2013 even in the sauna \u2013 in front of the opposite sex. Massaging naked girls with a besom had been unethical and in contravention of general moral principles, as had been the suggestion to a girl under the age of eighteen to sleep with the coach in the same bed. The District Court found that these actions on part of O.B. had violated the applicants\u2019 right to privacy.","96.Noting, inter alia, that none of the applicants had been caused grievous or irreversible consequences, the District Court ordered that O.B. pay LVL 300 (roughly corresponding to EUR 428) each to the first and third applicants and LVL 100 (roughly corresponding to EUR 143) to the second applicant.","2.Appeal proceedings","97.As submitted by the Government and not disputed by the applicants, on 2 December 2013 O.B. lodged an appeal against the aforementioned judgment before the Riga Regional Court (R\u012bgas apgabaltiesa). No appeal, however, was lodged by the applicants.","98.On 12 March 2014 O.B. withdrew his appeal. On 19 March 2014 the appeal proceedings were discontinued and the judgment of the District Court became final on 1 April 2014.","A.The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989","110.The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989, has binding force under international law on the States parties, including all member States of the Council of Europe (see S\u00f6derman v. Sweden [GC], no.5786\/08, \u00a7 51, ECHR 2013). Latvia acceded to this convention on 14April 1992. The relevant Articles read:","Article 19","\u201c1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.","2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement.\u201d","Article 34","\u201cStates Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent:","(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;","(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices;","(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.\u201d","111.As interpreted by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment No. 13 (2011):","\u201c4.Definition of violence. For the purposes of the present general comment, \u2018violence\u2019 is understood to mean \u2018all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse\u2019 as listed in article 19, paragraph 1, of the Convention ... In common parlance the term violence is often understood to mean only physical harm and\/or intentional harm. However, the Committee emphasizes most strongly that the choice of the term violence in the present general comment must not be interpreted in any way to minimize the impact of, and need to address, non-physical and\/or non-intentional forms of harm (such as, inter alia, neglect and psychological maltreatment).","...","25.Sexual abuse and exploitation. Sexual abuse and exploitation includes:","(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful or psychologically harmful sexual activity; (Sexual abuse comprises any sexual activities imposed by an adult on a child, against which the child is entitled to protection by criminal law...)","...","(d) ... Many children experience sexual victimization which is not accompanied by physical force or restraint but which is nonetheless psychologically intrusive, exploitive and traumatic.","...","51.Investigation. Investigation of instances of violence, whether reported by the child, a representative or an external party, must be undertaken by qualified professionals who have received role-specific and comprehensive training, and require a child rights-based and child-sensitive approach. Rigorous but child-sensitive investigation procedures will help to ensure that violence is correctly identified and help provide evidence for administrative, civil, child-protection and criminal proceedings. Extreme care must be taken to avoid subjecting the child to further harm through the process of the investigation. Towards this end, all parties are obliged to invite and give due weight to the child\u2019s views.","...","61. Article 3 (best interests of the child). The Committee emphasizes that the interpretation of a child\u2019s best interests must be consistent with the whole Convention, including the obligation to protect children from all forms of violence. It cannot be used to justify practices, including corporal punishment and other forms of cruel or degrading punishment, which conflict with the child\u2019s human dignity and right to physical integrity. An adult\u2019s judgment of a child\u2019s best interests cannot override the obligation to respect all the child\u2019s rights under the Convention...","...\u201d","B.The Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse","112.This convention obliges its parties to take the necessary legislative or other measures to prevent all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children and to criminalise certain intentional conduct. The convention was ratified by Latvia on 18 August 2014 and entered into force with respect to it on 1 December 2014. The relevant parts read as follows:","Chapter VI \u2013 Substantive criminal lawArticle 18 \u2013 Sexual abuse","\u201c1 Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conduct is criminalised:","a engaging in sexual activities with a child who, according to the relevant provisions of national law, has not reached the legal age for sexual activities;","b engaging in sexual activities with a child where:","- use is made of coercion, force or threats; or","- abuse is made of a recognised position of trust, authority or influence over the child, including within the family; or","- abuse is made of a particularly vulnerable situation of the child, notably because of a mental or physical disability or a situation of dependence.","2 For the purpose of paragraph 1 above, each Party shall decide the age below which it is prohibited to engage in sexual activities with a child.","3 The provisions of paragraph 1.a are not intended to govern consensual sexual activities between minors.\u201d","Article 24 \u2013 Aiding or abetting and attempt","\u201c...","2 Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally, attempts to commit the offences established in accordance with this Convention.","3 Each Party may reserve the right not to apply, in whole or in part, paragraph 2 to offences established in accordance with Article 20, paragraph 1.b, d, e and f, Article21, paragraph 1.c, Article 22 and Article 23.\u201d","Article 25 \u2013 Jurisdiction","\u201c1 Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to establish jurisdiction over any offence established in accordance with this Convention, when the offence is committed:","a in its territory; ...","...\u201d","Chapter VII \u2013 Investigation, prosecution and procedural lawArticle 30 \u2013 Principles","\u201c1 Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and criminal proceedings are carried out in the best interests and respecting the rights of the child.","...","3 Each Party shall ensure that the investigations and criminal proceedings are treated as priority and carried out without any unjustified delay.","...","5 Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures, in conformity with the fundamental principles of its internal law:","\u2013 to ensure an effective investigation and prosecution of offences established in accordance with this Convention, allowing, where appropriate, for the possibility of covert operations;","...\u201d","Article 31 \u2013 General measures of protection","\u201c1 Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect the rights and interests of victims, including their special needs as witnesses, at all stages of investigations and criminal proceedings, in particular by:","...","c enabling them, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of internal law, to be heard, to supply evidence and to choose the means of having their views, needs and concerns presented, directly or through an intermediary, and considered;","...\u201d","Article 34 \u2013 Investigations","\u201c1 Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that persons, units or services in charge of investigations are specialised in the field of combating sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children or that persons are trained for this purpose. Such units or services shall have adequate financial resources.","...\u201d","Article 35 \u2013 Interviews with the child","\u201c1 Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that:","a interviews with the child take place without unjustified delay after the facts have been reported to the competent authorities;","...\u201d","113.In the Explanatory Report to the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, the following relevant comments are given to Chapter VI, \u201cSubstantive criminal law\u201d, of that convention:","\u201c112. Articles 18 to 23 are concerned with making certain acts criminal offences...","113. The offences referred to in these articles represent a minimum consensus which does not preclude supplementing them or establishing higher standards in domestic law.","...\u201d","Article 18 \u2013 Sexual abuse","\u201c117. Article 18 sets out the offence of sexual abuse of a child. This offence has to be committed intentionally for there to be criminal liability. The interpretation of the word \u2018intentionally\u2019 is left to domestic law, but the requirement for intentional conduct relates to all the elements of the offence.","...","127. The term \u2018sexual activities\u2019 is not defined by the Convention. The negotiators preferred to leave to Parties the definition of the meaning and scope of this term.","...\u201d"],"28093":["6.The applicants were born in 1978 and 1986 respectively and live in Bucharest and Curtea de Arge\u015f respectively.","A.The incidents as described by the applicants","7.On 3 June 2006 the applicants participated in the annual gay march in Bucharest. It was organised by ACCEPT, a non-governmental organisation whose goal is to provide information and to assist the LGBTI community. The march was given police protection. Several individuals who had actively expressed their disapproval over the gay march were stopped by the police, their pictures taken and their identity papers checked and noted.","8.At around 7 pm, at the end of the march, the applicants and four other participants left the area using the routes and means of transport recommended by the authorities in the guidelines prepared by the organisers for march participants. As recommended in the same leaflet, they wore no distinctive clothing or badges that would identify them as having participated in the march.","9.After boarding a metro train, they were attacked by a group of sixyoung men and a woman wearing hooded sweatshirts. The attackers approached the victims directly and started punching them and kicking their heads and faces. They also swung from the metal bars above their heads, kicking their victims. During the attack they kept on shouting: \u201cYou poofs go to the Netherlands!\u201d (Poponarilor, duce\u0163i-v\u0103 \u00een Olanda!)","10.The victims were pushed into a corner of the carriage. One of them tried to protect the others with his body, but the second applicant remained exposed and suffered several blows.","11.The attack lasted for about two minutes. On their way out of the carriage, the attackers punched the first applicant again in the face.","12.The other passengers withdrew to the opposite side of the carriage during the attack. Among them was a photographer, Z.E., who had also been at the march. The victims asked him to take pictures of the incident, which he did. As a consequence, the attackers hit him as well.","B.The medical examinations","13.The same evening, accompanied by a representative of ACCEPT, the victims went to the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute and to Bagdasar Emergency Hospital for medical consultations.","14.The forensic medical certificate stated that the first applicant had bruises which could have been produced by blows from a hard object; they did not require \u201cdays of medical care\u201d.","15.The second applicant was diagnosed with multiple contusions (related to the incidents), minor cranio-cerebral trauma, contusion on the left shoulder and the left side of his face, and bruises. No bone damage was found. The forensic medical certificate concluded that the applicant needed one to two days of medical care.","C.The criminal investigation","16.Later that night of 3 to 4 June 2006 the victims, including the applicants, and a representative of ACCEPT went to Bucharest Police Station no. 25. They filed a criminal complaint against the attackers and stated that the assault was based on the victims\u2019 sexual orientation. They reiterated not having worn any visible signs that could have given away the fact that they were returning from the gay march. They argued that the attackers had identified them at the march (as they had not worn masks) and followed them afterwards, with the intention of harming them. They informed the police about the offensive remarks made during the attack.","17.According to the applicants, the police agents were surprised when they realised that the applicants and the other victims, although gay, were affluent individuals with regular jobs and positions of responsibility. They tried to dissuade them from pursuing their complaint, warning them that they would have to confront their aggressors in court.","18.On 5 June 2006 the applicants\u2019 representative submitted to the police several pictures of the attack taken by Z.E. In some of the pictures the attackers\u2019 faces were visible, as their hoods were down. The photographer gave statements and was able to identify one of the perpetrators.","19.The first applicant was also shown pictures taken by the police during the march. She was able to identify two of the individuals from their photos. The police had the suspects\u2019 names and addresses on record.","20.The victims gave statements to the police.","21.On 8 June 2006 the police received copies of fifteen police reports drawn up on the day of the march concerning administrative fines imposed on counter-demonstrators.","22.Due to a reorganisation within the police force, the case file was moved from one police station to another, and on 4 April 2007 it was registered at the Metro Police Station.","23.As it appeared that nothing was happening in the case, the applicants sought information on the progress of the investigation by means of letters sent by ACCEPT on 25 September 2006, 28March 2007 and 20 July 2011. On 19March 2007 they also complained to the Ministry of Internal Affairs about the lack of an effective investigation in the case, but to no avail.","24.On 27 April 2007 they were informed that, following the reorganisation within the police force, their file had finally been logged by the Metro Police Station. The letter also informed the applicants that the investigation was ongoing and steps were being taken to identify the culprits.","25.On the same day, the police submitted a request to the Romanian Intelligence Service (the \u201cSRI\u201d) to confirm whether R.S.A. \u2013 an intelligence officer who had been identified among the attackers \u2013 had been on an official mission that night. On 24 May 2007 the Intelligence Service asked for clarification concerning the nature of the request. It was not until September 2007 that the police were able to obtain a statement from R.S.A., who declared that he had been off duty that day and offered information on one other person in the group of attackers. The actions undertaken by the police to identify the other individuals remained without success.","26.The Metro Police received, on 12 June 2007, a list of forty five names and identification numbers of persons who had been fined by the police during the gay march.","27.As one of the suspects was believed to be a Steaua football club supporter, the investigators attended twenty-nine football matches between 16September 2007 and 13 December 2009 in an attempt to identify him. On 12 February, 14 May, 4 August and 7 December 2010 and 10 March 2011 the investigators tried to identify the suspects at metro stations. On eight occasions between 12 June 2007 and 6 July 2011, the investigators successfully asked the prosecutor to extend the deadline for completing the investigation.","28.On 10 June 2011 the police stated their view that the investigation should come to an end and asked the prosecutor\u2019s office not to institute criminal proceedings in the case. The police gave the following explanation for their request:","\u201c... the investigation was rendered difficult by the fact that the file arrived at the Metro Police Station ... almost one year after the incidents, and the police agents ... who had been in charge of the case until September 2006 could not continue the investigation as the Intelligence Service had refused to cooperate and allow their agent \u2012 who was the only identified eye-witness to the events \u2012 to be interviewed; it is to be noted that the police lost their motivation to use the information for the purposes of finding the truth in this case, of identifying and bringing to justice those responsible. In addition, to a certain extent the victims lost their interest in how their complaint was being dealt with (they did not ... adduce the medical certificates ... which had been obtained at the request of the police ... on 27October 2009 when it was noted that none of the victims had needed more than two days of medical care). It is observed that all the evidence-gathering methods for this type of crime have been exhausted and, given the lapse of time from the date when the complaints were lodged, the validity and relevance of the evidence gathered ... [have decreased], leaving the investigation into the identity of the culprits without an outcome. At the same time, it is observed that ... the criminal acts had become time-barred, removing criminal responsibility from the culprits.","29.On 9 August 2011, in response to a request from the applicants for information, the Metro Police informed them that their intention was to not institute a criminal prosecution (ne\u00eenceperea urm\u0103ririi penale) as the alleged crimes had become statute-barred (s-a \u00eemplinit prescrip\u0163ia special\u0103). The police explained that the investigation had been rendered more difficult by the fact that the file had not arrived at the Metro Police office until a year after the events. Moreover, all the actions undertaken by police in order to identify the alleged culprits had failed.","30.On 4 October 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bucharest District Court of the Fourth Precinct endorsed the police proposal and decided to terminate the investigation. The decision was sent to the first applicant\u2019s home on 27 February 2012.","31.On 19 March 2012 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor\u2011in\u2011Chief against the decision of 4 October 2011. They argued that the prosecutor should have investigated the more serious crime of organising a criminal group (asocierea pentru sav\u00e2r\u015firea de infrac\u0163iuni), which had not yet become time-barred. They also complained that the investigators had failed to pursue their allegation that the attack had been motivated by their sexual orientation.","The prosecutor-in-chief dismissed their objections on 18 June 2012.","32.The applicants reiterated their objections against both the decisions delivered by the prosecutors in two separate complaints lodged with the Bucharest District Court.","33.On 9 August 2012 the District Court dismissed the complaint lodged by the applicants against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 4 October 2011. The court made the following observation:","\u201cIt is true that the authorities were apparently not sufficiently diligent in carrying out within a reasonable time an effective investigation capable of identifying and punishing those responsible for the criminal acts (the long periods of police inactivity, the transfer of files, the lack of cooperation from some authorities are all duly noted). On the other hand, this situation \u2013 although not imputable to the [applicants] \u2013 cannot prevent the application of the statute of limitation of criminal responsibility.\u201d","34.On 12 November 2012 the District Court dismissed the complaint lodged against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 18 June 2012 as a mere reiteration of that already dealt with by the court in its decision of 9 August 2012.","35.Throughout the proceedings the applicants repeatedly sought access to the prosecution file. It was partially granted on 9 May 2012 and the applicants gained full access to the file once their objections had been lodged with the courts."],"28096":["6.The applicant, who is of Roma origin, was born in 1988 and lives in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata, a village of 2,800 people, about 450 of whom are of Roma origin.","7.On 6 March 2011 the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarorsz\u00e1g\u00e9rt Mozgalom), a right-wing political party, held a demonstration in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata. Between 1 and 16 March 2011, in connection with the demonstration, the Civil Guard Association for a Better Future (Szebb J\u00f6v\u0151\u00e9rt Polg\u00e1r\u0151r Egyes\u00fclet) and two right-wing paramilitary groups (Bety\u00e1rsereg and V\u00e9der\u0151) organised marches in the Roma neighbourhood of the village.","8.On 6, 9, and 10 March 2011, during the demonstration and the marches, there was a considerable police presence in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata.","9.At around 11 a.m. on 10 March 2011 Mr J.F., the president of the local Roma minority self-governing body, informed the police that he and the mayor of the municipality had been threatened by people they did not know. The mayor reported on the same events to the police, explaining that earlier that day some fifty members of the Roma minority had confronted approximately fifteen members of the Civil Guard Association, who were joined by four or five unknown persons, one of whom had an axe and another a whip.","10.As it appears from the case file, at around the same time four men passed by the applicant\u2019s house, yelling \u201cGo inside, you damned dirty gypsies!\u201d At this time the applicant was outside the house in her garden together with her daughter and some acquaintances. In response to the four men, the applicant and her acquaintances told them to leave, saying that it was their village. One of the men continued threatening them by yelling that he would build a house in the Roma neighbourhood \u201cout of their blood\u201d. He stepped towards the fence swinging an axe towards the applicant, but was held back by one of his companions.","11.At around 2 p.m. on the same day police officers K.K. and A.B. stopped and searched four individuals, Mr S.T., Mr F.W., Mr Cs.F., and MrG.M. The mayor of Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata identified two of them, Mr S.T. and Mr F.W., as having participated in the incident that morning. The men were members of Bety\u00e1rsereg. Mr S.T. informed the police that he was the leader of one of the \u201cclans\u201d within the organisation. He said that because some members of his group, about 200 people, intended to come to Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata \u201cto put the Roma situation in order\u201d, he was there to \u201cscout\u201d the village. Later the same day, Mr S.T., who by then was extremely drunk, was again spotted by the police being dragged away from the Roma settlement by a female acquaintance. When questioned by the police, he said he only wanted to play football with the Roma children.","12.On 7 April 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against \u201cunknown perpetrators\u201d with the Heves County Regional Police Department, alleging offences of violence against a member of an ethnic group, harassment and attempted grievous bodily assault. The police opened an investigation on charges of violent harassment under section 176\/A (2) of the Criminal Code.","13.In parallel, the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office opened an investigation on suspicion of harassment based on the report of a third person, MrJ.F., the president of the local Roma minority self-governing body.","14.On 12 April 2011 the applicant was heard as a witness concerning the events. She testified that three men and a woman had passed by her house and one of them, brandishing a whip, had threatened to build a house out of her blood.","15.At the request of her lawyer, the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department informed the applicant that criminal proceedings had been instituted on charges of harassment on the basis of the criminal complaint lodged by MrJ.F. Subsequently, the applicant was informed that her complaint had been joined to that of Mr J.F.","16.On 14 July 2011 the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department discontinued these proceedings on the grounds that harassment was punishable only if directed against a well-defined person, and that criminal liability could not be established on the basis of threats uttered \u201cin general\u201d.","17.The police also instituted minor offence proceedings on the ground that the impugned conduct was \u201cantisocial\u201d.","18.On 14 September 2011 a hearing was held in the ensuing minor offence proceedings in which MrS.T. and five other persons, Mr C.S.F., MrF.W., Mr G.M., Mrs A.B.I., and MrI.N.I. appeared before the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Court on charges of disorderly conduct.","All six persons subject to the proceedings denied having threatened any members of the Roma community.","Mr J.F., questioned as a witness, maintained that two of the persons subject to the proceedings had been wielding an axe and a whip and had threatened the inhabitants of the Roma settlement that they would kill them and paint the houses with their blood.","Mr L.T., the mayor of Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata, identified one of the persons as having been present in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata on 10 March 2011, but could not confirm that the threats had been directed at the Roma.","Another witness, P.F., identified three of the persons as having participated in the incident and maintained that it was Mr I.N.I. who had threatened the inhabitants of the Roma settlement.","The applicant, who was also heard as a witness, identified Mr S.T. and MrF.W. as having been armed and Mr S.T. as having said that he would \u201cpaint the houses with [the applicant\u2019s] blood.\u201d","19.On an unspecified date the applicant attached to the criminal file extracts from comments posted on a right-wing Internet portal in which MrS.T. had been referred to as the man who had \u201cenforced order among the Roma of Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata with a single whip\u201d.","20.At a further court hearing on 5 October 2011 the applicant\u2019s legal representative requested that the minor offence proceedings be stayed because criminal proceedings against unknown perpetrators were pending.","21.On 7 October 2011, following a complaint that procedural errors had been committed by the Heves County Regional Police Department in the investigation of Mr J.F.\u2019s complaint, the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant that it had opened a separate investigation into the allegations of harassment on the basis of the applicant\u2019s complaint.","22.On 20October 2011, in the criminal proceedings on charges of harassment, the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Prosecutor\u2019s Office to open an investigation into \u201cviolence against a member of an ethnic group\u201d under article 174\/B (1) of the Criminal Code. He maintained that the motive of the threats uttered against the applicant was her Roma origin. His allegation was supported by the fact that at the material time various paramilitary groups were \u201cinspecting\u201d the Roma settlement with the aim of \u201chindering Gypsy criminality\u201d.","23.On 3 November 2011 the prosecutor\u2019s office refused the request, finding that the use of force, the objective element of the criminal offence of \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d under article 174\/B (1) of the Criminal Code as in force at the material time could not be established at that stage of the proceedings.","On 28 November 2011 the applicant reiterated her request, apparently without success.","24.The identities of the persons who had passed by the applicant\u2019s house and that of the alleged perpetrator, Mr S.T., were established by the investigating authorities. Moreover, the Police Department questioned a number of witnesses, including the applicant\u2019s acquaintances present during the incident, but only two of them provided statements relevant for the case. MrS.T. refused to testify.","25.On 2 February 2012 the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department discontinued the investigation into harassment on the grounds that none of the witnesses heard had substantiated the applicant\u2019s allegation that she had been threatened. The Police Department noted that Mr S.T. had refused to testify and the witness testimony of Mrs I.B. had confirmed only that threats had been made, but not that they had been directed against a certain person.","26.The applicant challenged that decision, arguing that the witness testimonies had clearly stated that Mr S.T. had uttered degrading threats and that from the circumstances of the case it was clear that they had been directed against her. She also submitted that the investigating authorities had failed to hear Mr S.T. and two other individuals suspected of the offences.","27.On 21 March 2012 the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office upheld the first-instance decision. The Prosecutor\u2019s Office found that it could not be established on the basis of the witness testimonies whether MrS.T. had been armed and whether the threats and insults he had uttered had been directed at the applicant. Thus neither the criminal offence of harassment, nor \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d could be established.","This decision was served on the applicant on 2 April 2012, informing the applicant of the possibility to pursue substitute private prosecution proceedings.","28.On 1 June 2012 the applicant, acting as substitute private prosecutor, lodged an application with the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s District Court, which was declared admissible on 13 June 2012.","29.On 6 November 2012 the criminal proceedings were discontinued since the applicant had withdrawn the charges, in her submission, because of for fear of reprisals."],"28107":["1. The applicant, Ms Ma\u0142gorzata Stefaniak, is a Polish national who was born in 1964 and lives in Koszalin. She is represented before the Court by Mr A. Bodnar and Ms I. Pacho, lawyers working for the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in Warsaw. In 2015 Mr A. Bodnar was appointed to the post of Ombudsman and no longer represents the applicant.","2. The Polish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","1. Hearing aid","4. Since 2003 the applicant has been serving various prison sentences. The end of her current sentence falls in 2030.","5. The Government maintained that during her imprisonment in various prisons the applicant had been given constant medical care. The applicant had been treated for various illnesses and had received specialist treatment, specifically gynaecological, dental and psychiatric care.","6. The applicant submitted that the medical attention she had received had not been adequate. For instance she had refused a gallbladder removal as the prison hospital had offered her only standard surgery, not a laparoscopic operation. She had also reported problems with her spine and was undergoing constant psychiatric treatment.","7. On 1 September 2010 the applicant consulted a laryngologist who, for the first time, diagnosed a hearing impairment and recommended the use of a hearing aid. On 28 September 2010 an audiogram was carried out, on the basis of which a doctor confirmed, on 30 September 2010, that the applicant was suffering from hearing loss.","8. Her first request to be provided with a hearing aid had been dismissed by the prison authorities in December 2010 as it had not been absolutely necessary in her condition. In particular, the prison authorities did not find it established that her hearing impairment had been such as to cause her difficulties in her everyday life in prison.","9. On 31 January 2011, while detained in the Bydgoszcz prison, the applicant made a new request for a hearing aid. On 21 February 2011 the director of the prison hospital at the Bydgoszcz prison informed her that it had not been possible for the authorities to fund a device.","10. On 7 April 2011 the Koszalin medical prison service issued a certificate referring to the audiogram of 28 September 2010 and to the consultation with the laryngologist. The doctor stated that the applicant was suffering from a hearing impairment and recommended the use of a hearing aid, paid for either by the applicant or by the prison medical services.","11. On 31 August 2011 a doctor from a private practice issued a certificate on the basis of the audiogram of 28 September 2010 without examining the applicant. She certified a 60% hearing loss, justifying the need for a hearing aid.","12. On 8 September 2011 a second audiogram was carried out. The applicant was of the view that it proved deterioration of her hearing but the Government submitted that her condition had remained the same.","13. During that period the applicant underwent a re-education program to ease her spinal condition and various basic and more specialised medical examinations. Those included scans or X-rays of the spine, abdomen, breasts, and chest, as well as further audiograms.","14. The applicant submitted that she had requested a hearing aid on numerous subsequent occasions, but to no avail. The prison authorities referred to lack of funds.","15. On 15 April 2013 the applicant received a medical certificate confirming her various medical conditions, referring in particular to her spine, ovaries, kidneys and hearing. The certificate concluded that the applicant should continue receiving re-education treatment for her spine and recommended fitting her with a hearing aid.","16. On 14 March 2014 the applicant was transferred to the Chojnice Remand Centre. On 16 June 2014 she consulted a specialist doctor who recommended that the applicant be provided with a hearing aid.","17. On 23 July 2014 the authorities provided the applicant with a hearing aid. The entire cost of 877 Polish zlotys (PLN) was covered by the Chojnice Remand Centre.","18. On 31 November 2014 the director of the Chojnice Remand Centre explained in a letter that its limited financial resources had not allowed the purchase a different model of hearing aid, as requested by the applicant. The model given to her was of a type also used by other detainees, who had never complained about it. The Director referred to the provisions of domestic law, which allow the authorities to partly or entirely cover the cost of medical equipment such as hearing aids.","2. Leave from prison","19. During her detention the applicant frequently requested leave from prison for various purposes. She was granted leave in 2004 and 2008 for medical purposes.","20. On 19 April 2011 the Penitentiary Division of the Koszalin Regional Court dismissed the applicant \u2019 s request for temporary leave on health grounds. The court found that the applicant had obtained prison leave in 2008 for the purpose of having an operation. During the leave she had committed further offences and had undergone surgery on the very last day of her leave. She had also failed to return from the leave on time. The court sought a medical expert opinion which stated that the applicant could be treated in prison for her spinal condition. The court concluded that the applicant \u2019 s medical condition was not incompatible with detention and that she was receiving appropriate medical care from the prison health services. On 20 July 2011 the Szczecin Court of Appeal upheld the decision and refused her leave from prison.","21. In September 2011 the applicant again applied for leave from prison in order to take up employment. The penitentiary courts refused the application on 31 January 2012. The Government submitted that the medical opinion prepared in this set of proceedings had demonstrated a generally good state of health and the fact that she had been continuously receiving medical attention in prison.","3. Prison conditions","22. The applicant complained to the prison authorities on many occasions about the conditions of her detention, in particular the allegedly inadequate treatment of her chronic back pain. On each occasion the complaints were dismissed by the authorities as manifestly ill-founded.","23. The applicant lodged civil claims for compensation against some prisons by way of complaint about the prevailing conditions, for instance the type of cells to which she was assigned, the attitude of the prison guards towards her, etc. There is no evidence that any of those claims referred to the delay before the authorities provided her with a hearing aid.","B. Relevant domestic law","24. The provisions pertaining to medical care in detention facilities, and the relevant domestic law and practice are set out in the Court \u2019 s judgments in the cases of S\u0142awomir Musia\u0142 v. Poland (no. 28300\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 48-61, 20 January 2009); Kaprykowski v. Poland (no. 23052\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 36-39, 3 February 2009); and the decision in Ostrowski v Poland (dec.), no. 26945\/07, 1 September 2015."],"28119":["1. The case originated in two applications (nos. 39496\/14 and 39727\/14) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by Ms Ye. V. Gribanova, on 27 May 2014, on behalf of two Uzbek nationals, N. and M.","2. Ms Gribanova did not provide any written authority to act on behalf of N. and M.","3. N. and M. were born in 1972 and 1975 respectively and prior to their alleged disappearance lived in Kaliningrad.","4. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.","5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","A. Background of N. and M. and their arrival in Russia","6. Prior to 2008 N. lived in Uzbekistan. In December 2008 he left Uzbekistan for Russia, and settled in Kaliningrad.","7. Prior to 2009 M. lived in Uzbekistan. In November 2009 he left Uzbekistan for Russia and settled in Kaliningrad.","8. Both N. and M. are practising Muslims.","B. Criminal proceedings against N. and M. in Uzbekistan and extradition proceedings in Russia","9. In 2010 the Uzbek authorities charged N. and M. in absentia with being members of banned religious organisations, issued international warrants for their arrest, and ordered that they be placed in detention once arrested. During those criminal proceedings, on two occasions (in December 2008 and August 2010) the Uzbek authorities questioned N. \u2019 s relatives about his whereabouts.","10. In 2011 and 2012 the Russian police arrested N. and M. in Kaliningrad under an international warrant. The Kaliningrad Tsentralnyy District prosecutor \u2019 s office ordered their detention pending extradition. This was subsequently extended by the Kaliningrad Tsentralnyy District Court.","11. N. and M. retained Ms Gribanova to represent them in the extradition proceedings. She applied to the Prosecutor General \u2019 s Office of Russia (\u201cthe GPO\u201d) with a request for their extradition to Uzbekistan to be refused.","12. The GPO refused to extradite N. and M. on the grounds that the acts imputed to them by the Uzbek authorities were not regarded as criminal under Russian law.","13. On 13 March and 12 July 2012 respectively the Kaliningrad regional prosecutor ordered N. and M. \u2019 s release. The Government submitted that since their release N. and M. had not informed the relevant authorities of their place of residence on the territory of the Russian Federation.","14. In April 2012 N. and M. addressed the following statements to Ms Gribanova:","Statement by N.:","\u201cIn the event I give any written or oral submissions to the mass media to the effect that I have voluntarily decided to return to Uzbekistan, this should be regarded as a forced return to the Republic of Uzbekistan.\u201d","Statement by M.:","\u201cIn the event I give any written or oral submissions to the mass media to the effect that I have voluntarily decided to return to Uzbekistan, this should be regarded as a statement made under pressure and my return to my country of origin, Uzbekistan, should be regarded as a forced return.\u201d","15. In March 2012 and May 2013 respectively N. and M. \u2019 s names were removed from the international wanted list following the prosecutor \u2019 s decision not to extradite them to Uzbekistan.","C. Applications for refugee status and temporary asylum","16. N. and M. applied for refugee status and temporary asylum in Russia. They lodged their applications with the Kaliningrad regional branch of the Russian Federal Migration Service (\u201cthe FMS\u201d). They submitted that they had been persecuted in Uzbekistan on the basis of their religious beliefs, and would be subjected to ill-treatment if they returned. They indicated that Ms Gribanova was their point of contact.","17. In July 2012 and April 2013 respectively the FMS dismissed their requests for refugee status. In 2013 the Russian courts upheld those decisions. M. was represented in the proceedings by Ms Ye. Ryabinina, a lawyer practising in Moscow.","18. In October 2013 and April 2014 respectively the FMS dismissed their applications for temporary asylum. They lodged appeals against those decisions. The outcome of those proceedings is unknown.","D. Administrative proceedings against N.","19. On 11 February 2014 N. was arrested for violating residence regulations for foreign nationals. On 13 February 2014 the court refused to expel him and terminated the administrative proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. N. was represented by Ms Gribanova in those proceedings.","E. Alleged disappearance of N. and M.","20. On 22 May 2014 N. was summoned to the FMS and questioned about his place of residence. After being questioned he telephoned Ms Gribanova. According to her, he seemed very scared.","21. According to Ms Gribanova, on 23 May 2014 N. received a call from the Uzbek security service, which insisted that he return to Uzbekistan.","22. On the morning of 26 May 2014 N. was again summoned to the FMS and was asked to bring copies of all the appeals he had lodged with the FMS and the courts in connection with the asylum proceedings. Ms Gribanova stated that he seemed scared, and asked her to attend in his place.","23. At 8 p.m. on 26 May 2014 N. telephoned Ms Gribanova to ask for help. He said that unknown persons had forced him into a car and taken him to the airport. Immediately after this call his mobile telephone was switched off.","24. That evening Ms Gribanova informed M. that N. had been abducted, and asked him to be extremely careful.","25. Around 3 p.m. on 27 May 2014 Ms Gribanova received a call from a man who introduced himself as one of M. \u2019 s friends. According to him, at around 9 a.m. that day three unidentified men had approached M. in the street. Two of them were wearing camouflage uniforms, while one was in civilian clothes. They forced M. into a yellow minibus and drove him away to an unknown destination.","26. Ms Gribanova submitted that prior to their abduction N. and M. had given her their passports, which she still held.","F. Indication of interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court","27. On 27 May 2014 Ms Gribanova sought the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. She asked the Court to indicate to the Russian Government that N. and M. \u2019 s removal to Uzbekistan should be suspended.","28. On the same date the Court granted that request, indicating to the Russian Government that N. and M. should not be extradited, expelled or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Uzbekistan or any other country for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. It also asked the Government for information as to N. and M. \u2019 s whereabouts.","G. Subsequent events","1. Information provided by the Government","29. On 17 June 2014 the Government informed the Court that N. and M. had not been arrested by the Russian authorities on 26 and 27 May, and that since 25 May 2014 they had not passed through any border crossing points in the Kaliningrad region. Their whereabouts were unknown.","2. Information provided by Ms Gribanova","30. On 28 May 2014 Ms Gribanova received a telephone call from N. \u2019 s wife, who told her that she and N. \u2019 s father had been summoned by the Uzbek security service several times. The Uzbek authorities had insisted that N. return to Uzbekistan voluntarily or else he would be forcibly returned.","31. On 25 July 2014 Ms Gribanova submitted to the Court that there were grounds to believe that N. and M. had been transferred to Uzbekistan on one of the two direct flights from Kaliningrad which had been scheduled after the Court \u2019 s indication of interim measures. She also submitted that at the time of their abduction N. and M. had not been in possession of their passports, so they could not have crossed the border without the knowledge and passive or active involvement of the Russian authorities.","32. On an unspecified date Ms Gribanova was visited by a man who introduced himself as N. \u2019 s \u201cmate\u201d. He said that N. \u2019 s father had informed him that N. was in Uzbekistan.","33. On an unspecified date M. \u2019 s relatives informed Ms Gribanova that he had been transported to Uzbekistan on 2 June 2014.","34. In mid-October 2014 Ms Gribanova was contacted by some people who introduced themselves as N. and M. \u2019 s relatives. They asked her to return N. and M. \u2019 s passports. They explained that N. and M. were standing trial in Uzbekistan and therefore needed them. She refused to hand them over unless they made a written statement confirming that the passports had been taken by them and why. The people disappeared and never contacted her again.","H. Investigation into the disappearance of N. and M.","35. At the end of June 2014 the Kaliningrad regional department of the interior informed Ms Gribanova that enquiries had been made after she had reported that N. and M. had been abducted, but that their abduction by unknown persons and transportation to Uzbekistan had not been confirmed. In particular, N. \u2019 s relatives in Uzbekistan had submitted that he had been living in Kaliningrad, and there had been no information regarding N. and M. \u2019 s possible arrest by Russian law-enforcement bodies or their departure from the Kaliningrad region. Nor were their names on the list of deceased persons.","36. Between July 2014 and January 2015 the investigating authorities on several occasions refused to initiate criminal proceedings into N. and M. \u2019 s disappearance, for lack of corpus delicti. However, the decisions were overruled each time by the head of the Investigation Committee, and the matter was sent for additional investigation.","37. In one of the refusals to initiate criminal proceedings, namely a decision taken on 20 November 2014, the investigator referred to information provided by the information centre of the Kaliningrad department of the interior, to the effect that N. had been arrested in Uzbekistan on 11 June 2014.","38. On 31 March 2015 an investigator from the local investigation committee initiated criminal proceedings into N. and M. \u2019 s abduction by unknown persons. The Government did not inform the Court of the outcome of those proceedings.","39. Ms Gribanova submitted that on 16 June 2015 she had been summoned by the investigator in charge of the case to give evidence as a witness.","40. On 17 June 2015 she appeared before the Investigation Committee and claimed that she could not be questioned as a witness. She applied to be acknowledged as representing N. and M. She was allegedly told that the investigator possessed information to the effect that M. had been detained by the Uzbek authorities in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, shortly after his disappearance from Kaliningrad.","I. Family situation of N. and M.","41. In various proceedings in Russia N. and M. were questioned about their family situation, among other things.","42. N. submitted that all his relatives lived in Uzbekistan. He had been married but was divorced. He had a son from his marriage. He was not in contact with his former wife or their son. Since 2003 he had been living with his female partner B., an Uzbek national, with whom he had two daughters. Between 2011 and 2013 B. and their daughters had lived in Kaliningrad. In August 2013 B. and the children had returned to Uzbekistan, because one of their daughters needed to undergo an operation there. N. was in regular telephone contact with his parents, sisters and brothers. He submitted that he was not aware of any persecution of his family members in Uzbekistan.","43. M. submitted that all his relatives lived in Uzbekistan. He was married to Kh., an Uzbek national, and they had two sons. In 2011 his wife came to Russia to visit him and stayed with him. Their children stayed in Uzbekistan with their grandparents. In March 2013 his wife returned to Uzbekistan. He was in regular telephone contact with his wife and their two young children, as well as his father and brothers and sisters."],"28146":["5.The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently in detention in Daugavpils.","A.Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant","6.On 8 May 2006 the applicant was transferred from the Central Prison (Centr\u0101lcietums) to Riga Regional Court, where he was placed in a holding cell.","7.At 11.25 a.m. the applicant asked the detainee escort officers from the State Police to call an ambulance. He had pain around the waist area and was nauseous. The ambulance arrived at 11.35 a.m. It was established that the applicant was suffering from kidney stones and renal colic. He was given painkillers.","8.The Government submitted that the pain in the area of the applicant\u2019s waist had later returned, and that at approximately 1 p.m. he had once again asked his escort officers to call an ambulance, shouting and cursing whilst so doing. One of the escort officers, M.P., had entered the cell in order to calm him down. The applicant had attempted to hit M.P. In order to prevent the attack, M.P. had forced the applicant onto the floor, using physical force and a restraint technique in accordance with section13(1)5)and 6) of the Law on Police (likums \u201cPar Policiju\u201d).","9.The applicant submitted that at approximately 1.30 p.m. he had asked the officers to call an ambulance. They had refused to do so. As he had been in pain, he had continued to ask for medical assistance. At some point, one of the officers had entered the holding cell and had kicked him in the chest, as a result of which the applicant had fallen to the floor. Whilst the applicant was trying to stand up, he had received several more kicks. The applicant\u2019s screaming was heard by two other escort officers, who had rushed to the cell. One of the officers had forced him onto the floor and had kicked him several times in the back in order to keep him quiet. Then the officers had left.","10.At 1.48 p.m. the escort officers called the ambulance for the second time. The ambulance arrived at 2.04 p.m. The applicant informed the ambulance staff that the officers had hit him on his left side. He also told them that following an injury in 2005 he had suffered a right kidney rupture. In the ambulance log it was noted that he had no visible injuries. The applicant was taken to the prison hospital in Olaine, where he was diagnosed with a fracture to the third lumbar vertebra and contusion of the left kidney.","11.On the same day the escort officers M.P. and A.P. submitted reports to their superior regarding the incident.","12.On 19 May 2006 the applicant was discharged from the hospital.","B.The applicant\u2019s state of health","13.The Government referred to an extract from the applicant\u2019s medical file at the prison hospital in Olaine. It stated that on 6May 2006 (two days prior to the incident at issue) the applicant underwent an X-ray examination which revealed a fracture to his lumbar vertebrae. His condition was described as \u201csimilar\u201d following an X-ray on 9May2006 (sic) (the day after the incident at issue).","14.According to a letter from the prison in Olaine the applicant was treated at the prison hospital in Olaine between 8 and 19 May 2006. He was diagnosed with a transverse process fracture and a left kidney contusion. There were no injuries such as bruises or scratches on the applicant\u2019s body. The prison was unable to provide information as regards the applicant\u2019s medical care prior to 8 May 2006.","C.Investigation into alleged ill-treatment","1.The applicant\u2019s complaint","15.On 17 May 2006 the applicant\u2019s complaint of 10 May 2006 regarding the incident was received by the Internal Security Office of the State Police (Valsts policijas Iek\u0161\u0113j\u0101s dro\u0161\u012bbas birojs). The applicant alleged that he had been beaten by the escort officers.","2.Criminal investigation","(a)First round of investigation","(i)The Internal Security Office of the State Police","16.On 2 June 2006 the Internal Security Office of the State Police commenced criminal proceedings for the offence of exceeding official authority.","17.On 30 June 2006 the Internal Security Office of the State Police requested an expert medical report in respect of the applicant\u2019s injuries.","On 10 July 2006 an expert from the State Forensic Centre (Valsts tiesu medic\u012bnas ekspert\u012bzes centrs) examined the applicant\u2019s medical records. The expert noted his medical history, including the fact that he had been treated for polycystic kidney disease and a urinary tract infection between 1 and 10March 2006. She requested the applicant\u2019s X-ray from the prison hospital in Olaine. On 19 September 2006 the expert concluded that the applicant had sustained a fracture of the third lumbar vertebra which was classified as a moderately severe injury. The injury could have been caused by a blunt solid object on 8 May 2006. However, the possibility that the injury had been caused by the applicant\u2019s falling against a solid object could not be excluded.","18.In the meantime, a senior inspector questioned the applicant on 5July 2006. During the interview he had been unable to identify, from numerous photographs, the officers who had allegedly used excessive force against him.","19.On 22 and 23 August 2006 the senior inspector questioned detainee escort officers M.P., R.T. and A.P., who denied that excessive force had been used against the applicant.","20.The applicant referred to the evidence of S.\u0160., who stated that the applicant and two other individuals had been placed in the same cell as him. After the applicant\u2019s condition deteriorated, the officers had placed him in another cell opposite their cell. S.\u0160. could see what was happening in the corridor by looking through the peephole in the door. He had seen two or three officers entering the applicant\u2019s cell and then kicking \u201csomething\u201d. He had heard the applicant groan.","21.On 26 October 2006 the senior inspector closed the investigation.","22.She found that at approximately 1.30 p.m. on 8 May 2006 the applicant had been swearing and banging on the door of the holding cell while asking the escort officers to call an ambulance for the second time. One of the officers, M.P., had entered the cell in order to calm him down and the applicant had attempted to hit him. In order to prevent the attack, M.P. had forced the applicant onto the floor, using physical force and a restraint technique in accordance with section 13(1)5) and 6) of the Law on Police.","23.The senior inspector also noted that the applicant had at first been placed in the holding cell together with the witness S.\u0160. and two other individuals. According to S.\u0160. the applicant had been taken to another cell and S.\u0160. had heard the applicant groan. Thereafter the ambulance had arrived.","24.While the expert report of 19 September 2006 indicated that the applicant had been diagnosed with a moderately severe injury in the form of a fracture of a lumbar vertebra, the possibility could not be excluded that this injury had been caused by the applicant\u2019s falling against a hard object, which corresponded to the escort officers\u2019 account of the incident.","25.The senior inspector concluded that the constituent elements of an offence under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law (Krimin\u0101llikums) (exceeding official authority) were lacking in the officers\u2019 actions.","(ii)Prosecution service","26.The applicant lodged an appeal against the aforementioned decision with two levels of the prosecution service. On 22 December 2006 a prosecutor upheld the impugned decision.","27.On 29 January 2007 the deputy chief prosecutor quashed that decision. She found that the investigation had been superficial and that the decision concerned had lacked \u201csufficient justification\u201d.","28.There was no evidence that the applicant had fallen against a hard object. According to witness statements, he had fallen to the floor. It was therefore necessary to inspect the holding cell in which force had been used against the applicant and to verify the statements of both the applicant and of M.P. and A.P. at the scene to establish how the applicant had fallen and whether there had been any object against which he could have fallen. It was also necessary to obtain an expert report to find out whether or not the applicant could have sustained the injury prior to 8 May 2006.","29.The deputy chief prosecutor referred the case back to the Internal Security Office of the State Police.","(b)Second round of investigation","(i)The Internal Security Office of the State Police","30.On 28 February 2007 the Internal Security Office of the State Police ordered a further expert report.","31.Between 21 and 26 March 2007 the senior inspector questioned A.P. and M.P. and verified the applicant\u2019s evidence at the scene. A.P. and M.P. stated that they could not recall in which holding cell the applicant had been placed. Neither could they recall or demonstrate how force had been used against him.","32.On 26 March 2007 the senior inspector closed the investigation.","33.She noted that the ambulance had arrived for the second time at 2.06p.m. on 8May 2006. The applicant had complained of a pain in the area of his left kidney, alleging that the officers had kicked him there. During the investigation, however, he had alleged that the officers had kicked him on the right side of his body. Furthermore, he had stated that the officers had kicked him in the chest, as well as hitting him with a truncheon. At the same time, he had had no visible injuries.","34.According to the expert report dated 12 March 2007, the applicant could have remained mobile even after sustaining a lumbar vertebral fracture, and the possibility could not be excluded that the applicant had sustained this injury prior to 8May 2006.","35.It could not therefore be established when the applicant had sustained the injuries. The senior inspector concluded that the constituent elements of an offence under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law (exceeding official authority) were lacking in the officers\u2019 actions.","(ii)Prosecution service","36.The applicant lodged an appeal against the aforementioned decision with two levels of the prosecution service. On 11 May 2007 the prosecutor upheld that decision.","37.On 12 June 2007 the chief prosecutor quashed the impugned decision. He found that the investigation had not been thorough and that the decision had been made without assessing all the evidence in the case.","38.The senior inspector had not verified the evidence of A.P. and M.P. at the scene. Their questioning had been merely formal. The escort officers had previously stated that they had used force against the applicant. It was therefore necessary to establish whether or not the applicant had sustained injuries as a result thereof. In addition, the evidence of S.\u0160. had not been considered. According to S.\u0160. there had been two other individuals in the holding cell but these individuals had not been questioned.","39.The chief prosecutor referred the case back to the Internal Security Office of the State Police for the second time.","(c)Third round of investigation","(i)The Internal Security Office of the State Police","40.On 28 June 2007 the senior inspector visited the scene together with M.P. and A.P. to verify their evidence. The latter could no longer recall in which cells the various detainees, including the applicant, had been held, nor were they able to show how force had been used against him. They maintained their previous statements.","41.The senior inspector obtained an additional statement from S.\u0160. and questioned fourteen detainees who had been escorted by the officers on the day in question. Some of them had heard noise and shouted requests for a beating to be stopped. The whereabouts of other four detainees could not be established. The applicant referred to the evidence of M.R., who stated that S.\u0160. had been placed in the same cell as him. M.R. had not seen the incident but had heard some noise and a man shouting. He did not know the applicant.","42.On 24 April 2009 the senior inspector closed the investigation.","43.She noted that the applicant had given different accounts as to how force had been used against him. There were several other discrepancies. The applicant had stated that an officer had beaten him in his cell, whereas S.\u0160. had stated that three to four officers had beaten him in the corridor. Another detainee, V.J., had given evidence that the applicant had told him that he had been kicked once on the leg.","44.Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been kicked in the chest and hit on the head with a truncheon was not corroborated by the expert report, which had not recorded injuries to those areas of his body.","45.As regards the lumbar vertebral fracture, according to the expert report, this injury could have been caused by the applicant\u2019s falling against a hard object. This corresponded to the accounts given by M.P. and A.P.","46.The senior inspector concluded that the applicant had not sustained the injuries as a result of unlawful conduct by the escort officers. It could not be established that the use of force had been unjustified.","(ii)Prosecution service","47.On 29 May 2009 the prosecutor, in response to a complaint from the applicant, upheld the aforementioned decision.","48.He noted that force had been used against the applicant in compliance with section 13(1)6) of the Law on Police. It was impossible to determine when the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused. The constituent elements of an offence under section 317(2) of the Criminal Law (exceeding official authority) were lacking in the officers\u2019 actions.","49.Lastly, the prosecutor found that the senior inspector had taken all the investigative steps requested by the prosecution service. The duration of the investigation had been lengthy because many of the individuals who had been escorted on the day in question had been released and their whereabouts were unknown.","50.An appeal lay to a higher prosecutor against the aforementioned decision. According to information from the prosecution service dated 11and 19 February 2015, furnished by the Government, the applicant did not appeal.","51.On 20 November 2013 the applicant wrote to the prosecution service asking for a final decision in the criminal proceedings. On 28November2013 the prosecution service replied that an appeal against the prosecutor\u2019s decision should have been lodged within ten days. Although the applicant had been notified of the decision, he had not appealed against it within the statutory time-limit. The prosecution service could therefore not exercise its powers in respect of the criminal proceedings.","3.Internal inquiry","52.In the meantime, on 16 June 2006 the State Police instigated an internal inquiry into the events of 8 May 2006.","53.The applicant alleged that he had been kicked on various parts of his body, including his head, chest and spine, as well as in the kidney area. He said he had also been hit with a truncheon.","54.Between 26 and 29 June 2006 the escort officers gave their explanations (paskaidrojumi). M.P. and A.P. stated that M.P. had used force against the applicant as the latter had attempted to hit him. A.P. had helped to restrain the applicant.","55.On 30 June 2006 the State Police found that without carrying out procedural acts it was impossible to establish the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained the injuries and whether the force used against him by M.P. or A.P. had been in compliance with section 13 of the Law on Police."],"28162":["5.The applicant was born in 1992, and at the time of the introduction of the application was detained in Lyster Barracks Detention Centre, in \u0126al Far.","A.Background to the case","6.The applicant entered Malta in an irregular manner by boat on 6 May 2012. On arrival she was registered by the immigration police, given an identification number (12D-001) and presented with a Return Decision and a Removal Order. The applicant was immediately detained in Lyster Barracks; her detention was based on Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act (see Relevant domestic law below).","7.The Return Decision stated that she was a prohibited immigrant by virtue of Article5 of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) because she was in Malta \u201cwithout means of subsistence and liable to become a charge on public funds\u201d. The Return Decision also informed the applicant that her stay was being terminated and that she had the possibility to apply for a period of voluntary departure. The Removal Order was based on the consideration that the applicant\u2019s request for a period of voluntary departure had been rejected. It informed the applicant that she would remain in custody until removal was effected, and that an entry ban would be issued against her. The two documents further informed the applicant of her right to appeal against the Decision and Order before the Immigration Appeals Board (\u201cthe IAB\u201d) within three working days.","8.On 9 May 2012 the applicant was assisted to submit a Preliminary Questionnaire (PQ), thereby registering her wish to apply for asylum under Article 8 of the Refugees Act, Chapter 420 of the Laws of Malta. On 21May 2012 the applicant was called for an interview by the Office of the Refugee Commissioner (ORC).","9.On 30 June 2012 the ORC rejected her application on the basis, inter alia, that she had failed to support her claim that she was from central\/southern Somalia with convincing evidence (in particular, she had shown insufficient knowledge about Mogadishu and her speech displayed phonological, grammatical and lexical features not typical of those spoken in Mogadishu). Her appeal was also rejected by the Refugee Appeals Board (the \u201cRAB\u201d) on 18 December 2012. The appeal decision reads as follows:","\u201cThe Refugee Appeals Board refers to a fill-in-the-blanks form received in its Office on 18 July 2012 and to a legal submission on your behalf received in its Office on 8October 2012.","The Board notes that you travelled to Libya in December 2011, first via Kenya and then via Sudan. In none of these countries did you consider applying for refugee status. During the popular insurrection against the Gaddafi regime in Libya you disembarked on the island of Malta, illegally and undocumented on 6 May 2012, claiming that you were looking for peace, although seven of your siblings still live in Somalia. You also claim that your brother had been killed by a terrorist Islamic organization, Al Shabab, because they thought he worked for the Government. However, you also claim that if there was peace back home, you would be prepared to return. Since you left, as you may know, Al Shabab has been driven out of Mogadishu and Presidential elections have been successfully held and several Somalis are repatriating.","Your appeal for the grant of refugee status by Malta cannot be upheld according to law.\u201d","10.Up to the date of the lodging of her application with the Court on 19August 2013 the applicant had heard no news about any steps being taken in connection with her removal. In practice Malta effected no removals to Somalia or Somaliland.","B.The AWAS Adult Vulnerability Assessment Procedure","11.Ever since her arrival in Malta the applicant suffered from several medical problems, such as headaches, earaches and fainting, and was frequently hospitalised (see paragraphs 16-19 below). She showed signs of severe anxiety and depression which got worse following the refusal of her asylum request. In consequence, on 1 October 2012, she was referred to the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (AWAS) by the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). This referral was made with a view to obtaining her release from detention in terms of government policy on the grounds of vulnerability due to physical and psychological ill-health. According to the referral form, filled in by an official of the JRS:","\u201cSagal has been complaining of several medical problems ever since she arrived in Malta. She had several appointments in hospital was also taken to emergency by ambulance after collapsing in detention. Sagal was also rejected by the Office of the Refugee Commission, causing her to be very depressed. Every time we visit she is in her bed crying and showing signs of severe anxiety.\u201d","12.In December 2012 the applicant was interviewed (for a few minutes) by the Vulnerable Adults Assessment Team of AWAS, with a view to determine whether she should be released on the grounds of vulnerability. The interview was held in English and the applicant was assisted by another detainee who was not fluent in the language. Her impression is that she was verbally informed that she would be released. On 10 August 2013, that is just under one year after the referral, the interviewers verbally informed her that she would be released. The Government also confirmed that eventually the applicant\u2019s request for release on the ground of vulnerability was acceded to by AWAS.","13.Nevertheless, up to the date of the lodging of her application with the Court on 19 August 2013 the applicant was still in detention. She hoped to be released in November 2013 after the lapse of an eighteen month detention as per domestic practice at the time.","14.The applicant submitted that the Vulnerable Adult Assessment Procedure operated by AWAS was developed by the said organisation in order to give effect to a government policy introduced in January 2005 which stated that vulnerable individuals should not be detained. The applicant submitted that although AWAS was not formally charged with the responsibility of this procedure by the law which set it up, in practice the agency had full responsibility for the procedure. However, in spite of the fact that this procedure can have a determining impact on the continued detention of individuals detained in terms of the Immigration Act, it was not adequately regulated by law or by publicly available rules or procedures. The determining authority does not give written reasons for its decision and there is no possibility of appeal, although it may be possible to request a review if more evidence is available or there is a degeneration of the individual\u2019s condition.","15.According to the Government the Vulnerable Adult Assessment Procedure, which was operated to assess vulnerability, was widely known within the migration sector and a policy document had been issued about it. Forms were distributed to individuals working in the sector such as NGOs. The Government submitted that the Vulnerable Adult Assessment Procedure was a quick process in straightforward cases (such as pregnant women and families with very young children) which were usually determined within two weeks. However, less straightforward cases such as assessments on the grounds of mental health, psychological problems or chronic illness, required a more complex assessment procedure which was therefore lengthier.","C.The applicant\u2019s medical condition","16.A certificate issued by a doctor in May 2012 confirmed that the applicant had been hospitalised on 7 and 8 May 2012 (upon her arrival in Malta) for dehydration, she was seen again on 15 May and 15 June of the same year. She suffered \u201cfits\u201d and was waiting for an appointment.","17. According to the documents provided by the applicant, after her initial hospitalisation, and apart from the two visits mentioned above, she was seen by a doctor at the state hospital around sixteen times between May and September 2012, and each time was prescribed medication. On these occasions she suffered from, inter alia, epigastric pain and nausea (repeatedly), bilateral conjunctivitis, inflammation, bleeding gums, insomnia, otalgia\/earaches (also repeatedly) causing reduced hearing, as well as headaches and toothaches, and dizziness. In none of these occasions was she kept under observation overnight, or hospitalised. In June 2012 following claims by the applicant that she had been falling repeatedly, and that she was having episodes of jerking and tongue biting (which had left evident marks), the doctor requested her referral to a specified department to run the relevant tests to exclude epilepsy \u2013 the result of these tests, if undertaken, are unknown to the Court.","18.A medical certificate issued in March 2013 states that at the time the applicant was suffering from \u201clow mood and insomnia\u201d and had been \u201ccomplaining of somatic symptoms such as chest pain\u201d. The doctor noted \u201cevident deterioration of her mental state\u201d and suggested she be considered as vulnerable.","19.An attestation issued by a doctor in May 2013 states that according to available records \u201cshe has stayed unwell and been treated or referred to Mater Dei Hospital [the State hospital] more than usual\u201d and that \u201cher health has posed challenges in keeping her at the \u0126al Far detention centre and any assistance will be appreciated\u201d.","D.Conditions of detention","20.The applicant was detained in Hermes Block in Lyster Barracks, in conditions which she considered prison-like and basic. She explained that the Block is divided into five zones alike in terms of layout and facilities. The applicant was detained in Zone C for the first seven to eight months and was afterwards transferred to Zone D for a number of months until she moved to Zone A.","21.She noted that in Zone C there were over eighty (sic) single women and at one point the detention centre was so crowded that there were not enough beds and people had to sleep on metal tables in the television room. She noted that Zone D was less crowded but that it still lacked privacy and sanitation.","22.She complained about the lack of constructive activities to occupy detainees, overcrowding (particularly during the summer months), lack of privacy, limited access to open air, difficulties in communication with staff, other detainees and with the outside world, lack of information about their own situations, and the lack of proper arrangements for heating and cooling, leading to extreme cold in winter and extreme heat in summer. The applicant highlighted the lack of female staff - in particular she noted that every morning male soldiers barged into her dormitory while the inmates were still asleep to make a head count, during which they removed the sheets to check for their presence. This meant that the applicant had to sleep fully dressed every night, including her headscarf, to avoid embarrassing moments.","23.The applicant also complained of limited access to medical care, also because of a lack of interpreters to enable communication with medical staff.","E.Latest Developments","24.The applicant was informed of the AWAS decision to accede to her request and was released from detention on 12 September 2013.","30.The Report to the Maltese Government on the visit to Malta carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 26 to 30 September 2011, published on 4 July 2013, in so far as relevant in connection with Lyster Barracks, reads as follows:","\u201c44. At the time of the visit, Lyster Detention Centre was accommodating 248 foreign nationals (including 89 women), in five different detention units.","In keeping with the Government\u2019s Detention Policy, no unaccompanied minors were held in either of the two detention centres visited. Upon issuance of a care order by the Minister of Social Policy, unaccompanied minors were always transferred to a juvenile institution. Single women were always accommodated separately from male detainees.","47. More generally, the CPT has serious misgivings about the fact that female detainees at Lyster Detention Centre were frequently supervised exclusively by male detention officers, since only one female officer was employed by the Detention Service at the time of the visit.","The CPT recommends that the Maltese authorities take steps as a matter of priority to ensure the presence of at least one female officer around the clock at Lyster Detention Centre.","48. As was the case in 2008, a number of detainees complained about disrespectful behaviour and racist remarks by detention officers (in particular in the Warehouses at Safi Detention Centre). The CPT reiterates its recommendation that the Maltese authorities remind all members of staff working in detention centres for foreigners that such behaviour is not acceptable and will be punished accordingly.","55. At both Lyster [and Safi Detention Centres], material conditions have improved since the 2008 visit. In particular, at Lyster Barracks, these improvements are significant: the Hermes Block, which had been in a very poor state of repair at the time of the 2008 visit, had been completely refurbished and the Tent Compound, which had also been criticised by the Committee in the report on the 2008 visit, had been dismantled. At Safi Barracks, additional renovation work had been carried out in Block B. It is noteworthy that all foreign nationals received personal hygiene products on a regular basis and were also supplied with clothes and footwear.","...","56. At Lyster Detention Centre, the situation had clearly improved as regards activities. Each zone comprised a communal room, and groups of detainees could attend English-language courses which were organised by an NGO (usually, three times a week for two hours per group). Further, single women and couples were provided with food so that they could prepare meals themselves in a kitchenette. Every day, detainees could go outside and play football or volleyball in a rather small yard for a total of two hours.","...","60. As regards contact with the outside world, the CPT welcomes the fact that, in both detention centres visited, foreign nationals could receive telephone calls from the outside. They were also were provided with telephone cards free of charge on a regular basis, although these were limited to a total of 5\u20ac every two months.\u201d","31.The 9th General report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the \u201cCPT\u201d) on the CPT\u2019s activities covering the period 1January to 31 December 1998, at point 26, reads as follows:","\u201cMixed gender staffing is another safeguard against ill-treatment in places of detention, in particular where juveniles are concerned. The presence of both male and female staff can have a beneficial effect in terms of both the custodial ethos and in fostering a degree of normality in a place of detention.","Mixed gender staffing also allows for appropriate staff deployment when carrying out gender sensitive tasks, such as searches. In this respect, the CPT wishes to stress that, regardless of their age, persons deprived of their liberty should only be searched by staff of the same gender and that any search which requires an inmate to undress should be conducted out of the sight of custodial staff of the opposite gender; these principles apply a fortiori in respect of juveniles.\u201d","32.Rule 53 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, reads as follows:","\u201c(1) In an institution for both men and women, the part of the institution set aside for women shall be under the authority of a responsible woman officer who shall have the custody of the keys of all that part of the institution.","(2) No male member of the staff shall enter the part of the institution set aside for women unless accompanied by a woman officer.","(3) Women prisoners shall be attended and supervised only by women officers. This does not, however, preclude male members of the staff, particularly doctors and teachers, from carrying out their professional duties in institutions or parts of institutions set aside for women.\u201d","33.The report \u201cNot here to stay: Report of the International Commission of Jurists on its visit to Malta on 26-30 September 2011\u201d, May 2012, pointed out, inter alia, that:","\u201cThe ICJ delegation found a lack of leisure facilities in all three detention facilities visited. ... In the Lyster Barracks there was also a small recreation yard, but without direct access from the detention section. Detainees had two hours per day of \u201cair\u201d in the courtyard. They reportedly seldom received visits from outside, apart from the occasional NGO.\u201d","34.Bridging Borders, a JRS Malta report on the implementation of a project to provide shelter and psychosocial support to vulnerable asylum seekers between June 2011 and June 2012, highlights the fact that not all medication prescribed by medical personnel in detention is provided free by the Government health service. In fact the said report notes that during the lifetime of the project the organisation purchased medication for 130detainees."],"28152":["1. The applicant, Mr Aleksandre Manukian, is a Georgian national, who was born in 1965 and is currently in detention in Tbilisi. He was represented before the Court by Ms E. Fileeva, a lawyer practising in Tbilisi.","2. The Georgian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr L. Meskhoradze of the Ministry of Justice.","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.","A. The circumstances of the case","4. At the material time, the applicant was serving a prison sentence for various offences in Rustavi Prison no. 1. According to the bill of indictment, he and four other inmates attacked the head of the prison department (the authority in charge of prisons at the time), B. Akh, the governor of Rustavi Prison no. 1, T. T., and three other representatives of the prison department while they were inspecting the prison early on 30 January 2006. The head of the prison department and the accompanying prison officials were granted victim status in the above criminal proceedings.","5. On 1 August 2006 the Rustavi City Court convicted the applicant and his co-defendants under Article 378 \u00a7 4 of the Criminal Code of Georgia ( disobedience to a public authority, obstruction of prison activities and attacking prison officers). The trial judge concluded that the applicant had attacked the victims by throwing bottles and other items at them, by verbally insulting them and also by inciting other prisoners to riot against the prison administration. The applicant was sentenced to eight years \u2019 imprisonment. The final sentence, which included the unserved part of his previous sentence, was set at ten years and four months.","6. In finding the applicant guilty, the first-instance court relied on the statements of the five victims, including pre-trial statements by the head of the prison department and the prison governor. The two men, despite repeated requests from the defendants, were not heard in court. The court also relied on the testimony of seven members of the prison department \u2019 s special unit (\u201cthe special unit\u201d), which was involved in the incident, as well as on statements by two prisoners who had witnessed the events at issue.","7. According to the applicant, the Rustavi City Court found him guilty without considering the version of events given by him and his co \u2011 defendants. They alleged, in particular, that on 30 January 2006, they had been woken up at around 5 a.m. by the head of the prison department, accompanied by the governor of Rustavi Prison no.1, several prison department employees and members of the special unit, who had verbally insulted them and subjected them to humiliating treatment. The applicant had been threatened by the head of the prison department and then ill \u2011 treated by several special unit officers. The prisoners had protested and the head of the prison department and his colleagues had left. However, after a short while, at around 7 a.m. the special unit had re-entered the prison, forced the prisoners out of their dormitories and had severely beaten them. According to the applicant, they were made to pass through a so-called corridor formed of special unit officers, who had beaten and insulted them. A group of prisoners, including the applicant, had then been transferred to Ksani Prison, where they were put in a punishment cell and left for a month in extremely poor conditions, without any medical assistance. In support of their version of events, the applicant and his co \u2011 defendants requested that the trial judge question several other prisoners and the doctor who had recorded the injuries of the prisoners who had been ill \u2011 treated. The requests were, however, refused.","8. The applicant appealed against his conviction, protesting his innocence and stating that the statements of the prosecution witnesses had been contradictory, that his ill-treatment allegations had not been considered and that certain evidence given in his defence had been ignored.","9. On 23 April 2007 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant, finding that the first-instance court had properly established the applicant \u2019 s guilt and had given the correct legal classification to his actions. The appeal court failed to summon the two victims, B. Akh. and T. T., to the proceedings. As for defence witnesses, it only allowed the questioning of one prisoner who had witnessed the events of 30 January 2006. The appeal court did not examine the applicant \u2019 s allegation of ill \u2011 treatment.","10. By a decision of 11 February 2008, the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected an appeal on points of law by the applicant as inadmissible.","B. Relevant domestic law","11. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force at the material time, read as follows:","Article 261 \u2013 Obligation to initiate a preliminary investigation","\u201cUpon receipt of information concerning the commission of a crime, the investigator and the public prosecutor, within the limits of their powers, shall open an investigation. ...\u201d","Article 263 \u2013 Information concerning the commission of a crime","\u201c1. A preliminary investigation shall be opened on the basis of information concerning the commission of a crime brought to the attention of the investigator or the public prosecutor by a natural person or other legal entity ... reported in the media, or brought to light during the investigation of a case by the authority in charge of the investigation ...\u201d","501. Referral of criminal case for additional investigation","\u201cIf the prosecutor requests that a charge against the accused be classed as a more serious offence, the judge (court) shall rule on referring the criminal case back for additional investigation ...\u201d"],"28175":["6.The applicant was born in 1982 and until his arrest lived in Moscow.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","7.On 27 February 2012 the police opened a criminal investigation into large-scale fraud. According to investigators, an unknown person had convinced a businessman to hand over 10,000,000 Russian roubles (approximately EUR 248,000) on the pretext of selling some equipment. However, the person had had no intention of selling the equipment or returning the money.","8.On 24 January 2013 the applicant was accused of aggravated fraud. The police ordered him not to leave his place of residence, but he fled and was put on a wanted list by the police.","9.On 16 July 2013 he was arrested and taken to a police custody facility.The next day the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) authorised his pre-trial detention until 16 September 2013, having regard to the seriousness of the charges against him and the risk of his absconding, reoffending and interfering with justice.","10.The applicant appealed. He referred to, among other things, his poor health.","11.On 19 August 2013 the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) upheld the detention order on appeal after examining his recent medical documents, stating that his health did not preclude his detention on remand.","12.On 13 September 2013 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 16 November 2013, citing the risk of his absconding given his previous attempt to evade prosecution and the seriousness of the charges against him. The District Court also linked that risk to the applicant\u2019s lack of stable income or work. In the court\u2019s view, no alternative measure, such as house arrest or bail, could have ensured that the criminal proceedings ran smoothly. Lastly, the court noted the complexity of the case and several steps in the investigation which had yet to be performed, including some which required the applicant\u2019s presence and participation.","13.The applicant appealed. He applied to the City Court to be released on bail because of his worsening health. He insisted that he could no longer move without assistance. In the meantime, in October 2013 he was served with the final version of the bill of indictment and was committed to stand trial before the District Court.","14.On 13 November 2013 the City Court upheld the detention order of 13 September 2013, endorsing the District Court\u2019s reasoning. After examining medical evidence pertaining to the applicant\u2019s health, it found that the illnesses he suffered from were not severe enough to warrant his release.","15.On an unspecified date the police searched the applicant\u2019s flat and found a passport with his photograph but under another name.","16.On 14 November 2013 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 30 March 2014. It again cited his unemployment status and ability to abscond, in view of the seriousness of the charges and his having been on the run from January to July 2013. Noting that his state of health was compatible with the detention conditions, the court concluded that the extension of his detention was justified.","17.On 13 January 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s request for release on bail or under a written undertaking not to leave Moscow. It reiterated the arguments contained in the preceding detention orders and noted the discovery of the forged passport in his flat during the police search, which for the court was a clear sign of his intention to flee. It also addressed his arguments that he had become paraplegic and thus no longer posed a flight risk. It noted that according to a recent conclusion of a medical panel (see paragraph 32 below), his health did not call for his release.","18.On the same day the District Court convicted the applicant of aggravated fraud and sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment in a correctional colony.","19.On 20 February 2014 the City Court upheld the conviction, but reduced the sentence to four years.","B.The applicant\u2019s detention, transfer conditions and medical treatment in detention","1.Police ward","20.For about a week after his arrest on 16 July 2013 the applicant was kept in a Moscow police ward.","21.His cell measured 12 square metres, had three sleeping places and usually housed two or three inmates. He did not complain about his health and was not seen by a doctor, save for a general check-up on admission.","2.Remand prisons","22.On 24 July 2013 the applicant was taken to remand prison no.IZ\u201177\/2 in Moscow. He underwent the usual general medical check-up on arrival. Informing the resident doctor about serious back injuries he had sustained in 2008 and 2010, he did not make any specific complaints, except about his hypertension. He was considered to be in good health.","23.According to the Government, he was placed in a cell which measured 26.96 square metres and housed four other inmates. Subsequently he was transferred between less spacious cells, which he shared with two or three inmates. The living space afforded to him varied between 3.8 and5.7 square metres. Throughout his detention he slept on an individual prison bunk. The applicant did not dispute the above information submitted by the Government.","24.According to the applicant, in August 2013 he fell and hurt his back. Severe back pain was accompanied by numbness in the legs and resulted in him being unable to walk unaided. He spent the major part of his day in bed being assisted by his cellmates. They took him for walks in the prison yard, carried him to the toilet and washed him with wet towels, which was their way of showing that they were annoyed with his helplessness.","25.The applicant\u2019s medical records show that on 8 October 2013 he complained to the resident doctor that he was suffering from a headache and back and abdomen pain. The doctor prescribed him drugs and a consultation with a neurologist.","26.On 19 October 2013 he was taken to a medical unit in the same remand prison for inpatient treatment. The attending doctor noted that, owing to a pain syndrome, he had been unable to move unaided. After blood tests and a CAT (computerized axial tomography) scan, he was injected with painkillers, muscle relaxants, nootropics and vitamins.","27.The applicant submitted that on 24 October 2013 during his transfer to a court hearing in a standard prison van, he had again severely hurt his back and head.","28.On 13November 2013 the applicant was discharged from the medical ward to be transferred to the hospital in remand prison no.IZ-77\/1 in Moscow for more comprehensive treatment.","29.The transfer occurred a week later. On admission to hospital the applicant complained of head and back pain and numbness in his legs. The hospital performed a number of medical tests, including blood and urine tests, a CAT scan and a cerebrospinal fluid analysis. As a result he was diagnosed with paraplegia of unknown origin, headaches and chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy. He received antibiotics, muscle relaxants, vitamins and other medication. His health improved, but not significantly. The paraplegia remained unchanged. He was discharged from hospital on 9December 2013 to undergo treatment in a civilian hospital and to check whether his state of health called for his early release.","30.From 9 to 13 December 2013 the applicant stayed in Moscow City Hospital no. 20, where he underwent a medical expert examination and received treatment. He had an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) scan of his spinal column and spinal cord, a scintigraphy and an X-ray of his pelvis. According to a medical report dated 13 December 2013, he suffered the consequences of a reduced blood supply to the Adamkiewicz artery, including lower limb spasticity, dysfunction of the pelvic organs and bedsores developed outside the hospital. In addition, he was diagnosed with hypertension, a small hydrothorax on the right side and some residual effects of pneumonia that did not call for any treatment. The conditions did not fall within the established list of illnesses warranting early release.","31.The applicant was taken to the intensive care unit of remand prison no. IZ-77\/1, where he continued his drug regimen in line with the hospital\u2019s recommendations. The doctors were, however, unable to ensure any improvement in his conditions. A week later he was sent back to Moscow City Hospital no. 20.","32.A report drawn up on 31December 2013 by a medical panel from the hospital stated that, in addition to the previous diagnosis, the applicant suffered from neurogenic bladder and bowel dysfunction. However, his conditions still did not reach the level of severity to warrant his release.","33.The stay in hospital was followed by two weeks of detention in remand prison no. 77\/1. There is nothing to suggest that his treatment was interrupted during that period.","34.On 15 January 2014 the applicant was again taken to Moscow City Hospital no. 20 for a month of treatment. The hospital staff changed his drug regimen, completing it with antioxidant and neutrophil treatment, muscle relaxants, painkillers, and introducing physiotherapy, which resulted in \u201ccertain positive changes in [his] state of health\u201d.","35.Meanwhile, the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked an independent medical specialist to provide an opinion on the quality of medical care afforded to the applicant in the remand prison. In a report dated 11 February 2014 the specialist stated that the applicant\u2019s conditions required enhanced medical attention and inpatient treatment that could only be performed in a neurological medical facility. Remand prison no. 77\/1 was not licensed to provide neurological treatment or perform neurosurgery. His bedsores were a sign of insufficient medical attention. The report ended with a recommendation that he be classified as disabled.","36.On 14 February 2014 the applicant was taken to remand prison no.77\/1, where he was detained until 1 March 2014. According to the Government, he shared his cell measuring around 11.4 square metres with another inmate. As he was unable to care for himself, medical staff and inmates assisted him with his daily needs. It is apparent from the case file that he continued to receive treatment as prescribed.","37.On 1 March 2014 he was sent to serve his sentence in a correctional colony in Kostroma, over 300 kilometres away.","3.Transfer to correctional colony","38.In the early hours of 1 March 2014 the applicant was taken in a Gazel minivan designed to transfer the seriously ill, to a Moscow train station. The trip took two hours.","39.At the train station he was placed on board a standard train carriage, where he had to stay for four hours awaiting departure. The journey to the destination, the town of Yaroslavl, took approximately five hours. The Government only stated that the applicant had shared his carriage with other detainees and had been accompanied by escort officers ready to assist him if necessary.","40.In Yaroslavl the applicant was taken from the train to a prison van. According to the written statements by escort officers submitted by the Government, he was put on a thin blanket on the floor of the van. In the next half hour he was taken to a remand prison, so that new escort officers could join the transfer team. The applicant had to wait for another hour, lying on the floor of the van, while the official procedure involving the escort officers was under way. He was then taken back to the train station in Yaroslavl.","41.At the station the applicant was taken to a prison train carriage, which he shared with other inmates. After another two hours the train departed for Kostroma. The trip took three hours. At around midnight the train arrived at the Kostroma train station. The Government did not provide any description of the conditions in which the applicant travelled.","42.Within the next hour a prison van took the applicant to a nearby remand prison, where he was detained from 2 to 6 March 2014.","43.On the morning of 6 March 2014 the applicant was taken in the same prison van to correctional colony no. IK-15\/1 (\u201cthe correctional colony\u201d). The trip took around an hour.","44.The parties disagreed whether the vehicles used to transfer the applicant, with the exception of the Gazel minivan, were equipped to accommodate ill inmates. While the Government argued that all vehicles could transport bedridden patients, the applicant stated that they had had no special equipment on board. He had been forced to lie on the floor of the prison vans on a thin blanket used as a stretcher. During the entire journey he had been in severe pain, but had not received any painkillers.","4.Correctional colony","45.The applicant was placed in the medical unit of the colony. He continued receiving various drugs and injections, including nootropic drugs, muscle relaxants and antioxidants and vitamins, to improve the function of the central and peripheral nervous systems. He was regularly seen by doctors. His condition remained stable.","46.The applicant spent all his time in bed. Personal care workers provided him with bedside care, including basic nursing procedures.","47.The applicant was examined by a panel of doctors to check whether he should be released early on health grounds. In their report dated 15April 2014 they concluded that his conditions, in particular his lower limb spasticity and bladder and bowel dysfunction called for his early release.","48.On the panel\u2019s recommendation, the colony administration asked the court to authorise the applicant\u2019s early release on health grounds.","49.The Sverdlovskiy District Court of Kostroma granted the request and on 3 July 2014 ordered his release. On 26 August 2014 the Kostroma Regional Court upheld the order on appeal. Two days later the applicant was released.","54.The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 2006. Russia ratified the Convention on 25 September 2012. It did not ratify the Optional Protocol.","Article 1of the Convention provides:","\u201cThe purpose of the present Convention is to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.","Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.\u201d","The relevant part of Article 14 provides:","\u201c2. States Parties shall ensure that if persons with disabilities are deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of this Convention, including by provision of reasonable accommodation.\u201d","The relevant part of Article 15 provides:","\u201c2. States Parties shall take all effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with others, from being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d","The requirements regulating personal mobility are laid down in Article20, which reads as follows:","\u201cStates Parties shall take effective measures to ensure personal mobility with the greatest possible independence for persons with disabilities, including by:","Facilitating the personal mobility of persons with disabilities in the manner and at the time of their choice, and at affordable cost;","Facilitating access by persons with disabilities to quality mobility aids, devices, assistive technologies and forms of live assistance and intermediaries, including by making them available at affordable cost;","Providing training in mobility skills to persons with disabilities and to specialist staff working with persons with disabilities;","Encouraging entities that produce mobility aids, devices and assistive technologies to take into account all aspects of mobility for persons with disabilities.\u201d","55.In Interim Report of 28 July 2008 (A\/63\/175), the then UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr Manfred Nowak, noted as follows:","\u201c50. ... Persons with disabilities often find themselves in [situations of powerlessness], for instance when they are deprived of their liberty in prisons or other places ... In a given context, the particular disability of an individual may render him or her more likely to be in a dependant situation and make him or her an easier target of abuse ...","...","53. States have the further obligation to ensure that treatment or conditions in detention do not directly or indirectly discriminate against persons with disabilities. If such discriminatory treatment inflicts severe pain or suffering, it may constitute torture or other form of ill-treatment. ...","54. The Special Rapporteur notes that under article 14, paragraph 2, of the CRPD, States have the obligation to ensure that persons deprived of their liberty are entitled to \u2018provision of reasonable accommodation\u2019. This implies an obligation to make appropriate modifications in the procedures and physical facilities of detention centres ... to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the same rights and fundamental freedoms as others, when such adjustments do not impose disproportionate or undue burden. The denial or lack of reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities may create detention ... conditions that amount to ill-treatment and torture.\u201d","56.The relevant extracts from the 3rd General Report (CPT\/Inf (93) 12; 4 June 1993) by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) read as follows:","e. Humanitarian assistance","\u201c64. Certain specific categories of particularly vulnerable prisoners can be identified. Prison health care services should pay especial attention to their needs.\u201d","...","iv) prisoners unsuited for continued detention","\u201c70. Typical examples of this kind of prisoner are those who are the subject of a short\u2011term fatal prognosis, who are suffering from a serious disease which cannot be properly treated in prison conditions, who are severely handicapped or of advanced age. The continued detention of such persons in a prison environment can create an intolerable situation. In cases of this type, it lies with the prison doctor to draw up a report for the responsible authority, with a view to suitable alternative arrangements being made.\u201d","...","g. Professional competence","\u201c76. To ensure the presence of an adequate number of staff, nurses are frequently assisted by medical orderlies, some of whom are recruited from among the prison officers. At the various levels, the necessary experience should be passed on by the qualified staff and periodically updated.","Sometimes prisoners themselves are allowed to act as medical orderlies. No doubt, such an approach can have the advantage of providing a certain number of prisoners with a useful job. Nevertheless, it should be seen as a last resort. Further, prisoners should never be involved in the distribution of medicines.","77. Finally, the CPT would suggest that the specific features of the provision of health care in a prison environment may justify the introduction of a recognised professional speciality, both for doctors and for nurses, on the basis of postgraduate training and regular in-service training.\u201d","57.Recommendation no. R (98) 7 of the Committee of Ministers of 8April 1998 concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison, provides, in so far as relevant:","III. The organisation of health care in prison with specific reference to the management of certain common problems","C. Persons unsuited to continued detention: serious physical handicap, advanced age, short term fatal prognosis","\u201c50. Prisoners with serious physical handicaps and those of advanced age should be accommodated in such a way as to allow as normal a life as possible and should not be segregated from the general prison population. Structural alterations should be effected to assist the wheelchair-bound and handicapped on lines similar to those in the outside environment. ...\u201d","58.Recommendation CM\/Rec (2012) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of 12 April 2012 on the European Code of Ethics for Prison Staff, provides, in particular:","IV. Guidelines for prison staff conduct","D. Care and assistance","\u201c19. Prison staff shall be sensitive to the special needs of individuals, such ... disabled prisoners, and any prisoner who might be vulnerable for other reasons, and make every effort to provide for their needs.","20. Prison staff shall ensure the full protection of the health of persons in their custody and, in particular, shall take immediate action to secure medical attention whenever required.","21. Prison staff shall provide for the safety, hygiene and appropriate nourishment of persons in the course of their custody. They shall make every effort to ensure that conditions in prison comply with the requirements of relevant international standards, in particular the European Prison Rules.","22. Prison staff shall work towards facilitating the social reintegration of prisoners through a programme of constructive activities, individual interaction and assistance.\u201d"],"28187":["1. The applicant, Ms S.M.H., states that she is a Somali national who was born in 1981. She is currently living in the Netherlands. The President decided that the applicant \u2019 s identity was not to be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 \u00a7 4). She was represented before the Court by Ms J. Jansen, a lawyer practising in Kapelle.","2. The Netherlands Government were represented by their Agent, Mr R.A.A. B\u00f6cker, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Italian Government, who had been invited to intervene under Rule 44 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court, were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Spatafora, and their co-Agent, Ms P. Accardo.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and the Italian Government, may be summarised as follows.","4. On 1 April 2003, the applicant entered Italy, landing in Lampedusa. On 15 April 2003, she applied for asylum in Italy, stating that she had been born in 1983. She was registered accordingly by the Italian authorities. After her fingerprints had been taken and verified, it transpired that she had already been registered in Italy under another identity in October 2000 at the Milan Malpensa border.","5. The applicant applied for asylum on 15 April 2003 and was admitted to a reception centre in Capo Rizzuto. She was later transferred to another reception facility in Cir\u00f2 Marina and also provided with a temporary residence permit for asylum - seekers. On 14 February 2004, the reception facility in Cir\u00f2 Marina informed the authorities that the applicant had left the centre for an unknown destination.","6. By a decision of 20 January 2005, having noted that the applicant had left for an unknown destination, the competent territorial commission for the recognition of international protection ( Commissione Territoriale per il Riconoscimento della Protezione Internationale ) dismissed the applicant \u2019 s request for international protection.","7. On an unspecified date, the applicant was transferred back to Italy, in accordance with EU Council Regulation No. 343\/2003\/EC of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the member States by a third-country national (\u201cthe Dublin Regulation\u201d). On 13 September 2005, she was notified of the decision of 20 January 2005 and ordered to leave Italy within 15 days. However, the applicant did not leave and found shelter in accommodation run by a non-governmental organisation.","8. On 25 October 2005, the special bench of the National Commission for Asylum ( Commissione Nazionale per il diritto d \u2019 Asilo, Sezione Speciale Stralcio ) heard the applicant and held that she did not qualify for the status of a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, but granted her a residence permit for compelling humanitarian reasons under Article 5 \u00a7 6 of Legislative Decree ( decreto legge ) no. 286\/1998. On the basis of that decision, the applicant was provided with a residence permit that was valid until October 2006.","9. On 22 December 2006, having moved to Naples, the applicant applied to the Naples police headquarters for a renewal of the residence permit. After that request had been accepted by the National Commission, which found that she was still entitled to international protection, the applicant received a residence permit which was valid until 22 December 2007. On 12 February 2008, at the applicant \u2019 s request, the basis for her residence permit was converted into a residence permit for employment purposes, which was valid until 27 December 2009.","10. On 19 November 2009, the applicant entered the Netherlands and applied for asylum. In her interviews with the Netherlands immigration authorities, she stated, inter alia, that she was a Somali national, born in 1981. She further stated that she was pregnant, but that the father had left her after she had become pregnant. She also declared that she had lived in Italy before going to the Netherlands and that she had a sister who was living in the Netherlands.","11. An examination and comparison of the applicant \u2019 s fingerprints by the Netherlands authorities generated a Eurodac report, indicating that she had applied for asylum in Italy on 15 April 2003.","12. On 27 March 2010 the applicant gave birth to a daughter in the Netherlands.","13. On 7 May 2010 the Italian authorities accepted a request by the Netherlands authorities to take the applicant back, in accordance with the Dublin Regulation.","14. On 7 June 2010, the Netherlands Minister of Justice ( Minister van Justitie ) rejected the applicant \u2019 s asylum request. The Minister found that, pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, Italy was responsible for the processing of the asylum application and that this was not altered by the fact that she had a baby. The Minister rejected the applicant \u2019 s argument that she would risk treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention in Italy.","15. An appeal by the applicant against that decision was dismissed on 22 October 2010 by the single-judge chamber ( enkelvoudige kamer ) of the Regional Court ( rechtbank ) of The Hague. The applicant did not avail herself of the possibility of lodging a further appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division ( Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak ) of the Council of State.","16. On 31 January 2011, with reference to the acceptance of 7 May 2010, the Netherlands authorities informed their Italian counterparts that the transfer of the applicant and her child had been scheduled for 3 February 2011. It was specified that they would not be accompanied, that the applicant was pregnant, with delivery expected on 6 May 2011, but that that did not prevent a transfer.","17. On 2 February 2011, the applicant filed a fresh asylum request in the Netherlands. Pursuant to section 4 ( 6 ) of the General Administrative Law Act ( Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht ), the application had to be based on newly emerged facts or altered circumstances ( nieuw gebleken feiten of veranderde omstandigheden; \u201cnova\u201d) warranting a revision of the initial decision. During her interview on the new request, the applicant stated, inter alia, that her sister had been granted international protection in the Netherlands, that the father of her daughter was living in Norway, that she had seen him in July 2010 when he had visited a relative in the Netherlands and that she was now carrying a second child by him. On the basis of the fresh asylum request, the scheduled transfer to Italy was cancelled.","18. On 8 February 2011, the Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Policy ( Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel ) rejected the fresh asylum request, concluding that it had not been based on nova. The Minister rejected the applicant \u2019 s claim that she should be admitted to the Netherlands asylum procedure because she was pregnant and that the principle of mutual inter -State trust could no longer be regarded as applicable in respect of Italy.","19. On 7 May 2011, the applicant gave birth to a second child in the Netherlands.","20. An appeal by the applicant against the Minister \u2019 s decision of 8 February 2011 was accepted in December 2011 by the single-judge chamber of the Regional Court of The Hague. The court quashed the impugned decision and ordered the Minister to take a fresh decision. It took into account several reports on the situation for asylum - seekers in Italy, drawn up between January and May 2001 by various non-governmental organisations, a report by Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe \u2019 s Commissioner for Human Rights, drawn up in September 2011 after a formal visit to Italy in May 2011, and the indication of several interim measures by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It considered that the applicant had submitted sufficient concrete indications that Italy was failing to respect its international treaty obligations in respect of asylum - seekers and refugees. It therefore concluded that the Minister could not have relied on the principle of mutual inter -State trust without carrying out a further examination.","21. On 20 May 2012, the applicant gave birth to a third child in the Netherlands.","22. An appeal by the Minister against the judgment in the applicant \u2019 s favour was accepted on 13 November 2012 by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division. It quashed the parts of the judgment of 21 December 2011 where the court had not indicated that the legal effects of the decision of 8 February 2011 were to remain intact and where it had ordered the Minister to take a fresh decision. It further ordered that the legal effects of the decision of 8 February 2011 were to remain intact and upheld the rest of the impugned judgment. Although it accepted that the applicant, being a pregnant, single mother, could be regarded as a vulnerable alien, it agreed with the Minister that the applicant \u2019 s transfer to Italy would not be contrary to her rights under Article 3 of the Convention. It took note of the Court \u2019 s judgment in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC], no. 30696\/09, ECHR 2011), observed that the applicant had relied from the outset on the Hammarberg report and other documents and found that they had not been examined by the Minister in the manner described in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. However, it did not find any reason for reaching a different decision in the applicant \u2019 s case, noting in particular that prior to every transfer the Italian authorities were notified by the Netherlands authorities about the personal situation and, where necessary, the special care needs of the person concerned. No further appeal lay against that decision.","23. On 21 December 2012, with reference to the Italian authorities \u2019 acceptance in 2010 to take the applicant back, the Netherlands authorities informed their Italian counterparts that the transfer of the applicant and her three children had been scheduled for 10 January 2013. It was specified that they would not be escorted. That transfer was subsequently cancelled.","24. On 7 January 2013 the applicant filed a request under section 64 of the Aliens Act 2000 ( Vreemdelingenwet 2000 ) for deferral of her removal for medical reasons. She pointed out that she was pregnant and due to give birth in April 2013 and submitted that she was therefore unfit to travel. The Minister rejected her request on 15 January 2013 after referring to Chapter A4\/7.6 of the Aliens Act 2000 Implementation Guidelines ( Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 ), pursuant to which expulsion of pregnant women by air cannot take place in the six weeks leading up to the due date or the first six weeks after giving birth.","25. On 21 January 2013, submitting that she was a single mother of three children and pregnant with a fourth child, the applicant filed an objection with the Minister of Security and Justice ( Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie ) against their scheduled transfer to Italy. On the same day, she filed a request for a provisional measure with the Regional Court of The Hague for a stay of her transfer to Italy, pending determination of her objection.","26. On 28 January 2013, the Netherlands authorities informed their Italian counterparts that the transfer of the applicant and her three young children had been scheduled for 7 February 2013. Apart from detailed flight information, the letter further specified in bold characters that the applicant was pregnant, that the due date was 21 April 2013, that she would be examined by a doctor before the transfer and that she and her three children would be escorted.","27. On 4 February 2013, the provisional-measures judge of the Regional Court of The Hague dismissed the applicant \u2019 s application for a provisional measure, noting that the Italian authorities had been duly notified of the transfer of the applicant and her children and their particular circumstances, and that they would be accompanied by four escorts who would personally hand them over to the Italian authorities. The judge did not find that the transfer would entail a violation of Article 3 or Article 8 of the Convention.","28. After that decision, an additional notification of transfer was sent to the Italian authorities on 5 February 2013, informing them that the transfer had been scheduled for 7 February 2013. The notification contained a further specification, set out in bold, stating that the applicant would \u201c be transferred with her three minor children, age below 3 years. They are considered as vulnerable persons. \u201d The transfer was later cancelled, pursuant to an indication given under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 29 below).","B. Events after the lodging of the application","29. The application was lodged with the Court on 17 January 2013. On 6 February 2013, the Acting President of the Section decided, under Rule 39, to indicate to the Netherlands Government that it was desirable in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court not to remove the applicant to Italy until further notice. The Acting President further decided under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (b) to give notice of the application to the Netherlands Government. The Acting President also decided to put a factual question to the Netherlands Government (Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (a)), which concerned the information provided to the Italian authorities in relation to the applicant \u2019 s scheduled transfer to Italy. The Netherlands Government submitted their reply on 26 February 2013.","30. On 6 February 2013, the Acting President of the Section further decided that information was required from the Italian Government and a number of factual questions were put to the Government of Italy (Rule 44 \u00a7 3 (a)), which concerned the applicant \u2019 s situation in Italy before her arrival in the Netherlands. The Italian Government submitted their replies on 26 and 28 March 2013 and the applicant \u2019 s comments in reply were submitted on 6 May 2013.","31. On 13 January 2013, the respondent Government were invited to submit their written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. These were received by the Court on 24 February 2015. The applicant was invited to submit her observations in reply and claims for just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention by 10 April 2015.","32. On 10 April 2015, the applicant \u2019 s representative requested an extension of this time-limit until 17 April 2015. This request was granted by the President. When the time-limit expired, no observations in reply or just satisfaction claims had been submitted by the applicant. By letter of 30 April 2015, the Court brought this failure to the knowledge of the applicant \u2019 s representative, drawing her attention to Article 37 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention.","33. On 15 June 2015, the applicant \u2019 s representative requested two more weeks for submitting the applicant \u2019 s observations in reply to those of the respondent Government. Having noted that the time-limit fixed for that purpose had expired on 20 April 2015 and that no further extension had been sought before or on this date, the President rejected the request on 17 June 2015.","34. By letter of 5 August 2015 the respondent Government submitted a copy of a circular letter dated 8 June 2015 and sent by the Dublin Unit of the Italian Ministry of the Interior ( Ministero dell Interno ) to the Dublin Units of the other member States of the European Union, in which the Italian Dublin Unit set out the new policy of the Italian authorities on transfers to Italy of families with small children. The relevant part of the Netherlands Government \u2019 s letter which accompanied the circular reads:","\u201cA new policy was considered necessary in view of the fact that reception facilities specifically reserved for such families frequently remained unused as a result of families having left for an unknown destination prior to transfer, or having obtained a court order barring their transfer. In order to safeguard appropriate facilities where families may stay together, the Italian authorities earmarked a total of 161 places, distributed over twenty-nine projects under the System for Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR). The authorities confirmed that this number will be extended should the need arise. As may be inferred from the letter of 8 June, this comprehensive guarantee is intended to avoid the need for guarantees in specific cases.","The Dutch Dublin-Unit will continue to inform its Italian counterpart at an early stage of an intended transfer of a family with minor children. On 13 July 2015, the Dutch, German and Swiss migration liaison officers to Italy issued a report on SPRAR in general, including the requirements the accommodation must fulfil, and on two projects they had visited at the invitation of the Italian Government. It is understood that later this year the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) will also report on the matter.","The Government is of the opinion that the new Italian policy will provide adequate safeguards that families with minor children are kept together in accommodation appropriate to their needs.\u201d","35. On 26 January 2016, the applicant filed written comments on the respondent Government \u2019 s submissions of 5 August 2015.","36. On 22 February 2016, the respondent Government submitted a copy of a fresh circular letter dated 15 February 2016 and sent by the Dublin Unit of the Italian Ministry of the Interior to the Dublin Units of the other member States of the European Union, in which the Italian Dublin Unit provided an updated list of \u201cthe SPRAR projects where asylum-seeker family groups with children will be accommodated, in full respect of their fundamental rights and specific vulnerabilities\u201d.","C. Relevant law and practice","37. The relevant European, Italian and Netherlands law, instruments, principles and practice in respect of asylum proceedings, reception of asylum - seekers and transfers of asylum - seekers under the Dublin Regulation have recently been summarised in Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 28-48, ECHR 2014 (extracts) ); Hussein Diirshi v. the Netherlands and Italy and 3 other applications (( dec. ), nos. 2314\/10, 18324\/10, 47851\/10 & 51377\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 98-117, 10 September 2013); Halimi v. Austria and Italy (( dec. ), no. 53852\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 21-25 and \u00a7\u00a7 29 \u2011 36, 18 June 2013); Abubeker v. Austria and Italy ( ( dec. ), no. 73874\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 31-34 and \u00a7\u00a7 37-41, 18 June 2013); Daybetgova and Magomedova v. Austria (( dec. ), no. 6198\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 25 29 and \u00a7\u00a7 32-39, 4 June 2013); and Mohammed Hussein v. the Netherlands and Italy (( dec. ), no. 27725\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 25-28 and 33-50, 2 April 2013)."],"28209":["1. The applicant, Ms M.M.R., stated that she is a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (\u201cthe DRC\u201d) and that she was born in 1988. She is currently living in the Netherlands. The President decided not to disclose the applicant \u2019 s identity to the public (Rule 47 \u00a7 4). She was represented before the Court by Mr G. Vergouw, a lawyer practising in Arnhem.","2. The Netherlands Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr R.A.A. B\u00f6cker, and Deputy Agent, Ms L. Egmond, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","4. On an unspecified day in July 2010 the applicant fled from her native DRC to the Netherlands. She arrived on 8 July 2010 and applied for asylum. On 26 July 2010 she was interviewed by the immigration authorities about her identity, nationality and travel route. On 27 July 2010 she submitted corrections and additions ( correcties en aanvullingen ) to the report drawn up of the first interview ( eerste gehoor ). On 28 July 2010, the applicant was interviewed about her reason for seeking asylum. On 29 July 2010 she submitted corrections and additions to the report drawn up of the second interview ( nader gehoor ). In the interviews she gave the following account.","5. She was of Banyamulenge (ethnic Tutsi) origin and came from Bukavo, the capital of the South Kivu province in the east of the DRC. In August 2000 her father was killed in a fight with members of an angry crowd who had entered her family home in Bukavo, screaming that the Banyamulenge should leave the country. The applicant \u2019 s mother fled into the woods, together with the applicant and one of her sisters. Her older sister Ms E. and two of her brothers also fled, but after the incident she did not see them again. After the death of her father, the applicant and her remaining family were given a house and financial aid by Papa K., a friend of her father \u2019 s. In September 2004 six or seven men entered the applicant \u2019 s home, initially looking for Banyamulenge men and boys. They did not find any. The men then raped the applicant, as well as her mother and sister. Afterwards, the applicant was taken to a house where there were other women. She was raped and ill-treated on a daily basis. After four months, in January 2005, a man acting at the request of Papa K. managed to free her and took her to Papa K. \u2019 s house. After she recovered the applicant was moved at the instigation of Papa K. to her grandparents \u2019 house in the Nguba neighbourhood in Bukavo. In 2007 anti-Banyamulenge sentiments in the Congolese population resurfaced again. The applicant was hassled at school but eventually obtained a university diploma in 2008. For a while nothing major happened. Around the end of January or early February 2009, unknown men entered her grandparents \u2019 home, looking for Banyamulenge men and boys. They raped her grandmother, chopped off her grandfather \u2019 s arm and leg because he had refused to rape the applicant, raped the applicant, killed both her grandparents and took the applicant with them. As before, the applicant was taken to a house where there were other women and girls. She was sexually abused and ill-treated every two to three days. On 6 July 2010 a man acting for Papa K. came to the house and took the applicant with him.","6. On 30 July 2010 the Minister of Justice ( Minister van Justitie ;\u201cthe Minister\u201d) notified the applicant of his intention ( voornemen ) to reject her asylum application. The certificate of loss of documents ( attestation de perte des pi\u00e8ces ) submitted by her was found to be a forgery. The certificate, which concerned the applicant \u2019 s loss of her voting card ( carte d \u2019 \u00e9lecteur ), was also found to be unauthentic in that it had not been drawn up by the competent authority. As the applicant gave incorrect statements about the document and continued to claim that it was authentic, the Minister found that serious doubts had arisen as to the applicant \u2019 s claimed identity and nationality. The absence of any other travel or identity documents and her inability to give a consistent, detailed and verifiable account of her journey to the Netherlands further detracted from the credibility of her account. The Minister also considered it odd that for someone who had lived virtually her entire life in Bukavo and who had gone to university, the applicant had hardly any basic knowledge about her hometown. For instance, she did not know the former colonial name of the town, who the mayor was, and that a \u201ckhadafi\u201d is a petrol seller. She had to think about the name of the cathedral and anthem of the DRC, and she did not know the colour of car licence plates. The Minister therefore found it unlikely that the applicant actually came from Bukavu. As she had failed to establish her identity, her asylum claim, which was based on her having lived in Bukavu, was found to lack credibility.","7. In written comments ( zienswijze ) made on 3 August 2010, the applicant maintained her account and gave explanations for her inability to answer certain questions about Bukavu. She further requested to have a language analysis conducted to prove her origin.","8. In a decision of the same date the Minister rejected the applicant \u2019 s asylum application, confirming the finding that as she had failed to demonstrate her identity and nationality, her asylum claim lacked credibility. The Minister further found that there was no need for a language analysis test.","9. On 5 August 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Regional Court ( rechtbank ) of The Hague, accompanied by a request for a provisional measure ( voorlopige voorziening ) to stay her expulsion pending the outcome of her appeal.","10. On 20 August 2010 a hearing took place before the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Arnhem. It was attended by the applicant \u2019 s sister Ms E. who was living in the Netherlands and had obtained Netherlands nationality. She had been tracked down by the Dutch Council for Refugees ( VluchtelingenWerk Nederland ). The purpose of her attendance was to prove the applicant \u2019 s identity and nationality. To this end, Ms E. submitted documents concerning her own first asylum interview in the Netherlands, during which she had mentioned the applicant as a family member who had not accompanied her on her flight there.","11. By judgment of 27 August 2010 the provisional-measures judge ( voorzieningenrechter ) of the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Arnhem rejected the applicant \u2019 s appeal and the accompanying request for a provisional measure. The judge accepted the Minister \u2019 s decision and the underlying reasoning. The submissions of the applicant \u2019 s sister Ms E. were not taken into account by the judge.","12. The applicant \u2019 s further appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State ( Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State ) was dismissed on 28 October 2010. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division found that there were no grounds for quashing the impugned ruling ( kan niet tot vernietiging van de aangevallen uitspraak leiden ). Having regard to section 91(2) of the Aliens Act 2000, no further reasoning was required as the arguments submitted did not raise any questions requiring a determination in the interests of legal unity, legal development or legal protection in the general sense. No further appeal lay against that decision.","B. Relevant domestic law and practice","13. The relevant domestic law and practice as regards asylum proceedings and enforcement of removals are set out in K. v. the Netherlands ((dec.), no. 33403\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 16-19 and \u00a7\u00a7 25-32, 25 September 2012).","14. At the material time, the respondent Government \u2019 s policy on asylum seekers from particular countries was devised by the Deputy Minister of Justice ( Staatssecretaris van Justitie ) on the basis of official country assessment reports published by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the countries of origin of asylum seekers.","15. On 10 July 2013, the Deputy Minister for Security and Justice ( Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie ) adopted a moratorium on decisions on asylum applications and expulsions ( besluit- en vertrekmoratorium) for asylum seekers of Tutsi origin hailing from the east of the DRC, including the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu.","16. The moratorium was lifted by the Deputy Minister on 3 February 2014. That policy decision, published in the Official Gazette ( Staatscourant ) of 12 February 2014 (no. 4196), was based on the contents of an official country assessment report ( ambtsbericht ) on the DRC released by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 27 November 2013. It was found in this report that there was no systemic, structural and organised discrimination of Tutsis in the DRC, that there was no structural violence in the DRC against the Tutsi population or other Congolese with a Tutsi background and that Tutsi groups could obtain protection from the DRC authorities. Although the general situation in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele in the eastern part of the DRC continued to be considered to fall within the scope of Article 15(c) of Council Directive 2004\/83\/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (\u201cthe Qualification Directive\u201d; see, for further details, Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 30-32, 28 June 2011 ), an internal protection alternative was found to be available in other parts of the DRC, including Kinshasa, for asylum seekers hailing from those provinces who did not qualify for refugee status within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.","17. In December 2014 the Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a new official country assessment report on the DRC, according to which the general situation in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu remained unsettled and unpredictable and that the situation of the Tutsis in the rest of the DRC, including Kinshasa, remained unchanged in comparison with the last reporting period. As regards the situation of women, the report reads:","\u201cWomen in the DRC occupy a subordinate position. Discrimination against women is widespread and they often have no access to decision-making, adequate healthcare, clean water, basic sanitation and legal remedies. The general position of women remained consistently bad during the reporting period. Several NGOs are active in the DRC in the area of women \u2019 s rights and the improvement of the position of women. A draft bill for equal treatment between men and women, which has been taken up for examination in parliament, has not yet been adopted during the reporting period.","The Constitution stipulates that the government is to see to it that sexual violence against women is eliminated, in particular when it is used as a weapon aiming at destabilising or disrupting the family. Such forms of sexual violence are classified in the constitution as a crime against humanity.","Sexual violence against women and girls is widespread throughout the entire country. Cases of sexual violence are most numerous in areas of war where rape is often used as a weapon in the conflict. The BCNUDH [United Nations Joint Human Rights Office] registered from January 2014 to June 2014 256 victims of sexual violence: 156 women in the Orientale province, 70 women and 3 men in North Kivu, 16 women in Katanga and 11 women in South Kivu. In August 2014 the BCNUDH registered 257 human rights violations, including 50 cases of sexual violence...","On 9 July 2014 President Kabila appointed Jeanine Mabunda Lioko Mudiayi as special advisor in the fight against sexual violence and the recruitment of child soldiers. She declared on 20 August 2014 that remarkable progress had been made in North Kivu in the fight against sexual violence. The Ministry of Defence announced [at the] end of August 2014 a national fight against sexual violence committed by Congolese soldiers. The police have trained special units in Goma and Bukavu to combat sexual violence. ...","For most women in the DRC is it difficult to call in protection against sexual violence. In theory it is indeed possible to report rape but in practice women decline to do so, due to social stigma and lack of confidence in the judicial system. When a victim decides to turn to the authorities, it remains questionable whether her case will be taken up. Police officers nearly always ask victims for a financial contribution for carrying out the investigation.","... the Congolese NGO LIZADEEL [ Ligue de la Zone Afrique pour la D\u00e9fense des Droits des Enfants, Etudiants et El\u00e8ves ] has small centres in various towns in the DRC where victims of sexual violence are accommodated and accompanied to medical care facilities. There is a special telephone number for reporting sexual violence ...","In Kinshasa, a single woman with a job and able to fend for herself has sufficient freedom ... Single women from other parts of the country can join their own ethnic community ( communaut\u00e9 ) in Kinshasa. A single woman from out of town \u2013 who has no family in town \u2013 can temporarily find shelter with someone from their own community. Single women also seek support from the Catholic Church or one of the many awakening [evangelical] churches in Kinshasa. In Kinshasa legal training is given with a view to prosecuting perpetrators of sexual violence. The NGO LIZADEEL runs a shelter for traumatised women in Kinshasa.\u201d","18. In a letter of 27 January 2015, the Deputy Minister informed the Lower House of Parliament that on the basis of the official country assessment report on the DRC of December 2014 the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu continued to be considered to fall within the scope of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, but that this qualification no longer applied to the provinces of Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele and therefore the \u201c15(c) policy\u201d in respect of these regions was discontinued.","C. Relevant international materials","19. The summary of the report on the \u201cConditions for Tutsis in Kinshasa\u201d, published on 19 January 2015 by the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, reads:","\u201cThe Tutsis \u2019 share of the population of the Democratic Republic of Congo is fairly small, but they have played a political role in the country that is much more significant than their number would lead one to expect. The Tutsi population of Kinshasa has always been rather small. When the second Congo war broke out in August 1998, Tutsis were victims of large pogroms in Kinshasa after they were collectively blamed for Rwanda \u2019 s interference in Congolese politics by the country \u2019 s president and authorities. During and after the pogroms, the Tutsis who survived were either evacuated or managed to leave Kinshasa by themselves. Since the early 2000s, there have been no reports of human rights violations against Tutsis in Kinshasa. This can be explained partly by there being few Tutsis living there, and partly by political circumstances that differ from those present at the outbreak of the second Congo war in 1998.\u201d","20. The main findings of the report \u201cSituation des femmes seules \u00e0 Kinshasa\u201d, released on 15 January 2016 by the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration SEM (Country Analysis) states:","\u201cIn a country which ranks among the lowest according to the Human development index, women are [also] subject to obvious discrimination. Already vulnerable as a woman, a single woman deprived of a family or a social network is even more vulnerable without a means of existence. However, some single women can organise [themselves] in Kinshasa and find support to improve their living conditions and attempt to secure their financial independence.\u201d"],"28211":["1. The applicants, Ms M.R. and her two minor children, are Iraqi nationals who were born in 1 980, 2005 and 2008 respectively. They were represented before the Court by Ms Sini Ruutu, a lawyer practising in Helsinki.","2. The Finnish Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","The applicants \u2019 account of their circumstances","4. The applicant mother is a Kurd from Kirkuk, Iraq, who escaped from Iraq with her husband and two children due to persecution. The applicants claimed that the husband had been threatened by the \u201cIslamic State\u201d for having denounced to the authorities persons who were in possession of firearms. He had subsequently received many death threats, for which reason the family was relocated elsewhere in Northern Iraq. Despite the internal flight, the persecution continued. The family fled first to Turkey, where their persecutors tried to kidnap the children. They then fled to Italy.","5. The applicant mother fell gravely ill after her second pregnancy in 2009. Both of her kidneys were removed and she received a kidney transplant. Due to a lack of proper medication, she was in very poor condition during their escape from Kurdistan and does not even remember being in Italy.","Asylum proceedings in Finland","6. The applicants apparently arrived in Finland in July 2015 and sought asylum on 29 July 2015. The applicant mother was immediately admitted to hospital and was thereafter admitted to hospital on a monthly basis for periods of varying length. It appears that her husband has in the meantime been convicted of rape and that she has decided to divorce him. Upon their application for asylum in Finland on 29 July 2015, it was discovered that the applicants had previously been registered in Italy on 11 July 2015.","7. On 2 February 2016 the Finnish Immigration Service ( Maahanmuuttovirasto, Migrationsverket ) rejected the applicants \u2019 application and decided to order their return to Italy. The Service found that, on 31 August 2015, the Finnish authorities had informed the Italian Government about the applicants \u2019 family situation and the scheduled arrival of the applicant mother and her children, and that the Italian authorities had not opposed to receive them. The parents were capable of taking care of their children and removal to Italy was not against the best interest of the children, in whose interest it was to live with their parents. Italy had agreed to comply with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and was to examine the applicants \u2019 asylum application. The applicants had a right to services provided by Italian authorities. In a Dublin transfer decision the substance of the asylum claim is not examined, so the decision regarding the applicants did not deal with the applicant mother \u2019 s illness or her factual position as a single mother due to the pre-trial detention of the children \u2019 s father.","8. By letter dated 10 February 2016 the applicants appealed to the Administrative Court ( hallinto-oikeus, f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen ), requesting also a stay on removal.","9. On 12 February 2016 the Administrative Court decided not to grant a stay on removal.","10. By letters dated 17 February and 8 March 2016 the applicants made their second and third requests for a stay on removal. On unspecified dates the Administrative Court refused these requests.","11. The proceedings before the Administrative Court are still pending. However, a Dublin transfer decision is enforceable, notwithstanding that the case has not been finally determined.","B. Procedure under Rule 39","12. The application was lodged with the Court on 11 March 2016. On 15 March 2016 the duty judge of the Court decided to suspend the examination of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court until receipt of information from the respondent Government and to put factual questions to the Finnish Government under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (a), which concerned, inter alia, the guarantees obtained from the Italian authorities in relation to the applicants \u2019 scheduled transfer to Italy.","13. The Finnish Government submitted their reply on 29 March 2016. In their letter, the respondent Government noted that the Italian authorities had informed the Finnish authorities of the guarantees for vulnerable cases, including families with children, by their letters of 8 June 2015 and 15 February 2016. A copy of these circular letters sent by the Dublin Unit of the Italian Ministry of the Interior ( Ministero dell \u2019 Interno ) was attached to the Government \u2019 s letter. In these circular letters the Italian Dublin Unit set out the new policy of the Italian authorities on transfers to Italy of families with small children and provided an updated list of accommodation available to such families.","14. The Finnish Government noted that the Immigration Service would transfer the medical information detailing the special needs of the applicants to the competent authorities in Italy and, accordingly, those needs would be taken care of in such a manner that the applicants would receive any necessary medical care in Italy without interruption. They noted that the Finnish authorities had made sufficient efforts to obtain individual and specific guarantees from the Italian authorities, and that there was no reason to suspect that the applicants would be separated from each other or subjected to any treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention upon arrival in Italy. The examination of the applicants \u2019 application by the Court was premature, as no final decision by the relevant domestic courts had yet been made. Accordingly, the Government considered that the applicants \u2019 application should be declared inadmissible by virtue of Article 35 \u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.","15. On 1 April 2016 the applicants were sent a copy of the Government \u2019 s letter for information.","16. On 5 April 2016 the duty judge of the Court decided, under Rule 39, to indicate to the Finnish Government that the applicants should not be transferred to Italy for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.","17. On 22 April 2016 the applicants commented on the information submitted by the Government, maintaining that they had not been informed to date of any individual or specific guarantees concerning their possible removal to Italy. A mere agreement between Finland and Italy to keep families with children together and to arrange accommodation for them could not be regarded as sufficient. The applicants \u2019 situation would be unclear if Italy could give no individual guarantees by the time of the possible removal. According to the applicants, the children \u2019 s father had been convicted of rape and sentenced to two years \u2019 imprisonment. The applicant mother was certain that her marriage was over, but acknowledged that the children \u2019 s well-being was fully dependent on their father \u2019 s presence. Regular family visits to prison had already been arranged for the children. The applicants wished the Court to continue the examination of their case."],"28217":["5.The applicant was born in 1978 and until his arrest lived in Sarapul, the Republic of Udmurtiya.","6.He was arrested on 18 October 2006. On 28 May 2007 the Sarapul Town Court convicted him of several criminal offences, including aggravated robbery committed by a criminal group, and sentenced him to six years and ten months\u2019 imprisonment.","A.Conditions of detention","7.After the arrest on 18 October 2006 the applicant was taken to a police station in Sarapul and shortly thereafter to remand prison no. IZ-18\/1 in Izhevsk. Twenty days later he was admitted to prison hospital no.4 (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d).","8.The parties provided conflicting descriptions of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the prison hospital between March and October 2007.","1.Description submitted by the applicant","9.From March to May 2007 he was detained with nine other sick inmates in cell no. 4, which measured 36 sq. m. Accordingly, each detainee was afforded around 3.6 sq. m of personal space. The living space was further diminished by six bunk beds and a table. The cell had a window measuring 150 by 150 cm and two lamps, only one of which was functional. Inmates were allowed to smoke in the cell. The ventilation system, which was switched on in the mornings and evenings, and a small ventilation window measuring 25 by 30 cm, was unable to ensure sufficient inflow of fresh air. The cell had a squat toilet separated by a metal screen from the sink, but not from the table or the door.","10.In May 2007 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 1 which was not different in any aspect from cell no. 4, save for the facts that the cell had two windows and was located in the semi-basement and was therefore excessively humid.","11.In late June 2007 the applicant was placed in cell no. 20. The conditions of detention there were satisfactory. It was designed for ten detainees but only accommodated five.","12.Shortly after the applicant was returned to cell no. 4. He did not describe his further transfers between the cells, only claiming that the conditions of his detention had been deplorable.","13.As to the general conditions of detention, the applicant argued that daily outdoor exercises were dispiriting, as the prison yard, secured by high walls, was gloomy and small, and the outdoor activities did not last longer than an hour, or were sometimes even shorter.","14.The applicant used communal shower facilities which were in an appalling unsanitary condition. The floor was covered by a mixture of mud and detergent. Each detainee was afforded fifteen minutes to take a shower.","15.The quality of food served in the prison hospital was poor and scarce. Dishes largely comprised of cabbage, potatoes and barley grit. Meat or fish was only served on public holidays.","16.The applicant supported his claims with photos of the prison hospital and a dish served there.","2.Description submitted by the Government","17.Relying on certificates issued by the prison hospital administration on 22, 23 and 24 April 2013, extracts from records of inmates\u2019 transfers on 7 and 28 February, 27 March, 5 and 23 April, 7 August, 7 and 11September, 1October 2007, and a detailed plan of the prison hospital, the Government claimed that the facility had not been overcrowded. Their submissions may be summarised as follows:","Period of detention","Cell no.","Cell surface area (sq. m)","Number of detainees","28 February to 21 March 2007","4","37","7","21 to 27 March 2007","6","22.5","5","27 to 31 March 2007","4","37","7","31 March to 5 April 007","Punishment cell no. 1","6.1","1","5 to 23 April 2007","4","37","7","23 April to 7 August","1","30.4","7","7 August to 7 September 2007","20","36.8","7","7 to 11 September 2007","4","37","8","11 September to 1 October 2007","14","39.4","9","1 to 9 October 2007","Punishment cell no. 2","6.7","1","18.Relying on photos of the prison hospital, written statements about the conditions of detention in 2007 made by three inmates in 2013, and on certificates issued by the prison hospital administration on 22 and 24 April 2013, the Government argued that the cell windows had allowed sufficient daylight so that inmates had been able to read and write. The cells had been equipped with four 40\u2011watt fluorescent tubes which had been lit from 6a.m. to 10 p.m. At night the cells had been lit by security lights.","19.A ventilation system had been installed in every cell. The natural ventilation had also been ensured through the windows. The heating system had properly functioned.","20.Toilets in the cells had been separated from the main area by a partition for privacy. Due to the security considerations involved, punishment cells designed for solitary confinement had no such partition, but were equipped with a curtain. The applicant had been able take a shower once a week for at least fifteen minutes.","21.The premises of the prison hospital had been in good sanitary condition, as it had been checked daily by staff members. The cells had been cleaned and disinfected every day.","22.In addition to a daily hour-long walk in the prison hospital\u2019s yard, the applicant had been able to walk freely during the daytime within sanitary block.","23.The applicant had been provided with three hot meals per day and an extra allowance for ill inmates comprising bread, vegetables, meat, milk, cheese and fruit juice.","B.Medical treatment","24.Despite the Court\u2019s request to produce the applicant\u2019s complete medical record, the Government only submitted several illegible pages apparently belonging to his medical file. They further produced extracts from his medical history. The extracts contained fragments of information concerning the drugs prescribed.The following information on the applicant\u2019s treatment may be deduced from the submitted documents.","25.The applicant did not suffer from tuberculosis prior to his arrest.","26.On the day of his arrest, 18 October 2006, the applicant was seen by a prison paramedic, who performed a general check-up, noting, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s lungs were clear. The next day a prison doctor confirmed that he was in good health. In late October a periodic chest X-ray showed traces of tuberculosis. The prison doctor studied the X-ray record and recommended the applicant\u2019s transfer to the prison hospital.","27.Five days later the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital. A sputum smear test performed on admission led to his being diagnosed with infiltrative tuberculosis at the stage of lung tissue destruction, with inactive Mycobacterium tuberculosis (\u201cMBT\u201d). Two days later a new X-ray test confirmed the diagnosis.","28.Between 16 November 2006 and 11 January 2007 the applicant underwent inpatient anti-tuberculosis treatment in the prison hospital. There is no information describing the nature of the treatment. For unknown reasons it was unsuccessful.","29.According to the medical records, in the following year the applicant \u201creceived standard anti-tuberculosis treatment\u201d. However, he stated that between March 2007 and March 2008 he had only been given basic febrifuges and painkillers. During that period he was seen by the prison doctor on three occasions. No significant changes were registered. The size of the lung cavities remained the same.","30.In the beginning of 2008, when a chest X-ray and tomography examinations registered a new focal point of infiltration in the right lung, the applicant\u2019s doctor confirmed the extent of the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health.","31.In early March 2008 the applicant was examined by a commission of doctors and certified as having a second-degree disability. A three-month drug regimen based on pyrazinamide, ethambutol, capreomycin and other medication was prescribed. According to the applicant, one of the drugs was out of stock.","32.On 18 March and 1 April 2008 the applicant failed to see the attending doctor.","33.In May 2008 the treatment regimen was amended with capreomycin removed and new drugs (rifampicin, cycloserine and others) added into the applicant\u2019s daily drug intake.","34.In the following two months the applicant interrupted his treatment for a period of two or three weeks, having refused to take some drugs and having gone on hunger strike. In the late June 2008 his tuberculosis transformed into MBT-positive form.","35.Between July 2008 and March 2009 the applicant received inpatient treatment which had no effect on his medical condition. The deterioration of his health continued in the summer and autumn of 2009.","36.An X-ray and a tomography examination performed in September2009 indicated that the applicant\u2019s lungs were filled with caseation. The applicant was taken for a month-long inpatient treatment in the hospital with his condition had been brought under control. By September 2010 his health had improved and the lung cavities had disappeared.","37.According to his medical records, in December 2010 the applicant refused to take a few of the anti-tuberculosis drugs. In April, September and November 2011 he did not consult the attending doctor.","38.In September 2011 tuberculomas replaced the lung cavities. In2012\u201113 calcifications and pulmonary fibrosis scars were only registered in the applicant\u2019s lungs. The most recent sputum smear test in February2013 did not indicate whether the applicant remained MBT\u2011positive.","39.The parties did not submit information on the applicant\u2019s further treatment.","C.Complaints regarding medical treatment","40.In the end of 2006 the applicant complained about the poor quality of medical care to the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Udmurtiya. By a letter of 17 January 2007 his claim was rejected.","41.In the early 2007 he lodged a similar claim with the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Republic of Udmurtiya. It was dismissed on 23 April 2007.","42.In 2008 the applicant unsuccessfully complained to the Federal Ombudsman about his alleged lack of access to information about his health and diagnoses. His claim was not examined on the merits.","43.He further complained of the lack of medical assistance to the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Republic of Udmurtiya. On 21August 2008 his complaint was dismissed.","44.In 2010 the applicant lodged two claims with the Industrialnyy District Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya arguing that he had not benefitted from adequate medical care in detention. The claims were dismissed. According to the Government, the applicant did not appeal. The parties did not submit copies of the judgments."],"28218":["5.The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Cotiglet, Romania. At the time of the events complained of, she was aged fourteen years and four months.","A.The events of 13 January 2007","6.On 13 January 2007 the applicant was attending a funeral wake in her village. At around 8 p.m. she went with two girlfriends, P.A. (ten years old) and Z.F.D. (fourteen years old) to fetch some drinking water at a neighbour\u2019s house. On their way, three boys, M.I.C. (fifteen years old), M.S. (fifteen years old) and M.C.S. (sixteen years old), approached the girls. M.I.C. pulled the applicant\u2019s arm behind her back, grabbed her head and told her to go with him. The boys took her into the garden of a nearby deserted building, where a man, M.C. (twenty-two years old), was waiting.","7.The three boys left and M.C. pushed the applicant to the ground, partially undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. In the meantime, another man, A.C.L. (twenty-six years old), arrived at the scene and tried to have sex with the applicant, but was physiologically incapable. A third man, V.F. (thirty years old) was also there. He had also intended to have sexual intercourse with the applicant but finally decided to help her get up, clean and dress herself, and accompanied her back to the house where the funeral wake was being held. Twenty minutes later the applicant\u2019s father came looking for her and she told him that she had been raped. He immediately alerted the police.","B.The applicant\u2019s subsequent medical condition","8.The applicant underwent a forensic examination by a doctor on 14January 2007. According to the subsequent forensic medical report, there were no signs of traumatic lesions on the applicant\u2019s body and no sperm could be found either. The forensic doctor found signs of pathology which could have resulted from sexual intercourse. Lastly, the doctor mentioned that the applicant was in a state of anxiety and fear, and he recommended psychological counselling and possibly a neuropsychiatric examination.","9.On 15 February 2007 the applicant was admitted to the Oradea Psychiatric Hospital. The hospital observation sheet stated that the applicant had sought treatment because she had been raped. She was diagnosed with stress-related anxiety, irritability, a sleep disorder, slight intellectual disability (an IQ of 68) and lice infestation. She was prescribed treatment with anxiolytics and anti-depressives, and was discharged from hospital in a slightly improved condition on 20 February 2007.","10.On 5 March 2007 an additional forensic medical report was issued at the request of the applicant\u2019s father. It stated that the applicant presented a psychological disorder caused by a physical and psychological trauma to which she had been exposed on 13 January 2007. The doctor held that, according to the documents presented by the Oradea Psychiatric Hospital, the applicant\u2019s condition had required fourteen days of medical care. No signs of pregnancy had been detected.","11.On 24 April 2007 the applicant was readmitted to the Oradea Psychiatric Hospital. According to the hospital observation sheet, her state of health was slightly improving but she had started to have headaches. She was discharged from hospital the following day, having been told to continue the initial treatment and to return for further tests at the end of May.","12.In July 2007 the applicant was again hospitalised in the Oradea Psychiatric Hospital for fourteen days with symptoms including frontal headaches, depression, tearfulness and feelings of social isolation. She was diagnosed with an emotional disorder, a sleep disorder and anaemia, among other conditions. She received treatment with neurotropic drugs, anxiolytics and vitamins. The doctors prescribed further treatment with neurotropic drugs and anxiolytics until a follow-up examination scheduled for September.","C.The criminal investigation","13.On 14 January 2007 the applicant, accompanied by her father, lodged a formal complaint with the police. On the same day she made a written statement about the events of the previous day, accusing the three adult men involved in the incident of rape. She also mentioned that, all the way to the deserted house, M.I.C. and M.S. had held her by her arms and neck, not allowing her to leave, and had threatened to beat her if she screamed for help. The police accompanied the applicant and her father to the scene of the incident and took photographs. No objects or other evidence were found.","14.Later the same day, written statements were given to the police by M.C. and M.I.C. M.C. stated that he had not forced the applicant in any way and he had not been aware that she was under fifteen. He alleged that he had seen the applicant during the wake and had invited her to go with him to the deserted house, which she had done voluntarily. After he had had consensual sex with the applicant, he had left her in the company of M.C.S. and had returned to the wake. M.I.C. denied any involvement in the events, stating that he had not left the house where the wake had been held.","15. On 15 January 2007 A.C.L., V.F. and M.C.S. gave statements to the police.","16.A.C.L. stated that on the evening of 13 January 2007 he had been passing by the deserted house when he had heard noises coming from the garden. He decided to go inside to see what was happening. There he met V.F., who told him that M.C. was there with a girl. He saw M.C. on top of the applicant, having sex. After he had finished, M.C. called him to do the same thing. He tried, but was physiologically incapable of having sex so he stood up and put his clothes back on. He left together with M.C., who was waiting for him nearby.","17.M.C.S. stated that he had seen how M.I.C. had grabbed and twisted the applicant\u2019s arm and had left with her from the wake. He had followed them together with M.S., but received a phone call and continued on a separate road.","18.In his statement, V.F. claimed that he had been at the wake when the applicant\u2019s brothers had asked him to help them look for their sister. He left alone and went to the deserted house where he found the applicant with M.C. A.C.L. was also there. At that moment his phone rang so he did not pay attention to the three people. When he finished on the phone he heard the applicant calling him and went to her. She was alone, lying on the ground, undressed from the waist down. He asked her what had happened but she did not say anything. When she asked him to come closer, he started kissing her and wanted to have sex with her, but felt uneasy about it, so he helped her get dressed and clean up the mud on her coat, and accompanied her back to the wake.","19.On 17 January 2007 the applicant\u2019s two girlfriends made statements to the police. They mentioned that M.I.C., M.S. and M.C.S. had approached the applicant, twisted her arm to her back and taken her with them. When she returned to the wake, the applicant did not tell them where she had been. P.A. also stated that she had heard the applicant shouting at the three boys to leave her alone. Z.F. had also seen the three boys surround the applicant and take her with them.","20.The applicant gave another detailed account of the facts in a statement drafted on 18 January 2007. She repeated that the three boys had forced her to go with them without saying where they were taking her, so she had not known what was going on. Once they arrived at the deserted house, there was M.C. who threatened to beat her if she would not accept to have sex with him. She further clarified that M.C.S. had kept her there by force until M.C. had raped her a second time. Then A.C.L. and V.F. came around and tried to rape her but failed and it was V.F. who had finally helped her leave the scene of the incident. Lastly, she mentioned that she had never had sex before the incident of 13 January and that M.C., A.C.L. and V.F. had known her and had been aware of her age.","21. M.S. stated to the police on 22 January 2007 that he had heard M.C. asking M.I.C. to take the applicant to the deserted house without telling her why. When the girls came out of the house where the wake was being held, he saw M.I.C. going after them and grabbing the applicant\u2019s head, twisting her arm to her back and taking her in the direction of the deserted house. He denied having touched or spoken to the applicant. He had just walked behind her and continued on his way past the deserted house. M.C.S. gave the same account of the facts.","22.M.I.C. was questioned again on 22 January 2007, when he re\u2011considered his initial statement and told the police that M.C. had asked him, M.S. and M.C.S. to \u201cgrab\u201d the applicant and take her to the deserted house. He then admitted having grabbed her by the arms, but claimed that afterwards she had walked along with him voluntarily.","23.On 6 February 2007 the police took another round of statements from those involved in the events, who reiterated their previous statements. In addition, all the men questioned stated that they knew for a fact that the applicant had had sex before with other men and that they had been unaware of her age at the time.","24.On 2 March 2007 the case was transmitted to the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bihor County Court in order for it to pursue the investigation into the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor.","25.On 26 April 2007 the applicant gave a statement before the prosecutor and requested that M.C., A.C.L., M.I.C., M.C.S. and M.S. be investigated for rape and complicity to rape.","26.M.C. and A.C.L. also gave brief statements before the prosecutor. M.C. claimed on this occasion that the applicant was the one who had sent word through M.I.C. that she wished to meet with him. A.C.L. stated that he knew the applicant had already had sex before and she had poor school results.","27.On 23 May 2007 the prosecutor indicted M.C. for the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor and A.C.L. for attempt to commit the same crime. The prosecutor based the decision on the following facts: the two men declared that they had not forced the applicant in any way; the forensic medical certificate attested to no signs of violence on the applicant\u2019s body; and after returning to the wake she had not told her girlfriends what had happened to her. In view of those elements it was considered that the applicant had consented to have sex with M.C. and A.C.L. The witnesses, M.I.C., M.C.S. and M.S., did not know about M.C.\u2019s intentions and therefore it was considered that they had no criminal responsibility in the case. The criminal proceedings were discontinued with respect to V.F. because he had not had sexual intercourse with the applicant.","D.The trial","28.The Beiu\u015f District Court scheduled a first hearing in the case on 15June 2007. The applicant stressed before the court that M.C. had twice had sexual intercourse with her without her consent. In support of her allegations, she submitted copies of the medical reports referred to in paragraphs 8-11 above. She also claimed civil damages for the suffering caused by the actions of the two defendants.","29.M.C. testified before the court that, once he had arrived at the funeral wake, M.I.C. had told him that the applicant was waiting for him at the deserted house. When he reached the meeting point, the applicant started kissing him and asked him to go with her to the back of the garden, away from the road. They then lay down on his coat and the applicant started undressing herself. They had sexual intercourse once, which was consensual. He did it because V.F. had told him once that he had had sex with the applicant in the past. Lastly, M.C. mentioned that he had done this before with other girls at other funeral wakes.","30.A.C.L. reiterated the statements he had given during the investigation. He concluded his testimony before the court with the remark:","\u201c... I was asked by someone in the village whether it was true what happened and whether I was not ashamed of what I had done, but I replied that it was not safe to leave girls alone on the streets.\u201d","31.On 31 August and 28 September 2007 the court heard statements from the applicant\u2019s two girlfriends, as well as from M.I.C. and M.C.S. In her testimony Z.F. claimed that the applicant had been scared when she had returned to the wake. She also mentioned that the applicant was a well\u2011behaved girl who did not go out with boys or go to bars. M.C.S. stated that he had heard the applicant asking M.I.C. to let go of her hand, but the latter had refused.","32.In his testimony M.I.C. also stated as follows:","\u201cThe next morning we went to the police to give statements and afterwards I asked M.C. what had really happened. He then told me that he had raped her [the applicant]. He did not seem too happy about his actions. We have played this game before at another wake: you must take the girl to a secluded place where she must be kissed by the boy she chooses. When the defendant [M.C.] told me he had raped the victim, he also mentioned that he had kissed her.\u201d","33.On 12 October 2007 the Beiu\u015f District Court convicted M.C. of sexual intercourse with a minor and gave him a suspended sentence of one year and four months. A.C.L. was convicted of attempted sexual intercourse with a minor and given a suspended sentence of one year.","34.In reaching its decision the court firstly observed that the forensic medical report indicated that no signs of violence had been detected on the victim\u2019s body. The court further established the course of the events on the evening of 13 January 2007 as described by M.I.C., M.C.S. and M.S. It cited the parts of the statements given by the applicant\u2019s two girlfriends in which they had mentioned that the applicant had not cried for help. Lastly, the court concluded that the two defendants ought to have known that the injured party was under the age of fifteen. The court did not address the applicant\u2019s statement, the medical reports attesting to her medical condition or her requests for the incident to be examined as rape. It rejected her claim for civil damages, considering that the medical conditions described in the forensic reports had no connection with the incident at issue. In addition, it had come to light from witness statements that the applicant had had sex before the impugned incident.","35.All parties to the trial, including the applicant represented by her lawyer, appealed against the decision of the Beiu\u015f District Court. In her reasons for appeal the applicant claimed that the sexual abuse committed against her could only be classified as rape. She asked the court to extend the examination of the case to M.I.C., M.C.S. and M.S., whom she considered accomplices to rape. Lastly, the applicant considered that the medical reports submitted clearly attested to the suffering she had endured and therefore the court had erred in rejecting her claim for damages.","36.On 27 February 2008 the Bihor County Court decided to increase the sentences imposed on the two defendants to three years\u2019 imprisonment for M.C. and eighteen months\u2019 imprisonment for A.C.L. The decision of the Beiu\u015f District Court concerning the classification of the crime and the suspension of the execution of the sentences was upheld. The County Court also decided to award the applicant 2,000 Romanian lei (RON) (approximately 600 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In reply to the applicant\u2019s reasons for appeal, the court reasoned:","\u201cIt must be mentioned that the victim tried to convince the court that, in fact, she had not agreed to have sexual intercourse with the two defendants and that she had been the victim of a rape, but these allegations had not been proved in any way. Hence, the witnesses Z.F. and P.A. ... stated that ... the injured party had not cried for help ... and had not told them what had happened. ...","It must also be noted that from the forensic medical report ... it does not appear that the injured party was the victim of a rape, since she displayed no signs of post\u2011traumatic injury on her body.\u201d","37.An appeal on points of law (recurs) lodged by the applicant against that judgment was rejected as ill-founded on 8 May 2008 by the Oradea Court of Appeal. The court declared briefly that by corroborating the victim\u2019s statement with the forensic medical report of 14 January 2007, the existence of a crime of rape had been excluded in the case.","40.A detailed description of the relevant international material concerning sexual violence against children and women can be found in M.G.C. v. Romania (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 38-46).","41.As regards people with disabilities, on 2 February 2005 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the Resolution ResAP(2005)1 on safeguarding adults and children with disabilities against abuse. The Resolution recognizes that abuse against people with disabilities may also take the form of sexual abuse and exploitation, including rape, sexual aggression, indecent assault or indecent exposure. In this respect it reads as follows:","\u201cThese abuses require a proportional response \u2013 one which does not cut across legitimate choices made by individuals with disabilities but one which recognises vulnerability and exploitation. The term \u2018abuse\u2019 therefore refers to matters across a wide spectrum, which includes criminal acts, breaches of professional ethics, practices falling outside agreed guidelines or seriously inadequate care. As a consequence, measures to prevent and respond to abuse involve a broad range of authorities and actors, including the police, the criminal justice system, the government bodies regulating service provision and professions, advocacy organisations, user networks and patient councils, as well as service providers and planners. ...","They should encourage cooperation between authorities and organisations in finding measures to prevent abuse, to improve detection and reporting of abuse, and to support the victims.\u201d","42.The relevant parts of Recommendation Rec(2006)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the Council of Europe Action Plan to promote the rights and full participation of people with disabilities in society read as follows:","\u201cPersons with disabilities constitute a varied population group, but all have in common ... the need for additional safeguards in order to enjoy their rights to the full ... There are indicators that the rate of abuse and violence committed against persons with disabilities is considerably higher than the rate for the general population, and higher in women with disabilities ...","While governments cannot guarantee that abuse will not happen they must do their utmost to establish protection and the strongest possible safeguards ... Persons with disabilities who experience abuse or violence should have access to appropriate supports. They must have a system in which they can have sufficient confidence to report abuse and expect follow-up action, including individual support. Such systems require personnel who are skilled and qualified to detect and respond to situations of abuse.\u201d","43.The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Disability stated the following in her 2006 report on the question of monitoring the situation of people with disabilities:","\u201c2. People with developmental disabilities are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations. Also, people with disabilities are rarely taken into account, they have no political voice and are often a sub group of already marginalized social groups, and therefore, have no power to influence governments. They encounter significant problems in accessing the judicial system to protect their rights or to seek remedies for violations; and their access to organizations that may protect their rights is generally limited. While non-disabled people need independent national and international bodies to protect their human rights, additional justifications exist for ensuring that people with disabilities and their rights be given special attention through independent national and international monitoring mechanisms.\u201d","44.In the context of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities the United Nations had published the following relevant findings:","\u201cPersons with disabilities are more likely to be victims of violence or rape, according to a 2004 British study, and less likely to obtain police intervention, legal protection or preventive care.","Research indicates that violence against children with disabilities occurs at annual rates at least 1.7 times greater than for their non-disabled peers.\u201d"],"28245":["6.The applicants were born in 1955 and live in Baku.","7.The first applicant is a well-known human rights defender and civil society activist. She is the director of the Institute for Peace and Democracy (\u201cthe Institute\u201d), a non-governmental organisation specialising in human rights protection and conflict resolution.","8.The second applicant, the first applicant\u2019s husband, is a researcher and the head of the Conflict Resolution Department of the Institute.","A.Institution of criminal proceedings against the first applicant and her detention pending trial","9.On 30 July 2014 the first applicant was arrested by the police and was taken to the Serious Crimes Department (\u201cthe SCD\u201d) of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. On the same day she was charged under Articles 178.3.2 (large-scale fraud), 192.2.2 (illegal entrepreneurship), 213.2.2 (large-scale tax evasion), 274 (high treason), 320.1 and 320.2 (falsification of official documents) of the Criminal Code.","10.On 30 July 2014 the Nasimi District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the first applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s request for application of the preventive measure of remand in custody (h\u0259bs q\u0259timkan t\u0259dbiri), ordered her detention pending trial for a period of three months. The court justified its application of the preventive measure by the gravity of the charges and the likelihood that if released, she might abscond from the investigation.","11.On 1 August 2014 the first applicant appealed against this decision, claiming that her detention was unlawful. She submitted, in particular, that there was no reasonable suspicion that she had committed a criminal offence, and that there was no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody. She pointed out in this connection that her detention was related to her activities as a human rights defender and that she had been punished for her activities. She further complained that the court had failed to take into account her personal circumstances, such as her state of health and age, when it had ordered her detention pending trial.","12.On 6 August 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the first-instance court\u2019s decision was lawful.","13.On 24 October 2014 the Nasimi District Court extended the first applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by four months, until 28 February 2015. The court substantiated its decision by the fact that more time was needed to complete the investigation and that the grounds for the detention had not changed.","14.On the same day the Nasimi District Court also dismissed the first applicant\u2019s request to be released on bail or placed under house arrest instead of in pre-trial detention.","15.On 27 October 2014 she appealed against these decisions, reiterating her previous complaints.","16.On 30 October 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal, in two separate decisions, upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decisions of 24 October 2014.","17.No further extension decisions were included in the case file.","B.Institution of criminal proceedings against the second applicant and his detention pending trial","18.On 30 July 2014 the second applicant was questioned by an investigator at the SCD. Following the interrogation, he was charged under Articles 178.3.2 (large-scale fraud) and 274 (high treason) of the Criminal Code.","19.On the same day the investigator decided to apply the preventive measure of placement under police supervision (polisin n\u0259zar\u0259ti alt\u0131na verm\u0259 q\u0259timkan t\u0259dbiri), taking into account his state of health, in particular the fact that he suffered from chronic hypertension. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:","\u201cTaking into consideration the state of health of the accused, Arif Yunusov, who was diagnosed with grade 3 hypertension and hypertensive crisis, and given medical treatment in the Central Oil Workers\u2019 Hospital and Baku City Clinical Hospital No. 1 ... it was appropriate to choose the preventive measure of placement under police supervision.\u201d","20.It appears from the documents submitted by the Government that on 30 July 2014 the second applicant was examined by two experts, who issued forensic medical report no. 185\/KES dated 31 July 2014. The report confirmed that the second applicant suffered from chronic hypertension. The report also indicated that \u201cconsidering A. Yunusov\u2019s current state of health, it is possible to carry out investigative actions with him\u201d (\u201cA.Yunusovun hal-haz\u0131rk\u0131 sa\u011flaml\u0131q durumu il\u0259 \u0259laq\u0259dar onunla istintaq h\u0259r\u0259k\u0259tl\u0259rinin apar\u0131lmas\u0131 m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr\u201d).","21.On 5 August 2014 the second applicant was arrested by the police. On the same day the prosecutor lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court asking it to replace the second applicant\u2019s placement under police supervision with detention pending trial. The prosecutor justified his request by the second applicant\u2019s failure to comply with the requirements of the preventive measure of placement under police supervision. The request also indicated that forensic medical report no. 185\/KES dated 31 July 2014 did not reveal anything that would prevent the second applicant from participating in the investigation.","22.On 5 August 2014 the Nasimi District Court ordered the second applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for a period of three months. The court justified the detention by the gravity of the charges and the likelihood that if released he might abscond from the investigation.","23.On 8 August 2014 the second applicant appealed against this decision. He submitted, in particular, that there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence and that there was no justification for replacing the preventive measure of placement under police supervision with detention pending trial. He also pointed out that his detention was related to his and his wife\u2019s activities as a civil society activist and human rights defender and that the court had failed to take into account his personal circumstances, such as his state of health and age, when it had ordered his detention pending trial.","24.On 11 August 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the detention order was justified.","25.On 29 October 2014 the Nasimi District Court extended the second applicant\u2019s detention pending trial by four months, until 5 March 2015. The court substantiated its decision by the fact that more time was needed to complete the investigation and that the grounds for the detention had not changed.","26.On 30 October 2014 the Nasimi District Court also dismissed the second applicant\u2019s request to be released on bail or placed under house arrest instead of in pre-trial detention.","27.On 3 November 2014 the second applicant appealed against these decisions, reiterating his previous complaints and arguing that the first\u2011instance court had failed to justify his continued detention.","28.On 6 November 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal, in two separate decisions, upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decisions of 29 and 30October 2014.","29.No further extension decisions were included in the case file.","C.The applicants\u2019 state of health before their arrest","30.The medical documentation submitted by the parties shows that the first applicant suffers from a number of illnesses. In particular, she has suffered from chronic hepatitis (hepatitis C) since 1997. People with hepatitis C usually suffer from constant exhaustion, joint, muscle and abdominal pain, general sickness and weakness, and often depression. A low-fat diet is required to reduce liver damage. The disease is potentially fatal. The first applicant regularly underwent medical treatment in Germany before her arrest.","31.Since 2009 she has also had type 2 diabetes, which is non-insulin dependent and requires sufferers to follow a special diabetic diet and take regular exercise. In addition, she suffers from myogelosis (muscle stiffness), arterial hypertension and a single cyst in the left kidney.","32.It also appears from the medical documents in the case file that she underwent surgery on both eyes in Germany before her arrest and needs specialist medical care as a follow-up, to avoid any risk of damage to her eyesight. The relevant part of a letter dated 5 September 2014 from the head of the Department of Ophthalmology at the Asklepios Clinic in Hamburg reads as follows:","\u201cMrs Yunusova\u2019s right and left eyes were both myopic with cataracts.","It is absolutely necessary that she undergoes a repeat consultation and examination for the development of capsular fibrosis, which can lead to visual impairment and needs surgical laser treatment.","It is also absolutely necessary that she undergoes a complete bilateral examination of her retina since she has had myopia and her risk of retinal detachment is substantially higher than in normal eyes and is further increased by the previous surgery. Any signs of retinal tears must be treated early with a laser retinopexy to prevent further damage and minimise the risk of permanent visual impairment.\u201d","33.The medical documentation submitted by the parties shows that the second applicant suffers from grade 3 chronic hypertension and hypertensive crisis, with an increased risk of cardiovascular complications. He regularly underwent medical treatment in Germany before his arrest. He was also hospitalised from 25 to 28 April 2014 in the Central Oil Workers\u2019 Hospital and from 29 April to 6 May 2014 in Baku City Clinical Hospital No. 1.","D.The applicants\u2019 conditions of detention and medical care","1.The first applicant\u2019s conditions of detention and medical care","(a)The first applicant\u2019s account","34.The first applicant was detained in a cell with four other detainees, two of whom were extremely noisy. Heating was available but inadequate. The electricity was cut off from 2 to 3 p.m. and from 1 to 8 a.m., which made it impossible to use a heater. The temperature inside the cell and in the walking area was very low in winter. There was no proper ventilation inside the cell and the temperature was very high in summer. There was a problem with hot water distribution in the cell. In particular, she was not informed of the distribution time for the hot water and could not obtain more when necessary. Moreover, there was only one refrigerator for all the detainees on her floor which was not sufficient.","35.According to the first applicant, upon her arrival at the detention facility, she was examined by a doctor who confirmed that she had type 2 diabetes and chronic hepatitis C.","36.From 31 July to 5 August 2014 she was provided with the necessary diabetic food and medicine by the second applicant who, as a close family member, was entitled to deliver her parcels. However, following his arrest on 5 August 2014, she was deprived of the necessary diabetic food and medicine. In particular, the detention facility administration did not allow her lawyer or friends to deliver her parcels until 23 August 2014, arguing that only the family members of a detainee could send in parcels.","37.In this connection, it appears from the documents submitted by the first applicant that on 6 August 2014 her lawyer asked the investigator in charge of the case to allow her friends, A.I. and S.A., to deliver her a parcel. He pointed out that, taking into consideration that on 5 August 2014 her husband had been arrested and that her only daughter lived abroad, the first applicant did not have any other family member to do this. On 22 August 2014 the lawyer also lodged a request with the administration of the detention facility (\u201cthe administration\u201d), complaining that on 21 August 2014 employees had refused to receive a parcel for the first applicant on the grounds that it had not been sent in by a family member.","38.On 22 August 2014 the first applicant lodged a request with the administration and the investigator in charge of the case, asking for a medical examination at her own expense by a doctor of her own choosing, A.G. She specified in her request that she suffered from diabetes and other serious illnesses, and that under domestic law detainees could be examined by a doctor of their own choosing.","39.By a letter of 4 September 2014, the deputy governor of the detention facility replied to her request, noting that there was no need for a medical examination by A.G. In this connection, he pointed out that the first applicant\u2019s state of health was stable and being monitored by the detention facility doctors. The letter also indicated that on 19 August 2014 she had been examined by an endocrinologist from the Ministry of Health, who had recommended that she continue her previous treatment.","40.By a decision of 9 September 2014, the investigator dismissed her request, finding that all the necessary measures had been taken for her medical treatment in the detention facility.","41.On 23 September 2014 the first applicant\u2019s cell was searched. On the same day she was deprived of her right to make phone calls for one month. She was also obliged to take a cold shower because the shower room had no hot water.","42.On 26 September 2014 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the administration to provide him with a copy of the administrative decision depriving the first applicant of her right to make phone calls. He did not receive any response to his request.","43.On 14 October 2014 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the administration to provide him with a list of medication prescribed to the first applicant during her detention. He did not receive any response to his request.","44.By a letter of 21 October 2014 the deputy governor of the detention facility responded to the first applicant\u2019s complaint of being unable to receive parcels following her husband\u2019s arrest. He noted that she had received a parcel sent in by A.I. on 23 August 2014. The letter was however silent as to the delivery of any parcels between 5 and 23 August 2014.","45.In a statement dated 4 May 2015 submitted by the first applicant to the Court with the applicants\u2019 reply to the Government\u2019s observations, she stated that she had not been provided with any documents concerning her state of health. As regards her medical treatment in detention, she stated that she had been examined on 29 December 2014 and 12 March 2015 at the Baku Diagnostic Centre by C.W., a German doctor from Charit\u00e9, a university hospital in Berlin. During the examination on 29 December 2014, she had been insulted and humiliated by a doctor named R.A when C.W. had been out of the room. In March 2015 the eyesight in her left eye had drastically deteriorated. The ophthalmologist who had examined her on 31March 2015 stated that the same process would soon begin to happen to her right eye. She further stated that in detention her weight had dropped dramatically because of her illnesses and conditions of detention.","(b)The Government\u2019s account","46.On 31 July 2014 the first applicant was admitted to the Baku Pre\u2011trial Detention Facility of the Ministry of Justice.","47.She was held with four other detainees in a cell measuring 26.32sq.m designed to hold six detainees. The cell was adequately lit. It had two windows measuring 1.2 x 1.4 metres. The sanitary facilities were separate from the rest of the cell and were adequately ventilated. She was provided with food, water, bedding, clothing and other essentials.","48.Upon her arrival at the detention facility on 31 July 2014, she underwent a series of medical examinations. Fluorography and electrocardiography examinations did not reveal any changes to her pathological condition. Her neuropsychological status was evaluated as satisfactory. An ultrasound examination of her abdomen and external examination of her body confirmed that she had previously undergone surgery. General and biochemical blood tests concluded that her blood sugar level was a little higher than average. Following these examinations, she was diagnosed with chronic hepatitis C, type 2 diabetes, gallstones, a single cyst in the left kidney (measuring 0.91 cm) and pseudophakia (replacement of the natural lenses of the eyes with intraocular lenses). The Government provided the Court with copies of the results of the medical tests and examinations carried out that day.","49.It further appears from the extracts of the first applicant\u2019s detention facility medical records (m\u0259hkumun tibbi kitab\u00e7as\u0131) submitted by the Government that on 31 July 2014 the doctor recommended that the first applicant continue the medical treatment for diabetes prescribed by her previous doctor, the drug Galvus.She also had the rules of a diabetic diet explained to her and was provided with a blood glucose meter to monitor the level of sugar in her blood.","50.On 2 August 2014 the first applicant was provided with medication brought in by her relatives, including 20 Galvus Met capsules, 90 Glifer capsules, 308 Galvus tablets, 30 Beloc tablets and 17 Spasmalgon tablets. The next delivery of medication, comprising 20 Spasmalgon tablets, took place on 29 August 2014. The first applicant\u2019s need for medication during this period was fully covered by the medication delivered on 2 August 2014. As to the provision of diabetic food from 5 to 23 August 2014, upon her arrival at the detention facility, the first applicant was registered on a list of diabetic detainees and was consequently provided with diabetic food during this period.","51.On 19 August 2014 she was examined by an endocrinologist in the detention facility, who recommended that she continue her previous treatment. On the same day she also underwent a blood test to determine her sugar level and the state of the hepatitis C. The Government provided the Court with copies of the results of the medical tests and examinations conducted that day.","52.On 23 September 2014 she was examined by a detention facility doctor. She complained of general sickness without raising any particular complaints.","53.On 8 and 10 October 2014 she was examined by a neurologist and a therapist. No pathological conditions were revealed.","54.On 19 November 2014 the first applicant refused to be examined by an ophthalmologist at the National Ophthalmology Centre in order to establish the impact of the diabetes on her eyesight. According to the Government, on 25 and 26 November and 2 and 3 December 2014 she again refused to be examined by the detention facility doctors. They submitted various records compiled by the doctors to support this claim.","55.On 11 December 2014 she was examined by an endocrinologist who assessed her state of health as stable. The Government did not submit any documents concerning this medical examination.","56.On the same day she refused to undergo various medical examinations by a virologist, endocrinologist and physician from the Ministry of Health in the presence of the members of the joint working group on human rights and members of the public committee under the Ministry of Justice. However, she refused to sign anything to say that she had refused to be examined.","57.On 12 December 2014 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a request with the prosecution authorities, complaining of the deterioration of her state of health in detention and asking for a forensic medical examination. The lawyer submitted that her hepatitis C and diabetes were serious and that since her detention her weight had dropped dramatically from 61 to 47 or48kg. The lawyer also pointed out that, as the first applicant had not been provided with adequate medical care in detention, she refused to be examined by the detention facility doctors.","58.On the same day the investigator in charge of the case ordered a forensic medical examination of the first applicant. The experts could only examine her on 8 January 2015 in the presence of her lawyer due to her initial refusal. They issued forensic medical report no. 424\/KES, which indicated that the examination had begun on 18 December 2014 and ended on 28 January 2015. The report confirmed that the first applicant suffered from a number of illnesses, including hepatitis C and diabetes. However, the experts concluded that the illnesses were not life-threatening and could be treated in detention. The relevant part of the conclusion of the report reads as follows:","\u201c4. The illnesses revealed in L.Yunusova, being chronic in nature, do not pose any danger to her life and she does not currently need immediate and specialist treatment.","5. If necessary, L. Yunusova can receive outpatient treatment in her conditions of detention in respect of the hepatitis C and diabetes which were diagnosed.","6. L. Yunusova\u2019s current state of health allows her to remain in detention and does not pose any danger to her life.\u201d","59.In the meantime, on 29 December 2014 the first applicant underwent a number of medical tests and examinations in the presence of C.W from Charit\u00e9. In particular, she underwent a general and biochemical blood test, an ultrasound examination of the abdominal cavity, a chest computed tomography (CT) scan, and electrocardiography and echocardiography examinations. The Government submitted copies of the results of these medical tests and examinations to the Court with their observations. However, none of the documents submitted contained any information regarding medical recommendations or prescriptions made by the doctors following the examinations dated 29 December 2014.","60.On 26 January 2015 the first applicant again underwent various medical tests and examinations. She was examined by a group of doctors, including international doctors C.W., L.U. (a professor from the Budapest Metropolitan Cancer Centre) and A.B. (a gynaecologist). The Government submitted copies of the results of these medical tests and examinations to the Court with their observations. However, none of the documents submitted contained any medical recommendations or prescriptions concerning the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment.","61.On 12 March 2015 she was examined in the presence of C.W. and Z.R. (the director of ExaMed Medical Centre in Budapest). On the same day, she underwent a blood test and gynaecological ultrasound examination. The Government submitted copies of the results of these medical tests and examinations to the Court with their observations. However, none of the documents submitted contained any medical recommendations or prescriptions concerning the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment.","62.The extracts of the first applicant\u2019s detention facility medical records contained further information concerning her state of health from 31July 2014 to 12 March 2015:","-On 19 and 20 September 2014 she was provided with the relevant medication brought in by her lawyer and friends.","-On 22 September 2014 she complained of constant exhaustion, general sickness and weakness.","-On 23 September 2014 she again complained of general sickness and stayed in bed. That day and the next she was examined by a prison doctor who assessed her state of health as satisfactory. In particular, it was established that her blood pressure, temperature and sugar level were within the permitted range.","-On 30 September 2014 she was provided with medication for diabetes brought in by her friends.","-On 3 October 2014 she underwent a prophylactic medical examination and was provided with medication brought in by her friends.","-On 8 and 10 October 2014 she was examined by a neurologist and a therapist. During the examination, she complained only of frequent urination.","-On 17 October 2014 she underwent a prophylactic medical examination and was provided with medication brought in by her friends.","-On 25, 28 and 31 October 2014 she was provided with medication brought in by her friends.","-On 15, 21, 25 and 26 November she refused to be examined.","-On 12 December 2014 she was provided with medication brought in by her friends.","-On 3, 13 and 16 December 2014 she refused to be examined.","-On 19 December 2014 she complained of a migraine and stress, but refused to be examined by a doctor.","-On 23 December 2014 she was provided with medication brought in by her friends.","-On 29 December 2014 she was examined in compliance with international standards by a group of doctors, including an international doctor.","-On 6, 7 and 10 January 2015 she did not complain about her state of health.","(Illegible)","-On 23 January 2015 she complained of headaches, but refused to be examined by a doctor.","-On 26 January 2015 she was again examined by a group of international doctors.","-(date illegible) January 2015 she again refused to be examined by a doctor and was provided with medication brought in by her friends.","-On 6 and 17 February 2015 she again refused to be examined.","-On 19 February 2015 she complained of headaches.","-On 12 March 2015 she was again examined by a group of doctors, including international doctors.","2.The second applicant\u2019s conditions of detention and medical care","(a)The second applicant\u2019s account","63.The second applicant was detained alone in a cell at the Pre-trial Detention Facility of the Ministry of National Security.","64.According to his lawyer, his state of health significantly deteriorated after his arrest. In particular, the domestic authorities had failed to provide him with adequate medical care in detention. He further submitted that in the absence of any information concerning the second applicant\u2019s conditions of detention and medical care, it was impossible for him to give an account about either.","(b)The Government\u2019s account","65.On 6 August 2014 the second applicant was admitted to the Pre-trial Detention Facility of the Ministry of National Security.","66.He was held in a cell measuring 8 sq.m designed to hold two inmates. He was placed alone in the cell at his own request. The cell had two beds and was adequately lit and ventilated. He was provided with hot and cold water, bedding, clothing and other essentials.","67.According to a letter by the governor of the detention facility dated 13 March 2015, heating was available and functioned well. The sanitary conditions were acceptable and the food served was of good quality. The second applicant also had the right to listen to the radio for five hours a day and to use the detention facility library. He was also entitled to receive one food parcel a week (weighing up to 31.5 kg) from his relatives.","68.Upon his arrival at the detention facility, the second applicant underwent a medical examination, during which he stated that he had suffered from arterial hypertension since 2006. However, he did not make any particular complaint about his state of health which was assessed as satisfactory.","69.On 7 August 2014 the second applicant underwent an electrocardiography examination which did not reveal any problems.","70.It further appears from a medical certificate dated 29 September 2014 from the head of the medical service of the detention facility that the second applicant\u2019s state of health was satisfactory and that he had not sought medical attention during his pre-trial detention.","E.The first applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in prison by prison guard and her cellmate","1.The first applicant\u2019s account of events","71.On 7 August 2014 a repeat offender, N.H., was transferred to the applicant\u2019s cell. After being transferred, N.H. frequently subjected the first applicant to verbal and physical violence. She complained to the administration, but no action was taken.","72.On 19 September 2014 she lodged a request with the administration, complaining about N.H.\u2019s unlawful behaviour. In particular, she complained that she had been subjected to physical violence and that the placement of a repeat offender in her cell was not in compliance with domestic law.","73.On 23 September 2014 the first applicant was subjected to verbal and physical violence by Major Y., a prison guard.","74.By a letter of 21 October 2014, the governor of the detention facility responded to the first applicant\u2019s request of 19 September 2014. He claimed that she had not been subjected to violence by N.H. and that her conditions of detention complied with the established standards.","2.The Government\u2019s account of events","75.Following publication in the media of information concerning the first applicant\u2019s alleged beating in the detention facility, on 25 September 2014 an investigator from the Sabunchu District Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered a forensic medical examination. He asked experts to establish whether there were any signs of ill-treatment on the first applicant\u2019s body.","76.Following examinations on 29 September and 10 October 2014, the experts issued forensic medical report no. 285 dated 13 October 2014. They concluded that there were no signs of injury on the first applicant\u2019s body.","77.On 22 October 2014 the investigator in charge of the case refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that there was no evidence that the first applicant had been subjected to violence in the detention facility. The decision relied on the conclusions of the forensic medical report of 13October 2014, statements by the first applicant\u2019s cellmates and video footage from the detention facility.","78.No appeal was lodged against this decision.","F.The Government\u2019s monthly reports on the applicants\u2019 state of health","79.Following the indication of the interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by the Acting President of the Section on 30 September 2014, the Government responded by a letter dated 3 November 2014 submitting that the relevant domestic authorities had been immediately informed of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39. They further submitted that the applicants\u2019 state of health was stable and did not require their transfer to an appropriate medical facility. The letter also contained an overview of the medical examinations that the applicants had undergone in October 2014, although no medical documents were attached to the letter.","80.The Government subsequently provided the Court with monthly information reports concerning the applicants\u2019 state of health and medical treatment in detention. All the monthly reports submitted were one or two pages long. They began in a standard format and said that \u201cthe applicants\u2019 state of health is stable and does not require [their] transfer to a specialist medical facility\u201d. They were not accompanied by any medical documents.","81.The reports sent by the Government from November 2014 to June2015 contained the same information in respect of the first applicant\u2019s state of health and medical treatment as they submitted in their observations of 27May 2015. As regards the second applicant\u2019s state of health and medical treatment, all the reports contained the two following sentences:","\u201cOver the past month, the second applicant\u2019s state of health was under constant medical supervision, and it was assessed as satisfactory; no deterioration in his health has been noted.","(date), the second applicant passed [his] latest general medical examination, which did not reveal any deterioration in his health.\u201d","82.As regards the subsequent reports, the two-page report dated 30 July 2015 indicated that on 13 July 2015 the first applicant had been examined by C.W. in the presence of local doctors. The results of the examination showed that her state of health was stable and did not reveal any pathological conditions or signs of deterioration. C.W. recommended that the first applicant take Harvoni and she started treatment with this drug on 14 July 2015. As regards the second applicant, the report contained the above-mentioned two sentences. No medical documents were attached to the information report.","83.The two-page report dated 7 September 2015 indicated that on 14August 2015 the first applicant had again been examined by C.W. in the presence of local doctors. The results of the examination showed that her state of health was stable and did not reveal any pathological conditions or signs of deterioration. C.W. prescribed the drug Velmetia for the regulation of her blood sugar level. As regards the second applicant, in addition to the above-mentioned two sentences, the report indicated that on 3 August 2015 at a court hearing, the second applicant had asked for medical help. His blood pressure had been 210\/110 mm Hg and could be stabilised following the intervention of the emergency services. The hearing had been postponed upon a doctor\u2019s advice. No medical documents were attached to the information report.","84.The one-page report dated 6 October 2015 indicated that the first applicant had finished her medical treatment with Harvoni. The report also contained information relating to her blood pressure and sugar level. As regards the second applicant, the report contained the above-mentioned two sentences. No medical documents were attached.","85.The reports dated 19 November and 2 December 2015 contained information relating to the first applicant\u2019s blood pressure and sugar level and indicated that on 3 and 7 October 2015 the first applicant had refused to be examined by the doctors. On 30 October 2015 she had been examined by C.W, at whose request she had been transferred to the medical department of the Prison Service. As regards the second applicant, he had been examined by C.W on 30 October 2015. His blood pressure had been 224\/122 mm Hg and he had been prescribed with the relevant medical treatment. On 2November 2015 he had been transferred to the medical department of the Prison Service, where he had received the necessary medical treatment. Following this treatment, his blood pressure had lowered to 160\/110 mm Hg. No medical documents were attached to the information report.","G.The applicants\u2019 criminal conviction and subsequent release from detention","86.On an unspecified date the criminal investigation was completed and the applicants\u2019 case was referred to the Baku Assize Court for trial.","87.On 13 August 2015 it convicted and sentenced the applicants to eight and a half and seven years\u2019 imprisonment respectively.","88.On an unspecified date the applicants appealed against this judgment to the Baku Court of Appeal.","89.It appears from the information submitted by the Government that on an unspecified date the medical department of the Prison Service requested the Baku Court of Appeal to change the second applicant\u2019s detention pending trial due to his emotional state and the possible repeat of hypertensive crisis. The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of this request.","90.On 12 November 2015 the Baku Court of Appeal granted the request and ordered the second applicant\u2019s release. The Court was not provided with a copy of this decision.","91.On 9 December 2015 the Baku Court of Appeal quashed the Baku Assize Court\u2019s judgment of 13 August 2015 and gave the applicants a conditional sentence of five years\u2019 imprisonment. The first applicant was released from the court.","A.Extracts from the 3rd General Report by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) covering the period 1 January to 31 December 1992","100.The requirements concerning the organisation of health care services in detention facilities were described by the CPT in its 3rd General Report (CPT\/Inf (93) 12 - Publication Date: 4June 1993). The relevant part of the Report reads as follows:","\u201ca. Access to a doctor","33.When entering prison, all prisoners should without delay be seen by a member of the establishment\u2019s health care service. In its reports to date the CPT has recommended that every newly arrived prisoner be properly interviewed and, if necessary, physically examined by a medical doctor as soon as possible after his admission. It should be added that in some countries, medical screening on arrival is carried out by a fully qualified nurse, who reports to a doctor. This latter approach could be considered as a more efficient use of available resources.","It is also desirable that a leaflet or booklet be handed to prisoners on their arrival, informing them of the existence and operation of the health care service and reminding them of basic measures of hygiene.","34.While in custody, prisoners should be able to have access to a doctor at any time, irrespective of their detention regime ... The health care service should be so organised as to enable requests to consult a doctor to be met without undue delay.","...","35.A prison\u2019s health care service should at least be able to provide regular out\u2011patient consultations and emergency treatment (of course, in addition there may often be a hospital-type unit with beds) ... Further, prison doctors should be able to call upon the services of specialists.","As regards emergency treatment, a doctor should always be on call. Further, someone competent to provide first aid should always be present on prison premises, preferably someone with a recognised nursing qualification.","Out-patient treatment should be supervised, as appropriate, by health care staff; in many cases it is not sufficient for the provision of follow-up care to depend upon the initiative being taken by the prisoner.","36.The direct support of a fully-equipped hospital service should be available, in either a civil or prison hospital.","...","b. Equivalence of care","i) general medicine","38.A prison health care service should be able to provide medical treatment and nursing care, as well as appropriate diets, physiotherapy, rehabilitation or any other necessary special facility, in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by patients in the outside community. Provision in terms of medical, nursing and technical staff, as well as premises, installations and equipment, should be geared accordingly.","There should be appropriate supervision of the pharmacy and of the distribution of medicines. Further, the preparation of medicines should always be entrusted to qualified staff (pharmacist\/nurse, etc.).","39.A medical file should be compiled for each patient, containing diagnostic information as well as an ongoing record of the patient\u2019s evolution and of any special examinations he has undergone. In the event of a transfer, the file should be forwarded to the doctors in the receiving establishment.","Further, daily registers should be kept by health care teams, in which particular incidents relating to the patients should be mentioned. Such registers are useful in that they provide an overall view of the health care situation in the prison, at the same time as highlighting specific problems which may arise.","40.The smooth operation of a health care service presupposes that doctors and nursing staff are able to meet regularly and to form a working team under the authority of a senior doctor in charge of the service.","...","c. Patient\u2019s consent and confidentiality","45.Freedom of consent and respect for confidentiality are fundamental rights of the individual. They are also essential to the atmosphere of trust which is a necessary part of the doctor\/patient relationship, especially in prisons, where a prisoner cannot freely choose his own doctor.","i) patient\u2019s consent","46. Patients should be provided with all relevant information (if necessary in the form of a medical report) concerning their condition, the course of their treatment and the medication prescribed for them. Preferably, patients should have the right to consult the contents of their prison medical files, unless this is inadvisable from a therapeutic standpoint.","They should be able to ask for this information to be communicated to their families and lawyers or to an outside doctor.","47. Every patient capable of discernment is free to refuse treatment or any other medical intervention. Any derogation from this fundamental principle should be based upon law and only relate to clearly and strictly defined exceptional circumstances which are applicable to the population as a whole.","...","ii) confidentiality","50. Medical secrecy should be observed in prisons in the same way as in the community. Keeping patients\u2019 files should be the doctor\u2019s responsibility.","51. All medical examinations of prisoners (whether on arrival or at a later stage) should be conducted out of the hearing and - unless the doctor concerned requests otherwise - out of the sight of prison officers. Further, prisoners should be examined on an individual basis, not in groups. ...\u201d","B.Extracts from Recommendation (Rec(2006)2) of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules, adopted on 11 January 2006 (\u201cthe European Prison Rules\u201d)","101.The European Prison Rules provide a framework of guiding principles for health services. The relevant extracts from the Rules read as follows:","\u201cPart I","Basic principles","1.All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for their human rights.","2.Persons deprived of their liberty retain all rights that are not lawfully taken away by the decision sentencing them or remanding them in custody.","3.Restrictions placed on persons deprived of their liberty shall be the minimum necessary and proportionate to the legitimate objective for which they are imposed.","4.Prison conditions that infringe prisoners\u2019 human rights are not justified by lack of resources.","...","Scope and Application","10.1.The European Prison Rules apply to persons who have been remanded in custody by a judicial authority or who have been deprived of their liberty following conviction.","...","Part III","Health","Health care","39.Prison authorities shall safeguard the health of all prisoners in their care.","Organisation of prison health care","40.1Medical services in prison shall be organised in close relation with the general health administration of the community or nation.","40.2Health policy in prisons shall be integrated into, and compatible with, national health policy.","40.3Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.","40.4Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer.","40.5All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.","Medical and health care personnel","41.1Every prison shall have the services of at least one qualified general medical practitioner.","41.2Arrangements shall be made to ensure at all times that a qualified medical practitioner is available without delay in cases of urgency.","...","41.4Every prison shall have personnel suitably trained in health care.","...","Duties of the medical practitioner","42.1The medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall see every prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is obviously unnecessary.","...","42.3When examining a prisoner the medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall pay particular attention to:","a. observing the normal rules of medical confidentiality;","b.diagnosing physical or mental illness and taking all measures necessary for its treatment and for the continuation of existing medical treatment;","c. recording and reporting to the relevant authorities any sign or indication that prisoners may have been treated violently;","...","43.1The medical practitioner shall have the care of the physical and mental health of the prisoners and shall see, under the conditions and with a frequency consistent with health care standards in the community, all sick prisoners, all who report illness or injury and any prisoner to whom attention is specially directed.","...","Health care provision","46.1Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialised institutions or to civil hospitals when such treatment is not available in prison.","46.2Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities, they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide the prisoners referred to them with appropriate care and treatment.\u201d","C.Extracts from the UN Committee Against Torture\u2019s concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Azerbaijan","102.In November 2015 the UN Committee Against Torture considered the fourth periodic report of Azerbaijan (CAT\/C\/AZE\/4) and adopted, inter alia, the following concluding observations at its 1382nd meeting (CAT\/C\/SR.1382) held on 26 November 2015:","\u201cArbitrary imprisonment and ill-treatment of human rights defenders","10. The Committee is deeply concerned by consistent and numerous allegations that a number of human rights defenders have been arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, subjected to ill-treatment, and in some cases have been denied adequate medical treatment in retaliation for their professional activities, such as: Leyla and Arif Yunus ...","11. The State party should:","(a)Investigate promptly, thoroughly and impartially all allegations of arbitrary arrest, denial of adequate medical treatment, and torture or ill treatment of human rights defenders, including those listed above, prosecute and punish appropriately those found guilty, and provide the victims with redress;","(b) Release human rights defenders who are deprived of their liberty in retaliation for their human rights work;\u201d","D.Joint Statement of the UN Special Rapporteurs and the Chair\u2011Rapporteur of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention dated 20 August 2015","103.On 20 August 2015 the UN Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights defenders, on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, on freedom of opinion and expression, on the independence of judges and lawyers and on the right to health made a joint statement with the Chair-Rapporteur of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention condemning the applicants\u2019 criminal conviction. They expressed concern about the serious deterioration of the applicants\u2019 health during their extended period of pre-trial detention and called \u201con the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately provide them with adequate medical care\u201d."],"28259":["5.The applicants are a married couple, Mrs R.B.A.B. and Mr H.S., their two daughters, X and Y, and their son Z. The children were born in 1991, 1993 and 1996, respectively. The applicants have been in the Netherlands since 2001.","A.Proceedings before the introduction of the application","6.On 28 April 2001 the applicants entered the Netherlands, where the first and second applicants filed separate asylum applications, and MrsR.B.A.B. also filed applications on behalf of the other three applicants (the children, who were all minors). The immigration authorities conducted interviews with the first and second applicants on 8 May 2001 (eerste gehoor) and 9 August 2001 (nader gehoor). An additional interview (aanvullend gehoor) was conducted with the second applicant on 2November 2001.","7.The first and second applicants stated that they had previously lived in Dilling in Sudan\u2019s South Kordofan province and that they had fled Sudan after Mr H.S. had attracted the attention of the Sudanese authorities on account of his activities for the opposition movement M.","8.On 7 December 2001 the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie, the \u201cDeputy Minister\u201d) notified the first and second applicants of her intention (voornemen) to reject their asylum requests. In the light of various contradictions in the statements given by the first and second applicants, their inability to answer basic questions about the respective tribes they claimed to belong to, and the second applicant\u2019s inability to provide simple topographic details of the city and the surroundings of the place where he claimed he had grown up and\/or to provide any details about the M. opposition movement (goal, members, structure, leader) for which he claimed to have been active, the Deputy Minister concluded that no credence could be attached to the applicants\u2019 asylum statement.","9.In two separate decisions of 17 January 2002, after the applicants\u2019 lawyer had filed written comments (zienswijze) concerning the intended refusals, the Deputy Minister rejected the first and second applicants\u2019 asylum requests, finding that the written comments had not dispelled her doubts concerning the credibility of their asylum statement.","10.The first and second applicants\u2019 appeal against this decision were declared inadmissible on procedural grounds by the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague sitting in Zwolle in a joint ruling, the first and second applicants having failed to submit the requisite grounds for their appeals, even though they had been given extra time to remedy this shortcoming. The applicants\u2019 objection (verzet) was dismissed on 10September 2002 by the Regional Court. No further appeal lies against this ruling.","11.On 12 April 2003 the first and second applicants \u2013 and Mrs R.B.A.B. also on behalf of the other applicants \u2013 filed a second asylum request, which was based on essentially the same grounds as their initial request. They submitted various documents in support of their declaration. On 13April 2003, the Minister for Immigration and Integration (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie) notified the first and second applicants of her intention to reject their fresh asylum request, holding that their repeat requests were not based on newly emerged facts or altered circumstances as required by section 4:6 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht). The new documents submitted by the first and second applicants only served to increase the already existing doubts as to the credibility of their asylum statement. In two separate decisions of 14April 2003, having received the applicants\u2019 written comments on the intended decision, the Minister rejected the applicants\u2019 second asylum request on the grounds given in his notice of intention. The first and second applicants did not lodge an appeal against this decision before the Regional Court of The Hague even though it would have been possible to do so.","12.On 14 June 2005 the first and second applicants, and Mrs R.B.A.B. also on behalf of the other applicants, filed a third asylum request based on the claim that, if they were to be sent back to Sudan, their daughters X and Y would be subjected to female genital mutilation (\u201cFGM\u201d), contrary to Article3 of the Convention, due to tribal and social pressure. In interviews with the immigration authorities held on 16 June 2005, the first and second applicants stated that they opposed FGM but would be unable to protect their daughters against it. They further submitted a document issued by the Sudanese Embassy in the Netherlands on 26 April 2005 stating that the applicants \u201care all Sudanese citizens although they do not possess the requisite documents to enable them to obtain a Sudanese laissez-passer\u201d.","13.On 17 June 2005, the Minister for Immigration and Integration notified the first and second applicants separately of her intention to reject their third asylum request. The Minister doubted the sincerity of the applicants\u2019 purported fear that their daughter would be subjected to FGM because they had not raised this argument in their previous asylum requests. The Minister also took into consideration the order amending the Aliens Act 2000 Implementation Guidelines 2004\/36 (Wijzigingsbesluit Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000, \u201cWBV 2004\/36\u201d), which was based on an official report on Sudan drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) on 3 February 2004 (DPV\/AM\u2011823666), according to which women who had had the benefit of a higher education (namely a university or higher professional level education) and who were living in the larger cities in Sudan did not experience any social stigma for not subjecting their daughters to FGM, whereas women in the rural areas who had received little or no schooling had little choice but to subject their daughters to this practice. As the first and second applicants had still not substantiated their personal identities or given a credible statement concerning their place of residence in Sudan, the Minister considered that they had not established that they did not belong to the group of more highly educated people able to reject the practice of female circumcision. The Minister also considered that the second applicant constituted a danger to public order, having accepted a negotiated penalty (transactieaanbod) in order to settle out of court a criminal charge for shoplifting.","14.On 20 June 2005 the applicants filed their written comments concerning the intended refusal of their third asylum request. They argued that the Minister had failed to present a proper reasoning for her finding that it had not been demonstrated that the first applicant did not belong to the group of highly educated women who would be able to resist the social pressure to circumcise their daughters, especially as the first applicant had stated in her first request for asylum that she had only had a primary school level education. The first applicant therefore offered to take an IQ test to prove her level of education.","15.In two separate decisions of 20 June 2005 the Minister rejected the first and second applicants\u2019 asylum request on the grounds detailed in her notice of intention. The Minister added that it was not for her to examine the first applicant\u2019s level of education through an IQ test but rather for the applicants to prove their identities and background in their asylum application.","16.In a joint ruling given on 12 June 2005 the provisional-measures judge (voorzieningenrechter) of the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Zwolle granted the first and second applicants\u2019 appeals, quashed the impugned decisions and remitted the case to the Minister for a fresh decision. The provisional-measures judge held:","\u201cThe judge notes that it is no longer in dispute that the petitioners are Sudanese nationals. Nor is it in dispute that both daughters of the petitioners, currently 14 and 11 years old, have not been circumcised.","According to the policy guidelines set out in C1\/4.3.3 Vc 2000, a girl can \u2013 if return would entail a real risk of genital mutilation \u2013 qualify for an asylum-based residence permit ... The following conditions apply:","- there exists a risk of genital mutilation;","- the authorities of the country of origin are unwilling or unable to provide protection to persons exposed to an imminent risk of genital mutilation; and","- no internal relocation possibility is deemed to exist in the country of origin.","According to chapter A8 Vc 2000 \u201cCountry-specific part, the asylum policy in respect of Sudan\u201d under 5.5 Vc, genital mutilation is widespread in Sudan. Although there is a Health Act forbidding genital mutilation, the Sudanese authorities hardly ensure compliance with that act. The parental freedom of choice (as the court understands, whether or not to have their daughters circumcised) is connected to the cultural attitudes of the family and surroundings. Women with a higher education in larger towns will generally not have their daughters circumcised. This will generally not give rise to problems from their social environment. The term \u2018women with a higher education\u2019 is to be understood to mean women who have had an academic or higher vocational education. According to the official report of 3 February 2004, women with a low level of education living in rural areas have little choice. According to the same chapter it cannot be deduced from the official report whether it is possible to avoid circumcision by settling elsewhere in Sudan, meaning that for the assessment of the question whether there is an internal relocation alternative, each individual\u2019s declaration is of decisive importance.","The defendant\u2019s refusal to grant the requested residence permit is based to a large extent on the fact that the identity and origin of, in particular, [the first applicant] has not been demonstrated, but also because in the proceedings concerning the first asylum request, it was found that statements lacking credence had been given. For that reason, it is not possible to assess whether the conditions set out in the policy guidelines are met.","The refusal thus reasoned cannot be upheld.","The policy guidelines are aimed at protecting girls and women against circumcision, an act which according to the policy is to be seen as a violation of Article 3 [of the Convention]. ...","The assertion that [the first applicant] based her first asylum request on an asylum statement subsequently found to be implausible is correct. However, it is unclear what the relevance of that conclusion is in the context of the present [asylum] application, which is concerned with the protection of the daughters and not of [the parents].\u201d","17.On 19 July 2005 the Minister filed a further appeal against this judgment with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State.","18.On 25 August 2005, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division granted the Minister\u2019s further appeal, quashed the judgment of the Regional Court and rejected the first and second applicants\u2019 appeal against the Minister\u2019s decision of 20 June 2005. It considered that, pursuant to section 31 \u00a71 of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), it was for the applicants to demonstrate as plausible those facts and circumstances which could lead to the conclusion that they were eligible for admission pursuant to the policy in force, and not for the Minister to demonstrate the opposite. As not only the applicants\u2019 statements about their identity and origin but also their asylum statement had been found to lack credibility in a decision of 17January 2002 which had obtained the force of res iudicata, the Minister could reasonably have found that the applicants had not made out a persuasive case to show that they complied with the conditions for admission under the policy concerned, that the authorities could not provide them with protection, and that there was no internal relocation alternative for them. No further appeal lay against this ruling.","B.Developments subsequent to the lodging of the application","19.The third applicant, Ms X., gave birth to a daughter on 11 June 2011 and to a son on 15 March 2013.On 1 September 2015 Ms X. was granted a Netherlands residence permit for the purpose of remaining with her partner. On 15 September 2015 she informed the Court that she did not wish to maintain the application in so far as it concerned her.","20.In the meantime, on 7 November 2012, the Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Policy (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie) rejected a request for a residence permit filed by the fourth applicant, Ms Y., who had come of age in the meantime. On the same day Ms Y. filed an objection (bezwaar) against this refusal and, on 30November 2015, she attended a hearing on that objection before an official commission during which she stated that in 2012, as a volunteer for two non-governmental organisations, she had disseminated information about FGM, for which purpose she had attended a training course.","21.On 29 December 2015 the Minister rejected the fourth applicant\u2019s objection. In so far as the fourth applicant would allegedly be exposed to the risk of being subjected to circumcision in Sudan, the Minister noted that her parents opposed this practice and therefore found it likely that they would not force Ms Y. to be circumcised. As regards pressure from the social environment, the Minister noted that Ms Y had still not submitted any documents substantiating her identity or alleged Dilling origin. In this situation, the Minister found that it was not necessary to address the question of whether internal relocation would be a possibility. No further information about these proceedings has been submitted.","22.On 11 April 2013 the fifth applicant, Mr Z., applied for a residence permit under the Transitional Regulation on Children Residing Long-Term in the Netherlands (overgangsregeling langdurig in Nederland verblijvende kinderen), which provided that minors without a residence permit who had been residing in the Netherlands for over five years could obtain a residence permit if they met certain criteria. These criteria included that the minor in question must have applied for asylum at least five years before reaching the age of 18 and must not have evaded monitoring by the Netherlands authorities for more than three months. The close family members of such minors could also qualify for accompanying family-member residence permits for close relatives (that is to say parents and siblings). The fifth applicant also sought accompanying family-member residence permits for his parents, his sisters Y. and X., and for the latter\u2019s two children, who are minors.","23.On 30 July 2013 this request was rejected by the Deputy Minister of Security and Justice (Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie), who held that the applicants had not been in touch with the designated immigration authorities for over three months. On 1 September 2015, after remittal of the case by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division on 22 July 2015, the petitioners\u2019 objection was again rejected by the Deputy Minister. No further information about these proceedings has been submitted.","24.In a letter of 24 September 2014, the Deputy Minister informed the Mayor of Amsterdam that he would not avail himself of his discretionary powers to admit the applicants to the Netherlands. The applicants\u2019 objection was declared inadmissible by the Deputy Minister, who held that the content of the letter of 24 September 2014 was not a decision within the meaning of section 1:3 of the General Administrative Law Act which could be challenged in administrative appeal proceedings. Although the applicants\u2019 appeal against this decision was granted on 1 September 2015 by the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam, it nevertheless held that the legal effects of the impugned decision were to remain intact. No further information about these proceedings has been submitted.","25.The official report (ambtsbericht) on Sudan released by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs in April 2010 states the following in respect of the situation of women in Sudan:","\u201cAfter the regime change in 1989, the position of women deteriorated. Women were forced into the background of public life. Many highly educated women lost both their jobs and their freedom of movement. Strict dress codes and codes of behaviour were imposed on women employed by educational and (semi-)governmental institutions.","Genital mutilation","There is no specific statutory provision rendering genital mutilation of women (FGM) a criminal offence. The Criminal Code merely mentions a prohibition of damaging acts against girls and women. The interpretation of this legislative provision is left to the judge. In practice, perpetrators of genital mutilation are not prosecuted. In 2008 Sudan pledged to eradicate FGM within 10 years. However, the Sudanese authorities have not been consistent in the implementation of this policy. Whilst the National Council of Child Welfare is active in combatting FGM, inter alia in collaboration with UNICEF, the Council of Ministers, on the other hand, deleted in February 2009 a. provision prohibiting FGM from the draft bill for the Children\u2019s Act. The Children\u2019s Act was adopted on December 2009 and contains no provision prohibiting FGM.","FGM is widespread in Sudan. The percentage of women in North-Sudan having undergone FGM is estimated at about 90%. In so far as known, FGM is practiced by all North-Sudanese population groups (Arab and non-Arab). However, other population groups residing in the north, including the southern Sudanese, have also adopted the practice. Nothing is known about the extent to which pressure in exerted on communities in northern Sudan that do not traditionally practise FGM. ...","Genital mutilation takes place in childhood, generally between the ages of four and ten. It may occur that women who have not undergone FGM are forced to undergo this when they get married. It is not possible to say anything about the specific circumstances in which circumcision takes place at a later age, such as the place of residence or the level of education of the woman concerned.","Because genital mutilation is a parental choice, the question does not arise whether and to what extend girls can avoid it. The parents\u2019 decision is closely connected with the cultural attitudes of the family and the surrounding community. In practice it does not occur that people move home in order to avoid genital mutilation. There are no shelters in Sudan for women or girls seeking to avoid FGM.","An increasing number of urban, educated families are refusing to have their daughters circumcised. Generally these families do not experience any problems. The lesser educated and people living in rural areas are often unable or unwilling to make the choice not to have their daughters circumcised due to great pressure emanating from the community.\u201d","26.The country assessment report on Sudan drawn up by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs in July 2015 reads in its relevant part:","\u201cThere is no specific statutory provision rendering genital mutilation of women (FGM) a criminal offence. The Criminal Code merely mentions in general terms the ban on \u2018female circumcision\u2019 without any further definition. The interpretation of this legislative provision is left to the judge. In practice, those who commit FGM are not prosecuted.","FGM in Sudan is still being carried out at a large scale. Girls are circumcised traditionally to prepare them for marriage, for religious reasons and \u2013 based on superstition \u2013 for \u2018health reasons\u2019. The most recent estimate of the percentage of circumcised women between 15-49 years old in Sudan is 89%. ... UNICEF and UNFPA [United Nations Population Fund] conduct large-scale campaigns to stop FGM. These campaigns have rendered circumcision a topic of debate. Discussions are being held within families and in the press and on social media even photographs are being shown. There is, however, also a strong influence of the pro-FGM lobby which presents it as the traditional values and norms being affected by the West. Sheikh Abdel-Hay Yusuf is voicing this. It appears from UNICEF figures that the percentage of girls having been circumcised between the ages of 5 to 9 has reduced from 41 percent in 2006 to 35.5 percent in 2010.","Because genital mutilation is a parental choice, the question does not arise whether and to what extend girls can avoid it. The parents\u2019 decision is closely connected with the cultural attitudes of the family and the surrounding community. In so far as known, in practice it does not happen that people move home for the purpose of avoiding genital mutilation. The local NGO SEEMA refers victims for medical help.\u201d","27.FGM comprises all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons. The World Health Organisation (\u201cthe WHO\u201d) noted the following key facts in its Fact Sheet on FGM (as updated in February 2016): more than 200 million girls and women alive today have been cut in 30countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia where FGM is concentrated and is mostly carried out on young girls between infancy and 15years of age.","28.There are different forms of FGM (see \u201cEliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement\u201d, 2008, authored by various international organisations including the WHO, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children\u2019s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)). These include clitoridectomy, excision and infibulation. The same Interagency Statement described FGM as a violation of the right to freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, meaning that protection from FGM was provided for by various international treaties (the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), by regional treaties (the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People\u2019s Rights Relating to the Rights of Women in Africa, the \u201cMaputo Protocol\u201d) as well as by consensus documents published by several international organisations. The UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment considers that FGM amounts to torture even if it is legal and\/or medicalised (Report to the UN General Assembly, 14 January 2008. See also the \u201cGlobal strategy to stop health-care providers from performing female genital mutilation\u201d, 2010, published jointly by the WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM and others). Sudan signed the Maputo Protocol on 30 June 2008 but has not yet ratified it.","29.The United Kingdom Home Office Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan of 16 April 2010 includes the following observations on the subject of FMG:","\u201c25.40 The USSD [United States Department of State] Report 2008 recorded that: \u2018...The law does not prohibit FGM. While a growing number of urban, educated families no longer practiced FGM, there were reports that the prevalence of FGM in Darfur had increased as persons moved to cities. The government actively campaigned against it. Several NGOs worked to eradicate FGM.\u2019 The UNICEF Sudan country page, accessed 15 January 2010, reported that \u2018[FGM] and cutting affects 68 per cent of women and girls \u2013 mostly in the north of Sudan.\u2019","25.41 UNICEF reported on 6 February 2009 that the organisation commended the efforts made by the Sudanese government, civil society and local communities to bring an end to the practice of FGM in the country.","\u2018The dangers that female genital mutilation and cutting create for girls and women have been recognized by the government, religious leaders, health professionals, community elders and individual families in Sudan, and we applaud the collective efforts now being taken to eradicate the practice entirely. It is unacceptable that any girl should face this dangerous and unnecessary violation of her rights,\u2019 noted UNICEF Acting Representative Dr. Iyabode Olusanmi.","25.42 However, The Sudan Tribune reported on 8 February 2009 that Sudanese activists had slammed a decision by the Sudanese cabinet to drop an article banning the practice of female genital cutting in the country. The report stated that the government took its decision in accordance with an Islamic fatwa on the issue:","\u2018The Council of Ministers on February 5 dropped the article (13) of the draft Children\u2019s Act of 2009, which provides for the ban of female genital mutilation as part of other customs and traditions harmful to the health of the child, and after approval of the draft Children\u2019s Act 2009. The cabinet decided to drop the article, which deals with female circumcision, taking into account the advisory opinion of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, which distinguish between harmful circumcision or infibulation (Pharaonic circumcision) and the circumcision of Sunna, a less extensive procedure.","25.43 A press statement issued by UNICEF on 7 January 2010 however stated that the \u2018article dealing with female genital mutilation\/cutting which was taken out of this bill [The Child Act] will be included in the revision of the Criminal Act in the near future\u2019.\u201d","30.As regards FGM in Sudan, the Operational Guidance Note on Sudan released in August 2012 by the United Kingdom Home Office cites the following extracts from a country guidance determination issued by the United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum Tribunal (FM (FGM) Sudan CG [2007] UKAIT00060) on 27 June 2007:","\u201c\u2018Significant action is being taken in Sudan, both within government and by NGOs, to combat the practice of female genital mutilation in all its forms. Legal sanctions are, however, unlikely to be applied where a woman has been subjected by her family to FGM\u2019.","...","\u2018There is in general no real risk of a woman being subjected to FGM at the instigation of persons who are not family members. As a general matter, the risk of FGM being inflicted on an unmarried woman will depend on the attitude of her family, most particularly her parents but including her extended family. A woman who comes from an educated family and\/or a family of high social status is as such less likely to experience family pressure to submit to FGM. It is, however, not possible to say that such a background will automatically lead to a finding that she is not at real risk.\u2019","...","\u2018The risk of FGM from extended family members will depend on a variety of factors, including the age and vulnerability of the woman concerned, the attitude and whereabouts of her parents and the location and \u201creach\u201d of the extended family.\u2019","...","\u2018If a woman\u2019s parents are opposed to FGM, they will normally be in a position to ensure that she does not marry a man who (or whose family) is in favour of it, regardless of the attitude of other relatives of the woman concerned.\u2019\u201d","31.The \u201cJoint Evaluation of the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on FGM\/C: Accelerating Change 2008\u20132012\u201d in respect of Sudan, published in July 2013, includes the following:","\u201cIn 1983, when Sharia law was introduced, the article prohibiting FGM\/C was removed from the penal code.","Since then there have been several attempts to criminalise all forms of FGM\/C but none have been successful. The most significant recent setback occurred in 2009, when the Council of Ministers decided to remove Article 13 of the 2009 Child Act, which would have prohibited FGM\/C as a harmful practice and tradition affecting the health of children.","Despite limited progress made at the national level, several states in Sudan have managed to pass laws prohibiting all forms of FGM\/C. An anti-FGM\/C law was passed in the state of South Kordofan in 2008 and is now being used as a model for other states.\u201d","32.The United States Department of State\u2019s \u201cCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices 2014\u201d, published on 25 June 2015, reads:","\u201cFemale Genital Mutilation and Cutting (FGM\/C): There is no national law prohibiting FGM\/C. The states of South Darfur and Red Sea passed laws prohibiting FGM\/C as a harmful practice affecting the health of children.","FGM\/C is traditionally practiced in the country. According to UNICEF and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the national prevalence of FGM\/C among girls and women 15-49 years old was 88 percent. Within the country prevalence varies geographically and depends on the custom of local ethnic groups. The 2010 Sudan Household Health Survey indicated considerable variations in the practice of FGM\/C from one region to another, from 99.4 per cent in the Northern State compared with a rate of 68.4 per cent in Western Darfur.","Girls are generally cut when they are five to 11 years old. Comprehensive figures were not available for the year. The government and UNICEF reported a shift in attitudes towards FGM\/C and observed downward trends in the prevalence of FGM\/C between the household health surveys in 2006 and 2010. The 2010 survey concluded 34.5 percent of girls ages five to nine were cut, as compared with 41 percent in 2006. Of girls and women ages 15-19, 37 percent favored FGM\/C in 2010, compared with 73 percent in 2006.","The government attempted to curb the prevalence of FGM\/C and made public awareness campaigns on the subject a top priority. In 2008 the National Council on Child Welfare, with support from UNICEF, launched the National Strategy to Abolish FGM\/C in Sudan (2008-18). Under the strategy the government introduced \u2018Saleema\u2019, a public awareness campaign to counter FGM\/C, which received significant attention through local media.","The government agreed to a three-year program with UNICEF, the UNFPA, and the WHO to seek to end FGM\/C in the country. In October the government hosted a conference in Khartoum to promote the \u2018Saleema\u2019 campaign and anti-FGM\/C initiatives.\u201d"],"28276":["5.The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Astrakhan.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest, detention and trial","6.At approximately 8 p.m. on 15 June 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted fraud. On the same day at 11.37 p.m. criminal proceedings were instituted against him.","7.On 16 June 2004 at 12.58 a.m. a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest was drawn up by the investigator. The record indicated that the applicant\u2019s arrest took place at 11.05 p.m. on 15 June 2004.","8.On 17 June 2004 the Leninskiy District Court of Astrakhan (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) authorised the applicant\u2019s detention pending investigation. The court noted as follows:","\u201c[The applicant] is charged with a serious offence representing an increased danger to society; the material submitted contains sufficient data about [his] involvement in the crime, including the testimony of the victim ... [The applicant] is an acting police officer, and under such circumstances the court finds that the Prosecutor has made a well-founded argument about the necessity to isolate [the applicant] in view of the risk of [his] absconding and obstructing the establishment of the truth in the early stage of the investigation by putting pressure on witnesses using his [status].\u201d","9.On 25 June 2004 the Astrakhan Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) upheld the above decision on appeal. The appeal hearing was held in the applicant\u2019s absence. The applicant\u2019s lawyer was present.","10.On 13 August 2004 the applicant was informed that the investigation had been completed and that the case file had been submitted to the District Court for trial.","11.In the meantime, on 15 August 2004, the two-month time-limit for the applicant\u2019s detention pending investigation expired. The applicant, however, remained in detention.","12.On 25 August 2004 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing and ordered that the preventive measure applied to the applicant should remain unchanged until a date for the opening of the trial had been set.","13.The applicant challenged the above decision in a supervisory review procedure. He argued that since there had been no valid court order authorising his detention from 15August to 25 August 2004, the decision to retain the custodial measure unchanged had been unlawful.","14.On 9 September 2004 the District Court scheduled the opening of the trial and ordered that the preventive measure remain unaltered.","15.On 16 February 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for two months, until 16 April 2005, noting as follows:","\u201c[The applicant] is charged with a serious crime, representing an increased danger to society. The crime, according to the charges brought, was committed in abuse of office. So far [the applicant] has not been suspended from [his post]. Under these circumstances, if released, [the applicant] may put pressure on the victim and the witnesses. The sanction for the offence with which [the applicant] is charged varies from 5 to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment; therefore the arguments of the prosecution that [the applicant] may abscond from justice and render the examination of the case on the merits impossible are well-founded.\u201d","16.On 7 April 2005 the District Court dismissed the application for release and extended the applicant\u2019s detention pending trial for another two months, until 16 June 2005. The decision mentioned that an appeal could be lodged within three days to the Regional Court and the applicant appealed. However, on 20May 2005 the Regional Court discontinued the examination of the applicant\u2019s appeal. Referring to Article355 \u00a7 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court held that rulings rendered by a court in the course of the trial were not amenable to separate appeal.","17.On 15 June 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for three months, until 15 September 2005. The court applied the same reasoning as in its decision of 16February 2005. On 21 July 2005 the Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal.","18.On the same day, the Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s application to quash the decision of 25 August 2004 by means of supervisory review. The court held, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s detention from 16August to 25 August 2004 had been lawful and that the decision of 25August 2004 should stand.","19.On 14 September 2005 the District Court, applying the same arguments as in its previous decisions, extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 15 December 2005. During the hearing, the applicant requested that the court let his sister represent him. However, in view of the fact that the applicant was already represented by two professional advocates, the court dismissed the request. On 27October 2005 the Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal.","20.On 15 December 2005 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 15 March 2006. The court again relied on the gravity of the charges against the applicant, his position and the risk of his putting pressure on the victim and witnesses, and of absconding and obstructing justice. One of the applicant\u2019s lawyers was absent from the hearing. On 26January 2006 the Regional Court upheld the above decisions on appeal.","21.On 13 March 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 15 June 2006, noting that the grounds for detention had not changed.","22.The applicant lodged another application for release, relying on a deterioration of his health and the unavailability of adequate medical assistance in the remand prison. However, on 11 April 2006 the District Court dismissed the application.","23.The applicant appealed, but on 25 May 2006 the Regional Court, relying on Article 355 \u00a7 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, discontinued the appeal proceedings.","24.On 9 June 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 15 July 2006.","25.On 29 June 2006 the District Court convicted the applicant of attempted large-scale fraud in abuse of office and sentenced him to six years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and a fine. During the hearing the applicant was kept in a metal cage.","26.On 11 January 2007 the Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.","27.On 27 January 2009 the applicant obtained a conditional early release.","B.Conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in IZ-30\/1 and conditions of his transport to and from the courthouse","28.From 17 June 2004 to 22 January 2007 and from 5 May 2007 to 25February 2008 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-30\/1 in the Astrakhan Region. He claimed that the facility had been severely overcrowded and that the cells had been in a poor sanitary condition.","29.In the above periods, the applicant was transported between the remand prison and the District Court on no less than one hundred occasions. He claimed that the conditions of his transport to and from the courthouse had been appalling.","C.Medical assistance in IZ-30\/1","1.The Government\u2019s account","30.Upon the applicant\u2019s arrival at IZ-30\/1 remand prison in June 2004 he underwent a mandatory medical examination, including clinical laboratory tests and an examination by medical specialists. No abnormalities were found. The applicant subsequently underwent scheduled health examinations.","31.On 16 April 2006 the applicant sought medical assistance. In connection with this application, on 21 April 2006 he was referred to the prison hospital in IK-2 correctional colony for examination and treatment. The examination showed that the applicant was suffering from the initial stages of a cardiovascular disease. He was prescribed and provided with the necessary treatment and his condition improved. The applicant was discharged on 10May 2006 in a satisfactory condition with a recommendation to continue outpatient supervision. Upon return to IZ-30\/1 the applicant was put under outpatient supervision and given the recommended treatment.","32.From 30 August to 27 September 2006, from 30 May to 29 June 2007 and from 20 July to 27 August 2007 the applicant underwent subsequent scheduled courses of inpatient treatment in IK-2 correctional colony\u2019s prison hospital. The applicant\u2019s health condition remained satisfactory and no complications were noted.","33.Despite the Court\u2019s request to submit a copy of the applicant\u2019s medical file, the Government\u2019s account was not supported by any relevant documents.","2.The applicant\u2019s account","34.Several times during his detention in IZ-30\/1 the applicant applied for treatment for acute toothache. However, he was informed on each occasion that there was no dentist on the medical staff of the remand prison. In October 2005 a dentist was recruited by the remand prison. The only treatment available was extraction and there was a three-week waiting list.","35.A medical certificate issued by the applicant\u2019s dentist (who had provided dental care to the applicant since 2001, up to his detention) confirmed in January 2009 that there were no traces of dental care having been provided to the applicant in the period between June 2004 and January 2009 and noted a serious worsening of the state of the latter\u2019s teeth. It also stated that the applicant needed treatment for tooth decay (nine teeth) and a dental prosthesis.","36.The applicant also complained on numerous occasions about hypertension. He was given unidentified pills and a prescription for a more effective and costly medicine, with reference to the facility\u2019s lack of finance. The applicant could not afford to buy the medication prescribed.","37.The applicant developed chronic gastritis while in remand prison.","38.At the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, on 14 December 2005 the doctor at IZ-30\/1 remand prison issued a medical certificate reading as follows:","\u201cDuring his detention in IZ-30\/1 [the applicant] repeatedly turned to the medical unit of the [remand prison] for medical assistance. He was examined by a physician and diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia of a hypertonic type, and chronic gastritis of typeB at the stage of unstable remission.","Appropriate treatment was prescribed with the medicine available at the remand prison. Furthermore, a prescription was given to the applicant to purchase more efficient medication.","At the present moment [the applicant\u2019s] state of health is relatively satisfactory.","In the event of a worsening of his state of health the applicant can be transferred to the regional prison hospital for inpatient treatment.\u201d","39.An ambulance was called for the applicant at the court hearings on several occasions and he was given treatment for high blood pressure. The applicant submitted a medical certificate dated 14 December 2005, which shows that the ambulance was called for him on that date during the court hearing and that he was provided with the necessary medical assistance for a hypertensive crisis.","40.Following numerous complaints about inadequate medical assistance in the remand prison, the applicant was transferred on several occasions to the hospital in the IK-2 correctional colony in the Astrakhan Region. However, no effective treatment was available in the hospital either, because the applicant was not transferred there when his health required, that is following his hypertensive crises, but in accordance with an unclear schedule fixed by the administration of the remand prison.","41.As is apparent from the documents submitted by the applicant in support of his allegations, on 19 September 2006 an inspection of IZ-30\/1 was carried out by the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Astrakhan Region. The inspection revealed, inter alia, that there was a problem of deficient health care in the remand prison.","42.The applicant brought the issue of inadequate medical assistance before various domestic authorities, including the head of the remand prison, the Astrakhan regional prosecutor\u2019s office, the Ombudsman and a judge of the District Court, but all to no avail."],"28304":["7.The applicant was born in 1955 in the village of Z., the Omsk Region. Until his arrest he lived in the village of O. in the same region.","8.The applicant suffers from various illnesses, including rectal cancer. He has twice had colorectal surgery, in 1994 and 1995, and has been certified as having a second-degree disability.","A.Criminal proceedings","9.On 1 November 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of committing, with accomplices, large\u2013scale bank fraud by abuse of position. After being questioned by the police the applicant was released.","10.Two days later, the Kuybishevskiy District Court of Omsk authorised his detention pending investigation. The court concluded that he could abscond or hamper the investigation if released and that he had attempted to influence witnesses after they had been interviewed by the police. The applicant was taken to remand prison no. IZ-55\/1 in Omsk.","11.The defence appealed, stating that the applicant had serious health problems and was therefore not fit enough to exert pressure on witnesses. The defence also referred to the non-violent nature of the offence and the fact that it was not a particularly serious crime.","12.On 13 November 2006 the Omsk Regional Court rejected the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the District Court.","13.On 27 December 2006 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 14 March 2007. Despite arguments by the defence that his health was fragile and that he was unable to receive the necessary care in the detention facility, which did not employ a proctologist, the court, after examining medical evidence submitted by the prosecution, found that his health condition did not call for his release. Having cited the risks of the applicant absconding and obstructing justice, the court also noted that the case was complex and that the investigating authorities were proceeding with it with due promptness. The applicant\u2019s continued detention was therefore warranted.","14.The defence challenged the detention order, referring mainly to the applicant\u2019s deteriorating condition and a lack of adequate medical care in detention. They stated that the applicant was in need of constant medical assistance, supervision and treatment in a surgical department of a hospital.","15.On 29 December 2006 the Regional Court, without addressing the defence\u2019s arguments, found the detention order to be lawful and well\u2011founded.","16.On 9 March 2007 the District Court concluded that the circumstances which had called for the applicant\u2019s arrest and detention had not changed. His further detention was necessary so that the authorities could complete the investigation. The detention was extended until 14June2007.","17.On 14 March 2007 the Regional Court upheld the detention order, stressing that the accused\u2019s health was not the decisive factor in the assessment of the need for detention. The court also noted that Russian law guaranteed medical treatment to every detainee.","18.On 9 June 2007 the applicant\u2019s detention was extended until 14September 2007. The court endorsed its previous reasoning, namely the risks of absconding and influencing witnesses and the necessity to complete the investigation.","19.In appeal statements, the defence disagreed that there was a risk of influencing witnesses, and cited the applicant\u2019s serious health condition and the detention facility\u2019s continued failure to ensure his transfer to a hospital. The lawyers also argued that the investigative authorities had been idle in the previous three months.","20.On 18 June 2007 the Regional Court upheld the detention order without going into the defence arguments.","21.On 31 August 2007 the Tsentralniy District Court of Omsk extended the detention until 1 November 2007, given that the bill of indictment had not yet been drafted or served on the applicant.","22.The detention order was upheld on appeal on 10 September2007, including a specific reference to the detention authorities\u2019 consent to ensure the applicant\u2019s prompt admission to a civilian hospital if necessary.","23.Another extension followed on 29 October 2007 when the Regional Court ordered that the applicant had to remain in custody until 1 December 2007 because one of his alleged accomplices had not yet finished studying the case file. The court noted that there were no grounds for concern about the applicant\u2019s access to medical aid since the authorities had made assurances about his transfer to an adequate medical facility if needed.","24.On 6 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the detention order of 29 October 2007, finding it to be well-reasoned.","25.In the meantime, the pre-trial investigation was closed and the applicant was committed to stand trial before the Russkaya Polyana District Court of the Omsk Region.","26.On 30 November 2007 the Russkaya Polyana District Court held a preliminary hearing in the case in which it extended the applicant\u2019s detention in view of the continued presence of the factors which had initially warranted his arrest.","27.On 13 December 2007 the Regional Court dismissed an appeal against the extension order, noting the lawfulness and reasonableness of the District Court\u2019s findings.","28.In early 2008 the applicant sought release from detention on medical grounds. He cited colorectal surgery, which he had undergone in December, and his inability to take part in court hearings for three or four months given his need for bed rest.","29.On 8 February 2008 the District Court found that the circumstances justifying the applicant\u2019s continuous detention had ceased to exist. His health condition had become serious. Against that background the gravity of the charges no longer sufficed to justify continued detention. The court ordered the applicant\u2019s release against a written undertaking not to leave his home town. The criminal proceedings against the applicant were stayed. Three days later the applicant was released from detention. The release order became final.","30.The parties have not provided any information on subsequent progress in the case.","B.Medical treatment","31.Following admission to remand prison no. IZ-55\/1 on 3November 2006, the applicant was examined by the prison doctor, who noted that he had twice undergone colorectal surgery and that he was suffering from various illnesses, including coronary disease, angina pectoris, mild hypertension, moderate obesity, chronic gastritis and chronic enterocolitis.","32.In December 2006 a large part of the applicant\u2019s sigmoid colon prolapsed and fell out of the rectum, resulting in the development of faecal incontinence. On 21 December 2006 a generalist surgeon from Omsk Regional Penitentiary Hospital no. 11 (\u201cthe Penitentiary Hospital\u201d) examined the applicant and prescribed the use of adult absorbent briefs and the washing of his intimate areas twice a day. A consultation by a proctologist was recommended.","33.The authorities did not provide the applicant with adult absorbent briefs. It is apparent from a certificate signed by the detention authorities that the applicant received a small number of absorbent briefs from his relatives.","34.According to a written statement by Mr. P., a detainee who claimed to have shared a cell with the applicant between November 2006 and January 2007, the applicant complained of acute pain which intensified during the night. On a number of occasions the applicant lost consciousness owing to unbearable pain. A doctor called by inmates only gave painkillers to him. The applicant could only walk by taking small steps as walking caused a great deal of pain. He had to endure the pain each time he wanted to go to the prison shower room, which was located in the basement area of the prison. The authorities did not give him any hygiene products. Even toilet paper was supplied by his relatives.","35.On 6 January 2007 the applicant was admitted to the medical unit in the remand prison. Six days later, at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the head of the colorectal department of the State Regional Civilian Hospital, Dr N., examined the applicant in the remand prison and found his condition to be moderately serious. The applicant was diagnosed with a serious dysfunction of the anal sphincter and the presence of rectal strictures. An inpatient in-depth examination in a civilian hospital, as well as rectal surgery, was prescribed. Dr N. noted that the detention authorities were unable to ensure that the applicant receive the necessary examinations or provide him with treatment owing to a lack of equipment and medical specialists. Dr N. stressed that any delay in treatment could lead to complications and even death.","36.At the end of January 2007 the applicant was seen by a prison surgeon. Considering the applicant\u2019s condition to be satisfactory, the doctor concluded that there was no urgent need to perform surgery or admit the applicant to hospital. The applicant was, however, relieved from morning physical exercises, marching drills and lifting weights.","37.On 2 February 2007, again at the initiative of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, a senior doctor from the State Regional Civilian Hospital, Dr Z., visited him and recorded a further deterioration of his health in the form of an inflammation of the prolapsed part of his bowels. The doctor interpreted the inflammation as a serious complication which could result in the patient\u2019s death if urgent medical examinations and treatment did not take place. He stated that the penitentiary institutions were unable to perform a fibre endoscopic examination of the colon and a multislice computed tomography, the tests required for the correct diagnosis and treatment of the applicant\u2019s condition. The doctor endorsed the recommendations made on 12January 2007 and added that bed rest was required.","38.On 22 March 2007 the applicant was admitted to the Penitentiary Hospital where, by means of an endoscopy, he was diagnosed with dysfunction of the sphincter, and prolapse and inflammation of the sigmoid colon. Treatment with drugs was prescribed. The treatment was meant to reduce the applicant\u2019s pain and help cure his secondary illness.","39.On 2 April 2007 Dr Z. visited the applicant and confirmed the diagnosis. The doctor established that the inflammation had progressed, the patient\u2019s health had deteriorated and that the overall state of his health had become serious. He was in need of urgent colorectal surgery.","40.On 10 May 2007 the applicant was sent back to the medical unit in the remand prison, where he stayed for eleven days. Treatment with painkillers in that period was unsuccessful and the applicant was re\u2011admitted to hospital, apparently with a complication of his heart conditions.","41.At the end of May 2007 Dr N. examined the applicant and noted further progression of the inflammatory process and the aggravation of other illnesses. He insisted on an in-depth medical examination and surgery, noting that surgery could only be performed after bringing the applicant\u2019s heart-related problems under control.","42.The applicant was taken back to the prison medical unit at the beginning of June 2007. However, re-admission to the Penitentiary Hospital followed after just seven days. The applicant was again sent back and forth between the two institutions in August 2007. In that period he received painkillers and antispasmodic drugs. His condition deteriorated further. The attending doctors recorded enlargement of the prolapsed segment of the bowel and that the surrounding skin was macerated and oedematous.","43.On 20 and 27 June 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer arranged for an ultrasound examination by an independent doctor, who recorded pathologic changes in the liver and suggested that they could, in fact, be a sign of metastasis caused by the developing colorectal cancer. A liver puncture test was required for the correct diagnosis.","44.On 9 August 2007 the applicant was released from the Penitentiary Hospital and sent to the remand prison, where he stayed for a month.","45.On 16 August 2007 the applicant was examined by a surgeon from the Penitentiary Hospital who confirmed the necessity for colorectal surgery on the patient \u201cin due course in the very near future\u201d.","46.Eight days later Dr N. stated that owing to the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s condition he was in need of urgent colorectal surgery. Any postponement, in his view, could lead to irreparable damage, including the applicant\u2019s death.","47.According to a written statement by Mr S., who shared a cell with the applicant at the beginning of autumn 2007, at the time in question the applicant looked very sick. He had a sallow complexion, was thin and exhausted. The applicant could only take small steps when walking and supported the lower part of his abdomen. A pungent smell surrounded him. Mr S. helped the applicant to bathe. The applicant\u2019s perineum was inflamed. A bleeding segment of bowel the size of a fist prolapsed through his rectum. The applicant was not provided with incontinence wear and had to wash himself in a sink with cold water.","48.After another stay in the Penitentiary Hospital, from 6 September to 3October 2007, the applicant was taken back to the prison medical unit. In the notes accompanying his discharge the doctors noted that the applicant was suffering from stage 2 colorectal cancer. They recommended colorectal surgery after the applicant\u2019s release from detention.","49.On the following day the applicant was taken back to the Regional Hospital as an urgent case as his condition had become worse.","50.In the meantime, on 1 October 2007 he had lodged an application with the Court and had also asked for the application of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He wanted an indication to the Russian Government that he should be allowed to have colorectal surgery, an X-ray computer tomography and a paracentesis of a space-occupying lesion of the liver.","51.On 3 October 2007 the applicant had a new ultrasound examination. It was unable to give a definite answer as to whether the changes in the applicant\u2019s liver were indeed caused by metastasis.","52.According to a medical certificate issued in the Penitentiary Hospital on 29 October 2007, the applicant\u2019s health condition was considered to be satisfactorily and stable with no signs of negative trends. The detention authorities repeatedly insisted that there was no need for urgent surgery.","53.On 23 November 2007, following receipt from the Government of information on the applicant\u2019s state of health, the Court decided to apply Rule 39 and to draw the Russian Government\u2019s attention to the urgent necessity of the applicant having the following medical procedures: colorectal surgery in a specialist hospital, an X-ray computed tomography, as well as a surgical puncture of the space-occupying lesion of the liver.","54.Between 21 and 26 November diagnostic tests indicated by the Court were performed. They revealed no signs of liver metastasis or space\u2011occupying lesions.","55.On 26 November 2007 Dr N. examined the applicant. He observed a tumor-like stained mass measuring 10 cm in diameter with an opening measuring 1.3 cm, surrounded by coarse cicatrix. The doctor again urged the authorities to perform colorectal surgery.","56.The applicant\u2019s fellow inmate, Mr R., in a statement submitted to the Court, wrote that in November and December 2007 the applicant\u2019s state of health was serious. The applicant was stained with faeces, being unable to control his defecation function. He had to defecate in a standing position, supporting the prolapsed bowel, otherwise his rectum began bleeding. The faeces were liquid and flowed down his legs. He had to wash himself with cold water as no hot water was available in the cell.","57.On 24 December 2007 the applicant was admitted to Omsk Regional Hospital where a colostomy was performed. After a month-long stay, the applicant was discharged from the hospital back to the prison medical unit. Seventeen days later he was released from detention.","58.On 14 October 2008 the Court decided to lift the interim measure indicated under Rule 39.","59.According to the applicant, he underwent inpatient and outpatient treatment in various hospitals after his release.","C.Conditions of detention","60.The parties provided conflicting descriptions of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the remand prison.","1.The Government\u2019s version","61.On the applicant\u2019s admission to the remand prison, on 3 November 2006, the administration found him unfit for detention in a cell for common occupation and ordered his confinement in a cell for single occupation. An order to that effect was issued and the applicant signed it.","62.Relying on certificates issued by the administration of the remand prison in December 2011 the Government claimed that the facility had not been overcrowded. The applicant had been detained in ten different cells which fully complied with regulatory standards. Lavatory pans in the cells had been separated from the living area by a partition. The Government\u2019s submissions may be summarised as follows:","Period of detention","Cell","no.","Cell surface area (sq.m.)","Design capacity (pers.)","Height of the partition","(m.)","3 November 2006 to 4 January 2007","143","21","6","1.6","4 January to 6January 2007","239","39.9","10","ceiling height","6 January to 22March 2007","252","10.16","2","1.1","11 to 21 May 2007","248","11.35","2","1.1","8 to 16 June 2007","232","40","10","ceiling height","10 August 2007","39","-","-","-","10 August to 6September 2007","249","11.4","2","1.1","4 October 2007","276","40","5","ceiling height","17 to 20December 2007","247","12.6","2","1.1","20 to 24December 2007","278","41","10","ceiling height","63.According to the Government, there was hot and cold water in the cells. The facility had had separate shower rooms. The applicant had been given a bucket for his daily washing needs.","2.The applicant\u2019s version","64.The applicant disputed the idea that he had been put in a cell for single occupation and stated that no such order had ever been issued by the detention authorities. He stressed that he had always shared a cell with other detainees in the remand prison. To support that statement, the applicant submitted a certificate issued by a remand prison official on an unspecified date, apparently between 2006 and 2007.","65.In 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer questioned three inmates, MrP., Mr.S. and Mr R., who stated that they had been detained with the applicant in overcrowded cells. One cell had measured 41 square metres and housed between eighteen and twenty detainees, while two of the cells had measured between 18 and 20 square metres and had accommodated at least eight detainees. Each inmate, including the applicant, had thus been afforded between 2.05 and 2.5 square metres of living space.","66.The applicant submitted that during his detention in the remand prison he had only been able to take a shower once a week. However, acute pain while walking had sometimes prevented him from using the shower even on those occasions. After each instance of uncontrolled defecation he had had to wash himself while standing over the lavatory pan, exposed to the view of his cellmates. The partitions were low and therefore could not provide any privacy. No special arrangements had been made for him by the authorities.","67.In their statements, MrP., Mr. S. and Mr R. also confirmed the applicant\u2019s submissions about the lack of any possibility for him to take regular showers and about the conditions in which he had had to perform the daily washes caused by his illness. The inmates described the insults that the applicant had had to endure as a result of the need to wash himself in front of his cellmates. The three former detainees stressed that the applicant had had to make amends for the inconvenience he had caused to his fellow detainees by, for instance, giving them cigarettes, tea, or other valued products supplied by his relatives."],"28310":["1. The applicant, Ms G.J., is a Nigerian national who was born in 1985. According to the case file, she lives in Nigeria. She was represented before the Court by Ms G. Fern\u00e1ndez Rodr\u00edguez de Li\u00e9vana, a lawyer at the non \u2011 governmental organisation Women \u2019 s Links Worldwide (hereafter \u201cWLW\u201d) based in Madrid.","A. The circumstances of the case","2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","1. First set of asylum proceedings","3. In 2006 the applicant arrived in Spain and submitted an asylum request (also referred to hereafter as the first set of asylum proceedings). She alleged that she was a Catholic and had fled Sudan after her father \u2019 s assassination by a radical Muslim group.","4. On 12 July 2007 the Spanish authorities issued an expulsion order in respect of the applicant. According to the case file, the applicant did not seek judicial redress against that order.","5. Her first asylum request was dismissed on 13 July 2009. The administrative authorities found that the inconsistent and contradictory statement of facts provided by the applicant cast doubts on her current nationality and the existence of the alleged persecution. On 7 December 2009 Ms M.E. was appointed as the applicant \u2019 s legal aid lawyer.","6. The dismissal decision of 13 July 2009 was challenged on 22 March 2010 by means of an appeal introduced by Ms M.E. before the Audiencia Nacional ( Court sitting in Madrid with jurisdiction in asylum cases).","7. On 15 October 2010 the Audiencia Nacional dismissed the appeal on its merits. It found that the applicant had not provided any documents proving her identity and nationality. Nor had the applicant provided a minimum of evidence to support her allegations. The court noted that she did not speak Arabic, the official language in Sudan, and that her mother tongues were English and Niala, the latter being a dialect which was not spoken anywhere in Sudan. Lastly, violent incidents similar to those recounted by the applicant had been reported as occurring in Dafur, but not in Yala, the applicant \u2019 s alleged city of origin.","2. Second set of asylum proceedings","8. In the meantime, on 19 February 2010 two police officers stopped the applicant on the street and asked her to prove her identity. She was detained and, with a view to enforcement of the 2007 expulsion order, placed in an aliens \u2019 detention centre. At the time of her detention the applicant was pregnant.","9. On 25 February 2010 the applicant filed a new asylum request (hereafter referred to as the second set of asylum proceedings). She claimed that she was of Nigerian nationality and a Catholic and had fled Nigeria after her parents \u2019 assassination, having been helped to flee by a man called V. Upon her arrival in Spain, however, V. had forced her into prostitution in order to repay her travel expenses, which amounted to 20,000 euros (EUR). After having sex with clients she had become pregnant and V. had suggested she should have an abortion, but she had been detained just a few days prior to her appointment at the abortion clinic. She wished to have the baby and feared being killed if returned to Nigeria as she had not managed to repay her debt.","The United Nations Refugee Agency (hereafter, the \u201cUNHCR\u201d) had supported the applicant \u2019 s request since it considered that, on the basis of the facts recounted by the applicant, she had been a victim of \u2012 and might still be a victim of \u2012 human trafficking. In the second set of asylum proceedings the applicant was represented by the lawyer Mr A.P.","10. On 26 February 2010 this second asylum request was declared inadmissible by the Deputy Director on Asylum. She found that the applicant \u2019 s account of facts as to the alleged persecution was incoherent and inconsistent and she had already presented similar submissions in her first asylum request, which had been rejected.","11. On 3 March 2010 the NGO Proyecto Esperanza \u2012 an agency which specialises in the investigation of trafficking and which had been informed about the applicant \u2019 s case by the UNHCR \u2012 interviewed the applicant at the aliens \u2019 detention centre and submitted a report to the Asylum Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs supporting the applicant \u2019 s allegations.","12. On 4 March 2010 the applicant applied for a re-examination of the second asylum request. She departed from her initial claim alleging persecution on religious grounds, instead focussing exclusively on the fact that she had been trafficked to Spain for the purpose of being forced into prostitution, and provided a more detailed account of facts. The request for re-examination was dismissed on 5 March 2010, the applicant \u2019 s new submissions not being sufficient to alter the conclusions reached in the inadmissibility decision.","13. The applicant instituted administrative judicial proceedings ( procedimiento contencioso administrativo ) against the refusal decision. Additionally, the applicant requested the suspension of the expulsion order, arguing that she was a victim of trafficking and that she should not be removed from Spain until the identification procedure was completed.","14. On 10 March 2010 Madrid administrative judge no. 6 rejected the applicant \u2019 s request to have her expulsion suspended on the following grounds: the applicant had failed to demonstrate the existence of a risk to her life or physical integrity if returned to Nigeria; the applicant had submitted an international protection request only after having been detained and held in immigrant detention; the applicant had already sought asylum unsuccessfully in 2007; the reports compiled by the administrative authorities supporting rejection of the asylum request were better reasoned and more convincing than the report produced by the UNHCR office. According to the case file, the applicant did not appeal against the rejection of the suspension.","15. On 13 April 2010 Madrid administrative judge no. 6 ruled that he lacked jurisdiction to examine the applicant \u2019 s appeal, and relinquished the case to the Audiencia Nacional. It does not follow from the case file that either the applicant or the administrative courts have taken any further steps in pursuance of these proceedings.","3. The intervention of WLW","16. On 11 March 2010, while the above-mentioned judicial proceedings were pending before Madrid administrative judge no. 6, two lawyers from WLW visited the applicant in the detention centre. The applicant signed a written authority to act (hereafter referred to as \u201cthe authority dated 11 March 2010\u201d), instructing Ms Fern\u00e1ndez Rodr\u00edguez de Li\u00e9bana, one of the lawyers, to apply for the granting of a \u201crecovery and reflection period\u201d under section 59 bis of Organic Law 4\/2000 of 11 January on the rights and freedoms of aliens in Spain. In the application, which was introduced on 12 March 2010, WLW asked for a stay of the applicant \u2019 s expulsion.","17. WLW informed Mr. A.P., the applicant \u2019 s lawyer in the second set of asylum proceedings, that the organisation \u2019 s lawyers would represent the applicant from 11 March 2010 onwards. On an unknown date Mr. A.P. gave his consent thereto, but no power of attorney was signed by the applicant to formalise this.","18. On 15 March 2010 WLW applied to the Government Delegation in the Community of Madrid ( Delegaci\u00f3n del Gobierno en la Comunidad de Madrid ) to have the applicant \u2019 s expulsion order revoked. It claimed that the applicant satisfied all the legal requirements to be granted a residence permit in view of her social integration in Spanish society.","19. On 17 March 2010 at 7 a.m. the applicant was expelled to Nigeria. WLW first learnt of the applicant \u2019 s expulsion on 18 March 2010, the date on which she was served with a decision by the Government Delegation dated 16 March 2010 rejecting the request for a recovery and reflection period. On the basis of an interview conducted by police officers, the Government Delegation found that there was no evidence to support the argument that the applicant was a victim of human trafficking. It was clear that she had not been forced into prostitution since she worked independently and voluntarily without being controlled, lived alone and had not been deprived of her freedom of movement. Furthermore, she had no relatives in Nigeria who might be threatened.","4. Judicial proceedings concerning the applicant \u2019 s expulsion","20. On 31 March 2010 WLW instituted administrative judicial proceedings for the protection of fundamental human rights ( procedimiento contencioso administrativo para la defensa de los derechos fundamentales ), claiming that the applicant had been expelled before the Spanish authorities had examined the substance of her request for a recovery and reflection period.","21. On 5 April 2010 Madrid administrative judge no. 14 asked WLW to submit a power of attorney signed by the applicant before a relevant authority, namely a notary, a judicial secretary or a consular authority. He stated that the application would be deemed valid if the applicant had signed it herself.","22. On 7 May 2010 WLW argued before the judge that the manner in which the applicant had been expelled had prevented the organisation from having a power of attorney signed by the applicant before a notary or a judicial secretary. WLW contended that it had not been informed about the expulsion beforehand and had not been able to contact the applicant since then. In its view, the written authority dated 11 March 2010 (see paragraph 16 above) should be regarded as valid for the purposes of representation before domestic courts.","23. On 7 June 2010 the administrative judge rejected WLW \u2019 s submissions. He referred to sections 23 and 45 (2) (a) of Law 29\/1998 of 13 July on Administrative Judicial Procedure, which established the obligation to furnish a power of attorney in cases where applicants had instructed a lawyer to represent them before an administrative judge, and to section 24 of Law 1\/2000 of 7 January on Civil Judicial Procedure, which provided that the power of attorney must be signed before a notary or a judicial secretary. The judge observed that the aim of these requirements was to demonstrate the genuine existence of the person intending to apply to the judicial authorities for the purpose of defending his or her individual rights.","24. On 19 July 2010, as a result of a claim lodged by WLW concerning the applicant \u2019 s case, the Spanish Ombudsman issued a recommendation to the Asylum Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the effect that the asylum authorities should automatically initiate a procedure aimed at determining whether the alleged victim should be granted a recovery and reflection period in cases where an international protection request has been supported by the UNHCR office because it is thought that the person concerned might be a victim of human trafficking.","25. On 3 August 2010, after holding a hearing in the presence of WLW, Madrid administrative judge no. 14 declared the appeal inadmissible as WLW had no locus standi to represent the applicant. The judge found that WLW had failed to substantiate its assertion that its lawyers had tried three times to procure the attendance of a notary at the aliens \u2019 detention centre.","26. On 27 May 2011 the Madrid High Court of Justice upheld this decision, observing that WLW had not demonstrated that it had approached the professional association of notaries for the purpose of requesting the attendance of a duty notary at the aliens \u2019 detention centre. The High Court also found that no evidence had been produced showing that the applicant was unable to avail herself of consular services in her country of origin as provided by section 65 (2) of Organic Law 4\/2000 of 11 January on Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain. In view of the above, the High Court declared that the written authority dated 11 March 2010, which was valid for the purposes of the applicant \u2019 s representation in administrative proceedings, was not sufficient to satisfy the representation requirements under section 24 of Law 1\/2000. On 7 March 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant \u2019 s amparo appeal inadmissible for lack of any special constitutional significance.","B. Relevant domestic law","27. Section 59 bis of Organic Law 4\/2000 of 11 January on the Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain imposes on the competent domestic authorities the obligation to adopt the measures necessary for the identification of victims of trafficking in human beings. This provision reads:","Section 59 bis","\u201c1. The competent authorities shall adopt the necessary measures for the identification of victims of trafficking in human beings in compliance with Article 10 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, of 16 May 2005.","2. Whenever they consider that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an illegal immigrant is a victim of trafficking in human beings, the competent administrative bodies shall inform the person concerned of the provisions of this section and shall submit, in accordance with the relevant procedure, a proposal to the competent authority for the adoption of a decision on whether a recovery and reflection period should be granted in the case.","The recovery and reflection period shall last at least thirty days and shall be sufficient for the victim to make a decision on cooperating with the authorities in the investigation of the crime and, if appropriate, in the criminal proceedings thereafter. During the victim identification period and the recovery and reflection period no infringement proceedings may be instituted for a violation of section 53 (1) (a). Any infringement proceedings that may have been instituted and any expulsion or deportation decisions adopted will be suspended. Likewise, during the recovery and reflection period, the person concerned shall be authorised to stay in the territory temporarily and the competent administrations will provide for his or her subsistence and, if necessary, for the security and protection of the victim and any of his or her children who are minors or disabled and were in Spain at the moment of identification ...","3. The recovery and reflection period may be denied or revoked for reasons of public order or if it is found that victim status has been claimed improperly. The denial or revocation shall be properly reasoned and can be appealed against as provided for by Law 30\/1992 of 26 November on the Legal System of the Public Administration and on Common Administrative Procedure.","...\u201d","28. The relevant Spanish legislation setting out the formal requirement to provide legal representation (in force on the date of the institution of the proceedings for the protection of fundamental rights) provides as follows:","1. Law 29\/1998 of 13 July on Administrative Judicial Procedure","Section 23","\u201c1. In proceedings before a single judge, the parties may choose to be represented by a procedural representative and shall, in any event, be advised by a legal counsel ... \u201d","Section 45","\u201c1. Claims for judicial review shall be initiated in the form of a written application that merely cites the decision, act, inaction or action constituting the challenged ultra vires operation and the petitum that the claim be held to have been filed, unless otherwise provided by this law.","2. This application shall be accompanied by:","a) The document ascertaining the capacity of the person appearing on behalf of the party, unless this document has been previously attached to the judicial file of a case pending before the same court, in which case a certificate may be requested, to be attached to the new judicial file.","...\u201d","2. Law 1\/2000 of 7 January on Civil Judicial Procedure","Section 24. Procedural representative \u2019 s authority to act","\u201c1. The authority to act on behalf of a party shall be conferred through a notarial power of attorney witnessed by a public notary or through the party \u2019 s appearance in the office of a judicial secretary.","...\u201d","3. Law 4\/2000 of 11 January on Rights and Freedoms of Aliens in Spain","Section 65. Appealable nature of the decisions issued as regards aliens","\u201c1. The administrative decisions imposing an administrative sanction may be appealed against as provided for in the relevant regulations. These decisions shall be enforced according to the relevant general legislation.","2. Where the alien is outside Spain, he or she may introduce administrative or judicial proceedings through the relevant diplomatic or consular services, which shall forward the appeal to the relevant body in Spain.\u201d"],"28323":["A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","5.On 27 June 2006 a nineteen-year old woman, K., went to a party in Novy Sanzhary, a small town, and never returned home.","6.On 4 July 2006 her relatives reported her disappearance to the police.","7.Having questioned a number of witnesses, the police established that K. had left the party with her cousin R. and the applicant, one of his friends. At about 6 a.m. on 28 June 2006 K., R. and the applicant were seen drinking beer in a caf\u00e9. Several witnesses stated that while the applicant had been in the caf\u00e9 he had carried a certain \u201cpennant\u201d of a mobile operator company. Shortly afterwards, a witness saw the applicant walking down a road with his arms around K. After that nobody saw K.","8.R. told the police that in the morning on 28 June 2006 he had left K. with the applicant and had gone to work.","9.On an unspecified date between 4 and 8 July 2006 the police questioned the applicant as a witness in connection with K.\u2019s disappearance. During that questioning the applicant said that in the morning on 28 June 2006 he had left K. with two unknown men, had taken a taxi at a taxi stand and had gone home. Police officer I. brought the applicant to the taxi stand and asked the taxi drivers whether they had seen him on 28 June 2006. The taxi drivers did not recognise the applicant and the applicant could not indicate the car and the driver who had allegedly driven him on 28 June 2006. He also could not provide any details about the appearances of the car or the driver.","10.After the applicant\u2019s questioning as a witness and the visit to the taxi stand (see paragraph 9 above), on 8 July 2006 the police detained the applicant for an \u201coffence of minor public disorder\u201d and placed him in a cell at the Novy Sanzhary Police Station. Before the Court and the trial court the applicant submitted that he had not committed any such offence and had been placed in the cell without any reasons. No further information about the nature of the offence in question was made available to the Court.","11.Before the Court the applicant stated that on 8 and 9 July 2006, while he had been kept in the cell, police officers had beaten him and threatened him urging him to \u201ctell the truth\u201d about K.\u2019s disappearance. The material in the case file (namely, a copy of the applicant\u2019s indictment) contains reference to the statements of police officers I. and F. saying thaton 8 or 9 July 2006, while the applicant was in the cell at the Novy Sanzhary Police Station, they questioned him without a lawyer in connection with K\u2019.s disappearance. On 10 July 2006 they questioned him again on the same issue without a lawyer and he confessed to K.\u2019s murder, robbery and rape.","12.On 10 July 2006 during the questioning by I. and F. the applicant made a written statement saying that in the morning on 28 June 2006, after R. had left, he had decided to walk K. home. As he and K. had been walking down a road, he had tried to hug her but she had struck him in the groin. He had reacted by suddenly grabbing her by the neck with his two hands and holding her for several seconds. K. had fainted so he had let her go. After that he had dragged her body into some bushes, pulled down her knickers, bra and t-shirt and had raped her. After that he had taken 20Ukrainian hryvnias (approximately 3 euros) from her wallet and had left. As he had been leaving, K. had been unconscious, but he had not known whether she had been dead or alive, he had had no intention to kill K. when he had grabbed her neck but he had realized that such actions could theoretically result in her death. I. and F. passed the applicant\u2019s written confessions to investigator G. from the local prosecutor\u2019s office.","13.Still on 10 July 2006 investigator G. opened a criminal case against the applicant for the rape, robbery and murder of K. and read him his procedural rights as a suspect, including his rights of defence. The applicant confirmed in writing that he understood his rights. G. also arrested the applicant on suspicion of murder, robbery and rape.","14.Some forty minutes later investigator G. carried out a reconstruction of events in the presence of the applicant, attesting witnesses B. and L., and a forensic medical expert, B. The applicant showed them the place where he had grabbed K. by the neck and her body lying in the bushes. The experts and the investigator inspected the crime scene and collected physical evidence. Investigator G. kept written minutes of the inspection of the crime scene. He noted that the corpse was heavily damaged from decay, worms and insects, it was lying face up with legs spread apart. K.\u2019s bra, t-shirt and knickers were pulled down. Near the corpse the police found a pennant of a mobile operator company and K.\u2019s open wallet.","15.On the same day after the reconstruction of events, investigator G. questioned the applicant in his capacity as a suspect without a lawyer being present. The applicant confirmed his previous statements.","16.In his application form the applicant stated that for the first time he had been allowed to see a lawyer on 22 August 2006. However, from the material in the case file, the authenticity of which the applicant did not dispute before the Court, it follows that on 11 July 2006 the investigator G. appointed lawyer V. to represent the applicant under the legal aid scheme and questioned the applicant in his presence. The applicant confirmed that he had strangled K. with both hands, taken 20 hryvnias from her wallet, put her body in the bushes, pulled down her clothes and raped her.","17.On 12 July 2006 S. was appointed as the applicant\u2019s lawyer instead of V. at the request of the applicant\u2019s father. The applicant confirmed in writing that he wished to have S. as his lawyer.","18.Later that day the police conducted a further reconstruction of events which the applicant, lawyer S., two attesting witnesses and two forensic medical experts took part in. The applicant confirmed that he had strangled K. with both hands, and that after she had fainted he had put her body in the bushes, taken 20 hryvnias from her wallet, pulled down her clothes and raped her. During the reconstruction, he told the medical experts that he had not been ill-treated by the investigative authorities.","19.On 14 July 2006 the applicant was questioned again without a lawyer. Before the questioning he noted in writing that he did not object to being questioned without a lawyer. He described the clothes he had worn on the day of the murder and said that after the murder the clothes had been washed. The police seized the clothes in question from the house of the applicant\u2019s parents.","20.On 18 July 2006 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert, who observed no injuries and reported no complaints.","21.On the same date the investigator read the applicant his procedural rights as an accused, including his rights of defence. The applicant indicated that he wanted to have S. as his lawyer.","22.Later that day the applicant was charged with rape, robbery and murder. He was questioned in lawyer S.\u2019s presence and confirmed having strangled K. with both hands, taken 20 hryvnias from her, put her body in the bushes, pulled down her clothes and raped her.","23.Forensic examinations conducted in July and August 2006 revealed that K. had died because she had been strangled by the neck on both sides. The forensic experts did not find on the corpse any forensic evidence (fingerprints, body fluids, genetic material, and the like) originating from the applicant. No such evidence was discovered on the crime scene either. The experts also found no forensic evidence of rape on the body because its soft tissues had been destroyed by decay and worms. However, in their report the forensic medical experts noted that the corpse\u2019s position and the fact that the clothes on it had been displaced proved that K. had been raped.","24.On 9 September 2006 the applicant confirmed that he wished to have S. as his lawyer. Later that day he was questioned in S.\u2019s presence and said that he had not intended to kill or rape K. He had only decided to rape her after she had fainted. He said that he had not taken 20 hryvnias from K.\u2019s wallet. In fact, he had seen 20 hryvnias on the ground near her body, decided that they had fallen from his own pocket and had taken them. He also said that he had given his earlier statements voluntarily without being physically or psychologically coerced into doing so.","25.Witnesses questioned during the pre-trial investigation stated that the pennant found on the crime scene looked exactly as the one which they had seen on the applicant in the morning on 28 June 2006 (see paragraph 7above). The applicant did not deny that it was the same pennant.","26.On 19 September 2006 the investigator granted the applicant\u2019s request to have his mother appointed as his representative.","27.On the same day the applicant was informed that the pre-trial investigation was completed and the indictment was drafted. The applicant was allowed to study the case file with S. and his mother.","28.On 28 September 2006 the case was sent for trial to the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal.","29.On 16 November 2006, during a court hearing at which lawyer S. was present, the applicant stated that after K. had kicked him in the groin he had suddenly struck her on the neck with one hand. She had fainted and he had put her body in the bushes and left. He denied having strangled K. with his two hands, robbed her, pulled down K.\u2019s clothes, and raped her. He submitted that the police had detained him several days before 10 July 2006, kept him in a cell and ill-treated him until he agreed to confess to the murder, robbery, and rape.","30.The court ordered the prosecution authorities to conduct a pre\u2011investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment.","31.On 5 February 2007 the Novi Sanzhary prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill\u2011treatment after questioning F. and I., who denied that they had subjected him to any pressure. Copies of the written minutes of the questioning of F.and I. are not available to the Court.","32.The applicant requested the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal to send his case for additional investigation on the ground that his right to defence had been restricted on 10 July 2006 when he had been questioned without a lawyer. On 23 October 2007 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal rejected that request noting that although the applicant\u2019s right to legal assistance had indeed been restricted on 10 July 2006, the situation had been remedied because starting from 11 July 2006 the applicant had been represented by a lawyer and confirmed his self-incriminating statements in his presence.","33.The court questioned F. and I. and the attesting witnesses present during the reconstruction of events on 10 July 2006. They all denied that the applicant had been coerced. The forensic experts who had examined K.\u2019s body were questioned by the court; they refuted the applicant\u2019s claim that he had struck the victim once on the neck. They said that her injuries proved that she had died because she had been strangled by the neck on both sides, in the exact same way the applicant had described during the pre-trial investigation.","34.Being questioned at a court hearing in the presence of a lawyer the applicant stated that he had involuntarily killed K. by striking her with one hand, he had not strangled, robbed or raped her. According to him, the police had pulled down K.\u2019s clothes, put her body face up and spread her legs because they wanted to accuse the applicant of her rape.","35.On 20 November 2007 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of robbery, rape, and murder of K. and sentenced him to fourteen and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. The court found that the applicant had wanted to rob and rape K. and had strangled her in order to supress her resistance. The court referred to the statement which the applicant had made in the presence of his lawyer, the minutes of the inspection of the crime scene on 10 July 2006, the results of the forensic examination of K.\u2019s body and other material evidence found on the crime scene, forensic expert\u2019s statements made before the court, and statements of witnesses who on 28 June 2006 had first seen the applicant with R. and K. and then later with K. alone walking down the road. The court also noted that the pennant which the applicant had with him when he had been in the caf\u00e9 (see paragraph 7 above) had been later found on the crime scene. The court also referred to the statements of witnesses who had seen that on 27June 2006 K. had with her a note of 20 hryvnias. The conclusion that K. had been raped was made having regard to the position of K.\u2019s body when it had been discovered by the police and the fact that her clothes had been pulled down. In its reasoning the court did not refer to the clothes which the applicant described on 14 July 2006 (see paragraph 19 above) as an evidence of his guilt. However, in the operative part of the judgment the court ordered the police to return the clothes to the applicant\u2019s mother. As to the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment, the court dismissed this as unsubstantiated referring to the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 5 February 2007.","36.The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. He complained, in particular, that the trial court had relied on his confessions extracted under duress and without a lawyer.","37.On 27 March 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 20November 2007. It noted, in particular, that when convicting the applicant the trial court had mainly relied on the statements which he had made in the presence of the lawyer S. on 9 September 2006.","B.Conditions of detention","38.In a letter to the Court in September 2009, the applicant described the conditions of his detention in Poltava SIZO. He stated that he had been held there since 27 August 2006 in a cell measuring approximately 15square metres with three other inmates. The window had been covered by a plastic sheet making it impossible to open. Because of this no fresh air had entered the cell and in summer, the temperature would sometimes reach 45oC. He had never been allowed to leave the cell. The food had been inadequate.","39.The applicant submitted photos of a building which he claimed was Poltava SIZO. The windows appear to have bottom-hinged shutters made of transparent plastic. On the photographs the shutters are open, and there are several tens of centimetres of space between the window and shutter and the shutter and wall.","40.The Government submitted that during his detention in the SIZO, the applicant had been held in various cells and it was unclear which of them he had been referring to in his letter to the Court. From 29 December 2008 to 26 January 2009 he had been detained with three other detainees in cell no.135, which measured 10.34 square metres. He had therefore enjoyed 2.6square metres of personal space. From 26 January 2009 to 12 March 2010 he had been detained with three other inmates in cell no.24, which measured 12.42square metres. The space allocation for one person had therefore been 3.1square metres. Both cells were equipped with four beds. The SIZO windows could be opened and had not been blocked with plastic sheets. The food the applicant had received met the standard set by domestic law. The Government did not deny that the applicant had been unable to leave the cells he had been held in."],"28322":["5.The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in the town of Shargorod, Ukraine.","A.Events of 30-31 December 2002","1.The applicant\u2019s version","6.According to the applicant, at around 1.30 p.m. on 30December2002, while working in the backyard of his home, he saw three young men on the premises of the nearby Shargorodskiy Food Products Factory (\u201cthe factory\u201d). Since there had previously been thefts at the factory premises, during which scrap metal had been thrown over the fence into the applicant\u2019s yard, the latter decided to enter the factory yard to chase after the young men. However, having climbed over the fence and realising the young men were no longer there, the applicant went to look inside the building, entering \u201cthrough an opening in the wall\u201d. The factory premises were empty but the applicant claimed to have heard adult voices. He did not want to meet anybody and so he crawled out through the same opening and quickly returned home.","7.Five to ten minutes later a police officer, L., arrived at the applicant\u2019s house. According to the applicant, he had a gun in his hand, swore at the applicant, grabbed him by his collar and hit him on the head with the gun handle. The applicant fell to the ground and the police officer started kicking him. The applicant\u2019s mother-in-law appeared and asked the police officer not to beat the applicant, whereupon he grabbed the applicant by the sleeve and took him to the police station. The applicant was accused of stealing aluminium sheets from the factory.","8.The applicant also submitted that, at the police station, L., in the presence of two other police officers, had kicked him in the kidneys, at which point the applicant fell to the ground. After he got up, one of the police officers gave him some water. L. then took the applicant into one of the offices, where he and another police officer, P., beat the applicant about the head and kicked him on various parts of his body for 15-20 minutes. Another police officer, G., arrived and L. and P. continued to beat the applicant, wanting him to confess to theft. After a while the applicant was placed in a cell.","9.That night the applicant complained of a headache and general sickness. He was told by the duty police officer that a doctor would come. After some time a man wearing a white coat arrived, emptied two ampules labelled \u201cAnalgin\u201d and \u201cDimedrol\u201d (diphenylhydamine) into a plastic water bottle and gave it to the applicant.","10.On the morning of 31 December 2002 the applicant was taken to court, where he was fined in administrative proceedings for disobeying a police officer\u2019s order to stop. According to the applicant, he had wanted to show the judge his injuries but the latter refused, advising the applicant to go to a hospital and file a complaint.","11.The applicant was brought back to the police station, where he signed a paper stating that nobody had ill-treated him and that his personal belongings had been returned to him. The material in the case-file includes a note, allegedly signed by the applicant and dated 31December2002, stating that he had no complaints about the police officers and that no physical force had been used against him.","12.On the same day a decision not to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant for stealing aluminium was adopted. It was noted that the applicant had not had any intention of stealing the aluminium sheets and that he had entered the factory premises out of curiosity.","13.The applicant came home and told his family what had happened. The applicant\u2019s sister-in-law, who is a nurse, gave him an injection but the applicant did not feel any better. He was suffering from headache, nausea and fever which he claimed continued for eight months.","2.The Government\u2019s version","14.The Government did not provide a detailed description of the events of 30-31 December 2002 but it appears from their observations that they agreed with the findings of the national investigation authorities (seeparagraphs 48-50 below).","B.Applicant\u2019s stay in hospital","15.On 2 January 2003 the applicant was examined at a hospital and was hospitalised the next day. The applicant stayed in hospital until 11 February 2003. According to the applicant\u2019s medical records, upon arrival at the hospital, his condition was of \u201cmedium seriousness\u201d. He had bruises mostly on the left side of his body and some scratches on his back. On his left thigh there was a large bruise measuring 12 by 6 centimetres. The applicant was suffering from headache and nausea. He told the doctors that he had been beaten by police officer L.","16.In a medical certificate dated 11 February 2003, issued by the hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with multitrauma, closed brain injury, brain contusion of medium severity causing numerous neurological problems, two broken ribs, post-traumatic pneumonia and injuries to his kidneys, face and body.","C.Investigation into the events of 30 December 2002","17.On 10 February 2003 the applicant requested the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor that criminal proceedings be instituted against the police officers. In support of his complaint the applicant outlined his version of the events which took place on 30-31 December 2002 (see paragraphs 6\u201113 above).","18.On 18 February and 3 March 2003 several factory employees (F., S., Lo. \u2013 the wife of police officer L. \u2013, V. and A.) testified before the investigation authorities that a noise had been heard in one of the factory buildings. V. had asked a police officer, L., to check the origin of this noise. All of the above persons had approached the building and had seen footprints in the snow leading to a conveyor belt opening in the wall. Two of them had stayed outside while the others, accompanied by L., had entered the building and had seen aluminium sheets from the ceiling piled on the floor and a man trying to escape through the conveyor belt opening. V., who had stayed outside, had tried to catch the man, but the latter had broken free. When jumping from the conveyor belt, the man had slipped and fallen onto the asphalt and had then run away. The police officer had chased after the man. The latter had climbed over the 2.5 metre high fence but had lost his balance and fallen onto the other side. The witnesses had heard a thud and a shriek.","19.L. gave similar testimony. He added that the applicant had also fallen when jumping over the fence of his house. L. had found the applicant in a coal bunker in the backyard of the applicant\u2019s house and said that he had taken him to a police station.","20.On 3 March 2003 the applicant\u2019s mother-in-law, M., testified that L. had arrived at her house and had said that he was looking for a criminal. Later she had heard a noise behind the barn and had seen L. aiming a blow with the handle of his gun at the applicant, who was lying on the ground. M. had begged L. not to beat the applicant. After that L. had taken the applicant to a police station.","21.On the same day the Vinnytsya Regional Police Department (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0456\u043d\u043d\u044f \u041c\u0412\u0421 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u0443 \u0412\u0456\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0446\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456) approved the results of an internal investigation in response to the applicant\u2019s complaint. The investigation found that on 30 December 2002 around 2 p.m. the factory employees had asked L. to check the origin of a suspicious noise that had been coming out of one of the factory\u2019s abandoned halls. L., accompanied by five factory employees, checked the hall and found aluminium sheets, which had been torn from the ceiling and piled up on the floor. He also saw the applicant, who tried to escape. While running away, the applicant fell twice \u2013 once when climbing through a conveyor belt opening in the wall and a second time when climbing over the fence. He fell for a third time when jumping over the fence of his house. In the yard of his house the applicant hid in a coal bunker, where he was found and taken to a police station. The police officers testified that they had not ill-treated the applicant. The applicant\u2019s mother-in-law testified that a police officer L. had aimed a blow at the applicant as he was lying on the ground but she had not seen the applicant being beaten. Although summoned by a prosecutor, the applicant did not appear for questioning and neighbours \u2012 who did not want their names to be cited \u2012 described him as an alcoholic inclined to involvement in scandalous conduct, theft and fraud. The internal police investigation concluded that since the submissions of the applicant, the police officers and the witnesses were contradictory, the case-file of material should be sent to a prosecutor\u2019s office.","22.On 7 March 2003 the deputy prosecutor of the Shargorodskiy District (\u0437\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u0438\u043a \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u043e\u0440\u0430 \u0428\u0430\u0440\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443) refused to institute criminal proceedings following the applicant\u2019s complaint. The deputy prosecutor noted that the applicant had stated that he had not intended to steal aluminium but had entered the factory premises out of curiosity and had run away out of fear of being accused of theft, that L. and P. had denied using physical force on the applicant and that the factory employees said that they had not seen L. beat the applicant. It was also noted that the applicant had not appeared for the forensic medical examination. The deputy prosecutor concluded that the applicant had sustained his injuries when trying to run away from L.","23.On 10 April 2003 this decision was quashed by a higher prosecutor since it had not been established how the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted.","24.According to a forensic medical conclusion of 12 May 2003, the applicant had sustained the following injuries: closed concussion, two broken ribs on the left and one on the right, post-traumatic pneumonia and a kidney injury. He had numerous bruises: on the chest (20x15 cm), left shoulder (3x3 cm and 4x3 cm), left hip (12x6 cm), under the right knee (2x2cm), left shoulder blade (5x4 cm) and scratches on the back. Those injuries were of medium severity and had been inflicted by a blunt, hard object possibly on 30 December 2002.","25.Between 15 June 2003 and 27 October 2004 the Shargorodskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0428\u0430\u0440\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443) twice refused to institute criminal proceedings in response to the complaint from the applicant. Those decisions were quashed by higher prosecutors for reasons similar to those mentioned in the decision of 10 April 2003 and the case was referred for additional investigation.","26.Between 15 June 2003 and 27 October 2004 the following investigative steps were taken:","\uf02d on 30 August 2004 the applicant\u2019s mother-in-law testified that she had seen L. kicking the applicant whilst he was lying on the ground;","\uf02d on 30 August-1 September 2004 the applicant, his wife and the factory employees were questioned;","\uf02d on 30 August 2004 a forensic expert concluded that the applicant had sustained bodily injuries of medium seriousness and that those injuries could have been inflicted by blunt objects or by several falls from different heights;","\uf02d on 6-8 September 2004 police officers P. and L. were questioned;","\uf02d on 27 September 2004 the factory premises were examined;","\uf02d according to a forensic medical report dated 6 October 2004, the applicant could have sustained his injuries between 30 December 2002 and 2 January 2003 by being beaten or by falling from a height.","27.On 27 October 2004 the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0412\u0456\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0446\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456) instituted criminal proceedings on suspicion of abuse of power.","28.On 30 November 2004 the applicant was questioned and he reiterated his version of events (see paragraphs 6-10 above), submitting, in particular, that in the police station \u2012 in the presence of two police officers \u2012 L. had struck him on the chest; P. had hit him several times on the head; P. and L. had kicked him on various parts of his body and P. had struck him on the chest and on the abdomen and had then beaten him in the presence of a police officer.","29.On 10 January 2005 the forensic medical commission confirmed the previous expert conclusions and added that the applicant had been able to move after the injuries had been inflicted.","30.Between February and June 2005 the applicant, his family members, factory employees and police officers were again questioned and a reconstruction of events was staged in the police station. The applicant\u2019s mother-in-law testified that she had seen L. kicking the applicant as he lay on the ground. She also stated that L. had hit the applicant on the head with his gun handle. The factory employees F. and A. testified that they had seen the applicant running away and falling over on his way to the fence and again when climbing over the fence. Face-to-face confrontations between the applicant and police officers P., L. and G., and between the applicant and the factory employees were conducted.","31.On 19 April 2005 the police officers P. and L. were charged with abuse of power accompanied by violence.","32.By a letter of 5 May 2005 the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the applicant that investigating officers K. and T. had been disciplined for delaying the investigation.","33.On 18 May 2005 P. and L. were questioned as witnesses.","34.On 26 May 2005 the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office asked the Head of the Internal Security Department of the Vinnytsya Region, which is part of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of Ukraine (\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u043a \u0423\u0412\u0411 \u0443 \u0412\u0456\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0446\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456 \u0414\u0412\u0411 \u0413\u0423\u0411\u041e\u0417 \u041c\u0412\u0421 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438), to identify and question witnesses who had seen or talked to the applicant at the time of the events in question. On an unspecified date the police stated that it had not been possible to find any witnesses. Similar requests were also submitted on 16 May 2006 and 11 January 2007. The answers to those requests were also negative.","35.On 2 June 2005 the Shargorod Territorial Medical Unit (\u0428\u0430\u0440\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0435 \u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0456\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u2019\u0454\u0434\u043d\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f), in reply to a request from Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office, submitted that on 30and 31 December 2002 the applicant had not received any medical assistance from an ambulance team.","36.On the same day, judge Tr. was questioned. He submitted that when he had seen the applicant in court on 31 December 2002 the applicant had had no injuries to his head or hands, nor had he complained about any health problems. The applicant also did not complain that he had been beaten.","37.On 10 June 2005 the investigating officer from the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminated the proceedings against the police officers for absence of corpus delicti. On 16 August 2005 this decision was upheld by the Leninskyy District Court of Vinnytsya. On 22 September 2005 the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal quashed these decisions and remitted the case for a fresh investigation. The court found that the investigating officer had failed to check whether an ambulance had been called for the applicant when he had been at the police station, and had failed to question the witnesses to the applicant\u2019s arrest. It was also unclear whether the applicant\u2019s injuries could have occurred as a result of his falls.","38.On 28 October 2005 the Shargorod Territorial Medical Unit again submitted that on 30 and 31 December 2002 the applicant had not received any medical assistance from an ambulance team while at the police station.","39.In November 2005 L., A. and S. were again questioned.","40.On 22 December 2005 the forensic experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have occurred as a result of several falls.","41.On 28 December 2005 the investigating officer of the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office again terminated the proceedings for absence of corpus delicti.","42.On 20 February 2006 the Leninskyy District Court of Vinnytsya quashed that decision because witnesses to the applicant\u2019s arrest had not been sought and the hospital doctors had not been questioned. The applicant\u2019s family members and some factory employees were to be additionally questioned and the evidential material from the administrative case-file against the applicant was to be included in the file. The case was remitted for further investigation.","43.On 13 April 2006 the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal rejected the prosecutor\u2019s appeal against the decision of 20 February 2006.","44.Between 13 April 2006 and 19 October 2008 the proceedings were terminated three times for absence of corpus delicti and re-opened, in particular, in the light of the failure to obtain the applicant\u2019s medical file from the hospital or to conduct a reconstruction of events with the participation of L., witnesses and a forensic medical expert in order to establish where the applicant had fallen and the circumstances in which the applicant had suffered his injuries.","45.By letters of 7 July 2006 and 7 February 2007 the Shargorodskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the Vinnytsya Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s mother-in-law, wife and sister-in-law had refused to testify, that a factory guard who had been on duty on 30December 2002 had moved to Russia, and that \u201cit had been impossible to question doctors at Shargorod Hospital since there was no information about any medical assistance that might have been provided to the applicant\u201d.","46.On 14 October 2008 a reconstruction of events at the factory had been conducted with the participation of L. and a forensic medical expert. The expert had also been asked additional questions on the same day.","47.On 19 October 2008 an investigating officer of the Tomashpilskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office terminated the criminal proceedings against the police officers for absence of evidence of a crime.","48.It was found that on 30 December 2002 at around 1 p.m. employees of the Shargorodskiy Food Products Factory had asked a police officer L., who had been present at that time on the factory premises, to check the origin of noises coming from inside one of the locked factory buildings. L. together with V., F., A., Lo. and S. went to the premises in question. Inside the building, L. and the factory employees found aluminium sheets torn from the ceiling and piled up against a wall. They also saw the applicant, who ran away after tripping up several times. The applicant was later apprehended at his home and taken to a police station.","49.After being questioned on 30 August and 30 November 2004 (seeparagraphs 26 and 28 above), the applicant admitted that whilst running away he had heard people shouting behind him but had not paid any attention to them. The applicant also submitted that he had climbed over the fence having stepped on a manure pile on another side. However, the applicant\u2019s neighbours testified that the manure pile was located 1.5 metres away from the wall. The prosecutor also referred to the testimonies given by the police officer L., factory workers, other police officers and a judge Tr. during the investigation. Numerous forensic medical experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been caused by having fallen onto hard objects several times. The forensic medical expert who participated in the reconstruction of events testified that the applicant\u2019s injuries had most probably been caused as a result of his having fallen down several times, bearing in mind the frozen ground, the height of the conveyor belt and the fence, and the body\u2019s acceleration when running.","50.In view of the above the Tomashpilskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office concluded that there was no evidence of any crime and, since the events in question had taken place six years earlier, that there was no possibility of finding such evidence.","D.Search of the office of the applicant\u2019s representative","51.On 22 September 2010 the Leninskyy District Court authorised a search of premises at K. Street 54\/1. This search was the result of criminal proceedings instituted the previous day following the placement of pornographic material on an Internet page which allegedly belonged to the applicant\u2019s representative.","52.On 15 October 2010 Ya., who was using the premises at K. Street 54\/3, allowed the police to inspect those premises after receiving authorisation from the owner. She confirmed that the items of property in the room at that address belonged to the applicant\u2019s representative.","53.On the same day the police officers inspected the premises at K.Street 54\/3 and seized, inter alia, three computers. According to the applicant\u2019s representative, the office of a human rights organisation was located at that address, which was where he worked.","54.The applicant\u2019s representative complained about the seizure to a prosecutor indicating that one of the seized computers contained part of confidential correspondence with the Court in the present case.","55.On 5 November 2010, in response to complaints by the applicant\u2019s representative about alleged breaches of the law in the course of the search and seizure, the Vinnytsya City Prosecutor\u2019s Office issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. According to the applicant\u2019s representative, he appealed against that decision but to no avail.","56.According to reports in the media, in August 2013 the applicant\u2019s representative was acquitted."],"28341":["A. The circumstances of the case","1. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.","2. The applicants are Somali nationals, a mother and her two children. They were born in 1993, 2014 and 2015 respectively. They are currently living in Denmark. They are represented by the Danish Refugee Council ( Dansk Flygtningehj\u00e6lp ).","3. The applicant mother entered Italy on 15 January 2014.","4. On 26 February 2014 she entered Denmark, where she had a child on 23 March 2014.","5. On 7 March 201 4 the Immigration Service ( Udl\u00e6ndingestyrelsen ) found that the applicant should be returned to Italy under the Dublin Regulation. The Italian authorities accepted this on 16 May 2014.","6. On 15 July 2014 the Refugee Appeals Board decided to suspend transfer until judgment was delivered in Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). The judgment was delivered on 4 November 2014.","7. In the light thereof, on 11 December 2014 the present case was referred back to the Immigration Service for a review.","8. On 27 March 2015 the Italian authorities provided a general guarantee stating that all families with minors transferred to Italy under the Dublin III Regulation would be kept together and accommodated in a facility where the reception conditions were appropriate for the family and the age of the children.","9. On 14 April 2015 the Immigration Service found that the applicants could be returned to Italy under the Dublin Regulation, which was accepted by Italy on 16 May 201 5.","10. On appeal, on 12 June 2015 the decision was upheld by the Refugee Appeals Board ( Flygtningen\u00e6vnet ), on the condition that the Immigration Service could obtain an individual guarantee meeting the criteria set out in the Tarakhel judgment, prior to the transfer of the applicants.","11. In the meantime, on 8 June 2015 the Dublin Unit of the Italian Ministry of the Interior sent a letter to the Dublin Units of the other member States of the European Union, setting out the new policy of the Italian authorities on transfers to Italy of families with small children. The new policy was considered necessary in view of the fact that reception facilities, specifically reserved for such families, frequently remained unoccupied as a result of families having left for an unknown destination prior to transfer, or having obtained a court order barring their transfer. In order to safeguard appropriate facilities where families may stay together, the Italian authorities earmarked a total of 161 places, distributed over twenty-nine projects under the System for Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR). The Italian authorities confirmed that this number would be extended should the need arise. The circular letter read as follows: \u2018 RE: DUBLIN REGULATION Nr. 604\/2013. Guarantees for vulnerable cases: family groups with minors. Further to the previous circular letters dd. February 2nd 2015 and in relation to the current European case - law concerning the guarantees in case of transfers of family groups with minors in compliance with the Dublin Regulation, you will find herewith enclosed the list of the SPRAR projects, which can provide reception to the international protection applicants. Specifically, in the framework of the SPRAR \u2013 Protection System for International Protection Applicants and Refugees \u2013 provided for by the Act nr. 189\/2002 and consisting of the network of the local bodies, as it can also be seen from the www.sprar.it website, specific places have been reserved for family groups in the framework of the implementation of local reception projects. These projects of \u201cintegrated reception\u201d are financed by means of public resources on the basis of calls for tender with specific requirements, on a continuous basis, and they are implemented by the Municipalities with the support of the voluntary sector; they also provide for information, guidance, assistance and orientation measures, by creating individual and family paths of socioeconomic integration (autonomy and social inclusion paths) as well as specific paths for minors. These projects also ensure family unity, Italian language courses and job training. Any checks of the abovementioned requirements lie with the competent Authorities for the transfer to Italy of family groups, by means either of their delegates, or of their liaison officers or of Easo personnel with this specific task. We are therefore of the opinion that, despite the objective difficulties which Italy is facing on the grounds of the high number of migrants and international protection applicants who reach Europe through the Italian coasts, the guarantee requests by Member States concerning the reception standards specifically ensured to family groups with minors can be regarded as fulfilled, also in consideration of the principle of mutual trust, underlying the legislation which regulates the relations among member States. \u2019","12. On 24 June 2015, Italy stated at a meeting of the [Dublin] Contact Committee in Brussels that the circular letter of 8 June 2015 from Italy had replaced the previous letter of 27 March 2015 according to which the member States had been requested to ask Italy for an individual guarantee at least 15 days before a removal was to take place. Italy also said at the meeting that individual guarantees would no longer be issued, but that it was the perception of Italy that the SPRAR centres that had been identified and would be used in future to accommodate families with minor children satisfied the requirements set out in the Tarakhel judgment.","13. It appears from The SPRAR System, a joint report of 13 July 2015 by the Ministries of Immigration of the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland following a fact-finding mission to two SPRAR projects, that all SPRAR projects are to provide beneficiaries with personalised programmes to help them (re)acquire autonomy, and to take part and integrate effectively in Italian society, in terms of finding employment and housing, access to local services, social life and education. It further appears that a number of minimum services are guaranteed to beneficiaries of SPRAR projects, including provision by the managing entity of food, clothes, bed linen and sanitary products and pocket money. Moreover, the managing entity must facilitate access to and the use of public services and health care, and ensure the inclusion of children in the local school system and access to education for adults, as well as Italian language classes, without interruption for the whole year, for a minimum of 10 hours per week. The managing entity must also facilitate the recognition of the beneficiaries \u2019 degrees and professional qualifications and encourage university enrolment. Moreover, the managing entity must provide information on Italian labour legislation and support the integration of beneficiaries into the labour market. As regards the housing market, it is incumbent on the managing entity to provide information about Italian housing legislation and to facilitate access to the public and private housing market by supporting and mediating between beneficiaries and potential landlords. The managing entity must also facilitate access to protected housing if the specific personal situation of the beneficiary so requires. Finally, the managing entity must promote dialogue between beneficiaries and the local community and procedures and provide support relating to family reunification and Italian and European asylum law.","14. On 9 September 2015 the applicant mother had a child with a refused asylum seeker of Somali nationality.","15. In October 2015 the Immigration Service decided four test cases, including the present case, concerning transfer of asylum-seeking families with minor children to Italy under the Dublin Regulation.","16. In the present case it found, on 2 October 2015, that reception conditions for the applicant and her two children in Italy would be suitable. It emphasised, inter alia, that the Italian authorities had launched a number of initiatives to improve reception and accommodation conditions for families with minor children, and at a meeting in Brussels on 24 June 2015, the Italian authorities informed the other member States that the capacity of centres deemed suitable for the accommodation of families with minor children would be adapted according to need. The Italian authorities had also said that the circular letter of 8 June 2015 replaced the previous Italian letter of 27 March 2015, and that it appeared from the circular letter of 8 June 2015 that families with minor children will be offered accommodation in conditions appropriate for families and minors and intended to guarantee the unity of the family, and that offers of language courses and job training are also made. The Danish Immigration Service further referred to The SPRAR System, published on 13 June 2015.","17. On 8 October 2015 the applicants, represented by the Danish Refugee Council, appealed against the decision to the Refugee Appeals Board and simultaneously requested representation by the Danish Refugee Council during the appeal proceedings. They requested that their case be examined in Denmark by virtue of Article 17(1) of the Dublin Regulation, and submitted that a removal would be contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Danish Refugee Council also referred to the fact that the removal of the applicant to Italy would separate the applicant from her spouse and the children from [M.A.A.], who is the biological father of the applicant \u2019 s newborn child and acts as a father to the applicant \u2019 s older child, as [M.A.A.] is an asylum-seeker in Denmark and cannot go to Italy. The Danish Refugee Council made the primary claim that the decision made by the Danish Immigration Service on 2 October 2015 on suitable reception conditions did not satisfy the requirements set out in the decision made by the Refugee Appeals Board on 12 June 2015, and the Danish Refugee Council also claimed that the circular letter of 8 June 2015 could not be considered a sufficient guarantee that the applicant and her minor children will be given one of the reception places in Italy which satisfy the requirements set out in Tarakhel, in the event of their removal. The Danish Refugee Council further submitted that a number of places corresponding to 161 was not sufficient to meet the current needs. Moreover, the circular letter was addressed to all Dublin Units, for which reason 161 places were far from sufficient to accommodate the number of families with children currently awaiting transfer under the Dublin Regulation, and this also had to be viewed in the context of the large number of individuals who continued to enter Italy, for which reason the Danish Refugee Council disagreed with the assessment made by the Danish Immigration Service that conditions had improved or were \u2018 significantly different compared with previous conditions \u2019. The Danish Refugee Council further claimed that no detailed information on the individual accommodation centres appeared in the circular letter or on the website to which reference was made in the circular letter, nor was it specified for how long an asylum-seeker might use this kind of accommodation. The Danish Refugee Council further referred to the circumstance that the description given by Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands in the report of 13 July 2015 was not an adequate description of the general conditions at SPRAR centres. The Danish Refugee Council further observed that the circular letter was dated prior to the decision made by the Refugee Appeals Board on 12 June 2015, but that it was apparently not considered a sufficient guarantee of suitable reception conditions when the decision was made. As regards the consultation response from the Danish Immigration Service of 7 September 2015, the Danish Refugee Council failed to understand why most of the member States assumed that the Italian circular letter constituted a sufficient guarantee to transfer families with children, considering that there was a total of 31 member States, and only three member States had responded that their authorities accepted the Italian circular letter as a sufficient guarantee. The Danish Refugee Council made the alternative claim that the application for asylum submitted by the applicant and her children should be examined according to the standard asylum procedure in Denmark due to the long processing time, and in consideration of the best interests of the child to guarantee effective access to the asylum procedure as described in recital 5 of the Dublin Regulation. The Danish Refugee Council observed in this regard that it had brought ten cases before the European Court of Human Rights in which the applicants and their children also risked being transferred to Italy under the Dublin Regulation and that in October 2015 the Danish Immigration Service had decided to permit an examination of half of those cases according to the standard asylum procedure. The Danish Refugee Council found that the processing time of the case of the applicant and her children had been almost as long, and they were correspondingly vulnerable. Finally, the Danish Refugee Council appended an opinion of 8 October 2015 by a network officer of the Jammerbugt Municipality from which it appeared that the officer was concerned about whether the applicant would be able to manage her life and her children \u2019 s if she had to manage the children on her own, and that [M.A.A.] provided great support for the applicant and her children.","18. On 3 February 2016, in a decision which ran to 11 pages, the Refugee Appeals Board upheld the decision by the Immigration Service, setting out, inter alia:","\u201c ... the Refugee Appeals Board makes the following statement:","The applicant is a currently 22-year-old Somali woman who entered Italy illegally and was registered in Italy on 15 January 2014. On 26 February 2014, the applicant entered Denmark and applied for asylum. On 23 March 2014, she gave birth to her daughter [S.]. On 16 May 2014, Italy agreed to take back the applicant and her daughter under Article 13(1) of the Dublin Regulation. On 9 September 2015, the applicant gave birth to yet another daughter. According to the information available, the applicant and her children are in perfect health. [M.A.A.], the father of the younger child, who is also a Somali national, has been refused asylum in Denmark.","The members of the Refugee Appeals Board agree that the formal rules of the Dublin Regulation governing the return of the applicant and her children to Italy have been satisfied.","The issue to be determined by the Refugee Appeals Board is whether such circumstances exist that the applicant and her children cannot be returned to Italy anyway and that the application must be examined in Denmark, see Articles 3(2) and 17 of the Dublin Regulation. The issue at stake is therefore whether the applicant and her children must be assumed to be subject to circumstances on their return to Italy which are so burdensome that the circumstances would be contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.","The majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board find that the applicant, as a single mother with two children, must be deemed to belong to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable group in need of special protection.","Based on the circular letter of 8 June 2015 from Italy and Italy \u2019 s subsequent assurances on the adaptation of its reception capacity at the meeting of the Contact Committee on 24 June 2015, the majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board find that Italy must be considered to satisfy the requirements to take charge of the applicant and her children. The majority also refer to the unanimous decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights in J.A. and Others v. the Netherlands (decision of 3 November 2015) and A.T.H. v. the Netherlands (decision of 17 November 2015) finding inadmissible applications from other asylum-seekers with minor children who had complained that they would be subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights if returned to Italy under the rules of the Dublin Regulation.","It is observed that the Refugee Appeals Board had not yet received the circular letter of 8 June 2015 from Italy when it made its decision on 12 June 2015, for which reason the circular letter was not included in the basis of the decision of the Refugee Appeals Board.","The majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board further find that the applicant had not demonstrated that her future prospects, if transferred to Italy together with her two children, whether taken from a material, physical or psychological perspective, would be contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is observed in this respect that the applicant is a young woman in perfect health, according to her own statement to the Danish Immigration Service at the asylum screening interview. It cannot lead to a different conclusion that the Danish Refugee Council has submitted that it appears from the appended opinion of 8 October 2015 that an officer of the Jammerbugt Municipality expressed concern as to whether the applicant is able to manage the lives of herself and her children if she is to manage the children on her own and that [M.A.A.] is a great support for the applicant and the children. Accordingly, the majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board find no basis on which it could be assumed that the applicant would not be able to benefit from the resources available in Italy to a female asylum-seeker with two minor children or that, in case of health-related or other difficulties, the Italian authorities would not respond in an appropriate manner. The majority find that the consideration of the applicant \u2019 s children cannot independently justify that the family should not be transferred to Italy. It is observed in this respect that the applicant \u2019 s application for asylum has to be processed according to the regular asylum procedure, no matter which country is responsible for examining the application for asylum lodged by the applicant and her children, and within the processing time that can be expected for the procedure.","Furthermore, the majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board find that the length of the processing time cannot justify the processing of the application in Denmark. The majority emphasise in this respect that the applicant was informed already on 8 December 2014 that she was to be transferred back to Italy and that the subsequent processing time is attributable solely to the applicant \u2019 s complaint and the need to clarify the consequences of the Tarakhel judgment. The consequences must now be deemed clarified by Italy \u2019 s letter of 8 June 2015 and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights of 3 and 17 November 2015. The circumstance that the Danish Immigration Service has decided to process other applications in Denmark cannot lead to a different decision.","The Refugee Appeals Board also finds that the applicant \u2019 s relationship with [M.A.A.], who is the father of her younger child, cannot lead to the decision to process the application in Denmark. In this connection, the Board emphasises that the applicant only established cohabitation with [M.A.A.] in Denmark and after being notified of the decision to return her to Italy. Moreover, [M.A.A.] has been finally refused asylum in Denmark and must leave Denmark.","Against that background and based on a review of the case, the Refugee Appeals Board informs you that the Board finds no basis for reversing the decision made by the Danish Immigration Service, see section 48a(1), first sentence, cf. section 29a(1), of the Danish Aliens Act ( udl\u00e6ndingeloven ), see the Dublin Regulation.","The Refugee Appeals Board observes that the Board presumes that the Danish National Police will ensure, prior to the removal of the applicant and her children to Italy, that the Italian authorities agree to receive the applicant \u2019 s younger child as well and that the Italian authorities are notified of the relevant information on the applicant \u2019 s needs. \u201d","19. Another circular letter dated 15 February 2016 was sent by the Dublin Unit of the Italian Ministry of the Interior to the Dublin Units of the other member States of the European Union, in which the Italian Dublin Unit provided an updated list of \u201cthe SPRAR projects where asylum-seeker family groups with children will be accommodated, in full respect of their fundamental rights and specific vulnerabilities\u201d.","B. Relevant domestic law and practice","20. The relevant European, Italian and Netherlands law, instruments, principles and practice in respect of asylum proceedings, reception of asylum - seekers and transfers of asylum - seekers under the Dublin Regulation have recently been summarised in Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 28-48, ECHR 2014 (extracts) ); Hussein Diirshi v. the Netherlands and Italy and 3 other applications (( dec. ), nos. 2314\/10, 18324\/10, 47851\/10 and 51377\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 98-117, 10 September 2013); Halimi v. Austria and Italy (( dec. ), no. 53852\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 21-25 and \u00a7\u00a7 29 \u2011 36, 18 June 2013); Abubeker v. Austria and Italy ( dec. ), no. 73874\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 31-34 and \u00a7\u00a7 37-41, 18 June 2013); Daybetgova and Magomedova v. Austria (( dec. ), no. 6198\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 25 29 and \u00a7\u00a7 32-39, 4 June 2013); and Mohammed Hussein v the Netherlands and Italy (( dec. ), no. 27725\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 25-28 and 33-50, 2 April 2013).","21. Pursuant to section 56, subsection 8, of the Aliens Act, decisions by the Refugee Appeal Board are final, which means that there is no avenue for appeal against the Board \u2019 s decisions.","22. Aliens may, however, by virtue of Article 63 of the Danish Constitution ( Grundloven ) bring an appeal before the ordinary courts, which have authority to adjudge on any matter concerning the limits to the competence of a public authority.","Article 63 of the Constitution reads as follows:","\u201c1. The courts of justice shall be empowered to decide any question relating to the scope of the executives \u2019 authority; though any person wishing to question such authority shall not, by taking the case to the courts of justice, avoid temporary compliance with orders given by the executive authority.","The courts will normally confine the review to the question of deciding on the legality of the administrative decision, including shortcomings of the basis for the decision and illegal assessments, but will generally refrain from adjudging on the administrative discretion exercised.\u201d","Review by the courts pursuant to section 63 of the Constitution is a common legal remedy. Consequently, in cases where an alien claims that a refusal to grant a residence permit or a deportation order would be in violation of the Convention, the courts examine intensively whether the Administration \u2019 s decision is in accordance with Denmark \u2019 s obligations under the Convention, including Article 8 (see, for example, Priya v. Denmark ( dec. ), no 13594\/03, 6 July 2006, and Saeed v. Denmark ( dec. ), no. 53\/12, 24 June 2014 ). The courts cannot grant an alien a residence permit but they can annul the decision of the Administration and thus send the case back to the Administration for a renewed examination, for instance if the courts find that the refusal to grant a residence permit constitutes a violation of the alien \u2019 s right to respect for family life according to Article 8 of the Convention. An application pursuant to section 63 of the Constitution has no automatic suspensive effect. However, an application pursuant to section 63 of the Constitution may be granted suspensive effect if very particular circumstances ( ganske s\u00e6rlige omst\u00e6ndigheder ) exist."],"28376":["1. The applicant, Mr Gadaa Ibrahim Hunde, is an Ethiopian national who was born in 1992 and lives in Amsterdam. He was represented before the Court by Mr P. Fischer, a lawyer practising in Haarlem. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant and as apparent from public documents, may be summarised as follows.","A. Background to the case","2. In December 2012 a group of approximately 200 irregular migrants in the Netherlands who \u2013 as rejected asylum-seekers \u2013 were no longer entitled to State-sponsored care and accommodation for asylum-seekers, squatted the St. Joseph Church in Amsterdam. These irregular migrants formed an action group called \u201c We Are Here \/ Wij Zijn Hier \u201d seeking attention for and relief from their situation. During their stay there, the St. Joseph Church was colloquially referred to as the Refuge Church ( Vluchtkerk ). It appears that the group was evicted from the Refuge Church on 31 March 2013.","3. On 4 April 2013 the municipality of Amsterdam offered temporary shelter to the original members of the group \u201cWe Are Here\u201d who had been staying in the Refuge Church since December 2012. Accordingly, 159 persons were housed temporarily in a former detention facility on the Havenstraat in Amsterdam \u2013 which came to be known as the Refuge Haven ( Vluchthaven ) \u2013 until 31 May 2014. The remaining persons from the Refuge Church who had been evicted from there and not been offered shelter in the Refuge Haven, squatted an indoor car park, which came to be known as the Refuge Garage ( Vluchtgarage ).","4. A number of residents of the Refuge Garage initiated administrative proceedings against the municipality of Amsterdam demanding that they be provided with shelter, food and clothing. In one of those proceedings, lodged by three residents of the Refuge Garage, not including the applicant, a provisional measure ( voorlopige voorziening ) was granted on 17 December 2014 pending further appeal proceedings before the Central Appeals Tribunal ( Centrale Raad van Beroep ). At the request of the three petitioners, the provisional-measures judge ( voorzieningenrechter ) of the Central Appeals Tribunal ordered the municipality of Amsterdam to provide overnight shelter, a shower, breakfast and dinner to the petitioners. In that decision, account was taken of the fact that the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights ( College voor de Rechten van de Mens ) had found degrading living conditions in the Refuge Garage. In addition, regard was had to two decisions of the European Committee of Social Rights (hereinafter the \u201cECSR\u201d) of 1 July 2014, in which the Netherlands was found to have breached Articles 13 \u00a7 4 and 31 of the European Social Charter (hereinafter the \u201cCharter\u201d) by failing to provide adult irregular migrants with adequate access to emergency assistance, that is food, clothing and shelter (see paragraph 37 below).","5. In response to this provisional measure, the Association of Netherlands Municipalities ( Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten ) \u2013 in agreement with the Deputy Minister of Security and Justice ( Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie ) \u2013 set up a scheme to offer basic provisions to irregular migrants, the so-called Bed, Bath and Bread Scheme ( bed-bad-broodregeling ). That scheme entailed that the central municipalities [1] would provide basic accommodation to irregular migrants including night shelter with shower facilities, breakfast and dinner, starting from 17 December 2014. It was announced from the outset that this scheme would be temporary, awaiting the adoption of a resolution by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe concerning the ECSR \u2019 s two decisions, pursuant to Article 9 of the Additional Protocol to the European Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints. Although these resolutions were adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 April 2015 (see paragraph 38 below), the scheme has been prolonged and is currently still in place.","B. Particular circumstances of the case","6. The applicant fled from Ethiopia to the Netherlands in September 2011. His application for asylum was rejected as unfounded. Apart from the fact that, for reasons found imputable to him, the applicant did not hold any identity or travel documents, he was found to have given inconsistent, contradictory, vague and summary statements to the immigration authorities. In July 2013 he was released from immigration detention ( vreemdelingendetentie ) because, according to the applicant who has not provided any further details, an effective removal to his country of origin proved not possible. As a rejected asylum-seeker who had failed to leave the country within the voluntary return grace period of four weeks, the applicant was no longer entitled to State-sponsored accommodation and care in one of the reception centres for asylum-seekers.","7. In December 2013 the applicant, having joined the group \u201cWe Are Here\u201d, took shelter in the Refuge Garage in Amsterdam together with approximately 100 other irregular migrants. It appears that he lived in the Refuge Garage until March 2015. Meanwhile, the applicant instituted the proceedings set out in paragraphs 9-19 and 20-24 below.","8. On 11 February 2015 the applicant filed a fresh asylum application, which was accepted on 30 March 2015. He was provided with a temporary residence permit for asylum purposes valid from 30 March 2015 until 30 March 2020, based on section 29 \u00a7 1(a) of the Aliens Act 2000 ( Vreemdelingenwet 2000 ).","1. Proceedings lodged against the municipality","9. On 30 December 2013 the applicant requested the municipality of Amsterdam to grant him State-sponsored care and reception facilities similar to the facilities offered to asylum-seekers by the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum-Seekers ( Centraal Orgaan Opvang Asielzoekers; hereinafter \u201cCOA\u201d), submitting, inter alia, that he found himself in an emergency situation considering the appalling living conditions in the Refuge Garage. He further submitted that he had applied for shelter in the Refuge Haven but that, unlike other irregular migrants from the Refuge Church in a similar situation, he had not been admitted to the Refuge Haven.","10. The applicant submitted that the living conditions in the Refuge Garage were poor. Housing more than 150 persons, it was overcrowded. A limited, insufficient number of toilets was available and there were no washing facilities. Electricity was not always available. The irregular migrants staying in the garage were dependent on volunteers for food and the atmosphere between them was tense, regularly resulting in confrontations which were sometimes violent. The applicant himself had once been threatened and assaulted by a co-resident in the garage. He had sustained a light stab wound. He had reported that incident to the police.","11. On 31 March 2014 the Mayor and Aldermen ( college van Burgemeester en Wethouders ) of the municipality of Amsterdam, treating the applicant \u2019 s request as an application for access to community shelter services ( maatschappelijke opvang ) under the Social Support Act ( Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning ), rejected it as the applicant was neither a Dutch national nor did he hold a residence permit as required by the aforementioned act. An exception to that rule could apply when the right to respect for physical or psychological integrity flowing from Article 8 of the Convention was at stake, in particular if the person concerned was a minor or vulnerable because of a medical emergency. However, as the applicant had not provided any medical information \u2013 even though he claimed that he required medical care \u2013 he was considered as not falling within the category of vulnerable persons.","12. With regard to the fact that the applicant had been denied access to the Refuge Haven, the Mayor and Aldermen held that accommodation at that location had been offered to the original members of the group \u201cWe Are Here\u201d who had stayed in the Refuge Church for an uninterrupted period of time and who were willing to cooperate with the municipality and other institutions in the organisation of their return to the country of origin. The applicant did not fulfil those requirements.","13. The Mayor and Aldermen further made reference to the possibility of the applicant requesting the Repatriation and Departure Service ( Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek ) of the Ministry of Security and Justice ( Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie ) to impose a measure on him within the meaning of section 56 of the Aliens Act 2000 in order to gain access to reception facilities at a centre where his liberty would be restricted ( vrijheidsbeperkende locatie ). In such centres the focus is on departure from the Netherlands of the person concerned, meaning that reception facilities are provided on condition that the person concerned cooperates in the organisation of his or her departure to the country of origin.","14. The applicant lodged an objection ( bezwaar ) against the decision of 31 March 2014 which was dismissed by the Mayor and Aldermen on 11 July 2014, in accordance with an advice drawn up by the objections committee ( Bezwarencommissie ) on 9 July 2014 and on the same grounds as those on which the initial decision had been based. The applicant lodged an appeal ( beroep ) with the Amsterdam Regional Court ( rechtbank ).","15. On 8 May 2015 the Amsterdam Regional Court accepted the applicant \u2019 s appeal and quashed the Mayor and Aldermen \u2019 s decision of 11 July 2014. Proceeding to decide on the matter itself, the Regional Court considered that the ECSR \u2019 s decisions of 1 July 2014, in which the ECSR had found violations of Articles 13 and 31 of the Charter, could not be overlooked notwithstanding the fact that they were not binding for the State Parties to the Charter. Accordingly, the Regional Court considered that the denial of shelter, food and clothing to irregular migrants touched upon the right to respect for human dignity in such a way as to preclude a person \u2019 s enjoyment of private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. It concluded that the State was under a positive obligation to provide the applicant with shelter, food and clothing and that that provision should not be made conditional on the applicant \u2019 s cooperation in the organisation of his departure from the Netherlands. It was noted, however, that the municipality of Amsterdam, simultaneously with other municipalities in major cities of the Netherlands, had established the Bed, Bath and Bread Scheme (see paragraph 5 above), providing, as of 17 December 2014, basic accommodation to irregular migrants including night shelter with shower facilities, breakfast and dinner. As far as the applicant had argued that the Bed, Bath and Bread Scheme was insufficient, he had failed to substantiate that argument with any prima facie evidence.","16. Moreover, the applicant had obtained a residence permit on 30 March 2015 as a consequence of which he was already entitled to State-sponsored social benefits. The applicant \u2019 s argument that his right to emergency social assistance should nevertheless be acknowledged retroactively and that he should be granted living allowances ( leefgeld ) by way of compensation was dismissed. The Regional Court held that although such a right to emergency social benefits should be acknowledged retroactively, that is from 29 November 2013, there was no legal basis on which to conclude that this right included a right to living allowances. It was open to the applicant to claim compensation for damage in separate proceedings.","17. Both the applicant and the Mayor and Aldermen lodged a further appeal ( hoger beroep ) with the Central Appeals Tribunal.","18. On 26 November 2015 the Central Appeals Tribunal dismissed the applicant \u2019 s appeal but accepted the Mayor and Aldermen \u2019 s appeal and quashed the Regional Court \u2019 s judgment. The Central Appeals Tribunal found that the Mayor and Aldermen \u2019 s rejection of the applicant \u2019 s request for shelter under the Social Support Act was justified as the applicant had the possibility of receiving shelter at a centre where his liberty would be restricted. Unlike the Regional Court, it agreed with the Mayor and Aldermen that irregular migrants may be denied access to such a centre if they refuse to cooperate in the organisation of their return to their country of origin, unless there existed exceptional circumstances. Such exceptional circumstances could exist when the person concerned had demonstrated that he or she was unable to foresee the consequences of his or her actions or omissions due to his or her psychiatric state of mind. It was, however, incumbent upon the irregular migrant to claim that such exceptional circumstances pertained.","19. No further appeal lay against this decision.","2. Proceedings lodged against the Deputy Minister of Security and Justice","20. In the meantime, on 24 March 2014, the applicant had also requested the Deputy Minister of Security and Justice to grant him, either in cooperation with the municipality of Amsterdam or independently, State-sponsored care and accommodation, in particular to offer him shelter as well as (allowances for) food and clothing.","21. On 25 March 2014 the Deputy Minister rejected the applicant \u2019 s request, considering that he could apply for admission in a centre run by the Repatriation and Departure Service where his liberty would be restricted and where he would have to cooperate in the organisation of his departure from the Netherlands. The applicant was reminded of the fact that he was already under a statutory obligation to leave the Netherlands pursuant to section 61 \u00a7 1 of the Aliens Act 2000 as his asylum request had been rejected.","22. The applicant filed an objection against this decision, which was dismissed by the Deputy Minister on 16 June 2014.","23. An appeal lodged by the applicant was declared inadmissible by the Regional Court of The Hague on 8 September 2015, which considered that the applicant no longer had any interest in challenging the impugned decision in view of the provisional measure issued by the Central Appeals Tribunal on 17 December 2014, pursuant to which the municipality of Amsterdam had been ordered to provide night shelter, breakfast and dinner to irregular migrants (see paragraph 5 above).","24. Although possible, the applicant did not lodge a further appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State ( Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State ) against the decision of the Regional Court.","C. Relevant domestic law","25. The admission, residence and expulsion of aliens are regulated by the Aliens Act 2000. Section 5 \u00a7 1 of the said act reads as follows:","\u201cAn alien who has been refused entry into the Netherlands shall leave the Netherlands immediately, duly observing such directions as may have been given to him for this purpose by a border control officer.\u201d","26. Section 10 of the Aliens Act 2000 provides as follows:","\u201c1. An alien who is not lawfully resident may not claim entitlement to benefits in kind, facilities and social security benefits issued by decision of an administrative authority. The previous sentence shall apply mutatis mutandis to exemptions or licenses designated in an Act of Parliament or Order in Council.","2. The first subsection may be derogated from if the entitlement relates to education, the provision of care that is medically necessary, the prevention of situations that would jeopardise public health or the provision of legal assistance to the alien.","3. The granting of entitlement does not confer a right to lawful residence.\u201d","27. Section 45 of the said Act provides the following on the legal consequences of a rejection of an application for a residence permit in the Netherlands:","\u201c1. The consequences of a decision whereby an application for the issue of a residence permit for a fixed period [...] or a residence permit for an indefinite period [...] is rejected shall, by operation of law, be that:","(a) the alien is no longer lawfully resident [...];","(b) the alien should leave the Netherlands of his own volition within the time limit prescribed in section 62, failing which the alien may be expelled;","(c) the benefits in kind provided for by or pursuant to the Act on the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum-Seekers or another statutory provision that regulates benefits in kind of this nature will terminate in the manner provided for by or pursuant to that Act or statutory provision and within the time limit prescribed for this purpose;","(d) the aliens \u2019 supervision officers are authorised, after the expiry of the time limit within which the alien must leave the Netherlands of his own volition, to enter every place, including a dwelling, without the consent of the occupant, in order to expel the alien;","(e) the aliens \u2019 supervision officers are authorised, after the expiry of the time limit referred to in (c), to compel the vacation of property in order to terminate the accommodation or the stay in the residential premises provided as a benefit in kind as referred to in (c).","2. Subsection 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis if:","...","(b) A residence permit has been cancelled or not renewed.","3. The consequences referred to in subsection 1 shall not take effect as long as the application for review lodged by the alien suspends the operation of the decision.","4. [The] Minister may order that, notwithstanding subsection 1, opening words and (c), the benefits in kind provided for by or pursuant to the Act on the Central Reception Organisation for Asylum-Seekers or another statutory provision that regulates benefits in kind of this nature will not terminate for certain categories of alien. The order shall be repealed no later than one year after its notification.","5. An alien to whom an order as referred in subsection 4 is applicable shall be deemed to be lawfully resident as referred to in section 8 (j).\u201d","28. Under the Act on the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum-Seekers ( Wet Centraal Orgaan Opvang Asielzoekers ) and related regulations, including the Regulation on Provisions for Asylum-Seekers and Other Categories of Aliens ( Regeling verstrekkingen asielzoekers en andere categorie\u00ebn vreemdelingen ), the Central Agency \u2013 an autonomous administrative authority \u2013 is responsible for the provision of reception facilities which comprise housing, basic subsistence means and health care to asylum-seekers.","29. If no residence permit is granted to an asylum-seeker, he or she will remain entitled to benefit from the reception facilities for asylum-seekers for a grace period of four weeks after the date of the final decision taken on his\/her request. The rejected asylum-seeker is given this grace period to leave the Netherlands voluntarily \u2013 if need be assisted by the International Organisation for Migration \u2013 as he\/she is no longer lawfully staying in the Netherlands and under a legal obligation to leave. After the expiry of this period, access to reception facilities is automatically terminated without a specific decision. Nevertheless, an alien in such a situation may apply to the Central Agency for continued reception facilities. If highly exceptional circumstances so require, the Central Agency can take a decision to that effect. A negative decision can be appealed to the Regional Court and, subsequently, to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division. Both before the Regional Court and the Administrative Jurisdiction Division it is possible to apply for a provisional measure pending the outcome of the appeal proceedings.","30. Rejected asylum-seekers and other migrants in an irregular situation are entitled to health care in cases of medical emergency (as well as legal aid and education for minors). Rejected applicants for a residence permit with physical and\/or psychological problems severe enough to make them unfit for travel may furthermore apply for the deferral of their departure from the Netherlands under section 64 of the Aliens Act 2000. The expulsion is then suspended for the duration of the severe medical condition and the migrant concerned is granted a right to accommodation.","31. A migrant, who is under the legal obligation to leave the Netherlands because his or her lawful residence or entitlement to State-sponsored care and accommodation has come to an end, can be offered accommodation in a centre where his or her liberty is restricted. Such accommodation is based on a so-called liberty-restricting measure ( vrijheidsbeperkende maatregel ) within the meaning of section 56 of the Aliens Act, which measure entails that the person concerned can move in and out of the centre freely but is prohibited from crossing the municipal boundaries where the centre is located. That accommodation is offered for twelve weeks and its main focus is the migrant \u2019 s departure from the Netherlands to the country of origin with the Repatriation and Departure Service \u2019 s assistance: there has to be a realistic prospect of an effective return within twelve weeks and the migrant must be willing to cooperate by taking steps to effectuate his or her departure from the Netherlands.","32. A temporary residence permit may be issued to migrants who, through no fault of their own, cannot leave the Netherlands ( buitenschuldvergunning ) pursuant to section 3.48 \u00a7 2a of the Aliens Decree 2000 ( Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000 ). Section B8\/4.1 of the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines 2000 ( Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 ) lays down the conditions with which an alien must comply in order to be eligible for such a residence permit. At the relevant time the conditions were that:","\u201c[T]he alien has:","- done everything within his power to organise his departure independently;","- no doubt exists about his nationality and identity; and","- he cannot be blamed for his inability to leave the Netherlands.","the alien has:","- turned to the International Organisation for Migration in order to facilitate his departure; and","- this organisation has indicated that it is not capable of organising the aliens \u2019 departure due to the fact that the alien submits that he is unable to have travel documents at his disposal[;]","the alien has:","- requested the Repatriation and Departure Service to mediate in obtaining the required documents of the authorities of the country to which departure is possible; and","- the mediation has not led to the desired result; and","the alien:","- is residing in the Netherlands without a valid residence permit;","- does not comply with other conditions for being granted a residence permit; and","- has not also filed an application for a residence permit for the purpose of residence on other grounds.\u201d","33. From 1 January 2014 onwards, section 8 of the Social Support Act ( Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning; \u201cWMO\u201d) has provided as follows:","\u201c1. An alien can only be eligible for individual assistance, women \u2019 s shelter services or a payment as referred to in section 19a if he is lawfully resident within the meaning of section 8, subsection (a) to (e) inclusive and (l) of the Aliens Act 2000.","2. An alien can only be eligible for community shelter services if he is lawfully resident within the meaning of section 8, subsection (a) to (e) inclusive and (l) of the Aliens Act 2000, except in cases referred to in article 24, paragraph 2 of Directive 2004\/38\/EC.","3. Notwithstanding subsections 1 and 2, in cases designated by order in council, if necessary notwithstanding section 10 of the Aliens Act 2000, categories of aliens residing unlawfully in the Netherlands specified by or pursuant to that order may be wholly or partially eligible for assistance specified by that order or for a payment as referred to in section 19a. Eligibility for assistance or a payment as referred to in section 19a does not confer any right to lawful residence on an alien.","4. The order referred to in subsection 3 may provide that the municipal executive is responsible for delivering the assistance designated by that order.\u201d","D. The European Social Charter and the ECSR","34. Article 13 of the Charter, entitled \u201cThe right to social and medical assistance\u201d, provides as follows:","\u201cAnyone without adequate resources has the right to social and medical assistance.","With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social and medical assistance, the Parties undertake:","1. to ensure that any person who is without adequate resources and who is unable to secure such resources either by his own efforts or from other sources, in particular by benefits under a social security scheme, be granted adequate assistance, and, in case of sickness, the care necessitated by his condition;","...","4. to apply the provisions referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this article on an equal footing with their nationals to nationals of other Parties lawfully within their territories, in accordance with their obligations under the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, signed at Paris on 11 December 1953.\u201d","35. Article 31 of the Charter, entitled \u201cThe right to housing\u201d, provides as follows:","\u201cEveryone has the right to housing.","With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to housing, the Parties undertake to take measures designed:","...","2. to prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination;","...\u201d.","36. The first paragraph of the Appendix to the Social Charter reads:","\u201c Without prejudice to Article 12, paragraph 4, and Article 13, paragraph 4, the persons covered by Articles 1 to 17 include foreigners only insofar as they are nationals of other Contracting Parties lawfully resident or working regularly within the territory of the Contracting Party concerned, subject to the understanding that these articles are to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of Articles 18 and 19.","This interpretation would not prejudice the extension of similar facilities to other persons by any of the Contracting Parties. \u201d","37. On 1 July 2014 the ECSR adopted two decisions on the merits in the cases of Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. the Netherlands (complaint no. 90\/2013) and in European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) v. the Netherlands (complaint no. 86\/2012). It found that the Netherlands had violated Article 13 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Charter, which guarantees the right to social assistance, and Article 31 \u00a7 2 of the Charter, the right to housing, by failing to provide adequate access to emergency assistance (food, clothing and shelter) to adult migrants in an irregular situation. In CEC v. the Netherlands the ECSR held the following:","\u201c73. With regard to Article 13 \u00a7 4 in particular, the Committee recalls that emergency social assistance should be provided under the said provision to all foreign nationals without exception (Conclusions 2003, Portugal). Also migrants having exceeded their permitted period of residence within the jurisdiction of the State Party in question have a right to emergency social assistance (Conclusions 2009, Italy). The beneficiaries of the right to emergency social assistance thus include also foreign nationals who are present in a particular country in an irregular manner (Conclusions 2013, Malta).","74. The Committee observes in this connection that the complaint concerns the provision of the necessary food, water, shelter and clothing to adult migrants in an irregular situation. It considers the issues at hand to be closely linked to the realisation of the most fundamental rights of these persons, as well as to their human dignity.","75. Pursuant to the above, Article 13 \u00a7 4 applies to migrants in an irregular situation.","...","115. The Committee recalls that human dignity is the fundamental value and the core also of European human rights law (FIDH v. France, cited above, \u00a731).","116. Even though the Convention and the relevant legal rules of the European Union on asylum are applicable only to foreigners staying in a regular manner within the jurisdiction of the States Parties, the Committee observes that both the Court and the Court of Justice in their recent case-law have acknowledged the importance of preserving human dignity in connection with the minimum protection provided to migrants (see paragraphs 28-29, 47-48).","117. The Committee observes in this connection that the scope of the Charter is broader and requires that necessary emergency social assistance be granted also to those who do not, or no longer, fulfil the criteria of entitlement to assistance specified in the above instruments, that is, also to migrants staying in the territory of the States Parties in an irregular manner, for instance pursuant to their expulsion. The Charter requires that emergency social assistance be granted without any conditions to nationals of those States Parties to the Charter who are not Member States of the Union. The Committee equally considers that the provision of emergency assistance cannot be made conditional upon the willingness of the persons concerned to cooperate in the organisation of their own expulsion.\u201d","38. Following the abovementioned decisions of the ECSR, the Committee of Ministers, on 15 April 2015, adopted two substantially the same resolutions (Resolution nos. CM\/ResChS(2015)5 and CM\/ResChS(2015)4). Taking note of the Netherlands \u2019 Government \u2019 s submissions in which they had expressed their concern that the ECSR had not given a correct interpretation of the appendix to the Charter which excludes from the scope of the Charter all aliens who are not lawfully residing on the territory of a State Party, these resolutions read, in so far as relevant:","\u201cThe Committee of Ministers,","...","2. recalls that the powers entrusted to the ECSR are firmly rooted in the Charter itself and recognises that the decision of the ECSR raises complex issues in this regard and in relation to the obligation of States parties to respect the Charter;","3. recalls the limitation of the scope of the European Social Charter (revised), laid down in paragraph 1 of the appendix to the Charter;","4. looks forward to the Netherlands reporting on any possible developments in the issue.\u201d","E. Other relevant information","39. The information contained on the website of the Repatriation and Departure Service concerning possibilities for migrants in the Netherlands to return to Ethiopia, reads, in so far as relevant:","\u201cVoluntary return","Voluntary return is possible. The diplomatic representation issues laissez-passers to aliens who wish to return to Ethiopia and who can demonstrate their identity and Ethiopian nationality. The establishment of the identity and nationality depends on the presence of a (copy of) passport or an original and validated birth certificate. The alien must sign the laissez-passer, otherwise it is not valid.","Forced return","Forced return is possible with an original passport. The diplomatic representation may issue replacing documents if the alien wishes to return.\u201d"],"28381":["1. Mr Abdulazhon Mamadzhanovich Isakov was born in 1963 and lived, prior to his disappearance, in Tyumen. He is a stateless person. The application in his name was submitted to the Court by Ms N. Yermolayeva, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.","2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","A. Background information and the Court \u2019 s judgment in Mr Isakov \u2019 s earlier case ( Abdulazhon Isakov v. Russia, no. 14049\/08, 8 July 2010)","3. In 1989 Mr Isakov moved from Uzbekistan to the Tyumen Region in Russia.","4. In 1998 the Uzbek authorities opened a criminal case against Mr Isakov on charges of attempting to overthrow the State \u2019 s constitutional order in Uzbekistan and put his name on the wanted persons \u2019 list.","5. On 6 March 2008 Mr Isakov was arrested in Tyumen, Russia, and remanded in custody with a view to extradition.","6. On 12 August 2008 the Russian Prosecutor General \u2019 s office decided to extradite Mr Isakov to Uzbekistan. The domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction upheld the extradition order. A final decision on the matter was taken by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 22 December 2008.","7. On 21 March 2008 Mr Isakov lodged an application with the Court in which he complained about his detention in Russia with a view to extradition to Uzbekistan where he faced politically-based persecution by the local authorities. On 30 September 2008 Mr Isakov signed an authority form authorising several lawyers, including Ms Yermolayeva, to represent him in the proceedings before the Court.","8. On 10 November 2008 the Court granted Mr Isakov \u2019 s request for the application of interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court and indicated to the Russian Government that he should not be extradited to Uzbekistan until further notice. On the same date the application was communicated to the Government which were requested to submit observations concerning the risk of ill-treatment if the extradition order in respect of Mr Isakov were enforced, lawfulness and review of his detention in Russia and alleged lack of effective remedies in this respect. The parties \u2019 observations were received on 28 July and 2 October 2009 respectively. The Government complied with the Court \u2019 s request as to the application of interim measures and submission of observations.","9. On 5 March 2010 Mr Isakov was released from custody and on 17 March 2010 he was granted temporary asylum in Russia.","10. On 8 July 2010 the Court delivered a judgment in Mr Isakov \u2019 s case (see Abdulazhon Isakov v. Russia, no. 14049\/08, 8 July 2010) where it found, inter alia, that in the event of the extradition order against Mr Isakov being enforced, there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.","11. On 1 June 2011 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 12 August 2008 and the ensuing judicial decisions, including the Supreme Court \u2019 s decision of 22 December 2008 (see paragraph 6 above).","12. Mr Isakov and his family (wife and children) continued to reside in Tyumen, Russia.","13. On 3 February 2012 the Government informed the Committee of Ministers of the individual measures taken within the framework of the execution of the judgment in Mr Isakov \u2019 s case. In particular, the Government reported that (1) the judgment had been enforced as regards the payment of non-pecuniary damage and reimbursement of costs and expenses and (2) the extradition-related judicial decisions had been quashed.","14. In September 2013, within the framework of the supervision of the execution of a number of judgments against Russia relating to disappearances and\/or forcible transfers and also repeated allegations of such incidents, the Committee adopted an Interim Resolution (CM \/ResDh(2013)200) exhorting the Russian authorities to develop without further delay an appropriate mechanism tasked with both preventive and protective functions to ensure that applicants belonging to the risk group benefit from immediate and effective protection against unlawful or irregular removal from the Russian territory.","B. Mr Isakov \u2019 s disappearance and new proceedings before the Court","15. In the night of 21-22 July 2014 Mr Isakov \u2019 s car was found damaged on the road and Mr Isakov had disappeared. His family \u2019 s attempts to establish his whereabouts were to no avail.","16. On 22 July 2014 A.M., Mr Isakov \u2019 s nephew, reported Mr Isakov \u2019 s disappearance to the regional department of the interior. Mr Isakov \u2019 s family retained counsel Kh. to represent them in connection with the investigation into Mr Isakov \u2019 s disappearance.","17. On 23 July 2014 the Court granted a request lodged by Ms Yermolayeva, under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court, and indicated to the Government that Mr Isakov should not be extradited, expelled or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Uzbekistan or another country for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. The Government were also requested to furnish any information about Mr Isakov \u2019 s whereabouts and possible arrest and detention in Russia and\/or removal to Uzbekistan. The application was also granted priority under Rule 41 of the Rules of the Court.","18. On 6 August 2014 the Government reported that the investigation into Mr Isakov \u2019 s disappearance was pending and that his whereabouts were unknown to the authorities.","19. On the same date, relying on the authority form issued by Mr Isakov in 2008, Ms Yermolayeva lodged an application in Mr Isakov \u2019 s name. She alleged that Mr Isakov had been abducted by Russian state agents and forcefully removed to Uzbekistan where he would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Referring to Article 34 of the Convention, she argued that the Government had failed to comply with the Court \u2019 s indication made under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court.","20. On 25 August 2014 the senior investigator with the regional investigative committee opened criminal investigation into Mr Isakov \u2019 s disappearance.","21. On 4 September 2014 the senior investigator in charge of Mr Isakov \u2019 s disappearance questioned Kh.I., Mr Isakov \u2019 s brother. Kh.I. submitted that, according to his older sister who lived in Uzbekistan, Mr Isakov was allegedly in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.","22. On 12 September 2014 the President of the Section gave notice of the application to the Government and invited the latter to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the case.","23. On 24 October 2014 the senior investigator in charge of Mr Isakov \u2019 s disappearance questioned Z.I., Mr Isakov \u2019 s son.","24. On 29 October 2014 the Government submitted the observations.","25. On 8 January 2015 Ms Yermolayeva submitted the observations on the matter maintaining the complaints on Mr Isakov \u2019 s behalf and claims for just satisfaction.","26. On 12 February 2015 the Government provided comments on the claims for just satisfaction and further observations.","27. On 15 April 2015 the President of the Section invited the parties, under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (c) of the Rules of the Court, to submit further observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. The parties were to comment as to whether the application was compatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and the Government \u2019 s failure to submit a complete investigation file concerning Mr Isakov \u2019 s alleged abduction and disappearance.","28. On 31 May and 1 June 2015 Ms Yermolayeva and the Government respectively submitted further observations (see paragraphs 34-35 below).","29. Mr Isakov \u2019 s whereabouts remain unknown to date.","C. Committee of Ministers \u2019 supervision of the execution of the judgment in the case of Mr Isakov","30. In its decisions adopted at 1214th and 1230th meetings (December 2014 and June 2015), the Committee of Ministers, responding to the situation concerning disappearances and\/or forcible transfers, noted that the Russian authorities adopted a number of awareness-raising measures and instructions. Nevertheless, the Committee of Ministers considered that these measures were insufficient and invited the authorities to adopt special protective measures in respect of the applicants who were exposed to such risks and underlined the need for special measures to ensure rapid and effective investigations into such incidents.","31. On 2-4 December 2014 ( CM\/Del\/Dec(2014)1214E\/05 December 2014) at its 1214th meeting (DH), the Committee of Ministers noted as follows, as regards Mr Isakov \u2019 s situation:","\u201cAs to the investigation of the alleged abductions of Messrs Abdulazhon Isakov and Mukhitdinov reported in July 2014, criminal cases have been opened. No evidence has thus far been obtained regarding the removal of Mr Abdulazhon Isakov from the territory of the Russian Federation. The Russian authorities also insisted that the Committee of Ministers was not competent to supervise this issue as it was already being examined in the adversarial proceedings before the European Court.","As regards the Russian authorities \u2019 comments with respect to the Committee \u2019 s competence to supervise the investigations into the recent alleged abductions of Messrs Abdulazhon Isakov and Mukhitdinov, the following factors have to be taken into account. As regards the first case, there already exists a final Court judgment establishing a violation, granting the Committee full competence to look into both individual and general measures, irrespective of any new application made on behalf of the same person to the Court. Such situations are frequent and have never led the Committee to exempt the State concerned from its obligation to keep the Committee informed of the developments. As regards the second case, while it is true that there is no final judgment at the moment, the case is relevant for execution purposes as an example, among others, of the development of the situation and the efficiency of the general measures adopted (see e.g. the Court \u2019 s indication in the Savriddin Dzhurayev judgment (\u00a7263).\u201d"],"28404":["6.The applicants were born in 1978, 1980 and 2007 respectively.","7.They fled Armenia on account of fears of persecution related to the first applicant\u2019s activity as a journalist and his political activism.","8.After arriving in France on 4 October 2009 they filed applications for asylum, which were rejected by the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office fran\u00e7ais de protection des r\u00e9fugi\u00e9s et apatrides \u2013 OFPRA), on 21 December 2009, then by the National Asylum Court (Cour nationale du droit d\u2019asile \u2013 CNDA), on 28 February 2011. Their subsequent requests for re-examination were also rejected.","9.On 3 May 2011 the prefect of Loiret issued orders rejecting the applicants\u2019 requests for leave to remain and obliging them to leave French territory. On 18 October 2011 the Orleans Administrative Court, on an appeal from the applicants, refused to overturn those orders.","10.The first applicant was arrested by the police in connection with a theft on the evening of 16 February 2012 and was taken into police custody that same day. The second and third applicants were arrested the next day at the reception centre for asylum seekers (Centre d\u2019accueil des demandeurs d\u2019asile \u2013 CADA) at Chaingy, where the family had been living. The applicants were taken that same day to the administrative detention centre (Centre de r\u00e9tention administrative \u2013 CRA) of Toulouse-Cornebarrieu. The detention orders in respect of the first two applicants read as follows:","\u201cWhereas the immediate enforcement of the [order to leave France] is not possible on account of the organisation of [their] departure for [their] country of origin.","Whereas [the applicants] [have] not presented sufficient guarantees that [they] will not abscond, not having a valid passport, [having] neither a fixed abode nor sufficient resources, not [having] complied with the previous removal directions issued to [them] and [having] formally opposed, when interviewed, [their] return to [their] country of origin.\u201d","11.The first two applicants challenged their detention orders and in parallel lodged an urgent application for a stay of execution. They claimed that they had a fixed addressed at the reception centre (CADA), that a friend was prepared to accommodate them and that, in any event, their detention would be incompatible with the best interests of their child. In this connection they indicated that their child, who was too young to be left on his own, was obliged to accompany them in all their administrative formalities and therefore to come into contact with armed police officers in uniform.","12.On 21 February 2012 the President of the Toulouse Administrative Court dismissed the urgent application without a hearing, finding as follows:","\u201cUnder the [domestic statutory] provisions, the legality of decisions ordering administrative detention in connection with removal measures can be challenged fully through a specific procedure, which itself has the nature of an urgent procedure, separately from the remit of the urgent applications judge ...; it follows therefrom that the applicants\u2019 request for that judge to order ... the stay of execution of the detention orders made for the purpose of enforcing the removal directions, a stay which would in fact have an equivalent effect to that of the annulment of the same decision on the merits, is inadmissible.\u201d","13.On the same day, the Toulouse Administrative Court dismissed the application lodged by the first two applicants for the annulment of the administrative detention order, on the following grounds:","\u201cIt is not in dispute that [the applicants] cannot present any valid identity or travel document; although [they claim] that [they] have a fixed address in an asylum-seekers\u2019 reception centre, it can be seen from the evidence in the file that this centre asked [them] to vacate the premises, where [they have] unduly remained since June 2011; nor [have] the [applicants] adduced evidence of lawful income; lastly, since the notification of the judgment of the Orl\u00e9ans Administrative Court of 18 October 2011 dismissing [their] application against the order of the prefect of Loiret of 2 May 2011, [the applicants] [have] avoided the said removal measure; under those circumstances, the choice of the administrative authority to place [them] in administrative detention instead of ordering a measure of restricted residence ... is not vitiated by a manifest error of judgment.\u201d","Responding more specifically to the argument raised by the applicants concerning the child\u2019s best interests, the Administrative Court found it to be inapplicable, as the decisions appealed against pertained only to the parents\u2019 personal situation.","14.The prefect asked the Liberties and Detention Judge of the Toulouse tribunal de grande instance to extend the detention, after which the first two applicants tried to obtain the third applicant\u2019s voluntary intervention in the proceedings. On 22 February 2012 that judge authorised the extension of the applicants\u2019 detention for a period of twenty days, after finding inadmissible the request for voluntary intervention on behalf of the child, and having dismissed the argument that the conditions of detention were incompatible with the presence of a minor child, on the following grounds:","\u201cIt is not for the judicial authority to interfere in the running of an administrative detention centre\u201d.","15.That decision was upheld on 24 February 2012 by the President of the Toulouse Court of Appeal, who found in particular as follows:","\u201c... the administrative detention centre of Cornebarrieu, where the child is held, has been authorised to receive families and contains all the necessary facilities to ensure the comfort of a family with children.","Thus the whole family is together and they have, in an autonomous area and separated from the rest of the detainees, rooms for them alone and for their exclusive use.","In addition, there is a playground on the site, like those to be found in town squares.","Lastly, a doctor and a nurse are available every day in the Toulouse administrative detention centre and Mr and Mrs A.B. have not shown that they met with a refusal when they asked to present their child \u2013 a request of which the existence has not been established.","The Convention provisions, especially Article 8, do not therefore appear to have been breached.\u201d","16.On 24 February 2012 the applicants submitted to the Court, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a request for the suspension of the detention orders concerning them. On 29February 2012 the Court decided not to indicate the requested interim measure.","17.On 5 March 2012 the applicants were released, after expressing their wish to return to Armenia, and after seeking voluntary return assistance for that purpose. However, they did not leave France, on account of the third applicant\u2019s state of health. On 13 July 2012 the first applicant was granted leave to remain as the parent of a sick child.","18.In two judgments of 15 November 2012, the Bordeaux Administrative Court of Appeal annulled the administrative detention orders of 17February 2012 in respect of the first two applicants. Its judgments contained the same wording for each spouse:","\u201c4.Article L. 561-2 of the Entry and Residence of Aliens and Right of Asylum Code provides, by way of exception to the cases where a foreign national may be placed in detention, the possibility of ordering a measure of restricted residence (assignation \u00e0 r\u00e9sidence) if the alien can present guarantees to allay the risk of non-compliance with his or her obligation to leave France. Under provision 3o of part II of Article L. 511-1 of the same Code, such risk must in particular be regarded as established, save in specific circumstances, in cases where the alien has already evaded the execution of a removal measure. The finding by the administrative authority of facts falling within provision 3o of part II of Article L. 511-1, while it is such as to create a presumption of a risk that the alien might fail to comply with his or her obligation to leave France, does not dispense that authority, before any decision to place him or her in detention, from specifically examining the circumstances of the case. As regards aliens who are the parents of minor children and who do not have sufficient guarantees of compliance, such aliens being provided for by ArticleL. 562-1 of the said Code, and in accordance with the aims of Article 17 of Directive 2008\/115\/EC, recourse to placement in detention can only constitute an exceptional measure in cases where the alien does not have a stable place of abode at the time when the prefectoral authority takes the necessary measures to prepare for the removal.","5.For the purposes of transposition of the above-mentioned Directive, Article L. 562-1 of the Entry and Residence of Aliens and Right of Asylum Code, as inserted by Law no.2011\u2011672 of 16 June 2011, provides: \u2018In the cases provided for in ArticleL.551\u20111, where the alien is the parent of a minor child residing in France and has effectively contributed to the raising and education of that child in the conditions prescribed in Article 371-2 of the Civil Code since the birth of the child or at least for the past two years, and where the conditions for a restricted residence measure under Article L. 561-2 of the present Code are not fulfilled, the administrative authority can decide on a measure of curfew with electronic tagging, with the agreement of the alien concerned.","The measure of curfew with electronic tagging is decided by the administrative authority for a period of five days. The measure may be extended by the Liberties and Detention Judge under the same conditions as the extension of the administrative detention provided for in chapter II of title V of the present book.\u2019","6.It can be seen from the evidence in the file that on the date of the decision appealed against, Mr [A.B.], accompanied by his wife and four-year-old son [A.B.], had been accommodated for several years in the hostel of the asylum-seekers\u2019 reception centre in Chaingy, and that the child had been going to school. Mrs [A.A.B.] was apprehended on 16 February 2012 in that hostel, where the family had remained unlawfully, even though they had been requested to leave the premises by the centre\u2019s administration, following the rejection of their requests for a review of their asylum situation by a decision of 28 July 2011 of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless persons. In deciding on their placement in detention the prefect of Loiret merely stated that Mr [A.B.] did not present sufficient guarantees against the risk of non-compliance, as he did not have a valid passport, had no stable place of abode or sufficient income, and had not complied with the previous directions for his removal. It does not appear from the decision appealed against that the prefect had considered, having regard to the presence of a child, whether a less coercive measure than detention was possible for the necessarily short duration of the removal procedure. In those conditions, his decision was vitiated by an error of law and had for that reason to be declared null and void.","7.It transpires from the foregoing that, without there being any need to examine the other arguments in the application, Mr [A.B.] is justified in submitting that the judge appointed by the President of the Toulouse Administrative Court, in the judgment appealed against, had been wrong to reject his request for the annulment of the decision of 17February 2012 placing him in administrative detention.\u201d","..."],"28437":["6.The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Vladivostok.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant in Kyrgyzstan and his arrest and detention in Russia","7.The applicant is an ethnic Uzbek. He lived in the town of Osh in Kyrgyzstan. After the mass disorders and inter-ethnic clashes in the region in June 2010, he left Kyrgyzstan for Russia.","8.On 4 July 2010 the applicant arrived in Russia.","9.On 9 July 2010 the Kyrgyz authorities charged the applicant in absentia with violent crimes related to these clashes, including the kidnapping and murder of two law-enforcement officers.","10.On 10 July 2010 they ordered the applicant\u2019s arrest.","11.On 12 July 2010 the applicant\u2019s name was put on a national wanted list, and on 16 September 2010 on an international wanted list.","12.On 23 January 2014 the applicant was apprehended in Vladivostok, Primorsk Region, and placed in detention.","13.Shortly after his arrest, the applicant gave an explanation (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) in which he admitted having participated in the beating of one of the law-enforcement officers in June 2010 but denied his involvement in other crimes for which he was to be prosecuted in Kyrgyzstan. He also indicated that although he had not been directly informed about the charges being brought against him in Kyrgyzstan, he knew that his father had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of the same law-enforcement officers and suspected that he was himself also wanted by the Kyrgyz authorities.","14.On 24 January 2014 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladivostok decided to remand the applicant in custody. His detention was subsequently extended several times.","15.On 29 January 2014 the Russian Prosecutor\u2019s Office informed the Kyrgyz authorities about the applicant\u2019s arrest.","16.On 16 January 2015 a judge of the Primorsk Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 23 July 2015. The applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed, arguing that the applicant would be deprived of judicial review of his detention for a long period of time.","17.On 11 February 2015 the Primorsk Regional Court upheld the extension order on appeal. It did not address the applicant\u2019s argument that he would be deprived of judicial review of his detention for a long period of time.","18.On 27 July 2015 the applicant was released. It appears that the applicant is currently at large.","B.Extradition proceedings","19.On 11 February 2014 the Kyrgyz General Prosecutor\u2019s Office requested the applicant\u2019s extradition. The request was accompanied by assurances that the applicant would not be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment and that Russian diplomats would be granted the opportunity to visit him.","20.On 17 October 2014 the Deputy Prosecutor General granted the extradition request submitted by the Kyrgyz authorities.","21.On 6 November 2014 the applicant appealed, arguing that as an ethnic Uzbek charged with serious crimes in relation to the mass disorders of June 2010 he would face a serious risk of torture and ill-treatment if extradited. He also referred to the principle of non\u2011refoulement of asylum seekers pending the examination of his application for refugee status.","22.On 12 December 2014 the Primorsk Regional Court rejected his appeal in the light of the diplomatic assurances given by the Kyrgyz authorities and the improvement of the situation in Kyrgyzstan. As to the non\u2011refoulement principle, the Regional Court noted that the applicant\u2019s application for refugee status had been refused by the migration authority.","23.On 25 March 2015 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal and the extradition order became final. It noted in particular that in addition to the diplomatic assurances provided in writing by the Kyrgyz authorities, the representatives of the General Consulate of the Russian Federation in this country were able to monitor the situation of persons already extradited to Kyrgyzstan, including those held in relation to the mass disorders. For instance, on 30 and 31 July 2014 Russian diplomats had visited some such detainees, who had made no complaints in relation to their transfer, detention, prosecution or treatment. In the Supreme Court\u2019s view, such a monitoring mechanism was effective in observing compliance by the Kyrgyz authorities with their obligations to ensure the rights of the extradited persons, including the right not to be subjected to torture and inhuman treatment.","24.The Supreme Court noted that the applicant belonged to a vulnerable group whose members were at risk of being subjected to torture by the law\u2011enforcement agencies, according to international reports. It considered, however, that in the absence of specific evidence submitted by the applicant that he would personally be subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, these circumstances were not in themselves enough to reject an extradition request, since he had been charged with ordinary criminal offences to some of which he had confessed on 23 January 2014.","C.Refugee status proceedings","25.On 7 February 2014 the applicant applied to the Primorsk Region Department of the Federal Migration Service (\u0423\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u0438\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b \u043f\u043e \u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043a\u0440\u0430\u044e) (hereinafter the \u201cPrimorsk Region FMS\u201d) seeking refugee status.","26.On 23 April 2014 the Primorsk Region FMS refused the applicant\u2019s application for refugee status. Although it referred in its decision to inter\u2011ethnic conflicts existing in Kyrgyzstan, it considered that the applicant\u2019s arrival in Russia had rather been motivated by the unemployment situation existing in his country of origin and his wish to escape from criminal prosecution.","27.The applicant appealed to the Federal Migration Authority, (\u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043c\u0438\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 (\u0424\u041c\u0421)) (hereinafter the \u201cFMS\u201d). He claimed that he was being persecuted on the grounds of his ethnic origin and, if extradited, would be subjected to torture.","28.On 18 July 2014 the FMS dismissed his appeal on account of his prolonged failure to apply for refugee status and in view of the opportunity offered to the Russian diplomats to monitor the compliance by the Kyrgyz authorities with international standards as regards persons extradited from Russia.","29.On 13 November 2014 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow upheld the refusal of the FMS to grant the applicant refugee status, referring in particular to his protracted failure to apply for refugee status. It also indicated that the applicant was not a member of any political, religious, military or public organisation, had neither served in the army nor taken part in any military activities, had never been prosecuted or threatened by the authorities, and had not been involved in any violent incidents.","30.On 8 April 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld this judgment on appeal. The City Court endorsed the reasoning of the District Court, referring in addition to several international sources demonstrating positive developments in the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan during the period 2011-2012.","32.For relevant international documents see Abdulkhakov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a779\u201182 and 94).","33.For a number of relevant reports and items of information concerning Kyrgyzstan, in particular, the human rights situation in 2011\u20112015, see Tadzhibayev v. Russia (no. 17724\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 19\u201126, 1December 2015, with further references) and Turgunov v.Russia (no. 15590\/14, \u00a732, 22October 2015)."],"28439":["8.The applicants, a married couple and their son, were born in 1964, 1965 and 2000 respectively.","A.Account of events in Iraq","9. The applicants were brought up in Baghdad. Since the 1990s the husband (the first applicant) had run his own construction and transport business with exclusively American clients and had had his office at the United States military base \u201cVictoria camp\u201d (seemingly referring to Camp Victory). Several of his employees had on occasion been warned not to cooperate with the Americans.","10.On 26 October 2004 the first applicant was the target of a murder attempt carried out by al-Qaeda. He had to stay in hospital for three months. There, unknown men asked for him, after which he was treated in three different hospitals.","11.In 2005 his brother was kidnapped by al-Qaeda members, who claimed that they would kill him because of the first applicant\u2019s collaboration with the Americans. His brother was released through bribery a few days later and immediately fled from Iraq. The applicants fled to Jordan and stayed there until December 2006, before returning to Iraq.","12.Soon afterwards, al-Qaeda members placed a bomb next to the applicants\u2019 house. However, it was detected by the first applicant\u2019s wife (the second applicant), and the American forces arrested the perpetrator. During interrogation, the perpetrator confessed that he had been paid by al-Qaeda to kill the first applicant and disclosed the names of sixteen people who had been designated to watch the applicants. Thereafter, the applicants moved to Syria, although the first applicant continued his business in Iraq. During this time, al-Qaeda destroyed their home and the first applicant\u2019s business stocks.","13.In January 2008 the applicants returned to Baghdad. In October 2008 the first applicant and his daughter were shot at when driving. The daughter was taken to hospital, where she died. The first applicant then stopped working and the family moved to a series of different locations in Baghdad. The first applicant\u2019s business stocks were attacked four or five times by al-Qaeda members, who had threatened the guards. The first applicant stated that he had not received any personal threats since 2008 as the family had repeatedly moved around. The son (the third applicant) had spent most of his time indoors for fear of attacks and had only attended school for his final examinations. The applicants had never asked the domestic authorities for protection, fearing that the authorities lacked the ability to protect them and might disclose their address, on account of al\u2011Qaeda\u2019s collaboration with the authorities. The applicants maintained that, in the event of their return to Iraq, they risked persecution by al-Qaeda and that the first applicant appeared on al-Qaeda\u2019s death list.","B.Ordinary asylum proceedings","14.On 14 December 2010 the first applicant applied for asylum and a residence permit in Sweden. On 11 July 2011 his application was rejected since he was registered as having left the country.","15.On 25 August 2011 the first applicant applied anew for asylum and a residence permit in Sweden, as did the other applicants on 19September 2011. As to their state of health, the first applicant still had an open and infected wound on his stomach where he had been shot in 2004. They submitted several documents, including identity papers, a death certificate for the first and second applicants\u2019 daughter and a medical certificate for the first applicant\u2019s injury.","16.All three applicants were given an introductory interview by the Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) on 26 September 2011. Subsequently, the first and second applicants were given a further interview on 11October 2011, which lasted almost three and a half hours. The third applicant was interviewed briefly for a second time and the first applicant was interviewed a third time. The applicants were assisted by State-appointed counsel.","17.On 22 November 2011 the Migration Agency rejected the applicants\u2019 asylum application. In respect of the Iraqi authorities\u2019 ability to provide protection against persecution by non-State actors, the Agency stated:","\u201c...","Every citizen should have access to police authorities within a reasonable visiting distance. During the past few years the police authorities have taken numerous measures to fight against corruption, clan and militia connections and pure criminality within the police.","The current country information, however, shows that there are serious shortcomings in the police\u2019s work on crime-scene investigations and inquests. One of the reasons is probably that many police officers are relatively new and lack experience, and that it takes time to introduce a new method of investigation based on technical evidence. This problem is naturally accentuated by the fact that many individual police officers live under a threat emanating from different terrorist groups, which is likely to diminish their effectiveness. Nevertheless, the current country information shows that the number of suspects who have been prosecuted during the past few years has increased significantly. Even if fewer than half of all suspects are eventually prosecuted, this is still an improvement.","The Iraqi security forces have been reinforced significantly and no longer have any shortcomings in human terms. Instances of police infiltration, which were previously widespread, have decreased significantly. The leading representatives of the police authority have expressed both their willingness and their ambition to maintain general security in Iraq. The current country information also shows that it has become more difficult for al-Qaeda Iraq to operate freely in Iraq and that there has been a significant decline in sectarian violence. Today violence is mainly aimed at individual targets, especially civil servants, police, security forces and some minorities.","...\u201d","Regarding the assessment of the applicants\u2019 refugee status, as well as their need for alternative protection, the Agency held as follows:","\u201c...","The Migration Agency notes that [the first applicant] had a contract with the Americans until 2008. For this reason [the first applicant] has been exposed to two murder attempts, his brother has been kidnapped and [the first and second applicant]\u2019s daughter has been killed. Furthermore, on several occasions, [the first applicant] has suffered physical damage to his house and stock. [The first and second applicants] are convinced that al-Qaeda is behind these abuses. The family are also afraid of al-Qaeda in the event of their return.","The Migration Agency notes that [the first applicant] stopped working for the Americans in 2008 after his and [the second applicant]\u2019s daughter was killed. The Migration Agency further notes that [the first applicant] stayed in Baghdad until December 2010 and that [the second and third applicants] lived in Baghdad until September 2011. During this period they were not exposed to any direct abuses. [The first applicant] has, however, been indirectly threatened on four or five occasions by the people who guard his stock. Also, his stock has been attacked. [The first and second applicants] explained that they had managed to escape from abuses because they were in hiding and living in different places in Baghdad. The Migration Agency notes that [the first and second applicants] have two daughters who live with their grandmother in Baghdad and a daughter who is married and lives with her family in Baghdad. These family members have not been exposed to any threats or abuses.","The Migration Agency notes that the abuses which the family claim to be at risk of being exposed to are criminal acts which their home country\u2019s authorities have a duty to prosecute. In order to decide whether the family can enjoy protection against the abuses they fear, the Migration Agency notes the following.","In accordance with the principle that it is for an asylum-seeker to justify his or her need for protection and that it is primarily for the applicant to provide relevant information for the assessment in the case, the onus must be on the applicant to plead that he or she cannot or, owing to a severe fear of the consequences, for example, will not avail himself or herself of the protection of the authorities available in Iraq. In addition, the applicant must justify this. The shortcomings which still exist in the Iraqi legal system are then to be noted and evaluated in the context of the individual assessment of each asylum case. The circumstances on which an applicant relies in arguing that protection by the authorities is deficient are first of all examined in the usual way. In those cases in which the alleged risk of persecution or other abuses does not emanate from the authorities, which as a rule is the case in Iraq, the applicant must show what efforts he or she has made to be afforded protection by the authorities. The applicant can do this either by relying on evidence or by giving a credible account of events which appear plausible. When assessing the authorities\u2019 ability to protect against threats of violence emanating from terrorist groups or unknown perpetrators in a specific case, the individual\u2019s situation, as well as the severity of the violence or threats, their nature and their local reach, must be assessed individually (see Migration Agency, Legal opinion on protection by the authorities in Iraq, 5 April 2011, Lifos 24948).","The Migration Agency considers that the family have been exposed to the most serious forms of abuses (ytterst allvarliga \u00f6vergrepp) by al-Qaeda from 2004 until 2008. Such abuses, however, took place three years ago and nowadays it is more difficult for al-Qaeda to operate freely in Iraq. [The first and second applicants] never turned to the Iraqi authorities for protection. [The first applicant] has stated that the Iraqi authorities lack the capacity to protect the family. Further, he has stated that he did not dare to turn to the authorities because he would then have been forced to disclose his address, which could have resulted in al-Qaeda being able to find him. [The second applicant] has stated that al-Qaeda works together with the authorities. As stated earlier, the Migration Agency finds that there has been a significant decline in instances of police infiltration, which previously were widespread. Against the background of the fact that [the first and second applicants] have not even tried to seek the protection of the Iraqi authorities, the Migration Agency considers that they have not made a plausible case that they would not have access to protection by the authorities in the event of potential threats from al-Qaeda upon returning to Iraq.","Against this background, the Migration Agency finds that [the first and second applicants] have not made a plausible case that the Iraqi authorities lack the capacity and the will to protect the family from being exposed to persecution within the meaning of Chapter 4, section 1, of the Aliens Act or to abuses within the meaning of Chapter 4, section 2, first subsection, first point, first line, of the Aliens Act. The Migration Agency notes in this context that there is no armed conflict in Iraq. The Migration Agency therefore finds that the family are not to be regarded as refugees or as being in need of alternative or other protection, for which reason the family do not have the right to refugee status or alternative protection status.","The Migration Agency notes that fierce tensions between opposing factions are prevalent in Baghdad. Nevertheless, against the background of the above reasoning, the Migration Agency finds that the family also cannot be regarded as being otherwise in need of protection, within the meaning of Chapter 4, section 2a, first subsection, of the Aliens Act. The family do not therefore have any right to a status falling under any other need of protection.","...\u201d","In conclusion, the Migration Agency found that there were no grounds to grant the family residence permits. Against this background, the Migration Agency rejected the family\u2019s application and ordered their deportation from Sweden on the strength of Chapter 8, section 1, of the Aliens Act.","18.The applicants appealed to the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen), maintaining that the Iraqi authorities had been and would be unable to protect them. They had contacted the police following the fire to their home and the first applicant\u2019s business stock in 2006 and 2008 and the murder of the first and second applicants\u2019 daughter in 2008, but thereafter they had not dared to contact the authorities owing to the risk of disclosing their residence. Together with their written submissions, they enclosed a translated written statement allegedly from a neighbour in Baghdad, who stated that a masked terrorist group had come looking for the first applicant on 10 September 2011 at 10 p.m. and that the neighbour had told them that the applicants had moved to an unknown place. The neighbour also stated that, just after the incident, the first applicant had called him and been told about the incident. The applicants also submitted a translated residence certificate\/police report allegedly certifying that their house had been burned down by a terrorist group on 12 November 2011. Furthermore, the applicants submitted a DVD containing an audiovisual recording of a public debate on television concerning corruption and the infiltration of al-Qaeda members within the Iraqi administration. The applicants mentioned in that connection that the first applicant had participated in the public debate, which had been broadcast on the Alhurra channel in Iraq on 12 February 2008, that is to say, four years earlier. Finally, submitting various medical certificates, the applicants contended that the first applicant\u2019s health had deteriorated and that he could not obtain adequate hospital care in Iraq.","The Migration Agency made submissions before the Migration Court. It stated, among other things, that the documents submitted concerning the alleged incidents on 10 September and 12 November 2011 were of a simple nature and of little value as evidence.","19.On 23 April 2012 the Migration Court upheld the Migration Agency\u2019s decision. Concerning the need for protection, the court held:","\u201cIt is undisputed in the present case that the applicants\u2019 grounds for protection must be examined in relation to Iraq. The general situation in Iraq is not such that as to confer the automatic right to a residence permit. Therefore, an individual assessment of the grounds for protection invoked by the applicants must be made.","The applicants have alleged that they are in need of protection upon returning to Iraq as they risk being exposed to ill-treatment by al-Qaeda because [the first applicant]\u2019s company did contract-based work for the Americans in Iraq until 2008.","The Migration Court considers that the alleged events took place in the distant past, that it is difficult to see why there would still be a threat as [the first applicant] no longer performs such work, and that, in the event that some threats should still exist, it appears likely [framst\u00e5r som troligt] that the Iraqi law-enforcement authorities are both willing and able to offer the applicants the necessary protection. In such circumstances, there are no grounds to grant the applicants any residence permit on the basis of a need for protection.","...\u201d","20.The applicants appealed to the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrations\u00f6verdomstolen). Their request for leave to appeal was refused on 9 August 2012.","C.Extraordinary proceedings","21.On 29 August 2012 the applicants submitted an application to the Migration Agency for a re-examination of their case. They maintained that the first applicant was under threat from al-Qaeda because he had been politically active. They enclosed a video showing the first applicant being interviewed in English, a video showing a demonstration, and a video showing a television debate.","22.On 26 September 2012 the Migration Agency refused the applicants\u2019 application. The applicants did not appeal to the Migration Court against that decision.","30.Extensive information about the general human rights situation in Iraq and the possibility of internal relocation to the Kurdistan Region can be found in, inter alia, M.Y.H. and Others v. Sweden (no. 50859\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 20-36, 27June 2013) and A.A.M. v. Sweden (no. 68519\/10, \u00a7\u00a729-39, 3 April 2014). The information set out below concerns events and developments occurring after the delivery of the latter judgment on 3 April 2014.","A.General security situation","31.In mid-June 2014, following clashes which had begun in December 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS \u2013 also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)) and aligned forces began a major offensive in northern Iraq against the Iraqi Government during which they captured Samarra, Mosul and Tikrit.","32.According to a briefing by Amnesty International entitled \u201cNorthern Iraq: Civilians in the line of fire\u201d, dated 14 July 2014:","\u201cThe takeover in early June by the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) of Mosul, Iraq\u2019s second largest city, and other towns and villages in north-western Iraq has resulted in a dramatic resurgence of sectarian tensions and the massive displacement of communities fearing sectarian attacks and reprisals. Virtually the entire non-Sunni population of Mosul, Tal \u2018Afar and surrounding areas which have come under ISIS control has fled following killings, abductions, threats and attacks against their properties and places of worship.","It is difficult to establish the true scale of the killings and abductions that ISIS has committed. Amnesty International has gathered evidence about scores of cases. To date, ISIS does not appear to have engaged in mass targeting of civilians, but its choice of targets \u2013 Shi\u2019a Muslims and Shi\u2019a shrines \u2013 has caused fear and panic among the Shi\u2019a community, who make up the majority of Iraq\u2019s population but are a minority in the region. The result has been a mass exodus of Shi\u2019a Muslims as well as members of other minorities, such as Christians and Yezidis. Sunni Muslims believed to be opposed to ISIS, members of the security forces, civil servants, and those who previously worked with US forces have similarly fled \u2013 some after they and their relatives were targeted by ISIS.","ISIS has called on former members of the security forces and others whom they consider were involved in government repression to \u2018repent\u2019, and has promised not to harm those who do. The process involves a public declaration of repentance (towba), which in effect also entails a pledge of allegiance and obedience to ISIS, in mosques specially designated for the purpose. Many of those who have remained in ISIS-controlled areas are taking up the invitation and publicly repenting. The practice, however, is not without risks, as it allows ISIS to collect names, addresses, ID numbers and other identification details of thousands of men, who it could decide to target later.","Meanwhile, Amnesty International has gathered evidence pointing to a pattern of extrajudicial executions of detainees by Iraqi government forces and Shi\u2019a militias in the cities of Tal \u2018Afar, Mosul and Ba\u2019quba. Air strikes launched by Iraqi government forces against ISIS-controlled areas have also killed and injured dozens of civilians, some in indiscriminate attacks.","This briefing is based on a two-week investigation in northern Iraq, during which Amnesty International visited the cities of Mosul, Kirkuk, Dohuk and Erbil and surrounding towns and villages in these areas, and the camps for displaced people in al-Khazer\/Kalak and Garmawa; and met with survivors and relatives of victims of attacks perpetrated by ISIS and by government forces and allied militias, civilians displaced by the conflict, members and representatives of minorities, religious figures, local civil society organizations, international organizations assisting the displaced, and Peshmerga military commanders. All the interviews mentioned in the document were carried out during this visit.","...","Amnesty International\u2019s assessment is that all parties to the conflict have committed violations of international humanitarian law, including war crimes, and gross abuses of human rights. What is more, their attacks are causing massive displacement of civilians.","Where armed actors operate in populated residential areas, the warring parties must take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians. They must take precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks by the adversary, including by avoiding \u2013 to the maximum extent feasible \u2013 locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas. International humanitarian law also expressly prohibits tactics such as using \u2018human shields\u2019 to prevent attacks on military targets. However, failure by one side to separate its fighters from civilians and civilian objects does not relieve its opponent of its obligation under international humanitarian law to direct attacks only at combatants and military objectives and to take all necessary precautions in attacks to spare civilians and civilian objects. International humanitarian law prohibits intentional attacks directed against civilians not taking part in hostilities, indiscriminate attacks (which do not distinguish between civilian and military targets), and disproportionate attacks (which may be expected to cause incidental harm to civilians that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated). Such attacks constitute war crimes. These rules apply equally to all parties to armed conflicts at all times without exception.","The conflict in northern Iraq has displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians, who have fled to neighbouring Kurdish areas administered by the KRG. Most are living in dire conditions, some in camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) and others sheltering in schools, mosques, churches and with host communities. At first civilians who fled after ISIS captured large areas of north-western Iraq were being allowed to enter the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), but in recent weeks access for non-Kurdish Iraqis has been severely restricted by the KRG. Some of those who fled are seeking refuge in the KRI while others, mostly Shi\u2019a Turkmen and Shabak, want to travel southwards to the capital and beyond where the majority of the population is Shi\u2019a and where they feel they would be safer.","While the Iraqi central government remains beset by political and sectarian divisions, and the KRG appears increasingly focused on annexing more territory to the areas it controls, Iraqi civilians caught up in the conflict are finding it increasingly difficult to find protection and assistance.","Amnesty International calls on all parties to the conflict to put an immediate end to the killing of captives and the abduction of civilians; to treat detainees humanely at all times; to refrain from carrying out indiscriminate attacks, including the use of artillery shelling and unguided aerial bombardments in areas with large concentrations of civilians. It also reiterates its call on the KRG to allow civilians who are fleeing the fighting \u2013 whatever their religion or ethnicity \u2013 to seek refuge in and safe passage through KRG-controlled areas.\u201d","33.The position of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on returns to Iraq, dated October 2014, stated among other things:","\u201cIntroduction","1. Since the publication of UNHCR\u2019s 2012 Iraq Eligibility Guidelines and the 2012 Aide M\u00e9moire relating to Palestinian refugees in Iraq, Iraq has experienced a new surge in violence between Iraqi security forces (ISF) and Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) on the one hand and the group \u2018Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham\u2019 (hereafter ISIS), which operates both in Iraq and Syria, and affiliated armed groups on the other hand. Civilians are killed and wounded every day as a result of this surge of violence, including suicide attacks and car bombs, shelling, airstrikes, and executions. As a result of advances by ISIS, the Government of Iraq is reported to have lost full or partial control over considerable parts of the country\u2019s territory, particularly in Al-Anbar, Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala governorates. Although the ISF and Kurdish forces, supported by US airstrikes, have recently regained control over some localities, mostly along the internal boundaries with the Kurdistan Region, overall frontlines remain fluid. The conflict, which re-escalated in Al-Anbar governorate in January 2014 and since then spread to other governorates, has been labelled as a non-international armed conflict. Casualties so far in 2014 represent the highest total since the height of sectarian conflict in 2006-2007.","...","UNHCR Position on Returns","27. As the situation in Iraq remains highly fluid and volatile, and since all parts of the country are reported to have been affected, directly or indirectly, by the ongoing crisis, UNHCR urges States not to forcibly return persons originating from Iraq until tangible improvements in the security and human rights situation have occurred. In the current circumstances, many persons fleeing Iraq are likely to meet the 1951 Convention criteria for refugee status. When, in the context of the adjudication of an individual case of a person originating from Iraq, 1951 Convention criteria are found not to apply, broader refugee criteria as contained in relevant regional instruments or complementary forms of protection are likely to apply. In the current circumstances, with massive new internal displacement coupled with a large-scale humanitarian crisis, mounting sectarian tensions and reported access restrictions, particularly into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, UNHCR does in principle not consider it appropriate for States to deny persons from Iraq international protection on the basis of the applicability of an internal flight or relocation alternative. Depending on the profile of the individual case, exclusion considerations may need to be examined.\u201d","34.According to Human Rights Watch\u2019s World Report 2015 on Iraq, issued on 29 January 2015:","\u201cAbuses by Security Forces and Government-Backed Militias","In March, former Prime Minister al-Maliki told senior security advisers that he would form a new security force consisting of three militias: Asa\u2019ib, Kita\u2019ib Hezbollah, and the Badr Brigades. These militias kidnapped and murdered Sunni civilians throughout Baghdad, Diyala, and Hilla provinces, at a time when the armed conflict between government forces and Sunni insurgents was intensifying.","According to witnesses and medical and government sources, pro-government militias were responsible for the killing of 61 Sunni men between June 1 and July9,2014, and the killing of at least 48 Sunni men in March and April in villages and towns in an area known as the \u2018Baghdad Belt\u2019. Dozens of residents of five towns in the Baghdad Belt said that security forces, alongside government-backed militias, attacked their towns, kidnapping and killing residents and setting fire to their homes, livestock, and crops.","A survivor of an attack on a Sunni mosque in eastern Diyala province in August said that members of Asa\u2019ib Ahl al-Haqq entered the mosque during the Friday prayer, shot and killed the imam, and then opened fire on the other men in the mosque, killing at least 70 people. Three other Diyala residents reported that Asa\u2019ib Ahl al-Haqq had kidnapped and killed their relatives.","Iraqi security forces and militias affiliated with the government were responsible for the unlawful execution of at least 255 prisoners in six Iraqi cities and towns in June. The vast majority of security forces and militias are Shia, while the murdered prisoners were Sunni. At least eight of those killed were boys under age 18.\u201d","35.The Briefing Notes of 9 February 2015 issued by the German Federal Office for Migration and Asylum, Information Centre Asylum and Migration, stated in relation to Iraq:","\u201cSecurity situation","Daily reports of armed clashes and suicide bombings continue unabated. A suicide attack carried out in Baghdad on 9 February 2015 killed at least 12 people. More than 40 people were wounded. The attack was carried out in the Kadhimiya district which has a large Shia population. So far, no one has claimed responsibility for the attack. On 7 February 2015, more than 30 persons were killed and more than 70 were wounded in suicide bombings in Baghdad. The majority of casualties were reportedly Shia Muslims and security officers.","The night-time curfew was lifted in Baghdad on 7 February 2015.","The Islamic State (IS) is said to have killed 48 people on its territory in Iraq since the beginning of the year, the vast majority in the city of Mosul (Ninive province) and in the suburbs surrounding Mosul.","...\u201d","36.The United States (US) State Department\u2019s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, issued in February 2015, noted the following in respect of Iraq:","\u201cISIL committed the overwhelming number of serious human rights abuses. In a systematic and widespread fashion, ISIL targeted government officials and members of the security forces as well as civilians, especially Shia, religious and ethnic minorities, women, and children. To a lesser extent, Iraqi security forces (ISF) and Shia militias also reportedly committed abuses in the disorganized security environment.","Destabilizing violence and fighting between government forces and ISIL escalated in Anbar Province at the end of 2013 and spread to other provinces during the year. On June 9, ISIL launched an assault and quickly captured Mosul, the second largest city. Subsequently ISIL forces took control of large areas of Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ad Din, and Diyala provinces. Armed clashes between ISIL and the ISF, including the Peshmerga \u2013 the armed forces of the Kurdistan regional government \u2013 caused massive internal displacements, with the United Nations estimating more than two million persons forced to flee their homes nationwide. The humanitarian crisis worsened in July and August, as ISIL targeted ethnic and religious minorities, perpetrated gender-based violence, sold women and children off as slaves, recruited child soldiers, and destroyed civilian infrastructure.","Severe human rights problems persisted. Large-scale and frequent killings, the vast majority of which ISIL carried out, destabilized the country. They included the June 10 mass killing of more than 600 inmates, almost all Shia, at Badoush prison near Mosul. ISIL also killed, abducted, and expelled from their homes members of religious and ethnic groups, including Christians, Shia Shabak, Shia Turkmen, and Yezidis. Simultaneously, but on a much smaller scale, there were unverified reports of government actors and Shia militias killing Sunni prisoners.\u201d","37.On 9 March 2015 Iraqi News (IraqiNews.com) reported that the US Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey, at a joint press conference with the Iraqi Minister of Defence, Khalid al-Ubaidi, had said: \u201cProtecting Baghdad and al-Mosul Dam as well as Haditha district are among the top priorities of the International Coalition.\u201d","38.The United Kingdom Home Office\u2019s Country Information and Guidance on the security situation in Iraq, issued in November 2015, stated as follows under the heading \u201cPolicy Summary\u201d:","\u201cThe security situation in the \u2018contested areas\u2019 of Iraq, identified as the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al-din, has reached such a level that a removal to these areas would breach Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (QD).","The security situation in the parts of the \u2018Baghdad Belts\u2019 (the areas surrounding Baghdad City), which border Anbar, Salah Al-Din and Diyala governorates, has reached such a level that a removal to these areas would breach Article 15(c) of the QD.","In the rest of Iraq \u2013 the governorates of Baghdad (including Baghdad City), Babil, Basrah, Kerbala, Najaf, Muthanna, Thi-Qar, Missan, Quadissiya and Wassit, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) which comprise Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk governorates \u2013 indiscriminate violence does not reach such a level that is in general a 15(c) risk. However, decision makers should consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person\u2019s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at enhanced risk.","The security situation remains fluid and decision makers should take into account up-to-date country information in assessing the risk.\u201d","B.Situation of persons who collaborated with foreign armed forces","39.The United Kingdom Home Office\u2019s Country of Origin Information Report on Iraq of 10 December 2009 stated:","\u201c... civilians employed or otherwise affiliated with the MNF-I [Multi-National Force in Iraq] are at risk of being targeted by non-state actors. In areas where security has improved over the last year, the risks to persons affiliated with the MNF-I have diminished to some extent, but are still considerable given the continued influence of extremist groups. In areas where AQI [al-Qaeda in Iraq] and other insurgent groups continue to be present, in particular in Ninewa and Diyala Governorates, the risk of being targeted remains much higher. The risk is particularly high for persons working as interpreters for the MNF-I given their exposure and possible involvement in military activities, e.g. arrests, raids or interrogation of insurgent or militia members. Reportedly, some 300 interpreters have been killed in Iraq since 2003. There is also a heightened risk of attack in areas with a high concentration of foreign personnel such as the IZ [International Zone] or military compounds, particularly at checkpoints approaching these facilities and when travelling in military convoys ...","...","Iraqi nationals employed by foreign companies are at risk of being attacked when outside a secure compound such as the IZ or a military base.\u201d","40.The interim report of 14 January 2011 issued by the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre (Landinfo) and the Swedish Migration Agency on their fact-finding mission to Iraq observed that there had been a number of incidents where Iraqis who had worked for Americans had been killed. The United States had an assistance programme for Iraqis who had been subjected to threats for working at the embassy in Baghdad. Recruitment was carried out only after careful scrutiny, which could take three to six months.","41.The United Kingdom Home Office\u2019s Operational Guidance Note on Iraq, of 22 August 2014, stated the following:","\u201c3.10.9 Conclusion. Persons perceived to collaborate or who have collaborated with the current Iraqi Government and its institutions, the former US\/multi-national forces or foreign companies are at risk of persecution in Iraq. This includes certain affiliated professionals such as judges, academics, teachers and legal professionals. A claimant who has a localised threat on the basis that they are perceived to be a collaborator may be able to relocate to an area where that localised threat does not exist. The case owner will need to take into consideration the particular profile of the claimant, the nature of the threat and how far it would extend, and whether it would be unduly harsh to expect the claimant to relocate. A claim made on these grounds may be well founded and a grant of refugee status due to political opinion or imputed political opinion may be appropriate depending on the facts of the case.\u201d","42.According to Amnesty International Deutschland\u2019s 2015 Report on Iraq (translation from German original at https:\/\/www.amnesty.de\/jahresbericht\/2015\/irak):","\u201cISIS soldiers also killed Sunnis, blaming them for insufficient support or alleging that they were working for the Iraqi government and their security forces or were at the service of the US troops during the war in Iraq.\u201d","C.Ability of the Iraqi authorities to protect their citizens","43.According to the report of 5 May 2014 by Landinfo and the Migration Agency on \u201cIraq: Rule of Law and the Security and Legal System\u201d:","\u201cThe Iraqi constitution of 2005 guarantees a security system protected by apolitical and non-sectarian security forces. Also in numbers the forces are well disposed to protect the people of Iraq. However, politicization of the Iraqi security forces (ISF), corruption, sectarianism and lack of proper training blur the picture.","The legal system is also outlined in the constitution, where it is described as an independent system above all powers except the law. However, in reality the police and courts (and other institutions) still have shortcomings.","The regular police are considered the most corrupt institution of the security and legal system and thus people are apprehensive to report crimes, even though there are indications that today police work is better performed than in 2010.","Corruption seems to be less common among judges than the police, but the judiciary is not independent as was envisaged by the constitution and still remained in 2010. Courts may be under pressure from influential politicians, tribes and other actors (like militias and criminals). A considerable lack or shortage of judges combined with the many arrests because of the insurgency has led to a large backlog, which is negative for both the defendants and the injured parties.","Not only cases are pending, but also draft laws and this does not improve the rule of law. For example, the judiciary is not yet governed by the law envisaged in the constitution.","There are some remedies for the people to lodge complaints against the authorities, but perhaps the most important institution to deal with these complaints, the High Commission for Human Rights established in 2012, is still not functioning properly.","The remedies against corruption are weaker today than in 2010, mostly due to political interference and limited capacity.","There are legal measures to punish misconducting officials, but implementing them is not always easy \u2013 even if there is a will.","All in all, the worsened security situation and the political tug of war influence each other, and leads to deficits in both the capacity and the integrity of the Iraqi security and legal system \u2013 more so than in 2010 when we last assessed the rule of law in Iraq. The system still works, but the shortcomings seem to increase.\u201d","44.The US State Department\u2019s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, issued in February 2015, stated the following on the role of the police and the security apparatus in Iraq:","\u201cDue to attacks and offensive operations by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during the year, the government lost effective control over large areas of the country, principally in Arab Sunni and some mixed Sunni\/Shia areas. Control over the security forces was inconsistent, and the deterioration of the security situation led to a re-emergence of Shia militias, which operated largely outside the authority of the government.","...","Widespread corruption at all levels of government and society exacerbated the lack of effective human rights protections.","...","International human rights organizations criticized the increasingly sectarian nature of militia activity and the lack of sufficient government oversight. Prime Minister al-Abadi repeatedly called for the elimination of independent militias and ordered all militia groups brought under ISF authority. Shia religious leaders also called for Shia volunteers to fight under the command of the security forces and condemned violence against civilians, including destruction of personal property. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of cases, Shia militias operated independently and without oversight or direction from the government.","...","Problems persisted within the country\u2019s provincial police forces, including corruption and the unwillingness of some officers to serve outside the areas from which they originated. The army and federal police recruited and deployed soldiers and police officers on a nationwide basis, reducing the likelihood of corruption related to personal ties to tribes or militants. This practice led to complaints from local communities that members of the army and police were abusive because of ethnosectarian differences.","Security forces made limited efforts to prevent or respond to societal violence.\u201d","D.Internal relocation in Iraq","45.The United Kingdom Home Office\u2019s Country Information and Guidance on Iraq concerning internal relocation (and technical obstacles), issued on 24 December 2014, included the following under the heading \u201cPolicy Summary\u201d:","\u201cReturn arrangements from the UK","1.4.1 Current return arrangements from the UK to Iraq, either via Erbil or Baghdad, do not breach Article 3 of the ECHR.","Obtaining civil documentation in a new place of residence","1.4.2 The Civil Status ID Card and the Nationality Certificate are two of the most important forms of civil documentation, because they directly or indirectly provide access to a range of economic and social rights.","1.4.3 A person returned to Iraq who was unable to replace their Civil Status ID Card or Nationality Certificate would likely face significant difficulties in accessing services and a livelihood and would face destitution which is likely to reach the Article 3 threshold.","1.4.4 However, persons from non-contested areas of Iraq who are returned either to Erbil or Baghdad would in general be able to reacquire their Civil Status ID Card, Nationality Certificate and other civil documentation by either returning to their place of origin or by approaching relevant government and non-government agencies found across the non-contested areas.","1.4.5 Persons from contested areas of Iraq who are returned to Baghdad would in general be able to reacquire their Civil Status ID Card, Nationality Certificate and other civil documentation by approaching relevant agencies found in Baghdad and Najaf.","1.4.6 Persons in the UK seeking to reacquire their Civil Status ID Card and Nationality Certificate would be able to approach the Iraqi embassy in London for assistance, providing they can first prove their identity. This would generally be possible for persons compulsorily returned to Baghdad, as they would be in possession of a valid or expired passport of Laissez Passer document.","1.4.7 For those unable to prove their identity to the Iraqi embassy, the individual may be able to reacquire documents via a proxy in Iraq, e.g. from a relative or lawyer with a power of attorney.","Relocation to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)","1.4.8 Persons originating from KRI will in general be able to relocate to another area of the KRI.","1.4.9 Persons of Kurdish ethnicity who originate from outside of KRI and who are returned to Baghdad will in general be able to relocate to KRI providing they first regularise their documentation in Baghdad (or elsewhere).","1.4.10 For non-Kurdish persons with established family or other links to KRI (e.g. tribal or previous employment), internal relocation will usually be a reasonable alternative.","1.4.11 If a person is of Arab or Turkmen ethnic origin, internal relocation to KRI will be difficult. Internal relocation to Baghdad or the south is more likely to be reasonable. If this is not reasonable due to the particular circumstances of the case, a grant of protection may be appropriate.","Relocation to Baghdad and the south","1.4.12 In general Arab Sunnis; Kurds and Shias will be able to relocate to Baghdad, where it is noted there is a sizable Arab Sunni IDP population.","1.4.13 Shia Muslims seeking to internally relocate will in general be able to relocate to southern governorates. Sunni Muslims may be able to relocate to the south.","1.4.14 In general currently there are no insurmountable barriers preventing Iraqi nationals from relocating to Baghdad or the governorates in the south, although all cases need to be decided on their individual facts.\u201d","46.The United Kingdom Home Office\u2019s Country Information and Guidance on Iraq concerning internal relocation, issued in November 2015, stated the following under the heading \u201cPolicy Summary\u201d:","\u201cPossibility of internal relocation","In general, relocation to Baghdad from Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk (aka Ta\u2019min), Ninewah and Salah Al-din, and the north, west and east parts of the \u2018Baghdad Belts\u2019 (the \u2018contested areas\u2019) is possible. Decision makers will, however, need to take into account all the relevant personal factors which will impact on a person\u2019s ability to relocate, and the up-to-date country information.","The southern governorates (Basra, Kerbala, Najaf, Muthana, Thi-Qar, Missan, Qadissiya and Wassit) do not reach the threshold of 15(c) and there is no real risk of harm to ordinary civilians travelling to those areas from Baghdad. It is likely to be reasonable in general for persons from the \u2018contested areas\u2019 (or elsewhere) to relocate to Baghdad, although decision makers must take into account a person\u2019s individual circumstances and up to date country information.","Relocation to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) is possible in general for Iraqi Kurds from IKR and those not from the IKR via Baghdad, although decision makers must take into account relevant factors which will impact on their ability to relocate.","In general, it is not reasonable for non-Kurds who do not originate from the IKR to relocate to the IKR.","Feasibility of return","A person can only be returned to Baghdad city if they have an Iraqi passport (current or expired) or a laissez-passer. If they do not have one of these documents then return is not \u2018feasible\u2019.","A lack of these travel documents is a technical obstacle to return, and is not a reason itself to grant protection.","Only when return is feasible (i.e. the person has or can obtain a current or expired passport or a laissez-passer) can the issue of documentation (or lack of it) be considered in any assessment of protection.","Persons originating from the IKR who have been pre-cleared by the IKR authorities are returned to Erbil Airport, do not require a passport or a laissez-passer.\u201d","52.According to the UNHCR standards, while the burden of proof lies with the asylum-seeker, owing to the special circumstances of an asylum claim, the State official who examines an asylum claim carries with the asylum-seeker a shared duty to \u201cascertain and evaluate all relevant facts\u201d.","53.The relevant parts of the UNHCR 1998 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims state as follows:","\u201cII. Burden of Proof","5. Facts in support of refugee claims are established by adducing proof or evidence of the alleged facts. Evidence may be oral or documentary. The duty to produce evidence in order affirmatively to prove such alleged facts, is termed \u2018burden of proof\u2019.","6. According to general legal principles of the law of evidence, the burden of proof lies on the person who makes the assertion. Thus, in refugee claims, it is the applicant who has the burden of establishing the veracity of his\/her allegations and the accuracy of the facts on which the refugee claim is based. The burden of proof is discharged by the applicant rendering a truthful account of facts relevant to the claim so that, based on the facts, a proper decision may be reached. In view of the particularities of a refugee\u2019s situation, the adjudicator shares the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts. This is achieved, to a large extent, by the adjudicator being familiar with the objective situation in the country of origin concerned, being aware of relevant matters of common knowledge, guiding the applicant in providing the relevant information and adequately verifying facts alleged which can be substantiated.","III. Standard of Proof \u2013 General Framework and Definitional Issues","7. In the context of the applicant\u2019s responsibility to prove facts in support of his\/her claim, the term \u2018standard of proof\u2019 means the threshold to be met by the applicant in persuading the adjudicator as to the truth of his\/her factual assertions. Facts which need to be \u2018proved\u2019 are those which concern the background and personal experiences of the applicant which purportedly have given rise to fear of persecution and the resultant unwillingness to avail himself\/herself of the protection of the country of origin.","8. In common law countries, the law of evidence relating to criminal prosecutions requires cases to be proved \u2018beyond reasonable doubt\u2019. In civil claims, the law does not require this high standard; rather the adjudicator has to decide the case on a \u2018balance of probabilities\u2019. Similarly in refugee claims, there is no necessity for the adjudicator to have to be fully convinced of the truth of each and every factual assertion made by the applicant. The adjudicator needs to decide if, based on the evidence provided as well as the veracity of the applicant\u2019s statements, it is likely that the claim of that applicant is credible.","9. Obviously the applicant has the duty to tell the truth. In saying this though, consideration should also be given to the fact that, due to the applicant\u2019s traumatic experiences, he\/she may not speak freely; or that due to time lapse or the intensity of past events, the applicant may not be able to remember all factual details or to recount them accurately or may confuse them; thus he\/she may be vague or inaccurate in providing detailed facts. Inability to remember or provide all dates or minor details, as well as minor inconsistencies, insubstantial vagueness or incorrect statements which are not material may be taken into account in the final assessment on credibility, but should not be used as decisive factors.","10. As regards supportive evidence, where there is corroborative evidence supporting the statements of the applicant, this would reinforce the veracity of the statements made. On the other hand, given the special situation of asylum-seekers, they should not be required to produce all necessary evidence. In particular, it should be recognised that, often, asylum-seekers would have fled without their personal documents. Failure to produce documentary evidence to substantiate oral statements should, therefore, not prevent the claim from being accepted if such statements are consistent with known facts and the general credibility of the applicant is good.","11. In assessing the overall credibility of the applicant\u2019s claim, the adjudicator should take into account such factors as the reasonableness of the facts alleged, the overall consistency and coherence of the applicant\u2019s story, corroborative evidence adduced by the applicant in support of his\/her statements, consistency with common knowledge or generally known facts, and the known situation in the country of origin. Credibility is established where the applicant has presented a claim which is coherent and plausible, not contradicting generally known facts, and therefore is, on balance, capable of being believed.","12. The term \u2018benefit of the doubt\u2019 is used in the context of standard of proof relating to the factual assertions made by the applicant. Given that in refugee claims, there is no necessity for the applicant to prove all facts to such a standard that the adjudicator is fully convinced that all factual assertions are true, there would normally be an element of doubt in the mind of the adjudicator as regards the facts asserted by the applicant. Where the adjudicator considers that the applicant\u2019s story is on the whole coherent and plausible, any element of doubt should not prejudice the applicant\u2019s claim; that is, the applicant should be given the \u2018benefit of the doubt\u2019.","IV. Standard of Proof in Establishing the Well-Foundedness of the Fear of Persecution","13. The phrase \u2018well-founded fear of being persecuted\u2019 is the key phrase of the refugee definition. Although the expression \u2018well-founded fear\u2019 contains two elements, one subjective (fear) and one objective (well-founded), both elements must be evaluated together.","14. In this context, the term \u2018fear\u2019 means that the person believes or anticipates that he\/she will be subject to that persecution. This is established very largely by what the person presents as his\/her state of mind on departure. Normally, the statement of the applicant will be accepted as significant demonstration of the existence of the fear, assuming there are no facts giving rise to serious credibility doubts on the point. The applicant must, in addition, demonstrate that the fear alleged is well-founded.","15. The drafting history of the Convention is instructive on this issue. One of the categories of \u2018refugees\u2019 referred to in Annex I of the IRO Constitution, is that of persons who \u2018expressed valid objections to returning\u2019 to their countries, \u2018valid objection\u2019 being defined as \u2018persecution, or fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution\u2019. The IRO Manual declared that \u2018reasonable grounds\u2019 were to be understood as meaning that the applicant has given \u2018a plausible and coherent account of why he fears persecution\u2019. The Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems adopted the expression \u2018well-founded fear of persecution\u2019 rather than adhered to the wording of the IRO Constitution. In commenting on this phrase, in its Final Report the Ad Hoc Committee stated that \u2018well-founded fear\u2019 means that a person can show \u2018good reason\u2019 why he fears persecution.","Threshold","16. The Handbook states that an applicant\u2019s fear of persecution should be considered well-founded if he \u2018can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable...\u2019.","17. A substantial body of jurisprudence has developed in common law countries on what standard of proof is to be applied in asylum claims to establish well-foundedness. This jurisprudence largely supports the view that there is no requirement to prove well-foundedness conclusively beyond doubt, or even that persecution is more probable than not. To establish \u2018well-foundedness\u2019, persecution must be proved to be reasonably possible. Attached as an annex is an overview of some recent jurisprudence, by country.","Indicators for assessing well-foundedness of fear","18. While by nature, an evaluation of risk of persecution is forward-looking and therefore inherently somewhat speculative, such an evaluation should be made based on factual considerations which take into account the personal circumstances of the applicant as well as the elements relating to the situation in the country of origin.","19. The applicant\u2019s personal circumstances would include his\/her background, experiences, personality and any other personal factors which could expose him\/her to persecution. In particular, whether the applicant has previously suffered persecution or other forms of mistreatment and the experiences of relatives and friends of the applicant as well as those persons in the same situation as the applicant are relevant factors to be taken into account. Relevant elements concerning the situation in the country of origin would include general social and political conditions, the country\u2019s human rights situation and record; the country\u2019s legislation; the persecuting agent\u2019s policies or practices, in particular towards persons who are in similar situation as the applicant, etc. While past persecution or mistreatment would weigh heavily in favour of a positive assessment of risk of future persecution, its absence is not a decisive factor. By the same token, the fact of past persecution is not necessarily conclusive of the possibility of renewed persecution, particularly where there has been an important change in the conditions in the country of origin.\u201d","54.The UNHCR\u2019s Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (originally issued in 1979 and most recently reissued in 2011; hereinafter \u201cthe UNHCR Handbook\u201d) develop further the principles spelled out in the 1998 Note. Paragraphs 196 and 197 of the Handbook state as follows:","\u201c196. It is a general legal principle that the burden of proof lies on the person submitting a claim. Often, however, an applicant may not be able to support his statements by documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of all his statements will be the exception rather than the rule. In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even without personal documents. Thus, while the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application. Even such independent research may not, however, always be successful and there may also be statements that are not susceptible of proof. In such cases, if the applicant\u2019s account appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.","197. The requirement of evidence should thus not be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent in the special situation in which an applicant for refugee status finds himself. Allowance for such possible lack of evidence does not, however, mean that unsupported statements must necessarily be accepted as true if they are inconsistent with the general account put forward by the applicant.\u201d"],"28447":["5.The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Narva, Estonia.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest","6.On 29 April 2009, some time before 6 p.m., the police emergency call centre received a call about two young men who were at the junction of Kreenholmi and Kerese streets in Narva, Estonia. The caller reported that one of the men was carrying a knife and that the other was obviously drunk and had difficulty walking. He considered the men to be dangerous to passers-by. At 5.55 p.m. Officers S.B. and E.V., who were on patrol duty, were given instructions to respond to the call. At around 6 p.m. they found the men \u2013 the applicant and M.Z. \u2013 at a public playground.","7.The applicant\u2019s version of events relating to his encounter with the police, as it appears from his application and the documents submitted to the Court, is the following. At around 6 p.m. on 29 April 2009, he and M.Z. were waiting for an acquaintance, Y.B., at a playground. Both the applicant and M.Z. were drunk. Two policemen approached him. He did not behave aggressively or swear at them. The applicant spoke with the officers. He did not remember exactly what they talked about, except that it concerned a knife and that the applicant said that he did not have one. He also recalled that the name of one of the policemen was Andrei (this later turned out to be S.B.). He was then punched on the jaw by S.B. and fell to the ground, his face landing in a hole in the pavement. He momentarily lost consciousness, and when he attempted to get up he received another blow on the back, close to the bottom of his neck. One of the police officers put his knee on his neck and pushed him to the ground. He was handcuffed and then the officers started punching and kicking him all over his body and head. He lost consciousness after the beating and only regained it at the police station.","8.According to the Government, the criminal investigation carried out by the domestic authorities showed that the applicant\u2019s arrest had taken place in the following manner. The police officers who found the applicant and M.Z. at the playground had been given information about two men, one of whom was possibly carrying a knife, while the other one was reportedly drunk and walking with difficulty. At the playground, the applicant behaved aggressively and used obscene language. Officer E.V. tried to talk to the applicant, but the applicant acted in an erratic manner, and started waving his hands around and shouting at the officers. Officer E.V. decided to force him to the ground and keep him there until a police patrol vehicle arrived. He handcuffed the applicant with the help of two police officers, S.J. and N.S., who had arrived by car. While he was being kept on the ground, the applicant attempted to get up, kicked out and continued to utter obscenities at the officers. The police officers did not use excessive force against him and did not beat him. The applicant continued to resist the police while he was being put into a police van, which was last to arrive and was carrying Officers S.T. and J.S. Some force therefore had to be used to get the applicant in the van. In the course of that process, the applicant hit his left temple against the door of the van. The applicant also remained aggressive during his transportation. The officers on the front seats of the van heard what sounded like something being pounded against another object from the back compartment.","B.The applicant\u2019s detention at the police station and his admission to hospital","9.The applicant\u2019s account of the events during his detention, as it appears from his application and the documents submitted to the Court, is the following. When he woke up in a room next to the detention cells in the police station, he saw the two police officers who had been present at the playground in front of him. He was lying on the floor with his hands cuffed. When he attempted to stand up, S.B. kneed him in the area of his left ear. When the applicant tried to sit on a chair, he was knocked off his feet and ordered to sit on the floor. After E.V. left the room, S.B., who had on black leather gloves, started systematically punching and kicking the applicant. The applicant stood up and fell over several times. At one point, he was taken to the toilet, the sink tap was turned on and his head was put under the water. He was then taken back to the detention room. While passing the detention cells, he asked those inside whether they would confirm anything they had seen or heard. In the detention room, the applicant sat on the chair and S.B. punched him again several times. When E.V. returned, the applicant was knocked off the chair and beaten again on every part of his body. S.B. continued beating him after E.V. left the room. The applicant lost consciousness for a while and when he came around he had blood on his face and was eventually put on the chair. His handcuffs were removed and he was allowed to go to the toilet, where he washed himself. He returned to the detention room and was then placed in a cell to sober up. After a while, an ambulance came and he was taken to a hospital in the company of different policemen. He had blood on his clothes, but he threw away the T-shirt, while his mother washed his trousers.","10.According to the Government, the facts as they were established in the subsequent criminal investigation showed the following. The applicant, who was still handcuffed, continued to behave aggressively at the police station. He ran up to detainees in other cells, shouting that he was being beaten by the police. As he did not obey orders to calm down and stay still, physical force had to be used to make him sit or to place him on the floor. When he began to calm down, he was placed on a chair with his hands cuffed. He suddenly lost his balance and fell off the chair face down. The police officers lifted him up and put him back on the chair. Shortly after, the applicant again fell on the floor. In the interests of the applicant\u2019s safety, the officers left him sitting on the floor. The police removed the applicant\u2019s handcuffs as soon as he calmed down. He was then taken to a cell to sober up. A test showed that the applicant was in a moderate state of alcoholic intoxication.","11.At 7.45 p.m. Officers S.B. and J.S. drafted a report that the applicant had been taken from 10 Kreenholmi Street to recover from alcoholic intoxication. The report stated that the applicant had been in a state of alcoholic intoxication, had walked with difficulty, had fallen over and had been aggressive. It also stated that the applicant\u2019s face had been dirty and that he had had abrasions on his head.","12.At 1.42 a.m. on 30 April 2009 Officer P.S. called an ambulance to the police station at the request of the applicant. According to ambulance registration card no. 1419, the applicant complained of pain in the left part of his head and the right wrist, as well as nausea, vomiting and loss of hearing in the left ear. The findings on examination were that he had haematomas on the left part of the cranium and a swollen right wrist and was in a state of alcoholic intoxication. He was diagnosed with an intracranial injury and a fracture of the right hand and wrist. The applicant was taken to hospital.","13.Later at the hospital, according to patient registration card no. 4460, dated 30 April 2009, the applicant complained about losing consciousness and vomiting. The findings on examination were that he had haematomas and an oedema in the area of the left ear and eye. He was diagnosed with concussion and being in a state of alcoholic intoxication.","14.At 2.15 a.m. on 30 April 2009 other police officers, not those who had allegedly beaten the applicant at the police station, took a statement from him at the hospital. At 2.40 a.m. those officers drafted a misdemeanour report where they stated that the applicant had been drunk in a public place, Kreenholmi Street, and had been brawling, shouting and using obscene language, actions which amounted to a breach of the peace and a disturbance to others.","15.At 6.26 a.m. on 30 April 2009 a computer tomography scan was performed on the applicant. The results showed \u201ctemporal extracranial swelling on the left side, no haemorrhage, no intracranial pathology or haemorrhage, ventricular system symmetric, no midline shift, cranial bones intact and paranasal sinuses, middle ear spaces aerated\u201d. He was then released from hospital.","16.On 1 May 2009 the applicant, when close to home, called an ambulance. Ambulance registration card no. 1454 shows that he complained of severe headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting and pain in the neck. The findings on examination were that he had a haematoma around the left ear, an oedema in the area of the left eye, and was in a state of alcoholic intoxication. He was diagnosed with concussion and taken to hospital. He was examined at the hospital by a traumatology doctor who found paraorbital haematoma and swelling around the left eye, bruises on the neck and upper limbs, a smell of alcohol from the mouth, dysarthria, and that he staggered. He was diagnosed with concussion and being in a state of alcoholic intoxication. The applicant did not wish to stay in hospital.","C.The investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment","17.On 30 April 2009 the applicant complained to the police of his ill-treatment. He alleged that police officers had beaten him while arresting him, and that this had also happened later, while he was in detention at the police station. The police officer on duty refused to deal with the complaint and said it had to be submitted to a prosecutor\u2019s office. The prosecutor also refused to deal with the complaint and said it had to be submitted to the police. When the applicant returned to the police station, a police investigator allowed him to file his complaint.","18.On 5 May 2009 the applicant sent a letter to the prosecutor\u2019s office related to the same circumstances. On the same day the police decided to open a criminal investigation based on his complaint. According to the Government, the next day, on 6 May, the police investigator asked the hospital for the applicant\u2019s medical records.","19.On 13 May 2009 the applicant made a statement to the police investigator and gave his account of events (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above).","20.On the same day, the investigator took a statement from A.P., who had been held in the police station\u2019s sobering-up cell until 9 p.m. on 29 April 2009. He explained that he had looked through the eyehole of his cell door and had seen that a young man, with his hands cuffed behind his back, had been taken to the room in front of the sobering-up cells. Officer S.B., whose name he saw on his nametag, knocked the young man off his feet. He attempted to stand up, but the officer stopped him and ordered him to stay on the floor. Each time the young man attempted to stand up he was again knocked off his feet. Both men used foul language. He also heard someone being slapped on his body and saw how the police officer swung his hands towards the detainee. He understood from these gestures that the young man was being hit. The young man was then taken to a neighbouring room. After that, A.P. heard the man shouting and begging for his beating to stop. According to A.P. there was certainly some kind of fight between the young man and the officers. Subsequently, the man was put in a cell, where he continued to shout and requested a doctor, but he went quiet after a while.","21.On 15 May 2009 the applicant\u2019s legal representative sent a letter to the police requesting, among other measures, that the two police officers who had arrested the applicant, taken him to the police department and used force against him at the police station be shown to the applicant for identification. He also wanted the applicant to be taken to the police station so that his statements could be compared with the actual layout of the premises and so he could relate on the spot what happened. He further requested that the applicant\u2019s mother to be questioned about the applicant\u2019s state of health when he had left home on 29 April and when he had returned on 30 April; that the ambulance doctor and nurse be questioned as witnesses; and that a forensic medical examination of the applicant\u2019s injuries be ordered.","22.On 15 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from M.S., who had been held at the police station\u2019s sobering-up cell on 29 April 2009. He said that while he had heard that somebody in the neighbouring room had at one point shouted for help and that the police officers had shouted back at him, he had not seen police officers beating anybody when he had from time to time looked through the eyehole.","23.On 15 May 2009 the police investigator also took statements from Police Officer S.J., who had arrived in a police car with Officer N.S. at the scene of the applicant\u2019s arrest. While still in the police car, they had seen Officer E.V. talking to the applicant and that there had then been a scuffle between the applicant and the officer. S.J. and N.S. ran out of the car, but by the time they reached the scene the applicant had already been placed on the ground. He was aggressive and uttered obscenities at E.V. Officer S.J. kept him on the ground by using his knee to restrict the applicant\u2019s movement. Together with N.S., he helped E.V. to cuff the applicant\u2019s hands behind his back as the applicant was still putting up physical resistance. The applicant attempted to get up, continued to use indecent language and did not obey orders. The officers therefore kept the applicant on the ground until the police van arrived to transport him to the police station. No other force was used against him. S.J. added that at some point an elderly man had approached them and attempted to give them some money which allegedly belonged to the applicant. He was told that it was not necessary at that time to hand over the money. S.J. further stated that at the time of the events in question Officer S.B. had been in the vicinity talking to another young man who had a knife.","24.On 18 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from R.L., who had been detained in the police station\u2019s sobering-up cell on 29 April 2009. He told the investigator that he had heard through the door how officers had dragged somebody into the room facing the cells. He had heard how the officers provoked that person into using rude language, shouted at him, themselves using foul language, and then started to beat him. R.L. did not remember exactly in what way the officers had hit the person, but thought that it involved punches and kicks. The person had attempted to stand up, but had not been allowed to do so as he had been knocked off his feet. He had then been taken to another room.","25.On 18 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from M.Z. As to the arrest, he explained that before the events that happened at around 6 p.m. on 29 April 2009, he had had several beers with the applicant. They had just sat down at the playground behind some buildings when three police officers arrived in a police car. One of the officers came to talk to him and two went to the applicant and pushed him over. One of the policemen put his leg on the applicant\u2019s neck, while the other attempted to stand on the applicant\u2019s legs. M.Z. was taken to where the applicant had been beaten. The applicant was lying on the asphalt with his face down in some sand as there was a hole in the asphalt. After a while a police van arrived with two police officers. The applicant\u2019s hands were put behind his back and he was handcuffed, lifted onto his feet and moved towards the van. In the course of that process, one of the police officers slapped the applicant on the head. He was put in the van and taken to the police station.","26.Regarding the events at the police station, M.Z. explained that the applicant had been taken to a room where the cells were located. M.Z. himself had been left in the corridor which was situated immediately after the detention section. He could see through the open doors how the applicant was put on the floor right in front of the doors and two policemen started to beat him. They hit the applicant with their elbows and kicked him on the back of the head and elsewhere. No other police officers entered the room. The doors were open, as was the door to the duty room, but no one came out of that room. After some time, one of the police officers who had been beating the applicant came to M.Z. and took him to an office to make a statement. He gave a statement against the applicant because he was afraid as he had seen how the police officer had beaten his friend.","27.On 18 May 2009 the police investigator also took a statement from P.S., a police officer on duty at the police station at the time of the applicant\u2019s detention. He explained that when he had arrived at work at 8 p.m. on 29 April 2009 Officer E.V. had told him that the person who had been put in a temporary detention cell, that is, the applicant, might request that an ambulance be called and that he should be checked from time to time. During the night, the applicant went by himself to the toilet, complained of pain but declined an offer for an ambulance to be called. When during the night he was about to be released he requested an ambulance and P.S. called it for him. P.S. overheard the applicant telling the doctor and nurse that he had been beaten by police officers. When P.S. asked who had beaten the applicant, he replied that it had been the police officers who had taken him to the police station. When P.S. asked where the applicant had been beaten, he replied that it had happened on the street during his arrest. The ambulance then took him to the hospital.","28.On 27 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from K.I., who had been on duty at the police station\u2019s command centre at the time of the events in question. He said that when he had passed the detention room on his way out, he had seen the applicant sitting on the floor of the detention room with his hands cuffed. He was using offensive language, behaving aggressively and was intoxicated. K.I. said that the applicant had not been beaten in his presence. The applicant had not complained of being beaten or requested an ambulance.","29.On 2 June 2009 the police investigator took a statement from one of the suspects, Police Officer S.B. According to him, when he arrived with Officer E.V. on foot at the playground between the buildings at 10 Kreenholmi Street and 18 Kerese Street, the applicant was very drunk and was having an argument over some money with another man. As he had gone further on to talk to M.Z., he had not seen what had happened between the applicant and Officer E.V. or how E.V. had forced the applicant to the ground. M.Z. did not have a knife on him, but was wearing a large sheath on his belt. S.B. had no contact with the applicant. However, he saw that the applicant continued to be aggressive after E.V. had put him on the ground, while Officers S.J. and N.S had helped E.V. to handcuff him and kept him on the ground. He also saw what happened when Officers S.T. and J.S. helped to place the applicant in the police van. The applicant was not kicked or punched. On the way to the police station thumps and bangs could be heard from the back compartment of the police van.","30.S.B. also stated that at the police station officers had put the applicant in the room facing the detention cells. The door of the room had stayed open. He was alone in the room with the applicant for about 40 minutes, but did not beat him. The applicant did not obey orders to calm down and stay on the floor. S.B. could not therefore remove his handcuffs and had to use force against the applicant to make him stay on the floor and to calm him down. At one point E.V. had helped him. When the applicant calmed down a little, he was taken to another room to take his statement and was put on a chair with his hands still handcuffed behind his back. While sitting on the chair in the detention room, the applicant suddenly fell face down off the chair. Together with E.V., who had entered the interrogation room at that moment, S.B. put the applicant back on the chair, but he fell off again and was again helped back up onto the chair. When the paperwork had been done, the applicant was taken to a cell to sober up. He did not have any bodily injuries, except for some old scratches on the head, and did not request medical assistance.","31.On 3 June 2009 the police investigator took statements from four children who had seen the applicant\u2019s arrest (A.N., D.K., D.B. and E.G.). Three of the children (A.N., D.K., and D.B.) had seen the applicant when he was drunk and having an argument with an elderly man over some money. According to the statements of A.N. and D.K., two police officers arrived and first went to speak with the applicant and the older man. A.N., D.K., and D.B. said one of the officers had then gone further away to deal with the applicant\u2019s companion, who was carrying a knife sheath. According to A.N. the applicant started to shout obscenities at the police officer who had stayed with him. A.N., D.K. and D.B. stated that following an exchange with the applicant the police officer forced him to the ground. A.N. and D.K. said that the officer pushed the applicant over. D.K. added that the applicant was put on the ground with his right cheek facing down. Two other officers, who had arrived by car, helped the first police officer to cuff the applicant\u2019s hands behind his back. All of the children, including E.G., who had arrived after the applicant was put on the ground, confirmed that the officers kept the applicant on the ground by force. According to A.N. and E.G. that was done by standing on his legs, while D.K. and D.B said one officer knelt on the applicant\u2019s neck to keep his head down, while the other stood on his legs, close to his heels. All the children said the officers had neither punched nor kicked the applicant. The applicant had attempted to get up off the ground, had continued to swear and said that the officers were hurting him. All of the children confirmed that the applicant resisted being walked over to the police van. The police used force to put the applicant in the van and he had hit his head (the left side of his head, according to D.B. and E.G.) against the door of the van.","32.On 4 June 2009 the police investigator took statements from the ambulance nurse, L.G., and the ambulance doctor, V.K. They had received a call about a man with a head trauma at the police station. The applicant, who was drunk, said that police officers had beaten him at the police station. He did not have any blood on his clothes, and he did not vomit. However, given the nature of his injuries, the doctor decided to take him to the hospital for a further examination.","33.On 8 June 2009 the other suspect, Police Officer E.V., gave a statement. He explained that he had received an order to respond to a call that a man in a state of heavy alcoholic intoxication, possibly carrying a knife, was walking along Kreenholmi Street. He had then immediately gone with his partner, Officer S.B., to where the man was presumed to be. On reaching the building at 10 Kreenholmi Street he saw the applicant was not behaving appropriately as he was waving his hands and staggering. When he approached the men, M.Z. led the applicant by the hand behind the building at 10 Kreenholmi Street. The police officers followed them and found the applicant sitting on a kerbstone with M.Z. and an elderly man, who was standing next to him. When E.V. and S.B. approached, the applicant stood up and staggered towards them. M.Z. went in a different direction. When the applicant reached the officers, E.V. asked him politely to stop. As the applicant did not react and walked past him, E.V. stopped him by taking his elbow and spoke to him again. The applicant reacted quite violently, and started arguing and waving his hands around. E.V. therefore used the radio to call for assistance to have the applicant removed so he could sober up. Meanwhile, the elderly man had approached and told the applicant to calm down because he was dealing with police officers. The applicant replied that he did not care and started throwing money on the ground, telling the man to keep it. The man picked the money up, said he did not need it and put it back in the applicant\u2019s pockets. By that time, S.B. had gone after M.Z. E.V. attempted to calm the applicant down, but he continued to walk back and forth, waving his hands around and uttering obscenities. E.V. decided to handcuff the applicant because there were a lot of children around. The applicant was also clearly being aggressive and might have hurt other people, particularly given the possible presence of a knife. As the applicant did not let E.V. handcuff him, he forced the applicant to the ground, but did not hit him. Officers N.S. and S.J. arrived and helped in handcuffing the applicant and then took him to the police car, which was 10 metres away. The applicant did not have a knife. E.V. had no further contact with the applicant at the playground. While in the police van on the way back to the station the applicant continued his aggressive behaviour and E.V. heard what sounded like the applicant hitting himself against something.","34.E.V. further stated that at the police station the applicant shouted that the police were beating him, while S.B. tried to calm him down and conduct a search. E.V. left the room to interview M.Z. as a witness to the applicant\u2019s breach of the peace. When E.V. returned he saw that the applicant had fallen face down off his chair and he helped S.B. to lift him back onto the chair. The applicant fell to the ground for a second time and was then left on the floor. According to E.V., the applicant intentionally tried to injure himself in order to later accuse the police. When he started to behave calmly, the handcuffs were removed. The applicant walked unaided to the sobering-up cell. He did not have any injuries that required immediate medical attention. He had haematomas in the area of his face, but he could have received those during his transportation or when he fell off the chair. The applicant\u2019s clothes were dirty but did not have any bloodstains. E.V. informed the applicant that an ambulance would be called for him if he had any complaints about his health.","35.On the same day, 8 June 2009, the investigator took a statement from Officer N.S., who had arrived by police car with Officer S.J. at the scene of the applicant\u2019s arrest. When N.S. arrived, Officer E.V. was already holding the applicant down on the ground. When he and S.J. reached them they saw the applicant behaving aggressively and using foul language. N.S. helped E.V. to cuff the applicant\u2019s hands behind his back. The applicant was then lifted onto his feet and taken to the police car, but he refused to obey orders to keep still and calm down and started to kick the police car. The officers therefore removed him from the car and put him on the ground. N.S. held his feet and hands, while another officer knelt on the applicant to keep his head down. The applicant constantly resisted the officers, used bad language and behaved aggressively. He was kept down to prevent him from hurting himself and others. The officers did not beat him. The applicant continued to resist the police officers while he was being put in the police van and continued to be aggressive in the van. N.S. added that at some point an elderly man came to them offering to hand over some money which had allegedly belonged to the applicant. He was, however, informed that it was not necessary to hand over the money at that moment.","36.On the same day, 8 June 2009, the police investigator took statements from Officers S.T. and J.S., who had arrived in the police van at the scene of the applicant\u2019s arrest. When J.S. got out of the van, he saw that Officers S.J. and N.S. were holding the applicant down on the ground. The applicant was aggressive, was shouting and swearing and attempting to break free. N.S. and S.J. took the applicant to the police van. J.S. opened the door for them. He did not see the applicant banging into anything, but while he was being transported sounds could be heard from the back compartment which sounded like something being hit. S.T. stated that he did not get out of the van. He did not hear the applicant banging against anything while he was being put in the van. At the police station he and J.S. carried the applicant to the detention room and left him in front of the cells. He did not see any blood on the applicant or his clothes. Nor did he notice any visible injuries on the applicant.","37.That day, 8 June 2009, the police investigator ordered a forensic medical assessment of the injuries on the basis of the available documentary evidence (the ambulance cards, patient registration card and the statements of the applicant, the suspects in the case and two other police officers as witnesses).","38.On 9 June 2009 the police investigator took a statement from D.R., a police officer who had been on duty at the police station on 29 April 2009. He stated that he had arrived at work at 8 p.m. At around 2 a.m. he started to work on the applicant\u2019s documents. The applicant told D.R. that he had a bad headache and that his hands were hurting because of the handcuffs. He requested an ambulance. He also said that his head injury had been caused by other police officers. He had no blood on his clothes and did not vomit. When the applicant was taken to hospital, D.R. accompanied him.","39.On 15 June 2009 the applicant\u2019s legal representative lodged a complaint against the police with the prosecutor\u2019s office. He stated that the police had not taken the investigative measures he had requested on 15 May 2009 (including the presentation of the police officers for identification; a formal confrontation between the applicant and M.Z., who had allegedly witnessed him committing a breach of the peace; a comparison of the applicant\u2019s statements with the circumstances at the scene of the alleged offence; a forensic medical examination of the applicant\u2019s injuries; and interviews with the children that the applicant\u2019s representative had identified and about whom he had informed the police investigator on 27 May 2009). He requested that the prosecutor take measures to secure the collection of evidence. The prosecutor rejected the complaint on 1 July 2009, stating that the applicant had not challenged any acts or orders of an investigative authority.","40.On 17 June 2009 the police investigator showed the applicant photos to identify the possible suspects. According to the record of the meeting, the applicant was shown four lists with an unspecified number of photos of police officers who were similar in appearance. The applicant identified S.B. as the police officer who had beaten him at the police station. He did not remember whether that police officer had also beaten him during his arrest. The applicant was unsure in his idenfication of E.V. from the photos. Nevertheless, he added that he would be able to identify the other officer on the basis of his features and height if he saw him in person.","41.On 6 July 2009 the police investigator took a statement from V.Z., who was the person who had called the police on 29 April 2009 about the applicant\u2019s alleged breach of the peace. He explained that from his car on the crossroads of Kreenholmi and Kerese Street he had seen two young men crossing the street. One of them was carrying a knife. Another young man who was very drunk was walking in front of him, but was having trouble walking. He had called the police after seeing the young men and the knife as he considered them to be clearly dangerous and was worried about the safety of passers-by.","42.On 13 August 2009 the forensic medical expert delivered his opinion about the applicant\u2019s injuries. He concluded that the injuries found on the applicant on 30 April and 1 May had been caused by blows with a blunt object or objects. The exact cause of those injuries could not be established as their description in the documents was not sufficiently detailed. Nevertheless, the expert concluded that they had been inflicted shortly before the applicant had seen a doctor, possibly on 29 April 2009. He also noted that as there were no detailed descriptions of the injuries to the upper limbs, it was not possible to conclude whether those injuries had been received in self-defence. None of the documents disclosed any information about the ethanol content in the applicant\u2019s blood, but stated simply that the applicant had been in a state of alcoholic intoxication.","43.On 2 September 2009 the forensic expert gave an oral statement to the police investigator about his written opinion. In reply to a question about whether the applicant had had a haematoma in the area of the left eye on both 30 April and 1 May, the expert replied that there was no information about that in the documents of 30 April. He explained that it could not be excluded that the haematoma had been inflicted on 29 April, but it could also have been inflicted on 30 April or 1 May. He also stated in relation to a question about the cause of the injuries that since the documents had not contained detailed descriptions of the injuries, it was not possible to establish the exact nature of the object which had caused the traumas.","44.On 14 September 2009 the police investigator presented photos of officers to M.Z. for him to identify. According to the report of the meeting, M.Z. was shown four lists with an unspecified number of photos of police officers who were similar in appearance. M.Z. identified one of the police officers (E.V.) as the officer who, together with the other officer (S.B.), had beaten the applicant at the police station and had used force against the applicant at the playground. He was not certain in his recognition of S.B. on the photos, but pointed out another officer who, in his words, was very similar to S.B. He also stated that there had been no beating at the playground, but that the applicant\u2019s hands had simply been twisted behind his back and that he had been forced to the ground.","45.On 8 January 2010 the applicant complained to the prosecutor that he had still not been informed of a decision to carry out a forensic medical examination, despite repeated requests. He added that he had still not been examined by an expert, even though he had complained about headaches and a loss of vision after the beating. He requested that he be sent a copy of any expert reports if one had been carried out without his knowledge. He also complained that he had not had a formal confrontation with M.Z. and the suspects in order to eliminate any contradictions in their statements. The prosecutor rejected the complaint on 14 January 2010, stating again that the applicant had not challenged any acts or orders of an investigative authority.","46.On 20 January 2010 the police investigator decided to discontinue the investigation, concluding that there was no evidence that the police officers had committed the criminal offence of abuse of authority. Their use of force had not violated the Police Act, it had been lawful, justified and not excessive. The decision of the police investigator was approved by the prosecutor on 15 February 2010.","47.Regarding the applicant\u2019s arrest, the police investigator was of the view that the applicant\u2019s allegations about his beating were completely groundless. She concluded in substance that the use of force against the applicant during his arrest had been justified by the applicant\u2019s breach of the peace while being in a state of alcoholic intoxication; his refusal to obey the officers\u2019 lawful orders; and his attempt to leave the scene without the officers\u2019 consent. The physical force used to put the applicant on the ground, put on handcuffs and keep him on the ground had not been excessive.","48.In the decision, it was considered as established that the applicant\u2019s arrest had taken place in the following manner. While at the playground in the vicinity of 18 Kerese Street, the applicant had not behaved appropriately, had waved his hands around, used foul language and had been staggering a lot. He had not reacted to the orders given by the police officers. Police Officer E.V. had decided to put handcuffs on the applicant given that children were standing around, that the applicant was clearly of an aggressive state of mind, that he might have injured others and that there was a certain context to the call (the suspicion of carrying a knife). At that moment Officers N.S. and S.J. had arrived and helped to put the handcuffs on. The applicant had not complied with the officers\u2019 orders to stay still and calm down, but had started kicking the police vehicle. N.S. and S.J. had kept the applicant on the ground to restrain him. The applicant had continued to resist, use foul language and behave aggressively. Because of his aggressive behaviour, E.V. had been forced to call for a police van to transport the applicant to the police station. The applicant had resisted being put in the police van and had continued to behave aggressively and use foul language while being transported. Sounds from the transportation compartment made it seem like the applicant had hit himself against something.","49.In arriving at the conclusion that the applicant had not been beaten and that only lawful force had been used, the police investigator relied concretely on the statements of the children, Police Officers N.S., S.J., J.S., S.T., the suspected police officers, S.B. and E.V., and on the statements of M.Z., who had said during the presentation of the identification photos that there had been no beating at the playground, that the applicant\u2019s hands had simply been forced behind his back and that he had been forced to the ground.","50.Regarding the events at the police department, the police investigator rejected the statements of M.Z. as unreliable as he could not have seen what was happening to the applicant in the detention room. Though the door of that room had been open, M.Z. had been standing further away. As to the people detained at the police station, the investigator concluded that their statements had not directly confirmed that the applicant had been beaten. The statements of the detainees A.P. and R.L., who had stated that the applicant had been beaten, were dismissed as they contradicted the statements of the third detainee \u2013 M.S. \u2013 and other evidence. Four other police officers involved in the arrest and the transportation of the applicant, as well as one police officer who had been present at the police station during the applicant\u2019s detention, had also stated that the applicant had not been beaten.","51.As to the applicant\u2019s injuries, the police investigator cited observations in the report from when the applicant was taken to sober up, and from the ambulance and patient registration cards. Regarding the haematoma around the left eye, first documented at the hospital on 1 May 2009, the investigator referred to the forensic expert\u2019s opinion that it could have been caused on 29 April, 30 April or 1 May 2009 and that on the basis of the documents it was impossible to establish its cause. On the basis of that information the investigator concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegation that the haematoma around the left eye had been caused during his beating at the police department was unfounded and untrue. Turning to the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had vomited and that there had been blood on his clothing, the investigator viewed them as being disproven by the statements of the police officers as well as those of the ambulance doctor and the nurse who had not seen any blood on the applicant\u2019s clothes or witnessed any vomiting.","52.The police investigator found in conclusion that while at the police station the applicant had been aggressive, continued to use foul language and ignored orders to keep still. The force that S.B. and E.V. had used against him had been justified and lawful, and had not been excessive.","53.On 15 March 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision to discontinue the criminal investigation. He submitted among other things that the investigation had not been objective, that the statements of witnesses had been selectively cited and distorted, that some of the witnesses (such as Y.B., who had seen the applicant\u2019s arrest, and A.D., who had been detained in the police station at the same time as the applicant) had not been questioned, that he himself had not had a forensic medical examination; and that formal confrontations to eliminate any contradictions in statements in the case had not been arranged.","54.On 23 March 2010 the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision to discontinue the investigation as having been lodged out of time. The decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings had stated that the applicant had to lodge an appeal to the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office within ten days of the receipt of the relevant decision. The decision had been sent to the applicant\u2019s address by ordinary mail on 26 February 2010. Estonian Post had indicated that a standard letter was sent to an addressee on the next working day of the post office. The letter should therefore have reached the applicant on 1 March 2010, so the final day for lodging an appeal had been 11 March 2010. The applicant had lodged his appeal on 15 March 2010. The applicant stated that he had only received the letter on 5 March 2010 after returning home from his job in another city. Though the applicant had not requested the restoration of the time-limit for his appeal, the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office stated that in any event there had been no grounds for such a procedure. The State Prosecutor\u2019s Office was of the view that the applicant had a duty of diligence regarding his mail because he knew that there were proceedings pending where decisions concerning his situation might be made. The applicant had had several options available to him to avoid exceeding the time-limit.","55.On 30 April 2010 the Tartu Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office. The court agreed with the applicant\u2019s counsel that the time-limit for an appeal started to run from the date of actual receipt of the decision and not from the date it should have been received according to calculations based on mail delivery deadlines. It nevertheless considered that the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings had reached the applicant\u2019s mailbox on 1 March 2010, without however explaining on the basis of what evidence this conclusion was reached. The court also stated that there was no need to express an opinion with regard to the restoration of the deadline for the appeal, because the applicant had not believed that he had breached the deadline and had not sought its restoration.","D.Applicant\u2019s acquittal of misdemeanour charges","56.On 25 May 2009 the East Police Prefecture found the applicant guilty of the misdemeanour of committing a breach of the peace at Kreenholmi Street and ordered him to pay a fine. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Viru County Court.","57.On 17 November 2010 the Viru County Court, having held a public hearing on 4 November, acquitted the applicant of the charges. The court considered that there was no evidence to prove that his behaviour had constituted a misdemeanour.","58.The court, pointing to the fact that it was unlawfully obtained evidence, set aside the applicant\u2019s statements given on 30 April 2009 at 2.15 a.m. in the hospital, and which had been contained in the misdemeanour report drafted the same night at 2.40 a.m. It noted that the evidence had been gathered more than eight hours after the offence had allegedly been committed and after the person had in the meantime been taken to sober up, at 7.45 p.m.","59.The court considered that the witness M.Z. had given reliable testimony at the court hearing on 4 November 2010 when he had said that the police had unduly influenced him to give evidence against the applicant by letting him hear the applicant being beaten. The court considered that statement to be corroborated by the fact that the applicant had been taken to the hospital and had been interrogated there.","60.The court concluded that the evidence in the misdemeanour proceedings had been collected in an unlawful manner which infringed the applicant\u2019s honour and dignity and endangered his health. That conclusion was based on the statements of the applicant, M.Z., information from the hospital and the place and time of the drafting of the misdemeanour report.","61.The court further stated that there had been a material violation of the provisions governing misdemeanour proceedings because the applicant had been arrested at 5.40 p.m. and transported immediately to the police station, but had not been taken to sober up until 7.45 p.m.; also, his statement had only been taken at the hospital at 2.15 a.m. and the misdemeanour report not drafted at the hospital until 2.40 a.m.","62.The East Police Prefecture did not appeal against that judgment."]},"law":{"27237":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the treatment to which she had been subjected by the police officers during her transfer by ambulance to Skopje Bardovci hospital violated her rights under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility36.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not raise any objection as to the admissibility of this complaint.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government38.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s allegations of police brutality had been based solely on the notice of her discharge from Bardovci hospital, which had specified that her injuries had been \u201cmost probably of recent date\u201d; there was no other verbal or documentary evidence in support of her allegations. The discharge notice did not describe the injuries as \u201cfresh\u201d, as would have been the case had they been inflicted during the applicant\u2019s transfer (which did not last more than an hour). The photographs submitted in support (see paragraph 13 above) showed scratches on the applicant\u2019s back, which given their location (the upper part of the back), could not have been caused by the handcuffs with which the applicant had allegedly been restrained. As regards the alleged handcuffing, neither the photographs nor the medical evidence in the file confirmed that the applicant had sustained any injuries to her wrist joints, which would have been likely to be the case had the applicant been restrained with handcuffs which the defendants had then tightened up during the journey (see paragraph 22 above).39.\u00a0\u00a0They further submitted that the applicant\u2019s description of certain events to the domestic authorities had been rather inconsistent. In this connection they noted that it could not be established from the evidence submitted by the applicant in the domestic proceedings whether she had been examined by Dr M. before she was transferred to Skopje. In the criminal complaint (see paragraph 18 above), she referred to the certificate of 15 February 2010 (see paragraph 12 above), which contradicted the domestic courts\u2019 finding that she had not been examined by any doctor prior to being transferred. Furthermore, the discharge notice by Bardovci hospital had not confirmed the applicant\u2019s allegation that she was haemorrhaging when she was admitted to that hospital (see paragraph 22 above). On the other hand, the defendants had consistently stated that they had had recourse only to such measures (such as holding the applicant\u2019s arms and legs) which were appropriate to her state of health and were intended to prevent the applicant from hurting herself. They had neither handcuffed nor beaten up the applicant. In such circumstances, the Government concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted in another incident of \u201crecent date\u201d. They could have been a result of the applicant\u2019s tendency to self-harm or have been inflicted by a third person. In this connection the Government referred to statements by the doctors S.V. and L.S. (see paragraphs 14 and\u00a015 above).(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant reiterated that she had been hit and punched during the transfer and restrained with handcuffs. All the injuries, including bruises caused by the handcuffs, were described in the medical certificate no. 2131, which had been submitted in support of the criminal complaint lodged against M.N. and I.A. She also referred to her personal situation, namely that she had recently had an operation on her stomach, and that she was physically not strong and weighed only 35 kg. In such circumstances, it was not necessary for her hands to be handcuffed behind her back. Lying down in such a position for an extended time had also caused the scratches on her back, which were visible in the photographs included in the file (see paragraph 13 above). She further reiterated that when she was admitted to Bardovci hospital she was bleeding from the nose and mouth, but she did not know why the discharge notice contained no reference to that fact. Lastly, she contested the reliability of the evidence given by S.V. and L.S. In this connection she noted that the evidence produced by them had not been presented to or assessed by the domestic courts.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s evaluation of the facts41.\u00a0\u00a0Before examining the merits of the case, the Court will address the parties\u2019 dispute regarding issues of fact relevant to the case.42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in assessing evidence, it has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. It adopts conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no.\u00a029226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012, and the cases cited therein).43.\u00a0\u00a0It further reiterates that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its task, and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d (see, mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch v. Austria, 4\u00a0December\u00a01995, \u00a7 32, Series A no. 336, and Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no.\u00a024271\/03, \u00a7 51, 14\u00a0October 2010), even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place (see Cobzaru v. Romania, no.\u00a048254\/99, \u00a7 65, 26\u00a0July 2007). In other words, in such a context the Court is prepared to be more critical of the conclusions of the domestic courts. In examining them, the Court may take into account the quality of the domestic proceedings and any possible flaws in the decision-making process (see Denisenko and Bogdanchikov v. Russia, no. 3811\/02, \u00a7 83, 12\u00a0February 2009). The mere fact that the domestic courts found that the use of force did not amount to a criminal offence does not of itself absolve the Contracting State from its responsibility under the Convention (see Wiktorko v. Poland, no. 14612\/02, \u00a7 49, 31 March 2009).44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held on many occasions that where a person is injured while in detention or otherwise under the control of the police, any such injury will give rise to a strong presumption that the person was subjected to ill-treatment (see Corsacov v. Moldova, no. 18944\/02, \u00a7 55, 4 April 2006, and Bursuc v. Romania, no. 42066\/98, \u00a7 80, 12 October 2004). It is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how the injuries were caused (see Tomasi v. France, judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A, pp. 40-41, \u00a7\u00a7 108-11; Selmouni v. France [GC], no.\u00a025803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR 1999\u2011V; and Ribitsch, cited above, \u00a7 34). In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government (see Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7\u00a0274, 18 June 2002).45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations of police brutality on two grounds: in the first place they denied that the applicant had been restrained with handcuffs, and secondly they denied that the injuries specified in the notice of her discharge from Bardovci hospital and visible in the photographs had been inflicted during her transfer to that hospital. As regards the handcuffs, they submitted that neither the photographs of the applicant nor the available medical evidence showed any injuries allegedly inflicted by handcuffs. As regards the remaining injuries, they submitted that they had been inflicted in a prior incident either by the applicant herself (given her propensity to self-harm) or by her husband (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above).46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant, in support of her allegations that she had been ill-treated by M.N. and I.A., who had been involved in her transfer to Bardovci hospital, provided several medical certificates and four photographs showing injuries (haematomas and scratches) on her body and limbs. This evidence was part of the file in the criminal proceedings against the police officers, and was also submitted in support of her application before the Court.47.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the relevant medical evidence, the Court notes that the applicant produced three medical certificates: the discharge notice regarding her condition when she was admitted to Bardovci hospital, and two medical certificates of 31 October 2009, the date she was discharged from Bardovci hospital. The discharge notice did not provide a detailed description of the applicant\u2019s injuries. It did not go further than stating that the applicant \u201chad several haematomas of different sizes, most probably of recent date\u201d (see paragraph 9 above). By contrast, the medical certificates of 31 October 2009 specified the number, position on the body and size of the injuries. Both certificates indicated that the applicant had several haematomas on the lower legs, and specified their size. The certificate produced by Dr M. further specified that the applicant had scratches and haematomas on her stomach and back (see paragraph 11 above). The photographs of the applicant showed all these injuries (see paragraph 13 above). In addition, and contrary to the Government\u2019s assertion, the Court notes that the certificate no. 2131 issued by Kriva Palanka hospital specified that the applicant had haematomas on both wrist joints measuring 2 x 6 cm (see paragraph 10 above).48.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the existence of the applicant\u2019s injuries were sufficiently corroborated by appropriate evidence. The Court must establish whether the injuries were inflicted by the police as alleged by the applicant, namely while she was being transferred by ambulance to Bardovci hospital.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment of the established facts(a)\u00a0\u00a0The injuries on the applicant\u2019s back, stomach and legs49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that according to the Government these injuries were inflicted in incidents that pre-dated the applicant\u2019s transfer to Skopje. In support they referred to statements that S.V., a doctor at Kriva Palanka hospital, and L.S., a neighbour of the applicant, had given to the police on 21 November and 3 December 2009 respectively. Dr S.V. stated that on 27\u00a0October 2009 he had been called to intervene and provide medical assistance to the applicant who, as stated by her husband, had hurt herself by hitting her body and head against a wall and bed. L.S. stated that the applicant had been beaten by her husband on several occasions.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these statements were included in the Ministry\u2019s \u201cspecial report\u201d. They were part of the case file that was examined by the public prosecutor, and subsequently by the courts (see paragraphs 23, 24 and 30 above). However, neither the public prosecutor nor the courts made any reference to these statements in their consideration of the facts and merits of the case. Furthermore, they did not take any steps to examine their veracity. Despite these shortcomings, the fact that the domestic authorities did not test this evidence does not prevent the Court from taking it into consideration (see El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 162, ECHR 2012, and Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2008).51.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the statement by L.S., the Court notes that it was not corroborated by other evidence that the applicant was physically abused by her husband. No history of domestic violence was brought to the attention of the domestic courts or the Court. The Court further observes that in the letter of 11 January 2010 in which the Ministry informed the applicant about the statement by L.S., it (the Ministry) stated that it had warned L.S. that if there was false reporting a misdemeanour complaint would be lodged against her. That the discharge notice stated that the applicant had a \u201cparanoid attitude towards her husband which may be well-founded\u201d is insufficient for the Court to find that the applicant\u2019s injuries on the back, stomach and legs were inflicted by her husband.52.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the statement by Dr S.V., the Court notes that it concerned an incident that allegedly happened two days before the critical date, in which the applicant had hurt herself by hitting her head and body against a wall and bed. As a result, her face was covered with blood and there was blood on the floor (see paragraph 14 above). Dr S.V. gave this statement to police on 21 November 2009 after he had seen an interview broadcast on 3 November 2009 in which the applicant showed injuries she had received. The Court notes that the alleged incident of 27 October 2009 and the subsequent intervention of Dr S.V. were not supported by any other evidence (for example, a copy of the medical records of Kriva Palanka hospital). However, that is insufficient, in itself, to undermine its reliability. In this connection the Court observes that the applicant has not presented it with any reason to cast doubt on its credibility. Accordingly, it will take into consideration and assess its probative value in the context of other available evidence. In this connection it attaches particular importance to evidence attesting to the applicant\u2019s history of self-harm after she was operated on for stomach cancer. It observes that the discharge notice of Bardovci hospital noted that it had been informed by the applicant\u2019s husband that the applicant was prone to self-harm (see paragraph 9 above). Dr C.T. also testified that the applicant\u2019s husband had told him that the applicant was capable of killing herself (see paragraph 20 above).53.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, it considers that the Government have provided a plausible explanation as to how the applicant\u2019s injuries on her back, stomach and lower legs (noted in the medical certificates of 31\u00a0October 2009 and visible on the photographs submitted in the file) might have been inflicted. It considers that it cannot establish \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d that these injuries were inflicted by the police officers during the applicant\u2019s transfer with ambulance to Skopje.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The injuries to the applicant\u2019s wrist joints54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government denied that the applicant had been restrained by handcuffs during her transfer to Bardovci hospital. They maintained that there was no evidence that she had sustained any injuries in this respect.55.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court has already established (see paragraphs 47 and\u00a048 above) that the applicant had haematomas on both wrist joints, each measuring 2 x 6 cm. These injuries were described in the medical certificate no. 2131 issued by Kriva Palanka hospital on 31 October 2009, notably on the same day she was discharged from Bardovci hospital. The Government did not produce any explanation as to how these injuries were inflicted. Furthermore, the Court does not consider that the injuries to the applicant\u2019s wrist joints could have been inflicted in the incident of 27 October 2009 described by Doctor S.V. At this juncture, it notes that the Government conceded that such injuries could reasonably have been caused by handcuffing (see paragraph 38 above). The Government also made no submissions as to whether the applicant had not been handcuffed in the ambulance in the conditions she described. In such circumstances, the Court finds the applicant\u2019s allegations regarding the use of handcuffs sufficiently convincing and established beyond reasonable doubt. It has to examine accordingly whether the use of handcuffs, in the circumstances of the case, was justified.(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim\u2019s conduct. In order to fall within the scope of Article 3, the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity, the assessment of which depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 55, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011VIII, and the references cited therein).57.\u00a0\u00a0Treatment has been held by the Court to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000-IV). Treatment has been considered \u201cdegrading\u201d when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance (see Hurtado v.\u00a0Switzerland, 28 January 1994, opinion of the Commission, \u00a7 67, Series A no. 280, and Wieser v. Austria, no. 2293\/03, \u00a7 36, 22 February 2007). In order for a punishment or treatment to be \u201cinhuman\u201d or \u201cdegrading\u201d, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999-IX).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 does not prohibit the use of force to effect an arrest. However, such force may be used only if indispensable and must not be excessive. In respect of a person deprived of his liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see Wiktorko, cited above, \u00a7 47).59.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the kind of treatment in question in the present case, the Court reiterates that handcuffing does not normally give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where the measure has been imposed in connection with lawful arrest or detention and does not entail the use of force, or public exposure, exceeding what is reasonably considered necessary in the circumstances. In this regard, it is of importance for instance whether there is reason to believe that the person concerned would resist arrest or abscond, cause injury or damage, or suppress evidence (see Raninen, cited above, \u00a7 56).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that it is not disputed between the parties that on the critical date (29 October 2009) the applicant had an episode of mental distress; she had had such episodes since being operated on for stomach cancer (29 April 2009) and undergoing chemotherapy. That led her husband to seek treatment for her in Kriva Palanka hospital. Drs M. and C.T. both instructed that the applicant should be transferred to Skopje psychiatric clinic. The latter further instructed that the transfer was to be carried out with police assistance. Police officers M.N. and I.A., who were employed to provide the assistance, were also alerted to the applicant\u2019s \u201ccondition\u201d (see paragraph 21 and 23 above). In response to the applicant\u2019s refusal to get into the ambulance and her emotional behaviour when they arrived at her house (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above), M.N. handcuffed her hands behind her back. Whereas a form of constraint applied by police officers may be justified where individuals are offering physical resistance, or where they present a risk of violent behaviour (see Y v. Latvia, no.\u00a061183\/08, \u00a7 54, 21 October 2014, and B\u0113rzi\u0146\u0161 v. Latvia, no. 25147\/07, \u00a7\u00a090, 25 February 2014), the Court needs to establish whether the use of handcuffs was necessary and proportionate in the circumstances of the case. In this connection it has already established beyond reasonable doubt (see paragraph 55 above) that the applicant, with her hands cuffed behind her back, was put in the ambulance and made to lie on her back. She remained in that position throughout the transfer from her home in Kriva Palanka to Bardovci hospital in Skopje, which, according to the Government, lasted about an hour (see paragraph 38 above). During the transfer, M.N. and I.A. held the applicant down (see paragraphs 39 above) to prevent her from standing up (see paragraph 27 above). The applicant asserted, and maintained this consistently before the domestic authorities (see paragraphs\u00a011, 18, 22 and 28 above) and the Court, that during the transfer I.A. sat on her legs.61.\u00a0\u00a0At this juncture, the Court considers it appropriate to observe that it has emphasised that individuals in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect their physical well-being (see Tarariyeva v. Russia, no. 4353\/03, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2006-... (extracts); Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 77, 4 October 2005; Trubnikov v. Russia, no.\u00a049790\/99, \u00a7 68, 5 July 2005; and Mouisel v. France, no. 67263\/01, \u00a7 40, ECHR 2002-IX). The same applies to the applicant, who, during the transfer by ambulance, was in the hands of the police, and accordingly under their control. Furthermore, the Court attaches considerable importance to the applicant\u2019s state of health at the relevant time. Although she had no history of mental disorders (see paragraph 34 above), she could be deemed to be vulnerable because of her particular medical needs in view of her psychological state (see, mutatis mutandis, Rivi\u00e8re v. France, no. 33834\/03, \u00a7 63, 11 July 2006; Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2001\u2011III; and Aerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, \u00a7 66, Reports\u00a01998\u2011V). Furthermore, the Court notes the discomfort the applicant was experiencing as a result of her recent cancer surgery and subsequent chemotherapy, as well as her physical weakness (see paragraphs 9 and 40 above).62.\u00a0\u00a0Assuming that the handcuffing was aimed at preventing self-harm (see paragraph 39 above), the Court considers that, given the context of the treatment to which the applicant was subjected and her state of health, it has not been shown that the use of handcuffs throughout the transfer was proportionate. It observes that no consideration was given to this issue in the domestic proceedings. Likewise, the Government did not argue before the Court that no other, less stringent measures and precautions were available to diminish the opportunities for self-harm without infringing the applicant\u2019s personal autonomy. The Court notes that two police officers were sitting next to the applicant throughout the transfer to Bardovci hospital. Furthermore, it is unclear whether any medicine was administered to the applicant. In this respect the Court notes that the police officers and the applicant provided conflicting evidence as to whether a tranquilliser had been administered to the applicant before she was transferred to Bardovci hospital (see paragraphs 22 and 27 above). The domestic courts failed to establish this issue of fact (see paragraph 30 above). Lastly, the Court notes that neither the applicant\u2019s husband nor any other relative accompanied the applicant during her transfer by ambulance.63.\u00a0\u00a0It therefore considers that in the particular context of the case the Court cannot discern any ground for accepting that it was proportionate for the applicant to be handcuffed, as she described, throughout the transfer to Skopje hospital. The aforementioned leads the Court to conclude that the applicant\u2019s handcuffing during her transfer to Skopje hospital amounted to a degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of this Article.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION64.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the physical pain and emotional suffering in relation to the alleged violation.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s claim as unsubstantiated.67.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its finding under Article 3 of the Convention the Court considers that it is reasonable to award the full sum claimed by applicant under this head, plus any tax that may be charged.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 500 for travel costs related to her transfer from Kriva Palanka to Skopje, as well as for obtaining medical evidence (medical certificates). She did not provide any supporting documents in this respect. Lastly, she claimed EUR 300 for her legal representation before the Court.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested these claims as unsubstantiated and excessive.70.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as this relates to the violations found and it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see Editions Plon v.\u00a0France, no. 58148\/00, \u00a7 64, ECHR 2004\u2011IV). In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings, and considers it reasonable to award the full sum claimed in relation to the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27248":"I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS AS REGARDS THE VICTIM STATUS OF THE FIRST AND FIFTEENTH APPLICANTSA.\u00a0\u00a0As to the first applicant1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions40.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant, non-governmental organisation Identoba, complained, together with the fourteen individual applicants, that the attack by the counter-demonstrators during the march of 17 May 2012 and the authorities\u2019 failure duly to investigate the incident had amounted to a violation of its rights under Articles 3 and 8. It invoked the \u201cprivate life\u201d aspect of the latter provision, as well as Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. It also invoked, as complementary provisions, Article 14 of the Convention in relation to its rights under Articles 3, 8, 10 and 11, in order to denounce the discriminatory nature of the violations, and Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8, in order to emphasise the alleged ineffectiveness of the relevant criminal investigation.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government objected that the first applicant did not have standing under the Convention to claim a violation of its rights on account of facts which had affected some of its individual members. They stated, in particular, that a legal entity could not by its very nature claim, either in its own name or on behalf of its individual members, to have been subjected to ill-treatment or a breach of the right to respect for private life and to freedom of peaceful assembly, within the meaning of Articles 3, 8 and 11 of the Convention.42.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant disagreed with the Government\u2019s position as regards Articles 8, 10 and 11 only, without contesting the objection in relation to its victim status under Article 3 of the Convention. It submitted, in particular, that the dispersal of the march which it had organised, as part of its activities, with the aim of celebrating the International Day Against Homophobia \u2013 an assault which had been perpetrated with discriminatory intent \u2013 had significantly impeded it in its corporate mission and tasks. In the first applicant\u2019s view, its organisational activities should be understood as its \u201cprivate life\u201d within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the word \u201cvictim\u201d, in the context of Article 34 of the Convention, denotes the person or persons directly or indirectly affected by the alleged violation (see SARL du Parc d\u2019Activit\u00e9s de Blotzheim v. France, no. 72377\/01, \u00a7 20, 11 July 2006). Hence, Article\u00a034 concerns not just the direct victim or victims of the alleged violation, but also any indirect victims to whom the violation would cause harm or who would have a valid and personal interest in seeing it brought to an end (see, mutatis mutandis, Defalque v. Belgium, no. 37330\/02, \u00a7 46, 20 April 2006; and Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece, no. 26698\/05, \u00a7\u00a038, 27\u00a0March 2008).(a)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the first applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention taken separately or in conjunction with Articles 13 and 1444.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the first applicant\u2019s submissions, the Court observes that it is not clear whether the applicant organisation intended to complain on behalf of its individual members who had participated in the march of 17 May 2012 or in its own corporate name.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes, first, that the circumstances that constituted the alleged violations under both Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention are the same and consist of the intentional attacks on the physical and mental integrity of individual persons, coupled with the relevant State authorities\u2019 associated failure to protect those people. However, it is inconceivable that physical integrity, susceptible to be enjoyed by human beings, could be attributed to the first applicant, a legal person (compare with Verein \u201cKontakt-Information-Therapie\u201d (KIT) and Siegfried HAGEN v. Austria, no. 11921\/86, Commission decision of 12 October 1986, Decisions and Reports (DR) No. 57-A, p. 81). Even assuming that the first applicant intended to complain on behalf of those of its individual members whose physical integrity had been compromised during the incident of 17\u00a0May 2012, the Court would still not be able to attribute to it the necessary standing. Indeed, associations cannot be allowed to claim, under Article\u00a034 of the Convention, to be a victim of the acts or omissions which affected the rights and freedoms of its individual members who themselves are adult persons with full legal capacity to act and can thus lodge complaints with the Court in their own name (see, among others, Vallianatos and Others v.\u00a0Greece [GC], nos. 29381\/09 and 32684\/09, \u00a7 47, ECHR 2013 (extracts); Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a065542\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 115-116, ECHR 2013 (extracts); F\u00e9d\u00e9ration chr\u00e9tienne des t\u00e9moins de J\u00e9hovah de France v. France (dec.), no.\u00a053430\/99, ECHR\u00a02001-XI; and Association des Amis de Saint-Rapha\u00ebl et de Fr\u00e9jus and Others v. France (dec.), no. 45053\/98, 29 February 2000).46.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the first applicant cannot validly claim on the facts of the present case to be either a direct or indirect victim, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of a breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, taken either separately or in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14. This part of the application is thus incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 4.(b)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the first applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention47.\u00a0\u00a0As to the first applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, taken separately or in conjunction with Article 14, the Court observes that legal entities can, in principle, be affected in the exercise of their own right to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly (see, for instance, Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, no.\u00a072713\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 38-70, 29 March 2005, and Christians against Racism and Fascism v. the United Kingdom, no. 8440\/78, Commission decision of 16\u00a0July 1980, Decisions and Reports 21, p. 138). The Court further observes that, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the factual core of which is based on the attacks on a peaceful assembly, the scope of the protection under Article 10 of the Convention is not autonomous but rather contingent upon that of Article 11 (compare with Kakabadze and Others v.\u00a0Georgia, no. 1484\/07, \u00a7 83, 2 October 2012).48.\u00a0\u00a0 In this connection, the Court specifically reiterates that freedom of peaceful assembly is capable of being exercised not only by individual participants, but also by those organising it, including legal entities (see Hyde Park and Others v. Moldova (nos. 5 and 6), nos. 6991\/08 and 15084\/08, \u00a7 32, 14 September 2010; Plattform \u201c\u00c4rzte f\u00fcr das Leben\u201d v.\u00a0Austria, 21 June 1988, Series A no. 139; and Christians against Racism and Fascism, cited above). That being so, the Court accepts that the assault on the peaceful march of 17 May 2012, apart from constituting a possible encroachment on the various rights of individual members\u2019 of the first applicant under the Convention, also resulted in the disruption of the demonstration as such. That disruption in its turn affected the organiser of the event, the first applicant, in its own corporate interest of having messages relating to the situation of the LGBT community in Georgia expressed by means of the planned public procession.49.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the first applicant has standing to claim a violation of Article 11 of the Convention in its own name. Furthermore, having regard to the interplay between the latter provision and Article 10, as well as the complementary role of Article\u00a014, the Court considers that the Government\u2019s objection with respect to all those provisions must be dismissed.B.\u00a0\u00a0As to the fifteenth applicant1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions50.\u00a0\u00a0The fifteenth applicant, Mr Irakli Vatcharadze, complained that, together with the thirteen other individual applicants, he had been a victim of the violence that erupted during the march of 17 May 2012 and the inaction on the part of the police, in breach of his various rights under Articles 3, 8, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the Convention.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Government objected that the fifteenth applicant had never participated in the march of 17 May 2012 so could not claim to be a victim of the violence perpetrated there. Thus, unlike the other thirteen individual applicants, he did not take the trouble to submit at least some kind of account of the events, which could arguably have shown that he had actually taken part in the march. In further support of their objection, the Government referred to the video material available in the case file. They emphasised that those recordings of the march showed images of the thirteen individual applicants (from the second to the fourteenth) only, with the notable exception of the fifteenth applicant.52.\u00a0\u00a0The fifteenth applicant did not reply to the Government\u2019s objection.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, unlike the remaining thirteen individual applicants, the fifteenth applicant neither submitted an individual account of what had happened during the march of 17 May 2012, showing how the attack by the counter-demonstrators had concerned him personally, nor lodged a criminal complaint with the relevant domestic authorities in his own name (see paragraphs 10, 20 and 23 above). Furthermore, he did not refute the Government\u2019s objection calling into question his participation in the march.54.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court, upholding the Government\u2019s objection, finds that the fifteenth applicant cannot be taken to have participated in the march of 17 May 2012, and his allegation that he had been subjected to discriminatory ill-treatment during that procession is unsubstantiated.55.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the part of the application concerning the fifteenth applicant is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION56.\u00a0\u00a0The thirteen individual applicants (from the second to the fourteenth) complained under Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention that the relevant domestic authorities had failed to protect them from the violent attacks perpetrated by the counter-demonstrators during their peaceful march on 17\u00a0May 2012 and to investigate effectively the incident by establishing, in particular, the discriminatory motive of the attackers. The invoked provisions read as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 14\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201d57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 complaints of ill-treatment were largely unsubstantiated and exaggerated. Instead of providing sufficient details to illustrate in what manner each of the applicants had been individually ill-treated, they focused on the general events that had taken place during the march of 17 May 2012. Referring to the degree of the injuries that some of the applicants sustained during the altercation with the counter-demonstrators, as well as other circumstances surrounding the incident, the Government submitted that even if a certain amount of physical assault and verbal insults against some of the applicants had taken place, it had not reached the requisite threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention. They also added that two separate criminal investigations had been launched with respect to the alleged ill-treatment of the sixth and fourteenth applicants on 19 May and 24 October 2012, and a number of investigative measures had already been carried out.58.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicants\u2019 complaints of a discriminatory intent behind the violence in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, the Government limited their response to arguing that that complementary provision did not apply, as the applicants\u2019 allegations under Article 3 were either unsubstantiated by sufficient evidence and factual references, or ill\u2011founded given the absence of the requisite severity of the alleged treatment.59.\u00a0\u00a0In reply, the thirteen applicants, from the second to the fourteenth, referring to the video images of the incident of 17 May 2012, reiterated that all of them were on record as having participated in the march. As regards the severity of the ill-treatment, the applicants submitted that there existed a combination of sufficient and relevant factors \u2013 physical and mental abuse against them with clear discriminatory intent based on sexual orientation or gender identity, a lack of police presence, and so on \u2013 which rendered the treatment inflicted on them sufficiently severe to attain the relevant threshold under Article 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, the mere fact that two separate criminal investigations had been launched into the assaults on the sixth and fourteenth applicants could not be considered as a discharge of the respondent State\u2019s procedural obligations, as those investigations had been pending since 2012 without any progress.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility60.\u00a0\u00a0It is not disputed by the Government that the thirteen individual applicants (from the second to the fourteenth) took part in the march of 17\u00a0May 2012 and were targeted by a counter-demonstration. Indeed, they submitted individual written statements describing the exact circumstances surrounding the incident, their participation in the event was recorded by video cameras, and all of them filed their individual criminal complaints with the relevant domestic authorities (see paragraphs see paragraphs 10, 20\u00a0and 23 above above). To this extent, the Court can draw inferences from the materials available in the case file to find the factual background, as it was alleged by the applicants, sufficiently convincing and established beyond reasonable doubt for the purposes of the present case.61.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the ill-treatment perpetrated against the applicants was discriminatory and reached the relevant severity threshold and whether the domestic authorities conducted an effective investigation of the incident, these questions raise complex issues of fact and Convention law calling for examination on the merits.62.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, this part of the application cannot be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. Since it is not nor inadmissible on any other grounds, it must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Scope of the case63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the authorities\u2019 duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence on the part of private individuals, as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence can fall under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, but may also be seen to form part of the authorities\u2019 positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental value enshrined in Article 3 without discrimination. Owing to the interplay of the two provisions, issues such as those in the present case may indeed fall to be examined under one of the two provisions only, with no separate issue arising under the other, or may require simultaneous examination under both Articles. This is a question to be decided in each case in the light of its facts and the nature of the allegations made (see Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, no.\u00a015250\/02, \u00a7\u00a070, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011XIII (extracts); B.S. v. Spain, no. 47159\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a059\u201163, 24\u00a0July\u00a02012; and compare with Begheluri and Others v. Georgia, no.\u00a028490\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0171\u201179, 7\u00a0October 2014).64.\u00a0\u00a0In the particular circumstances of the present case, in view of the applicants\u2019 allegations that the violence perpetrated against them had homophobic and transphobic overtones which rendered their ill-treatment sufficiently severe to attain the relevant threshold, and that the authorities failed both to protect them from and then sufficiently investigate that bias-motivated violence, the Court deems that the most appropriate way to proceed would be to subject the applicants\u2019 complaints to a simultaneous dual examination under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (compare with Abdu v. Bulgaria, no. 26827\/08, \u00a7 31, 11\u00a0March 2014).2.\u00a0\u00a0General principles65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 247\u2011C). Furthermore, Article 3 cannot be limited to acts of physical ill-treatment; it also covers the infliction of psychological suffering. Hence, the treatment can be qualified as degrading when it arouses in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 103, 1 June 2010, and Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 3564\/11, \u00a7 54, 28 May 2013). The Court further reiterates that discriminatory treatment as such can in principle amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 where it attains a level of severity such as to constitute an affront to human dignity. More specifically, treatment which is grounded upon a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority may, in principle, fall within the scope of Article 3 (see Smith and Grady v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, nos. 33985\/96 and 33986\/96, \u00a7\u00a0121, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011VI). Discriminatory remarks and insults must in any event be considered as an aggravating factor when considering a given instance of ill-treatment in the light of Article 3 (see East African Asians v. the United Kingdom, nos. 4403\/70 et al., Commission\u2019s report of 14 December 1973, Decisions and Reports 78, p. 5, \u00a7 208, and Moldovan and Others v.\u00a0Romania (no. 2), nos. 41138\/98 and 64320\/01, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2005\u2011VII (extracts)). In assessing evidence in a claim of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, \u00a7 54, 2 December 2004).66.\u00a0\u00a0Article 1 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article\u00a03, imposes on the States positive obligations to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are protected against all forms of ill-treatment prohibited under Article 3, including where such treatment is administered by private individuals (see A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7\u00a022, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VI). This obligation should include effective protection of, inter alia, an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party, as well as reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities knew or ought to have known (see, for instance, T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26608\/11, \u00a7 38, 28 January 2014). Furthermore, Article 3 requires that the authorities conduct an effective official investigation into the alleged ill\u2011treatment, even if such treatment has been inflicted by private individuals (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7 151, ECHR 2003\u2011XII). For the investigation to be regarded as \u201ceffective\u201d, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means. In this connection, the Court has often assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the incidents reported at the relevant time. Consideration has been given to the opening of investigations, delays in taking statements and to the length of time taken for the initial investigation (see, for instance, Stoica v. Romania, no. 42722\/02, \u00a7 67, 4 March 2008).67.\u00a0\u00a0When investigating violent incidents, such as ill\u2011treatment, State authorities have the duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask possible discriminatory motives, which the Court concedes is a difficult task. The respondent State\u2019s obligation to investigate possible discriminatory motives for a violent act is an obligation to use best endeavours, and is not absolute. The authorities must do whatever is reasonable in the circumstances to collect and secure the evidence, explore all practical means of discovering the truth and deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may be indicative of violence induced by, for instance, racial or religious intolerance, or violence motivated by gender-based discrimination (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 160, ECHR 2005\u2011VII; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 138-42; and Mudric v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 74839\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a060-64, 16 July 2013). Treating violence and brutality with a discriminatory intent on an equal footing with cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. A failure to make a distinction in the way situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention (see, for instance, Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0173).3.\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the circumstances of the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the attack on the applicants reached the minimum threshold of severity under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention68.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing in mind the various reports on the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people in Georgia (see paragraphs 37\u201139 above), the Court acknowledges that the community finds itself in a precarious position. Negative attitudes against members of the LGBT community have become more or less prevalent in some quarters of Georgian society. It is when assessed against that background that the discriminatory overtones of the incident of 17 May 2012 and the level of vulnerability of the applicants, who publicly positioned themselves with the target group of the sexual prejudice, are particularly apparent.69.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, during the clashes between the participants of the march conducted to mark the International Day Against Homophobia, including the thirteen individual applicants, and representatives of the two religious groups \u2013 Orthodox Parents\u2019 Union and Saint King Vakhtang Gorgasali\u2019s Brotherhood \u2013 the latter were particularly insulting in the language used, spitefully calling the former \u201cfagots\u201d, \u201cperverts\u201d and so on. The homophobic connotation of the counter-demonstrators\u2019 speech was also evident in the acts of scornful destruction and ripping of LGBT flags and posters. In addition to those acts, the angry counter-demonstrators started threatening the applicants and other demonstrators with serious harm, including uttering death threats, using such terms as \u201ccrushing\u201d and \u201cburning to death\u201d. Those verbal attacks were then followed by actual physical assaults on some of the applicants.70.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the question of whether or not some of the applicants sustained physical injuries of certain gravity becomes less relevant. All of the thirteen individual applicants became the target of hate speech and aggressive behaviour, which facts are not in dispute by the Government (see paragraph 60 above). Given that they were surrounded by an angry mob that outnumbered them and was uttering death threats and randomly resorting to physical assaults, demonstrating the reality of the threats, and that a clearly distinguishable homophobic bias played the role of an aggravating factor (see Smith and Grady, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0121; Abdu, cited above, \u00a7 23; and Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0107 and 117), the situation was already one of intense fear and anxiety. The aim of that verbal \u2013 and sporadically physical \u2013 abuse was evidently to frighten the applicants so that they would desist from their public expression of support for the LGBT community (compare with Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others, cited above, \u00a7 105). The applicants\u2019 feelings of emotional distress must have been exacerbated by the fact that the police protection which had been promised to them in advance of the march was not provided in due time or adequately (see also paragraphs 73, 89 and 99 below).71.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the treatment of the applicants must necessarily have aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity (compare with Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0108 and 117), which were not compatible with respect for their human dignity and reached the threshold of severity within the meaning of Article\u00a03 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the authorities provided due protection to the applicants72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the municipal and police authorities had been informed well in advance of the LGBT community\u2019s intention to hold a march in the centre of Tbilisi on 17 March 2012. The organisers of the march specifically requested the police to provide protection against foreseeable protests by people with homophobic and transphobic views. Furthermore, given the history of public hostility towards the LGBT community in Georgia (see paragraphs 37-39 above), the Court considers that the domestic authorities knew or ought to have known of the risks associated with any public event concerning that vulnerable community, and were consequently under an obligation to provide heightened State protection (compare with, mutatis mutandis, Milanovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no.\u00a044614\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 84 and 89, 14 December 2010; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a096; and Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 113 and 119).73.\u00a0\u00a0However, in contrast to the respondent State\u2019s positive obligation to provide the peaceful demonstrators with heightened protection from attacks by private individuals, the Court notes the limited number of police patrol officers initially present at the demonstration distanced themselves without any prior warning from the scene when the verbal attacks started, thus allowing the tension to degenerate into physical violence. By the time the police officers finally decided to step in, the applicants and other participants of the march had already been bullied, insulted or even assaulted (compare with Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others, cited above, \u00a7 111). Furthermore, instead of focusing on restraining the most aggressive counter-demonstrators with the aim of allowing the peaceful procession to proceed, the belated police intervention shifted onto the arrest and evacuation of some of the applicants, the very victims whom they had been called to protect.74.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the domestic authorities failed to provide adequate protection to the thirteen individual applicants from the bias-motivated attacks of private individuals during the march of 17 May 2012.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was conducted into the incident75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the criminal complaints into the ill\u2011treatment of the participants of the march, including the thirteen individual applicants, by counter-demonstrators as well as the purported inaction of the police in the face of the violence, were filed the day after the incident, on 18\u00a0May 2012. Subsequently, all of the applicants again requested, on 3 and 5 July 2012, the initiation of an investigation of the two above-mentioned facts (see paragraphs 20 and 23 above). However, the relevant domestic authorities, instead of launching a comprehensive and meaningful inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the incident with respect to all of the applicants, inexplicably narrowed the scope of the investigation and opened two separate and detached cases concerning the physical injuries inflicted on two individual applicants only. Even in those separate criminal cases, no significant progress has been made for more than two years. The investigations are still pending at the early stages and the applicants have not even been granted victim status (see paragraph\u00a028 above, and compare with Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7 134-36). The only tangible result was the administrative sanctioning of two counter\u2011demonstrators, who were punished for minor breach of public order by a fine of some EUR 45 each (see paragraph 22 above). However, given the level of the unwarranted violence and aggression against the applicants, the Court does not consider that such a light administrative sanction was sufficient to discharge the State of its procedural obligation under Article\u00a03 of the Convention.76.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing in mind the factual circumstances of the acts that constituted the violence perpetrated against the applicants, the Court notes that there are quite a few provisions in the Criminal Code of Georgia which could have constituted a more appropriate ground for launching a criminal investigation into the violence, such as physical assault (Article 125), uttering death threats or threatening to damage health (Article 151) and encroachment on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (Article 161) (see paragraphs\u00a031, 34 and 35 above). Furthermore, it should have been possible for the investigation to narrow down the pool of possible assailants. First, it was a well-known fact that representatives of two religious organisations \u2013 the Orthodox Parents\u2019 Union and the Saint King Vakhtang Gorgasali\u2019s Brotherhood \u2013 had participated in the counter-demonstrations and, secondly, video recordings of the clashes had captured clear images of the most aggressive assailants from those two religious groups (compare with Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others, cited above, \u00a7 118; and also Begheluri and Others, \u00a7\u00a7 137-38).77.\u00a0\u00a0More importantly, the domestic criminal legislation directly provided that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity should be treated as a bias motive and an aggravating circumstance in the commission of an offence (see paragraph 29 above). The Court therefore considers that it was essential for the relevant domestic authorities to conduct the investigation in that specific context, taking all reasonable steps with the aim of unmasking the role of possible homophobic motives for the events in question. The necessity of conducting a meaningful inquiry into the discrimination behind the attack on the march of 17 May 2012 was indispensable given, on the one hand, the hostility against the LGBT community and, on the other, in the light of the clearly homophobic hate speech uttered by the assailants during the incident. The Court considers that without such a strict approach from the law\u2011enforcement authorities, prejudice-motivated crimes would unavoidably be treated on an equal footing with ordinary cases without such overtones, and the resultant indifference would be tantamount to official acquiescence to or even connivance with hate crimes (compare, for instance, with Milanovi\u0107, \u00a7\u00a7 96 and 97; Abdu, \u00a7\u00a7 32-35; and Begheluri and Others \u00a7\u00a0141, 142 and 175, all cited above).78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accordingly considers that the domestic authorities have failed to conduct a proper investigation of the thirteen applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment.(d)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusions79.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account all the evidence, the Court reiterates its findings that the attack on the applicants during the march of 17 May 2012 to mark the International Day Against Homophobia was instigated by those with a hostile attitude towards the LGBT community in Georgia. Furthermore, that violence, which consisted mostly of hate speech and serious threats, but also some sporadic physical abuse in illustration of the reality of the threats, rendered the fear, anxiety and insecurity experienced by all thirteen applicants severe enough to reach the relevant threshold under Article\u00a03 read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.80.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the reports of negative attitudes towards sexual minorities in some parts of the society, as well as the fact that the organiser of the march specifically warned the police about the likelihood of abuse, the law-enforcement authorities were under a compelling positive obligation to protect the demonstrators, including the applicants, which they failed to do. Lastly, the authorities fell short of their procedural obligation to investigate what went wrong during the incident of 17 May 2012, with particular emphasis on unmasking the bias motive and identifying those responsible for committing the homophobic violence. In the absence of such a meaningful investigation, it would be difficult for the respondent State to implement measures aimed at improving the policing of similar peaceful demonstrations in the future, thus undermining public confidence in the State\u2019s anti-discrimination policy.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus concludes that in the present case there has been a breach of the respondent State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1482.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant, Identoba, and thirteen individual applicants (from the second to the fourteenth) complained under Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention that they had not been able to proceed with their peaceful march owing to the bias-motivated assaults on them and the inaction on the part of the police. The invoked provisions read as follows:Article 10\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions ... without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...2.\u00a0\u00a0The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others...\u201dArticle 11\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly ... .2.\u00a0\u00a0No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ...\u201dArticle 14\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted the relevant domestic remedies for their complaints concerning their inability to proceed with their peaceful demonstration. Thus, if they considered that the police forces had not provided adequate protection from the counter-demonstrators, they should have sought civil redress from the Ministry of the Interior pursuant to Article 1005 \u00a7 1 of the Civil Code. Since the applicants had not resorted to that civil remedy, their complaints under Articles 10 and 11 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention were inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants disagreed. They submitted that the criminal complaints they had filed on the acts that had constituted an interference with their right to freedom of peaceful assembly already sufficed for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention requires that normal recourse should be had by an applicant only to remedies that relate to the breaches alleged and at the same time are available and sufficient. The application of this rule must make due allowance for the context. Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Cardot v. France, 19 March 1991, \u00a7 34, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0200). The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; in reviewing whether the rule has been observed, it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of the individual case (see Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6\u00a0November 1980, \u00a7 35, Series A no. 40).86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the individual applicants\u2019 complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention are based on the same facts as those under Article 3, namely the attacks by the counter-demonstrators and the lack of police protection. In this connection, it considers, by reference to its relevant case-law, that where acts that constitute serious offences are directed against a person\u2019s physical or mental integrity, only efficient criminal-law mechanisms can ensure adequate protection and serve as a deterrent factor (see, for instance, M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7\u00a050, ECHR\u00a02003\u2011XII; Sandra Jankovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 38478\/05, \u00a7 36, 5\u00a0March 2009; and August v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 36505\/02, 21\u00a0January 2003). This is especially so in the particular circumstances of the present case, where the existence of a bias motive behind the attack on the applicants\u2019 physical and mental integrity needed to be elucidated. The criminal law, notably Article 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, provides for such a possibility (see paragraph 77 above).87.\u00a0\u00a0As the applicant organisation and the thirteen individual applicants duly resorted to the criminal-law mechanism, the Court considers that they exhausted the relevant domestic remedy available to them, and there was no further necessity for them to seek any other alternative remedial actions. The Government\u2019s objection should accordingly be dismissed.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that this part of the application is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that there had been no violation of the applicants\u2019 rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of expression, as the relevant domestic authorities had not impeded their public gathering in any manner. On the contrary, the applicants and other participants of the demonstration were able to assemble freely near the Tbilisi Concert Hall and then proceeded with their march. As the organiser of the event had given a prior warning, the Ministry of the Interior deployed police units to the scene of the event. Police patrol vehicles escorted the LGBT marchers. As to the manner in which the police reacted to the clash between the marchers and counter-demonstrators, the Government admitted that that reaction had been somewhat delayed. However, they claimed that that had been done on purpose and in the marchers\u2019 best interests. Thus, the Government asserted that where a serious threat of a violent counter-demonstration exists, the domestic authorities have wide discretion in the choice of means to employ to protect assemblies. They referred to the Court\u2019s case-law in Plattform \u201c\u00c4rzte f\u00fcr das Leben\u201d (cited above, \u00a7\u00a034). Considering the large number of counter-demonstrators and their aggressive attitude towards the demonstrators, immediate preventive measures by the police could have provoked an even greater outburst of violence. Nevertheless, the law-enforcement officers remained at the scene and instantly intervened when the verbal attacks degenerated into actual physical violence by evacuating the attacked applicants from the scene. The police officers also separated the opposing parties by standing between them, verbally warning both sides to behave in an appropriate manner. As regards the applicants\u2019 complaints of discriminatory intent under Article\u00a014 of the Convention, the Government limited their response to noting that that provision was complementary and could not be invoked autonomously in the absence of a violation under Articles 10 and 11.90.\u00a0\u00a0In reply, the applicants maintained that the police\u2019s actions had been insufficient to prevent the marchers from aggression, which had been motivated by homophobic and transphobic hatred, and that as a result, the peaceful demonstration had been disrupted. Whilst the domestic authorities undoubtedly possessed a certain margin of appreciation in choosing appropriate means for ensuring that peaceful demonstrations could take place safely, the circumstances of the present case clearly showed that the actions of the police forces at the scene of the clashes had been wholly inadequate, and had further negated the applicants\u2019 rights under Articles\u00a010, 11 and 14 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the applicants\u2019 complaints91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants\u2019 complaints under Articles\u00a010 and 11 of the Convention are based on the allegations that the attacks by private individuals on their physical integrity, coupled with the passivity of the police in the face of the violence, disrupted their peaceful march. In such circumstances, Article 11 is to be regarded as a lex specialis and it is unnecessary to take the complaint under Article 10 into consideration separately. On the other hand, notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 must, in the present case, also be considered, if need be, in the light of principles developed under Article\u00a010 (see, for instance, Ezelin v. France, 26 April 1991, \u00a7\u00a7 35 and 37, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0202).92.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, given that the facts of the present case fall within the ambit of Article 11 of the Convention, and the applicants\u2019 claim that the breach of their right to freedom of peaceful assembly had discriminatory overtones, the Court considers that Article 14 is similarly applicable in the present case (see Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1997, \u00a7\u00a033, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011I), and its examination under the former provision must be conducted in conjunction with the latter.(b)\u00a0\u00a0General principles93.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of Article 11 of the Convention, the Court has often emphasised that pluralism and democracy are built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity. The harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for achieving social cohesion (see Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158\/98, \u00a7 92, 17\u00a0February 2004). Referring to the hallmarks of a \u201cdemocratic society\u201d, the Court has attached particular importance to pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. In that context, it has held that although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position (see Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 25, \u00a7 63; S\u00f8rensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark [GC], nos. 52562\/99 and 52620\/99, \u00a7\u00a058, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011I, and F\u00e1ber v. Hungary, no.\u00a040721\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a037\u201141, 24\u00a0July 2012).94.\u00a0\u00a0The State must act as the ultimate guarantor of the principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness (see Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no.\u00a0276, p.\u00a016, \u00a7\u00a038). Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11 of the Convention. This provision sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals, if need be (see Wilson and the National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 30668\/96, 30671\/96 and 30678\/96, \u00a7\u00a041, ECHR 2002\u2011V, and Ouranio Toxo v. Greece, no.\u00a074989\/01, 20\u00a0October 2005, \u00a7 37). That positive obligation is of particular importance for persons holding unpopular views or belonging to minorities, because they are more vulnerable to victimisation (see B\u0105czkowski and Others v.\u00a0Poland, no. 1543\/06, \u00a7 64, 3 May 2007).95.\u00a0\u00a0A peaceful demonstration may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it seeks to promote. The participants must, however, be able, with the State\u2019s assistance, to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents; such a fear would be liable to deter associations or other groups supporting common ideas or interests from openly expressing their opinions on highly controversial issues affecting the community. In a democracy the right to counter-demonstrate cannot extend to inhibiting the exercise of the right to demonstrate (see Plattform \u201c\u00c4rzte f\u00fcr das Leben\u201d, cited above, \u00a7 32).96.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court reiterates that the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 of the Convention duly covers questions related to sexual orientation and gender identity (see Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v.\u00a0Portugal, no. 33290\/96, \u00a7 28, ECHR 1999\u2011IX; Alekseyev v. Russia, nos.\u00a04916\/07, 25924\/08 and 14599\/09, \u00a7\u00a0108, 21 October 2010; and P.V. v. Spain, no.\u00a035159\/09, \u00a7 30, 30 November 2010).(c)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the circumstances of the present case97.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, noting that this issue is not even in dispute between the parties, the Court affirms that the disruption of the applicants\u2019 participation in the peaceful march of 17 May 2012, organised to mark the International Day Against Homophobia, undoubtedly constituted an interference under Article 11 of the Convention, read in the light of the relevant principles under Article 10. Indeed, the Convention protects public forms of expression, including through holding a peaceful assembly, and the expression of opinions in relation to campaigning for and raising awareness of the fundamental rights of various sexual minorities (see Alekseyev, cited above, \u00a7 84).98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicants\u2019 complaints that the State failed to protect their freedom to participate in the march of 17\u00a0May 2012 from the bias-motivated violence stem from exactly the same factual circumstances as those it has already examined under Article 3 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 14 (see paragraphs 68\u201181 above). Consequently, the Court\u2019s findings under the latter provisions are equally pertinent to the examination of the complaints under Articles\u00a011 and\u00a014 of the Convention.99.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the Court reiterates that despite the fact that the domestic authorities were given prior notice on 8 May 2012 about the intention to organise a peaceful march on 17 May 2012, they did not manage to use that generous period of nine days for careful preparatory work. Indeed, given the attitudes in parts of Georgian society towards the sexual minorities, the authorities knew or should have known of the risk of tensions associated with the applicant organisation\u2019s street march to mark the International Day Against Homophobia. They were thus under an obligation to use any means possible, for instance by making public statements in advance of the demonstration to advocate, without any ambiguity, a tolerant, conciliatory stance (compare with Ouranio Toxo, cited above, \u00a7 42) as well as to warn potential law-breakers of the nature of possible sanctions. Furthermore, it was apparent from the outcome of the LGBT procession, that the number of police patrol officers dispatched to the scene of the demonstration was not sufficient, and it would have been only prudent if the domestic authorities, given the likelihood of street clashes, had ensured more police manpower by mobilising, for instance, a squad of anti-riot police (contrast with Plattform \u201c\u00c4rzte f\u00fcr das Leben\u201d, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a037 and\u00a038; and also Ouranio Toxo, cited above, 43).100.\u00a0\u00a0All in all, the Court considers that the domestic authorities failed to ensure that the march of 17 May 2012, which was organised by the first applicant and attended by the thirteen individual applicants (from the second to the fourteenth), could take place peacefully by sufficiently containing homophobic and violent counter-demonstrators. In view of those omissions, the authorities fell short of their positive obligations under Article 11 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION101.\u00a0\u00a0The third, sixth, seventh and tenth applicants (Mr L. Berianidze, Mr\u00a0G.\u00a0Demetrashvili, Ms G. Dzerkorashvili and Ms M. Kalandadze) complained that their physical liberty had been unjustifiably restricted by the police on account of being forcefully placed in police patrol vehicles and evacuated from the scene of the disrupted demonstration, in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.102.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, all thirteen individual applicants reiterated their complaints about the assault on them during the march as well as the lack of police protection under Articles 8, taken both separately and in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention. They further reiterated their complaint of the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation into their allegations of ill-treatment under Article 13 of the Convention.103.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the relevant applicants\u2019 complaints under Article 5 \u00a7 1 and Article 8, the latter provision taken either separately or in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention, were either inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, incompatible ratione materiae or manifestly ill-founded. The applicants disagreed.104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court first observes that the third, sixth, seventh and tenth applicants (Mr L. Berianidze, Mr G. Demetrashvili, Ms G.\u00a0Dzerkorashvili and Ms M. Kalandadze) did not request the initiation of criminal proceedings in respect of their allegedly unlawful deprivation of liberty by the police, which could have been done by referring to Article 147 of the Criminal Code in their criminal complaints. Indeed, those complaints were confined to the distinct allegations of ill-treatment committed by counter\u2011demonstrators and the police\u2019s inaction in the face of that violation (see paragraphs 24 and 33 above). Nor did those four applicants attempt, as an alternative remedy, to sue the Ministry of the Interior, under the general rules of tort law contained in the Civil Code, for the wrong done to them by the allegedly abusive police actions, which consisted in forcing them into police patrol cars and evacuating them from the scene (compare with, Saghinadze and Others v. Georgia, no. 18768\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 95 and 96, 27\u00a0May 2010; and also, for instance, with Lazariu v. Romania, no. 31973\/03, \u00a7\u00a088, 13\u00a0November 2014).105.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the complaints of the four above-mentioned applicants under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention must be rejected under Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.106.\u00a0\u00a0As to the thirteen individual applicants\u2019 complaints under Article\u00a08, made either separately or in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention, as well as the specific repetition of their grievance about the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation under Article\u00a013 (see paragraph\u00a0102 above), the Court observes that this part of the application merely reiterates the issues already thoroughly examined under the lex\u00a0specialis \u2013 Articles 3 and 11, both read in conjunction with Article\u00a014. Consequently, this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill\u2011founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention (compare with Kakabadze and Others, cited above, \u00a7 100).IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION107.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage108.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants differentiated between various degrees of emotional distress and anxiety that each of them suffered as a result of breaches of their various rights under the Convention during the incident of 17\u00a0May 2012. The first applicant, Identoba, and the thirteen individual applicants (from the second to the fourteenth) thus made the following individual claims:-the first applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR);-the third and sixth applicants each claimed EUR 5,000;-the seventh and tenth applicants \u2013 EUR 3,000 each; and-each of the remaining nine applicants made a claim of EUR 2,000.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 claims were manifestly ill-founded and excessive.110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no doubt that the thirteen individual applicants suffered distress and frustration on account of the violations of their various rights under Articles 3, 11 and 14, and that the first applicant, as a legal entity, was also prejudiced in its legitimate interests as a result of a breach of its rights under Articles 11 and 14 of the Convention. The resulting non\u2011pecuniary damage would not be adequately compensated for by the mere finding of those breaches. Having regard to the relevant circumstances of the case, the principle of ne ultra petitum as well as to various equity considerations, the Court finds it appropriate to make the following awards, in respect of non-pecuniary damage: to the third and sixth applicants EUR\u00a04,000 each; to the seventh and tenth applicants EUR 3,000 each; to each of the remaining nine individual applicants EUR 2,000; and EUR\u00a01,500 to the applicant organisation.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses111.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of a claim for costs and expenses, the Court notes that there is no call to make any award under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27268":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant initially complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the national authorities had failed to consider his claims that he risked ill\u2011treatment in the event of his extradition to Uzbekistan, and that if extradition was to take place it would expose him to that risk. Further to information about the applicant\u2019s disappearance and the Government\u2019s reply to the Court\u2019s request for factual information (see paragraphs 23-26 above), the Court decided to consider, from the standpoint of Article 3 of the Convention, whether the Government had complied with their obligation to take measures both before and after his disappearance to prevent him from being transferred to Uzbekistan and whether there had been a thorough and effective investigation capable of elucidating the crucial aspects of the incident and of leading to identification and punishment of those responsible for the disappearance. Article\u00a03 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that these complaints are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the present case raises two\u00a0distinct issues under Article\u00a03 of the Convention: (1)\u00a0\u00a0the authorities\u2019 alleged responsibility for the applicant\u2019s disappearance, either through the direct involvement of State agents or through a failure to comply with their positive obligation to protect the applicant against the risk of disappearance; and (2)\u00a0\u00a0their alleged failure to comply with the procedural obligation to conduct a thorough and effective investigation into his disappearance. The Court reiterates that the determination of these issues will depend upon, notably, the existence at the material time of a well-founded risk that the applicant might be subjected to ill-treatment in Uzbekistan (see Kasymakhunov v. Russia, no. 29604\/12, \u00a7 120, 14 November 2013). The parties disagreed on the latter point. The Court will therefore start its examination by assessing whether the applicant\u2019s forcible return to Uzbekistan exposed him to such a risk. It will subsequently examine the other issues arising under Article\u00a03 mentioned above.1.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant\u2019s return to Uzbekistan exposed him to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article\u00a03(a)\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s allegations that he risked ill-treatment in the event of his extradition to Uzbekistan had been duly considered by the national authorities. The Russian Prosecutor General had received the assurances from his Uzbekistani counterpart that the applicant would not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment and that he would be given an opportunity to defend himself. The Russian authorities had no information about any extradited persons having been ill-treated or tortured in Uzbekistan. The Government pointed out that Uzbekistan was a party to international instruments prohibiting torture and ill-treatment and that the extradition was refused in respect of the offences of organising a criminal association, illegal crossing of the State border, terrorism and infringement of the constitutional order of the Republic of Uzbekistan.41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant replied that diplomatic assurances by the Uzbek authorities did not refute his arguments about high risk of ill-treatment (he referred to the Court\u2019s established case-law: Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no.\u00a014743\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 149-150, 2 October 2012, and Saadi v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a037201\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 147-148, ECHR 2008). The Government\u2019s claim that they had no information about anyone being ill-treated in Uzbekistan appeared to be false in the light of the recent reports by Amnesty International about the destiny of Mr Khamidkariyev who had been abducted in Russia and forcibly returned to Uzbekistan where he faced an unfair trial based on his confessions obtained by torture (see paragraph 33 above and the facts of application no. 42332\/14). The mere fact of ratification of international human rights treaties by Uzbekistan does not in itself provide sufficient safeguards against ill-treatment because of the absence of any control mechanisms in relation to the country\u2019s compliance with its commitments (here the applicant referred to the Court\u2019s findings in: Ermakov v. Russia, no.\u00a043165\/10, \u00a7 204, 7 November 2013, and Khodzhayev v. Russia, no.\u00a052466\/08, \u00a7 98, 12 May 2010). The applicant deemed illogical the Government\u2019s argument that his extradition had been refused in respect of some of the charges. What is important is that it was authorised for the offence of participation in an extremist organisation which put him in a vulnerable group systematically subject to torture. In view of the recent publications by international human rights organisations, the applicant submitted that there were no improvements in the sphere of human rights in Uzbekistan and that torture of persons suspected of prohibited religious activities had remained a widespread practice. However, the applicant\u2019s allegations of an increased risk of torture were not examined at any stage of the domestic proceedings.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will examine the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 in the light of the applicable general principles set out in, among others, Umirov v. Russia (no. 17455\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 92-100, 18 September 2012, with further references).43.\u00a0\u00a0In the recent cases against the Russian Federation examined under Article\u00a03 concerning the extradition of applicants to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the Court identified the critical elements to be subjected to a searching scrutiny (see, among many other authorities, Savriddin Dzhurayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 71386\/10, ECHR 2013 (extracts); Kasymakhunov and Abdulkhakov, both cited above; and Iskandarov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a017185\/05, 23\u00a0September 2010). Firstly, it has to be considered whether an applicant has presented the national authorities with substantial grounds for believing that he faced a real risk of ill\u2011treatment in the destination country. Secondly, the Court would inquire into whether the claim has been assessed adequately by the competent national authorities discharging their procedural obligations under Article 3 of the Convention and whether their conclusions were sufficiently supported by relevant material. Lastly, having regard to all of the substantive aspects of a case and the available relevant information, the Court would assess the existence of the real risk of suffering torture or treatment incompatible with the Convention standards.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faced a real risk of ill-treatment44.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, the Court reiterates that for more than a decade the United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organisations issued alarming reports concerning the situation in the criminal justice system in Uzbekistan, the use of torture and ill\u2011treatment techniques by law enforcement agencies, severe conditions in detention facilities, systemic persecution of political opposition, and harsh treatment of certain religious groups.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has been previously confronted with many cases concerning forced return from Russia to Uzbekistan of the persons accused by the Uzbek authorities of criminal, religious and political activities (see most recently, Egamberdiyev v. Russia, no. 34742\/13, 26 June 2014; Akram\u00a0Karimov v. Russia, no. 62892\/12, 28 May 2014; Nizamov and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos. 22636\/13, 24034\/13, 24334\/13 and 24528\/13, 7 May 2014, with further references). It has been the Court\u2019s constant position that the individuals, whose extradition was sought by the Uzbek authorities on charges of religiously or politically motivated crimes, constituted a vulnerable group, running a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of their transfer to Uzbekistan.46.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant consistently emphasised throughout the domestic proceedings that he had been prosecuted for religious extremism and his membership of the above-mentioned vulnerable group. The same followed from the extradition documents which were produced by the requesting Uzbekistani authority. The international search and arrest warrant and extradition request submitted by the Uzbek authorities were clear as to their basis, namely that he was wanted for prosecution in Uzbekistan on charges of religious extremism. These allegations regarding his criminal conduct and its nature remained unchanged throughout the relevant proceedings in the Russian Federation.47.\u00a0\u00a0This fact alone, taken in the context of the international reports regarding the systemic ill-treatment of those accused of religious and political crimes, was sufficient to place definitively the applicant within the group of individuals at a severe risk of ill-treatment in the event of their removal to Uzbekistan.48.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above considerations, the Court is satisfied that the Russian authorities had before them a sufficiently corroborated claim that the applicant could face a real risk of ill-treatment if returned to Uzbekistan.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Duty to assess adequately claims of a real risk of ill-treatment relying on sufficient relevant material49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes firstly that, despite the applicant advancing a substantiated claim of the risk of ill-treatment at the hands of the Uzbek law enforcement authorities, on 11 December 2013 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office authorised his extradition to Uzbekistan without examining any of the risks to him and merely referring to an absence of \u201cobstacles\u201d for transfer (see paragraph 18 above). No evidence has been presented by the Government to demonstrate that the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office made any effort to evaluate the risks of extradition to the State where, according to reputable international sources, the use of torture is commonplace and defence rights are routinely circumvented. Furthermore, the Prosecutor General\u2019s unqualified reliance on the assurances provided by the Uzbek authorities was at variance with the Court\u2019s established position that in themselves these assurances are not sufficient and that the national authorities need to treat with caution the assurances against torture given by a State where torture is endemic or persistent and whose assurances did not provide for any monitoring mechanism (see, among others, Kasymakhunov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0127, and Yuldashev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a01248\/09, \u00a7\u00a085, 8 July 2010, with further references). Accordingly, the Court is unable to conclude that the applicant\u2019s claims concerning his probable ill-treatment at the hands of the Uzbek authorities were duly considered by the prosecution authorities.50.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Court is of the opinion that the domestic courts have likewise failed to carry out a comprehensive and adequate assessment of the applicant\u2019s claims under Article 3 of the Convention. Thus, the Tyumen Regional Court and the Supreme Court refused to consider, in the extradition proceedings, a wide range of references to the Court\u2019s case-law, UN agencies\u2019 and non-governmental organisations\u2019 reports on the situation in Uzbekistan and appeared to attach the decisive weight to the assurances of the Uzbek authorities, taking them at face value, without engaging in an analysis of the context in which they were given or making their detailed assessment against the Convention requirements (see paragraphs 20 and 22 above). The Court finds it difficult to reconcile the authoritative directions given by the Supreme Court to the lower courts in its Ruling no.\u00a011 of 14\u00a0June 2012 to engage in a thorough and comprehensive review of the serious claims of ill-treatment and the restricted scope of inquiry it had adopted in the present case. It needs to be recalled in this connection that even if the national courts considered the applicant\u2019s arguments substantively unconvincing, they should have dismissed these arguments only after a thorough analysis. Nothing in the material in the Court\u2019s possession gives reason to believe that the Regional or Supreme Courts, confronted with substantial grounds for believing in a real risk of ill\u2011treatment amply supported by various international sources, honoured this claim with due and sufficient attention.51.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court is not persuaded that the applicant\u2019s allegations that he risked ill-treatment have been duly examined by the domestic authorities. It must, accordingly, assess whether there exists a real risk that the applicant would be subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 if he were to be removed to Uzbekistan.(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of a real risk of ill-treatment52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has had occasion to deal with a number of cases raising the issue of a risk of ill-treatment in the event of extradition or expulsion to Uzbekistan from Russia or another Council of Europe member State. It has found, with reference to material from various sources, that the general situation with regard to human rights in Uzbekistan is alarming, that reliable international material has demonstrated the persistence of a serious issue of ill-treatment of detainees, the practice of torture against those in police custody being described as \u201csystematic\u201d and \u201cindiscriminate\u201d, and that there is no concrete evidence to demonstrate any fundamental improvement in that area (see Egamberdiyev; Akram Karimov; Kasymakhunov; Ermakov; Umirov, all cited above; see also Garayev v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no. 53688\/08, \u00a7\u00a071, 10\u00a0June 2010; Muminov v. Russia, no.\u00a042502\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a093-96, 11\u00a0December 2008; and Ismoilov and Others v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a02947\/06, \u00a7 121, 24\u00a0April 2008).53.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s personal situation, the Court notes that he was wanted by the Uzbek authorities on charges related to his alleged membership of a Muslim extremist movement. Those charges constituted the basis for the extradition request and the arrest warrant issued in respect of the applicant. Thus, his situation is no different from that of other Muslims who, on account of practising their religion outside official institutions and guidelines, are charged with religious extremism or membership of banned religious organisations and, on that account, as noted in the reports and the Court\u2019s judgments cited above, are at an increased risk of ill-treatment (see, in particular, Ermakov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0203).54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is bound to observe that the existence of domestic laws and international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights is not in itself sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill\u2011treatment where, as in the present case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities that are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no.\u00a027765\/09, \u00a7\u00a0128, ECHR 2012). Furthermore, the domestic authorities, as well as the Government before the Court, used summary and non-specific reasoning in an attempt to dispel the alleged risk of ill\u2011treatment on account of the above considerations.55.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court considers that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the applicant would face a real risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention if extradited to Uzbekistan.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that the enforcement of the extradition order and the applicant\u2019s return to Uzbekistan exposed him to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the Russian authorities were responsible for a breach of Article\u00a03 on account of the applicant\u2019s disappearance(a)\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, upon receipt of the Court\u2019s indication of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, they had required the Tyumen Regional Prosecutor\u2019s office, the regional police department and the Border Service to abstain from any actions in relation to the applicant\u2019s transfer to Uzbekistan. After learning of the applicant\u2019s disappearance, the Investigations Committee instituted criminal proceedings under Article 126.1 of the Russian Criminal Code (abduction). The Government submitted that the applicant was searched for by means of checking the registers of various hospitals, correctional facilities, homeless persons, unidentified bodies, and police departments. The applicant\u2019s home was searched and his toothbrush was removed for taking DNA samples. Records of the applicant\u2019s calls were obtained from mobile operators. The Government claimed that they did not have any information about the applicant\u2019s movements inside Russia or about his crossing the Russian border.58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s representative maintained that his disappearance was the result of his abduction for the purpose of his involuntary removal to Uzbekistan. This was supported by the fact that he had been taken away from his home by State agents (the FMS officers) who had attempted to avoid eye-witnesses and prevented his lawyer from following them and that he had not contacted his lawyer or his relatives in Russia in order to inform them of his whereabouts after he had last been seen on the premises of the Tyumen FMS. Already on 11 March 2014 he had prepared a written statement, indicating that he had no intention to leave for Uzbekistan and that he feared abduction. The representative pointed out that, without passport or other travel document in his possession, the applicant could not leave of his will: he had never received an Uzbek passport, while his Russian passport had been cancelled by the Russian courts. The representative emphasised that the Government failed to provide any explanation of the applicant\u2019s disappearance or to put in place a legal mechanism capable of preventing his forcible transfer to Uzbekistan. Despite the available information that he might be sent to Uzbekistan on the Tashkent-bound flight, no measures had been taken in order to prevent it from happening or at least to check the flight and the passenger manifest. Finally, the representative submitted that the investigation conducted by the Russian authorities into the disappearance had been ineffective. Neither his counsel, nor his wife, nor the Court were informed about the progress of the investigation or given access to its materials. Some obvious steps were not taken: the FMS officers were not interviewed and the passenger lists were not examined. The search in the applicant\u2019s home and the removal of his toothbrush would be of little help in establishing his whereabouts.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the parties\u2019 arguments raise three distinct issues, namely whether the authorities (i) complied with their obligation to protect the applicant against the risk of the treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, (ii) conducted an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s disappearance, and (iii) should be held accountable for the applicant\u2019s disappearance. The Court will examine each of these issues separately.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the authorities complied with their obligation to protect the applicant against the risk of a forcible transfer to Uzbekistan60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation on Contracting Parties, under Article 1 of the Convention, to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, requires States to take reasonable steps to provide effective protection of vulnerable persons and to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge. Where the authorities of a State party are informed of an individual\u2019s exposure to a real and imminent risk of torture and ill\u2011treatment through his transfer by any person to another State, they have an obligation under the Convention to take, within the scope of their powers, such preventive operational measures as, judged reasonably, might be expected to avoid that risk (see Kasymakhunov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 134-135, and the authorities cited therein).61.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has established in paragraph 47 above, the applicant belonged to a group of people who have been systematically subjected to ill\u2011treatment in Uzbekistan in connection with their prosecution for religiously and politically motivated crimes. The factual pattern in the applicant\u2019s case is relevantly similar to other cases, in which the Court found that people whose extradition had been sought on similar charges had been forcibly transferred from Russia to either Uzbekistan or Tajikistan (see, among others, Iskandarov; Abdulkhakov; Savriddin Dzhurayev; and Kasymakhunov, all cited above). It is beyond any doubt that the Russian authorities were well aware \u2013 or ought to have been aware \u2013 of these incidents and, in the light of their experience and knowledge, must have reasonably considered that the applicant faced a similar risk of disappearance and irregular transfer after his release from custody on 11\u00a0March 2014. Indeed, the Russian authorities had been insistently alerted by both the Court and the Committee of Ministers to the recurrence of similar incidents of unlawful transfer from Russia to States not parties to the Convention, in particular Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Court refers in this connection to the five Committee of Ministers\u2019 decisions of 8\u00a0March, 6\u00a0June, 23 September, 6 December 2012 and 7 March 2013 regarding certain applicants\u2019 abductions and forced transfers to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (their relevant parts are reproduced in Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0122-126). Each of these decisions recalled the Russian authorities that they had a duty to ensure that no similar incidents would occur in future by introducing special protective measures.62.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above general context and the repetitive pattern of disappearances of applicants in similar circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the Russian authorities were aware before and after the applicants\u2019 release that he faced a real risk of forcible transfer to the country where he could be subjected to torture or ill-treatment. These circumstances, coupled with the applicant\u2019s background, were worrying enough to trigger the authorities\u2019 special vigilance and require appropriate measures of protection in response to this special situation (see Kasymakhunov, cited above, \u00a7 136).63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not inform the Court of any timely preventive measure taken by competent State authorities to avert the risk of the applicant\u2019s abduction or forcible transfer. Having regard to the established pattern of disappearances, sending a letter to the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, to the regional police department and to the Border Service to inform them of the Court\u2019s indication of an interim measure, as the Government claimed they did (see paragraph 57 above), was manifestly insufficient to discharge the duty of protection which the Russian authorities owed to the applicant. It does not appear that the applicant\u2019s representative\u2019s faxed communication to the Federal Security Service, the Border Control and the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, advising them of the applicant\u2019s disappearance and his impending transfer to Uzbekistan, elicited any prompt and robust reaction from the State authorities concerned (see paragraph 25 above). There is for instance no evidence that any warning message was conveyed to the airport authorities, alerting them to the applicant\u2019s special situation and the need to protect him from a forcible transfer to Uzbekistan (compare Kasymakhunov, cited above, \u00a7 138).64.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the Court finds that the Russian authorities failed in their positive obligation to protect the applicant against the real and immediate risk of exposure to torture and ill-treatment.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the authorities conducted an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s disappearance65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where the authorities of a State party are informed of an individual\u2019s exposure to a real and imminent risk of torture or ill\u2011treatment through his forcible transfer to another State, they have an obligation under the Convention to conduct an effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Kasymakhunov, cited above, \u00a7 144, and Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above, \u00a7 190). To be effective, the investigation must be both prompt and thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill\u2011founded conclusions to close their investigation or to use as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, in particular, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see the authorities cited in Kasymakhunov, \u00a7 143).66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes with satisfaction that a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s probable abduction was instituted without delay. It reiterates in this connection that institution of criminal proceedings is the best, if not the only, procedure in the Russian criminal-law system that is capable of meeting the Convention requirements of an effective investigation (see Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above, \u00a7 193, and Lyapin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 135-137, 24 July 2014).67.\u00a0\u00a0However, it follows from the Government\u2019s submissions that, since the beginning of the investigation, little has been done to establish the applicant\u2019s whereabouts and to identify those responsible for his disappearance. The nature of the queries, which included calls to various registers of missing persons and taking samples of the applicant\u2019s DNA, indicates that the investigation adopted as the only working hypothesis that of the applicant\u2019s death or abduction by private parties. There is no information that any consideration has been given to the plausible version of his forced transfer to Uzbekistan by State agents. As a consequence, the elementary and obvious investigative steps have not been taken. The investigators did not interview the officers of the Federal Migration Service who had apprehended the applicant and later brought him to their premises. It was not established whether the applicant had been taken from his home \u2013 as his lawyer claimed \u2013 or from a mosque \u2013 as it follows from the prosecutor\u2019s reply of 20 August 2014 \u2013 and what the legal grounds for detaining the applicant had been. The investigation did not identify or interview anyone who might have witnessed his release or might have seen him later on that day. There is no indication that passenger lists for the flights to Uzbekistan were obtained and checked or that the ground staff at the airports and officers of the Border Control were shown the applicant\u2019s photograph and questioned.68.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the deficiencies of the investigation it has identified above, the Court finds that it was neither thorough nor sufficiently comprehensive and thus fell short of the requirements of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the respondent State is liable on account of the passive or active involvement of its agents in the applicant\u2019s disappearance69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual from the risk of ill\u2011treatment is an obligation of means and not of result. Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the scope of that obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7\u00a0144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). Moreover, even where the Court has established that the obligation to take preventive measures was not properly discharged, this finding is not sufficient, on its own, to hold that the authorities were involved in, or responsible for, the applicant\u2019s disappearance (see Mamazhonov v. Russia, no. 17239\/13, \u00a7 203, 23 October 2014).70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, since the morning of 22 July 2014 when he was taken into custody, the applicant has not been seen in Russia, Uzbekistan or anywhere else. His location has remained unknown to date. This distinguishes the present case from those cases in which the applicants\u2019 disappearance from Russia was followed by their reported reappearance in the requesting State which led the Court to conclude to the Russian authorities\u2019 apparent involvement into facilitating a cross-border transfer (see, among others, Iskandarov, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0113-115; Adbulkhakov, \u00a7\u00a7 125-127; and Savriddin Dzhurayev, \u00a7 202, all cited above). By contrast, in the recent Mamazhonov case the applicant had never been seen upon his release from detention. In that case the Court found no indication of the Russian authorities\u2019 involvement in the applicant\u2019s disappearance since the Government were able to produce evidence that the applicant had left the detention facility on his own (see Mamazhonov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 205-206).71.\u00a0\u00a0By analogy with the importance of the protection against ill\u2011treatment, the Court considers that it must subject allegations of disappearance to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions of State agents but also all the surrounding circumstances. It reiterates that persons who have been taken into custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Salman v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 99, ECHR 2000\u2011VII). Where an individual disappears from custody, it is incumbent on the State to account for his fate.72.\u00a0\u00a0What little information is available to the Court about the circumstances surrounding the applicant\u2019s disappearance indicates that in the early morning of 22 July 2014 he was detained by officers of the Federal Migration Service, taken away in their car and brought to their official premises (see paragraphs 23 and 27 above). The applicant\u2019s next-of-kin were told later on that day that he had been released and the same was asserted by the supervising prosecutor in his reply to the applicant\u2019s counsel and by the Government in their observations. However, by contrast with the Mamazhonov case, there is no evidence of his release from custody. Even if the premises of the Federal Migration Service were not equipped with CCTV, as the detention facility in the Mamazhonov case was, it must have been possible to identify the persons who were present on the premises at the relevant time and to obtain statements from them. As the Court has found above, it does not appear that any such steps were taken.73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the only genuine way for Russia to honour its Convention obligations in the present case was to ensure that an exhaustive investigation of the incident was carried out and to inform the Court of its results. The Government\u2019s manifest failure to comply with their obligations in that respect (see paragraphs 66-68 above) and to adduce crucial information and evidence compels the Court to draw strong inferences in favour of the applicant\u2019s representative\u2019s position (Rule 44C \u00a7\u00a01 of the Rules of Court). In this connection, the Court attaches great weight to the way in which the official inquiries were conducted, as the authorities did not appear to want to uncover the truth regarding the circumstances of the case (see Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above, \u00a7 200, and El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 191-193, ECHR 2012).74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also considers that the applicant\u2019s disappearance must be seen not as an isolated occurrence but against the background of many similar incidents that have taken place in the recent years in Russia. In the leading Savriddin Dzhurayev case, the Court found that the repeated abductions of individuals and their ensuing transfer to the countries of destination by deliberate circumvention of due process \u2013 notably in breach of the interim measures indicated by the Court \u2013 amounted to a flagrant disregard for the rule of law and suggested that certain State agencies had developed a practice in breach of their obligations under the Russian law and the Convention (see Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above, \u00a7 257). The Court called on the Russian Government to take urgent and robust action to further improve domestic remedies and to prevent their unlawful circumvention in extradition matters (ibid., \u00a7 261).75.\u00a0\u00a0However, since the Savriddin Dzhurayev judgment was adopted on 25 April 2013 and became final on 9 September 2013, further instances of disappearances have been reported to the Court. Thus, on 3\u00a0December 2013 Mr Azimov, in whose case the Court had previously found that a forced return to Tajikistan would give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see Azimov v. Russia, no.\u00a067474\/11, 18 April 2013), was taken away from the migrants accommodation centre by five individuals who introduced themselves as police officers. On 29 April 2014 Mr Yakubov, also a former applicant before the Court whose planned removal to Uzbekistan was found to be in breach of Article 3 (see Yakubov v. Russia, no. 7265\/10, 8\u00a0November 2011), was intercepted by the police on his way to an interview at the Russian office of the UNHCR and loaded onto an unmarked van. Finally, in the night of 22\u00a0July 2014 Mr Isakov disappeared without trace; in his earlier application, the Court also held that his extradition to Uzbekistan would be in breach of Article 3 (see Abdulazhon\u00a0Isakov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 14049\/08, 8 July 2010). In connection with Mr\u00a0Yakubov\u2019s disappearance, the Committee of Ministers noted with concern that the incident cast doubt on the soundness of the protective arrangements set up by the Russian authorities and that there had been no information about any progress in the investigation into similar previous incidents (see paragraph 36 above).76.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the fact that the applicant was last seen in the custody of State authorities and to the established and consistent pattern of disappearances of individuals who were under the State protection, the Court considers that the Russian authorities bear the burden of proof to show that the applicant\u2019s disappearance was not due to the passive or active involvement of the State agents. However, they did not discharge the burden and their assertion of the applicant\u2019s release cannot be verified owing to serious shortcomings of the domestic investigation and to its restricted scope. The Court accordingly finds that the respondent State must therefore be held accountable for the applicant\u2019s disappearance.77.\u00a0\u00a0There has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 378.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended, under Article 13 of the Convention, that no effective remedies were available to him in respect of his allegations that he risked ill-treatment in the event of his return to Uzbekistan. Article\u00a013 reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the gist of the applicant\u2019s claim under Article 13, which it finds admissible, is that the domestic authorities failed to carry out a rigorous scrutiny of the risk of ill-treatment the applicant would face in the event of his extradition to Uzbekistan.\u00a0The Court has already examined that submission in the context of Article 3 of the Convention. Having regard to its findings above, the Court considers that there is no need to examine this complaint separately on its merits (see, for a similar approach, Azimov, cited above, \u00a7 145).III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his detention after 30 December 2013 had been in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention. He further complained under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention that he had been unable to obtain a judicial review of his detention. The relevant parts of Article\u00a05 provide as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition....4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that, after the initial six-month period, the applicant\u2019s detention after 30 December 2013 had been in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. They maintained however that, in so far as the applicant had been able to take part in the detention hearings and to make oral submissions to the court, there had been no violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a04.83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that his stay in custody after 30 December 2013 had been unlawful. He further submitted that the national courts should have effectively examined the substance of his arguments in order to comply with the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4. However, neither the Tyumen Regional Court on 13 February 2014, nor the Kalininskiy District Court on 21 February 2014 examined the gist of his complaints. As a consequence, he was released from unlawful detention only on 11\u00a0March 2014.2.\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s extradition was approved in respect of the offences which were classified as medium-gravity offences under Russian law. In such circumstances, the maximum period of detention was set by law at six months (see paragraph 30 above) and it expired in the applicant\u2019s case on 30 December 2013. His detention after that date ceased to be lawful as a matter of domestic law. The Regional Court, in its decision of 11 March 2014, and the Government in their submissions to the Court, acknowledged its unlawful character.85.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention as regards the applicant\u2019s detention after 30 December 2013.3.\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention entitles detained persons to institute proceedings for a review of compliance with the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the \u201clawfulness\u201d of their deprivation of liberty. While Article 5 \u00a7 4 does not enjoin a court examining a request for release to address every argument contained in detainees\u2019 submissions, its guarantees would be deprived of their substance if that court could treat as irrelevant, or disregard, particular facts invoked by detainees which could cast doubt on the existence of the conditions essential for the \u201clawfulness\u201d, in the sense of the Convention, of their deprivation of liberty (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a03455\/05, \u00a7 202, 19 February 2009, and Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a031195\/96, \u00a7 61, ECHR 1999\u2011II). Furthermore, Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, in guaranteeing to persons detained a right to institute proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, also proclaims their right, following the institution of such proceedings, to a \u201cspeedy\u201d judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of detention. The Court has previously found the delays of 36, 29 and 26 days to be incompatible with Article 5 \u00a7 4 (see Mamedova v. Russia, no. 7064\/05, \u00a7 96, 1 June 2006).87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant repeatedly raised the argument that his detention had ceased to be lawful upon the expiry of an initial six-month period, both in his statement of appeal to the Regional Court and at the new detention hearing before the District Court (see paragraphs 19 and 21 above). This argument was undeniably an essential condition for determining the lawfulness of his deprivation of liberty in the period after 30 December 2013. However, both courts treated the argument as irrelevant and disregarded it in their decisions. The Regional Court first examined the merits of the applicant\u2019s grievance and ordered his release only on 11 March 2014, that is seventy days after his detention had ceased to be lawful. It follows that the scope of the judicial review was manifestly inadequate and that the proceedings were not \u201cspeedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention.88.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL APPLICATION UNDER ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s representatives alleged that his disappearance and possible unlawful removal from Russia, the failure of the Russian authorities to put in place the necessary protective measures, and a lack of an effective investigation into the matter had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule\u00a039. These claims, substantively focusing on a violation of the right to individual application, fall to be examined under Article\u00a034 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d90.\u00a0\u00a0Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.2.\u00a0\u00a0Where it is considered appropriate, immediate notice of the measure adopted in a particular case may be given to the Committee of Ministers.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any interim measure it has indicated.\u201d91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, by virtue of Article 34 of the Convention, Contracting States undertake to refrain from any act or omission that may hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application, which has been consistently reaffirmed as a cornerstone of the Convention system. According to the Court\u2019s established case-law, a respondent State\u2019s failure to comply with an interim measure entails a violation of that right (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0102 and 125, ECHR 2005\u2011I, and Abdulkhakov, cited above, \u00a7 222). The Court does not find it necessary to once again elaborate at length on the importance of interim measures in the Convention system and their exceptional nature calling for maximal cooperation of the State, since these principles are distinctly well-established.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds it alarming that the Russian authorities\u2019 conduct appears to follow the same pattern, namely the failure to comply with an interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in respect of applicants who are prosecuted in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in connection with extremist or terrorist charges (see Kasymakhunov, \u00a7\u00a7 183-189, and Savriddin Dzhurayev, \u00a7\u00a7 216-219, both cited above). In such circumstances, the Court will consider the previous judgments, the position of the Committee of Ministers, and the unprecedented and recurring nature of similar incidents as a decisive contextual factor in the present analysis (see Mamazhonov, cited above, \u00a7 215).93.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, in their opinion, fully complied with their obligations under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 34 of the Convention by informing the relevant law enforcement agencies of the indicated measure and refraining from removing the applicant to Uzbekistan. The Court does not share that view.94.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has established above, the Russian authorities did not put in place the protective measures capable of preventing the applicant\u2019s disappearance and possible transfer to Uzbekistan, nor effectively investigated that possibility (see paragraphs 66-68 above). These findings, seen against the background of irregularities reoccurring in extradition cases against Russia, force the Court to conclude that at the very least the Russian authorities failed to comply with the indicated interim measure by failing to act with the necessary and required diligence (compare Mamazhonov, cited above, \u00a7 217).95.\u00a0\u00a0Evidently, the disappearance of an applicant creates a precarious situation whereby he is deprived of the protection afforded by the Convention mechanism and prevented from participating in the proceedings before the Court, and puts into question the execution of a judgment should it become final.96.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Court concludes that Russia disregarded the interim measure indicated by the Court in the present case under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and therefore failed to comply with its obligation under Article 34 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT97.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s whereabouts are still unknown but he is still liable to be extradited pursuant to the final judgments of the Russian courts in this case. Having regard to the finding that the applicant would face a serious risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in Uzbekistan, in pursuit of the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings, the Court considers it indispensable to maintain the application of the previously indicated measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court until such time as the present judgment becomes final or until further order.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION99.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage100.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that a finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.102.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the nature of the established violations of Article\u00a03 of the Convention and specific facts of the present case, and acting on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses103.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 7,600 for the costs and expenses incurred in the extradition proceedings before the domestic courts and EUR\u00a08,000 for those incurred before the Court.104.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant did not produce a legal-services agreement or any payment receipts.105.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 5,000 covering costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and EUR 5,000 for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be paid into the representatives\u2019 bank accounts.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.VII.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION107.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant part of Article 46 of the Convention reads:Article 46. Binding force and execution of judgments\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.2.\u00a0\u00a0The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution ...\u201d108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the present case disclosed several violations of one of the core rights protected by Article 3 of the Convention, disregard of the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and interference with the right to individual petition under Article 34 of the Convention. Furthermore, the Court reiterates that the applicant\u2019s whereabouts are still unknown and there is no indication of any progress in the investigation into his disappearance.109.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above considerations, bearing in mind a precarious situation whereby the applicant is currently deprived of the protection afforded by the Convention mechanism and being concerned with ensuring binding force and execution of the present judgment, the Court is compelled to examine certain aspects of the present case under Article 46 of the Convention.A.\u00a0\u00a0Payment of just satisfaction110.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the fact that applicant\u2019s whereabouts are still unknown, the Court is concerned with the modalities of payment of just satisfaction. The Court has already been confronted with similar situations involving applicants that happened to be unreachable after their removal from the respondent State. In some of those cases, it indicated that the respondent State must secure payment of just satisfaction by facilitating contact between the applicants, their representatives and the Committee of Ministers (see Muminov v. Russia (just satisfaction), no. 42502\/06, \u00a7 19 and point (c) of the operative part, 4 November 2010, and Kamaliyevy v. Russia (just satisfaction), no. 52812\/07, \u00a7 14 and point 1(c) of the operative part, 28\u00a0June 2011). In other cases, the Court ordered the awards to be held by the applicants\u2019 representatives in trust for the applicants (see Hirsi Jamaa, cited above, \u00a7 215, and point 12 of the operative part, ECHR 2012; Labsi v.\u00a0Slovakia, no. 33809\/08, \u00a7 155 and point 6 of the operative part, 15 May 2012; and Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0251 and point 6 of the operative part).111.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that after the applicant\u2019s disappearance, there has been no contact between him and his representative before the Court or his next-of-kin. In view of this, the Court considers it appropriate that the amount awarded to him by way of just satisfaction be held in trust for him by his representative Ms Yermolayeva until such time as payment to the applicant may be enforced.B.\u00a0\u00a0Individual remedial measures in respect of the applicant112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is of the view, however, that the obligation to comply with the present judgment cannot be limited to payment of the monetary compensation awarded under Article 41, which is only designed to make reparation for such consequences of a violation that cannot otherwise be remedied (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos.\u00a039221\/98 and\u00a041963\/98, \u00a7 250, ECHR 2000\u2011VIII).113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the primary aim of the individual measures to be taken in response to a judgment is to achieve restitutio in integrum, that is, to put an end to the breach of the Convention and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach (see Papamichalopoulos and Others v.\u00a0Greece (Article 50), 31 October 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 330-B).114.\u00a0\u00a0While it must be left to the Committee of Ministers to supervise, on the basis of the information provided by the respondent State, the adoption of such individual measures that are feasible, timely, adequate and sufficient, the Court find it indispensable for the Russian Federation to vigilantly pursue the criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s disappearance and to take all further measures within its competence in order to put an end to the violations found and make reparations for their consequences.C.\u00a0\u00a0General measures to prevent similar violations115.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of general measures, the Court reiterates that in Savriddin\u00a0Dzhurayev (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 256-64) it stated that decisive general measures capable of resolving the recurrent problem with similar cases must be adopted without delay, including \u201cfurther improving domestic remedies in extradition and expulsion cases, ensuring the lawfulness of any State action in this area, effective protection of potential victims in line with the interim measures indicated by the Court and effective investigation into every breach of such measures or similar unlawful acts\u201d (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0258).116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is well aware of the legal, administrative, practical and security complexities entangled in the execution of its judgments, and therefore does not find it reasonable to develop any further the approach, which had been previously adopted in Savriddin Dzhurayev (cited above).117.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, having regard to the present case the Court reiterates that in Savriddin Dzhurayev it approvingly mentioned \u201cthe recent significant development of the domestic jurisprudence undertaken by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in its Ruling no. 11 of 14 June 2012\u201d (cited above, \u00a7\u00a0259). The Ruling was considered as the tool allowing the judiciary to avoid such failings as those criticised in that judgment and further develop emerging domestic case-law that directly applies the Convention requirements through judicial practice. The Court therefore maintains its opinion that a genuine and rigorous application of that Ruling by all Russian courts is capable of improving domestic remedies in extradition and expulsion cases.","27275":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s submissions33.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the judgments in the cases of Calvelli and Ciglio v.\u00a0Italy ([GC], no. 32967\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 48-51, ECHR 2002\u2011I); and Vo v. France ([GC], no.\u00a053924\/00, \u00a7 90, ECHR 2004\u2011VIII) the Government submitted that in cases of this kind in which the death was not caused intentionally, the positive obligation imposed by Article 2 of the Convention to set up an effective judicial system did not necessarily require the provision of a criminal-law remedy in every case. In the sphere of medical negligence the obligation may for instance also be satisfied if the legal system afforded a victim a remedy in civil courts, either alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts, enabling any liability of the doctors concerned to be established and any appropriate civil redress, such as an order for damages and for the publication of the decision to be obtained. Disciplinary measures could also be envisaged.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that, as the applicant had not initiated any action for compensation, the application should be rejected on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also maintained that the applicant\u2019s son had been provided with the necessary treatment. In any event, even if the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s health problems had been diagnosed wrongly or not diagnosed at all, that would have been due to the doctor\u2019s individual fault and would not, therefore, entail the responsibility of the State authorities. In this connection the Government referred to the conclusions reached by the Court in the cases of Powell v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 45305\/99, 4 May 2000); and Sevim G\u00fcng\u00f6r v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 75173\/01, 14 April 2009) and argued that if a State Party to the Convention had legislated for provisions that are sufficient to provide high working standards to the medical personnel and to protect the lives of the patients, the faults of the medical personnel in treating a patient or negligent co-ordination between the medical personnel did not warrant the State being held responsible in respect of its obligation to protect life.36.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Government submitted that an effective investigation had been conducted by their authorities in a timely manner and that all possible steps had been taken in the course of that investigation.2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s submissions37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant rejected the Government\u2019s above-summarised submissions and maintained her complaints. She argued that her son had died as a result of the negligent and irresponsible behaviour of the prison authorities. Had the prison doctor done his job properly and examined her son properly, instead of prescribing him painkillers and sleeping pills, her son would not have died. Furthermore, as there was no doctor or any other medical personnel when her son\u2019s condition deteriorated, her son\u2019s fellow inmates had had to carry out the first aid procedures. The fact that the infirmary had been closed and that the telephones in the infirmary had not been working had delayed the arrival of appropriate medical assistance. As could be seen from the prison\u2019s security camera footage, the ambulance had not been requested promptly despite the fact that in such cases prompt and adequate medical assistance is crucial.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not deem it necessary to decide whether or not the applicant failed to comply with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies by not bringing a compensation claim, as it considers that her complaints are in any event manifestly ill-founded for the reasons set out below.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the first sentence of Article 2 of the Convention, which ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention and also enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe, requires the State not only to refrain from the \u201cintentional\u201d taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. Those principles apply in the public-health sphere too. The positive obligations require States to make regulations compelling hospitals, whether private or public, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of patients\u2019 lives. They also require an effective independent judicial system to be set up so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those responsible made accountable (see Vo, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a088-89 and the cases cited therein).40.\u00a0\u00a0As pointed out by the Government, where a Contracting State has made adequate provision for securing high professional standards among health professionals and the protection of the lives of patients, the Court cannot accept that matters such as error of judgment on the part of a health professional or negligent co-ordination among health professionals in the treatment of a particular patient are sufficient by themselves to call a Contracting State to account from the standpoint of its positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention to protect life (see Byrzykowski v. Poland, no.\u00a011562\/05, \u00a7 104, 27 June 2006 and the cases cited therein).41.\u00a0\u00a0In cases concerning the health and well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, however, a heightened diligence will be expected from the national authorities and the applicable principles will be those regulating the obligation to protect the right to life by taking preemptive steps. This follows from the Court\u2019s well-established case-law in which it was recognised that such persons are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7\u00a099, ECHR 2000\u2011VII). Thus, the national authorities have an obligation to protect the health and well-being of persons who have been deprived of their liberty by providing them with the medical care necessary to safeguard their lives (see Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, no.\u00a035254\/07, \u00a7\u00a071, 22 November 2011). In cases where a detainee dies as a result of a health problem, in addition to satisfying their above-mentioned obligation to show that they had provided the inmate with the medical care necessary prior to his or her death in order to safeguard his or her life, the State must also offer a reasonable explanation as to the cause of death (Kats and Others v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 29971\/04, \u00a7 104, 18 December 2008).42.\u00a0The Court will therefore examine whether the Government have satisfied these obligations. In doing so and in examining whether the Government have satisfactorily discharged their burden of providing a plausible explanation for the death of the applicant\u2019s son, the Court will have particular regard to the investigation carried out at the domestic level in order to establish whether that investigation was effective, in the sense that it was capable of establishing the true facts surrounding the death (see Beker v. Turkey, no. 27866\/03, \u00a7 44, 24 March 2009; and G\u00fclbahar \u00d6zer and Others v. Turkey, no. 44125\/06, \u00a7 59, 2 July 2013).43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that, according to the submissions made by the applicant and her other son Orhan Olsoy (see paragraphs\u00a018 and 15 above), F\u0131rat Olsoy had no known health problems prior to his death. This is further corroborated by the medical report of 13 March 2013 according to which the applicant\u2019s son F\u0131rat Olsoy had no medical problems at the time of his entry into the prison (see paragraph 28 above).44.\u00a0\u00a0According to the information in the Court\u2019s possession, during his detention in the prison F\u0131rat Olsoy visited the prison doctor on two occasions. The first visit was on 24 January 2009 during which he was diagnosed with myalgia (muscle pain) and anxiety and was prescribed medication for those problems (see paragraph 5 above). The second and last time F\u0131rat Olsoy saw the prison doctor was on 23 March 2009, a few hours before his death. According to the information provided by the doctor to the prosecutor, during that visit F\u0131rat Olsoy complained of pain in his chest and shoulder and of sleeping difficulties. The doctor told the prosecutor that he had prescribed the applicant\u2019s son with four different medicines to relax his muscles, relieve his pain and calm him down (see paragraph 10 above).45.\u00a0\u00a0A full autopsy was carried out on the body of F\u0131rat Olsoy immediately after his death and blood and tissue samples taken from his body during that autopsy were subjected to further forensic examination. When the forensic pathologist who conducted the initial autopsy and subsequently the forensic pathologists at the Forensic Medicine Institute\u2019s Istanbul branch were unable to establish the cause of death, the Expert Board of the Forensic Medicine Institute was called upon to scrutinise the initial autopsy report as well as the results of the toxicological and histopathological examinations (see paragraphs 8 and 22-23 above). At the end of all these forensic examinations the forensic authorities were still unable to establish the cause of death or determine any underlying health problems.46.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law on the obligation to carry out effective investigations within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention, any deficiency in an investigation into a death which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person responsible will risk falling foul of that obligation (see Akta\u015f v. Turkey, no. 24351\/94, \u00a7 300, ECHR 2003\u2011V (extracts) and the cases cited therein). However, a failure to establish the cause of death, as in the circumstances of the present case, cannot automatically amount to such a deficiency. Having regard to the documents in its possession, and having further regard to the lack of any challenge by the applicant to the conclusions reached at the end of the forensic examinations, the Court considers that no reproach can be made of the forensic authorities in failing to establish the cause of death.47.\u00a0\u00a0It is also important to stress at this juncture that the obligation to investigate \u201cis not an obligation of result, but of means\u201d; as such, not every investigation should necessarily be successful or come to a conclusion which coincides with the claimant\u2019s account of events. However, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and, if appropriate, punishment of those responsible (see Mikheyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a077617\/01, \u00a7\u00a0107, 26 January 2006 and the cases cited therein; see also Calvelli and Ciglio, cited above, \u00a7 51). The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony (Akta\u015f, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0300 and the cases cited therein).48.\u00a0\u00a0As it will be set out below, the prosecutor in the present case did not only rely on forensic examinations to establish the cause of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death, but has taken all reasonable steps available to him to clarify the circumstances surrounding the death. By way of analogy, the present case can be contrasted with the case of Durmaz v. Turkey (no. 3621\/07, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a064 and\u00a067, 13 November 2014) in which the Court observed that the forensic authorities\u2019 failure to establish the cause of death of the applicant\u2019s daughter had been exacerbated by the prosecutor\u2019s serious failures and found a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect.49.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court is not able to agree with the applicant that the prosecutor did not investigate whether anyone\u2019s negligence had contributed to her son\u2019s death (see paragraph 29 above). Having regard to the steps taken by the prosecutor in the investigation and to their nature, the Court finds that the prosecutor took all reasonable steps in a timely, independent and impartial manner to establish the cause of death and to establish whether anyone had acted negligently in the sequence of events leading up to the death of the applicant\u2019s son. Indeed, beyond arguing that the prosecutor had not taken any steps to examine whether her son had died due to someone\u2019s negligence, the applicant has not sought to refer to any specific aspects of the investigation which she considered flawed and which would have led to a different outcome.50.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the examination of the steps taken by the prosecutor, the Court notes that the above-mentioned forensic examinations were ordered during the course of the investigation started by the prosecutor of his own volition the day after the death of the applicant\u2019s son. In the course of that investigation the prosecutor also obtained the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s medical file from the prison, summoned and questioned a large number of inmates who had witnessed the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s condition and assisted him, the prison authorities \u2013\u00a0including the prison doctor\u00a0\u2013 who had come into contact with the applicant\u2019s son in one way or other during his detention, and the ambulance and hospital personnel who had tried to save his life (see paragraphs 9-14, 16 and 20-21 above).51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant and her family members were also given the opportunity to participate in the investigation during which they were able to give the prosecutor their own accounts of the events and voice their complaints (see paragraphs 15 and 18 above).52.\u00a0\u00a0When, on one of those occasions, the applicant\u2019s other son urged the prosecutor to investigate whether there had been any delays in calling the ambulance and to secure in evidence the footage recorded by the prison\u2019s security cameras (see paragraph 15 above), the prosecutor instructed crime scene investigators to examine the footage. That examination revealed that two persons could be seen carrying the applicant\u2019s son in their arms between 5.19 and 5.38 p.m. The applicant\u2019s son was put on a stretcher at 5.45\u00a0p.m. and put in the ambulance at 5.46 p.m. (see paragraph 17 above).53.\u00a0\u00a0It appears from this information, which is in turn corroborated by the statements made by the inmates, the prison guards and subsequently by the ambulance personnel, that F\u0131rat Olsoy was carried out of his wing by his fellow inmates at 5.19 p.m. The ambulance personnel told the prosecutor that they had been called at 5.31 p.m. and that they had arrived at the prison at 5.39 p.m. (see paragraph 21 above).54.\u00a0\u00a0It is thus clear that the ambulance was called within twelve minutes after F\u0131rat Olsoy was taken out of his ward. Noting that during that time a prison warden had been found and that that warden tried to administer first aid (see paragraphs 7 and 14 above), the Court cannot agree with the applicant that the ambulance had not been called in a timely fashion (see paragraph\u00a037 above).55.\u00a0\u00a0As to whether the prison doctor\u2019s alleged negligence in examining the applicant\u2019s son \u201chastily\u201d and not referring him to a hospital immediately contributed to his death, the Court considers it important to emphasise that the cause of death could not be established despite detailed forensic examinations. Having regard to that inability to establish the cause of death, and having further regard to the fact that the applicant\u2019s son had no known previous medical problems, the Court does not find a causal link between the death and the alleged cursory nature of the examination carried out by the doctor. This lack of a causal link also prevents the Court from speculating whether the applicant\u2019s son would have survived if the doctor had transferred him to the hospital immediately after he examined him. Thus, the present application can be contrasted with the comparable cases in which the Court examined whether the prison authorities had provided inmates with the necessary medical care for their existing and known problems (see, inter alia, Makharadze and Sikharulidze, cited above, \u00a7\u00a090; Kats and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 101 and 111; and Huylu v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a052955\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 57-69, 16 November 2006).56.\u00a0\u00a0As for the applicant\u2019s submissions that the doctor prescribed her son with \u201conly painkillers and sleeping medicines\u201d and sent him back to his cell (see paragraphs 6, 26 and 37 above), the Court observes that the medicines prescribed to the applicant\u2019s son are named in the prison doctor\u2019s statement made before the prosecutor (see paragraph 10 above). The Court notes that those medicines, namely \u201cZedprex, Cdoral, Voltaren and Duzyl\u201d, are used in the treatment of depression, anxiety, chest pain and inflammation which, it is to be observed, are compatible with the complaints the applicant\u2019s son brought to the doctor (see paragraphs 6 and 10 above). The Court cannot accept, therefore, that the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s condition worsened after having taken the painkillers and that this showed that the doctor had acted negligently (see paragraph 26 above).57.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances in which neither the authorities nor the applicant\u2019s son were aware of any existing health problems, the respondent State cannot be said to have failed to provide any particular measures in order to prevent the fatal outcome. The Court also finds that, once the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s health problems manifested themselves, the reaction of the authorities was adequate and those authorities could not, therefore, be said to have failed to act appropriately.58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes, therefore, that the national authorities conducted an effective investigation into the allegations and that the fact that the investigation did not yield any results does not mean that the authorities can be reproached (see \u0130lhan and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no.\u00a023856\/07, \u00a7 53, 27 August 2013). The Court finds that the investigation was effective, in the sense that it was capable of establishing the true facts surrounding the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death and it thus enabled the Government to discharge their obligation to account for the death of the applicant\u2019s son by showing that he had not died in circumstances in breach of Article 2 of the Convention. It also finds that the authorities of the respondent State did not fail to provide the requisite medical or other assistance to protect the right to life of the applicant\u2019s son.59.\u00a0\u00a0In light of the foregoing the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention are manifestly ill\u2011founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Articles 3, 14 and 17 of the Convention60.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained that her suffering stemming from the death of her son had been so severe as to be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Referring to Articles 14 and 17 of the Convention she added that she had been discriminated against on account of her Kurdish origin and that the domestic authorities had abused her rights set forth in the Convention.61.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of any of the above Articles of the Convention. It follows that these complaints are also inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court unanimouslyDeclares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 18 June 2015.Stanley NaismithAndr\u00e1s Saj\u00f3RegistrarPresident","27277":"\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings concerning the sexual assaults against her had been at variance with the respondent State\u2019s positive obligation to provide effective legal protection against sexual abuse, as they had been unreasonably delayed, lacked impartiality, and had exposed her to several traumatic experiences by violating her personal integrity. Moreover, the applicant claimed not to have had an effective remedy in respect of her complaints, as required by Article 13 of the Convention.74.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the nature and the substance of the above complaints, the Court considers that the alleged delays and bias of the domestic courts fall to be examined solely under Article 3 of the Convention (see P.M. v. Bulgaria, no. 49669\/07, \u00a7 58, 24 January 2012), which reads as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s remaining complaints regarding the lack of protective measures afforded to her in the criminal proceedings raise certain questions about the scope of the State\u2019s obligation to protect victims of crime appearing as witnesses in criminal proceedings. In the specific circumstances of the present case, the Court takes the view that these issues should be considered under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:Article 8\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies because she had not brought an action against the State for compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the State authorities based on Articles 148 and 179 of the Code of Obligations. According to the Government, any unlawful conduct on the part of the authorities could potentially constitute a violation of an individual\u2019s personality rights. In support of their submissions, they cited eight decisions of the Supreme Court adopted between 1999 and 2009, and three decisions of the Ljubljana Higher Court of 2010 and 2011, showing that the State had in some cases been found by the domestic courts to be liable for damages related to the work of its employees and the exercise of their powers. Moreover, the Government submitted several decisions of the Supreme Court, the Ljubljana Higher Court, and the Maribor Higher Court, adopted between 1992 and 2011, in which a wide range of rights, such as the rights to personal dignity, to physical and mental integrity, to family life, to a healthy living environment, to personal liberty, to respect for the deceased and to the inviolability of the home, had been considered personality rights by the courts, and their unlawful infringement had been found to cause mental distress warranting compensation.77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant challenged the Government\u2019s arguments, observing that non-pecuniary damages could only be claimed under Article 179 of the Code of Obligations in cases falling under one of the categories listed therein, and that there was no indication that the domestic courts considered the positive obligations of the State as belonging to one of these categories or, specifically, as personality rights. The applicant pointed out that the case-law submitted by the Government was not relevant to her case, and concluded that the remedy proposed by the Government was not established in practice. Moreover, the applicant took the view that in cases such as hers the protection afforded by civil law was insufficient, since an award of compensation could not satisfy the procedural requirements of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government raised a similar objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies based on the alleged availability of a civil action for compensation already in W. v. Slovenia (no. 24125\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a075-77, 23 January 2014). In that case, the Court found that all of the domestic decisions advanced by the Government related to substantive rights and not to rights arising from the State\u2019s positive obligation to conduct an effective investigation and criminal trial. Thus, it held that the action for compensation had not offered the applicant reasonable prospects of success, and rejected the Government\u2019s objection. Having regard also to the strict interpretation of categories of legally recognised non-pecuniary damage in the jurisprudence of the domestic courts (see paragraph 67 above), the Court sees no reason to depart from the conclusion reached in W.\u00a0v. Slovenia.79.\u00a0\u00a0Neither is the Court convinced that an action for compensation against the State offered the applicant effective relief in respect of the full range of her complaints of psychological trauma incurred as a result of her personal cross-examination by the defendant, the participation in the proceedings of the defendant\u2019s counsel who had allegedly previously been consulted by her on the same matter, and the allegedly inappropriate questioning by the expert in gynaecology. In this connection, the Court notes that in domestic compensation proceedings the applicant would have been required to prove, among other things, that the alleged deficiencies were unlawful in terms of domestic law in order to be entitled to compensation (see paragraph 66 above, and L.M. v. Slovenia, no.\u00a032863\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 168-69, 12 June 2014). However, it appears that the involvement of the defendant\u2019s counsel in the proceedings was not contrary to domestic law (see paragraphs 29 above and 91 below). Moreover, the case-law submitted by the Government does not indicate whether the scope of the State\u2019s liability extends to the conduct of court-appointed expert witnesses.80.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.2.\u00a0\u00a0Lack of victim status81.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant was precluded from raising the issue of promptness of the investigation and the ensuing trial, as an out-of-court settlement had been reached awarding her compensation under the 2006 Act (see paragraph 57 above).82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant pointed out that the settlement concerned only a violation of her rights under Article 6 of the Convention, and that the 2006 Act did not apply to complaints of violations of the rights protected under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.83.\u00a0\u00a0Although the Court does not exclude the possibility that the compensation awarded pursuant to this Act \u2013 which is in principle aimed at remedying violations of the right to trial within a reasonable time \u2013 may provide effective redress for the breach of the State\u2019s procedural requirements under other Convention provisions (see W. v. Slovenia, cited above, \u00a7 76), it does not appear that in the present case the breach of Article\u00a03 was acknowledged at the domestic level (see, conversely, ibid., \u00a7\u00a078). Moreover, it is not clear whether the compensation only applied to the trial stage of the proceedings or also covered the investigation stage. In this light, the Court considers that the award of compensation did not deprive the applicant of her victim status with regard to the delays in the criminal proceedings.3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 (a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that the investigation of the sexual assaults on her and the ensuing judicial proceedings had been unreasonably delayed and ineffective, the authorities having been biased against her due to her Ukrainian origin. Firstly, she contended that the Maribor Police had left the investigation of her complaints dormant for a year, and had only sent a report to the Maribor District State Prosecutor\u2019s Office when urged to do so by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office. Moreover, the Maribor District Court had not conducted the trial in compliance with the time-limits set out in the domestic legislation. In this connection, the applicant also maintained that it had not been her responsibility to attempt to accelerate the course of judicial proceedings.86.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Maribor District Court had refused to call important witnesses or to appoint a new expert in orthopaedics in order to clarify whether X\u2019s disability had in fact prevented him from performing the acts of force alleged by the applicant. Also, the court had lacked impartiality, relying predominantly on the orthopaedics report, which was based on the assumption that the applicant had been capable of actively defending herself. Moreover, that report was at variance with certain other evidence showing that X may not have been completely without the use of his left arm.87.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the applicant complained that the State had failed to protect her personal integrity during the proceedings. In this connection, she asserted that the expert in gynaecology B. had exceeded the scope of his duty and, instead of answering the investigating judge\u2019s question regarding the probability of sexual intercourse, had set out to discover whether a criminal offence had been committed, asking the applicant a number of questions which had put her in the position of having to defend herself against him (see paragraph 22 above).88.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, although the applicant had been questioned during the investigation, she had subsequently had to testify at four hearings before the Maribor District Court at which the defendant had been allowed personally to torment her with numerous provocative and repetitive questions, despite the fact that he was legally represented and those questions could have been asked by his counsel. This questioning had caused her intense psychological suffering; she had felt frustrated, humiliated and helpless. Moreover, the defendant had been represented by a lawyer to whom she had previously spoken about the events in issue and was therefore in a position to misuse or even abuse the information received. In this connection, the applicant, relying on the Court\u2019s case-law, and in particular the judgments in the cases of Doorson v. the Netherlands (26 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011II); Van Mechelen and Others v.\u00a0the Netherlands (23\u00a0April 1997, Reports 1997\u2011III); and S.N. v.\u00a0Sweden (no. 34209\/96, ECHR 2002\u2011V), maintained that the domestic legislation did not provide for the accused\u2019s rights of defence under Article 6 of the Convention to be weighed against the personal integrity and privacy of the victims protected by Articles 3 and 8. According to the applicant, her trauma had caused her severe and permanent psychological difficulties which had also led to her immune system being compromised. Lastly, the applicant complained that the domestic legislation had not afforded her an effective remedy in respect of her complaints.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 (b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the investigation of the alleged sexual assaults on the applicant and the ensuing trial had been effective. The police had questioned the applicant and X, as well as all the relevant witnesses, and, according to the Government, there was no proof that the criminal complaint would not have been forwarded to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office had it not been for the latter\u2019s intervention. The judicial investigation had been duly conducted and followed by an indictment against X.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also maintained that the trial had been conducted without bias. With regard to the orthopaedics report allegedly contradicted by other evidence, they pointed out that the report had been based on medical documentation and a clinical examination of X, and had contained no contradictions or deficiencies capable of raising doubts as to its accuracy. Since the alleged acts of sexual abuse had not been seen by any witnesses, nor had they been supported by the results of gynaecological examinations, the Maribor District Court had acquitted X. While it was true that the applicant had shown symptoms of sexual abuse, the court could not disregard the fact that another set of criminal proceedings had been pending at the time against another person suspected of having sexually abused the applicant, which had not been taken into account in the preparation of the opinion by the expert in psychology. Secondly, the Government argued that the expert in gynaecology had not \u201cquestioned\u201d the applicant, but had had a conversation with her outside the court hearing. In the Government\u2019s opinion, the applicant could have asked for the expert to be sanctioned if she had believed that he was not performing his work in an appropriate manner.91.\u00a0\u00a0Further, as regards X\u2019s court-appointed counsel M., the Government argued that, X having been entitled to mandatory representation, the Maribor District Court had followed the statutory provisions regulating court-ordered appointments. Moreover, in her application to have M. disqualified from representing X the applicant had failed to adduce any grounds which, under the domestic law, would justify a decision in her favour; thus, the court had had no duty to hear the parties on the matter. The Government added that the fact that M. had once worked for a law firm representing the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s husband in divorce proceedings did not give rise to the conclusion that M. should not have defended X.92.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Government asserted that a number of measures had been adopted, both during the investigation and at the trial, in order to prevent aggravation of the applicant\u2019s trauma. During the investigation, the applicant had been questioned in the absence of X and his counsel. Thus, the trial hearing had been the first opportunity for the defendant to put questions to the applicant, and consideration had to be given to the fact that she had been the only witness to X\u2019s alleged criminal acts. In this connection, the Government were of the view that the applicant\u2019s case had not warranted a limitation of the defendant\u2019s rights of defence to the extent that would prevent him from cross-examining her. They pointed out that the present case differed from Doorson, Van Mechelen and Others and S.N. v. Sweden, as the applicant\u2019s safety had not been at stake, nor had she been a minor. However, the Government emphasised that the Maribor District Court had excluded the public from the hearing and removed X from the courtroom during the applicant\u2019s testimony. After the applicant had given her testimony, the court had granted her request for the defendant to cross-examine her at the next hearing.93.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Government pointed out that X had not been allowed to ask the applicant certain questions that were not related to the case or were otherwise prohibited. Moreover, the court had on several occasions ordered breaks to be taken during the applicant\u2019s cross-examination; the Government asserted that the applicant could have requested further breaks if she had considered that necessary. Also, the applicant had been represented by a lawyer throughout the proceedings.94.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, as regards the delays in the proceedings the Government pointed out that during the investigation stage of the proceedings the applicant could have complained about the delays to the president of the competent court (see paragraph 61 above), but had not done so. The Government did, however, acknowledge that the applicant had lodged two supervisory appeals under the 2006 Act (see paragraphs 33 and 52 above). The Maribor District Court had responded appropriately on both occasions: the first time a hearing had been scheduled within a month, while the second time the reasoning of the judgment had been prepared and sent to the applicant within a few days of the appeal. It was true that the trial hearing had been adjourned nine times for various reasons; however, only the first time had the hearing been adjourned for a longer period, and this had been on account of X\u2019s illness. The Government further maintained that the large quantity of evidence that needed to be taken had also contributed to the overall duration of the trial.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 (a)\u00a0\u00a0The State\u2019s positive obligation to investigate and prosecute cases of sexual abuse95.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant principles concerning the State\u2019s obligation inherent in Article 3 of the Convention to investigate cases of ill-treatment, and in particular sexual abuse, committed by private individuals, are set out in M.C.\u00a0v. Bulgaria (no. 39272\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 149, 151 and 153, ECHR 2003\u2011XII).96.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the Convention requirements relating to the effectiveness of an investigation, the Court has held that it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, such as witness testimony and forensic evidence, and a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context (see Denis\u00a0Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704\/04, \u00a7 100, 17 December 2009, with further references). The promptness of the authorities\u2019 reaction to the complaints is an important factor (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0133 et seq., ECHR 2000-IV). Consideration has been given in the Court\u2019s judgments to matters such as the opening of investigations, delays in identifying witnesses or taking statements (see M\u0103t\u0103saru and Savi\u0163chi v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a038281\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 88 and 93, 2 November 2010), the length of time taken for the initial investigation (see Indelicato v. Italy, no. 31143\/96, \u00a7\u00a037, 18 October 2001), and unjustified protraction of the criminal proceedings resulting in the expiry of the statute of limitations (see Angelova and Iliev v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 55523\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 101-103, 26 July 2007). Moreover, notwithstanding its subsidiary role in assessing evidence, the Court reiterates that where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny, even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place (see Cobzaru v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a048254\/99, \u00a7 65, 26 July 2007).97.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that X\u2019s acquittal was the result of the domestic courts\u2019 bias against her, claiming that their findings were based on inaccurate assumptions and that they had neglected to call important witnesses. In this connection, the Court observes that the domestic courts were faced with the difficult task of having to decide on a sensitive issue of sexual abuse on the basis of irreconcilable statements and without any physical evidence supporting either the applicant\u2019s or X\u2019s version of the events. In the course of the investigation and the ensuing trial, the domestic authorities examined a number of witnesses and received three expert reports in attempts to elucidate the situation. While the two gynaecological reports neither confirmed nor disproved the applicant\u2019s allegations (see paragraphs 22, 42 and 44 above), the other two expert reports resulted in contradictory conclusions. The expert in clinical psychology established that the applicant clearly showed symptoms of sexual abuse (see paragraphs 23 and 43 above). On the other hand, the expert in orthopaedics was of the view that, owing to his disability, X lacked sufficient strength to overpower the applicant. After weighing up that contradictory evidence, and having regard to the possibility that the applicant\u2019s symptoms were caused by inappropriate conduct on the part of her mother\u2019s former husband, the domestic courts were convinced by the opinion of the orthopaedics expert.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, contrary to the applicant\u2019s argument, it does not appear that the expert\u2019s conclusions relied on an assumption as to whether or not the applicant was able to resist actively (see paragraph 49 above), but rather on the limits of X\u2019s physical abilities, the expert stating that X could not have used his left arm in some of the ways described by the applicant. Indeed, it appears that this opinion was decisive for the outcome of the trial; however, having regard to the considerable body of evidence considered by the first-instance court in addition to the statements made by the applicant and X (see paragraphs 39 and 43-49 above), and to the fact that it was essentially the latter\u2019s word against the applicant\u2019s, the Court does not consider it unreasonable that the Maribor District Court refused to admit additional evidence or that it considered objective medical evidence of X\u2019s disability as a crucial factor in its assessment.99.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court notes with concern that the proceedings were marked by a number of longer periods of complete inactivity. Firstly, the police did not submit an incident report of the applicant\u2019s complaint to the competent state prosecutor\u2019s office until a full year after their investigation had been concluded, and only on being urged by the prosecutor to do so (see paragraphs 12-14 above). The State prosecutor then promptly requested that a judicial investigation be initiated against X (see paragraph 15 above); however, the investigating judge took twenty-one months to decide on the request (see paragraphs 16-17 above). Once the investigation was concluded, the trial hearing was scheduled eight months after the indictment against X had been confirmed (see paragraph 25 above), in contravention of the domestic procedural rules (see paragraph 62 above). However, owing to several adjournments the first hearing was actually held almost a year and a half after X had been indicted. In sum, more than seven years elapsed from the time the applicant lodged her complaint until the first-instance judgment was rendered. While it is not possible to speculate whether these delays, for which no justification has been put forward by the Government, prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings in any way, in the Court\u2019s opinion they cannot be reconciled with the procedural requirement of promptness.100.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of the respondent State\u2019s procedural obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 (b)\u00a0\u00a0The protection of the applicant\u2019s personal integrity in the criminal proceedings concerning sexual abuse against her101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is called upon to examine whether in the criminal proceedings concerning alleged sexual assaults against the applicant the State afforded sufficient protection to her right to respect for private life, and especially for her personal integrity. Thus, what is in issue is not an act by the State, but the alleged lack or inadequacy of measures aimed at protecting the victim\u2019s rights in the criminal proceedings. In this connection the Court reiterates that while the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this negative undertaking there may be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private or family life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see X and Y v.\u00a0the\u00a0Netherlands, 26 March 1985, \u00a7 23, Series A no. 91).102.\u00a0\u00a0The boundary between the State\u2019s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 does not lend itself to precise definition; the applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the relevant competing interests (see White v. Sweden, no. 42435\/02, \u00a7 20, 19 September 2006).103.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the conflicts between the interests of the defence and those of witnesses in criminal proceedings, the Court has already held on several occasions that criminal proceedings should be organised in such a way as not to unjustifiably imperil the life, liberty or security of witnesses, and in particular those of victims called upon to testify, or their interests coming generally within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. Thus, the interests of the defence are to be balanced against those of witnesses or victims called upon to testify (see Doorson, cited above \u00a7 70). Notably, criminal proceedings concerning sexual offences are often conceived of as an ordeal by the victim, in particular when the latter is unwillingly confronted with the defendant. These features are even more prominent in a case involving a minor. Therefore, in such proceedings certain measures may be taken for the purpose of protecting the victim, provided that they can be reconciled with an adequate and effective exercise of the rights of the defence (see S.N. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 47, and Aigner v. Austria, no.\u00a028328\/03, \u00a7 35, 10 May 2012).104.\u00a0\u00a0In the cases hitherto before the Court, the question of whether the domestic authorities succeeded in striking a fair balance between the competing interests of the defence, especially the right of the accused set out in Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(d) to call and cross-examine witnesses, and the rights of the victims under Article 8 was raised by the accused. Conversely, in the present case the Court is called upon to examine this issue from the perspective of the alleged victim. In addressing the question, the Court will take into account the criteria laid down in the relevant international instruments (see paragraphs 69-72 above). In this connection, the Court notes that the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence requires the Contracting Parties to take the necessary legislative and other measures to protect the rights and interests of victims. Such measures involve, inter alia, protection from intimidation and repeat victimisation, enabling victims to be heard and to have their views, needs and concerns presented and duly considered, and enabling them, if permitted by applicable domestic law, to testify in the absence of the alleged perpetrator. In addition, the EU Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime provides, inter alia, that interviews with victims are to be conducted without unjustified delay and that medical examinations are to be kept to a minimum.105.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the manner in which the applicant\u2019s rights were protected in the criminal proceedings in issue, the Court observes, firstly, that her testimony at the trial provided the only direct evidence in the case. In addition, other evidence presented was conflicting, the psychologist\u2019s report confirming sexual abuse being countervailed by the orthopaedics report. In this light, it must be reiterated that the interests of a fair trial required the defence to be given the opportunity to cross-examine the applicant, who by that time was no longer a minor. Nevertheless, it needs to be determined whether the manner in which the applicant was questioned struck a fair balance between her personal integrity and X\u2019s defence rights.106.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court reiterates that, as a rule, the defendant\u2019s rights under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) require that he be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him either when he makes his statements or at a later stage of the proceedings (see Sa\u00efdi v. France, 20 September 1993, \u00a7\u00a043, Series A no.\u00a0261\u2011C, and A.M. v. Italy, no. 37019\/97, \u00a7 25, ECHR 1999-IX). Furthermore, the Court must be cautious in making its own assessment of a specific line of questioning, considering that it is primarily the role of the competent national authorities to decide upon the admissibility and relevance of evidence (see Schenk v. Switzerland, 12 July 1988, \u00a7 46, Series\u00a0A no. 140, and Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, \u00a7\u00a091, Series A no. 22). This being said, the Court has also already held that a person\u2019s right to defend himself does not provide for an unlimited right to use any defence arguments (see, mutatis mutandis, Brandstetter v. Austria, 28 August 1991, \u00a7 52, Series A no. 211). Thus, since a direct confrontation between the defendants charged with criminal offences of sexual violence and their alleged victims involves a risk of further traumatisation on the latter\u2019s part, in the Court\u2019s opinion personal cross-examination by defendants should be subject to most careful assessment by the national courts, the more so the more intimate the questions are.107.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s questioning stretched over four hearings (see paragraphs 31, 32, 34-38 and 40 above) held over seven months, a lengthy period, which, in the Court\u2019s opinion, in itself raises concerns, especially given the absence of any apparent reason for the long intervals between the hearings. Moreover, at two of those hearings X, the defendant, who was otherwise represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, personally cross-examined the applicant. In addition to claiming that he was physically incapable of assaulting her, X based his cross-examination on the premise that the applicant had considered him a person of trust and had sought his company, rather than the other way round, and that her accusations against him were prompted by her mother\u2019s wish to extort money from him. Accordingly, most of X\u2019s questions were of a distinctly personal nature.108.\u00a0The Court notes that some of the questions asked by X were phrased in such a manner as to suggest the answers, and a number of others were asked more than once (see paragraphs 34 and 36 above). X also continually contested the veracity of the applicant\u2019s answers, advancing his own version of events. Of course, the defence had to be allowed a certain leeway to challenge the reliability and credibility of the applicant and to reveal possible inconsistencies in her statement. However, the Court considers that cross-examination should not be used as a means of intimidating or humiliating witnesses. In this connection, the Court is of the view that some of X\u2019s questions and remarks suggesting, without any evidentiary basis, that the applicant could cry on cue in order to manipulate people, that her distress might be eased by having dinner with him, or that she had confided in him her desire to dominate men, were not aimed only at attacking the applicant\u2019s credibility, but were also meant to denigrate her character.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that it was first and foremost the responsibility of the presiding judge to ensure that respect for the applicant\u2019s personal integrity was adequately protected at the trial. In its opinion, the sensitivity of the situation in which the applicant was questioned directly, in detail and at length by the man she accused of sexually assaulting her, required the presiding judge to oversee the form and content of X\u2019s questions and comments and, if necessary, to intervene. Indeed, the record of the hearing indicates that the presiding judge prohibited X from asking certain questions which were of no relevance to the case. However, the Court takes the view that X\u2019s offensive insinuations about the applicant also exceeded the limits of what could be tolerated for the purpose of enabling him to mount an effective defence, and called for a similar reaction. Considering the otherwise wide scope of cross-examination afforded to X, in the Court\u2019s opinion curtailing his personal remarks would not have unduly restricted his defence rights. Yet such an intervention would have mitigated what was clearly a distressing experience for the applicant (see paragraphs 37 and 38 above).110.\u00a0\u00a0Further, as regards the applicant\u2019s assertion that X\u2019s counsel M. should have been disqualified from representing X in the proceedings, having been consulted by her regarding the sexual assaults even before the police were informed about the matter, it is not the Court\u2019s task to speculate on whether, and if so in what capacity, the applicant and M. might have known each other prior to the trial, that being the task of the domestic authorities. However, it appears that under domestic law the possibility of prior informal consultation between the applicant and M. did not raise an issue of conflict of interests which could lead to the latter\u2019s disqualification (see paragraphs 29, 31 and 40-42 above). Hence, finding that no statutory ground had been adduced by the applicant in support of her application to have M. disqualified, the Maribor District Court dismissed it.111.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, assuming that the applicant\u2019s allegation was true, the Court cannot but consider that the negative psychological effect of being cross-examined by M. considerably exceeded the apprehension that the applicant would have experienced if she had been questioned by another lawyer. Accordingly, this was a consideration which should not have been entirely disregarded in deciding whether M. should be disqualified as X\u2019s counsel. Moreover, on a more general note, the Court would add that any information that M. might have received from the applicant in his capacity as a lawyer, even without a retainer agreement, should have been treated as confidential and should not have been used to benefit a person with adverse interests in the same matter. Thus, the Court finds that the domestic law on disqualification of counsel, or the manner in which it was applied in the present case, did not take sufficient account of the applicant\u2019s interests.112.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained that B., the expert in gynaecology who was called upon to establish whether she had engaged in sexual intercourse at the material time, had made her answer a number of accusatory questions unrelated to his task. In this connection, the Court considers firstly that the personal integrity of the victims of crime in criminal proceedings must, by the very nature of the situation, be primarily protected by the public authorities conducting the proceedings. In this regard, the Court is of the view that the authorities are also required to ensure that other participants in the proceedings called upon to assist them in the investigation or the decision-making process treat victims and other witnesses with dignity, and do not cause them unnecessary inconvenience. As regards the present case, it is noted that, irrespective of B.\u2019s status in the proceedings, the Government did not dispute that the State could be held responsible for his conduct. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise, observing that the expert was appointed by, and the disputed examination ordered by, the investigating judge in the exercise of his judicial powers.113.\u00a0\u00a0Further, regarding B.\u2019s examination of the applicant, the Court notes that he confronted the applicant with the findings of the police and orthopaedics reports, and questioned her on why she had not defended herself more vigorously (see paragraph 22 above), thus addressing issues that were indeed not related to the question he was requested to examine. In the Court\u2019s opinion, B.\u2019s questions and remarks, as well as the legal findings he made in his expert opinion, exceeded the scope of his task, as well as of his medical expertise. Moreover, it does not appear that B. was trained in conducting interviews with victims of sexual abuse; hence, it is difficult to see what purpose was to be served by his intervention in matters within the jurisdiction of the prosecuting and judicial authorities. More importantly, as argued by the applicant, she was put in a defensive position which, in the Court\u2019s opinion, unnecessarily added to the stress of the criminal proceedings.114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is mindful of the fact that the domestic authorities, and in particular the judge presiding over the trial in issue, had the delicate task of balancing the competing interests and of ensuring effective exercise of the defendant\u2019s rights to legal assistance and to examine witnesses against him. It is also true that a number of measures were taken to prevent further traumatisation of the applicant. Her statement before the investigating judge was taken in the absence of the defendant and his counsel, the public was excluded from the trial, and the defendant was removed from the courtroom when she gave her testimony (see paragraphs 18, 29, 31 and 34 above). Owing to the applicant\u2019s stress during her testimony and cross-examination, the trial hearings were on several occasions adjourned for a few minutes or rescheduled to another date (see paragraphs 31, 37 and 38 above). Furthermore, the presiding judge warned the defendant against repeating questions in cross-examination and prohibited a number of them (see paragraph 36 above). Nevertheless, in the Court\u2019s opinion, the pre-existing relationship between the applicant and the defendant and the intimate nature of the subject matter, as well as the applicant\u2019s young age \u2013 she was a minor when the alleged sexual assaults took place \u2013 were points of particular sensitivity which called for a correspondingly sensitive approach on the part of the authorities to the conduct of the criminal proceedings in issue. Taking into account the cumulative effect of the factors analysed above, which adversely affected the applicant\u2019s personal integrity (see paragraphs 107-13 above), the Court considers that they substantially exceeded the level of discomfort inherent in giving evidence as a victim of alleged sexual assaults, and accordingly cannot be justified by the requirements of a fair trial.115.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the Court is of the view that the manner in which the criminal proceedings were conducted in the present case failed to afford the applicant the necessary protection so as to strike an appropriate balance between her rights and interests protected by Article 8 and X\u2019s defence rights protected by Article 6 of the Convention.116.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION117.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 A.\u00a0\u00a0Damage118.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, arguing that the sexual assaults and the secondary victimisation she had endured in the criminal proceedings had severely affected her psychological health and caused her mental anguish and distress. The applicant submitted that during the proceedings she had suffered from depression, anxiety, and inability to concentrate, necessitating psychiatric help; she had even come to the hearings accompanied by her psychiatrist. Moreover, she had subsequently become afflicted with multiple sclerosis.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Government took the view that the applicant had not shown causal links between her health problems and the alleged violations of the Convention. Moreover, they maintained that, were the Court to find a violation of the applicant\u2019s Convention rights and award the applicant just satisfaction, it should be taken into account that the applicant had already received monetary compensation in the amount of EUR 1,080 from the State for the violation of her right to trial within a reasonable time.120.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the medical certificate issued by the applicant\u2019s psychiatrist in 2010, the psychological distress experienced by the applicant in that period could, at least in part, be attributed to the criminal proceedings in issue which, as found by the Court, lacked effectiveness and disproportionately interfered with the applicant\u2019s personal integrity. Thus, the Court considers that some compensation should be awarded to the applicant for non-pecuniary damage in that respect. However, the Court notes that the domestic courts did not find the applicant\u2019s allegations of sexual assaults to have been established. Neither can the Court speculate as to whether the outcome of the domestic proceedings would have been different had there been no breach of the Convention. Accordingly, it considers that no award can be made to the applicant in respect of that claim.121.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the Government\u2019s objection that compensation was awarded to the applicant at the domestic level, it is true that the applicant received EUR 1,080 from the State for the excessive length of the criminal proceedings in issue. However, as it does not appear that the out-of-court settlement also covered the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 (see paragraph 83 above) and, consequently, this award had no bearing on the applicant\u2019s victim status under that provision (see, conversely, W. v.\u00a0Slovenia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a091), it cannot be taken into consideration in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded under Article 41 in respect of the violations found by the Court.122.\u00a0\u00a0Making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 9,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses123.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 7,462.50, plus VAT at 20%, amounting to a total of EUR 8,955 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court.124.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the claim was disproportionately high in comparison to the amounts that could be charged with regard to the costs of proceedings before the Strasbourg Court in accordance with the national Lawyers\u2019 Fees Act. The maximum fee stipulated in that Act for the proceedings in issue amounted to EUR 2,625 if a hearing was held before the Court and EUR 1,500 if there was no hearing.125.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 4,000, not including VAT, for the proceedings before the Court. As regards the claim that the amount should be increased by the rate of VAT, the Court reiterates that, although costs and expenses are frequently subject to value-added tax paid to the State by lawyers, translators and other professionals, the tax is nevertheless billed to the applicants and is ultimately payable by them. Applicants should be protected against this additional charge. For this reason alone, in the operative part of its judgments the Court directs that any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant is to be added to the sums awarded in respect of costs and expenses (see Kuri\u0107 and Others v. Slovenia (just satisfaction) [GC], no.\u00a026828\/06, \u00a7 127, ECHR 2014, and Association Les T\u00e9moins de J\u00e9hovah v. France (just satisfaction), no. 8916\/05, \u00a7 37, 5 July 2012).\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27296":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Joinder of applications459.\u00a0\u00a0Given their similar factual and legal background, the Court decides that the applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court.B.\u00a0\u00a0 Issues of standing and other admissibility criteria1.\u00a0\u00a0The list of applicants and issues of standing under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019 position460.\u00a0\u00a0In their letter of 14 September 2012 and observations of 24 October 2012, the Government noted that the list of applicants required clarification. They pointed out that some applicants had lodged complaints on behalf of their relatives who had been victims of the terrorist act, while others were themselves hostages. They noted that there were instances of \u201cdouble\u201d presentation of the same complaints, that some of the applicants have lodged complaints on behalf of their children who had reached majority in the meantime, that some applicants died after the complaints have been lodged, that several applicants had escaped from the school in the early minutes of the hostage-taking and thus had no standing, etc. They referred, by way of example, to the decision in the case of Finogenov and Others v. Russia (nos. 18299\/03 and 27311\/03, (dec.), \u00a7\u00a0204), where the Court had removed the name of one person from the list of applicants because his wife, who was also an applicant, had been among the hostages and survived. In their letter of 14 September 2012 the Government stated that \u201cthe issue of composition of the [list of] applicants... could not be resolved by the applicants... It is, no doubt, the matter for the Court to resolve\u201d.461.\u00a0\u00a0In their answers to the Court\u2019s additional questions submitted in September 2013, the Government reaffirmed their position on the admissibility of the applications. They made a particular emphasis on the composition of the list of applicants. They expressed an opinion that the attitude taken in respect of such a basic question of admissibility as victim status was \u201cabsolutely unacceptable\u201d and amounted to disregard of the admissibility criteria as such. In their view, the nature of the admissibility criterion remained inflexible and could not be dropped in view of the circumstances of a particular case. They reiterated their position at the oral hearing in October 2014.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants\u2019 position462.\u00a0\u00a0In April 2012 the applicants, through their representatives, were asked by the Court to verify the accuracy of the list. The \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d on several occasions submitted corrections, additions and updates to the list, which are indicated in the attached table (see Appendix). The \u201csecond group of applicants\u201d answered, in their initial and additional observations, that the composition of their group remained unchanged and that the list of applicants had been correct.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment463.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in view of numerous victims touched by the events in question, the list of applicants in this case is a complex and evolving matter which requires a closer examination (see Appendix). The Court stresses that the inevitable changes made to the list of over four hundred persons do not affect the standing of the vast majority of applicants who had been taken hostages or lost their close family members in the events.464.\u00a0\u00a0Two types of issues need to be addressed at the present stage and in view of the Government\u2019s challenges: (i) matters related to the situation of the applicants who have, over time, withdrawn their applications, died and are succeeded by their heirs; and (ii) questions of standing of some of the applicants under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention. The situation of each applicant affected by these changes and the Court\u2019s conclusions reached below is reflected in the Appendix in the last column (\u201cAdmissibility under Articles 2 and 13\u201d).(i)\u00a0\u00a0Striking out and succession465.\u00a0\u00a0By the time of the present decision, three applicants (Mr Amiran Urusov, applicant no. 59 in application no.\u00a026562\/07, Mr Zaurbek Tsorayev, applicant no.\u00a017 in application no.\u00a049380\/08 and Mr Soslan Dzugayev, applicant no. 18 in application no.\u00a021294\/11) by letters of 14 September 2012 and 5 March 2014 informed the Court that they no longer wished to maintain their complaints and asked to withdraw their applications. One applicant (Mrs Venera Kazakhova, applicant no. 14 in application no.\u00a049380\/08) died and no intention has been expressed by her heirs or relatives to maintain the case in her stead.466.\u00a0\u00a0The situation of these four applicants falls within the meaning of Article 37 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention and should lead to striking out of their complaints. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the continued examination of their complaints.467.\u00a0\u00a0The Court next remarks that two applicants submitted their application twice \u2013 Mr Vladimir Oziyev, applicant no. 54 in application no.\u00a026562\/07 and no.\u00a091 in application no. 49380\/08, and Ms Natalya Salamova, applicant no. 32 in application no. 49339\/08, and no.\u00a042 in application no.\u00a021294\/11. The Court decides that their earlier applications are maintained, and their names are deleted from the list of applicants in applications nos.\u00a049380\/08 and 21294\/11, respectively.468.\u00a0\u00a0Six applicants died (see Appendix; for example, applicant no. 69 in no.\u00a026562\/07), and their close relatives expressed the intention to continue in their stead. The Court reiterates that where an applicant has died after the application was lodged, the next-of-kin or heir may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC] no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2014; and Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII). In line with the Court\u2019s practice, the names of the deceased persons can be maintained, as they were the ones who had originally launched the applications. The successors can maintain the applications on behalf of their deceased relatives (see Balenko v. Russia, no. 35350\/05, \u00a7 39, 11 October 2011, and Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, no. 35254\/07, \u00a7 52, 22 November 2011).469.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above and the transferrable nature of the complaints concerning fundamental human rights, the Court accepts that the six applicants\u2019 close relatives have a legitimate interest in pursuing the application in their stead. It will therefore continue dealing with the deceased applicants\u2019 complaints in question, at their request.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Question of standing under Articles 2 and 13470.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, a number of applicants submitted complaints under Articles 2 and 13 on behalf of their surviving relatives, mainly children, who had been taken hostage. The Government disputed the standing of some of these applicants. These applicants were requested by the Court to clarify their position vis-\u00e0-vis the complaints lodged, especially in view of the fact that many of the direct victims of the events had in the meantime reached the age of majority. Where no complaints had been submitted by the surviving hostages, they were asked to indicate whether they wished to be included as direct victims.471.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicants\u2019submissions, received in 2013 and 2014, most surviving hostages who were minors at the time of the events (i.e. born in or after 1986) and have since reached the age of majority confirmed their wish to be applicants in their own right. Several applicants informed the Court that their relatives \u2013 direct victims \u2013 had no intention of pursuing the complaints before the Court; others specified that only the indirect victims should be considered applicants (see Appendix; for example, applicant nos. 17 and 26 in no.\u00a026562\/07; applicant no.\u00a01 in no.\u00a051313\/08).472.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is sensitive to the particular vulnerability of certain victims, and acknowledges that special considerations should apply where allegations are made of breaches of fundamental rights at the hands of the national authorities. Thus, applications lodged by individuals on behalf of the victim(s), even though no valid form of authority was presented, have previously been declared admissible. Particular consideration has been shown with regard to the victims\u2019 vulnerability on account of their age, sex or disability, which rendered them unable to lodge a complaint on the matter with the Court, due regard also being paid to the connections between the person lodging the application and the victim (see, mutatis mutandis, \u0130lhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277\/93, \u00a7 55, ECHR 2000\u2011VII, where the complaints were brought by the applicant on behalf of his brother, who had been ill-treated; Y.F. v. Turkey, no. 24209\/94, \u00a7 29, ECHR 2003\u2013IX, where a husband complained that his wife had been compelled to undergo a gynaecological examination; and S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, where a complaint was brought by a solicitor on behalf of children whom he had represented in domestic proceedings, in which he had been appointed by the guardian ad litem).473.\u00a0\u00a0These examples attest to the Court\u2019s reasonable flexibility in ensuring that formal criteria related to admissibility and representation do not result in unjustified exclusion of the most vulnerable victims from the protection guaranteed by the Convention. At the same time, the Court must ensure, having regard to its case law on victim status and the notion of \u201cstanding\u201d, that the conditions of admissibility governing access to it are interpreted in a consistent manner (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7 105).474.\u00a0\u00a0As the first conclusion, applying these principles to the present case and taking into account, in particular, the vulnerability of many of the victims and the initial submissions made on their behalf by their close relatives under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention, the Court finds it justified to correct the list of applicants, as compared to the initial submissions by adding nineteen names of direct victims of the alleged violations (see paragraphs 470 and 471 above). Of these persons, eleven had reached the age of majority by the time of submission of these additional observations; for the remaining eight their parents, the original applicants, remain the legal guardians and representatives (see Appendix; for example, applicants no. 131 in no.\u00a026562\/07 and no. 99 in no.\u00a049380\/08).475.\u00a0\u00a0The next question to address is the situation of those applicants who complained, under Articles 2 and 13, on account of events which had involved their surviving relatives. At present, there are fifty-one such applicants (see Appendix; for example, applicants nos. 17 and 26 in no.\u00a026562\/07; applicant no. 1 in no.\u00a051313\/08); most of them indicated to the Court, in their additional observations, their intention to maintain these complaints in their own right, independently of the intention of those close relatives who had been the direct victims of the events.476.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s case-law on the issues of direct and indirect victim status and the representation of applicants who have deceased or are unable to represent themselves has recently been summarised in the judgments delivered in the cases of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 96-103) and Lambert and Others v. France ([GC], no. 46043\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 93-102, 5 June 2015). As a general principle, in order to be able to lodge an application in accordance with Article 34, an individual must be able to show that he or she was \u201cdirectly affected\u201d by the measure complained of (see Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a013378\/05, \u00a7\u00a033, ECHR 2008, and \u0130lhan v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a022277\/93, \u00a7\u00a052, ECHR 2000\u2011VII). This is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion, although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings (see Karner v. Austria, no. 40016\/98, \u00a7 25, ECHR 2003\u2011IX, and Fairfield and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a024790\/04, ECHR 2005\u2011VI).477.\u00a0\u00a0More specifically, the Court has on many occasions recognised the standing of the victim\u2019s next-of-kin to submit an application where the victim has died or disappeared in circumstances allegedly engaging the responsibility of the State (see \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a023657\/94, \u00a7\u00a092, ECHR 1999\u2011IV, and Bazorkina v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a069481\/01, 15\u00a0September 2005). In the case of Varnava and Others v. Turkey ([GC], nos.\u00a016064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, ECHR 2009), the applicants lodged the applications both in their own name and on behalf of their disappeared relatives. The Court did not consider it necessary to rule on whether the missing men should or should not be granted the status of applicants since, in any event, their close relatives were entitled to raise complaints concerning their disappearance (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0112). The Court examined the case on the basis that the relatives of the missing persons were the applicants for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention. The applicant\u2019s participation in the domestic proceedings has been found to be only one of several relevant criteria (see N\u00f6lkenbockhoff v. Germany, 25\u00a0August 1987, \u00a7 33, Series A no. 123; Micallef v. Malta [GC], no.\u00a017056\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a048-49, ECHR 2009; and Kaburov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 9035\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a052-53, 19 June 2012).478.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court reiterates that in the case Finogenov and Others (cited above, (dec.), \u00a7\u00a0204) it found it justified to delete from the list of applicants the husband of an applicant who had been held hostage and who had lodged her own complaint, while the husband\u2019s complaint was based exclusively on the events concerning his wife\u2019s situation as a direct victim. Similarly, it refused to grant standing to the relatives of direct victims where the latter had failed to lodge complains or to argue their inability to do so (see Benzer and Others v. Turkey, no. 23502\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 100 and 102, 12\u00a0November 2013).479.\u00a0\u00a0The Court acknowledges the exceptional nature of the present case. It understands that the hostages\u2019 relatives, mainly parents, first, lived through gnawing uncertainty and fear for the fate of their loved ones, including minor children, taken hostage by a ruthless and heavily armed group, and subsequently through the tragic climax of the three-day stand-off; and, second, have borne the burden of participation in the numerous domestic proceedings, some of which remain pending to this day. It also understands that many of the direct victims were unable, for objective reasons, to assume entirely their proper roles in the proceedings which followed, both before the domestic authorities and at the time when the applications were lodged before the Court. The decisions by the domestic authorities to grant the status of victims not only to the direct victims, but also to their close relatives, appear fully justified in such circumstances, and must be seen as a measure to ensure the most effective protection of vulnerable victims.480.\u00a0\u00a0However, as noted above, the question of participation in the domestic proceedings is only one of the factors to be taken into account. The scope and purpose of the domestic criminal investigations and of the related civil proceedings cannot be amalgamated with the complaints lodged under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention, which raise issues of State responsibility under the positive, negative and procedural aspects of the right to life and the right to have effective remedies against the alleged violations and which constitute the crux of the applicants\u2019 grievances in the present case.481.\u00a0\u00a0On the basis of the Court\u2019s approach to relatively similar cases (see Finogenov and Others, (dec.), \u00a7\u00a0204, and Benzer and Others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0100 and 102, both cited above), it appears possible to conclude that wherever there are direct victims of the violations alleged, it is first and foremost their role to bring the complaints before the Court, unless there are exceptional circumstances which justify the transfer of this standing, usually to a close family member. A review of exceptional circumstances reveals the following two main criteria: the risk that the direct victim will be deprived of effective protection of his or her rights, and the absence of a conflict of interests between the victim and the applicant (see Lambert and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0102).482.\u00a0\u00a0Applying this principle to the case at hand, the Court is of the opinion that the direct victims\u2019 intention to lodge such complaints is of primary importance and should be given due consideration. Wherever the hostages (children) confirmed their own intention to be applicants, this should be taken into account (see paragraph 474 above). In these cases, the relatives who lodged the initial complaints on behalf of direct victims should be designated as additional representatives. They cannot be said to have been directly or separately affected by the violations alleged under these Articles in respect of their relatives, but may continue to represent the direct victims, if they so wish.483.\u00a0\u00a0By the same token, wherever the initial complaints under Articles 2 and 13 were lodged on behalf of surviving direct victims who have reached the age of majority and did not confirm their intention to pursue the applications, the Court finds that the relatives cannot be considered to be directly affected by the alleged violations for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, and they thus lack standing unless another reason exists for it (i.e. they themselves were among the hostages or they complain about the loss of another family member; see Appendix for details).484.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the complaints lodged under Articles 2 and 13 by fifty-one persons (see Appendix) who are not direct victims of the alleged violations are incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04.2.\u00a0\u00a0Other objections of admissibility(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The Government485.\u00a0\u00a0In their answers to the additional questions received by the Court in September 2013, the Government reaffirmed their position on the admissibility of the applications.486.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the Court\u2019s approach to treat the applicants as a single \u201crestricted group\u201d rather than a number of individual applications. They considered that as a result of that, the Court unreasonably relieved some of the applicants from the obligation to comply with the admissibility criteria, such as exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six months limit. They pointed out that in the domestic proceedings each complaint lodged by the victims, for example under Article 125 of the Criminal Procedural Code, had been treated separately and its results had applied only to those persons who had participated in that round. In view of the number and variety of proceedings employed by the applicants at the national level, they could not be said to have formed a single group, at least not before they have submitted their applications to the Court.487.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further stated that the applicants\u2019 intention to apply to the Court has formed within a period of several years, and that it has been due to the efforts, persuasion and public position of two \u201cactivity centres\u201d \u2013 Mrs Kesayeva and Mrs Tagayeva. In such circumstances the adoption of a single date of lodging of application in respect of the whole group was contrary to the idea of an individual petition, which in this case becomes a \u201ccollective application irrespectively of the individual circumstances of each applicant only because ... all of them share the same organiser and\/or [are] led by one small group of activists\u201d. The applicants had signed various procedural documents (first letters, application forms, powers of attorney) at different dates. In the Government\u2019s opinion, this should result in recording different dates for the lodging of their individual applications.488.\u00a0\u00a0In turn, this has repercussions on the calculation of the six-months limit. In the Government\u2019s opinion, already in 2006 persons affected by the terrorist attack had formed the opinion that the domestic remedies in respect of the alleged violations of Articles 2 and 3 had been ineffective. This distrust was stated in numerous letters and documents published on the web-sites devoted to the Beslan tragedy; in February 2006 a hunger strike had been staged by the members of NGO Golos Beslana with the aim of attracting public attention to the inefficiency of the investigation into the terrorist attack. Although it could not be established precisely when the applicants had realised that no effective domestic remedies were available against their complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the Government was convinced that it had been prior to February 2006. Since the earliest communication with the Court was dated 25 June 2007, the applicants had failed to demonstrate due diligence and to present their complaints within a reasonable time.489.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further noted that the domestic criminal proceedings initiated in connection with the terrorist act could be divided, broadly, into two clusters: the proceedings against the perpetrators of the terrorist act, namely, the trial of Mr Kulayev; and the proceedings against the State officials in connection with their respective roles in the prevention and aftermath of the hostage-taking. The Court should take into account the applicants\u2019 individual involvement in each set of proceedings in order to determine their compliance with the admissibility criteria of exhaustion of domestic remedies and compliance with the six-months limit.490.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Government argued that the \u201cactivist groups\u201d had been convinced of the inefficiency of the domestic proceedings no later than February 2006. Nevertheless, in order to artificially increase the number of applicants and to drag the proceedings in respect of the later submissions into the six-months\u2019 time limit, they submitted repeated complaints to the domestic authorities. Such strategy in respect of two latest cases in the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d, nos.\u00a021294\/11 and 37096\/11, amounted to abuse of the right of individual petition.491.\u00a0\u00a0In their letter of 14 June 2014 the Government reiterated their request to review the situation of the applicants individually. They proposed that the correspondence of each applicant with the Court be reflected in a separate table, containing the dates when various procedural documents, such as introductory letters, powers of attorney and application forms had been signed and dispatched by each of them or their representatives. It should then be determined which date should, in respect of each applicant, be regarded as the date of lodging of application. On the basis of the above calculations, questions of exhaustion and six-months limits should be calculated individually in respect of each applicant.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants492.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations received by the Court in February 2013, the applicants in the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d disputed the Government\u2019s interpretation of the \u201crestricted group\u201d notion. They argued that such approach, developed by the Court in the judgments Abuyeva and Others v. Russia (no.\u00a027065\/05, 2 December 2010) and Finogenov and Others (cited above), was fully applicable to the case at hand on three grounds: (i) the group was restricted in that the applicants have essentially identical complaints and all of its members were affected by the ineffectiveness of the investigation; (ii) the coordination of efforts was necessary due to the scale of the proceedings and the number of persons involved, thus there was no obligation for each member of the group to have the same status in the domestic proceedings; and (iii) the failure to apply such principle could result in unjust exclusion of the members collectively affected by the same situation.493.\u00a0\u00a0They also asked the Court to reject the Government\u2019s objections as to non-exhaustion, since the violations alleged have been carried out by the agents of the State, the national legal system was ineffective and the investigation carried out was not in compliance with the Convention standards.494.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in the \u201csecond group of applicants\u201d in their observations of 7 January 2013 also asked the Court to reject the challenges to the admissibility of the complaints, for reasons similar to those stated by the first group.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment495.\u00a0\u00a0In the communication report the Court decided to treat the applicants as a \u201crestricted group\u201d, based on the assumption that the substance of their complaints and their position vis-\u00e0-vis the domestic investigation have been relatively similar, whether or not each of them had participated in every given procedural step on the domestic level, either directly or through their representatives (see Abuyeva and Others, \u00a7 181, and Finogenov and Others, \u00a7\u00a0196, both cited above).496.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes, in particular, that the applicants in the present case form a restricted group in so far as they had been directly and personally affected by the events that took place between 1 and 3 September 2004, they have very similar complaints, have coordinated their efforts and have taken similar steps vis-\u00e0-vis the domestic authorities. More specifically, the requests lodged by various applicants in the context of the criminal investigation no.\u00a020\/849 demonstrate that they aimed to influence the scope of the investigation as a whole, and thus the outcome was relevant to the entire group (as examples, see paragraphs 266 and 265 above). In such circumstances, the applicants who have not pursued the same remedy that had proven ineffective for the other applicants in the same position can be reasonably absolved from doing so (see, mutatis mutandis, Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], nos. 39343\/98, 39651\/98, 43147\/98 and 46664\/99, \u00a7 156, ECHR 2003\u2011VI).497.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s argument that the dates of the applications should be calculated individually in respect of each applicant, based on the dates on which certain procedural documents had been signed, the Court finds that their intent to lodge applications was expressed sufficiently clearly already in the first communications with the Court, when provisional lists of applicants were submitted with each of the applications forming the present case (see paragraphs 3-12 above). It would anyway be unrealistic to expect that hundreds of persons, many of them still suffering from the consequences of the events, could have participated in each step of the proceedings domestically, or signed all the interim complaints and other documents necessary to lodge a complaint to the Court on the same date, as the Government seem to suggest.498.\u00a0\u00a0As to compliance with the six months criteria, criminal investigation no.\u00a020\/849 into the organisation of the terrorist act is still pending, and most of the applicants\u2019 grievances are inseparably linked with this set of proceedings. In so far as the Government argue that the applicants should have realised that the investigation was futile no later than February 2006, this stands in contrast with the applicants\u2019 continued and steadfast efforts to obtain an effective investigation after that date (see, for example, paragraphs 262-67 above). It cannot be said that by the time of lodging of the complaints the applicants had remained idle in the face of a dormant investigation for significant periods of time, or that the overall length of proceedings has been such so as to alert them to the obvious ineffectiveness of the investigation (see Bucure\u015fteanu v. Romania, no. 20558\/04, \u00a7 42, 16\u00a0April 2013; and compare and contrast with Nasirkhaeva v. Russia (dec.), no. 1721\/07, 31 May 2011; Finozhenok v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a03025\/06, 31\u00a0May 2011; and Dzhamaldayev v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a039768\/06, 22 January 2013). The Court is mindful of the need to maintain a strict and predictable application of its admissibility criteria, including the six months limit; however it does not find that any of the applications lodged in the present proceedings raise an issue under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.499.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court maintains the \u201crestricted group\u201d approach as outlined above, rejects the Government\u2019s request to apply the criteria of exhaustion and six months to each applicant separately, and dismisses the objections of six months and non-exhaustion in so far as they concern the complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Loss of victim status(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The Government500.\u00a0\u00a0In the observations of 24 October 2012 the Government pointed out that the status of victims in various domestic proceedings had been accorded to all persons concerned. Such persons have been fully appraised of the procedural steps and have been accorded all rights associated with such status. Those applicants who had not fully used their procedural powers, for example, to appeal against the decisions or to acquaint themselves with the case files, should be regarded as having waived their rights under the Convention and could no longer claim to be victims of the violations alleged. To prove this point, the Government submitted a table containing information about 130 victims\u2019 positions on their wish to assess the documents of criminal case no.\u00a020\/852 (the trial of the Pravoberezhny ROVD officers for professional negligence).501.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the above, the Government pointed out that the victims of the terrorist act had been compensated for their losses on the basis of the Counter-Terrorist Act (Federal Law no.\u00a035-FZ) and implementing legislation. The relevant monetary compensations, social and medical support for the applicants have resulted in the loss of victim status under the substantive limb of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. The Government submitted detailed background information in this respect, covering period up to April 2012.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants502.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations submitted in February 2013, the applicants in the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d asked the Court to reject the Government\u2019s objection. They stressed that the financial compensations paid to the victims could not, under the Court\u2019s case-law, lead to the loss of victim status under Articles 2 and 3, since no investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for a fatal assault has taken place.503.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in the \u201csecond group of applicants\u201d also asked the Court to maintain their position as victims of the alleged violations of the procedural and positive aspects of Article 2.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment504.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive that individual of his or her status as a \u201cvictim\u201d unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a07888\/03, \u00a7\u00a049, 20 December 2007, and G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7\u00a0115, ECHR 2010, and the cases cited therein). The applicants\u2019 principal complaints concern the authorities\u2019 alleged failures to prevent the terrorist act, their response to the situation of hostage-taking and the investigation of the events effectively and in full. The existence of these violations, or at least their scope, are disputed between the parties, and it therefore appears premature to speak of their acknowledgement and redress.505.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Government refer to the payment of compensations, the Court\u2019s practice confirms that confining the authorities\u2019 reaction to incidents of deprivations of life to the mere payment of compensation would also make it possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity, and the general legal prohibitions on killing, despite their fundamental importance, would be ineffective in practice (see Leonidis v. Greece, no. 43326\/05, \u00a7 46, 8\u00a0January 2009). In any event, the compensations in the present case have been paid to the applicants as victims of a criminal act by third parties and do not cover their principal complaints as stated above.506.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection to the loss of victim status should, therefore, be dismissed.4.\u00a0\u00a0Representation of applicants(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions507.\u00a0\u00a0In the observations of 24 October 2012 the Government questioned Mr Kay\u2019s authority to represent all applicants in four applications of the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d. They were of the opinion that the Court should apply the Rules of the Practice direction on Institution of Proceedings in a strict manner and accept that Mr Kay had represented only those applicants who had presented powers of attorney in his name within eight weeks after the Registry\u2019s letter.508.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were requested, on several occasions, to clarify the questions of representation. Most of the applicants in the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d informed the Court, in October 2013, of their intention to terminate their representation by Mr Kay (see paragraph 9 above). In 2014 the applicants in this group entrusted their representation to the lawyers of NGO EHRAC\/Memorial Human Rights Centre (Mr Koroteyev, principally) (see Appendix).(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment509.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that the parties have a duty to cooperate with it fully in the conduct of the proceedings (Rule 44A of the Rules of Court) and to participate effectively in the proceedings, within the meaning of Rule 44C of the Rules of Court. These rules may be applicable to the situation of communication with the Court and, in certain cases, extend to the situations arising out of the relations between the applicants and their representatives, or lack thereof (see, for example, Havelka v. the Czech Republic, no.\u00a029725\/11 (dec.), and Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810\/10, \u00a7 33, ECHR 2014). Failure to comply with these rules allows the Court to draw such inferences as it deems necessary (Rule 44C).510.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that at present all applicants in the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d are represented by the EHRAC\/ Memorial Human Rights Centre lawyers (Mr\u00a0Koroteyev, principally). All applicants in the \u201csecond group of applicants\u201d are represented by Mr Trepashhkin and Mr Knyazkin. It therefore finds that no issues arise under the above mentioned Rules of the Court that need to be examined.511.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, as to the Government\u2019s suggestion that the Practice Direction on Institution of Proceedings, as issued by the President of the Court in accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Court and supplementing Rules 45 and 47, should have been construed so as to exclude Mr Kay from representing some of the applicants, the Court notes that the Direction was in any event inapplicable to the present situation, since Mr Kay had entered the proceedings after the requirements of Rule 47 had already been complied with.C.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violations of Article 2 of the Convention512.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged a number of violations of their rights guaranteed under Article 2 of the Convention. Essentially, and depending on the group of applicants concerned, these complaints touched upon several aspects of the obligation to prevent the life-threatening acts by third parties, the planning and control of the operation involving use of force by the authorities and the investigation of the events. Article 2 reads as following:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.2.\u00a0\u00a0Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:(a)\u00a0\u00a0in defence of any person from unlawful violence;(b)\u00a0\u00a0in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;(c)\u00a0\u00a0in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0General questions(a)\u00a0\u00a0Article 2 - positive obligations to prevent threat to life(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions513.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the prevention of the terrorist act was concerned, the Government in their additional submissions in September 2013 essentially relied on the \u201call-round forensic expert examination no.\u00a01\u201d of 23 December 2005 (see paragraphs 134 and subsequent above). Although in November 2006 this document was declared void by a domestic court, it was still relied upon in later proceedings due to its extensive factual scope. As cited by the Government, the report found that the Ministry of the Interior, as well as other federal authorities, had taken all the necessary and adequate precautions in relation to the expected terrorist attack. At the same time, the actions of the local teams of the Ministry of the Interior in Ingushetia and in Beslan had been deficient, as a result of which the illegal armed group had been able to get together and train in Ingushetia, travel to Beslan across the administrative border with North Ossetia and then proceed to the hostage-taking without much opposition. These conclusions served as the basis for the criminal prosecution of the local police officers in Ingushetia and in Beslan (see paragraph 354 and subsequent paragraphs above).514.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d in their additional observations of 15 October 2013 cited the report of the North Ossetian Parliament of 29 November 2005 (see paragraph 375 above) that \u201cto argue that the terrorist act in Beslan had been unexpected would be as absurd as to deny the previous terrorist acts in North Ossetia. It\u2019s striking that the preparation of dozens of fighters which had lasted for many days in a populated district of Ingushetia remained unnoticed by anyone\u201d. In particular, they recalled that in the days immediately preceding the terrorist act the relevant information had been forwarded to the local police in North Ossetia. The applicants referred to telexes of the North Ossetia Ministry of the Interior no.\u00a01751 of 18 August 2004, no.\u00a01825 of 22 August 2004, no.\u00a01802 of 25 August 2004 (see paragraphs 27-29 above), which described the terrorist threat and instructed the local police to take preventive measures aimed at ensuring the population\u2019s security. They also referred to the North Ossetia Ministry of the Interior order no.\u00a0447 of 31 July 2004 about the measures aimed at prevention of terrorist acts in the republic. According to the applicants, this information allowed to consider school no.\u00a01 in Beslan, being an education facility holding a large public gathering and situated in the vicinity of the administrative border with Ingushetia, as one of the primary potential aims of the terrorists.515.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also relied on the testimonials of the Pravoberezhny ROVD servicemen given by them in the course of the investigation no.\u00a020\/852 which had ended on 2 August 2007 by the application of an amnesty act (see paragraphs 355-62 above). Some of these statements revealed that in the morning of 1 September a large part of the police force of the ROVD had been sent elsewhere and the school building had not been properly guarded. Not even a mobile post of traffic police had been stationed at the school, contrary to the usual practice. The only police officer \u2013 a woman, F.D., who had been also taken hostage, had not been armed and had no portable radio for communication. As a result, the terrorists were able to cross the border with Ingushetia, pass through busy streets of Beslan without being stopped or at least noticed by any police post. Having arrived at the school, within the next half an hour the terrorists proceeded to round up over a thousand persons and gather them in the school building without encountering any resistance, which could have given at least some persons an opportunity to escape. The police at the Pravoberezhny ROVD, whose office was situated a mere 300 metres from the school, learned of the event when they had heard shots being fired at the school. Similar information was available in Ingushetia, too (see paragraphs 364 and subsequent).516.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants of the \u201csecond group of applicants\u201d reiterated their initial complaints.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment517.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that Article 2 of the Convention may imply a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a0115, Reports 1998-VIII). For the Court to find a violation of the positive obligation to protect life, it must be established that the authorities knew, or ought to have known at the time, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see Osman, cited above, \u00a7 116; Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477\/99, \u00a7 55, ECHR 2002\u2011II; Medova v. Russia, no.\u00a025385\/04, \u00a7\u00a096, 15 January 2009; and Tsechoyev v. Russia, no.\u00a039358\/05, \u00a7\u00a0136, 15 March 2011).518.\u00a0\u00a0In the Finogenov and Others case (cited above, (dec.) \u00a7\u00a0173), the Court concluded that there was no evidence that the authorities had any specific information about the hostage-taking being prepared and declared this complaint inadmissible.519.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, in view of the parties\u2019 submissions and the domestic proceedings cited above, the Court considers that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Procedural obligation under Article 2(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s position520.\u00a0\u00a0In their additional submissions of September 2013, the Government referred to large number of materials and inter-related proceedings which had addressed the question from various angles. They recalled that there were four different sets of criminal proceedings: the first criminal investigation file, opened on 1 September 2004, no.\u00a020\/849, which was still pending; criminal proceedings against the only surviving terrorist Mr\u00a0Nurpashi Kulayev (no.\u00a020\/870); and two sets of proceedings against the officers of the interior in Ingushetia (no.\u00a004540064) and in Beslan (no.\u00a020\/852). The main investigative measures, such as examination of the crime scene, collection of witness testimonials, carrying out of expert examinations, were done in the framework of the first set of proceedings (no.\u00a020\/849). Later, three other sets of proceedings have been built up on the basis of the materials collected within this first investigation. The criminal case no.\u00a020\/849 was still pending, due to the need to identify the remaining bodies of the terrorists (five at the time of submission). Upon the Court\u2019s request, the Government submitted the list of documents contained in this criminal case by that date. According to this list, the case-file contained 235\u00a0volumes, each ranging, on the average, between 200 and 350 pages (see paragraph 122 and subsequent).521.\u00a0\u00a0Within the proceedings in criminal investigation no.\u00a020\/849 the investigators examined the lawfulness of the actions of the State officials in planning and control of the operation aimed at saving the hostages and neutralising the terrorists. The actions of the members of the Operative Headquarters (OH), military servicemen, members of the \u201cEmercom\u201d, medical professionals, fire-fighters etc. had been examined; it had been determined that no reasons to open criminal investigation into their actions had existed. The Government referred to the decision of 3\u00a0December 2004 not to charge officials with crimes (see paragraphs 229-34 above). The decision of 3\u00a0December 2004 was quashed on 12 September 2005; the subsequent situation was not clear.522.\u00a0\u00a0The cause of death was established for 215 persons; the exact cause of death of 116 persons could not be established due to extensive post-mortem burns. The investigation concluded that the deaths and injuries of the victims were not connected with any actions or omissions of the State agents, including use of firearms (see paragraphs 253-54 above).523.\u00a0\u00a0As to the origin of the first explosions in the gymnasium, the Government argued that the circumstances and places of the explosions had been thoroughly analysed. It had been established, by qualified experts, that the explosions had been caused by the detonation of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Government pointed, in particular, to the expert report no.\u00a016\/1 of 14\u00a0September 2007, counting over 300 pages, accompanied by detailed schemes and photos (see paragraphs 224 and subsequent). It dismissed the doubts expressed, notably, by a member of the Federal Assembly and a renowned expert in the field of explosions Mr\u00a0Savelyev about the external origins of the first two explosions in the gymnasium (see paragraphs 226, 406, 408, 410 above). The Government recalled the conclusions of report no.\u00a016\/1: the first explosion was the result of detonation of a large IED, measuring between three and six kilograms in TNT equivalent. The origin of this explosion was not linked to the electric wires and detonator, but resulted, most probably, from mishandling of the device by the terrorists guarding it. The IED exploded in the north-eastern part of the gymnasium, at the spot located about one metre away from the northern wall and five metres away from the eastern wall. The second explosion occurred about 20 seconds later and consisted of simultaneous detonation of several smaller IEDs in the north-western part of the hall; this explosion most probably resulted from intentional or unintentional use by one of the terrorists of the detonator pedal. Finally, the report concluded that out of all the recorded damages to the gymnasium\u2019s walls, only two marks could have been caused by either a thermobaric charge or a cumulative charge projected from outside. These projectiles could not have been launched from the roofs of houses nos. 37, 39 or 41 of the Shkolny Lane (as alleged by Mr Savelyev).524.\u00a0\u00a0As a follow up to that report, on 14 October 2007 the North Ossetia Ministry of the Interior\u2019s expert lab examined the explosion marks on the gymnasium walls and confirmed the above conclusions about the possible trajectory of the charges (report no.\u00a0S-I-63) (see paragraph 227 above).525.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Government submitted a copy of another expert report, no.\u00a016\/2, also commissioned by the investigation in order to dispel Mr Savelyev\u2019s allegations about the origin of the second explosion in the gymnasium which had resulted in the destruction of a section of the wall under the window on the northern side. It was commissioned in April 2007, and completed on 11\u00a0December 2009. Like report 16\/1, it was carried out by the experts of the State-owned scientific and production company Bazalt. The experts tested all the possibilities suggested by Mr Savelyev, including the employment of various types of grenade-launchers and flame-throwers upon a similar construction. The report ran to over 130 pages and concluded that the \u201cthe origin of the hole in the north-western wall of the gymnasium ... lied in the detonation of an IED with TNT equivalent of about six kilograms, put on the height of about 500 millimetres from the floor, near the radiator ... the power of this explosion\u2019s impact upon the wall was exasperated by almost simultaneous explosion of several other IED\u2019s located in the north-western part of the gymnasium, further away from the first explosion\u201d (see paragraph 228 above).526.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that the investigative authorities had conducted a most comprehensive inquiry into the terrorist attack. Testimonials had been collected from virtually every person who had been involved in the events, both private individuals and State officials. A large number of professional experts\u2019 reports had been ordered and conducted in order to asses and reconstruct the most important events. The outcomes of this large-scale investigation were reflected in the judgment rendered in the case of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, as well as in other proceedings.527.\u00a0\u00a0Unlike the above-cited Finogenov and Others case, the Government were of the opinion that the domestic investigation had thoroughly examined the question of whether there existed a nexus between the use of force by the State agents and the deaths and injuries among the hostages. The conclusion of the investigation was clear in that such nexus was absent: the deaths of the victims had been caused by the terrorist\u2019s actions. Again, in contrast to the Finogenov and Others case, the Government referred to the specific inquiries into the actions of the armed forces, security servicemen, other State personnel, which had ultimately resulted in the decision not to prosecute anyone. They stressed that the investigation had been independent and that there were no reasons to suspect that the investigators, or any of the numerous experts who had prepared the reports, had been subordinate to the bodies involved in the security operation in Beslan. They referred to the conclusions and the composition of the experts\u2019 board which had prepared the expert report no.\u00a01 of 23 December 2005 (see paragraphs 134 and subsequent).528.\u00a0\u00a0As to the question of safeguarding and collecting the evidence in the aftermath of the terrorist act, the Government stressed that the first investigative actions had taken place immediately after the end of the security operations. Thus, on 4 September 2004 a group of investigators, accompanied by experts, examined the site. Their work was recorded in a forty-three page document, complete with more than 150 pages of photographs and video recordings (see paragraphs 130-33 above). This document was used as a basis for a number of subsequent expert examinations. The questioning of the eye-witnesses and officials involved in the operation started immediately in the aftermath of the events, to ensure that their recollections were as detailed as possible.529.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that \u201cthe investigation has been comprehensive and lacked any deficiencies which could have influenced the completeness, clarity and adequacy of the establishment of the facts. In other words, the investigation left little, if any, room for any speculations, picturing an alternative course of events\u201d.530.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, as to the access of the case-file by the victims, the Government were of the opinion that all those persons who wanted to do so had acquainted themselves with the relevant documents. The Government stressed that some of the victims had waived their right to access the documents in the case-file, of which there were written statements.(\u00df)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants\u2019 position531.\u00a0\u00a0The initial set of observations submitted by the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d in February 2013 stated that the investigations carried out into the circumstances of the civilians\u2019 deaths and injuries did not satisfy the Convention requirements on a number of points. First, they argued that there existed a practice of non-compliance with the requirement to investigate abuses committed by military and security personnel in the course of anti-terrorist operations. Second, they submitted that the public scrutiny requirement has not been complied with, since they have not been properly informed of its terms of reference, scope, important procedural decisions etc. They rejected the Government\u2019s reliance on the victims\u2019 participation in the criminal trials in cases nos. 20\/852 (charges against the Beslan ROVD officers) and 20\/870 (trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev). Both these proceedings, in their view, had concerned very limited scope of issues and could not provide them with redress for the violations alleged. As to the investigation file no.\u00a020\/849, the applicants stressed that the time-frame and scope of this investigation were not clear, that their meaningful participation in these proceedings has been hampered by the limited communication with the authorities and the victims\u2019 restricted access to the case file and the relevant documents within.532.\u00a0\u00a0In their additional observations submitted in October 2013 the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d reiterated that the obligation to investigate has not been complied with, despite the carrying out of four criminal investigations. The applicants argued that the criminal investigations had failed to elucidate a number of important points which were crucial for the reconstruction of the sequence of events, establishment of truth and, ultimately, identifying personal liability. Among the investigations\u2019 main failures, the applicants recalled that the exact route taken by the terrorists from their camp site near Psedakh to school no.\u00a01 had not been established, that the investigation had failed to explain why the first documents concerning the terrorist act had mentioned another vehicle \u2013 Gazel minivan \u2013 allegedly used by the terrorists; that the work of the OH had not been properly investigated; that the investigation had failed to establish with precision the time and circumstances of use of flame-throwers, grenade-launchers and tanks upon the school building; that the identities of some terrorists had not been established and the investigation had failed to explain the absence, for post mortem identification, of some terrorists whom the hostages had described in details; that the cause of death for dozens of persons had not been established and for others \u2013 had been established only on the basis of external examination which did not allow, for example, to determine the provenance of the weapons used (bullets, splinters). The exact location of the bodies in the building had not been recorded.533.\u00a0\u00a0More specifically, the applicants expounded their arguments on the breaches of the domestic legal rules which governed the carrying out of autopsy reports. They cited the Federal Law \u201cOn the performance of State forensic expertise\u201d, the Criminal Procedural Code and the Instruction of the Ministry of Health of 24 April 2003 No\u00a0161 on the carrying out of the forensic expert reports. In particular, they pointed at the lists of questions which the experts should normally answer in respect of the bodies carrying signs of gunshot wounds, impact of explosions and fire. They were of the opinion that these directions had been disregarded by the experts upon directions of the investigation. They stressed that when the decisions had been rendered to carry out forensic reports, starting on 3 September 2004, the applicants had been effectively excluded from this aspect of the proceedings.534.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants made a particular emphasis on the investigation\u2019s failure to ensure public scrutiny by allowing the victims\u2019 access to the crucial materials contained in the case-file. They referred to their own numerous and futile attempts to obtain, directly and through the courts, copies of the decisions to appoint experts and the results of the most important expert conclusions, decisions not to prosecute certain officials, witness statements and other documents (see paragraphs 265-67 above). They stressed that in October 2013 they still had no access to many of the relevant materials collected by the investigation.535.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201csecond group of applicants\u201d considered that the ineffectiveness of the investigation has been evident. They stressed the absence of a meaningful examination and description of the site of the crime prior to its \u201ccleaning\u201d by heavy machinery, which they thought had amounted to \u201cdestruction of evidence of crimes committed by the authorities\u201d (see paragraph 112 above). They regretted the absence of the specialist expert reports that could have allowed tracing of bullets and projectiles that had caused deaths and injuries.536.\u00a0\u00a0Some applicants cited their complaints lodged in the criminal proceedings against the police officers of Ingushetia and North Ossetia. They argued that within these proceedings, too, the investigation had failed to establish the essential facts, to call the necessary witnesses and to ensure the victims\u2019 rights (see paragraph 360 above).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment537.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the parties\u2019 submissions, the Court considers that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.2.\u00a0\u00a0Applications nos. 26562\/07, 49380\/08, 212994\/11, 37096\/11 and 14755\/08(a)\u00a0\u00a0Planning and control of the operation(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s position538.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the planning and control of the operation was concerned, the Government were of the opinion that the actions of the authorities were fully consistent with the demands of Article 2 of the Convention. The special units of the FSB, who were in charge of the operation potentially involving lethal force, were the most professional teams of such sort in the country. Their experience in the areas of dealing with terrorists and hostage-taking crisis was unparalleled. During the crisis and before the storming, the officers of Alpha and Vympel conducted trainings in order to work through all possible scenarios of the takeover of the school building, including practical training at a similar school nearby.539.\u00a0\u00a0The Government drew the Court\u2019s particular attention that the questions put by the Court have been at the centre of domestic investigation which had fully elucidated them. The appointment and the process of decision making at the OH have been examined in details and the conclusions of the investigation as to the absence of criminal liability of the OH\u2019s members had been well grounded.540.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the complaints concerned the actions of the OH, the Government pointed out that its actions had been examined by the investigation. They listed the OH members, as established by the investigation and provided copies of their witness statements given to the investigation between September 2004 and October 2005. The Government stated that all members of the OH had been questioned and that particular attention of the investigation had been drawn to the question of whether the actions of the OH members had been lawful.541.\u00a0\u00a0More specifically, the Government explained that the first OH had been set up on 1 September 2004, as soon as the news of the hostage taking had been communicated to the authorities. Pursuant to the North Ossetia plan of application of anti-terrorist forces and means of 30 July 2004, this OH had been headed by the North Ossetia President Mr Dzasokhov. On 2\u00a0September 2004 at 2.45 p.m., pursuant to the directive of the Russian Government, a new OH was appointed, under command of the head of the North Ossetia FSB Mr Andreyev. His deputies were Mr Dzantiyev, the North Ossetia Minister of the Interior and General Tikhonov, the head of the FSB special forces centre; its members included Mr Dzasokhov; Mr\u00a0Koryakov, the head of the Ingushetia FSB; Mr Sobolev, the commander in chief of the 58th army of the Ministry of defence; Mr Vnukov, deputy head of the commander in chief of the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior; Mr Tsyban, deputy head of the counter-terrorist commission of North Ossetia; Mr Soplevenko, the North Ossetia Minister of Health; Mrs\u00a0Levitskaya, the North Ossetia Minister of Education; Mr Dzgoyev, the head of the North Ossetia \u201cEmercom\u201d; Mr Goncharov, the head of the disaster medicine centre Zaschita; and Mr Vasilyev, deputy head of the information programs department of the State TV company Rossiya.542.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the dynamic development of the situation, the OH had not held formal meetings and had not kept notes of its discussions and most of the decisions. The Government argued that the ensuing investigations confirmed that the OH actions had been in line with the pertinent legislation, in particular with the Federal Anti-terrorist Act of 25 July 1998, as it stood at the material time, and the Model Regulations on operative headquarters of the counter-terrorist operation, adopted by the Federal Anti-terrorist Commission on 11 June 2003. Among others, the relevant legislation established the principle of subordination of all participants of the anti-terrorist operation to the head of the OH who ensured a single line of command. Interference of other officials, irrespective of their rank, was directly prohibited in the work of the OH (see paragraphs 167 and subsequent).543.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants\u2019 allegation concerned the precautions taken by the authorities to protect lives and the strategy of negotiating, the Government made special emphasis on Article 14 of the Anti-terrorist Act, which provided that negotiations with the terrorists were allowed with the aim of saving human lives and health, protection of property and with the aim of supressing the terrorist act without recourse to force. Only those directly authorised by the OH to take part in the negotiations could do so. However, the said provision contained an outright prohibition to consider, in the course of negotiations, the possibilities of transferring any other persons to the terrorists, handing them weapons or any other dangerous substances or items, as well demands of political nature.544.\u00a0\u00a0In line with these directions, on 1 September the OH took a range of urgent steps. These included cordoning of the territory around the school, evacuation of population from the secured area, establishing control over the radio frequencies in the vicinity of the school, compiling a list of hostages and establishing means of communication with the terrorists. The OH also took care of accommodating and assigning areas of responsibility to the arriving members of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior, \u201cEmercom\u201d, health services. Four persons were put in charge of the contacts with the media: Mr Andreyev, Mr Dzugayev, Mr Dzantiyev and Mr Peskov from the Russian President\u2019s Administration. Later on the same day there arrived the FSB special forces who immediately started preparing for the various scenarios of the rescue operation.545.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 September the OH continued its attempts to reach an agreement with the terrorists. Through the FSB professional negotiators and public figures they were offered money and a possibility to leave. The terrorists were not ready to negotiate and interrupted the contacts, rejecting any offers and denying anything which could have alleviated the hostages\u2019 situation. Nevertheless, the release of some of the hostages on 2 September came as the result of the OH negotiating strategy (see paragraphs 167 and subsequent).546.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 September another compromise had been agreed upon \u2013 the terrorists acceded to the evacuation of the hostages\u2019 bodies from the school yard. After the first explosion at 1.10 p.m. the head of the OH had issued a written order to the FSB special units to start the rescue operation and extinguish the threat posed by the terrorists to the hostages. The subsequent examination of the servicemen\u2019 actions and equipment by the experts had been found to be adequate to the situation.547.\u00a0\u00a0Answering whether the storming had been planned and controlled so as to ensure minimal risk to lives and the use of firearms and other weapons, the Government recalled that the investigation had devoted special attention to the \u201calternative\u201d versions of the origin of the first explosions. These versions, in particular, suggested that the terrorists who had been holding the pedal detonators had been killed by an FSB sniper, or by a projectile launched from a portable grenade-launcher or a flame-thrower. These versions were thoroughly examined and rejected by the expert reports and the investigation. The Government referred, in particular, to the expert report no.\u00a016\/1 and the expert report no. 1 (see paragraphs 224, 134 and subsequent).548.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the explosions in the gymnasium at 1.10 p.m. on 3\u00a0September 2004 had triggered the development of the events which had not been wished for by the OH and whereby the decision to engage in combat had remained the only way to save the hostages\u2019 lives. The threat to the hostages\u2019 lives by that time has been clearly established and followed from the terrorists\u2019 statements and actions. This decision, taken under the pressure of time and in difficult circumstances, was perceived by the OH as the only means to eliminate the threat.549.\u00a0\u00a0Once the operation started, the servicemen of the special forces had entered the gymnasium and ensured evacuation of the hostages, while opening aimed fire at the terrorists. During the fight in the gymnasium, the terrorists had fired several shots at the officers from grenade-launchers, killing two officers and several hostages, and setting fire to the gymnasium roof. The battle continued in the same manner in other parts of the building; by 6 p.m. the rescue operation had been over and all living hostages had been evacuated from the building.550.\u00a0\u00a0Only after verifying the absence of alive hostages, the special forces had moved out of the building and resorted to heavier weapons, such as grenade-launchers and flame-throwers. The participation of the 58th army personnel and equipment had been limited to the use of tanks and armoured personnel carriers and their crews. Between 9.10 and 9.20 p.m. on 3 September one tank fired several shots at the canteen wall. Other tanks were not involved. Three APCs were involved in the storming: two were stationed near the school windows and covered the movements of the servicemen and the evacuation of the hostages. The third APC employed its stationary machine-gun in order to supress the terrorists\u2019 firing point on the second floor of the school prior to 3 p.m.; it was then used to evacuate one of the wounded members of the special forces.551.\u00a0\u00a0At 3.10 p.m. the OH ordered the deployment of fire-fighting units.552.\u00a0\u00a0The school building was secured on 4 September 2004 at 12.30\u00a0a.m. and at 1 a.m. the sappers started to deactivate the remaining explosive devices.553.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the preparation of and communication with rescue, medical and fire teams, the Government provided a detailed summary of the information contained in the criminal case no.\u00a020\/849 (see paragraphs 242 and subsequent). In particular, it informed the Court that on 1 September 2004 the Russian Ministry of Health had set up a coordination cell, joining the forces of the local and federal ministries of health, \u201cEmercom\u201d, the Zaschita centre and the centre of forensic examinations. As of 1 September evening, special units of psychological aid were put in place for the relatives. A number of other urgent steps had been taken, such as putting medical personnel in a number of local hospitals on standby, preparing contingents of necessary equipment and materials, including blood for transfusion, ensuring the preparedness of the local intensive care and surgery units.554.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 September an emergency paediatric field hospital was set up in Beslan. On 3 September an additional hospital was set up, equipped to perform urgent surgical operations and other types of emergency care.555.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, by the time of the first explosions, over 200 doctors, 307\u00a0medical staff, 70 ambulances had been ready in Beslan. This made 94\u00a0mobile medical brigades, including 14 reserve ones.556.\u00a0\u00a0Between 1.15 and 6.30 p.m. on 3 September 2004, 556 injured persons, of them 311 children, have been transferred to the local hospitals. By 7 p.m. on the same day all patients have been placed in hospitals in Beslan and Vladikavkaz; 47 urgent surgeries have been performed.557.\u00a0\u00a0Over one thousand persons had been provided with psychological aid.558.\u00a0\u00a0In total, between 3 September and 16 December 2004 about 800\u00a0patients received medical aid. 305 died at the school, 26 persons died in hospitals.559.\u00a0\u00a0As to the situation with the fire-fighters, the Government referred to expert report no.\u00a01 in the part concerning the actions of fire-fighters and other \u201cEmercom\u201d staff (see paragraphs 134 and subsequent). They also recalled the decisions not to open criminal investigation in respect of the \u201cEmercom\u201d staff (see paragraphs 235 and subsequent). The decision of 10\u00a0December 2004 not to charge the North Ossetia \u201cEmercom\u201d Minister Mr\u00a0Dzgoyev and his first deputy Mr Romanov with the crimes of professional negligence concluded that \u201cthe leadership of the anti-terrorist operation had been carried out by the FSB OH, and no actions could have been taken without their permission\u201d (ibid). The decision then stated that the two hours\u2019 delay between the call for firemen to intervene and the time when they had done so had been the result of absence of protective gear, which could lead to the situation that the firemen could have died without achieving their professional duties. In addition, on 20 April 2006 the investigation ruled not to open criminal proceedings in respect of Mr\u00a0Romanov and Mr Kharkov, the head of the fire-fighting service of the Pravoberezhny district, since the conclusions of the expert report no.\u00a01 and the fire-technical expert report had given no grounds to conclude that their actions had contained constituent elements of the crime of professional negligence (see paragraph 240 above).560.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further specified that had the fire-fighters been deployed immediately, their lives and the safety of the equipment would be put at serious risk. Such development would in any event render the rescue operation ineffective.561.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cEmercom\u201d staff at the site counted 254 persons, 70 rescue units.562.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation concluded, on the basis of the expert reports, including autopsy reports, that none of the victims had been killed as a result of fire (see paragraphs 253-54 above). The burns received by the surviving hostages had been received as a result of the explosions of IEDs. Referring to the expert report no.\u00a01 and the sources cited therein (such as pictures taken during the evacuation), the Government recalled that the fire in the gymnasium had started after the rescue operation was over; the hostages evacuated from the gymnasium recalled only smouldering in the ceiling but not open fire.(\u00df)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants\u2019 position563.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations of January 2013 and additional observations of October 2013, the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d reiterated their complaints about the violations of several aspects of Article 2 (see paragraphs 440, 442, 445 above). They were of the opinion that once the hostage taking had occurred, the authorities\u2019 had not acted with the required diligence to protect the hostages\u2019 lives. In October 2013 the applicants stressed that they still had no access to many of the relevant materials collected by the investigation and so they could only repeat their initial complaints.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment564.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the parties\u2019 submissions, the Court considers that this complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Use of the lethal force(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s position565.\u00a0\u00a0As to the circumstances of the use of lethal force by the State agents and their possible responsibility for the loss of life, the Government disputed the parallel drawn with the case of Finogenov and Others (cited above). In their opinion, in the latter case the (potentially) lethal force had been applied to the hostages \u2013 the applicants and their relatives \u2013 \u201cintentionally and consciously, either as a mean of achieving a distant aim (e.g., liquidation of a terrorist threat, in the course of which applicants or their relatives were affected by the measure applied) or as an aim in itself (where an applicant himself posed a threat to the others).\u201d Thus, the Government stressed that the use of lethal force in the circumstances as described in the Finogenov and Others case (cited above) [use of an unknown gas following which over 120 hostages died] had been indeed indiscriminate since the hostages were affected along with the terrorists. In contrast to that, the case at hand concerned a situation where lethal force had been applied \u201cdirectly and precisely\u201d to the terrorists, aiming to eliminate the threat they had posed to the hostages and others. In such circumstances, the Government argued that the examination of the applicant\u2019s grievances in the present case should be limited to the procedural aspect of Article 2.566.\u00a0\u00a0The Government insisted that the investigation had failed to impute a single death among the hostages to the actions of the security forces. The 331 deaths had been caused by the terrorists\u2019 actions (see paragraph 254 above). In such circumstances, they argued that the complaint about the use of lethal force by the State agents had been inadmissible for reasons of incompatibility with the ratione personae criteria.567.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to the conclusions of expert report no. 1 and to the investigator\u2019s decision of 3 December 2004 not to initiate criminal proceedings against officials (see paragraphs 134 and subsequent, paragraphs 229-34 above). These documents contained an exhaustive reconstruction of the chronology of the events, in particular of the first explosions of 3 September 2004 and the ensuing storming. In addition to the above mentioned documents, they relied on expert report no. 16\/1 (see paragraphs 224 and subsequent), to argue that the possibility that the first explosions could have been caused by external action had been thoroughly examined and dismissed by highly qualified and independent experts. Equally, the allegations that the security services had used indiscriminate weapons, such as grenades, grenade-launchers and flame-throwers, as well as tank cannons, prior to 6 p.m. on 3 September 2004, i.e. when the evacuation of surviving hostages had been completed, was dismissed as one for which there was no factual basis (see paragraphs 229-34 above).568.\u00a0\u00a0The Government reminded that the OH decision to start the storming of the building and the rescue operation was taken after the first explosions of the IEDs had killed dozens of persons in the gymnasium and, moreover, when the terrorists had started to shoot at the fleeing hostages. Thus, the decision had been adopted under tremendous pressure and in a situation where the authorities\u2019 control was minimal, that is, in the circumstances where the rigorous standard of \u201cabsolutely necessary\u201d could be departed from (the Government referred to Finogenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0211). Even if the Court found that the situation at hand did not \u201clie far beyond the Court\u2019s expertise\u201d and that the standard of \u201cabsolute necessity\u201d should be applied, the Government repeated that since there were no known victims of the lethal force employed by State agents, the traditional test under Article 2 had been passed.569.\u00a0\u00a0As to the storming itself, it had been performed by the special forces of the FSB \u2013 Alpha and Vympel groups \u2013 which had counted 329 servicemen. They were assisted by the forces of the 58th army. The servicemen had been equipped with ordinary weapons and special weapons, including grenade-launchers and flame-throwers.570.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to copies of dozens of witness\u2019 statements collected by the investigation between September 2004 and summer 2007 from the military and police servicemen, officers of the \u201cEmercom\u201d, fire-fighters, members of the OH. These statements, consistently and in details, denied the use of grenade-launchers, flame-throwers and tank cannon prior to 6 p.m. on 3 September 2004 (see paragraph 216 above).(\u00df)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants\u2019 position571.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants concerned were of the opinion that the official investigation\u2019s conclusions had failed to take into account or explain the testimonies given by the surviving hostages\u2019 and other witnesses, including police officers, about both the external reasons of the first explosions in the gymnasium and the use of powerful weapons, such as tank cannon and grenade-launchers upon the canteen and adjoining premises during day time. They cited the testimonials made during the trial of Mr Nurpashi Kulayev, which contained statements to that effect (see paragraphs 293, 294, 298, 300 and 303 above). They concluded that the results of the independent investigations had given grounds to conclude that a significant number of victims had lost their lives through the use by State agents of indiscriminate lethal weapons, such as flame-throwers and tank cannon.572.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the failure of the criminal investigation to take the necessary steps in order to establish the cause of death for each of the victims had rendered the accountability of the operation commanders impossible.573.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the steps taken by the investigation to protect the evidence, the applicants, once again, referred to the fact that the building of the school had been closed only during the day on 4 September 2004, while the investigation and rescue teams had worked at the site. During that day numerous relevant pieces of evidence, such as personal belongings, bullets, cartridges and pieces of explosives, even body parts were loaded onto trucks and taken to a dump site (see paragraphs 112 and 382 above). Since then, the building had suffered numerous alterations which rendered the collection of evidence and reconstruction of the events even more difficult.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment574.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the parties\u2019 submissions, the Court considers that these complaints raise serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that they are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established.D.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention575.\u00a0\u00a0A number of applicants from the \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d raised two complaints under Article 3: that the applicants hostages had been subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 for which the State was responsible, and that the positive obligations under this provision had not been complied with in the organisation of the medical and rescue aid to the victims. Article 3 reads as following:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s position576.\u00a0\u00a0As to the first allegation, the Government, in their submissions of September 2013, were of the opinion that the authorities have born no responsibility for the treatment of the hostages at the hands of the terrorists and that, accordingly, this complaint was inadmissible ratione personae.577.\u00a0\u00a0As to the provision of medical aid and rescue, the Government provided a detailed outline of the measures taken by the authorities in order to render adequate and efficient assistance to the victims. The aid and rehabilitation continued in the aftermath of the events. Specialised medical facilities were constructed in Beslan, groups of children and other victims have been taken to resorts and for medical treatment to other regions and abroad, where needed; teams of qualified specialists came from elsewhere in Russia and from foreign countries.578.\u00a0\u00a0As to the adequacy of the fire-fighting measures, the Government again referred to the conclusions of the expert report no.\u00a01 and the decisions by which it was decided not to prosecute the officials, including fire-fighters. In such circumstances, the actions of the fire-fighters could give no rise to any issues under Article 3 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants\u2019 position579.\u00a0\u00a0In their initial submissions and in the additional observations submitted in October 2013, the applicants concerned reiterated their argument that the State had born responsibility for the suffering of the hostages, notably through the failure of duty to prevent the terrorist act. Additional suffering had been inflicted upon the hostages\u2019 relatives by the fact of their being witnesses to the deaths and injuries of their close relatives.580.\u00a0\u00a0As to the failure of the fire-fighting service to intervene timely, they referred to the relevant passages of the North Ossetia Parliament\u2019s report which had established that after the third explosion, at about 1.30\u00a0p.m. on 3 September the fire from the ceiling had started to spread on the floor of the gymnasium (see paragraph 381 above). A number of wounded, shell-shocked and unconscious hostages remained in the gymnasium. The fire-fighters\u2019 intervention came at 3.25 p.m., after the partial collapse of the roofing at 1.42 p.m. This constituted a breach of the State\u2019s positive obligation under Article 3 to intervene and deliver extremely vulnerably persons from the effects of the spreading fire.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment581.\u00a0\u00a0The complaint under Article 3, as formulated by the applicants in this group, contains two distinct aspects. Their first argument is that the suffering of the hostages in captivity of the terrorists (and their relatives, by witnessing that suffering) could be attributed to the State as such, in so far as the authorities had failed to alleviate this situation. In this respect, the Court notes that, according to a general rule of international law, \u201cthe conduct of private persons is not as such attributable to the State\u201d (International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001. Vol. II, Part 2, p. 38, para. 3). This principle holds also true in respect of the Convention: human rights violations committed by private persons are outside of the Court\u2019s competence ratione personae. Independently of the outcome of the complaint which concerns the alleged omissions of the Russian authorities for the prevention of the life-threatening terrorist attack, in the present case the Court finds no grounds to conclude that the authorities should bear the responsibility under the Convention for the acts of the terrorists causing suffering to the hostages. It follows that this aspect of the complaint is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 4 (see Finogenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 229).582.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the complaint concerns the second aspect of applicants\u2019 argument \u2013 the provision of rescue, medical care and fire-fighters\u2019 response, the Court finds that this allegation essentially raises issues under Article 2 of the Convention, and concerns the planning and control of an operation involving lethal force. There is nothing in the applicants\u2019 submissions to indicate that there are separate aspects of this complaint which raise issues under Article 3 of the Convention.583.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.E.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention584.\u00a0\u00a0All applicants argued that they had no access to effective remedies against the violations alleged, especially under Article 2 of the Convention. Article 13 provides:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s position585.\u00a0\u00a0As outlined in their additional submissions received in September 2013, the Government were of the opinion that the rights of the applicants, as victims or relatives of victims in the criminal proceedings, were fully protected by the domestic legislation and practice. In particular, those persons who had expressed a wish to do so, have been granted the status of victims in the criminal proceedings. They thus acquired the procedural rights inherent to such status: to be informed about the developments, to be familiarised with the case-files, to lodge complaints and otherwise participate in the proceedings, as well as to lodge civil claims in order to compensate for the damage caused by the crime. Some of the victims have made use of these rights, while others have waived their rights to do so.586.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also referred to the wide range of measures taken by the State authorities in the aftermath of the crisis independently of the criminal proceedings. They referred to the documents which had detailed the compensations and other measures taken in respect of the hostages and their families, as well as the Beslan community as a whole.587.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Government argued that the applicants have had effective domestic remedies as required by Article 13 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants\u2019 position588.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cfirst group of applicants\u201d argued in their observations received in February 2013 that the payment of financial compensations and other measures of support to the victims had not replaced the obligation arising under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 to carry out a thorough and effective investigation. Relying on the Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia judgment (nos. 57942\/00 and 57945\/00, 24 February 2005), the applicants argued that since the criminal investigation in their case had been ineffective, \u201ccivil action is incapable, without the benefit of the conclusions of a criminal investigation, of making any meaningful findings as to the perpetrators of fatal assaults, and still less to establish their responsibility. Furthermore, a Contracting State\u2019s obligation under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention to conduct an investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible in cases of fatal assault might be rendered illusory if, in respect of complaints under those Articles, an applicant would be required to exhaust an action leading only to an award of damages\u201d (see Khashiyev and Akayeva, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0122).589.\u00a0\u00a0In their additional observations of October 2013 they further stressed that the domestic proceedings had been ineffective. Their numerous applications to the courts, especially in the course of criminal proceedings as provided for by Article 125 of the Criminal Procedural Code, had not rendered the investigation effective and had not resolved their grievances under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention).590.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, they submitted that only between December 2005 and September 2008 in the criminal investigation no.\u00a020\/849 the victims had lodged about 260 motions with the prosecutor\u2019s office. Most of their motions had been dismissed by the investigators. The applicants then appealed these rejections to the Promyshlenny and Leninskiy District Courts of Vladikavkaz in nine separate sets of proceedings and then to the North Ossetia Supreme Court. Their appeals had been dismissed by the courts, without seeking to examine the criminal case file (see paragraphs 256-67).591.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201csecond group of applicants\u201d also stressed that the judicial remedies turned out to be ineffective in their situation.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment592.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the parties\u2019 submissions, the Court considers that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.F.\u00a0\u00a0Other alleged violations of the Convention593.\u00a0\u00a0Certain applicants presented, in addition, complaints under Articles\u00a06, 8 and 10 of the Convention. Having regard to their complaints under Articles 2 and 13 arising out of the same facts considered above, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.594.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the complaints lodged by certain applicants under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court,Decides unanimously to join the applications;Decides unanimously to strike four persons out of its list of applicants (see Appendix);Declares unanimously the applications lodged by fifty-one applicants under Articles 2 and 13 inadmissible (see Appendix);Declares, by a majority, admissible, without prejudging the merits, the remaining applicants\u2019 complaints under Article 2 of the Convention concerning both substantive and procedural obligations of the Respondent State, and Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2;Declares unanimously inadmissible the remainder of the applications.Done in English and notified in writing on 2 July 2015.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Andr\u00e9 WampachIsabelle BerroDeputy RegistrarPresidentAPPENDIXApplication number \/ title \/Lodged onRepresented byApplicant no. \/Applicant\u2019s nameDate of birthPlace of residenceGrounds of complaints\/ Personal details: relation to the applicant; name; year of birth; death or injury sustainedAdmissibility under Articles 2 and 13 (see paragraphs 465, 466, 475 and 484)26562\/07\u00a0Tagayeva and Others v. Russia\u00a025\/06\/2007Mr Kirill Nikolayevich KOROTEYEV,\u00a0EHRAC\/Memorial Human Rights CentreEmma TAGAYEVA04\/02\/1962Beslanmother of Betrozov Alan 1988 (deceased) and Betrozov Aslan 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleLazar TAGAYEV03\/11\/1933(died on 14\/06\/11)legal successor Alan TAGAYEVMoscowgrandfather of Betrozov Alan 1988 (deceased) and Betrozov Aslan 1990 (deceased)Admissible \/ Legal successor no. 4Zhenya TAGAYEVA12\/07\/1927Beslangrandmother of Betrozov Alan 1988 (deceased) and Betrozov Aslan 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleAlan TAGAYEV14\/02\/1967Beslanuncle of Betrozov Alan 1988 (deceased) and Betrozov Aslan 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleValiko MARGIYEV10\/01\/1949Beslanfather of Margiyeva Elvira 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleSvetlana MARGIYEVA07\/10\/1959Beslanhostage (grave injuries); mother of Margiyeva Elvira 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleTaymuraz SALKAZANOV19\/05\/1956Beslanbrother of hostage Margiyeva Svetlana 1959 (grave injuries) (6) and uncle of Margiyeva Elvira 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleKazbek TSIRIKHOV07\/02\/1964Beslanfather of Tsirikhova Yelizaveta 1996 (deceased) and hostage Tsirikhova Zalina 1993 (10)AdmissibleZhanna TSIRIKHOVA02\/11\/1967Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of Tsirikhova Yelizaveta 1996 (deceased) and hostage Tsirikhova Zalina 1993 (10)AdmissibleZalina TSIRIKHOVA14\/06\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), sister of Tsirikhova Yelizaveta 1996 (deceased)AdmissibleSergey BIZIKOV26\/01\/1970Moscowuncle of Tsirikhova Yelizavieta 1996 (deceased)AdmissibleValeriy SALKAZANOV26\/02\/1960Beslanhusband of Salkazanova Larisa 1961 (deceased), father of Salkazanova Rada 2000 (deceased) and hostage Salkazanov Ruslan (1997) (grave injuries) (131)AdmissibleVera SALKAZANOVA01\/05\/1934(died on 23\/04\/11)legal successor Valeriy SALKAZANOVBeslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); grandmother of Salkazanova Rada 2000 (deceased)Admissible \/ Legal successor no. 12Boris ILYIN12\/02\/1953Beslanfather of Normatova Lira 1978 (deceased), grandfather of Bakhromov Amirkhan 2000 (deceased) and Normatova Zarina 1997 (deceased)AdmissibleEmiliya BZAROVA16\/04\/1971Beslanmother of Dzarasov Aslanbek 1994 (deceased) and hostage Dzarasov Zaurbek 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (16)AdmissibleZaurbek DZARASOV07\/01\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), brother of Dzarasov Aslanbek 1994 (deceased)AdmissibleElla KESAYEVA01\/09\/1963Beslanmother of hostage Kesayeva Zarina 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (18)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 18Zarina KESAYEV11\/07\/1992Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleRaisa KHUADONOVA12\/09\/1962Beslanmother of Khuadonova Regina 1989 (deceased)AdmissibleElvira KHUADONOVA05\/06\/1984Beslansister of Khuadonova Regina 1989 (deceased)AdmissibleNonna TIGIYEVA26\/09\/1972Beslanmother of Tigiyev Soslan 1990 (deceased) and hostage Tigiyeva Alana 1993 (grave injuries) (23)AdmissibleBoris TIGIYEV15\/03\/1972Moscowfather of Tigiyev Soslan 1990 (deceased) and hostage Tigiyeva Alana 1993 (grave injuries) (23)AdmissibleAlana TIGIYEVA23\/12\/1993Beslanhostage (grave injuries), sister of Tigiyev Soslan 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleRima BETROZOVA07\/04\/1957Vladikavkazsister of Betrozov Ruslan 1958 (deceased)AdmissibleZhanna BETROZOVA10\/11\/1967Leskensister of Betrozov Ruslan 1958 (deceased)AdmissibleSaveliy TORCHINOV23\/12\/1963Beslanfather of hostage Torchinova Layma 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (132)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 132Anna MISIKOVA12\/05\/1934Beslanmother of Misikov Artur 1974 (deceased), grandmother of hostage Misikov Atsamaz 1996 (28)AdmissibleAtsamaz MISIKOV15\/11\/1996Beslanhostage (medium grave injuries), son of Misikov Artur 1974 (deceased)AdmissibleOleg DAUROV29\/04\/1962Beslanfather of Daurov Taymuraz 1997 (deceased) and hostage Daurova Diana 1994 (medium gravity injuries) (31)AdmissibleTamara DAUROVA14\/04\/1967Beslanmother of Daurov Taymuraz 1997 (deceased) and hostage Daurova Diana 1994 (medium gravity injuries) (31)AdmissibleDiana DAUROVA24\/11\/1994Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), sister of Daurov Taymuraz 1997 (deceased)AdmissibleAida KHUBETSOVA05\/07\/1965Beslanmother of Khubetsova Alina 1993 (deceased)AdmissibleZoya AYLAROVA24\/03\/1941Vladikavkazgrandmother of Khubetsova Alina 1993 (deceased)AdmissibleAleksandr KHUBETSOV03\/12\/1987Beslanbrother of Khubetsova Alina 1993 (deceased)AdmissibleTamerlan SAVKUYEV23\/09\/1950Vladikavkazfather of Savkuyeva Inga 1974 (deceased), grandfather of Tomayev Totraz 1997 (deceased)AdmissibleTamara GOZOYEVA16\/07\/1962Beslanmother of Ktsoyeva Madina 1992 (deceased) and hostage Ktsoyev Atsamaz 1990 (medium gravity injuries) (38)Admissible Vladimir KTSOYEV25\/03\/1953Beslanfather of Ktsoyeva Madina 1992 (deceased) and hostage Ktsoyev Atsamaz 1990 (medium gravity injuries) (38)AdmissibleAtsamaz KTSOYEV27\/04\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), brother of Ktsoyeva Madina 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleMadina BDTAYEVA27\/06\/1960Beslanmother of hostages Godzhiyev Kazbek 1993 (grave injuries) (40) and Godzhiyev Amran 1989 (medium gravity injuries) (41)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 40 and 41Kazbek GODZHIYEV08\/03\/1993Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleAmran GODZHIYEV16\/09\/1989Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleKonstantin BALIKOYEV 11\/10\/1938(died on 25\/09\/2009)legal successor Oleg BALIKOYEV (08\/01\/1975)Beslanfather of Balikoyeva Larisa 1976 (deceased)Admissible \/ Legal successor Oleg Balikoyev (not an applicant)Zarema NADGERIYEVA20\/11\/1971Beslanmother of Bzykova Agunda 1994 (deceased) and hostage Bzykov Alan 1992 (44)AdmissibleAlan BZYKOV21\/11\/1992Beslanhostage, brother of Bzykova Agunda 1994 (deceased)AdmissibleZamira BUGULOVA01\/06\/1942Beslangrandmother of Dzhimiyev Oleg 1989 (deceased)AdmissibleZareta KADOKHOVA01\/06\/1933Beslangrandmother of Tsinoyeva Inga 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleYuriy KADOKHOV01\/01\/1933(died on 04\/01\/2014)legal successor Zareta KADOKHOVABeslangrandfather of Tsinoyeva Inga 1990 (deceased)Admissible \/ Legal successor no. 46Anna DZIOVA16\/05\/1934Beslanmother of Dziova (Dyambekova) Tamara 1967 (deceased), grandmother of Dyambekov Mayram 1998 (deceased) and Dyambekova Luiza 1995 (deceased)AdmissibleZalina TEBLOYEVA04\/12\/1961Nogirsister of Dziova (Dyambekova) Tamara 1967 (deceased)AdmissibleFatima DZIOVA20\/06\/1973Beslansister of Dziova (Dyambekova) Tamara 1967 (deceased)AdmissibleRazita DEGOYEVA08\/09\/1949Beslanmother of Bazrova Dzerassa 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleTotraz GATSALOV20\/08\/1956Beslanfather of Gatsalova Agunda 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleMariya OZIYEVA15\/09\/1942Beslangrandmother of Oziyev Vadim 1995 (deceased) and hostage Oziev Vladimir 1996 (grave injuries) (54)AdmissibleVladimir OZIYEV23\/11\/1996Beslanhostage (grave injuries), brother of Oziyev Vadim 1995 (deceased)AdmissibleFatima MALIKIYEVA16\/05\/1961Beslanmother of Malikiyev Arsen 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleAlik MALIKIYEV15\/09\/1958Beslan\u00a0father of Malikiyev Arsen 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleLyudmila GUTNOVA12\/10\/1950Beslangrandmother of Gutnov Zaurbek 1994 (deceased)AdmissibleZemfira TSIRIKHOVA10\/10\/1964Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), mother of Urusov Aleksandr 1996 (deceased) and hostage Urusov Amiran 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (59)AdmissibleAmiran URUSOV15\/09\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), brother of Urusov Aleksandr 1996 (deceased)Strike out from the list upon requests of 14\/09\/12 and 05\/03\/2014Aksana DZAPAROVA15\/03\/1968Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), wife of Archegov Aslan 1967 (deceased), mother of hostages Archegova Linda 1998 (61) and Archegov Alibek 1994 (62)Admissible Linda ARCHEGOVA29\/06\/1998Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), daughter of Archegov Aslan 1967 (deceased)AdmissibleAlibek ARCHEGOV19\/03\/1994Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), daughter of Archegov Aslan 1967 (deceased)AdmissibleZalina SABEYEVA11\/11\/1961Beslanmother of Sabeyeva Ilona 1989 (deceased)AdmissibleMzevinari KOKOYTI (former name KOCHISHVILI)28\/11\/1948Beslanmother of Kokoyti Bella 1992 (deceased)AdmissiblePartisan KODZAYEV13\/03\/1939Beslanhusband of Kodzayeva Tamara 1937 (deceased)AdmissibleAnya TOTROVA08\/03\/1954Vladikavkazmother of Totrova Marina 1993 (deceased)AdmissibleVadim URTAYEV20\/06\/1979Vladikavkazbrother of Totrova Marina 1993 (deceased)AdmissibleLarisa KULUMBEGOVA11\/01\/1962Vladikavkazmother of Valigazova Stella 1992 (deceased) and hostage Valigazov Georgiy 1994 (medium gravity injuries) (133)AdmissibleAlbert VALIGAZOV12\/05\/1960 (died on 04\/05\/10)legal successor Georgyi VALIGAZOVVladikavkazfarther of Valigazova Stella 1992 (deceased) and hostage Valigazov Georgiy 1994 (medium gravity injuries) (133)Admissible \/ Legal successor no. 133Vladimir TOMAYEV21\/08\/1960Beslanhusband of Kudziyeva Zinaida 1962 (deceased), father of Tomayeva Madina 1994 (deceased)AdmissibleVladimir KISIYEV28\/12\/1949(died on 23\/11\/2008)legal successor Nanuli KISIYEVAVladikavkazfather of Kisiyev Artur 1975 (deceased), grandfather of Kisiyev Aslan 1997 (deceased)\u00a0Admissible \/ Legal successor no. 72 in Savkuyev and OthersFatima SIDAKOVA05\/11\/1968Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), mother of hostages Zanigiyeva Santa 1989 (medium gravity injuries) (73) and Zangiyeva Albina 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (74) AdmissibleSanta ZANGIYEVA15\/04\/1989Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAlbina ZANGIYEVA18\/11\/1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZarina TOKAYEVA27\/10\/1976Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleNaira SIUKAYEVA13\/07\/1966Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), mother of hostage Margiyeva alias Margishvili Maya 1991 (medium gravity injuries) (77)AdmissibleMaya MARGIYEVA alias MARGISHVILI21\/05\/1991Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleFatima AYLYAROVA21\/11\/1963Beslanmother of hostages Aylyarov Aslanbek 1989 (medium gravity injuries) (79) and Aylyarov Vyacheslav 1987 (medium gravity injuries) (80)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 79 and 80Aslanbek AYLYAROV03\/04\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleVyacheslav AYLYAROV16\/09\/1987Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZalina KARAYEVA08\/09\/1973Beslanhostage, mother of hostage Bigayev Khasan 1994 (medium gravity injuries) (82)AdmissibleKhasan BIGAYEV26\/03\/1994Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleDali TIGIYEVA14\/03\/1964Beslanmother of hostages Tigiyeva Ketevan 1987 (medium gravity injuries) (84), Tigiyeva Svetlana 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (86) and escaped Tigiyeva Tina 1989 (85)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 84, 85 and 86Ketevan TIGIYEVA02\/09\/1987Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleTina TIGIYEVA15\/08\/1989BeslanescapedAdmissibleSvetlana TIGIYEVA04\/07\/1992Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleFatima USHAKOVA21\/02\/1956Beslanmother of hostage Ushakova Victoria 1992 (grave injuries) (89)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 89Viktor USHAKOV29\/01\/1956Beslanfather of hostage Ushakova Victoria 1992 (grave injuries) (89)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 89Viktoria USHAKOVA30\/01\/1992Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleElvira GAGIYEVA10\/12\/1962Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), mother of hostages Khadartseva Zarina 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (91) and Khadartseva Dzerassa 1990 (medium gravity injuries) (92)AdmissibleZarina KHADARTSEVA15\/02\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleDzerassa KHADARTSEVA30\/06\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleMarina UZHEGOVA12\/01\/1973Beslanmother of hostage Uzhegova Elena 1994 (medium gravity injuries) (94)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 94Elena UZHEGOVA12\/09\/1994Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleElvira YESIYEVA17\/07\/1969Beslanmother of hostages Yesiyev Vladislav 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (96) and Yesiyev Alan 1994 (grave injuries) (97)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 96 and 97Vladislav YESIYEV12\/10\/1992Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAlan YESIYEV16\/03\/1994Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleBella TSGOYEVA06\/02\/1960Beslanmother of hostage Tsgoyeva Alina 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (99)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 99Alina TSGOYEVA02\/09\/1995Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Irina MALIYEVA03\/08\/1958Beslanmother of hostage Khayeva Yana 1988 (medium gravity injuries) (101)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 101\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Yana KHAYEVA13\/10\/1988Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Svetlana BIGAYEVA08\/05\/1963Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Soslanbek BIGAYEV24\/03\/1988Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Azamat BIGAYEV01\/03\/1992Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Georgiy BIGAYEV02\/01\/1990BeslanescapedAdmissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Lyudmila TORCHINOVA30\/01\/1961Beslanmother of hostage Tortchinov Georgiy 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (107) and escaped Torchinov Zaurbek 1989 (108)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 107 and 108\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Georgiy TORCHINOV25\/11\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Zaurbek TORCHINOV29\/01\/1989BeslanescapedAdmissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Irina PERSAYEVA16\/10\/1964Beslanmother of hostages Persayev Soslan 1994 (medium gravity injuries) (110) and Persayev Aslanbek 1989 (grave injuries) (111)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 110 and 111\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Soslan PERSAYEV01\/08\/1994Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Aslanbek PERSAYEV16\/02\/1989Beslanhostage (grave injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Irina DOGUZOVA20\/03\/1967Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), mother of Dzhioyev Artur 1995 (deceased) and survived hostage Dzhioyev Mark 1996 (113)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Mark DZHIOYEV29\/09\/1996Beslanhostage, brother of Dzhioyev Artut 1995 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Zarema BEDOSHVILI29\/10\/1964Beslanmother of Bichenov Kazbek 1995 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Roman BICHENOV08\/01\/1963Beslanfather of Bichenov Kazbek 1995 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Murat KATSANOV28\/11\/1958Beslanfather of Katsanova Alana 1989 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Valeriy NAZAROV17\/08\/1940Vladikavkazhusband of Nazarova Nadezhda 1940 (deceased); farther of Balandina Natalia 1975 (deceased); grandfather of Balandin Aleksandr 1995 (deceased) and Nazarova Anastasiya 1994 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Yelena NAZAROVA28\/06\/1967Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), daughter-in-law of Nazarova Nadezhda 1940 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Irina MORGOYEVA15\/12\/1955Beslanmother of Khayeva Emma 1992 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Rita KACHMAZOVA09\/05\/1959Beslanmother of hostage Kachmazova Amina 1996 (grave injuries) (121)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 121\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Amina KACHMAZOVA14\/09\/1996Beslanhostage (grave injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Rigina KUSAYEVA09\/12\/1973Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostages Kusayeva Izeta 1995 (123) and Kusayev Fidar 2000 (grave injuries) (124)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Izeta KUSAYEVA01\/09\/1995BeslanhostageAdmissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Fidar KUSAYEV14\/05\/2000Beslan\u00a0hostage (grave injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Larisa KUDZIYEVA14\/05\/1964Nogirhostage (grave injuries); mother of hostage Kudziyev Zaurbek 1997 (medium gravity injuries, not an applicant, died on 26\/04\/11)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Lyudmila TSEBOYEVA18\/12\/1956Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Tseboyeva Lyana 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (127)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Lyana TSEBOYEVA11\/09\/1992Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Irina DZHIBILOVA11\/12\/1936Beslangrandmother of Dzhibilov Boris 1995 (deceased) and Dzhibilova Alana 1992 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Aleksandra KHUBAYEVA14\/08\/1950Beslanmother of Khubayeva Madina 1972 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Alma KHAMITSEVA07\/04\/1965Beslansister of Chedzhemova Lemma 1962 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ruslan SALKAZANOV04\/10\/1997Beslanhostage (minor) (grave injuries)Admissible \/ Applicant minor added to the list\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Layma TORCHINOVA1995 (copy of passport missing)Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible \/ Applicant added to the list\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Georgiy VALIGAZOV1994 (copy of passport missing)Vladikavkazhostage (medium gravity injuries) Admissible \/ Applicant added to the list14755\/08\u00a0Dudiyeva and Others v. Russia\u00a014\/02\/2008Mr Mikhail Ivanovich TREPASHKIN,\u00a0Mr Sergey Aleksandrovich KNYAZKINSusanna DUDIYEVA12\/07\/1961Beslanmother of Dudiyev Zaur 1991 (deceased)AdmissibleAneta GADIYEVA16\/06\/1963Vladikavkazhostage; mother of Dogan Alana 1995 (deceased) and hostage Dogan Milena 2003 (14)AdmissibleRita SIDAKOVA30\/05\/1959Beslanmother of Dudiyeva Alla 1995 (deceased)AdmissibleViktor YESIYEV18\/07\/1938Vladikavkazfather of Yesiyev Elbrus 1967 (deceased)AdmissibleElvira TUAYEVA06\/01\/1962Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of Tuayeva Karina 1992 (deceased) and Tuayev Khetag 1993 (deceased)AdmissibleRimma TORCHINOVA26\/12\/1965Beslanmother of Gumetsova Aza 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleRita TECHIYEVA13\/05\/1960Beslanmother of Rubayev Khasan 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleAleftina KHANAYEVA10\/11\/1970Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of Ramonova Marianna 1989 (deceased)AdmissibleSvetlana TSGOYEVA07\/02\/1938Beslangrandmother of Albegova Zalina 1995 (deceased)AdmissibleLarisa MAMITOVA02\/11\/1959Vladikavkazhostage (grave injuries); mother of hostage Toguzov Tamerlan 1991 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleZalina GUBUROVA24\/07\/1964Beslanmother of Guburov Soslan 1995 (deceased) and daughter of Daurova Zinaida 1935 (deceased)AdmissibleZalina BADOYEVA08\/04\/1961Vladikavkazsister of Badoyev Akhtemir 1957 (deceased)AdmissibleZema TOKOVA20\/06\/1963Beslanmother of Godzhiyev Roman 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleMilena DOGAN2003Vladikavkaz\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0hostageAdmissible \/ Applicant minor added to the list49339\/08\u00a0Albegova and Others v. Russia\u00a004\/09\/2008Mr Mikhail Ivanovich TREPASHKIN,\u00a0Mr Sergey Aleksandrovich KNYAZKINAlbina ALBEGOVA06\/10\/1972Beslanmother of Albegova Zalina 1995 (deceased)AdmissibleKazbek ADYRKHAYEV29\/08\/1971Beslanhusband of Alikova Zara 1966 (deceased); father of Galayeva Alina 1989 (deceased) and Adyrkhayev Albert 2001 (deceased)AdmissibleFilisa BATAGOVA23\/07\/1948Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleSvetlana BEROYEVA24\/07\/1949Beslangrandmother of Tokmayev Aslan 1994 (deceased) and Tokmayev Soslan 1994 (deceased)AdmissibleAlla BIBOYEVA29\/09\/1958Beslanmother of Batagov Timur 1991 (deceased)AdmissibleZalina BEROYEVA12\/03\/1974Beslanmother of Tokmayev Aslan 1994 (deceased) and Tokmayev Soslan 1994 (deceased)AdmissibleZarema GADIYEVA10\/03\/1938Beslanmother of Gadiyeva-Goloyeva Fatima 1975 (deceased)AdmissibleKanna GAYTOVA04\/09\/1963Beslanmother of Gaytov Alan 1998 (deceased) and hostage Gaytova Yelena 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissiblePolina GASINOVA03\/01\/1938Beslanmother of Gasinova Emma 1964 (deceased)AdmissibleMarina GAPPOYEVA08\/09\/1970Beslanhostage (grave injuries); mother of Gappoyeva Dzerassa 1998 (deceased) and wife of Gappoyev Ruslan 1970 (deceased)AdmissibleRafimat GABOYEVA10\/04\/1966Beslanhostage (light injuries); mother of Aylarova Svetlana 1998 (deceased)AdmissibleMarina DUDIYEVA25\/04\/1967Beslandaughter of Dudiyeva Tina 1939 (deceased); sister of hostage Kudzayeva Alina 1973 (app. no. 36 in Aliyeva and Others)AdmissibleVladimir DZGOYEV06\/10\/1957Beslanhusband of Dzgoyeva Anna 1957 (deceased); father of Dzgoyeva Olga 1982 (deceased) and hostages Dzgoeva Margarita 1989 (grave injuries) (not an applicant) and Dzgoyev Aslanbek 1990 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleKazbek DZARASOV30\/04\/1969Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); father of Dzarasov Aslanbek 1994 (deceased) and hostage Dzarasov Zaurbek 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (app. no. 16 in Tagayeva and Others)AdmissibleLena DULAYEVA25\/09\/1959Beslanmother of Gugkayeva Inga 1980 (deceased)AdmissibleAkhsarbek DUDIYEV21\/01\/1966Vladikavkazfather of Dudiyeva Izeta 1997 (deceased) and Dudiyev Soslan 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleElbrus DUDIYEV25\/03\/1953Beslanfather of Dudiyev Zaur 1991 (deceased)AdmissibleRita DUDIYEVA01\/01\/1967Vladikavkazhostage (grave injuries); mother of Dudiyeva Izeta 1997 (deceased) and Dudiyev Soslan 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleSeyfulmulal DOGAN09\/07\/1955VladikavkazHusband of hostage Gadiyeva Aneta (app. no. 2 in Dudiyeva and Others), father of Dogan Alana 1995 (deceased) and hostage Dogan Milena 2003 (app. no. 14 in Dudiyeva and Others)AdmissibleAlik DZGOYEV02\/02\/1967Beslanfather of Dzgoyeva Zalina 1996 (deceased)AdmissibleFatima DUDIYEVA01\/11\/1959Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleAnatoliy KANUKOV09\/09\/1965Nuzalfather of Kanukova Anzhelika 1991 (deceased); husband of hostage Kanukova Zarina 1965 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) AdmissibleFatima KABISOVA07\/03\/1970Vladikavkazmother of Khadikov Islam 1989 (deceased)AdmissibleMadinat KARGIYEVA16\/04\/1961Beslanhostage (grave injuries); mother of Kastuyeva Zarina 1992 (deceased) and hostage Kastuyev Alan 1995 (grave injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleTatyana KODZAYEVA09\/11\/1968Beslanhostage (grave injuries); mother of Kodzayeva Elina 1995 (deceased)AdmissibleElbrus NOGAYEV17\/10\/1959Beslanhusband of Nogayeva Rita 1960 (deceased) and Nogayeva Ella 1995 (deceased)AdmissibleZalina NOGAYEVA26\/12\/1969Beslanhostage; mother of Tokova Alina 1995 (deceased) and hostage Tokov Albert 1994 (grave injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleAnzhela NOGAYEVA07\/05\/1980Beslanhostage (grave injuries); mother of hostage Nogayev Batraz 1998 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleKazbek RUBAYEV05\/11\/1951Beslanfather of Rubayev Khasan 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleVenera SAMAYEVA05\/05\/1936Zavodskoymother of Muzayeva Fatima 1968 (deceased)AdmissibleIrina SOSKIYEVA16\/01\/1978Beslandaughter of Soskiyeva Olga 1951 (deceased)AdmissibleNatalya SALAMOVA09\/08\/1940Beslanmother of Dzutseva-Tatrova Alena 1976 (deceased)\u00a0AdmissibleGeorgiy TUAYEV15\/03\/1960Beslanhusband of hostage Tuayeva Elvira 1962 (app. no. 5 in Dudiyev and Others) (medium gravity injuries); father of Tuayeva Karina 1992 (deceased) and Tuayev Khetag 1993 (deceased)AdmissibleElbizdiko TOKHTIYEV07\/03\/1952Vladikavkazfather of Tokhtiyev Azamat 1989 (deceased)AdmissibleLyudmila KHADZARAGOVA16\/04\/1964Beslanmother of Dzhimiyev Oleg 1989 (deceased) and hostage Dzhimiyeva Alina 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleRita KHABLIYEVA19\/11\/1956Beslanmother of Farniyeva Kristina 1988 (deceased)AdmissibleZalina KHUZMIYEVA19\/01\/1967Beslanhostage (grave injuries); mother of Khuzmiyev Georgiy 1996 (deceased) and Khuzmiyeva Stella 1997 (deceased)AdmissibleTamara SHOTAYEVA14\/05\/1949Beslanmother of Kuchiyeva-Shotayeva Albina 1973 (deceased) and grandmother of Kuchiyeva Zarina 1997 (deceased)AdmissibleRuslan TSKAYEV07\/09\/1969Beslanhusband of Tskayeva Fatima 1974 (deceased); father of Tskayeva Kristina 1994 (deceased) and hostages Tskayev Makharbek 2001 (not an applicant) and Tskayeva Alena 2004 (not an applicant)AdmissibleGerman TSGOYEV15\/08\/1959Beslanhusband of Biboyeva Fatima 1967 (deceased); father of hostages Tsgoyev Aleksandr 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) and Tsgoyeva Valeriya 2000 (grave injuries) (not an applicant)\u00a0Admissible Elza TSABIYEVA21\/12\/1967Beslan\u00a0mother of Pliyeva Alana 1993 (deceased) and hostage Pliyeva Zalina 1996 (grave injuries) (not an applicant) AdmissibleSvetlana TSINOYEVA06\/09\/1964Vladikavkazmother of Tsinoyeva Inga 1990 (deceased)Admissible49380\/08\u00a0Savkuyev and Others v. Russia\u00a004\/09\/2008Mr Kirill Nikolayevich KOROTEYEV,\u00a0EHRAC\/ Memorial Human Rights CentreTimur SAVKUYEV16\/09\/1981Beslanbrother of Savkuyeva Inga 1974 (deceased)AdmissibleMarina KODZAYEVA21\/05\/1970Vladikavkazdaughter of Kodzayeva Tamara 1937 (deceased); mother of hostage Tatonov Gleb 2000 (grave injuries) (3)AdmissibleGleb TATONOV07\/12\/2000Beslanhostage (grave injuries), grandson of Kodzayeva Tamara 1937 (deceased)AdmissibleGennadiy BELYAKOV14\/02\/1961Beslanson of Kodzayeva Tamara 1937 (deceased)AdmissibleSvetlana BOKOYEVA25\/02\/1962Beslanmother of hostages Bokoyeva Marina 1989 (grave injuries) (6) and Bokoyeva Zaira 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (7)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative ofnos. 6 and 7Marina BOKOYEVA06\/01\/1989Beslan\u00a0\u00a0hostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleZaira BOKOYEVA17\/12\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZemfira AGAYEVA11\/06\/1971Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Agayev Aleksandr 1996 (medium gravity injuries) (9) and Agayev Georgiy (Zhorik) 1996 (deceased)AdmissibleAleksandr AGAYEV20\/05\/1996Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), brother of Agayev Georgiy (Zhorik) 1996 (deceased)AdmissibleMarita MAMSUROVA24\/02\/1962Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZarina KHADIKOVA10\/04\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAtsamaz DZAGOYEV09\/12\/1941Beslanfather of hostage Dzagoyev Chermen 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (13), husband of Dzagoyeva Zhanna 1963 (deceased)AdmissibleChermen DZAGOYEV22\/09\/1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), son of Dzagoyeva Zhanna 1963 (deceased)AdmissibleVenera KAZAKHOVA15\/05\/1938(died on 18\/08\/11)Vladikavkaz\u00a0\u00a0mother of Dzagoyeva Zhanna 1963 (deceased)Strike out from the list, no legal successorRoza BEKOYEVA05\/05\/1959Beslanmother of hostages Tsorayeva Alina 1992 (grave injuries) (16) and Tsorayev Zaurbek 1990 (medium gravity injuries) (17)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 16 and 17Alina TSORAYEVA22\/06\/1992Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleZaurbek TSORAYEV14\/03\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Strike out from the list upon request of 05\/03\/2014Klara DZAGOYEVA08\/03\/1957Vladikavkazmother of hostage Kibizova Viktoriya 1987 (medium gravity injuries) (99)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 99Larisa DZAGOYEVA25\/08\/1949Beslanmother of Dzagoyeva Irma 1980 (deceased)AdmissibleIrina DZAGOYEVA25\/03\/1988Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), sister of Dzagoyeva Irma 1980 (deceased)AdmissibleAlina SAKIYEVA25\/07\/1987Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleMarina DARCHIYEVA19\/10\/1967Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostages Darchiyev Akhsarbek 1996 (medium gravity injuries) (23) and Darchiyeva Yelena 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (24)\u00a0\u00a0AdmissibleAkhsarbek DARCHIYEV28\/05\/1996Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleYelena DARCHIYEVA11\/04\/1992Beslan\u00a0hostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZhanna KOZYREVA17\/02\/1964Beslanmother of hostage Kozyrev Zaurbek 1994 (grave injuries) (100)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 100Anna ALIKOVA12\/09\/1954Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleOksana DZAMPAYEVA15\/12\/1976Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Dzampayeva Irlanda 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (28)AdmissibleIrlanda DZAMPAYEVA09\/02\/1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZarina MORGOYEVA22\/05\/1975Beslanmother of hostage Morgoyev Soslan 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (30)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 30Soslan MORGOYEV23\/07\/1995Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleFatima URTAYEVA07\/03\/1962Beslanmother of hostage Tetov Alan 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (32) and Tetova Agunda 1991 (deceased) and Tetova Alina 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleAlan TETOV10\/08\/1992Beslan\u00a0hostage (medium gravity injuries), brother of Tetova Agunda 1991 (deceased) and Tetova Alina 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleZalina DULAYEVA28\/12\/1965Beslanmother of Tsabolov Marat 1994 (deceased)AdmissibleMariya ARCHEGOVA24\/04\/1946Beslanmother of Archegov Aslan 1967 (deceased)AdmissibleTamara MORGOYEVA24\/04\/1946Beslanmother of hostages Dzarasov Aslan 1990 (medium gravity injuries) (36) and Dzarasov Soslan 1992 (37)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 36 and 37Aslan DZARASOV03\/09\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleSoslan DZARASOV02\/07\/1992BeslanhostageAdmissibleVinera CHIKHTISOVA06\/08\/1960Beslanmother of hostage Chikhtisov Batraz 1993 (39)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 39Batraz CHIKHTISOV29\/12\/1993Beslan\u00a0hostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAlan KHADIKOV13\/02\/1965Beslanfather of Khadikov Islam 1989 (deceased)AdmissibleTamusya BEROZOVA08\/09\/1959Beslanmother of hostages Gutiyev Artur 1989 (medium gravity injuries) (42) and Gutiyeva Diana 1991 (medium gravity injuries) (43)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 42 and 43Artur GUTIYEV10\/10\/1989Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleDiana GUTIYEVA17\/06\/1991Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleFatima GUTIYEVA18\/04\/1961Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZhanna DZEBOYEVA24\/10\/1960Vladikavkazhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Dzandarova Diana 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (46)AdmissibleDiana DZANDAROVA26\/06\/1995Vladikavkazhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleIrina BEKUZAROVA08\/03\/1964Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Khudalova Madina 1997 (48) and Khudalov Beksoltan 1997 (deceased)AdmissibleMadina KHUDALOVA12\/06\/1997Beslanhostage, sister of Khudalov Beksoltan 1997 (deceased)AdmissibleBella KHUDALOVA12\/04\/1964Beslanmother of hostage Khudalov Islam 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (50)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 50Islam KHUDALOV08\/04\/1992Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleGalina KUDZIYEVA18\/02\/1962Beslanhostage (grave injuries); mother of Daguyeva Karina 1988 (deceased)AdmissibleLyudmila KORNAYEVA27\/03\/1954Beslanmother of hostages Kusova Dzerassa 1988 (medium gravity injuries) (53), Kusova Fatima 1990 (medium gravity injuries) (54) and Kusova Madina 1993 (deceased)AdmissibleDzerassa KUSOVA10\/10\/1988Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), sister of Kusova Madina 1993 (deceased)AdmissibleFatima KUSOVA26\/04\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), sister of Kusova Madina 1993 (deceased)AdmissibleLyudmila KOKAYEVA14\/02\/1957Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Kokayev Soslan Borisovich 1990 (medium gravity injuries) (56)AdmissibleSoslan KOKAYEV24\/04\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleIndira KOKAYEVA23\/04\/1974Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Kokayev Alan 1998 (medium gravity injuries) (58)AdmissibleAlan KOKAYEV05\/11\/1998Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZoya KTSOYEVA12\/04\/1963Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostages Eltarov Boris 1988 (medium gravity injuries) (60) and Eltarov Soslan 1991 (medium gravity injuries) (61)AdmissibleBoris ELTAROV25\/12\/1988Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleSoslan ELTAROV13\/08\/1991Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAlbina KASTUYEVA17\/08\/1966Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Kastuyeva Zalina 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (63)AdmissibleZalina KASTUYEVA01\/03\/1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAkhsarbek DZHIOYEV02\/08\/1964Beslanfather of Dzhioyev Artur 1995 (deceased)AdmissibleAlan ADYRKHAYEV18\/10\/1963Beslanhusband of Adyrkhayeva Irina 1975 (deceased); father of hostages Adyrkhayeva Milana 2000 (medium gravity injuries) (66) and Adyrkhayeva Emiliya 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (67) AdmissibleMilana ADYRKHAYEVA13\/04\/2000Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), daughter of Adyrkhayeva Irina 1975 (deceased)AdmissibleEmiliya ADYRKHAYEVA07\/06\/1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), daughter of Adyrkhayeva Irina 1975 (deceased)AdmissibleMarina PAK25\/11\/1965Beslanmother of Tsoy Svetlana 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleYelena SMIRNOVA24\/09\/1965Beslanmother of Smirnova Inna 1988 (deceased)AdmissibleAleksandra SMIRNOVA02\/06\/1933Beslangrandmother of Smirnova Alla 1989 (deceased)AdmissibleRita TIBILOVA18\/02\/1963Beslanmother of Gatsalova Agunda 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleNanuli KISIYEVA20\/12\/1953Vladikavkazmother of Kisiyev Artur 1975 (deceased); grandmother of Kisiyev Aslan 1997 (deceased)AdmissibleLyudmila DZAMPAYEVA10\/01\/1951Beslan\u00a0\u00a0grandmother of Bitsiyev Zaurbek 1996 (deceased)AdmissibleRuslan GAPPOYEV25\/01\/1961Beslanhusband of Gappoyeva Naida 1960 (deceased); father of hostages Gappoyev Alan 1997 (grave injuries) (75) and Gappoyev Soslan 1993 (grave injuries) (76) AdmissibleAlan GAPPOYEV24\/06\/1997Beslanhostage (grave injuries), son of Gappoyeva Naida 1960 (deceased)AdmissibleSoslan GAPPOYEV05\/05\/1993Beslanhostage (grave injuries), son of Gappoyeva Naida 1960 (deceased)AdmissibleShorena VALIYEVA12\/03\/1974Beslanhostage (grave injuries); mother of hostage Guldayev Georgiy 1998 (grave injuries) (78)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Georgiy GULDAYEV06\/02\/1998Beslanhostage (grave injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Vova GULDAYEV05\/04\/1963Beslanhusband of Msostova Elza 1969 (deceased); father of Guldayeva Olesya 1992 (deceased) and hostage Guldayeva Alina 1993 (grave injuries) (80)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Alina GULDAYEVA01\/07\/1993Beslanhostage (grave injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Kira GULDAYEVA02\/05\/1941Beslan\u00a0hostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Zarina DZAMPAYEVA10\/05\/1976Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of Bitsiyev Zaurbek 1996 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Lyubov SALAMOVA08\/08\/1946Beslangrandmother of Alkayev Sergey 1989 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Fatima KELEKHSAYEVA04\/08\/1964Brutmother of Arsoyeva Sofya 1990 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Oksana TSAKHILOVA25\/06\/1977Vladikavkazsister of Nayfonova Svetlana 1972 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Marina KOKOVA22\/11\/1974Beslanmother of hostages Kokov Shamil 1996 (medium gravity injuries) (101) and Kokova Valeriya 2001 (105)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 101 and 105\u00a0\u00a0Rustam KOKOV14\/07\/1974Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Anastasiya TEBIYEVA14\/04\/1948Beslanmother of hostage Khoziyeva Madina 1990 (not an applicant) (medium gravity injuries)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 102\u00a0\u00a0Zara GIOYEVA29\/11\/1936Beslanmother of hostage Tsagarayeva Lyubov 1962 (medium gravity injuries) (103) and grandmother of Tsagarayev Georgiy 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (104) Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 103 and 104\u00a0\u00a0Sergey OZIYEV01\/10\/1965Beslanhusband of Oziyeva Marina 1975 (deceased); father of Oziyev Vadim 1995 (deceased) and hostage Oziyev Vladimir 1996 (grave injuries) (91)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Vladimir OZIYEV23\/11\/1996Beslanhostage (grave injuries), son of Marina Oziyeva 1975 (deceased) and brother of Oziyev Vadim 1995 (deceased)Delete from the list of applicants as duplicate (remains applicant no. 54 in application no. 26562\/07)\u00a0\u00a0Nadezhda ZASEYEVA08\/12\/1946Beslanmother of Oziyeva Marina 1975 (deceased) and grandmother of Oziyev Vadim 1995 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Lidiya KHODOVA04\/01\/1953Beslanhostage (grave injuries); representative of hostage Aylyarov Asakhmat 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (94) Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Asakhmat AYLYAROV27\/01\/1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Lyubov ZAPOROZHETS04\/05\/1966Beslanmother of Zaporozhets Sergey 1992 (deceased) Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Sergey FRIYEV27\/05\/1959Beslanfather of Friyeva Yelena 1995 (deceased) and hostage Friyev Ruslan 1993 (97)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Ruslan FRIYEV13\/03\/1993Beslanhostage, brother of Friyeva Yelena 1995 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Larisa TSGOYEVA19\/12\/1969Beslanwife of Dzgoyev Khazbi 1970 (deceased)Admissible\u00a0\u00a0Viktoriya KIBIZOVA16\/08\/1987Beslan\u00a0hostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible \/ Applicant added to the list\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Zaurbek KOZYREV1994 (copy of passport missing)Beslanhostage (grave injuries)Admissible \/ Applicant added to the list\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Shamil KOKOV26\/03\/1996Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries) Admissible \/ Applicant added to the list\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Madina KHOZIYEVA08\/03\/1990BeslanhostageAdmissible \/ Applicant added to the list\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Lyubov TSAGARAYEVA1962Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries) Admissible \/ Applicant added to the list\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Georgiy TSAGARAYEV1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries) Admissible \/ Applicant added to the list\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Valeriya KOKOVA2001BeslanhostageAdmissible \/ Applicant minor added to the list51313\/08\u00a0Aliyeva and Others v. Russia\u00a022\/09\/2008\u00a0Mr Mikhail Ivanovich TREPASHKIN,\u00a0Mr Sergey Aleksandrovich KNYAZKINMargarita ALIYEVA27\/10\/1967Beslanmother of hostages Aliyev Kazbek 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) and Aliyev Aslanbek 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)Inadmissible rationae personeNadezhda BADOYEVA22\/07\/1987Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleZarema BADTIYEVA04\/11\/1952Farnmother of Badtiyeva Anzhela 1972 (deceased)AdmissibleValeriy BEKUZAROV11\/04\/1968Alaniyahusband of Bekuzarova Yelena 1974 (deceased)AdmissibleVladimir BICHENOV22\/04\/1964Beslanhusband of hostage Skayeva Tamara 1966 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) and father of hostage Bichenov Damir 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)Inadmissible rationae personeZarina VALIYEVA20\/02\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleGalina VALIYEVA08\/12\/1964Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries) AdmissibleDavid VALIYEV20\/02\/1989Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleZinaida VARZIYEVA21\/08\/1955Alaniyamother of Varziyev Erik 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleRaisa GABISOVA21\/10\/1945Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZaurbek GAYTOV24\/03\/1963Beslanfather of Gaytov Alan 1988 (deceased) and hostage Gaytova Yelena 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleLyudmila GODZOYEVA03\/11\/1968Vladikavkazmother of hostages Gabisov Ruslan 1991 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) and Gabisov Alan 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)Inadmissible rationae personeZara GOZYUMOVA29\/05\/1959BeslanhostageAdmissibleDzhaba GOLOYEV29\/06\/1979Novyy Batakohusband of Gadiyeva Fatima 1975 (deceased) and father of Goloyeva Kristina 2002 (deceased)AdmissibleZarina DAUROVA18\/08\/1985Vladikavkazhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleElochka DZARASOVA30\/08\/1940Beslan\u00a0\u00a0hostageAdmissibleElza DZEBOYEVA13\/10\/1951Terekhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZoya DZUTSEVA14\/07\/1939Beslangrandmother of Tsibirova Tameris 1994 (deceased) and hostage Tsibirova Amaga 1991 (grave injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleLyudmila DZUTSEVA12\/02\/1966Beslansister of Dzutseva-Tatrova Alena 1976 (deceased)AdmissibleZarina DZHIBILOVA21\/06\/1977Elkhotovosister of Dzhidzalova Edita 1976 (deceased)AdmissibleLarisa DIGUROVA29\/09\/1964Beslanmother of hostage Digurov Soslan 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)Inadmissible rationae personeLarisa DZHUMOK30\/09\/1960Beslanhostage AdmissibleZara DUDAROVA06\/11\/1957Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleMadina DUDAROVA15\/07\/1969Vladikavkazmother of hostage Dudarov Umar 2003 (medium gravity injuries) (59)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 59Svetlana DZIOVA31\/03\/1964Beslan\u00a0mother of Dziova Dzerassa 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleIndira ITAZOVA10\/10\/1971Beslanmother of hostages Itazov Artur 1992 (not an applicant) and Itazov Azamat 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)Inadmissible rationae personeMarina KALAYEVA23\/08\/1972Vladikavkazmother of hostage Khudalov Sarmat 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)Inadmissible rationae personeViktoriya KASTUYEVA25\/11\/1971MikhaylovskoyehostageAdmissibleRaya KIBIZOVA03\/02\/1942BeslanhostageAdmissibleIrina KOKAYEVA07\/01\/1970Beslanmother of hostage Sidakov Alan 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)Inadmissible rationae personeTeya KOKOYTI06\/01\/1975Beslansister of Kokoyti Bella 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleZayra KOKOYEVA11\/10\/1972Beslanhostage; mother of Kokoyeva Lyana 1995 (deceased) and hostage Kokoyeva Kristina 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleLiana KOKOYEVA02\/07\/1977KambileyevskoyehostageAdmissibleRita KOMAYEVA21\/05\/1960Beslanhostage; mother of hostages Gadzhinova Diana 1990 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant), Gadzhinova Alina 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) and Gadzhinova Madina 2001 (60)AdmissibleFatima KOCHIYEVA13\/11\/1971Vladikavkazhostage: mother of hostages Melikova Larisa 1999 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) and Melikov Soslan 1999 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleAlina KUDZAYEVA20\/10\/1973Beslanhostage; mother of hostage Kudzayeva Dzerassa 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant), Kudzayeva Madina 2002 (61)AdmissibleSergey KTSOYEV12\/08\/1969Beslanfather of hostages Ktsoyeva Viktoriya Sergyevna 1990 (grave injuries) (not an applicant) and Ktsoyev Artur 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)Inadmissible rationae personeKonstantin MAMAYEV25\/09\/1954Beslanfather of Mamayeva Sabina 1990 (deceased)AdmissibleKazbek MISIKOV20\/03\/1961Beslanhostage (grave injuries); husband of hostage Dzutseva Irina 1969 (grave injuries) (not an applicant); father of hostages Misikov Batraz 1989 (light injuries) (not an applicant) and Misikov Atsamaz 1997 (grave injuries) (62)\u00a0AdmissibleMarina MIKHAYLOVA14\/02\/1979Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleNatalya MOKROVA28\/06\/1959Beslanwife of Mokrov Vladimir 1951 (deceased) and mother of hostage Mokrov Vladislav 1994 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleTamara SKAYEVA17\/10\/1966Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleSvetlana SUANOVA26\/08\/1963Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleLarisa TOMAYEVA14\/02\/1971Beslanhostage; mother of hostages Tomayev Azamat 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) and Tomayeva Kristina 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleLarisa TORCHINOVA11\/09\/1965Vladikavkazmother of hostages Torchinova Diana 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) and Torchinova Madina 1991 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)Inadmissible rationae personeAlan URMANOV04\/08\/1974Beslan\u00a0\u00a0father of Urmanova Maria 1995 (deceased)AdmissibleLidiya URMANOVA19\/04\/1950Beslanmother of Urmanova-Rudik Larisa 1972 (deceased); mother-in-law to Urmanova Rita 1965 (deceased); grandmother of Urmanova Zalina 1998 (deceased), Rudik Yana 1992 (deceased), Rudik Yulia 1990 (deceased), Urmanova Maria 1995 (deceased)AdmissibleTatyana FARDZINOVA17\/02\/1957Beslanmother of hostage Fardzinov Zaurbek 1990 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)Inadmissible rationae personeTamara KHAYEVA15\/05\/1987Beslansister of Khayeva Emma 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleAleta KHASIYEVA03\/05\/1962BeslanhostageAdmissibleMarina KHUBAYEVA06\/07\/1975Beslansister of Khubayeva Madina 1972 (deceased)AdmissibleBatraz KHUDALOV12\/05\/1964Beslanfather of hostage Khudalova Madina 1997 (app. no. 48 in Savkuyev and Others) and Khudalov Beksoltan 1997 (deceased)AdmissibleZalina KHUDALOVA10\/04\/1972Beslanwife of Khudalov Elbrus 1951 (deceased); mother of Khudalov Georgiy 1994 (deceased) AdmissibleAnzhela KHUMAROVA23\/02\/1972Beslanhostage (grave injuries); mother of hostage Khumarov Timur 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (63)AdmissibleFatima TSAGARAYEVA04\/08\/1964Beslanhostage; mother of hostages Murtazova Diana 1990 (grave injuries) (not an applicant), Murtazova Viktoriya 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) and Murtazova Madina 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (64)AdmissibleSvetlana KHUTSISTOVA16\/08\/1953Beslanmother of Khutsistov Azamat 1978 (deceased)AdmissibleRimma TSOMARTOVA10\/08\/1944Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); grandmother of hostages Fardzinova Zhaklin 1994 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant) and Fardzinov Alan 1996 (medium gravity injuries) (not an applicant)AdmissibleOlga SHCHERBININA18\/10\/1956Beslanhostage (light injuries)AdmissibleUmar DUDAROV2003Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible \/ Applicant minor added to the listMadina Gadzhinova2001BeslanhostageAdmissible \/ Applicant minor added to the listMadina Kudzayeva2002Beslan\u00a0hostageAdmissible \/ Applicant minor added to the listAtsamaz Misikov1997Beslanhostage (grave injuries)Admissible \/ Applicant minor added to the listTimur Khumarov1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)\u00a0Admissible \/ Applicant minor added to the listMadina Murtazova 1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible \/ Applicant minor added to the list21294\/11\u00a0\u00a0Kokova and Others v. Russia\u00a012\/03\/2011\u00a0Mr Kirill Nikolayevich KOROTEYEV,\u00a0EHRAC\/ Memorial Human Rights CentreTereza KOKOVA29\/04\/1966Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostages Kokova Alana 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (2) and Kokov Batraz 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (3)AdmissibleAlana KOKOVA13\/12\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleBatraz KOKOV29\/03\/1995Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleMairbek VARZIYEV21\/05\/1996Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAleksandr CHEDZHEMOV30\/09\/1992Beslan\u00a0\u00a0hostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleLidiya RUBAYEVA27\/01\/1938Beslanmother of Rubayev Artur 1963 (deceased)AdmissibleArtur TSAGARAYEV22\/11\/1991Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleVadim TSAGARAYEV07\/01\/1994Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAlina KANUKOVA08\/02\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleInal KANUKOV06\/01\/1992Beslanhostage AdmissibleSoslan MARGIYEV20\/10\/1991Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAndzhela KODZAYEVA16\/07\/1971Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleDiana AGAYEVA18\/12\/1996Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleBella NUGZAROVA13\/10\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleSoslan KANUKOV09\/07\/1991Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleYelena ZAMESOVA11\/01\/1972Beslanmother of Zamesova Natalya 1994 (deceased) and Zamesov Igor 1992 (deceased)AdmissibleRaisa ZHUKAYEVA27\/04\/1942Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleSoslan DZUGAYEV19\/12\/1991Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Strike out from the list of applicants upon request of 14\/09\/12Ksenya TEBIYEVA26\/11\/1952Beslanmother of Tebiyeva Alma 1991 (deceased)AdmissibleFatima BITSIYEVA01\/11\/1945Beslangrandmother of Bitsiyev Zaurbek 1996 (deceased)AdmissibleSergey ZHUKAYEV25\/03\/1969Beslanhusband of Zhukayeva Marina 1973 (deceased) and father of hostages Zhukayeva Madina 1996 (grave injuries) (22) and Zhukayeva Albina 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (23) AdmissibleMadina ZHUKAYEVA26\/12\/1996Beslan\u00a0\u00a0hostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleAlbina ZHUKAYEVA04\/12\/1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAzamat TETOV30\/10\/1994Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleTatyana TETOVA21\/05\/1940Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleLiliya KHAMATKOYEVA23\/10\/1969Beslandaughter of Khamatkoyeva Rimma 1938 (deceased) and mother of hostages Urusova Luiza 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (27) and Urusova Zarina 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (28) AdmissibleLuiza URUSOVA01\/08\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZarina URUSOVA15\/02\/1995Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZemfira DZANDAROVA19\/06\/1972Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries), mother of hostages Dzandarov Ruslan 1991 (30) and Dzandarova Viktoriya 1997 (31)AdmissibleRuslan DZANDAROV02\/09\/1991Beslan\u00a0\u00a0hostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleViktoriya DZANDAROVA11\/04\/1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleSima ALBEGOVA30\/03\/1949Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleYelena DZUSOVA12\/06\/1965Beslandaughter of hostage Dauyeva Taisya 1938 (died on 09\/08\/2006); tutor of hostages Bziyev Roman 1998 (medium gravity injuries) (34) and Bziyev Boris 2001 (35); mother of hostages Dzusov Alikhan 1996 (36) and Dzusova Ilona 1995 (37); and sister of hostage Bziyev Sergey 1963 (medium grave injuries) (died on 19\/03\/2005)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 34, 35, 36 and 37Roman BZIYEV28\/01\/1998Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); son of Pliyeva (Bziyeva) Dinara 1964 (deceased); grandchild of hostage Dauyeva Taisya 1938 (died on 09\/08\/2006) AdmissibleBoris BZIYEV14\/11\/2001Beslanhostage; son of Pliyeva (Bziyeva) Dinara 1964 (deceased) (not a hostage); grandchild of hostage Dauyeva Taisya 1938 (died on 09\/08\/2006) AdmissibleAlikhan DZUSOV26\/12\/1996Beslan\u00a0hostage; grandchild of hostage Dauyeva Taisya 1938 (died on 09\/08\/2006)AdmissibleIlona DZUSOVA25\/05\/1999Beslanhostage; grandchild of hostage Dauyeva Taisya 1938 (died on 09\/08\/2006)AdmissibleAgunda VATAYEVA25\/11\/1990Beslanhostage (grave injuries); daughter of Vatayeva Gulemdan 1951 (deceased)AdmissibleYelizaveta VATAYEVA21\/09\/1985Beslandaughter of Vatayeva Gulemdan 1951 (deceased)AdmissibleAlan KODZAYEV21\/11\/1996Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleInna DZANAYEVA13\/09\/1990Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleNatalya SALAMOVA09\/08\/1940Beslanmother of Dzutseva-Tatrova Alena 1976 (deceased)\u00a0Delete from the list of applicants as duplicate; remains applicant no.\u00a032 in application no.\u00a049339\/08Khetag GUTIYEV03\/07\/1988BeslanescapedAdmissibleAzamat GUTIYEV24\/01\/1992Beslan\u00a0\u00a0escapedAdmissibleZarina KASTUYEVA22\/04\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleTamara BEROYEVA20\/04\/1938Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleVladimir GUBIYEV18\/10\/1994Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleBela GUBIYEVA28\/12\/1991Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleChermen PLIYEV23\/10\/1995Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible37096\/11\u00a0\u00a0Bibayeva and Others v. Russia\u00a028\/05\/2011\u00a0Mr Kirill Nikolayevich KOROTEYEV,\u00a0EHRAC\/ Memorial Human Rights CentreFatima BIBAYEVA20\/08\/1988Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAida TSIRIKHOVA26\/06\/1968Beslanmother of hostage Mordas Tsirikhova Rozita 1993 (grave injuries) (3) and Tsirikhova Zarina 1990 (grave injuries) (59)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 3 and 59Rozita MORDAS TSIRIKHOVA21\/10\/1993Beslan\u00a0\u00a0hostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleLyudmila GAPPOYEVA24\/01\/1941Beslanmother of Gappoyev Ruslan 1970 (deceased)AdmissibleInga KHAREBOVA15\/09\/1974Beslanmother of hostage Kharebov Arsen 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (6)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 6Arsen KHAREBOV28\/09\/1995Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleSvetlana DZHERIYEVA01\/06\/1964Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Chedzhemova Dana 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (8)AdmissibleDana CHEDZHEMOVA18\/07\/1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAlbina SAKIYEVA26\/01\/1968Beslanmother of hostage Kabaloyev Rustam 1993 (grave injuries) (10)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 10Rustam KABALOYEV20\/06\/1993Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleLalita URTAYEVA29\/06\/1979Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Urtayev Taymuraz 1996 (medium gravity injuries) (12)AdmissibleTaymuraz URTAYEV28\/09\/1996Beslan\u00a0hostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible Amest SARIBEKYAN18\/08\/1965Beslanmother of hostages: Simonyan Siranush 1987 (medium gravity injuries) (14), Simonyan Mariam 1991 (grave injuries) (15), Simonyan Ovannes 1993 (light injuries) (16)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 14, 15 and 16Siranush SIMONYAN16\/04\/1987Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleMariam SIMONYAN06\/01\/1991Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleOvannes SIMONYAN03\/09\/1993Beslanhostage (light injuries)AdmissibleZarina PUKHAYEVA05\/04\/1979Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Pukhayev Gennadiy 1997 (medium gravity injuries) (18)AdmissibleGennadiy PUKHAYEV25\/03\/1997Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleOlga KUBATAYEVA08\/12\/1967Beslanmother of hostage Kubatayev Vladimir 1989 (medium gravity injuries) (20)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 20Vladimir KUBATAYEV27\/04\/1989Beslan\u00a0\u00a0hostage (medium gravity injuries)\u00a0Yelena TSALLAGOVA02\/12\/1968Beslanmother of hostage Tsallagov David 1993 (22)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 22David TSALLAGOV19\/09\/1993Beslanhostage \u00a0Serafima BASIYEVA03\/01\/1960Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostages Bekoyev Azamat 1989 (medium gravity injuries) (24) and Bekoyev Atsamaz 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (25)AdmissibleAzamat BEKOYEV08\/12\/1989Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAtsamaz BEKOYEV17\/05\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleTamara GABISOVA07\/05\/1963Beslanmother of hostage Gabisov Arsen 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (27)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 27Arsen GABISOV28\/07\/1995Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleLarisa DZAMPAYEVA30\/09\/1959Beslan\u00a0\u00a0hostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostage Gabisova Dzerassa 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (29)AdmissibleDzerassa GABISOVA31\/10\/1995Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleMadina TOKAYEVA21\/10\/1988Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleDaniya BEDOYEVA14\/12\/1958Beslanmother of hostage Bedoyev David 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (32)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 32David BEDOYEV17\/10\/1992Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleIrina PARSIYEVA21\/11\/1963Beslanmother of hostage Parsiyeva Anzhelika 1990 (grave injuries) (34)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 34Anzhelika PARSIYEVA30\/07\/1990Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleRaisa TOTIYEVA01\/08\/1960Beslanmother of Totiyeva Larisa 1990 (deceased), Totiyeva Lyubov 1992 (deceased), Totiyeva Albina 1993 (deceased), Totiyev Boris 1996 (deceased) AdmissibleRuslan KHUADONOV15\/03\/1986Beslanbrother of Khuadonova Regina 1989 (deceased)AdmissibleZalina BIGAYEVA25\/12\/1974Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); mother of hostages Bigayeva Madina 1996 (medium gravity injuries) (38) and Bigayeva Alina 1998 (medium gravity injuries) (39)AdmissibleMadina BIGAYEVA07\/08\/1996Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAlina BIGAYEVA09\/01\/1998Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries) AdmissibleZalina BAGAYEVA05\/03\/1961Beslanmother of hostages Azimova Madina 1992 (medium gravity injuries) (41) and Azimova Marina 1991 (42)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 41 and 42Madina AZIMOVA25\/12\/1992Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleMarina AZIMOVA03\/04\/1991BeslanhostageAdmissibleTamaz KHUGAYEV07\/10\/1958Beslanfather of hostages Khugayev Tsezar 1991 (medium gravity injuries) (44) and Khugayeva Albina 1992 (grave injuries) (45)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of nos. 44 and 45Tsezar KHUGAYEV21\/09\/1991Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleAlbina KHUGAYEVA29\/11\/1992Beslanhostage (grave injuries)AdmissibleAnzhela KHANIKAYEVA26\/11\/1968Beslanmother of hostage Khadikov Borislav 1993 (medium gravity injuries) (47)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 47Borislav KHADIKOV19\/06\/1993Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleFatima KUSOVA16\/09\/1959Beslanmother of hostage Ilyin Georgiy 1996 (medium gravity injuries) (49)Inadmissible rationae persone, representative of no. 49Georgiy ILYIN29\/11\/1996Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleZareta KARGIYEVA20\/03\/1941Beslanmother in law of of Khubayeva Madina 1972 (deceased), grandmother of Khubayev Rusland 1993 (deceased) and hostage Khugayeva Ilona (grave injuries) 1996 (58) AdmissibleIgor KARGIYEV25\/05\/1965Beslanhusband of Khubayeva Madina 1972 (deceased) and father of Khubayev Rusland 1993 (deceased) and of hostage Khugayeva Ilona (1996) (grave injuries) (58) AdmissibleSvetlana DZODZIYEVA19\/10\/1969Beslanhostage; mother of hostages Peliyev Georgiy 1991 (medium gravity injuries) (53) and Peliyeva Zarina 1995 (medium gravity injuries) (54)\u00a0\u00a0AdmissibleGeorgiy PELIYEV30\/07\/1991Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)Admissible Zarina PELIYEVA21\/04\/1995Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries)AdmissibleLarisa SABANOVA01\/03\/1952Beslandaughter of Sabanov Tarkan 1915 (deceased)AdmissibleFatima SABANOVA28\/03\/1948Beslandaughter of Sabanov Tarkan 1915 (deceased)AdmissibleVladimir DAUROV13\/03\/1969Beslanhostage (medium gravity injuries); father of Daurov David 1994 (deceased)AdmissibleIlona Kargiyeva18\/06\/1996Beslanhostage (grave injuries)Admissible \/ Applicant added to the listZarina Tsirikhova1990Beslanhostage (grave injuries)Admissible \/ Applicant added to the list\u00a0\u00a0","27313":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION108.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained about the material conditions of his detention in the SIZO. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that on his arrival in the SIZO on 28\u00a0December 2010, the applicant had been kept in cell no. 158, measuring 8.58 square metres, where he had remained until 8 May 2011, sharing it with two other persons and having thus at his personal disposal 2.86 square metres. However, in connection with the hunger strike from 28 April to 8\u00a0May 2011 the applicant was held in this cell alone. From 8 to 10 May 2011 he had been held in the SIZO medical unit in cell no. 257, measuring 23.21 square metres. Between 10 and 23 May 2011 the applicant had been hospitalised. Having returned to the SIZO on the latter date, he had been placed in the SIZO medical unit in cell no. 260, measuring 22.32 square metres. As he was sharing this cell with another person, he had had at his disposal 11.16 square metres. Finally, from 1 July 2011 to 6 April 2012 the applicant was again detained in cell no. 158 which, during this period of time, he was sharing with another person, having therefore at his personal disposal 4.29 square metres. The Government submitted photographs of these three cells.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further stated that the applicant had had an opportunity to receive drinking water and bedding from his relatives, but the SIZO had also been properly supplied with bedding. In any case, the applicant had not complained on this account to the SIZO administration. Moreover, since his admission until 23 May 2011, when his case had been sent to the Pechersk Court, the applicant had had the right to daily exercise in the fresh air. After that date he had had exercise, except on those days when lengthy court hearings had been held.The Government concluded that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention complied with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.112.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that upon his admission to the SIZO he had been placed in cell no. 158, measuring 8.58 square metres, which had previously been used for detainees who had been expecting the execution of a death sentence. The cell had only cold water. Instead of a proper toilet there was only a hole in the floor, which was not separated from the rest of the cell, which moreover was poorly ventilated, and therefore had a strong odor of human excrement. The cell was cold and damp, the temperature never rising above 16o C. The applicant had been allowed to take a shower once or twice a week. He had not been in this cell from 8 to 10 May 2011, when he had been transferred to cell no. 257 in the SIZO medical unit, from 10 to 23 May 2011, when he had been in the Emergency Hospital, and from 23 May to 1 July 2011, when he was once again in the SIZO medical unit, in cell no. 260. Accordingly, he had spent a total of 408 days in cell no. 158. He had shared this cell with one or two co-detainees.113.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant added that on 27 March 2012, prior to the visit of the members of the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, he had been transferred to cell no. 136, which was equipped with a proper toilet bowl and a LCD TV set. He was also placed in this cell on 20 April 2012, after his discharge from the Emergency Hospital.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the parties\u2019 observations cover the period from 28 December 2010 to 20 April 2012 (see paragraphs 110, 112 and 113 above). It will therefore limit its examination of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention to this period of time.115.\u00a0\u00a0It reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the fundamental values of a democratic society. The Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances or the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for instance, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).116.\u00a0\u00a0If a person is detained, the State must ensure that the conditions are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately ensured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI). Moreover, when assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions and the duration of the detention (see Ostrovar v. Moldova, no.\u00a035207\/03, \u00a7 80, 13 September 2005).(a)\u00a0\u00a0The period from 28 December 2010 to 8 May 2011117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant was brought to the SIZO on 28 December 2010 and put in cell no. 158 measuring 8.58 square metres where he remained until 8 May 2011 (see paragraphs 82, 110 and 112). Except for the period from 28 April to 8 May 2011 (see paragraph 110 above), he shared this cell with two other detainees, having therefore at his personal disposal 2.86 square metres. Moreover, given that the cell also contained sanitary facilities, furniture and fittings, the floor area available to the applicant had been further reduced.118.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of its jurisprudence (see, e.g., Melnik v. Ukraine, no.\u00a072286\/01, \u00a7 103, 28 March 2006; Iglin v. Ukraine, no. 39908\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a051\u201152, 12 January 2012; and Zinchenko v. Ukraine, no. 63763\/11, \u00a7 66, 13\u00a0March 2014), the Court finds that the lack of personal space afforded to the applicant in detention during the relevant period itself raises an issue under Article 3 of the Convention.119.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the above considerations, the Court considers that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in cell no. 158 in the Kyiv SIZO during the period from 28 December 2010 to 28 April 2011 were degrading.120.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the detention facility from 28 December 2010 to 8 May 2011.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The periods from 28 April to 10 May 2011, from 23\u00a0May 2011 to 6\u00a0April 2012 and on 20 April 2012121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that during the remaining part of his stay in the Kyiv SIZO the applicant had more than four square metres of individual space at his disposal (see paragraphs 86, 110, 112 and 113 above) and that at that time there was no shortage of sleeping places in the cells concerned. The Court does not have any information about the size of cell no. 136 but the applicant does not raise any complaint in this respect. As during the relevant period of time the size of the cells by itself does not raise an issue under the Convention, the Court will have to determine whether the cumulative effect of other aspects of the physical conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention was such as to amount to inhuman and\/or degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts in this respect that the applicant could have experienced certain problems on account of the material aspects of his detention in the cells in question. At the same time, it is unable to determine whether such drawbacks affected him in any significant way. Nor is there any evidence that the internal lighting or ventilation systems were deficient. Moreover, the applicant was allowed a one-hour period of outdoor exercise daily. Windows in the cells were not fitted with metal shutters or other devices preventing natural light from penetrating into the cells, and the applicant did not complain that the cells were not additionally equipped with artificial lighting.123.\u00a0\u00a0As regards sanitary and hygiene conditions, the Court noted, having assessed the material evidence presented by the parties including the photographs submitted by the Government (see paragraph 110 above), that the table, the lavatory pan, the fridge and the bed were located inside the applicant\u2019s cells, sometimes very close to each other. However, from the material in its possession, the Court can establish neither the condition of the toilet \u2013 except for cell no. 260 - nor whether it was separated from the rest of the cells. Cold running water was normally available in the cells and detainees, including the applicant, had access to showers at least once every seven days. The Court adds that the applicant admitted that the conditions in cell no. 136 were adequate.124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is of the opinion that taking into account the cumulative effect of these conditions, they did not reach the threshold of severity required to characterise the treatment as inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see Fetisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 43710\/07, 11248\/08, 27668\/08, 31242\/08, 52133\/08 and 6023\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0137-138, 17 January 2012).125.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant\u2019s detention in the detention facility from 28 April to 10 May 2011, from 23\u00a0May 2011 to 6\u00a0April 2012 and on 20 April 2012.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE MEDICAL TREATMENT PROVIDED TO THE APPLICANT126.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that the medical care he received was inadequate, and that this was a breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, being the master of characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers that the applicant\u2019s complaint should be examined under Article 3 of the Convention.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions129.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that upon his admission to the SIZO the applicant had been examined by the head of the medical unit and a doctor on duty. He had undergone clinical, laboratory and X-ray examinations, and had been diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension. Moreover, from the extract of his outpatient card it appeared that in 2010 the applicant had been suffering on a number of occasions from gastritis, fatty hepatosis, dyskinesia of the bladder, chronic pancreatitis at the incomplete remission stage, diabetes mellitus and pancreatic insufficiency.130.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the chronology of the treatment of the applicant, the Government noted that during the period preceding his hunger strike the applicant had not submitted any complaint regarding his medical treatment. His health deteriorated as a result of his hunger strike, when all the illnesses from which he had previously been suffering reappeared. New conditions, such as an ulcer, also appeared. According to the Government, the national authorities had taken all necessary measures to reduce possible consequences and influence on the applicant\u2019s organism. Thus, during his hunger strike, the applicant had been examined by the doctors on a daily basis, necessary laboratory researches aimed at monitoring of consequences of hunger strike had been conducted, and measures had been taken which were intended to reduce the consequences of the hunger strike. Moreover, the applicant had been repeatedly offered a food compound.131.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further stated that one of the reasons which had to a large extent contributed to the appearance of new illnesses had been the psychological and emotional burden to which the applicant had been subjected as the result of having been in detention and the criminal proceedings against him. Hence, the national authorities could not bear responsibility for the appearance of these illnesses, as it was not connected with the provision of medical treatment in the SIZO or with the material conditions of detention in the SIZO. The Government underlined that the applicant had received regular and appropriate medical treatment for the new conditions which had appeared. He had been examined by SIZO doctors, he had been repeatedly examined by medical commissions numbering the best specialists from civilian hospitals, had received everything he had been prescribed and had had all the indicated examinations; when necessary he had been admitted to a civilian hospital. The Government considered that the medical treatment provided to the applicant had complied with Article 3 of the Convention.132.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the failure to provide him with adequate medical care, such as proper examination and treatment of his diseases, concealment of his true state of health, as well as his arbitrary discharge from the hospital and forced attendance at the court hearings despite his poor state of health, all proved that there had been a breach of the Government\u2019s positive obligation to prevent prisoners\u2019 suffering which exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention. The failure of the Government to provide him with adequate medical care proved that he had received inhuman treatment and the intention of the Government was to create feelings of despair and inferiority in him and to humiliate and belittle him, as well as to prove his vulnerability. Such treatment of the applicant is in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment133.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that when assessing the adequacy of medical care in prison, it must reserve, in general, sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, which must accommodate the legitimate demands of imprisonment but remain compatible with human dignity and the due discharge of its positive obligations by the State. In this regard, it is incumbent upon the relevant domestic authorities to ensure, in particular, that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Hummatov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29 November 2007; Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006; Yevgeniy\u00a0Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 74266\/01, \u00a7 100, 8 January 2009; Gladkiy v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a03242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21 December 2010; Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a056994\/09, \u00a7\u00a085, 11 October 2011; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7 121, 7 November 2006), and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision by proficient medical personnel is regular and systematic, and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at successfully treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 114; Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4\u00a0October 2005). The mere fact of a deterioration in an applicant\u2019s state of health, albeit capable of raising, at an initial stage, certain doubts concerning the adequacy of the applicant\u2019s treatment in prison, cannot suffice, by itself, for the finding of a violation of the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article\u00a03 of the Convention, if, on the other hand, it can be established that the relevant domestic authorities have in a timely fashion provided all reasonably available medical care in a conscientious effort to hinder development of the disease in question (see, among many others, Jashi v.\u00a0Georgia, no. 10799\/06, \u00a7 61, 8 January 2013).134.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that it transpires from the voluminous case-file materials and submissions by the parties that the applicant\u2019s health received considerable attention from the domestic authorities. The applicant was examined by doctors immediately upon admission to the SIZO. He underwent clinical, laboratory and X-ray examinations. On the basis of those examinations, he was diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension. Moreover, it cannot be disregarded that according to his medical record he had already been suffering from gastritis, hepatosis, dyskinesia of the bladder, chronic pancreatitis at the incomplete remission stage, diabetes mellitus, and also from pancreatic insufficiency, before his detention (see paragraphs 20 and 129 above).135.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that during his detention in the SIZO, the applicant was under regular supervision by doctors of the SIZO medical unit and the SPS medical panel. Moreover, the applicant was examined by civilian doctors and received proper medical treatment in the Emergency Hospital during two hospitalisations.136.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicant was on hunger strike for 33 days (see paragraphs 27 and 37 above) and lost weight considerably. On 8 May 2011 the medical panel noted that the hunger strike was significantly affecting the applicant\u2019s general state of health (see paragraph\u00a033 above). During the period when he was refusing to consume food, the applicant was examined by doctors on a daily basis. Later on, necessary laboratory tests aimed at monitoring the consequences of the applicant\u2019s hunger strike were conducted, and measures were taken to reduce those consequences. The applicant was repeatedly offered a food compound. As regards the new illnesses which could have been caused by the hunger strike, the applicant had been constantly receiving adequate medical treatment.137.\u00a0\u00a0These considerations enable the Court to conclude that the domestic authorities afforded the applicant comprehensive, effective and transparent medical assistance.138.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court does not overlook the fact that despite their knowledge of the applicant\u2019s difficult state of health, the national authorities failed to assure his rapid transfer to the hospital in order to carry out complementary medical examinations recommended by the doctors on 28\u00a0May 2011 (see paragraph 38 and 43 above). The Court observes in this respect that while the judge had given his approval for the applicant\u2019s transport on 14 June 2011 (see paragraph 44 above), the applicant was driven to the hospital only on 15\u00a0July 2011 (see paragraph 49 above). However, taking into account the character of the medical examination, the Court does not consider that the inaction of the national authorities reached the threshold of Article 3 of the Convention (see, a contrario, Kupczak v.\u00a0Poland, no. 2627\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 58-68, 25 January 2011).139.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE APPLICANT\u2019S DETENTION ON HEARING DAYS IN THE LIGHT OF THE STATE OF HIS HEALTH140.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained about the conditions of his detention during court hearings, in particular that he had been held in a small and poorly ventilated room waiting for the hearings and that he had not been provided with drinking water or food and had had no opportunity to rest.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Parties\u2019 submissions142.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that during most of the eighty hearings held in the applicant\u2019s criminal case, breaks had been announced. Of the thirty-four hearings during which breaks had not been announced there had only been seven which had finished after 1 p.m., and none of them had lasted until the end of the working day. Of the remaining forty-six hearings, twenty-five had had one break, ten had had two breaks, six had had three breaks, and the hearing of 30 June 2011 had had five breaks. These breaks had lasted from ten minutes to one or two hours.143.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that on the days when the Pechersk Court hearings had been held the applicant had left the SIZO between 7 and 8 a.m., most often after 7.30 a.m., as the court hearings usually started at 9 a.m. They emphasised that he had always been able to have breakfast. Moreover, the court hearings had usually ended at about 6.20 p.m., but if the applicant reached the SIZO before 3 p.m. he could have a walk in the fresh air. Besides, as the applicant was consuming only his own food, he was not restricted to eating at the times when food was provided in the SIZO. Accordingly, he always had the opportunity to have a proper meal after his return to the SIZO.144.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also maintained that the applicant had sufficient sleeping hours, while they admitted that on one occasion the hearing before the Pechersk Court had ended at 11.16 p.m. and that the applicant had reached the SIZO only at 11.30 p.m. However, as there was no hearing on the next three days he had had sufficient time to recover.145.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further explained that during his detention the applicant had refused to consume the food prepared in the SIZO and to receive ready-to-eat food packs, as he had been provided with his own food by his relatives. Accordingly, he had had the opportunity to receive and consume food on hearing days. This was corroborated by a letter from the president of the Pechersk Court, who confirmed that the applicant had been allowed to consume food during breaks in the court hearings. The Government added that even if the applicant had not received food from his relatives, the national legislation set out a procedure for nourishment for individuals being escorted to court to attend hearings. In particular, on 13\u00a0and 19 October 2011 and 19 January 2012, despite the applicant\u2019s refusal, lunch had been delivered to the court in accordance with the national legislation. Moreover, the court had announced breaks for lunch at the request of the applicant, other accused or their lawyers on 14 July 2011, 19 January and 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 14 and 15 February 2012. The Government also noted that on 19 July 2011 and 6 February 2012 the applicant had been granted a one-hour break to consume food, as the medical recommendation was that he must eat three times per day.146.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the court hearing held on 23 May 2011, the Government admitted that the applicant must have been in a weakened condition because of his hunger strike, and that therefore the court hearing and escort procedures would not have been easy for him. Nevertheless, the medical staff had not indicated that his state of health would not be compatible with his appearance in court. The Government also maintained that the court hearing had started at 11 a.m. and had lasted about four hours, which was a comparatively short period of time. During the hearing two breaks had been announced by the court, of one hour and half an hour respectively. The Government stated that the applicant had had the opportunity to consume food and drink water. Moreover, he had not sought to have the hearing postponed so that he could be provided with medical treatment, or be given time to rest or eat. The hearing had ended at 3.09 p.m., and the applicant had been driven back to the SIZO, where he had been placed in the medical unit. Besides, there were no hearings for the next six days, so the applicant had sufficient time to rest.147.\u00a0\u00a0Within the Rule 39 procedure (see paragraph 96 above) the Government submitted, inter alia, that at the hearing of 17 January 2012, which started at 9:09 a.m. and ended at 5:55 p.m., the court announced two technical breaks and a break for lunch which lasted from 1:11 to 1:55 p.m. Moreover, the court was in the deliberation room from 9:39 to 10:25 a.m. On 18 January 2012 the hearing began at 9:12 a.m and ended at 2:15 p.m. during which the court announced a break to have a rest and lunch from 12:19 to 12:39 p.m. Furthermore, the hearing held on 19\u00a0January 2012 started at 9:09 a.m. and ended at 11:16 p.m. During the hearing, the court announced six breaks lasting from 1:20 to 2:05 p.m., from 2:14 to 3:56, from 4:30 to 4:37, 4:40 to 5:26 p.m., from 5:27 to 5:40 and from 8:32 to 8:49 p.m. In addition, the court deliberated from 5:50 to 6:04 p.m. The Government further noted that the court hearing of 20 January 2012 lasted for five minutes.According to the Government, during the hearings held on 17, 18 and 19\u00a0January 2012 the applicant had been allowed to take food, to have a rest and do any other need. He had had that opportunity not only during the special breaks for rest and food but also during the technical breaks as well as during the court deliberations.148.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that he had been given no food or water on the hearing days prior to 21 January 2012. He disputed the Government\u2019s argument that he had refused to consume SIZO food and had relied upon parcels delivered to him from home. He noted in this connection that under point 18 of the Instruction on Escort and Detention in Courtrooms of Detainees at the Request of the Judiciary, a detainee could take only documents, relevant to his hearing to the court-house. No parcels, utensils, food, bottles of water or anything else were allowed. Furthermore, under point 28 of the Instruction, any food or beverage consumed by a detainee shall be provided by the detention facility only. However, due to his severe gastroenterological diseases and liver malfunction, and the lack of special diet food provided by the SIZO, the applicant usually consumed food delivered by his family while in the SIZO. Point 23 of the Instruction strictly prohibited any parcels or other deliveries to detainees in court. Moreover, under section 7 of the Law on Preliminary Detention any parcel for a detainee was to be delivered to the detention centre at designated times only, and was subject to monitoring by the authorities. Accordingly, the applicant was not able to consume his own food after the court hearings.149.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant added that he was not given a designated place or time to consume any food in court. Throughout all the court hearings he was held in a metal cage which he could only leave to go to the lavatory. It would have been humiliating for him to consume food while sitting in a courtroom with journalists, reports and photographers, even if he had had any, in a metal cage without any utensils or table. As a result, he had remained without any food or beverage during all the court hearings; the one which took place on 19 January 2012 lasted fourteen hours. He stated that this breach of a proper nutrition regime had worsened his state of health, as was also stated in the medical certificate of 20 January 2012 provided by the Government.150.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the Government\u2019s comments regarding the breaks during the court hearings held on 17, 18 and 19 January 2012 (see paragraph 147 above), the applicant noted that on 17 January 2012 there had been two breaks, lasting eleven and sixteen minutes respectively, when the participants to the proceedings had been allowed to use the facilities, then there had been a forty-minute break for lunch, which he had been deprived of because he had stayed in the metal cage. He added that when the judges went to their retiring room the participants had remained seated and were not allowed to leave the courtroom under the national legislation.In respect of the hearing of 19 January 2012 the applicant stated that all breaks referred to by the Government had been announced following the worsening of his state of health and his inability to participate in the court hearing and because of his treatment by the ambulance which had to come four times.151.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the first hearing day of 23 May 2011 the applicant submitted that he had been escorted to the court-house directly from the hospital from which he had been discharged that very morning with a diagnosis of chronic pancreatitis, diabetes mellitus, chronic cholecystitis and duodenal ulcer. He had been woken up at 4.30 a.m. in order to reach the courthouse by 6.30 a.m. On arrival he had been held in the waiting metal cage, which was approximately 1.5 square metres in area. At 10.30 a.m. he had been transferred to the courtroom, which was small and hot, with no air conditioning. After staying in the courtroom until 3 p.m. he was driven back to the SIZO at about 6 p.m. According to the applicant, he was given no water or food the whole day, though the SIZO administration and the court were aware of his deteriorating state of health, which had not improved at the hospital. Exhausted, the applicant had stopped his hunger strike in order to be able to take part in future court hearings.152.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further stated that his state of health had worsened later that night. He had fainted the next day, and SIZO doctors had been called. However, the applicant had refused to be examined by them and civilian doctors had not been allowed to see him. He stated that no record had been made in his medical file and he had not been provided with appropriate medicines. The civilian doctors appointed by the Ministry of Health were allowed to examine the applicant only on 28 May 2011; they diagnosed him with acute 12-duodenal ulcer, post-gastrointestinal bleeding, and erosive gastritis, and recommended immediate treatment in a specialised gastroenterological hospital. According to the civilian doctors, since the applicant had been discharged from the Kyiv Clinical Emergency Hospital without any internal bleeding, the bleeding must have occurred between 23 and 28 May 2011 as a result of the premature termination of the specialised inpatient treatment.153.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the SIZO administration, by arbitrarily transferring the applicant from the Emergency Hospital and subjecting him to the lengthy court hearing on 23 May 2011 without any medicine or water supply, had caused him disproportionate suffering and contributed to the further worsening of his health.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment154.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the applicant referred in his original application form to the court hearing held on 23 May 2011. Moreover, within the Rule 39 procedure, he added further complaints regarding the court hearing days from 17 to 19 January 2012 during which his health problems were not taken adequately care of (see paragraph 96 above). The Court does not, however, overlook the fact that, on the whole, the applicant attended seventy-nine hearings held before the Pechersk Court (see paragraph 90 above), that the applicant\u2019s health deteriorated after his hunger strike, what the Government do not deny (see paragraph 130 above) and that the period of about eight months elapsed between the first hearing of 23 May 2011 and the three hearings held in January 2012, during which the applicant suffered from different illnesses necessitating continued medical treatment (see paragraphs 38-76 above). In addition, there is no indication in the case-file that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention during the hearing days were adapted accordingly.155.\u00a0\u00a0As it has already been mentioned above, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of execution of the measure of detention do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well\u2011being are adequately secured (see paragraph 116 above). The Court considers that these principles also apply to the conditions of detainees\u2019 transportation to and from a court-house and of their confinement in the court-house including a proper catering (see Yevgeniy Bogdanov v. Russia, no.\u00a022405\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 101-105, 26 February 2015; Romanova v. Russia, no.\u00a023215\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a088\u201192, 11 October 2011; Kovaleva v. Russia, no. 7782\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 62-65, 2\u00a0December 2010; Yakovenko v. Ukraine, no. 15825\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 103-113, 25\u00a0October 2007).156.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court observes that during the hearing days the applicant left the SIZO generally between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m, usually reaching the court-house in 20 to 30 minutes. While the Government did not submit information about the time when the applicant was escorted from the car to the waiting room, the Court has information at its disposal concerning the moment when he reached the court-house and the beginning of the hearings. It will therefore presume that the applicant spent the time awaiting the hearings either in the car or in the waiting room. From the evidence presented by the Government and the indications given by the applicant it appears that the waiting room was a small barred cell containing a bench.157.\u00a0\u00a0Against the background of the whole proceedings (see paragraph\u00a0154 above), the Court finds that on 23 May 2011 and on 17, 18 and 19 January 2012 the applicant had to face particular hardship. It observes in this respect that on 23 May 2011 he spent three hours and forty-four\u00a0minutes in the waiting room and took part in the hearing which lasted four hours and four minutes, without any proper break being announced, while it was known that he was on hunger strike which significantly affected his general state of health (see paragraphs 33 and 136 above).After having previously attended fifty-nine court hearings, lastly on 16\u00a0January 2012, the applicant was driven to the next hearing, held on 17\u00a0January 2012, which lasted eight hours and forty-six minutes, with two breaks of 11 and 16 minutes, respectively and a break for lunch. Before the hearing begun, the applicant had to stay in the waiting room thirty-nine minutes.On the next day, he spent in the waiting room one hour and two minutes before the beginning of the hearing which lasted five hours and three minutes. The Court notes that, contrary to the Government\u2019s information (see paragraph 147 above), it appears from the minutes of the hearing that the court granted one ten minute technical break, but not a break for rest and lunch.Finally, the Court observes that on 19 January 2012 the applicant spent in the waiting room fifty-four minutes and was present at the hearing which, having started at 9:19 a.m., lasted thirteen hours and fifty-seven minutes. During the hearing, the doctors had to be called four times in order to provide the applicant with medical help. The Pechersk Court did allow a break for rest at the beginning afternoon. However, it appears that the applicant stayed in the metal cage during the break (see paragraph 149 above). Moreover, late in the afternoon, the court did not grant the requests of the applicant\u2019s lawyers to adjourn the hearing and to have a break for food, but continued to hold the hearing until 11:16 p.m., ordering the next hearing for the next hearing at 8:05 a.m.158.\u00a0\u00a0It further appears that the applicant did not receive wholesome food on the four days in question, when he was transported to the court, which would be in line with the state of his health. Relying on the material in its possession, the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s assertion that the applicant could take with him the food provided by his family. In any event, the Court is of the opinion that permission to take one\u2019s own food cannot substitute for appropriate catering arrangements, because it is primarily the State that is responsible for the well-being of persons deprived of their liberty. Besides, it does not find the suggestion, that the applicant could have consumed the food in the waiting room or metal cage prior to or during the hearings, at all realistic.159.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in many cases on account of applicants\u2019 confinement in cramped conditions in detention units of court-houses and a lack of proper food on court days (see, e.g., Vlasov v. Russia, no. 78146\/01, \u00a7 96, 12 June 2008; Salmanov v. Russia, no.\u00a03522\/04, \u00a7 64, 31 July 2008; and Starokadomskiy v.\u00a0Russia, no. 42239\/02, \u00a7\u00a058, 31 July 2008).160.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the present case the cumulative effect of malnutrition and state of health of the applicant on the court hearings held on 23 May 2011 and on 17, 18 and 19 January 2012 must have been of an intensity such as to induce in the applicant physical suffering and mental fatigue. This must have been further aggravated by the fact that the above treatment occurred during the applicant\u2019s trial, a time when he most needed his powers of concentration and mental alertness. The Court therefore concludes that the applicant was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see, for similar reasoning, Strelets, cited above, \u00a7\u00a062).161.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPLICANT\u2019S PLACEMENT IN A METAL CAGE DURING THE TRIAL162.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant finally complained, relying on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, of his confinement in a metal cage in the courtroom during the hearings before the Pechersk Court.163.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds it appropriate to examine the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility164.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Parties\u2019 submissions165.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicant had been held behind the metal bars in the courtroom in accordance with the relevant domestic legislation. They explained that the bars were intended to separate defendants upon whom the preventive measure of detention had been imposed from the bench and those present in the courtroom, so that those individuals could be securely guarded during the court hearings.166.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the State authorities had not intended to humiliate or debase the applicant. He had been held behind the metal bars in the interest of public safety. Furthermore, the measure of holding the applicant behind metal bars could in no way have caused him distress or humiliation of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering or humiliation inherent in detention.167.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the national legislation did not state that the accused should be put in metal cages during public hearings. According to him, nothing in his behaviour or personality could have justified such a security measure, because he had no previous convictions, no record of violent behavior, and was accused of a non-violent crime. Despite that, he had been kept in the cage throughout the trial, exposed to the public, which had humiliated him and aroused in him feelings of inferiority.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment168.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a measure of restraint does not normally give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where this measure has been imposed in connection with lawful detention and does not entail a use of force, or public exposure, exceeding that which is reasonably considered necessary. In this regard it is important to consider, for instance, whether there was a danger that the person concerned might abscond or cause injury or damage (see, e.g., \u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. \u00a7 182, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011IV).169.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously examined the issue of holding a person in a metal \u201ccage\u201d during court hearings in a number of cases (see, lastly, Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/06 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0113-139, 17 July 2014), a practice which is still present in a few Member States including Ukraine (cited above, \u00a7 75). In those cases, in which the Court found a violation of Article 3, the applicants were accused of non-violent crimes, they had no criminal record, there was no evidence that they were predisposed to violence, and the \u201csecurity risks\u201d were not supported by any specific facts. Furthermore, those applicants\u2019 trials attracted considerable media attention. Therefore, the reasonable balance between the different interests at stake was upset.170.\u00a0\u00a0In the case at hand, it appears from the documents submitted by the parties that the applicant was held in a cage with metal bars during all the eighty hearings which took place between 23 May 2011 and 27\u00a0February 2012 (see paragraph 14 above). It is not for the Court to examine this practice in the abstract, but to assess whether in the applicant\u2019s case the measure was justified in the light of the above criteria.171.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court notes that no evidence before it attests to the applicant\u2019s having a criminal record. Likewise, he was not suspected of having committed a violent crime. It is therefore not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant was placed in the metal cage in the interest of public safety. It emerges that the dock with metal bars was permanently installed in the courtroom, and that the applicant, who was a largely known politician (see also Ashot Harutyunian, cited above, \u00a7 126 et seq.; and Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, no. 5829\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 120 et seq., 31 May 2011), was placed there during all the hearings held before the Pechersk Court from May 2010 to February 2012. The Court further notes that the criminal procedure was closely observed by journalists, and photographs depicting the applicant behind metal bars were published soon after the court hearings (see paragraph 14 above). The Court also takes into consideration that the proceedings against the applicant had gained a high profile. Thus, the applicant was exposed behind bars not only to those attending the hearings but also to a much larger public who were following the proceedings in both national and international media.172.\u00a0\u00a0Although, in contrast with the cases referred above, the applicant was not handcuffed, the Court considers that, given their cumulative effect, the security arrangements in the courtroom were, in the circumstances, excessive, and could have been reasonably perceived by the applicant and the public as humiliating.173.\u00a0\u00a0There has, therefore, been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, in that the treatment was degrading within the meaning of this provision.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION174.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d175.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.","27336":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that her daughter had been thrown from the window by police officers and that no meaningful investigation into those circumstances had been carried out. She relied on Article 2 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.\u201d43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. They argued that Ms\u00a0Eneyeva\u2019s death had been the result of an unfortunate attempt to flee the premises. They also argued that it could have been a suicide attempt since Ms\u00a0Eneyeva had had a history of drug abuse and had attempted suicide by jumping out of a window at the age of eighteen. In sum, they insisted that Ms\u00a0Eneyeva\u2019s death was not imputable to the State.44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained her complaint. She argued that a jump from the second floor window could not have caused lethal injuries, which, in her submission, proved that her daughter had been badly beaten by the police officers. Moreover, she asserted that her daughter, herself a mother of three children who had been allocated social housing, had had no reason to commit suicide.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 2 of the Convention, which safeguards the right to life, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention. Together with Article 3, it enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. The first sentence of Article 2 enjoins the Contracting States not only to refrain from the taking of life \u201cintentionally\u201d or by the \u201cuse of force\u201d disproportionate to the legitimate aims referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of the second paragraph of that provision, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see, inter alia, L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, \u00a7 36, Reports of Judgments and\u00a0Decisions 1998-III, and Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7\u00a089, ECHR 2001-III).47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further emphasises that persons in custody are in a particularly vulnerable position and the authorities are under an obligation to account for their treatment. As a general rule, the mere fact that an individual dies in suspicious circumstances while in custody should raise an issue as to whether the State has complied with its obligation to protect that person\u2019s right to life (see Slimani v. France, no. 57671\/00, \u00a7 27, ECHR\u00a02004-IX (extracts)). Such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources (see, among others, Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965\/04, \u00a7 219, ECHR 2010 (extracts); Renolde v. France, no. 5608\/05, \u00a7 82, ECHR 2008 (extracts); and Shumkova\u00a0v. Russia, no.\u00a09296\/06, \u00a7 90, 14 February 2012).48.\u00a0\u00a0A positive obligation will arise, the Court has held, where it has been established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual by a third party or himself and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see Keenan, cited above, \u00a7 90, and Paul and\u00a0Audrey Edwards\u00a0v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, no. 46477\/99, \u00a7\u00a055, ECHR\u00a02002\u2011III). However, even where it is not established that the authorities knew or ought to have known about any such risk, there are certain basic precautions which police officers and prison officers should be expected to take in all cases in order to minimise any potential risk to protect the health and well-being of the arrested person (see\u00a0Mi\u017eig\u00e1rov\u00e1\u00a0v.\u00a0Slovakia, no.\u00a074832\/01, \u00a7 89, 14 December 2010, and Eremi\u00e1\u0161ov\u00e1 and Pechov\u00e1\u00a0v.\u00a0the\u00a0Czech Republic, no. 23944\/04, \u00a7 110, 16\u00a0February 2012).49.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, such proof may follow from the co\u2011existence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see, among many other authorities, Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a038361\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 109-11, ECHR 2002-IV).50.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention requires by implication that there should be some form of adequate and effective official investigation when individuals have died in suspicious circumstances (see Ya\u015fa v. Turkey, 2 September 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 98 and 100, Reports 1998\u2011VI). The essential purpose of such an investigation is to ensure effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life. The investigation must be capable, firstly, of ascertaining the circumstances in which the incident took place and, secondly, of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but of means. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its capability of establishing the circumstances of the case or the person responsible is liable to fall foul of the required standard of effectiveness (see, with further references, Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385\/99, \u00a7 74, ECHR\u00a02004\u2011XI).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged failure to carry out an effective investigation into Ms\u00a0Eneyeva\u2019s death51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where lives have been lost in circumstances potentially engaging the responsibility of the State, Article 2 entails a duty for the State to ensure, by all means at its disposal, an adequate response \u2013 judicial or otherwise \u2013 so that the legislative and administrative framework set up to protect the right to life is properly implemented and any breaches of that right are repressed and punished (see \u00d6nery\u0131ld\u0131z v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a048939\/99, \u00a7 91, ECHR 2004\u2011XII). Where a positive obligation to safeguard the life of people in custody is at stake, the system required by Article 2 must provide for an independent and impartial official investigation that satisfies certain minimum standards as to effectiveness. In such cases, the competent authorities must act with exemplary diligence and promptness and must of their own motion initiate investigations capable of, firstly, ascertaining the circumstances in which the incident took place and any shortcomings in the operation of the regulatory system and, secondly, identifying the State officials or authorities involved. The requirement of public scrutiny is also relevant in this context (see Shumkova, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0109).52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that a criminal investigation into Ms Eneyeva\u2019s death has never been instituted. It notes that, despite the applicant\u2019s objections, the domestic authorities inexplicably refused to look into the circumstances of death in police custody and focused their efforts on finding an unidentified police officer who had allegedly hit the victim on her legs a few hours prior to her death (see paragraph 22 above).53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the failure to open a criminal investigation in a situation where an individual has died or has been seriously injured while in police custody is in itself a serious breach of domestic procedural rules capable of undermining the validity of any evidence which had been collected (see Kleyn and Aleksandrovich v. Russia, no. 40657\/04, \u00a7 56, 3\u00a0May 2012). It notes that, as a result of their repeated refusals to open a criminal case into Ms Eneyeva\u2019s death, the investigative authorities never conducted a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures was carried out, including questioning, confrontation, identification parade, search, seizure and crime reconstruction. The Court has previously ruled that in the context of the Russian legal system a \u201cpre\u2011investigation inquiry\u201d alone is not capable of leading to the punishment of those responsible, since the opening of a criminal case and a criminal investigation are prerequisites for bringing charges against the alleged perpetrators which may then be examined by a court (see Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 132 and 135-36, 24 July 2014, and Zelenin v. Russia, no. 21120\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 56-57, 15 January 2015). Accordingly, the Court does not consider it necessary to analyse every alleged deficiency in the domestic proceedings. The absence of a criminal investigation lead it to the conclusion that the Russian authorities did not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the circumstances in which Ms\u00a0Eneyeva died (see Kleyn and Aleksandrovich, cited above, \u00a7 58, and Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7 137).54.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged breach of Ms Eneyeva\u2019s right to life55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the factual circumstances surrounding Ms\u00a0Eneyeva\u2019s death are disputed by the parties. The applicant insisted that her daughter had been thrown out of the window by the police officers, while the Government suggested that Ms\u00a0Eneyeva had jumped from the window while attempting to flee.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates in this respect that the applicable standard of proof under Article 2 is \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. In the instant case it finds no serious evidence in support of the hypothesis of the intentional taking of Ms Eneyeva\u2019s life. The applicant\u2019s assertion that Ms\u00a0Eneyeva could not have jumped from the window of her own volition because she had been allocated social housing does not satisfy this standard and is in itself insufficient to shift the burden of proof on to the respondent Government.\u00a0Her contention that traumas caused by jumping from the height of the second floor level could not be lethal is not supported by any medical or forensic evidence. Nor are there sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences allowing the Court to deem the explanation provided by the Government unsatisfactory or unconvincing (see Kleyn and\u00a0Aleksandrovich, cited above, \u00a7\u00a049). Having regard to the case file and the parties\u2019 submissions, the Court finds that it is most conceivable that Ms\u00a0Eneyeva\u2019s death was the result of an unfortunate attempt to escape from police detention.57.\u00a0\u00a0However, this conclusion does not absolve the respondent State from responsibility for Ms Eneyeva\u2019s death. The Court reiterates that the obligation to protect the health and well-being of persons in detention clearly encompasses an obligation to protect the life of arrested and detained persons from a foreseeable danger (see Eremi\u00e1\u0161ov\u00e1 and Pechov\u00e1, cited above, \u00a7 117, and Mi\u017eig\u00e1rov\u00e1, cited above, \u00a7\u00a089). Although there is insufficient evidence to show that the authorities knew or ought to have known that there was a risk that Ms\u00a0Eneyeva might attempt to escape by jumping out of a second floor window, there were certain basic precautions which police officers should be expected to take in respect of the persons held in detention in order to minimise any potential risk (see Keller, cited above, \u00a7 88; Mi\u017eig\u00e1rov\u00e1, cited above, \u00a7 89; and\u00a0Eremi\u00e1\u0161ov\u00e1 and Pechov\u00e1, cited above, \u00a7 110).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out in this connection that, in the absence of any findings by domestic authorities as to the establishment of the facts surrounding Ms\u00a0Eneyeva\u2019s death (see paragraph 21 above), it cannot assess in detail whether the escort and supervision arrangements for Ms Eneyeva\u2019s detention were adequate. Nonetheless, it is clear from the Government\u2019s submissions that Lieutenant A.Zh. allowed an arrested person to remain unsupervised in the lavatory equipped with an opening window, for which he was later subjected to disciplinary measures (see\u00a0paragraphs\u00a010\u00a0and\u00a021 above). This omission in itself runs contrary to the authorities\u2019 duty to protect physical well-being of persons in custody.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would reiterate its view that it would be excessive to request the States to put bars on every window at a police station in order to prevent tragic events like the one in the instant case (see Eremi\u00e1\u0161ov\u00e1 and\u00a0Pechov\u00e1 , cited above, \u00a7 117). However, this does not relieve the States of their duty under Article 2 of the Convention to protect the life of arrested and detained persons from a foreseeable danger.60.\u00a0\u00a0In the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot but conclude that the State authorities failed to provide Ms Eneyeva with sufficient and reasonable protection as required by Article 2 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention on account of the authorities\u2019 failure to safeguard the right to life of Ms Eneyeva.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that her daughter had been ill-treated at the police station and that there had been no meaningful investigation into the matter in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d62.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. In their submission, Ms\u00a0Eneyeva had not been ill-treated in any manner by the police. She had tried to escape from the police vehicle. The bruises and scratches on Ms\u00a0Eneyeva\u2019s legs had resulted from the fight with Ms G.Zh. Mr A. \u2012 who had allegedly witnessed her being hit by the police officer \u2012 could not be regarded as a reliable witness as he had previous history of drug abuse. They further added that the applicant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant insisted that Mr A.\u2019s statement had proven that Ms\u00a0Eneyeva had been ill-treated by the police officers and suggested that the State authorities had implicitly confirmed this hypothesis by opening an investigation into the alleged abuse of power by unidentified police officers.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where a person is injured while in detention or otherwise under the control of the police, any such injury will give rise to a strong presumption that the person was subjected to ill\u2011treatment (see, among many other authorities, Mrozowski v. Poland, no. 9258\/04, \u00a7\u00a026, 12\u00a0May 2009). Although the use of force during arrest, even if resulting in injury, may disclose no breach of Article 3 if the use of force was indispensable and resulted from the conduct of the applicant (see\u00a0Klaas\u00a0v.\u00a0Germany, 22 September 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 269), the Court also points out that where an individual, when taken into police custody, is in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011V).66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that in assessing evidence in a claim of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, it adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. Such proof may, however, follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no.\u00a04672\/02, \u00a7 54, 2 December 2004; Bazjaks v. Latvia, no. 71572\/01, \u00a7\u00a074, 19\u00a0October 2010; and Krivo\u0161ejs v. Latvia, no. 45517\/04, \u00a7\u00a069, 17\u00a0January\u00a02012).67.\u00a0\u00a0Where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0131, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011IV).68.\u00a0\u00a0An obligation to investigate \u201cis not an obligation of result, but of means\u201d: not every investigation should necessarily come to a conclusion which coincides with the applicant\u2019s account of events. However, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7\u00a0107, 26 January 2006).69.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation into allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough. That means that the authorities must make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis for their decisions (see Assenov and\u00a0Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 103 et seq., Reports\u00a01998\u2011VIII). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness accounts and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of the applicable standard (see Mikheyev, cited above, \u00a7 108).70.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation must also be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used by the police was or was not justified in the circumstances (see Kaya v. Turkey, 19\u00a0February 1998, \u00a7 87, Reports 1998-I).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention71.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the post\u2011mortem report of 28 May 2007 confirmed that Ms Eneyeva had had scratches and bruises on her legs that had not been caused by the fall out of the window (see paragraph 15 above). The parties disagreed as to the origin of those injuries: according to the Government, they had been inflicted in the course of Ms Eneyeva\u2019s fight with Ms G.Zh., while the applicant asserted, relying on Mr A.\u2019s statement (see paragraph 9 above), that her daughter had sustained the injuries in question while at the hands of the police.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes in this connection that the Government\u2019s hypothesis is not confirmed by the materials of the case file as it does not appear that the domestic authorities questioned Ms G.Zh. to establish the circumstances surrounding her supposed fight with Ms Eneyeva. On the contrary, already in the early days of the inquiry the Nalchik town prosecutor established that an unknown police officer had inflicted injuries on Ms Eneyeva (see paragraph 18 above). Moreover, the domestic authorities instituted an investigation into the abuse of powers by an unidentified police officer who had allegedly beaten Ms Eneyeva\u2019s on her legs in the police vehicle (see paragraph 22 above).73.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances the Court is ready to accept that the applicant made a credible assertion that her daughter had been ill-treated while at hands of the police. It notes that it was open to the Government to refute the applicant\u2019s allegations by providing their own plausible version of events and submitting evidence to corroborate their version. Bearing in mind the authorities\u2019 obligation to account for injuries caused to persons within their control in custody, and in the absence of a convincing and plausible explanation by the Government in the instant case, the Court considers that it can draw inferences from the Government\u2019s conduct and finds it established to the standard of proof required in the Convention proceedings that the injuries sustained by Ms Eneyeva were the result of the treatment for which the Government bore responsibility (see Barabanshchikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 36220\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 49-50, 8 January 2009).74.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, having regard to the nature and the extent of Ms\u00a0Eneyeva\u2019s injuries, the Court concludes that the State is responsible under Article 3 on account of the inhuman and degrading treatment to which the applicant\u2019s daughter was subjected.75.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s allegations that her daughter had sustained injuries were confirmed by the medical evidence and were thus sufficiently serious to reach the \u201cminimum level of severity\u201d required under Article 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, these allegations were \u201carguable\u201d and thus required an investigation by the national authorities. It is the Court\u2019s task to assess whether the respondent State has complied with its procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates in this respect that important factors for an effective investigation, viewed as a gauge of the authorities\u2019 determination to identify and prosecute those responsible, are its promptness and expedition (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 121, ECHR\u00a02010). In the present case the authorities opened an investigation into the abuse of powers by an unidentified police officer on 27 July 2007, that is to say, two months after the date of the alleged ill-treatment (see paragraph 22 above). Such delay in itself was liable to affect the investigation (see, mutatis mutandis, Betayev and Betayeva v. Russia, no.\u00a037315\/03, \u00a7 85, 29\u00a0May 2008).78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the authorities in charge of the investigation into the abuse of powers, which was repeatedly stayed and resumed and thus protracted over years and yet did not lead to any meaningful results, did very little to identify the perpetrator. For example, an examination of the case materials was ordered in April 2010 but remained unperformed for almost five years (see paragraph 32 above). Moreover, it appears that when the investigators chose to act, they concentrated their efforts on measures that were devoid of purpose (see paragraph 37 above).79.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above failings of the Russian authorities, the Court finds that the investigation carried out into the allegations of ill\u2011treatment of Ms Eneyeva was not thorough, adequate or effective.80.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that she had no effective domestic remedies at her disposal in respect of the alleged breaches of Articles 2 and\u00a03 of the Convention. She relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. They claimed that the applicant\u2019s complaints to the prosecutor\u2019s offices at two levels had been mostly successful and that she had had ample opportunity to initiate court proceedings.83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained her complaint.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the complaint relating to the lack of an adequate investigation into the circumstances of Ms Eneyeva\u2019s ill-treatment and death is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.85.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the findings relating to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb (see paragraphs\u00a09 and 80 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, there have been violations of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Khodzhayev v. Russia, no.\u00a052466\/08, \u00a7\u00a0151, 12\u00a0May\u00a02010).IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION86.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed lost income for Ms Eneyeva \u2012 whose children are minors \u2012 in the amount of 404,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 10,200 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage and a further EUR 100,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the amounts claimed to be excessive.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court rejects the applicant\u2019s claims in respect of pecuniary damage as unsubstantiated. Given that violations of Article 2 on two accounts have been found, as well as violations of Article 3 of the Convention, it awards the applicant EUR\u00a026,000 on an equitable basis in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses90.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed RUB\u00a0164,500 (approximately EUR\u00a04,000) in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. She submitted invoices confirming that she had paid her lawyer RUB 7,500 (approximately EUR 191) and a copy of a retainer agreement of 28\u00a0January 2008 listing her lawyer\u2019s standard rates.91.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment on this claim.92.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, taking account of the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court accepts the claim for costs and expenses and awards the sum of EUR 4,000 in respect of proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27334":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had been ill-treated by the police and that the officers concerned had escaped any liability in the absence of an effective investigation. They relied on Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment of the applicants(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions73.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant submitted that he had been subjected to ill-treatment, which had caused him severe pain and suffering even though it had not resulted in any significant injuries for him. He referred, in particular, to the expert reports of 23 December 2008 and 12\u00a0July 2012 (see paragraphs 44 and 55 above) as evidence in support of his allegations.74.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant maintained her complaint too. She submitted that, following her ill-treatment by the police, she had not felt well and had had to seek medical assistance. The second applicant also referred to the undisputed fact that during the night on 2\u00a0July 2008 the prosecution officials had found her in tears locked in one of the offices of the police station (see paragraph 28 above).75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the first applicant\u2019s allegations lacked convincing evidence. They noted that he had maintained his confession even during his questionings in the presence of his lawyer on 28 and 30\u00a0June 2008.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also questioned the veracity of the second applicant\u2019s allegation. In their view, had she indeed been ill-treated as alleged, there would have been at least some injuries. However, the Government emphasised that the second applicant had herself admitted that she had not sustained any injuries. They also observed that she had never challenged any of the prosecution authorities\u2019 refusals to launch a criminal investigation in respect of her ill-treatment complaint.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment77.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the core values of democratic societies (see, among many other references, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7\u00a095, ECHR 1999\u2011V). Where allegations are made under this provision, the Court must conduct a particularly thorough scrutiny and will do so on the basis of all the evidential material submitted by the parties (see Matyar v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a023423\/94, \u00a7 109, 21\u00a0February 2002, and \u00dclk\u00fc Ekinci v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a027602\/95, \u00a7\u00a0136, 16\u00a0July\u00a02002).78.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Furthermore, it is to be recalled that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. Where the events in issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 151 and 152, ECHR 2012, with further case-law references).79.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court takes note of the medical documents proving that the first applicant sustained some bruises and sores while in police custody. More specifically, these are three forensic medical examination reports (of 4 July and 23 December 2008 and of 12 July 2012 \u2013 see paragraphs 32, 44 and 55 above). Moreover, the report of 12 July 2012, which was delivered by a panel of experts, stated that the first applicant could have sustained his injuries at the time and under the circumstances as alleged by him. Those findings have never been refuted. Furthermore, the Court notes that the authorities did not advance any alternative explanation regarding the origin of the first applicant\u2019s injuries, apart from a general observation that some of those were located on the part of his body reachable for self-infliction (see paragraphs 45 and 49 above). Accordingly, the Court considers the State to be responsible for those injuries.80.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the second applicant, the Court notes that indeed her examination on 2 July 2008 did not reveal any injuries. The Court does not consider, however, this fact alone to undermine the credibility of her ill-treatment allegation. Thus, the Court is well aware that there are methods of applying force which do not leave any traces on a victim\u2019s body (see Boicenco v. Moldova, no.\u00a041088\/05, \u00a7 109, 11 July 2006). And, of course, the consequences of any intimidation, or indeed any other form of non-physical abuse, would in any event have left no visible trace (see Hajnal v.\u00a0Serbia, no. 36937\/06, \u00a7 80, 19\u00a0June 2012).81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the second applicant\u2019s later examination on 5 July 2008 documented bruises on the soft tissues of her head. That conclusion appears concordant with the second applicant\u2019s account of the events (see paragraphs 21 and 34 above).82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also attaches weight to the established fact that in the evening on 1 July 2008 the applicants were forcefully taken by the police from the office of the prosecutor in spite of the latter\u2019s objections. The prosecution authority proved unable to protect them from that virtual kidnapping. The Court considers that even if there were no physical ill-treatment of the applicants as such during the aforementioned events, they must have undoubtedly suffered anxiety and fear, as well as utter helplessness and vulnerability.83.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, it does not escape the Court\u2019s attention that, as pointed out by the applicants, one of the police officers actively involved in their ill-treatment, K., has been mentioned by the Court in the case of Savin (cited above). Indeed, it was established by the domestic courts in that case that K. had severely ill-treated the applicant back in 1999, but the charges were dropped as time-barred. The Court classified that ill-treatment as torture given that it had resulted in the applicant\u2019s disability for life. It also noted that K. had however built a successful career in the police as of March 2010 (see, in particular, \u00a7\u00a7 59-73 of the cited judgment). In the present case, the behaviour of K. and his colleagues, as described by the applicants, can only be interpreted as a demonstration of ultimate impunity and arbitrariness.84.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the foregoing, the Court considers it sufficiently established that both applicants suffered ill-treatment in the hands of the police in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.85.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of the substantive limb of that provision in respect of both applicants.2.\u00a0\u00a0Effectiveness of the investigation86.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the investigation into their allegations of ill-treatment had been superficial and lacked independence.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. They maintained that the investigation had been launched without delay and that all the essential investigative steps had been taken to verify the applicants\u2019 allegations. The fact that those allegations had proved unsubstantiated was not an indication of the ineffectiveness of the domestic investigation.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated in breach of Article\u00a03, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article\u00a01 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000\u2011IV). Thus the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis for their decisions (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a0103 et seq., Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII).89.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court has found that the respondent State was responsible under Article 3 for the applicants\u2019 ill-treatment (see paragraphs\u00a084 and 85 above). The authorities therefore had an obligation to investigate it in accordance with the aforementioned effectiveness standards.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the authorities launched a criminal investigation into the matter without delay. Thus, the first applicant complained of his ill-treatment for the first time on 30\u00a0June 2008. Subsequently, on 1\u00a0July 2008 the alleged ill-treatment of both applicants was brought to the attention of the prosecution authorities. On the following day a criminal case was opened, both applicants were afforded victim status and questioned in that capacity (see paragraphs 23-24 and 29-31 above). However, the first questioning of the police officers concerned took place more than a month later. The police department explained that delay by the fact that all the three officers were on sick leave and that their whereabouts could not be established (see paragraph 37-39 above). The Court considers the aforementioned reasons unconvincing.91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the domestic investigation lasted for over four years (from July 2008 to October 2012) and resulted in the refusal of the prosecution authorities to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. It is noteworthy that, prior to that decision, the investigation had been dropped and re-opened about eight times, each time having been criticised by the higher authorities as being incomplete or superficial (see, in\u00a0particular, paragraphs 52 and 56 above).92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that four forensic examinations of the first applicant or of his medical file were carried out at various dates in 2008 and 2010 (see paragraphs 14, 31, 43 and 48 above). However, on 11 June 2012 the prosecution authorities decided to order yet another such examination, this time by a panel of experts, having concluded that those carried out earlier had been inconsistent in their findings. Although the subsequent expert examination corroborated the first applicant\u2019s allegation regarding the origin of his injuries, no further consideration was apparently given to that conclusion (see paragraphs 54 and 55 above).93.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the second applicant, the Court observes that her medical examination on 2 July 2008 in fact failed to assess her complaint of headaches closely linked to her allegation of ill-treatment. Nor did the investigation assess the medical finding of 5 July 2008, according to which the second applicant had bruises to the head (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the case of Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no.\u00a023893\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 173-180, 15 May 2012) it found that reluctance on the part of the authorities to ensure that a prompt and thorough investigation of the ill-treatment complaints by the criminal suspects was carried out constituted a systemic problem within the meaning of Article 46 of the Convention. The Court concludes that, in the light of the circumstances of the case and in line with its earlier case-law, in the present case, too, the domestic authorities failed in their procedural obligation to effectively investigate the allegations of ill-treatment.95.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore also been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb too in respect of both applicants.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 AND 3 (c) OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE FIRST APPLICANT96.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention that his self-incriminating statements obtained under duress and without the presence of a lawyer had been used for his conviction. The provisions relied on read as follows in the relevant part:\u201c1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:... (c)\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions98.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant submitted that his initial confession of 28\u00a0June 2008 had been the result of his severe ill-treatment by the police, while he had had no access to a lawyer. The first applicant noted that he had maintained his confessions during the subsequent investigative measures in the presence of the appointed lawyer later on 28 and 30 June 2008 while still remaining under the effect of his ill-treatment and fearing that it would be repeated. He observed that the domestic courts had relied on those confessions, even if not to a decisive degree, for securing his conviction without due verification of his allegations of ill-treatment.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, firstly, the domestic courts had relied only on the first applicant\u2019s confessions given in the presence of his lawyer and, secondly, they had not been decisive or sole evidential basis for securing his conviction. The Government also emphasised that the first applicant had had an adversarial trial, which had given him the opportunity to raise any arguments he considered relevant as well as to challenge any evidence.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the requirements of paragraph\u00a03 of Article\u00a06\u00a0are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by paragraph 1 of that Article and thus they are to be examined together (see Van Geyseghem v. Belgium [GC], no. 26103\/95, \u00a7 27, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011I). On the whole, the Court is called upon to examine whether the proceedings in their entirety were fair (see Balliu v. Albania, no.\u00a074727\/01, \u00a7\u00a025, 16\u00a0June\u00a02005).101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that, although not absolute, the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental features of fair trial (see Krombach v. France, no. 29731\/96, \u00a7\u00a089, ECHR 2001\u2011II). As a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7 55, ECHR\u00a02008). The right to defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction (ibid).102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently viewed early access to a lawyer as a procedural guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination and a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment, noting the particular vulnerability of an accused at the early stages of the proceedings, when he is confronted with both the stress of the situation and the increasingly complex criminal legislation involved. Any exception to the enjoyment of this right should be clearly circumscribed and its application strictly limited in time. These principles are particularly called for in the case of serious charges, for it is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 54).103.\u00a0\u00a0The aforementioned principles of the right to defence and the privilege against self-incrimination are in line with the generally recognised international human rights standards, which are at the core of the concept of a fair trial and whose rationale relates in particular to the protection of the accused against abusive coercion on the part of the authorities. They also contribute to the prevention of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article\u00a06, notably equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting authorities and the accused (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 53, Bykov v. Russia [GC], no. 4378\/02, \u00a7 92, 10 March 2009, with further references, and Pishchalnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 7025\/04, \u00a7 68, 24\u00a0September\u00a02009). The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused (see Jalloh v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7 100, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011IX).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the first applicant was de facto detained and questioned as a suspect in respect of the murder of Mr L. from 10 p.m. on 27\u00a0June to 8.15 p.m. on 28 June 2008. While he did not make any self-incriminating statements during his questioning on 27\u00a0June 2008, on the following day he confessed to the murder. By virtue of the Court\u2019s case-law principles, the applicant was entitled to be assisted by a lawyer as from his very first questioning as a suspect by the police. However, he was not legally represented until his repeated questioning late in the evening on 28\u00a0June 2008. The Court therefore considers that his right to legal assistance was restricted on this account.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also refers to its finding of a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment (see paragraphs 84 and 85 above). The Court therefore considers it established that the first applicant was subjected to ill-treatment during his questioning on 28 June 2008, which resulted in his initial confession.106.\u00a0\u00a0It does not escape the Court\u2019s attention that the first applicant maintained his confession in presence of the appointed lawyer during his repeated questioning later on 28 June 2008 (for the first time in his status of a criminal suspect) and during the reconstruction of the crime on 30\u00a0June 2008. It is noteworthy, however, that his original confession formed part of the case file. It thus affected the investigation strategy and set the framework within which the first applicant\u2019s further defence had to be mounted.107.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, having regard to the fact that the first applicant was questioned for the first time in the presence of his lawyer only a few hours after his ill-treatment, the Court does not consider it unlikely that he was still under the effect of that ill-treatment. Likewise, the events of 1\u00a0July 2008 (namely, the applicants\u2019 unhindered kidnapping by the police officers, who had earlier ill-treated them, directly from the prosecutor\u2019s office) indicate to the Court that the first applicant remained vulnerable and had reasons to fear further ill-treatment. This could explain the fact that he continued to maintain his confession on 3 July 2008.108.\u00a0\u00a0Another issue of relevance is the possible delay as regards the first applicant\u2019s confidential communication with his lawyer. It remains unclear when it took place. The fact that only forty minutes after the reconstruction of the crime on 30 June 2008 the first applicant retracted his confession and decided to complain about his ill-treatment suggests that it might be then that he had been able to talk to his lawyer in private. At\u00a0the same time, the lawyer himself stated that such a conversation had taken place before the first applicant\u2019s questioning on 28 June 2008 (see paragraph\u00a022 above). The Court would not, however, be inclined to take that statement at face value given that the drastic change in the first applicant\u2019s position on 30\u00a0June 2008 remained unexplained.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the domestic courts relied on the first applicant\u2019s confessions, along with some other evidence, with a view to securing his conviction. They failed, however to establish in a convincing manner that those confessions had been made in full freedom. Thus, in its judgment of 4 July 2012 the trial court dismissed the first applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment with the reference to the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 18 May 2012 refusing to open a criminal case in respect of the police officers. If the court had sought at least to obtain a factual update on the matter, it would have noticed than meanwhile, on 11 June 2012, a higher-level prosecution authority had in fact stated that the origin of the first applicant\u2019s injuries had never been established and had therefore ordered a repeated forensic medical examination to that effect (see paragraphs 53-55 and 65-66 above). Although the Higher Specialised Court had once quashed the first instance court\u2019s judgment for its failure to duly examine the first applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint, there appears no indication in the subsequent judgment of any further efforts having been made in that regard.110.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the foregoing, the Court considers that the first applicant\u2019s right to freedom against self-incrimination and to legal assistance were unduly restricted during his initial questionings by the police, and that that restriction was not remedied in the course of his trial.111.\u00a0\u00a0This suffices for the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention in respect of the first applicant.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION112.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage113.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The second applicant claimed EUR 8,000 under this head.114.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested these claims as unsubstantiated and exorbitant.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants suffered non-pecuniary damage on account of the violations of their rights under Article 3 of the Convention, which cannot be compensated for by the mere finding of a violation of his Convention rights. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41, the Court awards the first applicant EUR\u00a09,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount. The Court also awards the second applicant EUR 4,500 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable.116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that where an individual, as the first applicant in the instant case, has been convicted by a court in proceedings which did not meet the Convention requirement of fairness, a retrial, a reopening or a review of the case, if requested, represents in principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation (see, for example, Leonid Lazarenko v. Ukraine, no. 22313\/04, \u00a7\u00a065, 28 October 2010).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses117.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed EUR 14,970 in respect of his legal representation, which comprised about 95\u00a0hours of legal work in the domestic proceedings at EUR 60 per hour, and about 93\u00a0hours of work in the proceedings before the Court at EUR 100 per hour.118.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the first applicant claimed EUR\u00a01,047.9 in compensation for administrative expenses. This amount was calculated as being equal to 7% of the legal fees mentioned above.119.\u00a0\u00a0To substantiate that claim, the first applicant submitted a legal assistance contract with Mr Tokarev of 22\u00a0December 2008, which stipulated that it would remain valid until the completion of the proceedings in Strasbourg and that payment would be made thereafter and within the limits of the sum awarded by the Court, or any domestic court, in costs and expenses. The first applicant also submitted five time-sheets and expense reports completed by Mr\u00a0Tokarev in respect of the work done over the period from September 2009 to September 2014.120.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the above claims.121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must establish, firstly, whether the costs and expenses indicated by the first applicant were actually incurred and, secondly, whether they were necessary (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, \u00a7 220, Series A no. 324).122.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the first applicant the sum of EUR 5,000 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27372":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of the inhuman conditions of his detention, more specifically the poor hygiene aggravated by the lack of activities of any kind or work and the fact that the food he received was not adapted to his diabetes.This complaint falls to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility32.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not complained to the post sentencing judge or any other domestic authority about the conditions of his detention.33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit observations on this point.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s complaint concerns mainly the physical conditions of his detention, in particular the lack of hygiene and absence of activities or work. In this regard, it notes that in recent applications lodged against Romania concerning similar complaints, it has already analysed such submissions from the Government and found that, given the specific nature of this type of complaint, the legal avenues suggested by the Government did not constitute an effective remedy (see L\u0103utaru v. Romania, no. 13099\/04, \u00a7 85, 18 October 2011; Leontiuc v.\u00a0Romania, no. 44302\/10, \u00a7 50, 4 December 2012; and Necula v. Romania, no. 33003\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 32-39, 18 February 2014). At any rate, the Court notes that out of the three decisions issued by the post sentencing judge submitted by the Government, only one admitted the prisoner\u2019s complaint, and then only to impose a very general obligation on the prison authorities (see paragraph\u00a026 above). The other two judgments of the High Court of Cassation and Justice submitted by the Government relate to specific situations in which the right to correspondence and medical assistance were breached, as well as a particular incident concerning the provision of hot water (see paragraphs 27 and 28 above). They do not address structural issues such as poor hygiene or the applicant\u2019s specific allegations of lack of activities and work. In addition, the Government did not say what specific measures had been taken by the prison authorities in order to remedy the shortcomings identified by the above-mentioned decisions.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that those decisions do not demonstrate how the legal actions proposed by the Government could have afforded the applicant immediate and effective redress for the purposes of his complaint (see, mutatis mutandis, Marian Stoicescu v. Romania, no.\u00a012934\/02, \u00a7 19, 16 July 2009).36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore rejects the Government\u2019s plea of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the physical conditions of his detention, in particular the lack of hygiene and the absence of activities and work in Rahova and Giurgiu Prisons.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.38.\u00a0\u00a0With respect to the applicant\u2019s complaint that he did not receive food adapted to his diabetes, the Court notes that, according to the documents submitted by the Government, the applicant received a special menu for prisoners suffering from diabetes (see paragraphs 12 and 16 above). The applicant did not contradict the Government\u2019s submissions. In addition, there is no indication in the file as to whether the applicant ever complained about that issue before the authorities. It follows that this part of the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits39.\u00a0The applicant considered that the detention conditions in both Rahova and Giurgiu Prisons amounted to torture, especially given that he was suffering from diabetes. He further alleged that the fact that no activities or work had been proposed to him had aggravated the suffering caused by the inhuman conditions in which he was being held.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, referring to their description of the detention conditions submitted before the Court (see paragraphs 10 to 17 above), contended that the domestic authorities had taken all the measures necessary to ensure adequate conditions of detention, and that the applicant\u2019s complaint was unsubstantiated.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that under Article 3 of the Convention the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of execution of the measure of detention do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well\u2011being are adequately secured (see Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no.\u00a044558\/98, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII, and Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000-XI).42.\u00a0\u00a0When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR\u00a02001-II).43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in addition to overcrowding, other aspects of the physical conditions of detention are relevant for its assessment of compliance with Article 3 (see Ostrovar v. Moldova, no. 35207\/03, \u00a7 89, 13\u00a0September 2005; Babushkin v. Russia, no. 67253\/01, \u00a7 44, 18 October 2007; and Iacov Stanciu, cited above, \u00a7 169). The Court has found that the following conditions of detention raise an issue under Article 3 of the Convention: lack of appropriate furniture in the cells; poor sanitary facilities, such as a limited number of toilets and sinks for a large number of detainees; sinks in cells providing only cold water for a wide range of needs (personal hygiene, washing clothing and personal objects, cleaning the toilets); limited access to hot showers; poor sanitary conditions in general, including the presence of cockroaches, rats, lice and bedbugs (see Iacov Stanciu, cited above, \u00a7 175).44.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant started to complain on 15 July 2008 about the conditions in which he was detained in Rahova and then in Giurgiu Prison. More specifically, he complained of lack of hygiene and the presence of bedbugs, which prevented him from sleeping at night. He also complained of a lack of activities and opportunities to work. The Government did not explicitly contradict those allegations.45.\u00a0\u00a0Even though there are no relevant CPT reports concerning the above-mentioned prisons, the applicant\u2019s allegations are supported by the reports of APADOR-CH, a Romanian NGO which visited the said prisons (see paragraph 25 above). Moreover, the Court has already held in a number of cases that the detention conditions in Rahova or Giurgiu Prisons, which included the presence of parasites, breached the safeguards of Article 3 of the Convention (see Iacov Stanciu, cited above; Geanopol v. Romania, no.\u00a01777\/06, 5 March 2013; and Niculescu v. Romania, no. 25333\/03, 25\u00a0June 2013, for the conditions in Rahova Prison; Cucu v. Romania, no.\u00a022362\/06, 13 November 2012, and B\u0103dil\u0103 v. Romania, no. 31725\/04, 4\u00a0October 2011, for the conditions in Giurgiu Prison).46. The Court cannot but conclude that the applicant in the instant case was subjected to unsatisfactory sanitary conditions.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes the view that the applicant\u2019s state of health made him vulnerable and that his detention in unhygienic conditions must have been aggravated by the lack of activities or work as well as the overcrowding. It results from the information submitted by the Government that the applicant had available in Rahova Prison less than four sq. m of personal space. The Court considers that such a level of overcrowding cannot but increase the difficulties encountered by the authorities and the prisoners in maintaining an adequate level of hygiene (see Ion Ciobanu v. Romania, no. 67754\/10, \u00a7 42, 30 April 2013).48.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the cumulative conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention caused him distress that exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that attained the threshold of severity under Article 3.49.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained in substance of a violation of his right to private and family life because he had been unable to maintain contact with his wife and four children owing to the Romanian authorities\u2019 refusal to allow his transfer to serve the rest of his sentence in a Turkish prison.This complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention which reads:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d51.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the Court had previously held that the Convention did not grant prisoners the right to choose their place of detention and that separation and distance from their family were an inevitable consequence of their detention. They relied on the cases of Selmani v. Switzerland ((dec.), no. 70258\/01, 28 June 2001) and Plepi v.\u00a0Albania and Greece (nos. 11546\/05, 33285\/05 and 33288\/05, 4 May 2010). The Government further maintained that the aim of the Transfer Convention concluded between Romania and Turkey was not to enable sentenced persons to return to their country of origin and free themselves of the unfavourable consequences of serving the sentence imposed by the sentencing State. The sentencing State was not obliged to agree to the transfer. They therefore requested the Court to declare this complaint incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the essential issue raised by the current case is whether a refusal by Romania to transfer the applicant to Turkey falls within the scope of any Article of the Convention.53.\u00a0\u00a0In the first place, the Court notes that there is no evidence that Romanian law confers on the applicant any right to be transferred to Turkey and the applicant did not refer to any relevant legal provisions which would indicate the existence of such a right. Nor is there any domestic court transfer order in his favour. Accordingly, it cannot be maintained that he has any substantive right under Romanian law to be transferred to his country of origin.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that, whereas provisions of international agreements may create individual rights protected by the Convention, either where the provision is directly applicable (see S.A. Dangeville v. France, no.\u00a036677\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 46-48, ECHR 2002\u2011III, concerning a failure to bring the domestic law into line with a Community directive) or where the requisite domestic legislation applying it has been enacted (see Beaumartin v.\u00a0France, 24 November 1994, \u00a7\u00a7 27-28, Series A no. 296\u2011B, concerning a right to compensation deriving from a Franco-Moroccan treaty and subsequent French legislation setting up a committee responsible for apportioning the Moroccan indemnity), the provisions of the convention between Romania and Turkey confine themselves to providing an inter-State procedural framework for the transfer of sentenced persons and do not generate any individual substantive rights per se. In any event, those types of .international instruments do not contain an obligation on the signatory States to comply with a request for transfer (see Passaris v. Greece (dec.), no. 53344\/07, 4 September 2009). Even though the convention contained grounds for refusing a transfer, it did not bind the Romanian authorities to find in favour of the applicant\u2019s transfer requests.55.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, it must be recalled that, as regards the refusal to authorise the applicant\u2019s transfer to Turkey, the Convention does not grant prisoners the right to choose their place of detention and that separation and distance from their family are an inevitable consequence of their detention following the exercise by the Romanian State of its prerogatives in the area of criminal sanctions (see Plepi and Selmani, judgments cited above).56.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION57.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 250,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the claim excessive and unsubstantiated.60.\u00a0\u00a0On the basis of its case-law in the matter, the Court awards the applicant EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage incurred as a result of the violation of his Article 3 rights due to the inhuman conditions of his detention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not claim any costs or expenses. Accordingly, the Court does not make any award under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27375":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION\u00a015.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that if returned to Italy he would face treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d16.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those arguments.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stressed that as an asylum seeker he belonged to a particularly vulnerable population group in need of special protection. In this connection, he referred to the Court\u2019s judgment in M.S.S. where the Court had found that the exposure of an asylum seeker to conditions of indigence amounted to a breach of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convenetion.19.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that due to systemic deficiencies in the Italian reception system, if returned to Italy he would not benefit from proper housing and adequate medical treatment. In support of his allegations he referred to the findings of the 2013 report of the Swiss Refugee Council (OSAR), which the Court extensivley analysed in its Tarakhel judgment. Against this background he submitted that a return to Italy would cause a serious deterioration of his mental health status and put him at a very significant risk of suicide.20.\u00a0\u00a0He stressed that the support of his sisters living in Switzerland was paramount for the successful outcome of his therapy as stated in the medical report of 6 June 2013.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government21.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s assessment as to the existence of systemic deficiencies in the Italian reception system and referred to a series of decisions where the Court had found such allegations to be manifestly ill-founded (Mohammed Hussein and Others v. the Netherlands and Italy (dec.), no. 27725\/10, 2 April 2013; Abubeker v.\u00a0Austria and Italy (dec.), no. 73874\/11, 18 June 2013; Halimi v. Austria and Italy (dec.), no.\u00a053852\/11, 18 June 2013; Miruts Hagos v. the Netherlands and Italy (dec.), no. 9053\/10, 27 August 2013; Mohammed Hassan and Others v. the Netherlands and Italy (dec.), no. 40524\/10, 27\u00a0August 2013; and Hussein Diirshi and Others v. the Netherlands and Italy (dec.), no. 2314\/10, 10\u00a0September 2013).22.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed that the health system in Italy was capable of dealing with all sorts of diseases. Moreover, Italy was bound by the Council Directive 2003\/9\/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in the Member States (\u201cthe Reception Directive\u201d), which provided for adequate medical treatment of asylum seekers, including those with special needs (Article 15).23.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s individual case, the Government recalled that during his interview with the FOM on 28 March 2013, the applicant had not raised any specific reason showing that his removal to Italy would be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. He had merely stated that he wished to stay in Switzerland because some of his relatives were living there, without mentioning any particular health issue apart from his back pain at that stage. According to the Government, the applicant\u2019s present treatment for his post-traumatic stress disorder was not particularly heavy and consisted in a daily prescription of Sertraline, an anti-depressant, as well as a medical interview once every two weeks. The lower back pain was being treated with basic pain-killers.24.\u00a0\u00a0The Government finally recalled that according to the Court\u2019s case law (Dragan and Others v. Germany (dec.), no. 33743\/03, 7 October 2004) the risk of suicide does not require the State to refrain from enforcing an expulsion order, provided that concrete measures are taken to prevent those threats from being realized.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that according to its well-established case-law the expulsion of an asylum seeker by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving country. In such circumstances, Article 3 implies an obligation not to expel the individual to that country (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7\u00a0July\u00a01989, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a090-91, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0161; Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, \u00a7 103, Series A no. 125; H.L.R. v.\u00a0France, 29 April 1997, \u00a7\u00a034, Reports 1997-III; Jabari v. Turkey, no.\u00a040035\/98, \u00a7 38, ECHR 2000\u2011VIII; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no.\u00a01948\/04, \u00a7 135, ECHR 2007\u2011I; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 152, ECHR 2008; and M.S.S., cited above, \u00a7 365).26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held on numerous occasions that to fall within the scope of Article 3 the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, inter alia, Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a091, ECHR 2000-XI; and M.S.S., cited above, \u00a7 219).27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also ruled that Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home (see Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a027238\/95, \u00a7 99, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011I). Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living (see M\u00fcslim v. Turkey, no. 53566\/99, \u00a7 85, 26\u00a0April 2005; and M.S.S., cited above, \u00a7 249).28.\u00a0\u00a0In the M.S.S. judgment (\u00a7 250), the Court nevertheless took the view that what was at issue in that case could not be considered in those terms. Unlike in the M\u00fcslim case (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 83 and 84), the obligation to provide accommodation and decent material conditions to impoverished asylum seekers had entered into positive law and the Greek authorities were bound to comply with their own legislation transposing European Union law, namely the Reception Directive. What the applicant held against the Greek authorities in that case was that, because of their deliberate actions or omissions, it had been impossible in practice for him to avail himself of those rights and provide for his essential needs.29.\u00a0\u00a0In the same judgment (\u00a7 251), the Court attached considerable importance to the applicant\u2019s status as an asylum seeker and, as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection. It noted the existence of a broad consensus at the international and European level concerning this need for special protection, as evidenced by the Geneva Convention, the remit and the activities of the UNHCR, and the standards set out in the European Union Reception Directive.30.\u00a0\u00a0Still in M.S.S. (\u00a7\u00a7 252 and 253), having to determine whether a situation of extreme material poverty could raise an issue under Article 3, the Court reiterated that it had not excluded \u201cthe possibility that the responsibility of the State [might] be engaged [under Article 3] in respect of treatment where an applicant, who was wholly dependent on State support, found herself faced with official indifference in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity\u201d (see Budina v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no. 45603\/05, 18 June 2009).31.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the expulsion of seriously ill persons, the Court has summarized the applicable principles in its judgment in the case of N.\u00a0v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565\/05, \u00a7 42-44, ECHR 2008) as follows.Aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot in principle claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance and services provided by the expelling State. The fact that the applicant\u2019s circumstances, including his life expectancy, would be significantly reduced if he were to be removed from the Contracting State is not sufficient in itself to give rise to a breach of Article 3. The decision to remove an alien who is suffering from a serious mental or physical illness to a country where the facilities for the treatment of that illness are inferior to those available in the Contracting State may raise an issue under Article 3, but only in a very exceptional case, where the humanitarian grounds against the removal are compelling. In the D. v. the United Kingdom case (2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III) the very exceptional circumstances were that the applicant was critically ill and appeared to be close to death, could not be guaranteed any nursing or medical care in his country of origin and had no family there willing or able to care of him or provide him with even a basic level of food, shelter or social support.The Court does not exclude that there may be other very exceptional cases where the humanitarian considerations are equally compelling. However, it considers that it should maintain the high threshold set in D.\u00a0v.\u00a0the United Kingdom and applied in its subsequent case-law, which it regards as correct in principle, given that in such cases the alleged future harm would emanate not from the intentional acts or omissions of public authorities or non-State bodies, but instead from a naturally occurring illness and the lack of sufficient resources to deal with it in the receiving country.Although many of the rights it contains have implications of a social or economic nature, the Convention is essentially directed at the protection of civil and political rights (see Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, \u00a7 26, Series\u00a0A no. 32). Furthermore, inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual\u2019s fundamental rights (see Soering, cited above, \u00a7 89). Advances in medical science, together with social and economic differences between countries, entail that the level of treatment available in the Contracting State and the country of origin may vary considerably. While it is necessary, given the fundamental importance of Article 3 in the Convention system, for the Court to retain a degree of flexibility to prevent expulsion in very exceptional cases, Article 3 does not place an obligation on the Contracting State to alleviate such disparities through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. A finding to the contrary would place too great a burden on the Contracting States.32.\u00a0\u00a0With regard, in particular, to persons suffering from serious mental illnesses, the Court recalls that in Bensaid v. the United Kingdom (no.\u00a044599\/98, ECHR 2001-I), which concerned the removal from the United Kingdom of an Algerian national who was a schizophrenic, the Court unanimously rejected the complaint under Article 3 and held as follows (\u00a7\u00a7\u00a036-40):\u201cIn the present case, the applicant is suffering from a long-term mental illness, schizophrenia. He is currently receiving medication, olanzapine, which assists him in managing his symptoms. If he returns to Algeria, this drug will no longer be available to him free as an outpatient. He does not subscribe to any social insurance fund and cannot claim any reimbursement. It is, however, the case that the drug would be available to him if he was admitted as an inpatient and that it would be potentially available on payment as an outpatient. It is also the case that other medication, used in the management of mental illness, is likely to be available. The nearest hospital for providing treatment is at Blida, some 75 to 80 km from the village where his family live.The difficulties in obtaining medication and the stress inherent in returning to that part of Algeria, where there is violence and active terrorism, would, according to the applicant, seriously endanger his health. Deterioration in his already existing mental illness could involve relapse into hallucinations and psychotic delusions involving self-harm and harm to others, as well as restrictions in social functioning (such as withdrawal and lack of motivation). The Court considers that the suffering associated with such a relapse could, in principle, fall within the scope of Article 3.The Court observes, however, that the applicant faces the risk of relapse even if he stays in the United Kingdom as his illness is long term and requires constant management. Removal will arguably increase the risk, as will the differences in available personal support and accessibility of treatment. The applicant has argued, in particular, that other drugs are less likely to be of benefit to his condition, and also that the option of becoming an inpatient should be a last resort. Nonetheless, medical treatment is available to the applicant in Algeria. The fact that the applicant\u2019s circumstances in Algeria would be less favourable than those enjoyed by him in the United Kingdom is not decisive from the point of view of Article 3 of the Convention.The Court finds that the risk that the applicant would suffer a deterioration in his condition if he were returned to Algeria and that, if he did, he would not receive adequate support or care is to a large extent speculative. The arguments concerning the attitude of his family as devout Muslims, the difficulty of travelling to Blida and the effects on his health of these factors are also speculative. The information provided by the parties does not indicate that travel to the hospital is effectively prevented by the situation in the region. The applicant is not himself a likely target of terrorist activity. Even if his family does not have a car, this does not exclude the possibility of other arrangements being made.The Court accepts the seriousness of the applicant\u2019s medical condition. Having regard, however, to the high threshold set by Article 3, particularly where the case does not concern the direct responsibility of the Contracting State for the infliction of harm, the Court does not find that there is a sufficiently real risk that the applicant\u2019s removal in these circumstances would be contrary to the standards of Article 3. The case does not disclose the exceptional circumstances of D. v. the United Kingdom (cited above), where the applicant was in the final stages of a terminal illness, Aids, and had no prospect of medical care or family support on expulsion to St Kitts.\u201d33.\u00a0\u00a0In a more recent case, concerning the removal of a Moroccan national from Finland to Morocco (S.B. v. Finland (dec.), no.\u00a017200\/11\u00a0\u00a7\u00a036, 24 June 2014) the Court found that mental health care was available in Morocco, that treatment for depression as well as for anxiety disorders was in general available in outpatient and inpatient clinics and that the applicant also had access to the anti-depressant medication which had been prescribed for her. It therefore considered that the applicant had access to treatment for her severe depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and generalised anxiety disorder in Morocco and was therefore not at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if removed to Morocco.34.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, as far as the risk of suicide is concerned, the Court reiterates that the fact that a person whose expulsion has been ordered has threatened to commit suicide does not require the State to refrain from enforcing the envisaged measure, provided that concrete measures are taken to prevent those threats from being realised (see, for example, Dragan and Others v.\u00a0Germany (dec.), no. 33743\/03, 7 October 2004; Karim v. Sweden (dec.), no. 24171\/05, 4 July 2006; and Kochieva and Others v. Sweden (dec.), no. 75203\/12, 30 April 2013). The Court has reached the same conclusion also regarding applicants who had a record of previous suicide attempts (see Goncharova and Alekseytsev v. Sweden (dec.), no 31246\/06, 3 May 2007; and A.A. v.\u00a0Sweden (dec.), no. 8594\/04, \u00a7 71, 2 September 2008).(a)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that according to the medical information provided the applicant shows severe symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder for which he is being treated by a doctor and receives medication (paragraph 9 above). The Court must therefore determine whether his return to Italy would put him in a situation of harm which would reach the high threshold set by Article 3 of the Convention.36.\u00a0\u00a0In Tarakhel (\u00a7 115), the Court found that while the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy could not in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum seekers to that country, the data and information available to the Court nevertheless raised serious doubts as to the capacities of the system. Accordingly, in the Court\u2019s view, the possibility that a significant number of asylum seekers might be left without accommodation or accommodated in overcrowded facilities without any privacy, or even in insalubrious or violent conditions, could not be dismissed as unfounded. The applicant is not, however, at the present time critically ill. The rapidity of any deterioration which he would suffer because of his removal from Switzerland and the extent to which he would be able to obtain access to medical treatment in Italy must involve a certain degree of speculation (see, mutatis mutandis, N. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 50). At present, there is no indication that the applicant, if returned to Italy, would not receive appropriate psychological treatment (see, mutatis mutandis, Halimi v. Austria and Italy, (dec.) no. 53852\/11, 18\u00a0June 2013) and would not have access to anti-depressants of the kind that he is currently receiving in Switzerland. In this respect, the Court notes that it is common knowledge that Sertraline or equivalent treatment is available in Italy.37.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, the applicant\u2019s case cannot be distinguished from those cited in paragraphs 32 and 33 above. It does not disclose very exceptional circumstances, such as in D. v. the United Kingdom (cited above), where the applicant was in the final stages of a terminal illness, AIDS, and had no prospect of medical care or family support (Bensaid, cited above, \u00a7 40).38.\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that the implementation of the decision to remove the applicant to Italy would not give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION39.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 8 of the Convention the applicant alleged that, by severing his relationship with his sisters who live in Switzerland, his removal to Italy would violate his right to respect of his family and private life. Article 8 reads as follows:\u201c1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint under Article 8 raises issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. It finds no other grounds for declaring this part of the application inadmissible. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stressed that he had no family members living in Italy and that he was young and unmarried. He submitted that his relationship with his two sisters living in Switzerland fell within the protective scope of his right to respect for his family life owing to his severe mental health status which should be considered as an additional factor of dependence, other than normal emotional ties. In this respect he referred to the Court\u2019s judgment in Bousarra v. France (no. 25672\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 38-39, 23\u00a0September\u00a02010).In addition, the applicant alleged that a removal to Italy would also infringe his right to respect for his private life because it would affect his moral and physical integrity, as he would no longer benefit from his sisters\u2019 support, which was paramout for the successful outcome of his therapy. In support of his argument, the applicant relied on Bensaid (cited above, \u00a7 47) where the Court held that mental health must be regarded as a crucial part of private life associated with the aspect of moral integrity.Moreover, the applicant considered that the interference with his family and private life in case of removal to Italy would not be \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d as provided by Article 8 of the Convention, since the Swiss authorities did not conduct the asylum procedures according to Article\u00a015\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Dublin Regulation which was specifically intended to protect persons like him.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the applicant, who is an adult, could not claim any interference with his family and private life in case of removal to Italy.With regard to family life, the Government stressed that the applicant\u2019s sisters had settled in Switzerland years before the applicant\u2019s arrival and when the applicant was already an adult. The applicant had therefore already lived away from his sisters with whom he did not have particularly strong ties. The Government also recalled that siblings were not listed as \u201cfamily members\u201d under Article 2(i) of the Dublin Regulation and that Article 15 of the same regulation which dealt with asylum seekers depending on the assistance of their relatives only referred to \u201cserious illness\u201d or \u201csevere handicap\u201d.With regard to private life, the Government referred to their observations under Article 3 of the Convention and considered that the applicant\u2019s removal to Italy, where adequate medical assistance was available, did not disclose a sufficient interference with his moral integrity to fall within the scope of Article 8.43.\u00a0\u00a0In the event that the Court accepted the applicant\u2019s argument that his removal to Italy would result in an interference with his family and private life, the Government stressed that any such interference would be in accordance with the law and would be motivated by the legitimate aim of enforcing immigration control, which served the general interests of the economic well-being of the country. Moreover, since the applicant had spent little time in Switzerland and in full knowledge that his situation was precarious, he only had his sisters in Switzerland and not more immediate relatives such as a spouse, parents or children and, in any event, it had not been shown that his sisters were unable to follow him to Italy, the applicant\u2019s removal would be a measure proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by the Swiss authorities.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that where a Contracting State tolerates the presence of an alien in its territory, thereby allowing him or her to await a decision on an application for a residence permit, an appeal against such a decision or a fresh application for a residence permit, such a Contracting State enables the alien to take part in the host country\u2019s society, to form relationships and to create a family there. However, this does not automatically entail that the authorities of the Contracting State concerned are, as a result, under an obligation pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention to allow him or her to settle in their country. In a similar vein, confronting the authorities of the host country with family life as a fait accompli does not entail that those authorities are, as a result, under an obligation pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention to allow the applicant to settle in the country. The Court has previously held that, in general, persons in that situation have no entitlement to expect that a right of residence will be conferred upon them (Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 12738\/10, \u00a7 103, 3\u00a0October\u00a02014).The same applies to cases of asylum seekers whose presence on the territory of a Contracting State is tolerated by the national authorities on their own motion or accepted in compliance with their international obligations.45.\u00a0\u00a0Like Jeunesse (\u00a7 104), the present case may be distinguished from cases concerning \u201csettled migrants\u201d as this notion has been used in the Court\u2019s case-law, namely, persons who have already been granted formally a right of residence in a host country. A subsequent withdrawal of that right, for instance because the person concerned has been convicted of a criminal offence, will constitute an interference with his or her right to respect for private and\/or family life within the meaning of Article 8. In such cases, the Court will examine whether the interference is justified under the second paragraph of Article 8. In this connection, it will have regard to the various criteria which it has identified in its case-law in order to determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the grounds underlying the authorities\u2019 decision to withdraw the right of residence and the Article 8 rights of the individual concerned (ibid., \u00a7 104).46.\u00a0\u00a0As the factual and legal situation of a settled migrant and that of an alien seeking admission, whether or not as an asylum seeker, are not the same, the criteria developed in the Court\u2019s case-law for assessing whether the withdrawal of a residence permit of a settled migrant is compatible with Article 8 cannot be transposed automatically to the situation of the applicant. Rather, the question to be examined in the present case is whether, having regard to the circumstances as a whole, the Swiss authorities were under a duty pursuant to Article 8 to grant the applicant a residence permit in Switzerland, whether or not as an asylum seeker, thus enabling him to exercise any family life he might have established on Swiss territory (mutatis mutandis, ibid., \u00a7 105). The instant case thus concerns not only family life but also immigration lato sensu. For this reason, it is to be seen as one involving an allegation of failure on the part of the respondent State to comply with a positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention (mutatis mutandis, ibid., \u00a7 105).47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that in a case which concerns family life as well as immigration, the extent of a State\u2019s obligations to admit to its territory relatives of persons residing there will vary according to the particular circumstances of the persons involved and the general interest. Factors to be taken into account in this context are the extent to which family life would effectively be ruptured, the extent of the ties in the Contracting State, whether there are insurmountable obstacles in the way of the family living in the country of origin of the alien concerned and whether there are factors of immigration control (for example, a history of breaches of immigration law) or considerations of public order weighing in favour of exclusion (ibid., \u00a7 107).48.\u00a0\u00a0Another important consideration is whether family life was created at a time when the persons involved were aware that the immigration status of one of them was such that the persistence of that family life within the host State would from the outset be precarious. It is the Court\u2019s well\u2011established case-law that, where this is the case, it is likely only to be in exceptional circumstances that the removal of the non-national family member will constitute a violation of Article 8 (ibid., \u00a7 108).49.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that there is no trace of the applicant\u2019s presence in Switzerland before he lodged his asylum request on 18 February 2013 (paragraph 5 above), four months before the lodging of the present application. During this very short period of time, the applicant\u2019s presence on Swiss territory was accepted by the domestic authorities only for the purpose of examining his status as an asylum seeker and complying with their relevant obligations under the Dublin Regulation and national law.The Court recalls that it has already held that there would be no family life, within the meaning of Article 8, between parents and adult children or between adult siblings unless they could demonstrate additional elements of dependence (see F.N. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 3202\/09, \u00a7 36, 17\u00a0September 2013).Assuming that the applicant and his sisters had maintained family ties when they were living in Syria and assuming that additional elements of dependence could be demonstrated in the applicant\u2019s case, it cannot be argued that the tolerance by the domestic authorities of the applicant\u2019s presence on Swiss territory for a lengthy period of time enabled him to establish and develop strong family ties in Switzerland (a contrario, Jeunesse, cited above, \u00a7 116).50.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing in mind the margin of appreciation afforded to States in immigration matters, the Court finds that a fair balance has been struck between the competing interests at stake, namely the personal interests of the applicant in establishing any family life in Switzerland on the one hand and, on the other, the public order interests of the respondent Government in controlling immigration (a contrario, ibid., \u00a7 121 and 122)51.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the fact that his removal to Italy would prevent him from continuing to benefit from the support from his sisters in the context of his therapy, it has already been dealt with under Article 3. The Court does not consider that it raises any separate issue under Article 8 of the Convention (mutatis mutandis, F.N. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 38).52.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the Court finds that the implementation of the decision to remove the applicant to Italy would not give rise to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.\u00a0III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION53.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 the applicant claimed that the FAC failed to grant him interim relief pending the outcome of the proceedings before it. Thereby, it made his appeal a totally ineffective remedy because, despite his severe mental health status, he was not protected from being expelled to Italy at any time, which would have put him at a serious risk of a treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see Mohammed v. Austria, no. 2283\/12, \u00a7 72, 6 June 2013). Article 13 reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d54.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.55.\u00a0\u00a0In his observations of 24 January 2014, the applicant informed the Court that he intended to withdraw this part of the application.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, having regard to Article 37 of the Convention, finds that the applicant does not intend to pursue this part of the application, within the meaning of Article 37 \u00a7 1 (a). The Court also finds no reasons of a general character, affecting respect for human rights, as defined in the Convention, which require the further examination of the present complaint by virtue of Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in fine (see, for example, Chojak v.\u00a0Poland, no. 32220\/96, Commission decision of 23 April 1998, unreported; Singh and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 30024\/96, 26 September 2000; and Stamatios Karagiannis v. Greece, no.\u00a027806\/02, \u00a7\u00a028, 10\u00a0February 2005).57.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application must be struck out in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention.","27394":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION (RECEPTION CONDITIONS)113.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their exclusion from reception facilities from 26 September 2011 onwards had exposed them to a life\u2011threatening situation and to inhuman and degrading treatment. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility114.\u00a0\u00a0The Government raised an objection based on non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They submitted that the applicants should have relied on other provisions of the \u201cReception\u201d Act and contacted the social welfare office having territorial jurisdiction. In the event of a refusal, an appeal lay to the relevant employment tribunal.115.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that they had been victims of a general problem related to the saturation of the reception network and that they had attempted \u2013 unsuccessfully \u2013 to use the only remedies available to them to prevent themselves from being removed from the reception centre and to find accommodation urgently.116.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, the questions raised by the Government\u2019s preliminary objection partly overlap with those that it will have to consider when examining the merits of the complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. The objection shall accordingly be examined together with the merits of those complaints and examined in this context.117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissionsa)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants118.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicants complained that their exclusion from the reception facilities from 26\u00a0September 2011 onwards had exposed them to a life-threatening situation and inhuman treatment. They explained that the situation had arisen as a result of a particularity of Belgian law which was to terminate material assistance for Dublin asylum-seekers on the date of expiry of the time-limit for complying with an order to leave the country (\u201cannex 26quater\u201d) without waiting for the conclusion of the asylum proceedings. Added to that was the fact that the appeal they had lodged against that decision had not been of suspensive effect, thus depriving them of any possibility of applying for a stay of execution of the order to leave the country. They had thus found themselves \u201cillegally resident\u201d within the meaning of Belgian law whereas they had still been asylum-seekers awaiting a final decision regarding their application.119.\u00a0\u00a0They submitted that in addition to an application to set aside and obtain a stay of execution of the\u00a0\u201cannex 26quater\u201d, they had instructed the social worker from the centre and their legal representative to use all the domestic remedies which, having regard to their status as \u201cillegally resident\u201d had been available to them to prevent their removal from the reception centre or to find a solution with regard to accommodation: two applications to extend the order to leave the country; multiple and reasoned requests to the Aliens Office; an application for leave to remain on medical grounds pursuant to section 9ter of the Aliens Act; and an application to the Aliens Appeals Board to process their case as a matter of priority. Every time they had produced all the evidence in their possession to establish their vulnerability. The authorities had failed to react, however, despite the urgent need to find a solution.120.\u00a0\u00a0After their removal from the accommodation centre, not speaking the languages of the country and having no means of subsistence, they had first roamed the streets before being directed to a public square in the centre of Brussels occupied by other homeless members of the Roma minority of Serbia. They spent eight days there, from 27\u00a0September to 5\u00a0October 2011, until their legal representative\u2019s efforts to contact the General Delegate to the Rights of the Child resulted in their finding accommodation on 5\u00a0October 2011 for two days in a transit centre, also in the Brussels-Capital district, and then space in the open centre of Bovigny. However, when they went there the accommodation was refused them on the grounds that their order to leave the country \u201cwas not valid\u201d. When they got back to Brussels the applicants disembarked at the Gare du Nord where a Roma woman directed them to a charitable organisation. It was there that they learnt that their return could be taken charge of in the context of Fedasil\u2019s \u201cvoluntary\u201d programme, which they accepted out of desperation, failing any other solution in Belgium and despite the pending appeals. The applicants also explained that they had had to stay at the Gare du Nord for a week, while their departure was organised for 25\u00a0October.121.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the other possibilities of obtaining the assistance referred to by the Government (see paragraph 125 below) were all bound to fail because of the rejection of their application by the Brussels social welfare office, which was the office having territorial jurisdiction, and the policy implemented by Fedasil since 2009 of refusing to take charge of families in their situation because the reception network was saturated. Furthermore, contrary to the Government\u2019s assertions, they had not satisfied the conditions for requesting an extension under section 7 of the \u201cReception\u201d Act because their asylum proceedings had not yet terminated and Fedasil had given instructions back in April 2010 to refuse application of the mechanism for extending reception arrangements for foreign nationals who had received an \u201cannex 26quater\u201d and illegally resident families with minor children. With regard to the emergency medical assistance incumbent on Fedasil to provide, the applicants observed that it was reserved by law and practice to persons currently seeking asylum and was not granted to persons illegally resident in the country. The same was true of the emergency medical assistance that Brussels social welfare office refused to grant to illegally resident foreign nationals. The applicants pointed out that this analysis of the situation was supported by the signed statement of the General Delegate to the Rights of the Child which attested to the failure of his attempts to find a solution by contacting the social welfare office and Fedasil. The applicants also submitted that appeals to the employment tribunals on the subject of reception facilities did not provide the guarantees of effectiveness required by the urgent situation in which they had found themselves.122.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the situation they had experienced had been contrary to Article 3 of the Convention as interpreted by the Court in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above (\u00a7 263). The state of extreme poverty and material and psychological want in which the authorities had placed them, in full knowledge of their vulnerability as asylum-seekers and as a family with young children including a severely disabled young daughter, had reached the threshold required by Article 3. The obligation to provide for the applicants\u2019 basic needs as asylum-seekers had also been one of the positive obligations of the Belgian State under European law and more particularly the Reception Directive, which provided that Dublin asylum-seekers had to continue being provided with reception facilities until they were actually transferred to the responsible State, as had been confirmed by the CJEU in Cimade and Gisti, cited above (\u00a7 58) (see paragraph 105 above), and the revised European Social Charter (see paragraphs 108-09 above).123.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the Belgian authorities had not appreciated the inevitably harmful consequences for the children and had failed to give precedence to their best interests, whereas they should have acted on the presumption that the children were vulnerable both on account of their status as children and their personal background.b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government124.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the reception facilities made available to the applicants had been adapted to their situation. From the date on which they had lodged their asylum application, on 1 April 2011, they had been given a place in a reception centre where their basic needs had been met in accordance with the \u201cReception\u201d Act. Moreover, whilst the order to leave the country, which had been issued on 26 May 2011, should have put an end to the material assistance, the Belgian authorities had decided to extend the reception facilities in a suitable reception centre on account of the second applicant\u2019s pregnancy and the birth. Once the provision of reception facilities on account of the status of asylum-seeker had ceased on 26 September 2011, the Belgian authorities had intervened again, on humanitarian grounds, on 5 October 2011. After the applicants had spent two days at a place assigned to them at the transit centre of the Woluwe\u2011Saint-Pierre municipality, they had been assigned a place in Bovigny but had failed to go there. The Government could not but conclude that the applicants had themselves caused the situation of which they complained, particularly as they had eventually decided of their own accord to participate in a voluntary return programme before the Aliens Appeals Board had even ruled on their appeal.125.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that the applicants had been compelled to leave their accommodation on the expiry of the extended time-limit for executing the order to leave the country. In their submission, the Belgian authorities could not be blamed for having acted in accordance with the law without having regard to the clarification subsequently provided by the CJEU. Moreover, the applicants could and should have used the other possibilities of obtaining assistance. They could have requested social support, pursuant to section 60 of the \u201cReception\u201d Act,\u00a0 from the social welfare office having territorial jurisdiction or a stay of application of section 57 \u00a7 2 of the Act of 8 July 1976 on grounds of impossibility of complying with the order to leave the country for medical reasons (see paragraphs 73 and 86 below). They could also have applied to Fedasil for an extension of material assistance pursuant to section 7 \u00a7 1 of the \u201cReception\u201d Act having regard to the presence of minor children or a request for emergency medical assistance under section 25 \u00a7 4 of the \u201cReception\u201d Act (see paragraphs 85 and 87 above). All decisions taken regarding reception, or even the lack of a decision, were amenable to an appeal to the employment tribunal, in urgent proceedings where appropriate.2.\u00a0\u00a0Observations of the NGO Coordination et initiatives pour r\u00e9fugi\u00e9s et \u00e9trangers (Cir\u00e9), third-party intervener126.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener submitted that the facts dated back to a period known as the \u201creception crisis\u201d during which asylum-seekers arriving in Belgium had encountered major difficulties in obtaining social assistance both from Fedasil, the agency in charge of providing material assistance in reception centres, and from the social welfare offices. They explained that the situation in which the applicants and many other families had found themselves had been the result of an anomaly of Belgian law which, contrary to the requirements of the Reception Directive, provided that reception facilities for asylum-seekers in respect of whom the responsible State was being determined terminated when the time-limit for execution of the\u00a0\u201cannex 26quater\u201d expired and also of the systematic and structural position adopted from 2009 by Fedasil and the social welfare offices to no longer take charge of illegally resident families. Those families found themselves out on the street with no means of obtaining material assistance.127.\u00a0\u00a0In 2011 Fedasil had refused to provide reception facilities to 553\u00a0families, which amounted to 2,143 adults and 1,242 minors. After the employment tribunal had found against Fedasil and imposed a fine, the latter had eventually granted reception facilities to 43 of those families. Between March 2011 and May 2012 the Federal Ombudsman had sent 18\u00a0recommendations to Fedasil, of which 15 had been implemented.128.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener observed that the principle of non\u2011refoulement was fully applicable to asylum-seekers and that the refusal to provide physical reception facilities for vulnerable persons could amount to treatment contrary to Article 3, as had been acknowledged by the Court in M.S.S v. Belgium., but could also create particular problems regarding the principle that the child\u2019s interests were paramount.129.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, failing detention and thus an imminent risk of removal within the meaning of the case-law of the Aliens Appeals Board illegally resident families did not have any means of appeal of suspensive effect against their removal, and had no material means of waiting for the outcome of the appeal determining the remainder of the asylum proceedings.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessmenta)\u00a0\u00a0General principles130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the right to political asylum is not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 113, ECHR 2012) and that the Contracting States are entitled, subject to their treaty obligations, including those arising from the Convention, to control the entry, residence and removal of aliens (see, among many other authorities, \u00dcner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410\/99, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2006\u2011XII).131.\u00a0\u00a0In line with those obligations, States must have particular regard to Article 3 of the Convention, which enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies and prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment irrespective of the circumstances and of the victim\u2019s conduct (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held on numerous occasions that to fall within the scope of Article 3 the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0219; Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a0114, ECHR 2014 (extracts); and Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 94).133.\u00a0\u00a0Treatment is considered to be \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 when it humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or when it arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7 220; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 202, ECHR 2012; and Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115).134.\u00a0\u00a0Applying those criteria to the question of living conditions, the Court had found \u2013 prior to M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above \u2013 that it could not be excluded that the responsibility of the State might be engaged under Article 3 in respect of treatment where an applicant, who was wholly dependent on State support, found him or herself faced with official indifference in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity. However, none of the factual situations examined had been considered by the Court to reach the threshold of severity required by Article 3 (see, for example, Budina v. Russia, (dec.), no. 45603\/05, 18 June 2009).135.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to an Iraqi national who had obtained provisional refugee status from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and complained that he had been unable to provide for his essential needs in Turkey, the Court held that Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention could not be interpreted as entailing any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living (see M\u00fcslim v. Turkey, no. 53566\/99, \u00a7 85, 26 April 2005).136.\u00a0\u00a0With M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, which concerned an Afghan asylum-seeker who had been sent back to Greece by the Belgian authorities in accordance with the Dublin II Regulation, the Court initiated a change in its case-law. After noting that, unlike in the M\u00fcslim case, the obligation to provide decent material conditions to impoverished asylum-seekers had entered into positive law, the Court held that, in determining whether the threshold of severity required by Article 3 had been attained, particular importance had to be attached to the applicant\u2019s status as an asylum\u2011seeker. Accordingly, he belonged to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection. It noted the existence of a broad consensus at the international and European level concerning this need for special protection (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0251).137.\u00a0\u00a0When assessing the applicant\u2019s individual situation, the Court held that the national authorities had not had due regard to that vulnerability and that the seriousness of the impoverished situation in which the applicant had found himself, having remained for several months with no means of providing for his essential needs, combined with the inertia on the part of the asylum authorities, had amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 262-63; see, following M.S.S., Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7\u00a0283, 28\u00a0June 2011, and F.H. v. Greece, no. 78456\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0107\u201111, 31 July 2014).138.\u00a0\u00a0In cases concerning the reception of accompanied or unaccompanied minors, the Court has also established that the relevant authorities should consider that the status of child prevailed over that of illegal immigrant (see Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, no.\u00a041442\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 55 and 63, 19 January 2010; Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, no.\u00a015297\/09, \u00a7 62, 13 December 2011; and Popov v. France, nos.\u00a039472\/07 and 39474\/07, \u00a7 91, 19 January 2012). Recently, the Tarakhel case, which concerned the planned return to Italy by the Swiss authorities under the Dublin II Regulation of a family of Afghan nationals, gave the Court the opportunity to rule that the vulnerability of asylum-seekers was accentuated in the case of families with children and that the reception conditions for children seeking asylum must be appropriate for their age, to ensure that those conditions did not create for them a situation of stress and anxiety, with particularly traumatic consequences (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0119).b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case139.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the Belgian authorities had acted with all the necessary care to ensure that the applicants were provided with reception facilities, given that from the date on which they had applied for asylum \u2013 on 1 April 2011 \u2013 they had been assigned an accommodation centre where their essential needs had been catered for until 26 September 2011.140.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that this was not disputed by the applicants. The subject of their complaint against the Belgian authorities was their inability during the period following their eviction, on 26\u00a0September 2011, from the accommodation centre until their departure for Serbia, on 25\u00a0October 2011, to obtain reception facilities enabling them to provide for their essential needs. The Court\u2019s examination will therefore concern only the latter period.141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the parties disagree as to whether an obligation to continue providing the applicants with accommodation and decent material conditions had entered into Belgian positive law and constituted an obligation on the Belgian authorities under European Union law, namely, the Reception Directive (see paragraphs 71, 75 and 103 above; see, regarding the relevance of the question, M.S.S. v.\u00a0Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 250 and 263, and S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60367\/10, \u00a7\u00a090, 29 January 2013).142.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that under section 6 of the \u201cReception\u201d Act of 12\u00a0January 2007, material assistance had to be granted throughout the entire asylum proceedings and terminate when the time-limit for complying with the order to leave the country served on the asylum-seeker had expired. At the material time, in the context of the \u201creception crisis\u201d, Fedasil had interpreted that provision restrictively with regard to asylum-seekers who, like the applicants, were subject to the Dublin procedure. Asylum-seekers were deprived of material assistance on the expiry of the time-limit for complying with the order to leave the country accompanying the decision refusing to examine their application on the grounds that another State was responsible for examining it, even where an appeal was pending against that decision (see paragraph 84 above).143.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes from the parties\u2019 description of the situation under Belgian law that it cannot be inferred from this that the applicants, as a family accompanied by minor children, including a severely disabled child, were unable, under Belgian law, to continue receiving any form of material and medical assistance. As submitted by the Government themselves, the entire legislative apparatus formed by the \u201cReception\u201d Act of 12 January 2007 or the Public Social Welfare Offices Institutional Act of 8\u00a0July 1976 was designed so that, in exceptional situations, such as that of the applicants, material and medical assistance could in theory have been extended.144.\u00a0\u00a0The Government criticised the applicants, moreover, for not requesting assistance by those other means. In the Government\u2019s submission, the applicants could, and should, have requested social support from the relevant social welfare office or applied to Fedasil for an extension of material assistance under section 7 of the \u201cReception\u201d Act (see paragraph 85 above). The applicants submitted that, in practice, as the network had been saturated during the relevant period, those possibilities had been bound to fail.145.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants\u2019 allegations are supported by the findings made both by the players working on the ground at the material time, including the third-party organisation, and by the domestic courts and relevant administrative authorities, particularly the Brussels social welfare office and Fedasil (see paragraphs 92-95 above). All the decisions and reports consulted reach the same conclusions on this point: at the material time the asylum-seekers\u2019 reception network had become saturated on account of a very high number of asylum-seekers. In that context the policy followed by the Brussels social welfare office, which was the office having jurisdiction for the applicants, and Fedasil was to exclude from the reception facilities families accompanied by minor children who were in the applicant\u2019s position, namely, illegally resident owing to an order to leave the country and pending a final decision in their asylum proceedings. The majority of the families concerned were deprived of accommodation and any form of assistance whatsoever pursuant to the \u201cReception\u201d Act or the Public Social Welfare Offices Institutional Act.146.\u00a0\u00a0Added to that is the fact that in the present case, contrary to the Government\u2019s submission, the applicants\u2019 representative and the French\u2011speaking community\u2019s General Delegate to the Rights of the Child had contacted the relevant authorities in an attempt to find urgent accommodation for the applicant family (see paragraphs 44 and 46 above).147.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances the applicants can hardly be criticised for failing to seek a solution regarding where they were to live following their eviction from the accommodation centre.148.\u00a0\u00a0That conclusion remains unaltered by the fact, stressed by the Government, that the applicants did not appeal to the employment tribunal against the lack of a decision by Fedasil regarding reception facilities. Such proceedings, which could have been instituted under the urgent procedure or ex parte, do not satisfy the requirements of effectiveness contained in the Convention. The applicants and Cir\u00e9, the third-party intervener, have shown that in the context of the reception crisis the Brussels judicial district courts refused the use of ex parte proceedings to families in the same situation as the applicants. With regard to the urgent procedure, it is not disputed that if the applicants had applied to the President of the Brussels Employment Tribunal under the urgent procedure, in addition to the practical difficulties of appointing a lawyer and complying with the relevant time-limits, they would have had to wait approximately ten days at the material time to obtain an order. Moreover, and in any event, the decisions examined by the Court (see paragraphs 95-96 above) show that at the relevant time the case-law of the employment tribunals was still inconsistent regarding acknowledgment of the right of reception of families who were \u201cillegally resident\u201d and subject to the Dublin procedure. Lastly, even supposing that the applicants had been able to apply to the employment tribunal and obtain an injunction against Fedasil to find them accommodation or incur a penalty, they would still have had to obtain execution of the injunction, which at the time could take several weeks (see paragraph 96 above).149.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, being faced with that much uncertainty, the Court is of the opinion that neither can the applicants be criticised for failing to apply to the employment tribunal. It considers that in the light of their particular situation and the specific circumstances of the reception network at the material time, the applicants were dispensed from the obligation to use that remedy.150.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted, lastly, that the applicants had been partly responsible for their situation by failing to go to the accommodation centre that had been assigned to them after they had stayed at the transit centre on 5\u00a0and 6 October 2011, namely, the Bovigny centre. The applicants claimed that they had gone to the centre assigned to them but had been sent back to Fedasil\u2019s Dispatching Department on the grounds that their order to leave the country was no longer valid.151.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is clearly not in a position to verify what actually happened. That said, the Court can well believe that, given the circumstances, the applicants, who were unfamiliar with the correct procedure, were overwhelmed and not in a position to use every possible means to find their way to an accommodation centre located over 150 km from Brussels.\u00a0The Court considers that this possibility should not be held against them and that it was rather for the Belgian authorities to show greater diligence in finding them accommodation.152.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court rejects the objection raised by the Government, based on non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraph 114 above).153.\u00a0\u00a0The Court next observes that, for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention, although they had received an order to leave the country, the applicants had applied to the Belgian authorities for asylum and the procedure to determine the State responsible for examining their applications had been under way. If that procedure is not to be deprived of all effectiveness as a result of a refusal to protect the most elementary of rights, the applicants, like the applicant in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (\u00a7\u00a0251), must be regarded as belonging to \u201ca member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection\u201d. As the Court observed in Tarakhel, cited above (\u00a7 119), that requirement of \u201cspecial protection\u201d is particularly important when the persons concerned are children. It is an even stronger requirement in the present case, in the Court\u2019s view, given the presence of very young children, including a baby and a disabled child, who were themselves inherently fragile and more vulnerable than adults when faced with deprivation of their basic needs.154.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that in the present case the applicants were awaiting a final decision regarding the determination of the State responsible for examining their asylum application did not place them in a different situation from that of the applicants in the above-cited cases with regard to the Convention given that in none of those cases did the authorities of the returning State rule on the merits of the applicants\u2019 fears of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of return to the country they had fled. The fact that in the instant case the French authorities had previously examined the asylum applications lodged by the applicants before rejecting them cannot be taken into account since the applicants alleged before the Belgian authorities that they had arrived in Belgium after leaving the territory of the European Union for more than three months and had requested the protection of the Belgian authorities on the basis of a new situation.155.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, and as a subsidiary consideration, the Court observes that the CJEU ruled, in judgments of 27 September 2012 and 27 February 2014, admittedly delivered after the facts of the instant case, on the scope of the requirements of the Reception Directive in the situation in which the applicants found themselves here. According to the CJEU, the Reception Directive required the Member States to grant throughout the procedure determining the State responsible for examining their asylum application sufficient material assistance to ensure a dignified standard of living and adequate for health and to ensure the applicants a means of subsistence and housing. Reception States also had to take account of the situation of persons with special needs and of the best interests of children (see paragraphs 105-06 above).156.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must next rule, with regard to the case-law set out above (see paragraphs 130-138 above) on whether the conditions in which the applicants were living in Belgium between 26\u00a0September and 25\u00a0October 2011 engage the responsibility of the Belgian State under Article 3.157.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the reality of the living conditions experienced by the applicants, the Court notes that they were not the subject of dispute before it. The Government acknowledged that the applicants were dependent on the reception facilities and were compelled to leave their accommodation on 26 September 2011 pursuant to Belgian law. Nor did they deny that from that date onwards the applicants had found themselves without any means of subsistence and without accommodation, barring two nights in a transit centre.158.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the situation experienced by the applicants was a particularly serious one. They explained that when they left their reception centre on 26 September 2011 they found themselves out on the streets before staying in a public square in the centre of Brussels where other homeless people from Serbia\u2019s Roma minority were already staying. They remained there \u2013 with no assistance to cater for their most basic needs (eating, washing and housing) \u2013 until 5 October 2011. The fact that the authorities had offered them accommodation at a reception centre did not alter the applicants\u2019 situation. After two nights in a transit centre and their return to Brussels on 7 October 2011, the applicants disembarked at the Gare du Nord in Brussels, where they stayed nearly three more weeks before their return to Serbia was organised by a charitable organisation.159.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the seriousness of this finding echoes that of the European Committee of Social Rights, a body monitoring respect for human rights guaranteed by the European Social Charter, which concluded, in a decision of 23 October 2012, that this type of situation did not respect the child\u2019s right to protection laid down by Article 17 \u00a7\u00a01 of the revised Charter (case of Defence for Children International (DCI) v. Belgium, complaint no. 69\/2011, paragraphs 108\u2011109 above).160.\u00a0\u00a0Admittedly, as submitted by the Government, that decision was made after the facts of the present case. However, it is based on the same premise as that of the Court when it interprets Article 3 of the Convention, namely, the rights linked to the prohibition of all inhuman and degrading treatment are granted to individuals on account of the dignity attached to the human being.161.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court notes that the predicament in which the applicants found themselves could have been avoided or at the very least curtailed if the application to set aside and obtain a stay of execution of the decisions refusing leave to remain with an order to leave the country that they had lodged on 16 June 2011 had been processed more speedily by the Aliens Appeals Board, which did not rule until 29 November 2011, that is, more than two months after the applicants had been excluded from the reception facility and over a month after their departure from Belgium.162.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the situation experienced by the applicants calls for the same conclusion as in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. In the Court\u2019s opinion, the Belgian authorities did not duly take account of the vulnerability of the applicants as asylum-seekers or of that of their children. Notwithstanding the fact that the reception crisis was an exceptional situation, the Court finds that the Belgian authorities should be considered to have failed to satisfy their obligation not to expose the applicants to conditions of extreme poverty for four weeks \u2013 barring two nights \u2013 having left them out on the streets with no resources, no access to sanitary facilities, and no means of providing for their essential needs. The Court considers that the applicants were thus victims of treatment which failed to respect their dignity and that this situation undoubtedly aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of inducing desperation. It finds that such living conditions, combined with the lack of any prospects of their situation improving, attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention and amounted to degrading treatment.163.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the applicants found themselves, through the fault of the authorities, in a situation incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, there has been a violation of that provision.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION (DEATH OF THE APPLICANTS\u2019 DAUGHTER)164.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the reception conditions in Belgium had resulted in their eldest daughter\u2019s death. They relied on Article 2 of the Convention, which provides:Article 2\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law....165.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that this part of the application is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established. The Court therefore declares it admissible.166.\u00a0The applicants submitted that their eldest daughter would not have died of a lung infection less than one month after they had returned to Serbia if the Belgian authorities had not exposed them to conditions of extreme material poverty in Belgium and had not thus \u201cforced\u201d them to return to Serbia where the living conditions of the Roma population that they had fled, particularly on account of their daughter\u2019s poor health, awaited them.167.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had not shown beyond all reasonable doubt that their eldest daughter\u2019s death, in hospital in Serbia, had been caused by the conditions of their stay in Belgium. Failing such evidence and in the absence of reliable and objectively verifiable information regarding the grounds for admitting her to hospital and the exact causes of the death, it had to be concluded that there was no causal link between the conditions allegedly experienced in Belgium and the circumstances of the death in Serbia.168.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the first sentence of Article 2 \u00a7 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. Article 2 of the Convention may imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual from another individual or, in particular circumstances, from himself. However, such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, bearing in mind in particular the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see, among other authorities, Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, ECHR 2001\u2011III; De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium, no. 8595\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 68-69, 6 December 2011; and Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 48609\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 105 and 108, 18 June 2013).169.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court must examine whether the Belgian authorities knew or ought to have known that there was a real and immediate risk that the applicants\u2019 eldest daughter\u2019s health would deteriorate following their eviction from the accommodation centre to a point that could result in her death.170.\u00a0\u00a0A number of factors must be taken into account in that connection. The Court notes, firstly, that whilst the Belgian authorities could not have been unaware that the applicants would be destitute following their eviction from the centre or that the eldest daughter suffered from a number of disorders, the medical certificate issued in support of the request for leave to remain on medical grounds (see paragraphs 33-34 above) made no mention of the degree of seriousness of those disorders. Secondly, and above all, the chronology of events shows that a number of factors could have contributed to the applicants\u2019 daughter\u2019s death and in particular the fact that the applicants spent several weeks living in insalubrious conditions following their return to Serbia.171.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, the Court considers that the applicants have not shown, beyond all reasonable doubt, that their eldest daughter\u2019s death was caused by the conditions of their stay in Belgium and that the Belgian authorities failed to satisfy any positive obligation in that respect.172.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has not been a violation of Article 2.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2, 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION (ASYLUM AND REGULARISATION ","27400":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of ill-treatment during his arrest and police custody, and of the absence of an effective investigation in that respect. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Applicability of Article 3 of the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the injuries which the applicant had sustained during his arrest on 29 October 2008 did not reach the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, the Government stressed that the applicant was a young and strong man and he had already been injured several times in his life, which should have certainly made him more tolerant to pain. Accordingly, the injuries which he had sustained during the arrest, for which he had received prompt medical assistance, could not have caused him suffering reaching the minimum level of severity to fall under Article 3 of the Convention.67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that he had been seriously ill-treated by the police and that he had sustained numerous injuries on his head and body. He therefore considered that the Government\u2019s arguments were fully inappropriate and misplaced.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 247-C; and Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7 67, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011IX).69.\u00a0\u00a0Treatment has been held by the Court to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000-IV). Treatment has been considered \u201cdegrading\u201d when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance driving them to act against their will or conscience (see, for example, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7 203, ECHR 2012).70.\u00a0\u00a0Where a person is injured while in detention or otherwise under the control of the police, any such injury will lead to a strong presumption that the person was subjected to ill-treatment, which gives rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention (see, inter alia, Butolen v. Slovenia, no.\u00a041356\/08, \u00a7 84, 26 April 2012).71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it is undisputed that the applicant actually sustained injuries during his encounter with the police in the context of his arrest. These injuries, supported by available medical evidence, in particular include contusions of head, nose and shoulder and a nose fracture (see paragraphs 21 and 34 above). The Court finds them sufficiently serious to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention (compare, for example, Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 95, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII; and Nikiforov v. Russia, no. 42837\/04, \u00a7 46, 1 July 2010).72.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection.2.\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with the six-month time-limit(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments73.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that the applicant had for the first time complained before the domestic authorities in January 2012 concerning his alleged ill-treatment by the police in the period between 29 and 31 October 2008. Moreover, in the course of the subsequent investigation into his complaints he had never inquired about the status of the case and had lodged his application with the Court one and a half year later following the opening of the investigation into his complaints.74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that it was incumbent on the domestic authorities to institute an official investigation into the circumstances surrounding his case irrespective of any official complaint on his part. He also stressed that throughout the period following his arrest and the alleged ill-treatment he had been under the control of the domestic authorities. In these circumstances he had nevertheless lodged an official criminal complaint within the time-limits provided under the relevant domestic law. In the applicant\u2019s view, no issue could arise with regard to the six-month time-limit given that the investigation at the domestic level had finally ended by the rejection of his criminal complaint on 3 March 2014.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the six-month time-limit provided for by Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention has a number of aims. Its primary purpose is to maintain legal certainty by ensuring that cases raising issues under the Convention are examined within a reasonable time, and to prevent the authorities and other persons concerned from being kept in a state of uncertainty for a long period of time (see Sabri G\u00fcne\u015f v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a027396\/06, \u00a7 39, 29 June 2012; and El Masri v. \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 135, ECHR 2012).76.\u00a0\u00a0Normally, the six-month period runs from the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. However, where it is clear from the outset that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of. Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to seize the Court of his complaint before his position in connection with the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level. Where, therefore, an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, the Court considers that it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 \u00a7 1 to take the start of the six-month period from the date on which the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a027229\/95, 22\u00a0May 1998, and Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a046477\/99, 7\u00a0June 2001; and Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 259-260, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already held that, in cases concerning an investigation into ill-treatment, the obligation of diligence incumbent on applicants contains two distinct but closely linked aspects: on the one hand, the applicants must contact the domestic authorities promptly concerning progress in the investigation \u2013 which implies the need to apply to them with diligence, since any delay risks compromising the effectiveness of the investigation \u2013 and, on the other, they must lodge their application promptly with the Court as soon as they become aware or should have become aware that the investigation is not effective (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 264).78.\u00a0\u00a0The first aspect of the duty of diligence \u2013 that is, the obligation to apply promptly to the domestic authorities \u2013 must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case. In this regard, the Court has held that applicants\u2019 delay in lodging a complaint is not decisive where the authorities ought to have been aware that an individual could have been subjected to ill-treatment \u2013 particularly in the case of assault which occurs in the presence of police officers \u2013 as the authorities\u2019 duty to investigate arises even in the absence of an express complaint (see Velev v. Bulgaria, no. 43531\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a059\u201160, 16 April 2013). Nor does such a delay affect the admissibility of the application where the applicant was in a particularly vulnerable situation, having regard to the complexity of the case and the nature of the alleged human rights violations at stake, and where it was reasonable for the applicant to wait for developments that could have resolved crucial factual or legal issues (see El Masri, cited above, \u00a7 142).79.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the second aspect of this duty of diligence \u2013 that is, the duty on the applicant to lodge an application with the Court as soon as he realises, or ought to have realised, that the investigation is not effective \u2013 the Court has stated that the issue of identifying the exact point in time that this stage occurs necessarily depends on the circumstances of the case and that it is difficult to determine it with precision (see Nasirkhayeva v. Russia (dec.), no. 1721\/07, 31 May 2011). In particular, the Court has considered it indispensable that persons who wish to bring a complaint about the ineffectiveness or lack of an investigation before the Court do not delay unduly in lodging their application. However, so long as there is some meaningful contact with the authorities concerning complaints and requests for information, or some indication, or realistic possibility, of progress in investigative measures, considerations of undue delay by the applicants will not generally arise (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 269).80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in the case at issue that following the applicant\u2019s arrest there were clear indications of the possibility that violence had been used against him. In particular, the authorities must have been alerted of such a possibility on the basis of the applicant\u2019s medical examination in the police station on 29 October 2008 (see paragraph 21 above) as well as the applicant\u2019s statement to the investigating judge on 30 October 2008 where he complained that he was injured and stated that he had refused medical assistance in order to get out from the police station as soon as possible (see paragraph 30 above). Similarly, the findings of the applicant\u2019s medical examination in Zagreb Prison Hospital on 3 November 2008 should have alerted the authorities of the possibility of use of violence against the applicant (see paragraphs 33-34 above).81.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, even without an express complaint from the applicant, a duty to investigate had already arisen at that early stage. This is so because Article 3 of the Convention requires an official investigation in cases where there are sufficiently clear indications that ill-treatment might have occurred (see Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156\/01, \u00a7 97, 3 May 2007; and Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750\/09, \u00a7 62, ECHR 2014). See further, J.L. v. Latvia (no. 23893\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 11-13 and 73-75, 17 April 2012) where the obligation to investigate arose, inter alia, on the basis of facts implied in the applicant\u2019s complaints made during the criminal proceedings against him; and P\u0103dure\u0163 v. Moldova (no. 33134\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 63-64, 5 January 2010) where a duty of a prompt investigation arose on the basis of the applicant\u2019s medical examination revealing the possibility of ill-treatment.82.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, although it is true that the applicant started inquiring about the measures taken with regard to his alleged ill-treatment by the police in October 2011 and then lodged an official criminal complaint in February 2012, the Court does not find this delay decisive given that the domestic authorities were sufficiently aware of the possibility that he could have been subjected to ill-treatment and were under a duty to investigate his possible ill-treatment (see Velev, cited above, \u00a7 59; and Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 265). In this connection the Court has already acknowledged that the psychological effects of ill-treatment inflicted by State agents may also undermine victims\u2019 capacity to complain about treatment inflicted on them, and may thus constitute a significant impediment to the right to redress of victims of torture and other ill-treatment. Such factors may have the effect of rendering the victim incapable of taking the necessary steps to bring proceedings against the perpetrator without delay (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 274).83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that in February 2012, soon after he learnt that the authorities had failed to institute an investigation into his alleged ill\u2011treatment, the applicant lodged an official criminal complaint (see paragraph 44 above). These plausible allegations of ill-treatment triggering the authorities\u2019 further investigation into the applicant\u2019s case and thus reviving their procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention (see Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 70-71, 27 November 2007; and, by contrast, Finozhenok v. Russia (dec.), no. 3025\/06, 31 May 2011). At that point there were sufficiently tangible indications that the investigation was progressing given that the applicant was on 20 February 2012 informed of the ongoing investigation during which several investigative measures were being taken (see paragraphs 45 and 46 above). Indeed, the final decision concerning the applicant\u2019s official complaint was adopted on 3\u00a0March 2014 (see paragraph 46 above), while he had already on 6 May 2013 lodged an application with the Court.84.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court considers that the application has not been lodged out of time. The Government\u2019s objection must therefore be dismissed.3.\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments85.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the application was premature given that the applicant\u2019s civil proceedings for damages against the State, in relation to his alleged ill-treatment by the police, were still pending.86.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued, pointing out that the domestic authorities had been under a duty to conduct an official effective investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment, that the pending civil proceedings had no bearing on the admissibility of his application.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it falls, firstly, to the national authorities to redress any violation of the Convention. However, in cases of wilful ill-treatment by State agents in breach of Article 3, the Court has found that two measures are necessary to provide sufficient redress. Firstly, the State authorities must have conducted a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Secondly, an award of compensation to the applicant is required where appropriate or, at least, the possibility of seeking and obtaining compensation for the damage which the applicant sustained as a result of the ill-treatment (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 116, ECHR\u00a02010; and Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7 50, 5 February 2015).88.\u00a0\u00a0In cases of wilful ill-treatment by State agents, a breach of Article 3 cannot be remedied only by an award of compensation to the victim because, if the authorities could confine their reaction to incidents of wilful ill-treatment by State agents to the mere payment of compensation, while not doing enough to prosecute and punish those responsible, it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity, and the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, despite its fundamental importance, would be ineffective in practice (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0119; Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 78, 24 July 2008; and Razzakov, cited above, \u00a7 50).89.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s civil proceedings do not have a decisive effect on the admissibility of his application to the Court.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus rejects the Government\u2019s objection.4.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments(i)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant92.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that there had been no effective investigation into his alleged ill-treatment by the police on 29 and 30\u00a0October 2008. In particular, he had been totally excluded from the investigative process and in fact there was no evidence that any effective measures had been taken to investigate his complaints. In the applicant\u2019s view this was obvious from the fact that the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office had rejected his criminal complaint solely on the basis of written material, which had been obtained without his knowledge and involvement. At the same time, no witnesses were questioned and no further investigative actions were taken. Similarly, in view of the very nature of the internal police assessment of lawfulness of the use of force it could not be said that such procedure aimed at the identification and punishment of those responsible, as required under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Government93.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the use of force against the applicant during his arrest had been promptly, effectively and independently assessed by the competent authorities; namely the Commander-in-chief of the Special Police Forces and the Police Director. Moreover, the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office also conducted an effective investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment and found that no criminal offence had been committed against him.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles94.\u00a0\u00a0When there is an arguable claim or credible assertion that an individual has been seriously ill-treated by the police in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article\u00a01 of the\u00a0Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. This investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see, amongst many others, G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 117; and El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 182; and Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 317).95.\u00a0\u00a0An obligation to investigate is not an obligation of result, but of means (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a046477\/99, \u00a7\u00a071, ECHR 2002\u2011II). However, for an investigation to be effective, it may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events (see Barbu\u00a0Anghelescu v. Romania, no. 46430\/99, \u00a7\u00a066, 5 October 2004; and Gharibashvili v. Georgia, no. 11830\/03, \u00a7 61, 29 July 2008). This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also practical independence (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 320; and, mutatis mutandis, Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and Fecire Tun\u00e7 v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a024014\/05, \u00a7 177, 14 April 2015).96.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation must also be thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or otherwise base their decisions (see Mikheyev v. Russia, no.\u00a077617\/01, \u00a7 108, 26\u00a0January 2006; and \u0110ur\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no.\u00a052442\/09, \u00a7 84, ECHR 2011). The investigation must be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and so on. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 183; Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 322; and, mutatis mutandis, Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and Fecire Tun\u00e7, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 172-174).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found that the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case gave rise to an obligation to investigate his alleged ill-treatment by the police (see paragraphs 71, 80-81 above).98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that initially the only investigation into the use of force by the ATJ team during the applicant\u2019s arrest was conducted within the Special Police Forces chain of command. In particular, one of the arresting ATJ officers reported on the matter to his superior, the Commander of the ATJ (see paragraph 36 above); and the latter reported further on the matter to his superior, the Commander-in-chief of the Special Police Forces (see paragraph 37 above). Final assessment of the lawfulness of use of force was made by the Police Director on the basis of these reports (see paragraph 38 above). However, the Police Director was the highest supervising police officer in the internal police hierarchy of the Special Police Forces (see paragraph 60 above) and, acting in that capacity, he gave the order for deployment of the ATJ team for the applicant\u2019s arrest (see paragraph 11 above).99.\u00a0\u00a0It thus follows that the initial investigative measures were conducted solely within the chain of command of the same police unit which had been implicated in the incident, without securing an external impartial assessment (compare, for example, Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29462\/95, \u00a7 74, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011XII; and Eremi\u00e1\u0161ov\u00e1 and Pechov\u00e1 v. the Czech Republic, no.\u00a023944\/04, \u00a7 155, 16 February 2012). Such investigation thus failed to meet the requirements of hierarchical, institutional and practical independence of those carrying out the investigation from those implicated in the events (see paragraph 95 above; compare Scavuzzo-Hager and Others v. Switzerland, no. 41773\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 81-82, 7 February 2006).100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that under the relevant domestic law it was ultimately the responsibility of the competent State Attorney\u2019s Office to conduct an official effective investigation into the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 55 and 56 above). It was thus incumbent on the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office, as the competent authority in the case, to ensure that an effective investigation was carried out and that the necessary evidence, such as identification of the alleged perpetrators, was obtained.101.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court finds in the instant case that the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office also lacked the necessary transparency and appearance of independence (see, for example, Matko v. Slovenia, no.\u00a043393\/98, \u00a7 90, 2 November 2006). In this respect, the Court notes that the central platform for its decision to reject the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint were the reports submitted by the Police Director and written reports submitted by the police inspectors M.A. and M.M., who were also implicated in the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment during his stay in the police station (see paragraph 46 above; and compare Eremi\u00e1\u0161ov\u00e1 and\u00a0Pechov\u00e1, cited above, \u00a7 159).102.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Zagreb County State Attorney\u2019s Office did not undertake any independent steps; such as, for example, attempting to identify the ATJ officers involved in the arrest, and interviewing the applicant and the police officers involved. Nor did it consider interviewing the doctors who had examined the applicant at the material time and ordering an independent and thorough medical examination of the applicant\u2019s injuries. Instead, it limited its enquiry to reading the applicant\u2019s medical documentation and the documents from the criminal proceedings against him, which was evidently insufficient to elucidate all the relevant circumstances of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment (compare Gharibashvili, cited above, \u00a7 73).103.\u00a0\u00a0Against the above background, it can be concluded that there are no indications that the domestic authorities were prepared in any way to genuinely and independently investigate the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by the police (see Matko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a090).104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore finds that the investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill-treatment did not comply with the Convention requirements of independence and effectiveness.105.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Substantive aspect of Article 3 of the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments(i)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant106.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that there was no doubt that he had been severely ill-treated by the police during his arrest on 29 October 2008 and his subsequent stay in the police custody. This was confirmed by the available medical evidence and several witnesses who had given their oral statements during the civil proceedings which he had instituted against the State. It also followed form photographs taken by the media at the material time, as well as the fact that his clothes had been soaked in blood after his arrest.107.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicant\u2019s view, there was no reason to deploy the ATJ team for his arrest as he had been under the constant police surveillance and the police had been well aware of his routine. It was therefore unnecessary for the ATJ team to storm into his flat as it also seriously disturbed his grandmother and sister. There was also no pressing urgency for the Police Director to issue an oral order for his arrest. In overall, in the applicant\u2019s view, the conduct of the police disclosed badly prepared and managed action of his arrest.108.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stressed that the official version of his injuries, according to which he had hit a table with his face while being apprehended by the ATJ officers, was fully incoherent and implausible. This is because he sustained injuries which ordinarily arose after beating but, due to the absence of a criminal investigation into his complaints, he was unable to obtain a forensic expert report to conclusively confirm it. In any case, he was in good health before the intervention of the police, which suggested that he had sustained his injuries in the course of the arrest. The applicant explained that it was true that he had said to the investigating judge that he had fallen but this was only because he had been instructed by the police officers to say so if he wished to be released from detention. However, it was fully illogical that the ATJ officers would struggle with him or apply some throwing techniques when they had all carried automatic rifles in their hands. Moreover, the arresting ATJ officer submitted in his report that the applicant had been pulled to the ground and not that he had himself fallen.109.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the applicant submitted that it was implausible that he had been held in a minivan on the parking of the police station in the period between 6.45 p.m. and 8.30 p.m. In fact, he had been taken near a river and ill-treated, which was confirmed by the fact that the police could by no means account for this period of his confinement. Once when in the police station, he had been forced to sit on a chair for twenty-four hours and he had not been given any opportunity to rest nor had he been provided any food or drink. In fact, the only food he had received was a sandwich given in JZP but at the time he had had a strong jaw pain and could not eat. The applicant also contended that inside the police station he had been beaten and he had been tightly constrained to a chair which had also caused him certain injuries. In this respect, he stressed that the medical examinations at the material time did not note all his injuries, such as the testicular injuries which he had also sustained during the ill-treatment.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Government110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment by the police were fully unfounded and unsubstantiated. These allegations had no basis in the available evidence. In particular, the available photographs of the applicant\u2019s clothes depicted only several blood stains and did not suggest that his clothes had been soaked in blood. Similarly, the statement of the applicant\u2019s co-accused in the civil proceedings was unfounded and contradictory as it was highly improbable that he could have seen the applicant in the police station.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that it was justified to deploy the ATJ officers to carry out the applicant\u2019s arrest as the intelligence available at the time suggested that he was associated with a highly dangerous group of international criminals. In these circumstances, it was reasonable to act promptly and to carry out the arrest on the basis of an oral order without a written plan of action.112.\u00a0\u00a0As to the injuries the applicant sustained during his arrest, the Government submitted that these injuries were the result of an accident which had occurred by his fall on the ground during which he had hit the table with his head. Although the relevant documents concerning the ATJ\u2019s deployment in the applicant\u2019s arrest were confidential, the Government considered that the disclosed material sufficiently showed that the fall had been the result of the application of technique of \u201cfoot sweep\u201d by the ATJ officers, which was provoked by the applicant\u2019s resistance to the arrest.113.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment by the ATJ officers during his transfer to the police station were implausible given that neither the police inspectors nor the doctor who had examined the applicant in the police station noted that he was wet from the alleged immersing in the water. In any case, the ATJ officers were merely arresting forces and not crime investigators so that they would not need to force the applicant to confess to some crimes.114.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Government argued that there was no evidence that the applicant had been ill-treated by the police in the police station. It also followed from the fact that the police had requested the intervention of emergency service, which they certainly would not have done in case they had actually ill-treated the applicant as he alleged. Moreover, inside the police station the applicant was kept in appropriate facilities. Although it was true that he had not been taken to the detention unit to rest for a period of twenty-four hours, it was not done with an intention to ill-treat him. The sole reason for that was the fact that at the material time the investigation had been ongoing and his presence in the police station had been needed. Moreover, throughout his stay in the police station he had made no complaints or particular requests and had only once or twice used the toilet.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the applicant\u2019s statement given to the investigating judge that he had wanted to leave the police station as soon as possible was illogical since it would be reasonably expected of somebody who had sustained such serious injuries as those alleged by the applicant to request medical treatment. However, when examined by a doctor in the police station the applicant had explicitly refused further medical treatment, although the police officers would have allowed his transfer to the hospital as that was their moral and legal obligation.116.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also submitted that the applicant had been provided rest, food and water in JZP and it was solely the question of his own choice if he had decided not to eat.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles117.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult of circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism or crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450\/00, \u00a7 115, ECHR 2006\u2011IX).118.\u00a0\u00a0Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7 119; Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999-V; and El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 195). Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are prohibited in absolute terms, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 79, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V). The nature of the offence allegedly committed by the applicant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3 (see Indelicato v. Italy, no. 31143\/96, \u00a7 30, 18 October 2001; G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 87, and cases cited therein).119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual is taken into police custody in good health and is found to be injured on release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7\u00a087). The same principle applies to alleged ill-treatment resulting in injury which takes place in the course of an applicant\u2019s arrest (see Klaas v. Germany, 22\u00a0September 1993, \u00a7\u00a7 23-24, Series A no. 269; Rehbock, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a068-78; and Mikiashvili v. Georgia, no. 18996\/06, \u00a7 69, 9 October 2012).120.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 does not prohibit the use of force by police officers during an arrest. Nevertheless, the use of force must be proportionate and absolutely necessary in the circumstances of the case (see, among many other authorities, Altay v. Turkey, no. 22279\/93, \u00a7 54, 22 May 2001). In this regard, it is of importance for instance whether there is reason to believe that the person concerned would resist arrest or abscond, cause injury or damage or suppress evidence (see Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 56, Reports 1997 VIII; and Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 34529\/10, \u00a7 126, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). However, any recourse by agents of the State to physical force against a person which has not been made strictly necessary by his or her own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see Rachwalski and Ferenc v. Poland, no. 47709\/99, \u00a7 59, 28 July 2009). This strict proportionality test has also been applied by the Court in situations where the individuals concerned were already in the hands of the law enforcement agencies (see, for example, Gladovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 28847\/08, \u00a7 37, 10 May 2011).121.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, where it can be assumed that some of an applicant\u2019s injuries were caused at the time of his arrest, the Court must determine whether they were the result of force strictly necessary to subdue him. The burden to show that this was the case is on the Government (see Lenev, cited above, \u00a7 113, and cases cited therein).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that there is no dispute between the parties that before the applicant\u2019s arrest he had been in good health and that he sustained injuries in the context of his arrest. Their versions, however, differ with regard to the extent of these injuries and the manner in which they were caused.123.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, the only force used against the applicant by the authorities was the technique of \u201cfoot sweep\u201d, which forced the applicant to the ground so he could be restrained and apprehended. Allegedly, the sole reason for the use of such force was to overcome the applicant\u2019s resistance to the arrest and it was in the course of the application of the technique of \u201cfoot sweep\u201d that the applicant fell and hit the table with his head which caused his injuries. The applicant, however, contended that his injuries were caused in the course of his arrest and subsequent ill-treatment by the ATJ officers and the police officers in the police station.124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that there is objective medical evidence showing that at the time of his arrest the applicant sustained several injuries of his head; in particular a visible 1,5 centimetre long open injury above the left eye and contusion and hematoma of the nose with a possible fracture (see paragraph 21 above). Several days later, when examined in Zagreb Prison Hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with contusions of head, nose and shoulder and a nose fracture without dislocation, as well as a distortion of a metal implant in his hand related to an old injury. At the time he still bore a smaller hematoma on the left side of his head and nose and smaller hematomas below both eyes. He also had smaller hematoma on the left shoulder and a visible dislocation of the metal implant in his hand (see paragraph 35 above).125.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court finds it unconvincing that several injuries on different parts of the applicant\u2019s body could have resulted in the manner advanced by the Government. It notes that while no conclusive evidence was provided by the parties concerning the exact nature and degree of force resulting in the applicant\u2019s injuries, viewed cumulatively, the medical evidence, the nature of the applicant\u2019s injuries, as well as the lack of plausible and detailed explanation on the part of the Government as to the cause of the injuries, give rise to a strong adverse inference that the applicant was subjected to excessive and disproportionate force by the state agents.126.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, given the failure of the domestic investigation to establish in detail the exact circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest and his subsequent treatment by the police, and in particular whether the extent and nature of the use of force by the ATJ officers was strictly necessary to affect the applicant\u2019s arrest (see paragraphs 103-105 above), the Court concludes that the Government failed to discharge the burden satisfactorily to disprove the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill-treatment (see, for example, Anzhelo Georgiev and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 51284\/09, \u00a7 78, 30 September 2014).127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore finds that there has been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION128.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage129.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.130.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the applicant\u2019s claim excessive, unfounded and unsubstantiated.131.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a016,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses132.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 2,500 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court.133.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the applicant\u2019s claim unsubstantiated and unfounded.134.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,500 plus any tax that may be chargeable covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest135.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27413":"I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS45.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the similarity of the applicants\u2019 grievances, the Court is of the view that, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, the applications should be joined in accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION46.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant complained about the conditions of his detention. In addition to the description of the material conditions of his detention, the applicant claimed that he was handcuffed to his cell bed for a month. He also attempted suicide on several occasions and went on hunger strike. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government raised an objection of failure to exhaust the domestic remedies. They considered that the second applicant should have complained before the post-sentencing judge about the alleged lack of proper medical care after the suicide attempt or while on hunger strike. They also noted that the second applicant had failed to complain about being allegedly kept handcuffed to a bed for an extended period of time.48.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant contended that it would have been useless for him to complain, for instance, about being placed with smokers, in so far as there were at the time no means for the authorities to remedy the situation as there were no places available in the non-smoking cells. He further pointed out that the prison had kept no record of his being handcuffed for a month, thus making it impossible for him to prove his allegations.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the second applicant brought to the authorities\u2019 attention his complaints, but they were either dismissed (see paragraph 36 above) or ignored (see paragraph 40 above). As for the general complaint about overcrowding, the Court reiterates having found, in numerous similar cases regarding complaints about material conditions of detention relating to structural issues such as overcrowding or dilapidated institutions, that given the specific nature of this type of complaint the legal actions suggested by the Romanian Government do not constitute effective remedies (see, among other authorities, Petrea v. Romania, no. 4792\/03, \u00a7 37, 29 April 2008; Cucu v.\u00a0Romania, no. 22362\/06, \u00a7 73, 13 November 2012; and Niculescu v.\u00a0Romania, no. 25333\/03, \u00a7 75, 25 June 2013).50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection should therefore be dismissed.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 observations52.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant argued that if the conditions of detention had been good he would have had no reason to attempt suicide on two occasions.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government averred that the authorities had taken all the necessary steps to offer the second applicant adequate conditions in prison as regards space, hygiene, food, drinking water, and hot water. They considered that the conditions of detention had not gone beyond the inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with the given form of legitimate punishment.54.\u00a0\u00a0As for the incidents mentioned by the second applicant, they pointed out that the allegations of ill-treatment by a prison officer had been investigated but dismissed as unfounded; the allegation that he was handcuffed to his bed remained unproven. Moreover, when he had gone on hunger strike to protest about being detained with smokers, the authorities moved him to a single cell until a place became available in the non\u2011smoking cell.55.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, they pointed out that the second applicant had received medical care and psychological assessment after the attempted suicide of 2\u00a0December 2005.56.\u00a0\u00a0They also contended that the mere fact that he had gone on hunger strike and had attempted suicide should not in itself lead the Court to conclude that the conditions of detention had been unbearable.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the principles established in its case-law regarding conditions of detention (see, for instance, Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 90-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI; Kalashnikov v. Russia, no.\u00a047095\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 97 et seq., ECHR 2002-VI; and Iacov Stanciu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 165-170). It reiterates, in particular, that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3; the assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7 91).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has considered extreme lack of space as a central factor in its analysis of whether an applicant\u2019s detention conditions complied with Article 3 (see Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no. 53254\/99, \u00a7 39, 7 April 2005). In a series of cases the Court has considered that a clear case of overcrowding is sufficient for the conclusion that Article 3 of the Convention has been violated (see Colesnicov v. Romania, no. 36479\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a078\u201182, 21 December 2010, and Budaca v. Romania, no. 57260\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a040\u201145, 17 July 2012). Moreover, it has already found violations of Article\u00a03 of the Convention on account of the physical conditions of detention in Romanian detention facilities, including Baia Mare, Gherla and Jilava Prisons (see, for example, Radu Pop v. Romania, no. 14337\/04, \u00a7\u00a0101, 17 July 2012).59.\u00a0\u00a0In the case at hand, the Court observes, on the basis of all the material at its disposal (see paragraphs 36 and 37 above), that the personal space allowed to the second applicant in detention fell short of the requirements set out in the case-law. The Government have failed to put forward any argument that would allow the Court to reach a different conclusion.60.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the second applicant\u2019s submissions in respect of the overcrowding correspond to the general findings by the CPT in respect of Romanian prisons (see Iacov Stanciu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 125-126).61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the conditions of detention caused the second applicant harm that exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and have thus reached the minimum level of severity necessary to constitute degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.62.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the material conditions of the second applicant\u2019s detention.63.\u00a0\u00a0Taking this finding into account, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the remaining parts of the complaints concerning the conditions of detention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that if it had not been for the undercover police agent\u2019s insistence, the first applicant would not have procured and sold the drugs and the second applicant would not have been compelled to help his brother out with the deal. They further complained that they could not obtain an expert evaluation of the drugs by an independent body; they argued that so long as the laboratories were subordinate to the police, which was an interested party in the case, the principle of equality of arms was breached. They also considered that there had been an interference with their defence rights in so far as the courts had excluded from the file most of the CDs containing the recordings of their conversations, without hearing them first and without allowing their lawyer to assess their utility for the defence. The second applicant added that he had discovered a conversation between his brother and the undercover police agent which could have proved that he had not been involved in the drug trafficking. The second applicant lastly complained that the court of appeal had denied him the right to study the case file.They relied on Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (b) and (d) of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u00a0\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights ...(b)\u00a0\u00a0to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence ...(d)\u00a0\u00a0to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants reiterated at the outset that they had not been involved in drug trafficking prior to 2004, and that the only reason the first applicant had brought drugs into the country was because the undercover agent had insisted on it.67.\u00a0\u00a0They further complained that they had had no opportunity to question the undercover agent, as he had not been brought before the domestic courts despite their specific requests.68.\u00a0\u00a0They reiterated that they had been denied access to the criminal file and to the totality of the recorded conversations, and expressed lack of confidence in the impartiality of the experts from the Ministry of the Interior in the case.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government denied that there had been police entrapment in the case. They explained that the prosecutor had identified an organised crime group, and that the role of the undercover agent was to confirm those findings. The infiltrated agent remained passive and did not exert any pressure on the applicants. As regards the applicants\u2019 conduct, they averred that they demonstrated familiarity with the current prices of drugs and were able to obtain drugs at short notice.70.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the procedural safeguards in place in the domestic proceedings, they contended that the undercover agent had duly summarised his activity in reports which had become part of the prosecution file and thus was available to the parties and courts in the domestic proceedings. The Government further argued that the evidence thus obtained had not been the sole evidence leading to the conviction, or even decisive for it. They reiterated that it was for the domestic courts to decide whether it was appropriate for a witness to be called.71.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the expert examination of the drugs, the Government admitted that it was understandable that doubts could arise as to the neutrality of the experts from the Ministry of the Interior, but contended that the domestic courts took steps to obtain such an independent evaluation and a new more comprehensive report had been presented to the court, albeit by experts from the Ministry of the Interior. They further argued that the applicants\u2019 apprehensions should not be decisive in the case and pointed out that there were no objective justifications for fearing lack of independence on the part of the experts. Lastly on this point they outlined that the applicant could have asked to cross-examine the experts in court, but had not done so.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further averred that the applicants had not denied having the recorded conversations, and that they had had numerous opportunities to challenge the validity of that evidence. The fact that some of the recordings were destroyed because they had been deemed irrelevant to the case could not be construed as a denial of the rights of the defence; the Government maintained that the right of access to evidence should only concern the evidence on which the accusation relied. They pointed out that the applicant had had opportunities to challenge the evidence.73.\u00a0\u00a0They further reiterated that the Court has a subsidiary role in the assessment of evidence, and that in the absence of any indication of arbitrariness in the present case it should find no reason to depart from the interpretation given to the facts by the domestic courts.74.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government rejected the argument that the second applicant had been denied access to the criminal file. They noted that in his numerous submissions to the domestic courts he had relied extensively on the documents in the file, which proved in their view that he had sufficient knowledge of its content. Moreover, even if the applicant had not been able to study each document personally, that task could have been entrusted to counsel. In any case, the applicants\u2019 contacts with their lawyers were never restricted.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles75.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset the Court reiterates that paragraph 3 of Article 6 contains a non-exhaustive enumeration of specific applications of the general principle stated in paragraph 1 of that Article (see, for instance, Andrejeva v.\u00a0Latvia [GC], no. 55707\/00, \u00a7 98, ECHR 2009). The Court will therefore examine the case from the standpoint of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 alone.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has recognised in general that the rise in organised crime and difficulties encountered by law-enforcement bodies in detecting and investigating offences has warranted appropriate measures being taken. It has stressed that the police are increasingly required to make use of undercover agents, informants and covert practices, particularly in tackling organised crime and corruption (see Ramanauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no.\u00a074420\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 49 and 53, ECHR 2008).77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has thus consistently accepted the use of undercover investigative techniques in combatting crime. It has held on several occasions that undercover operations per se did not interfere with the right to a fair trial and that the presence of clear, adequate and sufficient procedural safeguards set permissible police conduct aside from entrapment (see Ramanauskas, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 51 and 53; Bannikova v. Russia, no.\u00a018757\/06, \u00a7 35, 4 November 2010; Veselov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 89 and 93; and Lagutin and Others v. Russia, nos. 6228\/09, 19123\/09, 19678\/07, 52340\/08 and 7451\/09, \u00a7 90, 24 April 2014).78.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court has reiterated that while admissibility of evidence lies within the domain of the national courts, the Court will in its turn ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair (see Ramanauskas, cited above, \u00a7 52). Therefore, in cases where the main evidence originates from an undercover operation, the authorities must be able to demonstrate that they had good reasons for mounting that operation (see Bannikova, cited above, \u00a7 40, citing Ramanauskas, \u00a7\u00a7 63 and 64, and Malininas v. Lithuania, no.\u00a010071\/04, \u00a7\u00a036, 1 July 2008). They should be in possession of concrete and objective evidence showing that initial steps have been taken to commit the acts constituting the offence for which the applicant is subsequently prosecuted (see Veselov, cited above, \u00a7 90).79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found in that context that the national authorities had no good reason to suspect a person of prior involvement in drug trafficking where he had no criminal record, no preliminary investigations had been opened against him, and there was nothing to suggest that he had a predisposition to become involved in drug dealing until he was approached by the police (see Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, 9\u00a0June 1998, \u00a7 38, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011IV; confirmed in Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39647\/98 and 40461\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 46 and 48, ECHR 2004\u2011X; Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 129, ECHR 2006\u2011XII (extracts); Ramanauskas, cited above, \u00a7 56; and Bannikova, cited above, \u00a7\u00a039; see also Pyrgiotakis v. Greece, no. 15100\/06, \u00a7 21, 21 February 2008). In addition to the aforementioned, the following may, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, also be considered indicative of pre\u2011existing criminal activity or intent: the applicant\u2019s demonstrated familiarity with the current prices of drugs and ability to obtain drugs at short notice (see Shannon v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 67537\/01, ECHR 2004\u2011IV), and the applicant\u2019s pecuniary gain from the transaction (see Khudobin, cited above, \u00a7 134, and Bannikova, cited above, \u00a7 42).80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has further emphasised that any information relied on by the authorities must be verifiable (see Veselov, cited above, \u00a7 90) and that the public interest cannot justify the use of evidence obtained as a result of incitement, as to do so would expose the accused to the risk of being definitively deprived of a fair trial from the outset (see Teixeira de Castro, cited above, \u00a7 36, and Bannikova, cited above, \u00a7 34).81.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, the Court has repeatedly held that the line between legitimate infiltration by an undercover agent and incitement to commit a crime was likely to be crossed if no clear and foreseeable procedure was set up under the domestic law for authorising undercover operations, and especially if proper supervision was lacking (see Nosko and Nefedov v.\u00a0Russia, nos. 5753\/09 and 11789\/10, \u00a7 53, 30 October 2014).82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has further observed in its case-law that undercover operations must be carried out in an essentially passive manner, without any pressure being put on the applicant to commit the offence through means such as taking the initiative in contacting the applicant, renewing the offer despite his initial refusal, insistent prompting, the promise of financial gain such as raising the price beyond average, or appealing to the applicant\u2019s sense of compassion (see Bannikova, cited above, \u00a7 47, and Veselov, cited above, \u00a7 92, and the cases cited therein).83.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court has highlighted that where the accused puts forward an arguable claim of incitement, domestic courts have an obligation to examine it through an adversarial, thorough, comprehensive and conclusive procedure. The Court places the burden of proof on the authorities. It falls to the prosecution to prove that there was no incitement, provided that the defendant\u2019s allegations are not wholly improbable. The scope of the judicial review must include the reasons why the undercover operation was mounted, the extent of the police\u2019s involvement in the offence, and the nature of any incitement or pressure to which the applicant was subjected. For instance, a procedure for the exclusion of evidence was found to satisfy these criteria (see Veselov, \u00a7 94; Ramanauskas, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a070 and\u00a071; and Khudobin, \u00a7 133, judgments cited above).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the case84.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the case under examination, the Court notes at the outset that the two applicants\u2019 situations differ significantly: it was only the first applicant who brought the drugs into the country and negotiated the transactions. The second applicant became involved only towards the end of the process, when everything had already been arranged in detail between his brother and the undercover police agent. As far as the second applicant was concerned, it can be accepted that he only got involved in order to help his brother whom he thought to be, along with the whole family, at great risk of retaliation from the Dutch drug dealer (see paragraph 18 above). Therefore the matter of whether there was police incitement in the case applies primarily to the first applicant. It nevertheless affects the outcome for the second applicant as well.85.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities established that the first batch of drugs was brought into the country in September 2004, and it appears that most of the tablets were eventually sold to the police agent (see paragraph 6 above). The authorisation for the use of an undercover agent does not offer more details in respect of the information the authorities had about the first applicant\u2019s involvement in drug trafficking (see paragraph 13 above). It is therefore hard to discern on what basis the operation was mounted and whether the authorities had a good reason to instigate the operation. On the basis of the information in the file the Court notes that the first applicant had no relevant prior criminal record, and the mere fact that he was a drug user could not justify the police intervention (see, mutatis mutandis, Constantin and Stoian, cited above, \u00a7 55). As regards the financial gain sought by the first applicant from the sale of drugs, it appears that from the first batch of drugs, besides the tablets sold to the infiltrated agent (160 of the 250 tablets) he either gave away most of the remaining tablets or consumed them himself (see paragraphs 6, 7 and 17 above). No other potential buyer was either identified or even mentioned by the police investigation.86.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court notes that it was the police agent who calculated the price of the first transaction (see paragraph 6 above). Not only did he indicate the price, but he also arranged for the next deal, set all the details, leaving the first applicant with nothing more to do than follow his lead. Certainly it was the first applicant who showed the ability to obtain more drugs on a short notice, but the Court cannot but note the significant role played by the undercover agent in arranging the next deal, which runs counter to the requirement of passivity on the State agent\u2019s part. The undercover agent was the main buyer of the first batch of drugs and, although the crime had already been committed, he insisted that the first applicant bring in more drugs to sell exclusively to him. He renewed his offer, was insistent, and threatened the first applicant that he would take his business elsewhere if drugs were not produced rapidly.87.\u00a0\u00a0The police insistence, coupled with the lack of prior information on the alleged implication in drug trafficking of the first applicant are sufficient to conclude that there was entrapment in the case.88.\u00a0\u00a0As the applicants raised a plea of incitement, albeit summarily, with the domestic courts (see paragraphs 28 and 30 above), the Court will further look into the manner in which the authorities responded to their arguments.89.\u00a0\u00a0It notes that as well as arguing that the undercover police had played too significant a role in the drug deal, the applicants also asked expressly for the undercover agent to be heard by the court (see paragraph 25 above). The courts, however, either gave no answers to their pleas or dismissed them without further consideration (see paragraphs 29 and 32 above).90.\u00a0\u00a0The courts did not hear direct evidence from the undercover agent. They did not question the legitimacy of the undercover operation, even in the absence of prior relevant information about the applicant\u2019s alleged involvement in drug trafficking. Furthermore, the Court notes that the domestic courts failed to offer the applicants the opportunity to study the entirety of the recorded conversations, despite their potential relevance for the preparation of the defence (see paragraphs 19 and 30 above).91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court lastly notes that, although the applicants\u2019 conviction was based on a whole body of evidence, the role played by the elements gathered through the covert operation undeniably played a significant role. It notes that, besides the undercover police reports, the county court relied mainly on the statements made by the two taxi drivers who did not witness the drug transaction (see paragraph 29 above); and on transcripts of conversations which were not complete and could not be examined by an independent expert.92.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the undercover measure at issue went beyond the mere passive investigation of pre-existing criminal activity and amounted to police incitement as defined in the Court\u2019s case-law, and the evidence obtained by police incitement was further used in the ensuing criminal proceedings against the applicant.93.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in respect of both applicants.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not consider it necessary to examine the remaining arguments raised by the applicants under Article 6 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION95.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage96.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed 210,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. The second applicant claimed EUR 2,100,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicants\u2019 requests were speculative, excessive and not proven. They considered that should the Court find a violation of Article 3, the acknowledgement as such could constitute sufficient just satisfaction. They further invited the Court, should it decide to make an award of damages in respect of the alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention, not to depart from its previous rulings; they referred to Constantin and Stoian, cited above, and Bulfinsky v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a028823\/04, 1 June 2010.98.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards, in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, EUR\u00a02,400 to the first applicant and EUR\u00a09,750 to the second applicant.99.\u00a0\u00a0It further acknowledges that the applicants have the possibility of seeking the reopening of the proceedings under the provisions of Article\u00a0465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should they choose to do so (see Mischie v. Romania, no. 50224\/07, \u00a7 50, 16 September 2014).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses100.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed EUR 2,000 for lawyers\u2019 fees for their representative before the domestic courts, and EUR 1,500 for lawyers\u2019 fees for their representative before the Court. They alluded to other costs, claiming that they could not produce evidence to support the additional claims. They adduced bills attesting payment of 75,000,000 old Romanian lei (ROL) to their representative in the domestic proceedings, of 6,750 new Romanian lei (RON) to their representative in the current proceedings, and of RON 380 for translations.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the veracity of these claims.102.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a0142, ECHR\u00a02014 (extracts)). In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants jointly the sum of EUR 3,500 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27416":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the conditions under which the first applicant had been arrested had infringed Articles 3, 5 and 13 of the Convention.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case, considers that the case should be assessed only under Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d...B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The substantive limb of Article 3a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissionsi.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that his arrest had been neither necessary nor legitimate. He attributed the origin of his subdural haematoma to the conditions of his arrest, and more specifically to the way in which he had been brought to the ground and the blow from the knee which he had received. He added that the factual evidence submitted to the Court was sufficiently cogent to enable the latter to disregard the findings of the domestic courts, observing that the French authorities were unable to put forward any plausible explanation for his injuries. In that regard he contested the hypothesis of a prior scuffle, which had not been supported by any conclusive evidence. Furthermore, he argued that many witnesses had testified to the violence of his takedown, when his head had violently struck the ground and he had received a sharp, violent blow from a knee.106.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the causal link between the violence exercised and the injuries sustained, he referred to the initial expert reports, one of which had stated that the arrest could have caused the brain injury, and the other that the operational conditions had undoubtedly been the cause of the injuries. As regards the third expert opinion, which contradicted the first two, he pointed out that that opinion had been based solely on a reconstruction effected three years after the event, which had drawn exclusively on the information provided by the SUGE and police officers concerned. Moreover, the applicant argued that the length of time between his arrest and his collapse had been underestimated by the experts, given that security cameras had shown that the arrest had taken place at 7.59 p.m. and the fire brigade had been called at 8.14 p.m. Referring to the first expert report, he observed that the doctors had mentioned the great difficulty of accurately determining the timescale of incidents which could have varied between a few minutes and several hours. He concluded that the domestic authorities were indeed responsible for the ill-treatment he had sustained and that the time-lapse between his arrival at Lagny hospital and his transfer to Beaujon hospital had been excessively long.ii.\u00a0\u00a0The Government107.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the facts of the present case did not point to any violation of the substantive limb of Article 3. They affirmed that the use of force had been necessitated by the applicant\u2019s behaviour, and considered that the domestic investigations had proved that the occurrence of a subdural haematoma could not have been caused by violent acts committed during the arrest, even though they conceded that investigations had not enabled the events which had preceded the arrest and which might have explained the injuries noted to be established with any certainty. Finally, they argued that the national authorities had done their utmost to protect the applicant\u2019s physical integrity as soon as the first traumatic symptoms had appeared.b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessmenti.\u00a0General principles108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see, for example, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 163, Series A no. 25, and Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999\u2011V)109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that according to its case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Ireland, cited above, \u00a7162, and M\u0103ciuc\u0103 v. Romania, no. 25763\/03, \u00a7 22, 26 May 2009).110.\u00a0\u00a0In cases of alleged violations of Article 3 of the Convention, in order to assess the evidence, the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny, adopting the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d, although such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, in particular, Ireland, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0161; Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7 88; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000\u2011VII; Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a054810\/00, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2006\u2011IX; Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no.\u00a059450\/00, \u00a7 117, ECHR 2006\u2011IX; and G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7 92, ECHR 2010).111.\u00a0\u00a0Where domestic proceedings have taken place it is not the Court\u2019s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts, and it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a093, and Alberti v. Italy, no. 15397\/11, \u00a7\u00a041, 24\u00a0June 2014). Indeed, even though in such a context the Court is prepared to be more critical of the conclusions of the domestic courts (see El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7 155, ECHR 2012), it nevertheless requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts (see, among many other authorities, Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7\u00a059, 24 July 2008, and Alberti, cited above, \u00a7\u00a041).112.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court observes that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (\u201cthe burden of proof is upon him who affirms\u201d). The Court reiterates its case-law under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to the effect that where the events in issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman, cited above, \u00a7 100; Rupa v. Romania (no.\u00a01), no. 58478\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 97 and 100, 16\u00a0December 2008; and El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0152). In the absence of such an explication the Court can draw inferences from the respondent Government\u2019s conduct in this respect which might be unfavourable (see Orhan\u00a0v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7\u00a0274, 18 June 2002). Furthermore, the Court reiterates that whatever the outcome of the domestic proceedings, the defendants\u2019 conviction or acquittal does not absolve the respondent State from its responsibility under the Convention (see Ribitsch\u00a0v.\u00a0Austria, 4\u00a0December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no.\u00a0336); it is accordingly under an obligation to provide a plausible explanation of how the injuries were caused, otherwise Article\u00a03 is applicable (see Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7 87).113.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, as regards the particular issue of violence perpetrated during police identity checks and arrests, the Court reiterates that the use of force must be proportionate and necessary in the light of the circumstances of the case. In that respect it attaches particular importance to any injuries caused to individuals targeted by the operation and to the exact circumstances under which they were caused (see Alberti, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 43 and 44).ii.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes from the outset that the injuries sustained by the applicant, namely a subdural haematoma which caused a loss of consciousness followed by a coma and had major after-effects, depriving him of autonomy in respect of all the basic activities of everyday life, exceeded the severity threshold for the ill-treatment complained to fall within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention.115.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it observes that the circumstances of the case concern not only the applicant\u2019s police custody but also the circumstances of his apprehension by the SUGE officers and his handover to the police officers in order to be taken to the police station. The Court will thus consider whether the alleged facts have been established by seeking the existence of a body of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions.116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court first of all notes that the injuries appeared while the applicant was in police custody following an arrest involving the use of force, during which the applicant had been forced to the ground.117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the domestic court considered that the investigation had ruled out any possibility that the actions of the SUGE and police officers had caused the traumatic injury to the applicant, the last expert assessment conducted having concluded that the time lapse between the arrest and the appearance of the symptoms had been too short (see paragraphs 83 and 89 above), which reinforces the assumption that the injuries had been occasioned during incidents preceding the applicant\u2019s arrest.118.\u00a0\u00a0In that regard, the Court observes that, as conceded by the Government, the investigations conducted by the domestic authorities failed to establish whether any such incidents had actually taken place. It notes that their hypothetical existence had been based exclusively on the statements of one witness relaying comments by a third person who had himself been confided in by relatives of the applicant, pointing out that he had not taken that information seriously (see paragraph 38 above). The last few expert assessments indicated that they had discovered nothing to support the assertion that the applicant had been struck on the head with a bottle during the afternoon preceding his arrest (see paragraph 67 above).119.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the medical reports, the Court notes that the first doctor interviewed during the in flagrante investigation considered that the injuries found on the applicant might have been compatible with a single, extremely violent blow, such as a blow from a knee or a medium-weight non-blunt instrument, or indeed with a heavy fall (see paragraph 21 above). Subsequently, the authors of an expert report dated 25 April 2005 considered that the applicant\u2019s injuries might have stemmed from his having been forced to the ground, received blows from a knee or fallen heavily during his apprehension by the SUGE officers (see paragraph 50 above). In another report drawn up on 19\u00a0October 2006 the experts observed that according to the sequence of events reported to them, the conditions of the arrest in the railway station had very probably, or indeed certainly, caused the traumatic injuries in question (see paragraph 55 above). Finally, an expert assessment submitted on 9 March 2009 had found that it was very unlikely, or indeed impossible, that the fracture had occurred during the incidents at the railway station or at the police station, specifying that the various statements by persons questioned had been deemed incompatible with the forensic medical findings (see paragraphs 65 and 66 above). The Court therefore notes that the different experts reached contradictory findings.120.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it observes that the statements of the SUGE and police officers, which had been the sole basis for the reconstruction on which the last expert assessment had been carried out, were also mutually contradictory, with each service blaming the other for the applicant\u2019s injuries. In that connection the Court reiterates that the SUGE stated that they handed the applicant over in good condition to the police and subsequently noticed that he displayed major injuries (see paragraphs 20, 42 and 44 above). For their part, some of the police officers mentioned that the applicant\u2019s head had hit the ground while he was being apprehended by the SNCF security service and also that he had been kneed in the head by Y.F. (see paragraphs 15 to 17, 20, 39 to 41, 61 and 62 above). The Court nevertheless observes that the statements given by some of the police officers varied widely during the investigation, the more senior officers having admitted that they had deliberately not mentioned the kneeing incident during his initial hearing in order to give Y.F. an opportunity to shoulder his responsibilities (see paragraph 16 above). The Court is surprised at such an omission and at the changes in the interviewees\u2019 testimonies and statements, particularly in a case of deliberate violence against an individual who displayed serious injuries while in police custody.121.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, as regards the justification of the use of force during the arrest, the Court once again notes contradictions among the different witness statements, some affirming that the applicant had made a violent gesture towards a SUGE officer (see paragraphs 43, 44 and 60 above), and others contesting that version by stating that the applicant had not been violent at all, and had merely pushed away the hand of one of the SNCF employees (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above).122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the internal investigations unearthed contradictory and disturbing pieces of evidence contained in both the successive expert reports and the witness statements as regards the reasons for and conditions of the applicant\u2019s arrest and handover. It holds that the hypothesis of violence suffered by the applicant prior to his arrest, which hypothesis was deemed plausible by the Investigations Division, is insufficiently substantiated to be deemed cogent in the light of the circumstances of the case.123.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the aforementioned conflicting items of evidence, the Court considers that the circumstances of the case highlight the existence of a body of evidence sufficient for a finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, given the domestic authorities\u2019 failure to provide a satisfactory and cogent explanation for the injuries sustained by the applicant, the symptoms of which appeared while he was under the control of the police officers.124.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly there was a violation of the substantive limb of Article 3.2.\u00a0\u00a0The procedural limb of Article 3a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissionsi.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant125.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that investigations into allegations of ill-treatment should be swift and detailed. He admitted that the in flagrante procedure in the present case had been prompt. He considered, on the other hand, that there had been several deficiencies in the judicial investigation, complaining that it had been excessively long and ineffective. In that regard, he disputed the appropriateness of the final expert report, which had been commissioned three-and-a-half years after the event, and submitted that medical experts should have been appointed to conduct a detailed analysis of the concept of \u201cresponse time\u201d, a key element in this case.126.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, he complained that the investigating judge had not issued a warrant ordering S.Gh., an eye-witness to the events, to finally appear before him after having disregarded the ordinary summonses, and that the same judge had failed to show due diligence in contacting the SNCF employee who had been confided in by a dog handler, with a view to clarifying the former\u2019s allegations. The applicant concluded that there had been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3.ii.\u00a0\u00a0The Government127.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the domestic authorities had conducted an effective investigation, as of the time of occurrence of the events, with a view to ascertaining the cause of the applicant\u2019s injuries and identifying those responsible. They recalled the different inquiries made, emphasising the intensive involvement of both the judiciary and the public prosecutors. They submitted that the length of the investigation had not been excessive given, in particular, the number and complexity of many of the expert assessments conducted.128.\u00a0\u00a0The Government added that the applicant\u2019s relatives, in their capacity as civil parties, had been able to participate actively in the investigations, in particular by requesting the implementation of investigative measures. They concluded that no violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 was attributable to the national authorities.b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessmenti.\u00a0\u00a0General principles129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully and in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. This investigation, as with that under Article 2, should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. If this were not the case, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, despite its fundamental importance, would be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see, among many other authorities, Assenov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 102, Reports 1998\u2011VIII, and El Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0182).130.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or to use as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard. Furthermore, the investigation should be independent from the executive. Independence of the investigation implies not only the absence of a hierarchical or institutional connection, but also independence in practical terms (see El\u00a0Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0183-184, and Alberti, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 62-63).131.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the victim should be able to participate effectively in the investigation in one form or another (see El Masri, cited above, \u00a7 185).ii.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case an in flagrante procedure was opened upon the discovery of the facts. Under that procedure, several witnesses were heard, and moreover, three SUGE officers were remanded in custody. Furthermore, a reconstruction of the scene was effected in the presence of two prosecutors.133.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that an investigation was promptly instigated, leading to the implementation of numerous investigative measures. Three persons were formally charged, one of them having spent several months in preventive detention. The Court considers that the length of the investigation can be explained by the scope of the inquiries carried out, since numerous hearings and no less than four expert assessments were conducted. Thus the investigation cannot be considered excessively long. Moreover, the Court observes that the statements by S.Gh. and the SNCF employee mentioned by the applicant were obtained by the investigators pursuant to letters rogatory, even if those two persons were not heard by the investigating judge himself owing to the death of the former and the absence of the latter.134.\u00a0\u00a0 Moreover, the Court holds that the last expert assessment, which was conducted concurrently with the reconstruction, seemed justified for reasons of establishing the truth, the medical experts having, in particular, pronounced on the issue of the \u201cresponse time\u201d between the initial shock and the first symptoms of the traumatic injury sustained by the applicant.135.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court notes that the applicant, who had joined the proceedings as a civil party and was represented by counsel, had the opportunity to submit requests for investigative measures and to defend his interests.136.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Court holds that in the instant case the applicant has not demonstrated that the investigations failed to comply with the requirements of Article 3.137.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, there was no violation of the procedural limb of Article 3....","27440":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION57.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained that his involuntary confinement in a psychiatric hospital between 25\u00a0May and 9\u00a0June 2005 constituted a violation of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(e) of the Convention, which reads:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...(e)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of persons ... of unsound mind ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions59.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on the principles established in the Court\u2019s case-law in connection with deprivation of liberty on the basis of unsoundness of mind, and on the relevant provisions of domestic law, the Government submitted that although the first applicant\u2019s involuntary hospitalisation in the psychiatric hospital on 25\u00a0May 2005 had been justified as, according to the opinion of a forensic psychiatric expert, the first applicant\u2019s psychiatric pathology was such as to render him dangerous to himself, his involuntary stay in the psychiatric hospital between 25\u00a0May and 9\u00a0June 2005 had been in breach of the requirements of the domestic law (see paragraph 34 above) and therefore in violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention.60.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant maintained his complaint, and argued that the necessary conditions for his involuntary deprivation of liberty had not been met.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment61.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the first applicant\u2019s factual submissions and the Government\u2019s acknowledgement of the unlawfulness of the first applicant\u2019s confinement in the psychiatric hospital between 25\u00a0May and 9\u00a0June 2005, the Court finds no reason to hold otherwise. It therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(e)\u00a0of the Convention on account of the first applicant\u2019s involuntary confinement in the psychiatric hospital.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION62.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained that he had not had at his disposal an effective procedure by which he could challenge the lawfulness of his detention in the psychiatric hospital. He relied on Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cEveryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the first applicant was afforded an opportunity to challenge before the court the lawfulness of his involuntary psychiatric confinement through his representatives, the second and third applicants, of which he had not availed himself, thereby failing to exhaust domestic remedies. In this connection they made a reference to Article\u00a0254 of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 49 above).64.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant argued that the remedy suggested by the Government had not been accessible to him in practice, as he had been held in the psychiatric hospital without any contact with the outside world, and had not been capable of restoring his rights.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the non-exhaustion grounds raised by the Government are closely related to the substance of the complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, and should be joined to the merits.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government made no submissions on the merits of the above complaint.68.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant maintained his complaint.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles69.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention deals only with those remedies which must be made available during a person\u2019s detention with a view to that person obtaining speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention leading, where appropriate, to his or her release. The provision does not deal with other remedies which may serve to review the lawfulness of a period of detention which has already ended (see Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no.\u00a048321\/99, \u00a7\u00a0158, ECHR 2003\u2011X).70.\u00a0\u00a0According to the principles which emerge from the Court\u2019s case-law, a person of unsound mind who is compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for an indefinite or lengthy period is entitled under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention to take proceedings at reasonable intervals before a court to put in issue the \u201clawfulness\u201d, within the meaning of the Convention, of his or her detention, given that the reasons initially warranting confinement may cease to exist. In guaranteeing to persons arrested or detained a right to institute proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, Article 5 \u00a7 4 also proclaims their right, following the institution of such proceedings, to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of the detention and ordering its termination if it proves unlawful (see Musia\u0142 v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a024557\/94, \u00a7\u00a043, ECHR 1999\u2011II).71.\u00a0\u00a0A key guarantee under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 is that a patient compulsorily detained for psychiatric treatment must have the right to seek judicial review of that detention of his or her own motion. Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 therefore requires, in the first place, an independent legal device by which the detainee may appear before a judge who will determine the lawfulness of the continued detention. The detainee\u2019s access to the judge should not depend on the good will of the detaining authority or be activated at the discretion of the medical corps or the hospital authorities (see Gorshkov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a067531\/01, \u00a7\u00a044, 8\u00a0November 2005, with further references).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that sections 33-35 of the Psychiatric Treatment Act set out the procedure for judicial review of the lawfulness of involuntary psychiatric confinement. It provided, in particular, that judicial review was to be carried out following an application by the hospital authorities within five days of receipt of the application. The judge\u2019s decision either to grant or to refuse the application could be appealed against within ten days (see paragraph 48 above).73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has previously examined the system of review of lawfulness of involuntary psychiatric confinement under sections\u00a033-35 of the Psychiatric Treatment Act in Rakevich v. Russia (no.\u00a058973\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a044\u201146, 28\u00a0October 2003). In that case the Court arrived at the conclusion that whilst the legal mechanism contained in the above-mentioned sections of the Act, ensuring that a mental patient is brought before a judge automatically once a relevant application has been lodged by the hospital authorities, constituted an important safeguard against arbitrary detention, it was nevertheless deficient in so far as it did not provide for an independent legal device which would enable a person compulsorily detained in a psychiatric hospital to seek judicial review of such detention of his or her own motion in order to secure release. The lack of this basic guarantee under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention in the Psychiatric Treatment Act led the Court to the conclusion that there had been a violation of the above Convention Article in the case of Rakevich.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the circumstances of the present case its previous finding as to the need for a person compulsorily detained in psychiatric hospital to have a direct right of appeal in order to secure his or her release is all the more eloquent, given that the hospital authorities omitted to apply to the court for judicial review of the first applicant\u2019s detention (see paragraphs 34, 59 and 61 above), as a result of which the latter remained in the hospital for two weeks without being able himself to initiate a review of the lawfulness of his confinement in the hospital and thus eventually to be released.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the Government\u2019s argument to the effect that it was open to the first applicant to complain about unlawfulness of his involuntary psychiatric confinement, in accordance with Article 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, since the Government failed to illustrate the practical effectiveness of the remedy in question with examples from the case-law of the domestic courts, and in the absence of any examples of the successful use of this remedy in any of the cases relating to lawfulness of involuntary psychiatric confinement that have previously come before the Court, the Court remains unconvinced that the avenue advanced by the Government satisfies the requirements of effectiveness.76.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above considerations, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection as to the non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies and concludes that the first applicant was not entitled to take proceedings to test the lawfulness of his continued detention for compulsory psychiatric treatment by a court, as required by Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. There has, accordingly, been a violation of this provision.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST APPLICANT\u2019S INVOLUNTARY PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT77.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained that his subjection to forced psychiatric treatment in the absence of an established medical need and in the framework of a piece of scientific research amounted to treatment prohibited by Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the first applicant\u2019s forced psychiatric treatment in the psychiatric hospital between 25\u00a0May and 9\u00a0June 2005 did not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. The first applicant\u2019s involuntary psychiatric hospitalisation was necessitated by the latter\u2019s mental state at the material time, which manifested itself in expressed depression with suicidal tendencies, which was confirmed by forensic psychiatric expert examination. During the period of hospitalisation the first applicant underwent treatment with Seroquel (atypical antipsychotic medication), Iskel (antidepressant), Carbamazepine (mood-stabilising drug), Triftazin (neuroleptic) and Cyclodol, prescribed by an attending psychiatrist of the hospital. The Government submitted that the medical need for the first applicant to be treated with the above medication could not be established at the present moment because of the latter\u2019s refusal to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.80.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant argued that his unlawful confinement in the psychiatric hospital and that his being treated with the antipsychotic drug Seroquel as scientific research and in the absence of an established medical necessity amounted to torture. He asserted that in 2005 the Seroquel medication was on trial on humans in Russia, whereas abroad it was tested only on rats, mice and dogs. It was contraindicated for patients like him suffering from cerebroasthenia, hypotension and tachycardia, of which the attending psychiatrist was aware. As a result of such treatment the first applicant began to experience frequent acute headaches, loss of consciousness, loss of speech, vision deterioration, insomnia, nausea, frequent bouts of tachycardia, and hypertension. The procedural guarantees for the decision to administer involuntary psychiatric treatment were not complied with either: a panel of psychiatrists was not constituted to determine the medical need for the first applicant\u2019s forced psychiatric treatment, no application had been made to the court by the head of the psychiatric hospital in connection with the need for his continued involuntary stay in the psychiatric hospital, and thus no proceedings took place before the court. Regarding the Government\u2019s remark about his refusal to submit to a psychiatric evaluation, the first applicant stated that within the framework of criminal case no.\u00a0401966 opened in connection with his unlawful placement in the psychiatric hospital and his stay there he was voluntarily examined at psychiatric neurological hospital no.\u00a014 in Moscow and was found to be mentally healthy. His refusal to submit to another psychiatric examination was found legitimate by the Moscow Prosecutor\u2019s Office, which noted the existence of a number of other medical documents in the file confirming that he was mentally healthy, and held that no further psychiatric examination was required.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see Labita v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0119, ECHR 2000-IV).82.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects, and in some cases the sex, age and state of health of the victim. Although the purpose of such treatment is a factor to be taken into account, in particular the question of whether it was intended to humiliate or debase the victim, the absence of any such purpose does not inevitably lead to a finding that there has been no violation of Article 3 (see Peers v. Greece, no.\u00a028524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 68 and 74, ECHR 2001-III, and Grori v. Albania, \u00a7\u00a0125, no.\u00a025336\/04, with further references).83.\u00a0\u00a0In order for treatment to be \u201cinhuman\u201d or \u201cdegrading\u201d, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond the inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7 120).84.\u00a0\u00a0In determining whether a particular form of ill-treatment should be classified as torture, consideration must be given to the distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. As noted in previous cases, it appears that it was the intention that the Convention should, by means of such a distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0167, Series A no. 25).85.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element to torture, as recognised in the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which in Article 1 defines torture in terms of the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim, inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or intimidating (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no.\u00a025803\/94, \u00a7\u00a097, ECHR 1999\u2011V).86.\u00a0\u00a0Allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence (see, mutatis mutandis, Klaas v. Germany, 22 September 1993, \u00a7\u00a030, Series A no. 269). To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences, or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Ireland, cited above, \u00a7 161 in fine, and Labita, cited above, \u00a7 121).87.\u00a0\u00a0With respect to medical interventions to which a detained person is subjected against his or her will the Court has held that a measure which is of therapeutic necessity from the point of view of established principles of medicine cannot in principle be regarded as inhuman and degrading. The Court must nevertheless satisfy itself that a medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist and that procedural guarantees for the decision exist and are complied with (see Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, no.\u00a054825\/00, \u00a7\u00a094, ECHR 2005-II (extracts); Gorobet v. Moldova, no.\u00a030951\/10, \u00a7\u00a051, 11\u00a0October 2011; and V.C. v. Slovakia, no.\u00a018968\/07, \u00a7\u00a0103, ECHR 2011 (extracts)).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes with regard to the existence of a medical necessity for the first applicant\u2019s forced psychiatric treatment, that according to the 2008 report of the first applicant\u2019s forensic psychiatric examination, while his involuntary hospitalisation on 25\u00a0May 2005 had been justified in view of his attempted suicide, his mental state between 27\u00a0May and 9\u00a0June 2005 did not fall under the definition of a \u201csevere\u201d mental disorder or any other acute mental condition, and did not require involuntary psychiatric treatment (see paragraph 34 above). No evidence proving otherwise was produced by the Government. The Court considers therefore that the medical necessity for the first applicant\u2019s involuntary psychiatric treatment has not been convincingly shown to exist between 27\u00a0May and 9\u00a0June 2005.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that while forced psychiatric treatment was being administered to the first applicant, the latter was made part of scientific research into the effects of a then new antipsychotic drug and prevented from having any contact with the outside world (see paragraphs\u00a013 and 38 above).90.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the first applicant\u2019s forced psychiatric treatment in the absence of an established medical need and his being included in this context in unconsented scientific research into a new antipsychotic drug, was such as to arouse in him feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him. The Court finds unacceptable, in the light of international standards (see paragraphs 51-55 above), that a program of scientific research with new drugs be implemented without the consent of the subject submitted to the experimentation. Accordingly, the Court considers that the treatment to which the applicant was subjected against his will amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (compare to Gorobet, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 47-53).91.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST APPLICANT\u2019S BEATINGS IN THE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL92.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant further complained with reference to Article 3 of the Convention, cited above, that he had been subjected to beatings during his confinement in the psychiatric hospital and that there had been no effective investigation in that respect.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility93.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pleaded non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, since the first applicant had failed to appeal before the court against the decisions of 22\u00a0December 2012 and 9\u00a0January 2013.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that on 22 December 2012 the investigating authorities ordered that the proceedings in connection with the first applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment in the psychiatric hospital be discontinued. Shortly afterwards, on 9\u00a0January 2013, the above decision was set aside by the supervising prosecutor and the case-file material was referred to the investigation department for additional investigation, which remains pending to the present day. In such circumstances an appeal before the court against the above decisions would have been devoid of any purpose. The Court finds, therefore, that the first applicant was not obliged to pursue that remedy, and holds that the Government\u2019s objection should be dismissed.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with the infliction of bodily injuries on the first applicant during the night of 26-27 May 2005. Throughout the proceedings all possible investigative measures were carried out to establish the circumstances of the alleged beatings. However, since it was impossible to identify the alleged perpetrators, the proceedings were discontinued. The Government concluded therefore that there had been no violation of either the substantive or the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention in the present case.97.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant maintained his complaints. He argued that the domestic authorities had made every effort to prevent the crime committed from becoming public and to exempt the perpetrators from criminal liability. Unjustified refusals to open criminal proceedings and failure to act by investigators and prosecutors had made the investigation a mere formality and had resulted in termination of the criminal proceedings as the charges had become time\u2011barred.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7 131). Even though the scope of the State\u2019s positive obligations might differ between cases where treatment contrary to Article 3 has been inflicted through the involvement of State agents and cases where violence is inflicted by private individuals, the requirements in respect of an official investigation are similar (see Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704\/04, \u00a7 100, 17\u00a0December).99.\u00a0\u00a0Any investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. The authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened, and should not rely on hasty or ill\u2011founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard. Thus, the mere fact that appropriate steps were not taken to reduce the risk of collusion between alleged perpetrators amounts to a significant shortcoming in the adequacy of the investigation. Furthermore, the investigation must be independent, impartial and subject to public scrutiny. It should result in a reasoned decision to reassure a concerned public that the rule of law had been respected (see Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a0126, 24\u00a0July 2014, with further references).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in October 2005 the first applicant complained to the Russian Federation Ombudsman about unlawful committal and treatment in the psychiatric hospital, and beatings by hospital nurses and two of the patients during the night of 26-27 May 2005. His complaint was referred to the Meshchanskiy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office, from where it was further referred to the Meshchanskiy District Department of the Interior.101.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant\u2019s allegations of beatings were supported by medical evidence, confirming the presence of a haematoma under his right eye, as well as bruises and contusions in the area of his chest and waist upon his discharge from the psychiatric hospital (see paragraph 14 above). In the Court\u2019s view, the allegations thus raised an arguable claim of ill-treatment, giving rise to an obligation on the domestic authorities to carry out an effective official investigation into the circumstances in which the first applicant sustained his injuries.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in response to the first applicant\u2019s complaint of beatings in the psychiatric hospital criminal proceedings were instituted by the domestic authorities. It remains therefore to be seen whether the investigation which was conducted in connection with the first applicant\u2019s allegations was such as to meet the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the investigative authority did not open a criminal case until 2 November 2006, that is over a year after the first applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment had been brought to its attention (see paragraph 16 above). The Court considers that a delay in the opening of the criminal proceedings into the applicants\u2019 credible assertions could not but have had a major adverse impact on the investigation, significantly undermining the investigating authority\u2019s ability to secure the evidence concerning the alleged ill\u2011treatment (see Razzakov v. Russia, no.\u00a057519\/09, \u00a7\u00a061, 5\u00a0February 2015, with further references).104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the proceedings were subsequently suspended on four occasions: twice in 2007 and once each in 2008 and 2009, on the grounds that it was impossible to identify the alleged perpetrators. The proceedings were also discontinued on three occasions: in\u00a02007, 2010 and 2012, all on the grounds of expiry of the procedural time\u2011limit for prosecution. The latest decision of 2012 on termination of the proceedings was set aside in January 2013, and the case-file material was again referred to the investigation department for additional investigation, which remains pending to the present day (see paragraphs 16-26 above).105.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the foregoing, the Court finds that the significant delay in opening the criminal case in connection with the first applicant\u2019s credible assertions of beatings in the psychiatric hospital, and the subsequent handling of the criminal proceedings which remain pending some ten years after the events complained of, show that the authorities failed in their obligation to conduct an effective investigation of the allegations of the first applicant\u2019s beatings in the psychiatric hospital.106.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural aspect.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Substantive aspect of Article 3 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles107.\u00a0\u00a0Further to the general principles summarised above (see paragraphs\u00a081-86 above), the Court reiterates its constant approach that Article\u00a03 imposes on the State a duty to protect the physical well-being of individuals who find themselves in a vulnerable position by virtue of being under the control of the authorities (see Denis Vasilyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115, with further references).108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in particular that where a person is injured while in detention or otherwise under the control of the authorities, any such injury will give rise to a strong presumption that the person was subjected to ill\u2011treatment (see Bursuc v. Romania, no.\u00a042066\/98, \u00a7 80, 12 October 2004). It is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how the injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7\u00a087).109.\u00a0\u00a0The position of inferiority and powerlessness which is typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals calls for increased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with (see M.S.\u00a0v.\u00a0Croatia (no. 2), no. 75450\/12, \u00a7 98, 19 February 2015, and Bure\u0161 v.\u00a0the\u00a0Czech Republic, no. 37679\/08, \u00a7 87, 18 October 2012).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the psychiatric hospital to which the first applicant was involuntarily admitted and where he was held was a public institution, and that the first applicant while there was under the exclusive control of State authorities.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that while being held in the psychiatric hospital during the night of 26 to 27 May 2005 the first applicant sustained bodily injuries including a haematoma under his right eye, as well as bruises and contusions in the area of his chest and waist (see paragraph 14 above). The Government were therefore required to provide a plausible explanation as to how those injuries could have been caused.112.\u00a0\u00a0On the basis of all the material placed before it, the Court finds that neither the authorities at the domestic level nor the Government in the proceedings before the Strasbourg Court have advanced any explanation as to the origin of the first applicant\u2019s injuries. The Court concludes therefore that the Government have not satisfactorily established that the first applicant\u2019s injuries were caused otherwise than by the treatment he underwent while being held in the psychiatric hospital.113.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, having regard to the nature and the extent of the first applicant\u2019s injuries, the Court concludes that the State is responsible under the substantive aspect of Article 3 on account of the inhuman and degrading treatment to which the first applicant was subjected while in the psychiatric hospital.V.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION114.\u00a0\u00a0The second and third applicants complained under Articles\u00a03 and 5 of the Convention that the first applicant\u2019s psychiatric internment had been unlawful, that no judicial review had been available, that the first applicant had been ill-treated in the psychiatric hospital, and that there had been no effective investigation of this. The first, second and third applicants further complained that the first applicant\u2019s psychiatric hospitalisation and treatment amounted to a violation of Article\u00a02 of the Convention, and that the absence of effective domestic remedies in connection with the complaints raised in the present application amounted to violation of Articles 13 and 17 of the Convention.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that under Article 34 of the Convention it may receive applications from individuals and others \u201cclaiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto\u201d. In order to claim to be a victim of a violation, a person must be directly affected by the impugned measure (see Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 25 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a056-59, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV). Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the second and third applicants were not victims of the alleged violations. It therefore considers that their complaints are incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a), and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.116.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the complaints under Articles 2, 13 and 17 of the Convention raised by the first applicant, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that these complaints must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION117.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage118.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed 36,900 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, broken down as follows:(a)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 34,100 as compensation for his loss of income in the form of salary which he could have received from June 2005 onwards;(b)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 2,800 as compensation for the cost of his medication for \u201cdepressive hypochondriasis against the background of traumatic encephalopathy\u201d diagnosed in August 2005, \u201ctraumatic encephalopathy, closed head injury, concussion, incised wounds forehead and right hand\u201d diagnosed in April 2007, \u201ctraumatic encephalopathy with cephalgic syndrome, osteochondrosis of the cervical spine, cervicalgia\u201d diagnosed in September 2009 and \u201cdiscirculatory traumatic toxic encephalopathy, motoric aphasia, syndrome of parkinsonism, low back pain, strabismus, oculomotoric disorders\u201d diagnosed in July 2011.119.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of non-pecuniary damage the first applicant claimed EUR\u00a080,000.120.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the first applicant had failed to show a clear causal connection between the violations alleged and the pecuniary damages claimed. The Government further considered that the first applicant\u2019s claims for non-pecuniary damage were excessive, and that if the Court were to find a violation the finding of such a violation would constitute in itself sufficient just satisfaction.121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has found a combination of serious violations in the present case. The first applicant was unlawfully detained in a psychiatric hospital for two weeks and was not entitled to take proceedings to test the lawfulness of his detention by a court. Besides, he was subjected to forced psychiatric treatment and beatings in the psychiatric hospital, and the domestic authorities have failed to investigate effectively the circumstances under which the first applicant sustained the injuries he suffered.122.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the compensation for pecuniary damage claimed by the first applicant, the Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.123.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers that the first applicant\u2019s suffering and frustration cannot be compensated for by a mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the first applicant EUR 26,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on it.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses124.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant also claimed EUR 325 for photocopying, translation and postal expenses and EUR\u00a02,720 for his legal representation before the Court.125.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the first applicant had failed to prove that he had incurred expenses in the amount of EUR 2,720 for his legal representation before the Court.126.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, and bearing in mind that the applicants were granted EUR 850 in legal aid for their representation by Ms\u00a0I.\u00a0Sergeyeva, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a02,000 for costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27442":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED BREACH OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the Government\u2019s failure to have his medical examination performed with a view to answering the three questions asked by the Court had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 and had thus violated Article 34 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201dRule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.2.\u00a0\u00a0Where it is considered appropriate, immediate notice of the measure adopted in a particular case may be given to the Committee of Ministers.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any interim measure it has indicated.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that there had been no violation of the applicant\u2019s right under Article 34 by the correctional institutions of Tatarstan.43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed. He referred to principles established by the Court in cases pertaining to Article 34 of the Convention and Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court. He further pointed out that the authorities had failed to comply with the Court\u2019s request under Rule 39 that he should be subjected to an examination by medical specialists independent of the penal system. The medical examination carried out in\u00a0April 2014 had not been independent, and the commission had not included a neurologist or an epileptologist. The commission\u2019s interpretation of the applicable domestic law had been erroneous, and their findings had not been in accordance with the medical evidence. The Government\u2019s failure to immediately subject the applicant to an independent medical examination had stripped him of procedural guarantees under Article 34, since he had had no opportunity to rely on an independent expert report.44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further submitted that after his case had been communicated to the Government staff of the correctional colony and the prison hospital had threatened him, to force him to withdraw his application before the Court. The applicant argued that such conduct had also constituted a violation of his right of individual petition.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, pursuant to Article 34 of the Convention, Contracting States undertake to refrain from any act or omission that may hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application, and this has been consistently reaffirmed as a cornerstone of the Convention system (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2005\u2011I). Although the object of Article 34 is essentially that of protecting an individual against any arbitrary interference by the authorities, it does not merely compel States to abstain from such interference. In addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there are positive obligations inherent in Article 34 requiring the authorities to furnish all necessary facilities to make possible the proper and effective examination of applications. Such an obligation will arise in situations where applicants are particularly vulnerable (see Naydyon v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a016474\/03, \u00a7 63, 14\u00a0October 2010; Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no.\u00a038773\/05, \u00a7\u00a0156, 26 July 2012; and Iulian Popescu v. Romania, no. 24999\/04, \u00a7\u00a033, 4\u00a0June 2013).46.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s established case-law, a respondent State\u2019s failure to comply with an interim measure entails a violation of the right of individual application (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0125, and Abdulkhakov, cited above, \u00a7 222). The Court cannot emphasise enough the special importance attached to interim measures in the Convention system. Their purpose is not only to enable an effective examination of the application to be carried out, but also to ensure that the protection afforded to the applicant by the Convention is effective; such measures subsequently allow the Committee of Ministers to supervise the execution of the final judgment. Interim measures thus enable the State concerned to discharge its obligation to comply with the final judgment of the Court, which is legally binding by virtue of Article 46 of the Convention (see Mamatkulov and\u00a0Askarov, cited above, \u00a7 125; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378\/02, \u00a7 473, ECHR 2005\u2011III; Aoulmi v. France, no.\u00a050278\/99, \u00a7\u00a0108, ECHR 2006\u2011I; and Ben Khemais v. Italy, no. 246\/07, \u00a7\u00a082, 24\u00a0February 2009).47.\u00a0\u00a0The crucial significance of interim measures is further highlighted by the fact that the Court issues them, as a matter of principle, only in truly exceptional cases and on the basis of a rigorous examination of all the relevant circumstances. In most of these cases the applicants face a genuine threat to life and limb, with the ensuing real risk of grave, irreversible harm in breach of the core provisions of the Convention. The vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system not only underpins their binding legal effect on the States concerned, as upheld by the established case-law, but also commands that the utmost importance be attached to the question of the States Parties\u2019 compliance with the Court\u2019s indications in that regard (see, inter alia, the firm position on that point expressed by the States Parties in the Izmir Declaration and by the Committee of Ministers in Interim Resolution CM\/ResDH(2010)83 in the above-mentioned case of Ben\u00a0Khemais). Any laxity on this question would unacceptably weaken the protection of the core rights in the Convention, and would not be compatible with its values and spirit (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7\u00a0July 1989, \u00a7\u00a088, Series A no. 161); it would also be inconsistent with the fundamental importance of the right of individual petition and, more generally, undermine the authority and effectiveness of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order (see Mamatkulov and\u00a0Askarov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 100 and 125, and, mutatis mutandis, Loizidou v.\u00a0Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, \u00a7 75, Series A no. 310).48.\u00a0\u00a0Article 34 will be breached if the authorities of a Contracting State fail to take all steps which could reasonably be taken in order to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court (see Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806\/05, \u00a7 88, 10 March 2009). It is for the respondent Government to demonstrate to the Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation (see Paladi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-106, and Aleksanyan v.\u00a0Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 228-32, 22 December 2008, in which the Court concluded that the Russian Government had failed to honour their commitments under Article 34 of the Convention as a result of their failure to promptly transfer a seriously ill applicant to a specialised hospital and to subject him to an examination by a mixed medical panel including doctors of his choice, in disregard of an interim measure imposed by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual application instituted by Article\u00a034 that applicants should be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints. In this context, \u201cpressure\u201d includes not only direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation, but also other improper indirect acts or contacts designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from using a Convention remedy. The issue of whether or not a disputed measure taken by authorities amounts to unacceptable practices from the standpoint of Article\u00a034 must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case (see, among other authorities, Poleshchuk v. Russia, no. 60776\/00, \u00a7 31, 7 October\u00a02004; Akdivar and\u00a0Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 105, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV; Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, \u00a7\u00a0105, Reports\u00a01996-VI; and Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7\u00a0159, Reports\u00a01998\u2011III).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case50.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that on 12 February 2014 it indicated to the Russian Government, under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, that the applicant should be immediately examined by medical experts independent of the penal system, including by a neurologist and an epileptologist. The experts were to be asked whether the treatment and physical care the applicant was receiving were adequate for his condition, whether his current state of health was compatible with detention in the conditions of a correctional colony or a prison hospital, and lastly whether the applicant\u2019s current condition required him to be admitted to a specialised hospital or released. The Government responded by submitting a typed copy of the applicant\u2019s medical history prepared by the detention authorities; certificates issued by the head of the applicant\u2019s correctional colony and the head of the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Tatarstan Republic; and a copy of the report drawn up on 25 December 2013 by a medical commission, comprising the head, a deputy head and a senior inspector of the medical unit of the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Tatarstan Republic, and a deputy head of the prison hospital of correctional colony no. 2. The Government themselves also answered the three questions put forward by the Court.51.\u00a0\u00a0Following the communication of the case, the Government insisted that they had fully complied with the interim measure. The Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument. It reiterates that the aim of the interim measure in the present case, as formulated in the Court\u2019s decision of 12 February 2014, was to obtain an independent medical expert assessment of the state of the applicant\u2019s health, the quality of the treatment he was receiving, and the adequacy of the conditions of his detention for his medical needs. That expert evidence was necessary to decide whether, as the applicant argued, his life and limb were at real risk as a result of the conditions of his detention, including the alleged lack of requisite medical care. In addition, the Court was concerned by the contradictory nature of the medical reports prepared by the applicant\u2019s experts and those commissioned by the prison authorities, which the applicant submitted with his application and his request for an interim measure. The interim measure in the present case was therefore also meant to ensure that the applicant could effectively pursue his case before the Court (see, mutatis mutandis, Shtukaturov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 44009\/05, \u00a7 141, ECHR 2008).52.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst the formulation of an interim measure is one of the elements to be taken into account in the Court\u2019s analysis of whether a State has complied with its obligations under Article 34, the Court must have regard not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the interim measure indicated (see Paladi, cited above, \u00a7 91), and indeed to its very purpose. The main purpose of the interim measure, as indicated by the Court in the present case - and the Government did not pretend to be unaware of it - was to prevent the applicant\u2019s exposure to inhuman and degrading suffering in view of his poor health and his remaining in the conditions of an ordinary detention facility that was unable to ensure that he received, as he argued, adequate medical assistance.53.\u00a0\u00a0The report of 25 December 2013 was prepared by a medical commission which only included prison doctors. Although the Court is mindful of the fact that the three experts who comprised the medical commission worked for the Russian penal system and did not specialise in the medical fields relevant to the applicant\u2019s major illnesses, it will not consider in detail the experts\u2019 independence or professional expertise and qualifications. It is more concerned with the fact that the aim of the expert examination, the result of which was set in the report, was to compare the applicant\u2019s condition against the exhaustive list of illnesses provided for by the Governmental Decree, which could have warranted his early release. Having limited their assessment to the mere restatement of the applicant\u2019s medical history, at no point during the examinations did the three doctors assess the applicant\u2019s state of health independently from that list or evaluate whether his illnesses, separately or in combination, given their current symptoms, nature and duration, required additional, case-related medical procedures or even the applicant\u2019s transfer to a specialised hospital. Nor did they pay any attention to the quality of the medical care he had been receiving while in detention, or the conditions in which he was being detained. The reports therefore have little relevance to the implementation of the interim measure indicated by the Court to the Russian Government in the present case.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the Government themselves responded to the three questions put forward in the Court\u2019s letter of 12\u00a0February 2014. The Court notes in this respect that in view of the vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system, they must be strictly complied with by the State concerned. The Court cannot conceive, therefore, of allowing the authorities to circumvent an interim measure such as the one indicated in the present case by replacing the medical expert opinion with their own assessment of the applicant\u2019s situation. Yet, that is what the Government have done in the present case. In so doing, the State has frustrated the purpose of the interim measure, which sought to enable the Court, on the basis of a relevant independent medical opinion, to effectively respond to and, if need be, prevent the possible continuous exposure of the applicant to physical and mental suffering in violation of the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention (see Salakhov and Islyamova v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 28005\/08, \u00a7\u00a0222, 14 March 2013.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not demonstrate any objective impediment preventing compliance with the interim measure (see Paladi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a092). Consequently, the Court finds that the State has failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by it in the present case under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.56.\u00a0\u00a0This finding is sufficient for the Court to find that the authorities failed to comply with their obligation under Article 34 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court does not deem it necessary to deal with the applicant\u2019s allegations of pressure put on him with the aim of making him withdraw his application.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he was unable to obtain effective medical care while in detention, which had led to a serious deterioration in his condition, placed him in a life-threatening situation, and subjected him to severe physical and mental suffering, in violation of the guarantees of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, finds that these complaints cover the same ground, and thus finds it appropriate to examine the applicant\u2019s allegations solely under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties59.\u00a0\u00a0Having referred to the general principles laid down by the Court in a number of judgments concerning the standards of medical care of detainees, the Government stressed that the applicant had received comprehensive medical care in detention. They submitted that the hospital of correctional colony no.\u00a02 had the equipment and medication necessary for the treatment of the applicant\u2019s condition. He was properly diagnosed and was placed under dynamic supervision by well-qualified medical staff. His treatment regime was regularly adjusted following the recommendations of doctors who were not employed by the detention facilities, i.e. civil specialists. The authorities were mindful of the applicant\u2019s situation and tried to improve the conditions of his detention.60.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed. He noted that he had only received one drug instead of some thirty drugs prescribed to him. The equipment necessary to diagnose and treat his disease was unavailable at the hospital, and the hospital neurologist did not have the necessary medical qualifications. The applicant further submitted that the information provided by the Government was inaccurate. In particular, he observed that the copy of his medical file did not contain information about his epileptic seizures. The applicant insisted that physical care had been mostly provided to him by other detainees, who had regularly changed his catheter bag and had showered him. Despite the fact that the applicant\u2019s condition progressed and that the prognosis for him was negative, the authorities had not taken any steps to alleviate his sufferings and safeguard his life and limb.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint pertains to two distinct periods of his detention. The first period started on 22\u00a0February 2012, when the applicant was arrested, and ended on 25\u00a0September 2012, when he was released on health grounds. The Court observes that the application was lodged before the Court more than six months after the end of the first period. It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible for non-compliance with the six-month rule.62.\u00a0\u00a0The second period of the applicant\u2019s detention started on 8\u00a0October 2013, when he was again taken into custody and was placed in correctional colony no.\u00a02. It ended with his release on 11 March 2015. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles(i)\u00a0\u00a0As to the Court\u2019s evaluation of the facts and burden of proof63.\u00a0\u00a0In cases in which there are conflicting accounts of events, the Court is inevitably confronted, when establishing the facts, with the same difficulties as those faced by any first-instance court. It reiterates that, in assessing evidence, it has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, it has never been its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that standard. Its role is to rule not on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States\u2019 responsibility under the Convention. The specificity of its task under Article 19 of the Convention \u2013 to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention \u2011 conditions its approach to the issues of evidence and proof. In proceedings before the Court there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions. In accordance with its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (see Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012, and the cases cited therein).64.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. The Court reiterates its case-law under Articles\u00a02 and 3 of the Convention to the effect that where the events at issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries, damage and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII; and Oleg Nikitin v. Russia, no.\u00a036410\/02, \u00a7\u00a045, 9 October 2008). In the absence of such an explanation the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the respondent Government (see, for instance, Orhan v. Turkey, no.\u00a025656\/94, \u00a7\u00a0274, 18\u00a0June 2002, and Buntov v. Russia, no. 27026\/10, \u00a7 161, 5\u00a0June 2012).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the application of Article 3 and standards of medical care for detainees65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Verbin\u0163 v.\u00a0Romania, no. 7842\/04, \u00a7 63, 3 April 2012, with further references).66.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III, with further references).67.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI, and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 208, 13 July 2006). In most cases concerning the detention of persons who are ill, the Court has examined whether or not the applicant received adequate medical assistance in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to secure the health and well-being of detainees, among other things, as an obligation on the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7 94; Kalashnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a047095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI; and Khudobin v. Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7\u00a096, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)).68.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists that, in particular, authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Hummatov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29 November 2007; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011; Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21 December 2010; Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 121, 7 November 2006), and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 114; Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4 October 2005; and Popov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0211).69.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case70.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant is almost totally paralysed and suffers from multiple sclerosis and epilepsy. Relying on a large number of expert opinions, the applicant argued that his condition was extremely serious, or even life\u2011threatening, particularly given that he had not received adequate medical care in detention. He submitted that neither the quality nor the quantity of the medical services he had been provided with corresponded to his needs. In addition, he had been left in unsanitary conditions and without appropriate physical care, which had further aggravated his state of health.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disagreed. They drew the Court\u2019s attention to the reports prepared by doctors from the prison hospital, as well as the medical certificates issued by the Russian prison authorities. They insisted that the applicant was not suffering from any of the serious illnesses listed in the Governmental Decree, that his condition did not therefore call for his early release, and that the quality of the medical services afforded to him was beyond reproach.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already stressed its difficult task of evaluating the contradictory and even mutually exclusive evidence submitted by the parties in the present case. Its task has been further complicated by the need to assess evidence calling for expert knowledge in various medical fields. In this connection it emphasises that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d (see, mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch v. Austria, 4\u00a0December 1995, \u00a7 32, Series A no. 336, and Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7\u00a051, 14 October 2010).73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined a large number of cases against Russia raising complaints of inadequate medical services afforded to inmates (see, among the most recent ones, Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, 13\u00a0November 2012; Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461\/10, 27 November 2012; Reshetnyak v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56027\/10, 8 January 2013; Mkhitaryan v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046108\/11, 5 February 2013; Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, 5\u00a0February 2013; Bubnov v. Russia, no. 76317\/11, 5 February 2013; Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, 9 January 2014; and Gorelov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a049072\/11, 9\u00a0January 2014). In the absence of an effective remedy in Russia to air those complaints, the Court has been obliged to perform a first\u2011hand evaluation of the evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention had been respected. In that role, paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants in view of their detention, the Court has called on the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.74.\u00a0\u00a0Coming back to the medical reports and opinions submitted by the applicant in the present case, the Court is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence in favour of his submissions, and that the burden of proof should shift to the respondent Government.75.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its findings under Article 34 of the Convention, the Court considers that it can draw inferences from the Government\u2019s conduct and is ready to apply a particularly thorough scrutiny to the evidence submitted by them in support of their position. It therefore finds that the Government have failed to demonstrate conclusively that the applicant received effective medical treatment for his illnesses while in detention. The evidence submitted by the Government is unconvincing and insufficient to rebut the applicant\u2019s account of the treatment to which he was subjected in detention. In such circumstances, the Court will proceed with the examination of the case, attaching particular weight to the medical evidence and expert opinions submitted by the applicant in support of his position. It also takes account of the statements made by the applicant\u2019s attending doctors or other medical specialists, including those working for the Russian penitentiary facilities, who on several occasions confirmed the impossibility for the applicant to receive adequate treatment for his multiple sclerosis while in detention.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus finds that the applicant was left without the medical assistance vital for his illnesses, primarily for his multiple sclerosis, a very serious condition threatening his life. It is aware that with multiple sclerosis being an incurable condition, treatment of such patients typically focuses on speeding recovery from attacks, slowing the progression of the disease and managing symptoms to alleviate the patients\u2019 sufferings. In the applicant\u2019s case, the treatment he received was incomplete and the medical supervision afforded to him was insufficient to maintain his health. There was no thorough and continuous evaluation of his condition or adequate diagnosis in response to the increasing number of his health-related complaints. It appears that during the entire period of his detention the applicant had no more than two MRI exams. The Government was not able to cite any additional diagnostic procedures which could have in detail recorded the progress of the applicant\u2019s condition and permitted a timely response to the aggravation of his illness. The medical personnel of the detention facilities took no steps to address his concerns or to apply the recommendation of the experts commissioned by the applicant. The Court is particularly concerned that the applicant did not receive the complete drug regimen. Without going into the issue of the medical record forgery, the Court finds that administering of merely a quarter of the prescribed medicines to the applicant was clearly insufficient to address his needs. It also did not find any evidence that at any point during the applicant\u2019s detention prison doctors significantly amended or extended his chemotherapy to modify the progress of the disease. There is also unconvincing evidence that prison doctors effectively addressed the applicant\u2019s associated effects of the multiple sclerosis, such as pain and bladder control problems, or comprehensively dealt with yet another of the applicant\u2019s illnesses, epilepsy. It does not escape the Court\u2019s attention that even the physical therapy, so needed for the treatment of the applicant\u2019s movement problems, was not provided. The poor quality of the medical services was accentuated by the fact that the applicant was kept in unsanitary detention conditions susceptible to further aggravating his state of health. The Court believes that, as a result of the lack of comprehensive and adequate medical treatment, the applicant was exposed to prolonged mental and physical suffering that diminished his human dignity. The authorities\u2019 failure to provide the applicant with the medical care he needed amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.77.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there was a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy to complain about the lack of the adequate medical assistance, as required under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to submit any complaints of lack of effective medical care to the Russian courts. He had also failed to challenge in court the authorities\u2019 refusal to order his medical examination. The Government requested the Court to dismiss the complaint for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his claims. He submitted that on several occasions he and his wife had complained to the prison hospital authorities and to prosecutors and courts, seeking an independent medical examination with a view to determining whether his condition was compatible with detention. The applicant argued that none of the remedies suggested by the Government were effective.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the Government\u2019s objection as to exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the substance of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention and should, therefore, be joined to the merits. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of this Article is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable\u201d complaint under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief (see, as a classic reference, Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, \u00a7 54, Series A no. 131).83.\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article\u00a013 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint; the \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. At the same time, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law, in the sense either of preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or of providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 157-58, and Wasserman v.\u00a0Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7 45, 10 April 2008).84.\u00a0\u00a0Where the fundamental right to protection against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, the preventive and compensatory remedies have to be complementary in order to be considered effective. The existence of a preventive remedy is indispensable for the effective protection of individuals against the kind of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed, the particular importance attached by the Convention to that provision requires, in the Court\u2019s view, that the States Parties establish, over and above a compensatory remedy, an effective mechanism in order to put an end to any such treatment rapidly. Had it been otherwise, the prospect of future compensation would have legitimised particularly severe suffering in breach of this core provision of the Convention (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7\u00a078, 24\u00a0July 2008).85.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant did not attempt to make use of any avenues for exhausting remedies whereas the documents produced by the applicant show that on numerous occasions he and his wife drew the attention of the penitentiary authorities, prosecutors and courts to the applicant\u2019s state of health.86.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court observes that its task in the present case is to examine the effectiveness of the various domestic remedies suggested by the Russian Government, and not merely to determine whether the applicant made his grievances sufficiently known to the Russian authorities. In this connection, the Court reiterates that it has on many occasions examined the effectiveness of the domestic remedies suggested by the Government in cases of applicants complaining of ongoing inadequate medical treatment, such as in the present case. It found, in particular, that in deciding on a complaint concerning breaches of domestic regulations governing the provision of medical care to detainees, the prison authorities would not have a sufficiently independent standpoint to satisfy the requirements of Article\u00a035 of the Convention (see Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, \u00a7\u00a079, 13\u00a0November 2012, and Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461\/10, \u00a7\u00a075, 27\u00a0November 2012). The Court also stressed that even though review by a supervising prosecutor plays an important part in securing appropriate medical care in detention, a complaint to the supervising prosecutor falls short of the requirements of an effective remedy, because of the procedural shortcomings that have been previously identified in the Court\u2019s case-law (see Koryak, \u00a7 80-81, cited above). Having assessed a civil claim for compensation under the tort provisions of the Civil Code, the Court considered that such a claim could not offer an applicant any other redress than a purely compensatory award, and could not put an end to a situation where there is an ongoing violation, such as inadequate medical care (see Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 65-73, 8\u00a0January 2013). Moreover, the Court found that such a remedy did not offer reasonable prospects of success, in particular because the award was conditional on the establishment of fault on the part of the authorities, which was extremely improbable in a situation where domestic legal norms prescribed the application of a certain measure, for instance certain conditions of detention or level of medical treatment (see A.B. v. Russia, no. 1439\/06, \u00a7\u00a096, 14\u00a0October 2010).87.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above considerations, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous findings, and concludes that the legal avenues put forward by the Government did not constitute an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.88.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and finds that the applicant did not have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaint, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION89.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage1.\u00a0\u00a0Pecuniary damage90.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, on account of the expenses he would incur after his eventual release to undergo treatment in foreign hospitals.91.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the claims were unsubstantiated and speculative.92.\u00a0\u00a0Finding no causal link between the damage claimed and the compensation claimed by the applicant, the Court rejects this claim in full.2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-pecuniary damage93.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this claim was excessive.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses96.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed 60,567 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 900) for costs and expenses incurred before the Court on account of legal representation and postal services.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the claim was ill-founded.98.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum claimed in full, together with any tax that may be chargeable to him on that amount.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27462":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the incompatibility of detention with the applicant\u2019s advanced age and state of health44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that her health problems, coupled with her advanced age, were of such a nature and degree that her life had been in danger while in detention. She further contended that her health problems had been exacerbated by the stress and humiliation brought on by her imprisonment. She relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0Recapitulation of the relevant principles45.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s well-established case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article\u00a03. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, inter alia, Price v. the United Kingdom, no. 33394\/96, \u00a7 24, ECHR 2001-VII; Mouisel v. France, no.\u00a067263\/01, \u00a7 37, ECHR 2002-IX; Naumenko v. Ukraine, no.\u00a042023\/98, \u00a7\u00a0108, 10 February 2004; Davtyan v. Armenia, no. 29736\/06, \u00a7 79, 31 March 2015).46.\u00a0\u00a0In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be \u201cinhuman\u201d or \u201cdegrading\u201d, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7 68, ECHR 2006\u2011IX; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000\u2011IV, and Enea v. Italy [GC], no. 74912\/01, \u00a7 56, ECHR 2009).47.\u00a0\u00a0Measures depriving a person of his or her liberty may often involve such an element of suffering or humiliation. Yet it cannot be said that the execution of detention on remand in itself raises an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. Nor can that Article be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to place him or her in a civil hospital to enable him or her to obtain a particular kind of medical treatment (see Papon v. France (no. 1) (dec.), no. 64666\/01, ECHR 2001\u2011VI; Priebke v. Italy (dec.), no. 48799\/99, 5 April 2001; see also Mouisel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 40-42, and Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, \u00a7 55, 2\u00a0December 2004).48.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, under Article 3 the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his or her human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him or her to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his or her health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him or her with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI and Davtyan v. Armenia, cited above, \u00a7 81).49.\u00a0\u00a0There is no express prohibition in the Convention against the detention in prison of persons who have attained a certain age. However, the Court has already had the opportunity to note that, under certain circumstances, the detention of an elderly person over a lengthy period might raise an issue under Article 3. Nonetheless, regard is to be had to the particular circumstances of each specific case (see Priebke (dec.), cited above, and Sawoniuk v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 63716\/00, 29 May 2001).50.\u00a0\u00a0There are at least three specific elements to be considered in relation to the compatibility of an applicant\u2019s health with his or her stay in detention: (a) the medical condition of the prisoner, (b) the adequacy of the medical assistance and care provided in detention, and (c) the advisability of maintaining the detention measure in view of the state of health of an applicant (see Farbtuhs, no. 4672\/02, cited above, \u00a7 53, 2 December 2004, and Contrada v. Italy (no. 2), no. 7509\/08, \u00a7 78, 11 February 2014).51.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, as far as the standard of proof is concerned, the Court reiterates that\u00a0allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence (see Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857\/13, 27 November 2014). To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d, but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25, and Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826\/03, \u00a7 95, 22 May 2012).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the foregoing principles to the present case52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the ill-treatment complained of by the applicant consists of the overall incompatibility of detention with her state of health, coupled with her advanced age (she was seventy-seven years old when first placed in pre-trial detention in 2010). She does not appear to identify particular occasions on which she was denied medical treatment, or specific steps which ought to have been taken by the authorities in order to secure her health and well-being.53.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention in the Sollicciano correctional facility (see paragraphs 16-23 above), the Court notes that the Pistoia preliminary investigations judge requested a medical examination by an independent expert with a view to assessing the compatibility of her health with detention, and that the expert concluded they were compatible. The Court points out that the domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction, namely the Pistoia preliminary investigations judge and the Florence District Court, carefully assessed all the medical evidence submitted by the independent expert and parties, and reached their conclusions based on such evidence. The Court of Cassation subsequently confirmed the Florence District Court\u2019s decision.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further points out that, with regard to the second request for modification of the detention order (see paragraphs 24-31 above), the Pistoia District Court transferred the applicant to a correctional hospital with a view to ensuring she received the necessary medical assistance and treatment, and prevention of a further worsening of her condition. It did so promptly and on the basis of a medical report issued by an independent expert who had noted a deterioration in the applicant\u2019s clinical condition (see paragraph 26 above). Moreover, the Court notes that she was detained in the correctional hospital for a total period of less than two months, as her detention there was ordered on 5 May 2011 but on 20 June 2011 the Florence District Court ordered that she be released and placed under house arrest.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that when the Pistoia District Court once again remanded the applicant in custody in July 2012 because of repeated breaches of the conditions of her house arrest (see paragraphs 32-38 above), she was again transferred to the correctional hospital in Pisa. The independent expert whose report had been requested by the Pistoia District Court stated that her conditions could be adequately monitored in such a centre, where she would be placed under medical supervision. In addition, the documents submitted show that her health was indeed monitored, and that she was examined by several specialists during her detention from July to December 2012 (see paragraph 34 above). When evidence of difficulties in the management of treatment and performance of diagnostic tests was submitted to the Florence Court of Appeal, it promptly placed her under house arrest.56.\u00a0\u00a0In light of the foregoing, and on the basis of the documents submitted, it can be stated that the national judicial authorities grounded all their decisions concerning the issuing of custodial orders on medical evidence, and reacted by modifying such orders pursuant to the applicant\u2019s requests when concerns raised by medical experts were submitted for their attention.57.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the Court accepts that the applicant\u2019s advanced age, coupled with the presence of certain medical conditions, might have made her more vulnerable than the average detainee, and that her detention may have exacerbated to a certain extent her feelings of distress. However, on the basis of the evidence before it, and bearing in mind the prompt and effective responses of the authorities, the Court does not find it established that she was subjected to ill-treatment that attained a sufficient level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention.58.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of overcrowding and inadequate conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention about the conditions of her detention in the Pisa correctional hospital where she had been detained from May to June 2011 and July to December 2012.60.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, she contended that she had had to share a small cell with four detainees during the first period of detention. She complained about the height of the ceilings and windows in her cell, and of a lack of access to open air. As regards the second period of detention, she complained, in a very general manner, about the size of her cell and of a lack of fresh air.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that no information has been provided about the size of the cells during the two periods of detention and no supporting documentation has been submitted (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7 122, 10 January 2012).62.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the considerations above, it must be concluded that the applicant\u2019s claims are without any corroboration and are generally unsubstantiated. Accordingly, they are manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible.C.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention63.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the criminal proceedings against her had been unfair on account of the fact that she had not had the assistance of her privately hired counsel during the hearing of 15 November 2011 before the Court of Cassation, which had refused to adjourn the proceedings.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate to examine the above complaint under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, the relevant parts of which are as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201c3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; ...\u201d65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in appeal and cassation proceedings, the manner in which Article 6 \u00a7 1 and 3 (c) are to be applied depends upon the special features of the proceedings in question (see, mutatis mutandis, Hermi v. Italy [GC], no. 18114\/02, \u00a7 60, ECHR 2006\u2011XII, and Tripodi v.\u00a0Italy, 22 February 1994, \u00a7 27, Series A no. 281\u2011B). Account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings conducted in the domestic legal system, the role of the particular appellate court therein, and the manner in which the applicant\u2019s interests were actually presented and protected before it (ibid., \u00a7 27).66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that a State cannot be held responsible for every shortcoming on the part of a lawyer appointed for legal aid purposes or by the accused. Given the independence of the legal profession from the State, the conduct of the defence is essentially a matter between the defendant and his counsel, whether appointed under a legal aid scheme or privately financed (see Cuscani v. the United Kingdom, no. 32771\/96, \u00a7 39, 24 September 2002; Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2006\u2011II; and Plesic v. Italy (dec), no. 16065\/09, \u00a7 35, 2 July 2013).67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Italian Court of Cassation decides on points of law. Its proceedings are essentially written and at the hearing the appellant\u2019s counsel may only present arguments in relation to submissions already made in the appeal and statements.68.\u00a0\u00a0It also noteworthy that the applicant\u2019s counsel submitted a written appeal to the Court of Cassation and filed additional written submissions in a statement dated 28 October 2011. It appears that the Court of Cassation examined all the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant and dismissed them in a reasoned and duly motivated manner.69.\u00a0\u00a0Of further relevance is the fact that the applicant freely chose the lawyer to represent her in the proceedings before the Court of Cassation and signed a written consent to his participation in the strike. Finally, her counsel had ample notice of the date of the hearing but, notwithstanding this knowledge, it would appear that he did not take any action, such as ensuring that he was replaced on the day in question. In addition, he ought reasonably to have known that he could not expect an automatic adjournment of the proceedings on account of his absence (compare and contrast Vamvakas v.\u00a0Greece (no. 2), no. 2870\/11, 9 April 2015).70.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court cannot conclude that the applicant\u2019s rights were restricted to an extent that there was an infringement of the principles of a fair hearing established by Article\u00a06 of the Convention.71.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.D.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 9 of the Convention72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that her criminal conviction following the first set of proceedings entailed a violation her freedom of religion within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.2.\u00a0\u00a0Freedom to manifest one\u2019s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d73.\u00a0\u00a0She maintained that she was the founder of Opera di Ges\u00f9 Misericordioso, a religious association aimed at the worship and practice of the Catholic faith, through which she expressed her religious beliefs. In a vague manner, she argued that her criminal conviction by the domestic courts and the classification of the association as a criminal association constituted, in her view, an unjustified interference with the freedom to manifest her religion with its other members.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that while religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies freedom to manifest one\u2019s religion, alone and in private, or in community with others, in public and within the circle of those whose faith one shares. Article 9 lists the various forms which the manifestation of one\u2019s religion or beliefs may take, namely worship, teaching, practice and observance (see, mutatis mutandis, Cha\u2019are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], no. 27417\/95, \u00a7\u00a073, ECHR 2000-VII, and Leyla \u015eahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774\/98, \u00a7 105, ECHR 2005\u2011XI).75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the applicant has not elaborated on her claim, thus failing to explain with sufficient clarity which were the acts carried out in manifestation of her religion that were classified as criminal offences by the domestic courts and that, in her view, attracted the protection of Article\u00a09.76.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the considerations above, it must be concluded that the applicant\u2019s claim is generally unsubstantiated. Accordingly, it is manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible.For these reasons, the Court unanimouslyDeclares the application inadmissible.\u00a0\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 24 September 2015.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131,P\u00e4ivi Hirvel\u00e4Deputy RegistrarPresident","27460":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention63.\u00a0\u00a0 The applicant complained that his detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment as no adequate measures had been taken to accommodate his impaired hearing. Article 3 reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d64.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies available to him. He should have brought a civil action seeking compensation for the infringement of his personal rights, namely his dignity and health, under Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code, read in conjunction with Article\u00a0448 of that Code. This remedy was of a compensatory nature and might have offered financial redress for his suffering. Consequently, the Government invited the Court to reject this part of the application for non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. The Government did not refer to any examples of judicial practice in this connection.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that, when they submitted their observations in the present case, the civil proceedings were pending before the Szczecin Regional Court. It was primarily the role of the domestic court to adjudicate the case and rule on the applicant\u2019s compensation claim. The Government stated that they would therefore prefer to refrain from taking a position on the merits of the case, as it would have been premature.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that in the initial phase of his detention, to reduce the negative effects of his disability on his mental health, the applicant had been prescribed psychotropic drugs and had been regularly examined by a prison psychiatrist. He had also been examined by a laryngologist. However, later, because of consecutive transfers to different penal facilities, his medical treatment and supervision had been interrupted for significant periods of time.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the medical expert reports had demonstrated that the applicant\u2019s hearing was \u201csocially efficient\u201d with regard to his left ear, and that he suffered from practical deafness in his right ear. The use of a hearing aid could improve his hearing from only \u201csocially efficient\u201d to \u201cgood\u201d with regard to his left ear, but it would never be \u201cvery good\u201d or \u201cexcellent\u201d again. The applicant had one hearing aid at his disposal since April 2008 and hearing aids for both ears since 2011. He had not demonstrated that his hearing had deteriorated as a result of his detention. Nor had he shown that he suffered from any mental disorder resulting from his hearing difficulties. The medical treatment made available to him had been an adequate response to his personality disorder. Overall, his detention conditions had been adequate, as he had been imprisoned in small cells and had obtained prison leave on several occasions.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government averred that in 2007 the number of doctors\u2019 consultations per capita in the Polish civilian health care system amounted to 6.5 consultations per person. In the penal health care system this rate amounted to 14.3 consultations per detainee. Hence, detained persons had access to specialists more than twice as often as other patients, who had to cope with long waiting lists, both with respect to access to specialists and to hospital admissions. The waiting times sometimes amounted to months and years.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government concluded that the application was premature and that, in any event, there had been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the allegedly insufficient medical care the applicant had been receiving.70.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant averred that he had been refused adequate medical treatment during his detention. Despite the fact that he had informed the prison authorities of his hearing problems and about the deterioration of his hearing, the authorities had refused his requests for proper treatment and for leave on medical grounds. The applicant acknowledged that it was true that since April 2008 he had been using a replacement hearing aid; however, it was not appropriate for his condition. While his hearing had been classed as \u201csocially efficient\u201d, this assessment referred only to good acoustic conditions. Any environmental interference resulted in a reduced response.71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was of the view that the compensatory remedy relied on by the Government could by no means bring the result sought by him, namely the timely provision of adequate medical care and hearing aids.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not find it necessary to examine the Government\u2019s objection concerning the applicant\u2019s failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as the present complaint is in any event inadmissible for the reasons set out below.73.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. In considering whether treatment is \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a03, one of the factors which the Court will take into account is the question whether its object was to humiliate and debase the person concerned, although the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of Article 3 (see, among many other authorities, Price v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 33394\/96, \u00a7 24, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011VII; Peers v.\u00a0Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 67-68 and 74, ECHR\u00a02001\u2013III; and Engel v.\u00a0Hungary, no. 46857\/06, \u00a7 26, 20 May 2010).74.\u00a0\u00a0 Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to transfer him to a civil hospital, even if he is suffering from an illness that is particularly difficult to treat (see Mouisel v. France, no. 67263\/01, \u00a7 40, ECHR\u00a02002\u2011IX). However, this provision does require the State to ensure that prisoners are detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure does not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a094, ECHR 2000\u2011XI; S\u0142awomir Musia\u0142, cited above, \u00a7 86; and Kaprykowski, referred to above, \u00a7 69). There are three particular elements to be considered in relation to the compatibility of an applicant\u2019s health with his stay in detention: (a) the medical condition of the prisoner, (b) the adequacy of the medical assistance and care provided in detention, and (c) the advisability of maintaining the detention measure in view of the state of health of the applicant (see, among many other authorities, Mouisel v. France, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 40-42, and Rivi\u00e8re v. France, no. 33834\/03, \u00a7 63, 11 July 2006).75.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s condition, the Court notes that the applicant referred in general terms to feeling humiliated and debased as a result of his hearing problems. However, in so far as he intended to state that he was being humiliated or ill-treated by other detainees, such allegations have neither been supported by any evidence brought before the Court, nor even by reference to any actual incidents; nor has it been shown that they have ever been brought to the attention of the domestic authorities.76.\u00a0\u00a0Likewise, there is no evidence of any incident or positive intention to humiliate or debase the applicant on the part of the State authorities. The Court holds, therefore, that even though a prisoner with special needs is more vulnerable to the hardships of detention in view of his or her health problems, the treatment of the applicant in the circumstances of the present case did not reach the threshold of severity required to constitute degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see Vladimir Vasilyev v.\u00a0Russia, \u00a7 55, no. 28370\/05, \u00a010 January 2012; V.D. v. Romania, no.\u00a07078\/02, \u00a7 92, 16 February 2010 and Slyusarev v. Russia, no. 60333\/00, \u00a7\u00a043, 20 April 2010).77.\u00a0\u00a0No prima facie evidence was submitted to the Court to support a conclusion that the applicant\u2019s condition was of such severity as to be as such incompatible with his detention. The Court further considers it relevant to also take note of the fact that his compensation claim was dismissed by the civil court, which found no evidence to show that he had been attacked or ill-treated by inmates because of his bad hearing. It observes that the medical reports had certified that he could have some difficulties following conversations held in a noisy room between a number of people; that his hearing was \u201csocially efficient\u201d; that there was no evidence to show that his hearing had deteriorated during his detention; that a hearing aid could assist him in everyday life but could not be regarded as treating his condition; and that the refusals to provide him with a hearing aid at the public\u2019s expense did not result in the deterioration of his hearing, nor could be seen as humiliating or debasing treatment.78.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the adequacy of the medical assistance and care provided to the applicant, the Court observes that he started to serve his sentence on 10\u00a0July 2006. A hearing evaluation report prepared in June 2006, prior to his detention, confirmed that he had a hearing impairment. A subsequent report prepared in December 2006 demonstrated that his hearing had deteriorated. He was examined by various doctors \u2013 twice in 2006, on four occasions in 2007 and on nine occasions in 2008. A replacement hearing aid for one ear was issued to him by the Polish Association of the Deaf on 8\u00a0April 2008.79.\u00a0\u00a0It is further noted that during his leave granted to him on 3\u00a0February 2009 (see paragraphs 22 above and 82 below) the applicant obtained a hearing aid for his left ear which was partly paid for with public funds. The applicant failed to report to prison at the end of his leave. Once he was taken back to the prison by the police in February 2010, he asked the prison authorities to provide him with a hearing aid for his right ear. In December 2010 a laryngologist expressed the view that the applicant should be provided with also with a right ear hearing aid. On 1 March 2011 a medical certificate for the purposes of the applicant\u2019s next request for prison leave certified that he had been examined by laryngologists on several occasions. He was examined again by a laryngologist on 5 May 2011. These opinions differed as to whether there was a need to also provide him with a hearing aid for his right ear. Another consultation was therefore arranged on 29\u00a0August 2011 at the Szczecin Medical University. On 8 November 2011 the court granted the applicant a further six months\u2019 prison leave, having regard to his hearing problems and the need to address them outside the prison. Before the applicant left prison, he was provided with a hearing aid paid for by the detention facility.80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s attempts to institute criminal proceedings against the prison staff on suspicion of allegedly putting his life at risk were likewise unsuccessful essentially because the prosecution authorities observed that he had been under continuous medical care while in prison. Further, in its decision of 10 March 2008 the District Court held that a hearing aid was not absolutely necessary for the applicant. His hearing impairment made his detention more difficult, but it did not render it incompatible with his detention.81.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, the applicant\u2019s administrative complaints regarding the alleged failure to address his health problems were unsuccessful, as the authorities found that he was in fact under medical supervision and that laryngologists were of the view that it was not necessary for the applicant to have a hearing aid at the relevant time.82.\u00a0\u00a0As to whether the domestic authorities pondered the advisability of maintaining the detention in view of the applicant\u2019s state of health, it is noted that that on 15 September 2005 and 25 May 2006 the \u015awinouj\u015bcie District Court decided to postpone the start of his prison sentence, having regard to his health and the need for him to undergo appropriate medical treatment. The applicant has not shown to the Court\u2019s satisfaction that while at liberty, he took steps with a view to obtaining a hearing aid.It is further noted that on 3 February 2009 the applicant was granted further prison leave for a period of six months with a view to obtaining a hearing aid tailored specifically to his purposes. His leave was subsequently extended for another six months, the court having regard to the fact that he had not managed to obtain a hearing aid.Subsequently, on 8 November 2011 the court granted the applicant a further six-month prison leave, having regard to his hearing problems. The Court is therefore satisfied that the authorities repeatedly examined the compatibility of the applicant\u2019s condition with his maintained detention and on several occasions granted him leave on medical grounds.83.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Article 6 of the Convention84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that he had been deprived of his right to fair hearing in connection with the proceedings concerning the refusal of his request for prison leave submitted to the court on 5 July 2007. He alleged a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:\u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... fair hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201d85.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that Article 6 was not applicable to the proceedings concerned, as they were part of proceedings concerning the execution of criminal sentences (or \u201cpenal proceedings\u201d). Article 6 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention under its criminal head was therefore not applicable, as they did not serve the purpose of determining a criminal charge against an individual.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the Court usually requires penal proceedings to be of a \u201cpecuniary nature\u201d in order for them to fall under the civil head of Article 6 \u00a7 1. In particular, this provision under its civil head applied to criminal proceedings involving a determination of pecuniary claims asserted by the injured parties, or if they had an impact of the applicant\u2019s own reputation or that of their deceased relatives (see Brudnicka and Others v. Poland, no. 54723\/00, \u00a7\u00a724-34, ECHR 2005-11; Kurzac v.\u00a0Poland (dec), no. 31382\/96, 25 May 2000) and, even in the absence of such claims, to those criminal proceedings the outcome of which is decisive for the \u201ccivil right\u201d in question\u201d. The Convention did not confer any right to \u201cprivate revenge\u201d or to an actio popularis. Thus, the right to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence could be asserted independently (see, among other authorities, Perez v. France [GC], no.\u00a047287\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 65-67 and 71, ECHR 2004\u2011I). The present case also had to be distinguished from the case of Aerts v. Belgium (30 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011V) where the applicant was detained for seven months in the psychiatric wing of an ordinary prison, rather than in a social protection centre designated by the relevant mental health authority. The Court considered that the Aerts case did not involve the \u201cdetermination of a criminal charge\u201d, but held that Article 6 \u00a7 1 was applicable under its civil head as the applicant had sought compensation.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Government concluded that Article 6 was not applicable to the proceedings held in November 2007 and January 2008 concerning the applicant\u2019s request for prison leave.88.\u00a0\u00a0They further submitted that, in any event, the applicant had failed to make a formal request to be brought before the penal court prior to the hearing held on 20 November 2007.89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit his observations on this aspect of the case.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the proceedings for the applicant\u2019s release on probation did not involve the determination of his criminal charge, it having already been determined by his final conviction. The Court concludes therefore that the criminal limb of Article 6 \u00a7 1 does not come into play (see Enea v. Italy [GC], no. 74912\/01, \u00a7 97). Furthermore, the Court has already determined that complaints regarding proceedings seeking early release from prison, such as those conducted in the present case under the provisions of the Polish Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, were incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) (see Boulois v. Luxembourg [GC], no.\u00a037575\/04, \u00a7\u00a082\u2011105, ECHR 2012; and Pawlak v. Poland (dec.), no.\u00a073620\/10, 2\u00a0April 2013).91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not deem it necessary to ascertain whether the proceedings concerning a request to be granted prison leave instituted by the applicant concerned a \u201cdispute\u201d over a \u201cright\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1, or whether this alleged right was \u201ccivil\u201d in nature, for the following reasons (see, for the same approach in the context of proceedings for release on probation, Bogus\u0142aw Krawczak v. Poland, no. 24205\/06, \u00a7\u00a096-100, 31\u00a0May 2011, and Karabin v. Poland, \u00a7\u00a052\u201155, no.\u00a029254\/06, 7\u00a0January 2014).92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes, firstly, that he has not shown that he submitted a request to be brought before the penal court for the hearing held on 20\u00a0November 2007. It is further noted that he had his request for leave examined by domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction. The courts dismissed his request referring to the relevant medical certificates. The impugned decisions do not disclose any appearance of arbitrariness or unfairness on their part (see paragraphs 15\u00a0and 18 above). The crucial issue to be determined was whether the applicant\u2019s condition was so bad at that time that it was impossible to have it treated by the prison health services. The courts had his medical records before them, and made their decision with reference to the medical certificates drawn up by the doctors.93.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above circumstances, the Court concludes that the applicant was not deprived of his \u201cright to a fair ... hearing\u201d required by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.94.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the complaint regarding the unfairness of the proceedings for prison leave is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a04.C.\u00a0\u00a0Other alleged violations of the Convention95.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the State authorities had failed to manage his apartment during his detention and did not do anything to prevent him becoming increasingly in debt from overdue rent.96.\u00a0\u00a0 The applicant informed the Court that on the day of his arrest he had been transported to his apartment under police escort and had had the opportunity to secure it properly. The Court therefore cannot accept that any further obligations arose on the part of the State authorities in respect of the applicant\u2019s apartment under Article 8, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 or any other Convention provision.97.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.98.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 24 September 2015.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Guido RaimondiDeputy RegistrarPresident","27461":"20.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of her complaint concerning the conditions in Sveti Ivan Rilski State Psychiatric Hospital the applicant relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions21.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as she had not brought a claim for damages under section 1 of the State and Municipalities Liability for Damage Act 1988 or a general tort claim under sections 45 and 49 of the Obligations and Contracts Act 1951. They referred to a number of judgments and decisions in which the Court had accepted that a claim under section 1 of the 1988 Act was an effective domestic remedy in respect of poor conditions of detention in prisons and pre-trial detention facilities in Bulgaria, and to many domestic decisions allowing such claims. Since the applicant\u2019s case, although concerning conditions in a psychiatric hospital, was analogous to those cases, it was open to her to likewise raise her grievances relating to the conditions of her detention by means of such a claim, directed either against the hospital or against the Ministry of Health. In support of that assertion, the Government referred to two decisions in which the Bulgarian courts had held that State psychiatric hospitals could be held liable under section 1 of the 1988 Act for unlawful detention, and to decisions in which such hospitals had been found liable under section 49 of the 1951 Act.22.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that a claim under the 1988 Act did not provide reliable protection against breaches of the Convention and that such a claim would not have secured her release from the hospital.23.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the substance of the complaint, the Government argued that the conditions in which the applicant had been kept in Sveti Ivan Rilski State Psychiatric Hospital had not reached the minimum level of severity to be regarded as inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. They pointed out that after her admission to the hospital, the applicant\u2019s mental health had rapidly improved, to the point that it had been possible quickly to relax the initial strict regime under which she had been placed, grant her home leave, and then continue her treatment as an outpatient, with the result that the amount of time that she had spent in the impugned conditions had been rather limited. According to the Government, the applicant\u2019s allegations with regard to the conditions in the hospital were subjective, untrustworthy and unsupported by evidence. In particular, her allegations that it had been very cold were contradicted by temperature readings carried out by staff at the time of her stay there. The staff\u2019s attitude to her had been very good, she had been allowed to move freely around, and had been provided with the necessary medication. The Government also noted that the hospital had undergone renovation works in 2012 and 2013, and that it was not as inaccessible as the applicant made it out to be. They went on to say that the purpose of the applicant\u2019s detention had not been to subject her to ill\u2011treatment but to provide her with medical care.24.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that in the course of her stay in the hospital she had been treated as an object and that the conditions there had been miserable. Cold and hunger had been driving the patients to steal clothes, shoes and food from each other; this had forced her mother to visit her every other day. She had had to put on two coats to keep warm, but her hands had still been very cold. She had developed a common cold and was coughing, but had not been given any medication for that. On one occasion she had been attacked by another patient but had not complained in writing because the orderlies mistreated patients who did so. She had also been threatened with being placed in the isolation unit.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment25.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, it is not necessary to determine whether the applicant has complied with the requirement under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention to exhaust domestic remedies with respect to her complaint about the conditions of her detention because this complaint is in any event manifestly ill-founded, for the reasons that follow.26.\u00a0\u00a0The general principles governing the assessment of conditions of detention in psychiatric institutions by reference to Article 3 of the Convention were recently summarised in Stanev v. Bulgaria ([GC], no.\u00a036760\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 201-06, ECHR 2012), and there is no need to repeat them here.27.\u00a0\u00a0It is, on the other hand, important to point out that the Court\u2019s task in these proceedings does not consist in assessing whether the psychiatric hospital in which the applicant was confined for compulsory treatment was properly equipped, fit for its intended purpose, and corresponding to all requirements for the operation of such hospitals under Bulgarian law. The Court must rather examine the specific conditions in which the applicant was kept and decide whether their effect on her was such as to be regarded as inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. So, while having regard to the findings of the Ombudsman \u2011 which provide a description, as of June 2012, of the general situation in the hospital \u2013 the Court will focus on the applicant\u2019s individual situation, as it was at the relevant time, and on the extent to which she was personally affected by the failings noted by the Ombudsman (see, mutatis mutandis, Narcisio v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 47810\/99, 27 January 2005, and Ivanova-Sokolova v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 26057\/04, 29 April 2008).28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was admitted to the hospital on 22 February 2012. Although her compulsory treatment there was to continue for two months, until 22 April, after 29 March it continued on an outpatient basis, and she was only required to remain in the hospital during the day for medication and therapy and could go home at night. It should in addition be noted that between 15 and 17 March the applicant was granted home leave. Her detention in allegedly inhuman and degrading conditions thus lasted a total of one month and four days.29.\u00a0\u00a0The available information and in particular the Ombudsman\u2019s report show that the general conditions in the hospital were far from satisfactory. However, it cannot be overlooked that the applicant did not specify in what way the particular failings identified in that report affected her during her stay there. For instance, it does not appear that the hospital\u2019s location prevented the applicant from being visited by her relatives \u2013 indeed, her mother apparently visited her quite frequently. Nor is there any indication that the hospital\u2019s lack of proper medical equipment affected the applicant in any particular way, for instance by rendering impossible any required medical procedures. The same goes for the limited number of bathrooms and toilets (two for up to thirty-five patients): the applicant did not specify whether she was prevented from using those facilities or had difficulties accessing them. Indeed, except for her allegations of low temperatures, the applicant did not describe with any particularity the conditions in which she was kept (see, mutatis mutandis, P\u016bce v. Latvia (dec.), no. 38068\/08, \u00a7 34, 9\u00a0December 2014), and even those allegations are to some extent contradicted by the three temperature readings provided by the Government, whose accuracy she did not contest.30.\u00a0\u00a0It is true that it might be unreasonable to expect mentally disturbed persons to give a detailed and coherent description of what they have experienced in the course of their detention (see Aerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, \u00a7 66, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V). It is also true that detailed information relating to conditions of detention often falls within the exclusive knowledge of the domestic authorities, and that applicants might experience difficulties in procuring evidence in relation to that. Still, they can be expected to submit at least an account of the circumstances they have experienced and provide, to the greatest extent possible, some evidence in support of their allegations (see Krempl v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 6427\/10, 25\u00a0June 2013). In this case, this could also have been done by the applicant\u2019s mother, who represented her in the proceedings before the Court and who visited her in the hospital on a number of occasions.31.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the applicant\u2019s and her mother\u2019s claim that the conditions in which the applicant was kept were so poor as to amount to inhuman and degrading treatment should be treated with some caution because the two of them might have a tendency to exaggerate their inadequacy on account of their negative attitude towards an establishment in which they considered the applicant should have never been detained (see B. v. the United Kingdom, no. 6870\/75, Commission\u2019s report of 7 October 1981, Decisions and Reports 32, p. 29, \u00a7\u00a7 174 and 175, and Sabeva v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a044290\/07, \u00a7 41, 10 June 2010).32.\u00a0\u00a0Most importantly, all of these matters must be seen against the backdrop of the relatively limited amount of time spent by the applicant in detention in the hospital \u2013 a little over a month. This is a far cry from the situation obtaining in Stanev (cited above, \u00a7 210), where the applicant had been kept in poor conditions for about seven years.33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the applicant could have experienced inconvenience as a result of the poor conditions in the hospital. However, in view of the above considerations it is not persuaded that those conditions were so harsh as to reach the threshold of severity required to bring them within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention.34.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the incident on 29 February 2012 in which the applicant was assaulted by another patient in the shower, it is in the first place open to doubt whether the treatment to which she was subjected \u2013 a push in the chest \u2013 could be regarded as inhuman and degrading.35.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, while it is clear that the authorities have an obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to take reasonable steps to protect a detainee from inhuman and degrading treatment inflicted by other detainees, especially if they have reason to believe that the detainee is particularly vulnerable \u2013 for instance because he or she is suffering from a psychological disorder (see Pantea v. Romania, no. 33343\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 189-92, 3 June 2003), is of young age (see Premininy v. Russia, no. 44973\/04, \u00a7 86, 10 February 2011), or belongs to a category that is at heightened risk (see Rodi\u0107 and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 22893\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 69-70, 27 May 2008 (Serbs convicted of war crimes against Bosniacs and kept, unsegregated, in a prison where about ninety per cent of inmates were Bosniacs); Stasi v.\u00a0France, no. 25001\/07, \u00a7 91, 20 October 2011 (homosexuals); J.L.\u00a0v.\u00a0Latvia, no. 23893\/06, \u00a7 68, 17 April 2012 (police collaborators); Aleksejeva v. Latvia (dec.), no. 21780\/07, \u00a7 34, 3 July 2012 (relatives of prison guards); Starovoitovs v. Latvia (dec.), no. 27343\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 35-38, 27\u00a0November 2012 (private security guards); D.F. v. Latvia, no. 11160\/07, \u00a7\u00a081, 29 October 2013 (sexual offenders); Totolici v. Romania, no.\u00a026576\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 48-49, 14 January 2014 (police officers); and M.C.\u00a0v.\u00a0Poland, no. 23692\/09, \u00a7 90, 3 March 2015 (persons accused of sexually abusing minors)) \u2013 or to believe that the other detainees have an increased propensity to violence (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 57-60, ECHR 2002-II, and Oshurko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 33108\/05, \u00a7 72, 8 September 2011), there is no evidence \u2011 and the applicant has not elaborated on that point either \u2013 that in her case the hospital staff knew or ought to have known that she stood a real risk of being assaulted by the other patient in the shower. The incident, which the applicant has not described in detail, was apparently not very serious, brief in duration, and a one-off (see, mutatis mutandis, Tautkus v.\u00a0Lithuania, no. 29474\/09, \u00a7 58, 27 November 2012, and contrast Premininy, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 79, 80 and 86, and Oshurko, cited above, \u00a7 72), and the applicant did not call for help while it was taking place. It is also significant in this connection that there is no indication that after the applicant and her mother informed the nursing staff about the incident the next day, the applicant was ever again assaulted by other patients. It cannot therefore be said that the authorities failed in their duty to take reasonable steps to prevent her from being ill-treated by other patients.36.\u00a0\u00a0Nor is the Court persuaded that any anxiety on the part of the applicant caused by the risk of further attacks by other patients reached a level of severity that brought it within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention (see Aleksejeva, cited above, \u00a7 40, and contrast Alexandru Marius Radu v. Romania, no. 34022\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 48-49, 21 July 2009). The incident appears to have been minor, and the hospital staff reassured the applicant after it. Moreover, the period of time between the incident and the applicant\u2019s subsequent discharge as an outpatient was only a month (contrast D.F. v. Latvia, cited above, \u00a7 95, where the relevant period was more than a year).37.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 24 September 2015.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Guido Raimondi\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident","27464":"I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY QUESTION36.\u00a0\u00a0In a document of 9 July 2013 containing additional observations and submissions on just satisfaction, the Government for the first time raised an objection that domestic remedies had not been exhausted. They drew attention to the provision of Article 13 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, to the effect that: \u201can alien may ... lodge an appeal against a deportation or removal order with the Justice of the Peace for the place where the authority ordering the measure is based\u201d (see paragraph 27 above). In their submission, the applicants had not availed themselves of that remedy.37.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations of 23 May 2013, in reply to the Government\u2019s first observations, the applicants noted that in the last paragraph of the latter document of 25 September 2012, the Government had merely asked the Court to \u201cdeclare the application inadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 1\u201d without indicating the remedies that should have been exhausted. Under those circumstances, the applicants argued, the Government were precluded from raising an objection as to non-exhaustion.In any event, the applicants claimed that they had never had the possibility of challenging the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty in the Italian courts.As to the possibility of filing a criminal complaint for a breach of their Convention rights in the criminal courts, they argued that such a remedy was not an effective one because it had no suspensive effect.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, under Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, any plea of inadmissibility must be raised by the respondent Contracting Party, in so far as the nature of the objection and the circumstances so allow, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application (see N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952\/94, \u00a7 44, ECHR 2002-X). In the present case, the Government did not clearly raise an objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in their observations of 25 September 2013 on the admissibility and merits, because they merely argued therein that the Court should declare the application \u201cinadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 1\u201d without indicating the ground of inadmissibility or, at that stage, the remedy that should have been used. The question of a failure by the applicants to lodge an appeal before the Justice of the Peace against the refusal-of-entry orders was raised only in the document containing additional observations and submissions on just satisfaction. The Government did not provide any explanation for that delay and the Court cannot find any exceptional circumstance capable of exempting them from their obligation to raise any objection to admissibility in a timely manner (see, mutatis mutandis, Dhahbi v. Italy, no. 17120\/09, \u00a7 24, 8 April 2014, and G.C.\u00a0v. Italy, no. 73869\/10, \u00a7 36, 22 April 2014).39.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government are precluded from relying on a failure to exhaust domestic remedies.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had been deprived of their liberty in a manner that was incompatible with Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(a)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;(b)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;(d)\u00a0\u00a0the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;(e)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201d41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Compatibility ratione materiae of the complaint with the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government began by arguing that Article\u00a05 was inapplicable in the present case. They asserted that the Italian authorities had identified the applicants in accordance with the relevant Italian and European rules. That fact had not been disputed by the applicants. Secondly, the migrants had been accommodated in a CSPA, which was not a detention centre, but a centre for initial rescue and assistance (particularly in terms of health and personal hygiene) for all the migrants who had arrived in Italy in 2011. Legal advice, including on the asylum application procedures, had been provided by the organisations present in the CSPA. The applicants had subsequently been transferred to the ships Vincent and Audace \u2013 which had to be regarded as the \u201cnatural extension of the CSPA\u201d of Lampedusa \u2013 on account of the arson attack that other migrants had carried out in the CSPA two or three days after the applicants\u2019 arrival there. Faced with a situation of humanitarian and logistical emergency, the Italian authorities had been forced to find new reception facilities, which in the Government\u2019s view could not be regarded as places of detention or arrest.43.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Government contended that the applicants had not been arrested or detained, but \u201cmerely [rescued] at sea and taken to the island of Lampedusa to assist them and to ensure their physical safety\u201d. They explained that the law had obliged the authorities to rescue and identify the applicants, who were in Italian territorial waters when their vessels had been intercepted by the coastguard. Any measure taken against the applicants could not, in the Government\u2019s view, be regarded as an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. They argued that, quite the contrary, the measures had been necessary to deal with a humanitarian emergency and to strike a fair balance between the safety of the migrants and that of the local inhabitants.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants\u2019 reply44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants acknowledged that, under Italian law, the CSPA was not designed for detention but for reception. They argued, however, that this fact did not preclude the conclusion that, in concreto, they had been deprived of their liberty in the Lampedusa CSPA and on the ships Vincent and Audace. In that connection, they observed that they had been prohibited from leaving those facilities, which had been under constant police surveillance. This had been confirmed by the reports of the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee (see paragraph 34 above) and by the Senate\u2019s Special Commission (see paragraph 31 above). The latter had reported prolonged periods of confinement, an inability to communicate with the outside world and a lack of freedom of movement.(c)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in proclaiming the right to liberty, Article 5 \u00a7 1 contemplates the physical liberty of the person and its aim is to ensure that no one should be dispossessed of this liberty in an arbitrary fashion. (see Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no. 30471\/08, \u00a7\u00a0125, 22 September 2009). The difference between deprivation of liberty and restrictions on freedom of movement under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance. Although the process of classification into one or other of these categories sometimes proves to be no easy task, in that some borderline cases are a matter of pure opinion, the Court cannot avoid making the selection upon which the applicability or inapplicability of Article 5 depends (see Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, \u00a7\u00a7 92-93, Series A no. 39). In order to determine whether someone has been deprived of his liberty, the starting-point must be his or her concrete situation, and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, \u00a7 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, and Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a036760\/06, \u00a7 115, ECHR 2012).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court begins by noting that the Government have not disputed the applicants\u2019 allegation (see paragraphs 8 and 44 above) that they were prohibited from leaving the Lampedusa CSPA and the ships Vincent and Audace, which had been under constant police surveillance. Moreover, in paragraph 54 of its report published on 30\u00a0September 2011 (see paragraph 34 above), the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee found that \u201c[d]espite the authorities\u2019 claim that the Tunisians were not detainees because they were not in cells, ... the conditions to which they were subjected [in the Contrada Imbriacola centre] were similar to detention and deprivation of freedom\u201d. It also stated that the migrants were, \u201c[i]n practice, ... imprisoned there without access to a judge\u201d (see paragraph 55 of the report).47.\u00a0\u00a0The Senate\u2019s Special Commission, for its part, referred to the \u201cprolonged confinement\u201d, \u201cinability to communicate with the outside world\u201d and \u201clack of freedom of movement\u201d of the migrants placed in the Lampedusa reception centres (see paragraph 31 above). The applicants rightly emphasised these points (see paragraph 44 above).48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government did not provide any evidence to suggest that the applicants were free to leave the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola. In this connection it observes that the applicants pointed out that after the fire of 20 September 2011 they had managed to evade the police surveillance and reach the village of Lampedusa. However, they had then apparently been stopped by the police and taken back to the reception centre (see paragraph 9 above). The Government did not deny that version of events, according to which the applicants were being held at the CSPA involuntarily (see, mutatis mutandis, Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 127).49.\u00a0\u00a0Similar considerations apply to the ships Vincent and Audace, which, according to the Government themselves, were to be regarded as the \u201cnatural extension of the CSPA\u201d (see paragraph 42 above).50.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court cannot agree with the Government\u2019s argument that the applicants were neither arrested nor detained but \u201cmerely [rescued] at sea and taken to the island of Lampedusa to assist them and to ensure their physical safety\u201d (see paragraph 43 above). The Court finds, on the contrary, that the applicants\u2019 placement in the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola and on the ships can be regarded as a \u201cdeprivation of liberty\u201d having regard to the restrictions imposed on the applicants by the authorities and in spite of the nature of the classification of that placement under domestic law (see, mutatis mutandis, Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0126-127). It thus finds that the applicants were deprived of their liberty.51.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that Article 5 of the Convention is applicable and that the Government\u2019s objection as to the incompatibility ratione materiae of that complaint with the Convention must be dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Other admissibility conditions52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants observed that for 12 days, or 9 days, depending on the case, they had been held in closed facilities under constant police surveillance with the aim of \u201cpreventing them from unlawfully entering\u201d Italy. However, they argued that the authorities had not acted in accordance with the law, because no refusal-of-entry or removal procedure compliant with domestic law had been initiated against them; instead they had been returned using a simplified procedure provided for by an agreement of 2011 between Italy and Tunisia (see paragraphs 28-30 above). They emphasised that their deprivation of liberty had not been based on any judicial decision.54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants explained that under Italian law (Article 14 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 \u2013 see paragraph 27 above), the only legal form of deprivation of liberty of an unlawful migrant was placement in a CIE, subject to judicial supervision, as required by Article 5 of the Convention. By using the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola as a detention centre Italy had removed the applicants\u2019 deprivation of liberty from any judicial supervision. The same could be said of their confinement on board the ships.55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also observed that the treatment to which they had been subjected could not be justified on the basis of Article 10 \u00a7 2 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (see paragraph 27 above), which provided for so-called \u201cdeferred\u201d refusal of entry when an alien had entered Italy \u201cfor purposes of public assistance\u201d. The above-cited Article 10 made no mention of deprivation of liberty or of any procedure for a possible confinement measure. In the applicants\u2019 submission, unlike the system provided for in other States, in Italy only confinement in a CIE had a legal basis (Article 14 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998). Any other form of confinement of an unlawful migrant, as in the present case, had to be regarded as illegal and therefore as incompatible with Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.56.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Government had argued that the situation complained of had been prompted by an emergency or a state of absolute necessity, the applicants claimed that the real source of the problems on the island had been the political decision to concentrate the confinement of aliens on Lampedusa. In their view there was no insurmountable organisational difficulty preventing the authorities from organising a regular service for the transfer of migrants to other places in Italy. Moreover, they explained that to deprive aliens of their liberty without judicial supervision was not permitted by any domestic legislation, even in an emergency, adding that Italy had not exercised its right of derogation under Article 15 of the Convention.57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants lastly argued that, in spite of repeated criticisms from various national and international institutions, the processing of arriving migrants as described in the application was still the practice of the Italian authorities, with the result that there was a structural violation of the migrants\u2019 fundamental right to liberty.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government58.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, the facts of the case did not fall within the scope of sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, as the applicants had not been held pending deportation or extradition, but had on the contrary been temporarily allowed to enter Italy. In that connection, the Government pointed out that they had been accommodated in a CSPA, and not sent to a CIE. They explained that the legal conditions for placing the applicants in a CIE had not been fulfilled; accordingly, no additional verification of their identity had been necessary.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that, as the preliminary investigations judge of Palermo had indicated in his decision of 1 June 2012 (see paragraphs 19-24 above), the applicable domestic provisions did not expressly provide for the adoption of a measure of confinement against migrants placed in a CSPA (such a measure, under the supervision of a Justice of the Peace, was applicable, by contrast, to migrants in a CIE). However, they explained that the presence of the migrants in the CSPA had been duly registered. Moreover, each of the migrants had been issued with a refusal-of-entry and return order, mentioning the date of their unlawful entry into Italy. Those decisions had been duly notified to the applicants. They had not been subject to review by a Justice of the Peace because such review was provided for only in cases of removal and deportation (not refusal of entry).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 \u00a7 1 contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of those grounds. Moreover, only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty (see, among many other authorities, Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, \u00a7\u00a025, Reports 1997-IV, and Velinov v.\u00a0the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no.\u00a016880\/08, \u00a7 49, 19 September 2013).61.\u00a0\u00a0One of the exceptions, contained in subparagraph (f), permits the State to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a013229\/03, \u00a7\u00a043, ECHR 2008; A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a03455\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 162-163, ECHR 2009; and Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0128).62.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) does not require the detention to be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent the individual from committing an offence or fleeing. However, any deprivation of liberty under the second limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) will be justified as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 164).63.\u00a0\u00a0The deprivation of liberty must also be \u201clawful\u201d. Where the \u201clawfulness\u201d of detention is in issue, including the question whether \u201ca procedure prescribed by law\u201d has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. It requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of Article\u00a05, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, \u00a7 63, Series A no. 244, and L.M. v. Slovenia, no. 32863\/05, \u00a7 121, 12 June 2014). In laying down that any deprivation of liberty must be effected \u201cin accordance with a procedure prescribed by law\u201d, Article 5 \u00a7 1 primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law. However, these words do not merely refer back to domestic law. They also relate to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all Articles of the Convention (see Amuur, cited above, \u00a7 50, and Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0130).64.\u00a0\u00a0On this last point, the Court stresses that where deprivation of liberty is concerned it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of \u201clawfulness\u201d set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person \u2013 if need be, with appropriate advice \u2013 to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see Baranowski v.\u00a0Poland, no. 28358\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 50-52, ECHR 2000-III; Je\u010dius v.\u00a0Lithuania, no.\u00a034578\/97, \u00a7 56, ECHR 2000-IX; and Mooren v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a011364\/03, \u00a7 76, 9 July 2009).65.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is only justified where other, less severe measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest which might require that the person concerned be detained. That means that it is not sufficient for the deprivation of liberty to be executed in conformity with national law, it must also be necessary in the circumstances (see Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629\/95, \u00a7\u00a078, ECHR 2000-III, and Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 143).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court begins by noting the Government\u2019s view that the applicants were not awaiting deportation or extradition and that the facts of the case did not therefore fall within sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 of the Convention, authorising a person\u2019s \u201clawful arrest or detention ... to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country\u201d or against whom \u201cdeportation or extradition\u201d proceedings are pending (see paragraph 58 above).The Government did not, however, indicate under which other sub-paragraph of Article 5 the deprivation of the applicants\u2019 liberty could be justified.67.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has previously had occasion to find (see paragraph 60 above), the list of permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty is exhaustive. This means that any deprivation of liberty which does not fall within any of the sub-paragraphs of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention will inevitably breach that provision.68.\u00a0\u00a0However, in spite of the Government\u2019s allegations, the Court is in the present case prepared to accept that the deprivation of the applicants\u2019 freedom fell within sub-paragraph (f) of the Article 5 \u00a7 1. In that connection it observes that the applicants had unlawfully entered Italy and that a procedure was initiated to identify and return them.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the parties agree in saying that Italian law does not expressly provide for the confinement of migrants who, like the applicants, are placed in a CSPA (see paragraphs 54-55 and 59 above). It is true that Article 14 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (see paragraph 27 above) provides for a measure of confinement. But that type of confinement applies only when it is necessary to provide assistance to the alien, to conduct additional identity checks, or to wait for travel documents or the availability of a carrier. That was not the situation in the present case. Furthermore, the aliens to which such confinement is applicable are placed in a CIE by an administrative decision under the supervision of the Justice of the Peace. The applicants, however, were placed in a CSPA and no formal decision to hold them in confinement had been taken. On that point, it is noteworthy that in his decision of 1 June 2012, the preliminary investigations judge of Palermo stated that the Office of the Commissioner of Police of Agrigento had merely recorded the presence of the migrants in the CSPA without ordering their placement and that the same was true for the migrants\u2019 transfer to the ships (see paragraphs\u00a020-21 above).70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes from the foregoing that the deprivation of liberty in question was devoid of legal basis.This finding is corroborated by the Senate\u2019s Special Commission, which, in its report approved on 6\u00a0March 2012 (see paragraph 31 above), noted that stays at the Lampedusa centre, which in principle should be limited to the time strictly necessary to establish the migrant\u2019s identity and the lawfulness of his presence in Italy, sometimes extended to over twenty days \u201cwithout there being any formal decision as to the legal status of the person being held\u201d. According to the Special Commission, such prolonged confinement, \u201cwithout any legal or administrative measure\u201d providing for such it, had led to \u201cheightened tension\u201d. It should also be noted that the PACE Ad Hoc Committee expressly recommended that the Italian authorities \u201cclarify the legal basis for the de facto detention in the reception centres in Lampedusa\u201d, and where Tunisians in particular were concerned, that they should only \u201ckeep irregular migrants in administrative detention under a procedure prescribed by law, authorised by a judicial authority and subject to periodic judicial review\u201d (see paragraph 92, points (vi) and (vii), of the report published on 30 September 2011 \u2013 paragraph 34 above).71.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, even supposing that the applicants\u2019 confinement had been provided for by a bilateral agreement with Tunisia, the Court notes that the agreement in question could not give that confinement a sufficient legal basis for the purposes of Article 5 of the Convention. The content of that agreement has not been made public (see paragraph 29 above) and was not accessible to those concerned, who could not therefore have foreseen the consequences of its application (see, in particular, the case-law cited in paragraphs 63-64 above). In addition, there is nothing to indicate that the said agreement provided for satisfactory guarantees against arbitrariness (see, for example and mutatis mutandis, Nasrulloyev v. Russia, no. 656\/06, \u00a7 77, 11 October 2007).72.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the deprivation of the applicants\u2019 liberty did not satisfy the general principle of legal certainty and was not compatible with the aim of protecting the individual against arbitrariness. It cannot therefore be regarded as \u201clawful\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Accordingly, there has been a violation of that provision in the present case.73.\u00a0\u00a0This finding dispenses the Court from having to ascertain whether the deprivation of the applicants\u2019 liberty was necessary in the circumstances of the case (see, in particular, the case-law cited in paragraph 65 above).III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 2 OF THE CONVENTION74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained about the lack of any kind of communication with the Italian authorities throughout their stay in Italy.They relied on Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c2.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.\u201d75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed that allegation.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court noted that the present complaint is related to that examined above and must therefore also be declared admissible.A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants observed that the refusal-of-entry orders had been adopted only at the time of the enforcement of their return, and thus only at the end of the period of detention. Consequently, they took the view that, even supposing that those orders had been notified to them, the guarantee of being informed \u201cpromptly\u201d under Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Convention had not been observed. In addition, they explained, those orders had merely set out in a summary and standardised manner the legal basis for the return, but made no mention, not even implicitly, of the reasons for their detention.78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further took the view that the information provided for in Article 5 \u00a7 2 had to emanate from the authority carrying out the arrest or placement in detention \u2013 or, in any event, from official sources. The fact that members of non-governmental organisations had been able to communicate with the migrants on this subject could not, in their view, satisfy the requirements of that provision.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicants had been informed in a language which they understood, by police officers present on the island, assisted by interpreters and cultural mediators, of their status, which was that of Tunisian citizens temporarily admitted to Italian territory for reasons of \u201cpublic assistance\u201d, in accordance with Article 10 \u00a7 2 (b) of Legislative Decree no.\u00a0286 of 1998 (see paragraph 27 above). In their view, that status had automatically entailed the applicants\u2019 return to Tunisia, as provided for, they argued, in the refusal-of-entry and return order. In any event, the members of the organisations which had access to the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola had informed the migrants about their situation.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles80.\u00a0\u00a0Paragraph 2 of Article 5 lays down an elementary safeguard: any person arrested should know why he is being deprived of his liberty. This provision is an integral part of the scheme of protection afforded by Article\u00a05: any person arrested must be told, in simple, non-technical language that he can understand, the essential legal and factual grounds for his deprivation of liberty, so as to be able to apply to a court to challenge its lawfulness in accordance with paragraph 4 (see Van der Leer v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1990, \u00a7 28, Series A no. 170-A, and L.M. v. Slovenia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 142-143). Whilst this information must be conveyed \u201cpromptly\u201d, it need not be related in its entirety by the arresting officer at the very moment of the arrest. Whether the content and promptness of the information conveyed were sufficient is to be assessed in each case according to its special features (see Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, \u00a7 40, Series\u00a0A no. 182).81.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court has previously held that the requirement of prompt information is to be given an autonomous meaning extending beyond the realm of criminal law measures (see Van der Leer, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 27-28, and L.M.\u00a0v.\u00a0Slovenia, cited above, \u00a7 143).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants left Tunisia on rudimentary vessels heading for the Italian coast (see paragraph 6 above). They had no entry visas and the very nature of their journey to Italy reflected their intention to circumvent immigration laws. Moreover, the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Commission observed that the Tunisians with whom its members had spoken \u201cwere perfectly aware that they had entered Italian territory illegally\u201d (see paragraph 56 of the report published on 30\u00a0September 2011 \u2013 paragraph 34 above). In addition, the applicants did not expressly contradict the Government\u2019s statement (see paragraph 79 above) to the effect that they had been informed, in a language they understood, about the status they were supposed to have in the view of the national authorities, namely that of Tunisian citizens temporarily admitted to Italy for purposes of \u201cpublic assistance\u201d within the meaning of Article 10 \u00a7 2 (b) of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would note, however that mere information as to the legal status of a migrant does not satisfy the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, in accordance with which the legal and factual grounds for deprivation of liberty have to be notified to the person concerned. The Court has already concluded, under the first paragraph of that Article, that in the present case the deprivation of the applicants\u2019 liberty had been devoid of legal basis in Italian law (see paragraph 70 above).84.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the Government failed to produce any official document addressed to the applicants indicating the factual and legal grounds for their confinement (see, mutatis mutandis, Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7 138; Moghaddas v. Turkey, no.\u00a046134\/08, \u00a7 46, 15\u00a0February 2011; Athary v. Turkey, no. 50372\/09, \u00a7 36, 11 December 2012; and Musaev v. Turkey, no. 72754\/11, \u00a7 35, 21 October 2014). On this point it should be noted that the refusal-of-entry orders (see paragraph 14 above) merely stated that the applicants had \u201centered the territory of the country by evading the border controls\u201d and that they had been refused leave to enter. The orders made no mention of the confinement to which they had been subjected. Lastly, those orders were apparently addressed to the applicants on 27 and 29 September 2011, respectively, although they had been placed in the CSPA on 17 and 18 September. Consequently, not only was the information incomplete and insufficient for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 2, it had not been provided \u201cpromptly\u201d (see, in particular and mutatis mutandis, Shamayev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 416, and L.M. v. Slovenia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0145, where the Court found that an interval of four days had to be regarded as falling outside the constraints of time imposed by the notion of promptness for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 2).85.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION86.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that at no time had they been able to challenge the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty.They relied on Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201d87.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed that allegation.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the present complaint is related to those examined above and must therefore also be declared admissible.A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not deny that there had been a possibility of appealing against the refusal-of-entry orders, but claimed that they had not been able to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. No decision justifying their deprivation of liberty had been notified to them; accordingly, it had not been open to them to challenge any such decision in a court. In addition, the refusal-of-entry orders had not concerned their liberty, but rather their removal, and had been adopted at the end of their period of detention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government90.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the refusal-of-entry orders had indicated that it was open to the applicants to lodge an appeal with the Justice of the Peace in Agrigento. Some other Tunisian migrants had in fact used that remedy, and in 2011 the Justice of the Peace had annulled two refusal-of-entry orders (see paragraph 26 above) as a result. The Government concluded that the applicants had certainly had the possibility of applying to a court to challenge the lawfulness of their alleged deprivation of liberty.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 \u00a7 4 entitles detained persons to institute proceedings for a review of compliance with the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the \u201clawfulness\u201d, in Convention terms, of their deprivation of liberty. The notion of \u201clawfulness\u201d under paragraph 4 of Article 5 has the same meaning as in paragraph 1, such that a detained person is entitled to a review of the \u201clawfulness\u201d of his detention in the light not only of the requirements of domestic law but also of the Convention, the general principles embodied therein and the aim of the restrictions permitted by Article 5 \u00a7 1. Article 5 \u00a7\u00a04 does not guarantee a right to judicial review of such a scope as to empower the court, on all aspects of the case including questions of pure expediency, to substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-making authority. The review should, however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions which are essential for the \u201clawful\u201d detention of a person according to Article 5 \u00a7 1 (see E. v. Norway, 29 August 1990, \u00a7 50, Series A no. 181-A). The reviewing \u201ccourt\u201d must not have merely advisory functions but must have the competence to \u201cdecide\u201d the \u201clawfulness\u201d of the detention and to order release if the detention is unlawful (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 200, Series A no. 25; Weeks v. the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, \u00a7 61, Series A no. 114; Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 130, Reports 1996\u2011V; and A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0202).92.\u00a0\u00a0The forms of judicial review satisfying the requirements of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 4 may vary from one domain to another, and will depend on the type of deprivation of liberty in issue. It is not the Court\u2019s task to inquire into what would be the most appropriate system in the sphere under examination (see Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009\/05, \u00a7 123, ECHR 2008, and Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 169).93.\u00a0\u00a0The existence of the remedy must nevertheless be sufficiently certain, not only in theory but also in practice, failing which it will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Vachev v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 42987\/98, \u00a7\u00a071, ECHR 2004-VIII, and Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7 139).94.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 4 also secures to persons arrested or detained the right to have the lawfulness of their detention decided \u201cspeedily\u201d by a court (see, for example, Baranowski, cited above, \u00a7 68). While one year per level of jurisdiction may be a rough rule of thumb in Article 6 \u00a7 1 cases, Article 5 \u00a7 4, concerning as it does issues of liberty, requires particular expedition (see Hutchison Reid v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 50272\/99, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2003-IV, and Moiseyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a062936\/00, \u00a7 160, 9\u00a0October\u00a02008).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has established that the applicants were not informed of the reasons for their deprivation of liberty (see paragraphs 83-85 above). In its view, that fact in itself meant that the applicants\u2019 right to appeal against their detention was deprived of all effective substance (see Shamayev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 432; Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0141; Dbouba v. Turkey, no. 15916\/09, \u00a7 54, 13 July 2010; and Musaev, cited above, \u00a7 40).96.\u00a0\u00a0This finding suffices for the Court to conclude that the Italian legal system did not provide the applicants with a remedy whereby they could obtain judicial supervision of the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty (see, mutatis mutandis, S.D. v.\u00a0Greece, no. 53541\/07, \u00a7\u00a076, 11 June 2009, and Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0142). This normally dispenses the Court from having to determine whether the remedies available under Italian law could have afforded the applicants sufficient guarantees for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention (see, for example and mutatis mutandis, Shamayev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 433).97.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court would point out that the refusal-of-entry orders did not mention the legal or factual basis for the applicants\u2019 confinement (see paragraph 84 above). Those orders cannot thus be regarded as constituting the decisions on the basis of which the confinement measure was implemented. In addition, those orders were apparently not notified to the applicants until 27 and 29 September 2011 (see paragraphs 14-15 above), shortly before they were returned by plane and therefore at a time when their deprivation of liberty was about to end. It follows that, even supposing that in certain cases the lodging of an appeal with the Justice of the Peace against a refusal-of-entry order could be regarded as providing an indirect review of the lawfulness of the restriction of liberty imposed on the alien concerned, in the present case such a review, if it had been sought, could not have taken place until after the applicants\u2019 release and return to Tunisia.98.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION99.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that they had sustained inhuman and degrading treatment during their detention in the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola and on board the ships Vincent and Audace.They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d100.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed that allegation.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under procedural head of Article 3 of the Convention101.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations of 23 May 2013, in response to those of the Government, the applicants raised for the first time a complaint under the procedural head of Article\u00a03 of the Convention. They claimed that at the relevant time the ships had been converted into floating detention centres moored in the port of Palermo and cut off from the public and the media. Access to the vessels was prohibited not only to journalists, but also to humanitarian organisations, and the judicial authorities had failed to take statements from the migrants. The applicants submitted that this was incompatible with the obligation to carry out an effective investigation into allegations of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the present complaint was not raised until 23 May 2013, whereas the situation at issue had ended on 27 and 29\u00a0September 2011, when the applicants were returned to Tunisia (see paragraph 12 above). It does not therefore comply with the six-month rule under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Allan v.\u00a0the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 48539\/99, 28 August 2001, and Adam and Others v.\u00a0Germany (dec.), no. 290\/03, 1 September 2005).103.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is out of time and must be dismissed pursuant to Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a04 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under substantive head of Article 3 of the Convention104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint under the substantive head of Article 3 of the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) thereof. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that the CSPA was overcrowded and that at the material time it housed over 1,200 persons, that is, three times its normal capacity (381 places) and more than its maximum capacity in case of necessity (804 places). Those figures were not contradicted by the Government, which indicated the presence of 1,357 persons on 16 September 2011, 1,325 on 17 September, 1,399 on 18 September, 1,265 on 19 September and 1,017 on 20\u00a0September. In addition, the conditions of hygiene and sanitation were unacceptable in the applicants\u2019 view: owing to a lack of space in the rooms, they had been obliged to sleep outside, directly on the concrete floor to avoid the stench from the mattresses. The CSPA had no canteen and the bathrooms were overcrowded and often unusable. In the applicants\u2019 opinion, their statements on these points had not been contradicted by the Government.106.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also alleged that they had endured mental distress on account of the lack of information about their legal status, the duration of their detention and their inability to communicate with the outside world. They referred in this connection to the report of the Senate\u2019s Special Commission (see paragraph 31 above). That document indicated, among other things, that some migrants had been detained for over twenty days without any formal decision being taken as to their status. The Commission had also visited the Lampedusa CSPA on 11 February 2009 and had heavily criticised its conditions of accommodation and hygiene.107.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants pointed out that they were not complaining of physical injury, but about the conditions of their detention in the CSPA. Accordingly, the Government\u2019s argument that they should have produced medical certificates (see paragraph 116 below) was not pertinent.108.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that the media and the national and international human rights organisations had established that the crisis situation on Lampedusa had started well before 2011. It had continued in the following years, creating in their view a situation of structural and systematic violation of migrants\u2019 rights under Article 3 of the Convention. In those circumstances, they argued, it could not be concluded that the situation complained of had mainly been caused by an urgent need to deal with the significant influx of migrants following the \u201cArab Spring\u201d uprisings.109.\u00a0\u00a0As to their confinement on the vessels Vincent and Audace, the applicants asserted that they had been placed in an overcrowded lounge, that they had not had proper access to bathroom and toilet facilities, that meals had been distributed by throwing the food on the floor, that they had only been allowed outside in the open air for a few minutes each day, that they had not received any information or pertinent explanations, and that the security forces had sometimes ill-treated or insulted them. In the applicants\u2019 view, those conditions were the logical consequence of the events on Lampedusa. They argued that their allegations could not be ruled out by the 1 June 2012 decision of the preliminary investigations judge of Palermo (see paragraphs 19-24 above), asserting that the ships had suitable facilities, with hot water and electricity, and that the migrants had been provided with full assistance in terms of health and hygiene. They pointed out that the judge had based his decisions on, among other things, the statements of an MP who had visited the ships accompanied by the authorities.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government began by setting out a number of preliminary observations.They claimed that they had monitored the situation on Lampedusa in the period 2011-2012 and had intervened on a factual and legislative level to coordinate and implement the measures required for providing the migrants with aid and assistance. The active presence on the island of the ACNUR, the IOM, Save the Children, the Order of Malta, the Red Cross, Caritas, the ARCI and the Community of Sant\u2019Egidio had been placed within the framework of the \u201cPraesidium Project\u201d, financed by Italy and by the European Union. The representatives of those organisations had had unrestricted access to the migrants\u2019 reception facilities. In addition, on 28 May 2013 the Government had signed a memorandum of agreement with the Terre des hommes Foundation, which provided a service of psychological support at the Lampedusa CSPA. On 4 June 2013 the Ministry of the Interior had signed an agreement with the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) to coordinate the reception arrangements for migrants. Since July 2013, the association Doctors without Borders had begun to help train the staff at the CSPA and on the ships responsible for rescue at sea.111.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, the rescue of migrants arriving on the Italian coast was a problem not only for Italy but for all the member States of the European Union, which had to establish a proper common policy to deal with it. The local institutions in Lampedusa had financed the construction of new aid and assistance centres (6,440,000 euros (EUR) had been invested to create facilities capable of receiving 1,700 persons). During his visit on 23 and 24 June 2013, the delegate from the UNHCR for Southern Europe had expressed his satisfaction with the work carried out by the national and local authorities in order to improve the general situation on the island.112.\u00a0\u00a0In 2011 the massive influx of North African migrants had created a situation of humanitarian emergency in Italy. From 12\u00a0February to 31 December 2011, 51,573 nationals of countries outside the European Union (\u201cthird States\u201d) had landed on the islands of Lampedusa and Linosa. That situation was well explained in the report of the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee (see paragraph 34 above), which had also reported on the efforts of the Italian authorities, in cooperation with other organisations, to create the necessary facilities for the reception and assistance of migrants, among whom were vulnerable individuals.113.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that, during the relevant period, the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola had been fully operational and had had the necessary human and material resources to provide aid and initial accommodation to migrants. In addition to the director and two deputy directors, the centre employed ninety-nine \u201csocial operators\u201d and cleaning staff, three social workers, three psychologists, eight interpreters and intercultural mediators, eight administrative employees and three division managers responsible for supervising activities in the facility. Three doctors and three nurses provided medical assistance in a temporary unit. According to the results of an inspection carried out on 2 April 2011 by the health services of Palermo, the conditions of hygiene were satisfactory, and so was the quality and quantity of the food provided. A further inspection immediately after the fire of 20\u00a0September 2011 reported that drinking water was provided in bottles and that the canteen was serving meals.114.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view the applicants, like all the other migrants, had definitely been informed of the possibility of applying for asylum, but had merely decided not to make use of it. Seventy-two other migrants on Lampedusa at the time of the fire had, by contrast, expressed a wish to apply and on 22 September 2011 they had been taken to the reception centres of Trapani, Caltanissetta and Foggia pending determination of their status.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further noted that in his decision of 1 June 2012 (see paragraphs 19-24 above), the preliminary investigations judge of Palermo had found that the measures taken to cope with the presence of migrants on Lampedusa had been compliant with national and international law, and had been adopted with the requisite promptness in a situation of emergency. The judge had also taken the view that the reception conditions on the ships Audace and Vincent had been satisfactory. The Government emphasised that international cooperation in matters of unlawful migration was governed by Article\u00a011 of Legislative Decree no.\u00a0286 of 1998 in compliance with multilateral treaties and bilateral agreements.116.\u00a0\u00a0The Government lastly challenged the applicants\u2019 allegations about ill-treatment by the police, pointing out that they were not based on any evidence such as medical certificates.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles117.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s well-established case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Price v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no.\u00a033394\/96, \u00a7 24, ECHR 2001-VII; Mouisel\u00a0v. France, no. 67263\/01, \u00a7 37, ECHR 2002-IX; and Naumenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a042023\/98, \u00a7 108, 10 February 2004). Allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 161 in fine, and Labita v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2000-IV).118.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3, one of the factors which the Court will take into account is the question whether its object was to humiliate and debase the person concerned, although the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of Article 3 (see Raninen v.\u00a0Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 55, Reports 1997-VIII; Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 68 and 74, ECHR 2001-III; and Price, cited above, \u00a7 24). Measures depriving a person of his liberty inevitably involve an element of suffering and humiliation. Although this is an unavoidable state of affairs which, in itself and as such, does not infringe Article 3, this provision nevertheless requires the State to ensure that detainees are held in conditions that are compatible with respect for their human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI, and Rahimi v. Greece, no.\u00a08687\/08, \u00a7 60, 5 April 2011).119.\u00a0\u00a0While States are entitled to detain would-be immigrants under their \u201cundeniable ... right to control aliens\u2019 entry into and residence in their territory\u201d (see Amuur, cited above, \u00a7\u00a041), this right must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Convention (see Mahdid and Haddar v.\u00a0Austria (dec.), no.\u00a074762\/01, 8 December 2005). The Court must have regard to the particular situation of the person concerned when reviewing the manner in which the detention order was implemented against the yardstick of the Convention provisions (see Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos.\u00a029787\/03 and 29810\/03, \u00a7\u00a0100, 24 January 2008, and Rahimi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a061).120.\u00a0\u00a0When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a040907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2001-II). In particular, the length of the period during which the applicant was detained in the impugned conditions will be a major factor (see Kalashnikov v. Russia no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2002-VI; Kehayov v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 41035\/98, \u00a7 64, 18 January 2005; and Alver v.\u00a0Estonia, no.\u00a064812\/01, \u00a7 50, 8\u00a0November 2005).121.\u00a0\u00a0Where overcrowding reaches a certain level, the lack of space in an institution may constitute the key factor to be taken into account in assessing the conformity of a given situation with Article\u00a03 (see, in respect of prisons, Karalevi\u010dius v.\u00a0Lithuania, no.\u00a053254\/99, \u00a7 39, 7 April 2005).122.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, in examining cases of severe overcrowding, the Court has found that this aspect suffices in itself to entail a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. As a general rule, although the space considered desirable by the CPT for collective cells is 4\u00a0sq. m, the personal space available to the applicants in the relevant cases was less than 3\u00a0sq. m (see Kadikis v.\u00a0Latvia, no.\u00a062393\/00, \u00a7\u00a055, 4\u00a0May 2006; Andrey Frolov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 205\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 47-49, 29\u00a0March 2007; Kantyrev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a037213\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a050-51, 21\u00a0June\u00a02007; Sulejmanovic v.\u00a0Italy, no.\u00a022635\/03, \u00a7 43, 16 July 2009; and Torreggiani and Others, cited above, \u00a7 68).123.\u00a0\u00a0However, in cases where the overcrowding was not significant enough to raise, in itself, an issue under Article 3, the Court noted that other aspects of detention conditions had to be taken into account in examining compliance with that provision. Those aspects included the possibility of using toilets with respect for privacy, ventilation, access to natural air and light, quality of hearing and compliance with basic hygiene requirements (see also the points developed in the European Prison Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers, as cited in paragraph 32 of the judgment in Torreggiani and Others, cited above). Thus, even in cases where each detainee had had 3 to 4\u00a0sq. m of personal space, the Court found a violation of Article\u00a03 where the lack of space went together with a lack of light and ventilation (see Torreggiani and Others, cited above, \u00a7 69; see also Babushkin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a067253\/01, \u00a7 44, 18\u00a0October 2007; Vlasov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 78146\/01, \u00a7 84, 12 June 2008; and Moiseyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0124\u2011127); limited access to outdoor exercise (see Istv\u00e1n G\u00e1bor Kov\u00e1cs v.\u00a0Hungary, no. 15707\/10, \u00a7\u00a026, 17 January 2012) or a total lack of privacy in the cell (see Novoselov\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 66460\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 32 and 40-43, 2 June 2005; Khudoyorov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a06847\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 106-107, ECHR\u00a02005-X (extracts); and Belevitskiy v. Russia, no.\u00a072967\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a073-79, 1 March 2007).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would first observe that it is not in dispute that in 2011 the island of Lampedusa was facing an exceptional situation. As the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee noted on 30\u00a0September 2011 (see paragraph 34 above \u2013in particular, \u00a7\u00a7 9-13 and 27-30 of the report), following uprisings in Tunisia and Libya there was a fresh wave of arrivals by boat, as a result of which Italy declared a state of humanitarian emergency on the island and appealed for solidarity from the member States of the European Union. By 21\u00a0September 2011, when the applicants were on the island, 55,298 persons had arrived there by sea. As indicated by the Government (see paragraph 112 above), between 12\u00a0February and 31 December 2011, 51,573 nationals of third States landed on the islands of Lampedusa and Linosa.125.\u00a0\u00a0The state of emergency created organisational and logistical difficulties for Italy. The accommodation capacity available in Lampedusa was both insufficient to receive such a number of new arrivals and ill-suited to stays of several days. There is no doubt that the local authorities and international community deployed significant efforts to cope with the humanitarian crisis of 2011.126.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to that general situation, there were some specific problems that arose after the applicants\u2019 arrival. On 20 September a violent revolt broke out among the migrants being held at the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola and the premises were gutted by an arson attack (see paragraphs 9 and 21 above). On the next day, about 1,800 migrants started protest marches through the island\u2019s streets (paragraph 9 above) and clashes occurred in the port of Lampedusa between the local community and a group of aliens threatening to explode gas bottles. Acts of self-harm and vandalism were also perpetrated. Those incidents contributed to exacerbating the existing difficulties and creating a climate of tension, which led the preliminary investigations judge of Palermo to take the view that the immediate transfer of the migrants was justified under Article 54 of the Criminal Code, which provided that actions taken to protect a third party from an instant danger of serious bodily harm, among other reasons, were not liable to punishment (see paragraphs 21, 23 and 32 above).127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not under-estimate the problems encountered by the Contracting States when faced with exceptional waves of immigration such as that which underlies the present case. It is also aware of the many duties that the Italian authorities had to assume, obliged as they were to take measures to provide, simultaneously, for rescue at sea, for the health and accommodation of the migrants, and for the prevention of disorder on an island inhabited by a small community.128.\u00a0\u00a0Those factors cannot, however, exempt the respondent State from its obligation to guarantee conditions that are compatible with respect for human dignity to all individuals who, like the applicants, find themselves deprived of their liberty. In that connection, the Court points out that Article\u00a03 must be regarded as one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention and as enshrining core values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7\u00a0July\u00a01989, \u00a7\u00a088, Series A no. 161). In contrast to the other provisions in the Convention, it is cast in absolute terms, without exception or proviso, or the possibility of derogation under Article 15 of the Convention (see M.S. v. Belgium, no. 50012\/08, \u00a7 122, 31 January 2012).129.\u00a0\u00a0In order to determine whether the applicants were victims of a violation of Article 3, the Court finds it appropriate to examine separately the two situations at issue, namely the reception conditions both in the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola and on the ships Vincent and Audace.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Conditions in the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants were placed in the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola on 17 and 18 September 2011 (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above), and that they were held there until 20\u00a0September, when, after a fire, they were transferred to a sports complex on Lampedusa (see paragraph 9 above). Their stay there lasted between three and four days.131.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained, in particular, about serious problems of overcrowding, poor hygiene and lack of outside contact in the CSPA. The Court observes that their allegations about the general state of the centre are corroborated by the reports of the Senate\u2019s Special Commission and Amnesty International (see paragraphs 31 and 35 above). That non-governmental organisation referred to \u201cappalling conditions\u201d of detention, with severe overcrowding, a general lack of hygiene, smells and unusable toilets. The Special Commission, for its part, reported as follows:\u201cThe rooms measure about 5 x 6 metres: they are supposed to accommodate 12 persons. In them can be found, next to each other, bunk beds with four levels, occupied by up to 25 men per room ... In many of the blocks, foam-rubber mattresses are placed along the corridor. In many cases the foam-rubber from the mattresses has been torn away to be used as a cushion. In some cases, double mattresses, protected by improvised covers, have been placed on the landings, outside ... On the ceiling, in many rooms, the plastic shade around the light has been removed and the bulb has disappeared. At the end of the corridor, on one side, there are toilets and showers. There is no door and privacy is ensured by cloth or plastic curtains placed in an improvised and haphazard manner. There are no taps and water flows from the pipes only when centrally activated. The pipes sometimes get blocked; on the floor, water or other liquids run as far as the corridor and into the rooms where the foam-rubber mattresses lie. The smell from the toilets pervades the whole area. When it starts to rain, those on the metal staircases, who have to go up to the floor above, get wet and take dampness and dirt into the living quarters.\u201d132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to doubt the accuracy of these findings, emanating as they do from an institution of the respondent State itself. Moreover, it has often attached weight to information in recent reports from independent human rights associations such as Amnesty International (see, mutatis mutandis, Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7\u00a0131, ECHR 2008).133.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, according to the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee (see paragraph\u00a033 of the report published on 30 September 2011 \u2013 paragraph 34 above), the accommodation capacity of the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola ranged between 400 and 1,000 places (800 places according to Amnesty International). The Government did not dispute the applicants\u2019 figures, which showed that from 17 to 20 September 2011, between 1,399 and 1,017 individuals had been held there (see paragraph 105 above). Even though the personal space allotted to each migrant is not known, that information can only corroborate the applicants\u2019 allegations of overcrowding. In addition, the situation of rapid saturation of the Lampedusa reception centres was emphasised by the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee, which also reported the concern expressed by Doctors without Borders and the Red Cross as to the conditions of hygiene in the event of overcrowding in the centres (see \u00a7\u00a7\u00a048 and 51 of the report published on 30 September 2011 \u2013 paragraph 34 above).134.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, the foregoing information shows that the conditions of detention fell short of the standards prescribed by the international instruments in such matters and, in particular, of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Rahimi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 81-85).135.\u00a0\u00a0It is true that the applicants stayed in the CSPA for only a short period, such that the alleged lack of contact with the outside world could not have had serious consequences for their personal situations (see, mutatis mutandis, ibid., \u00a7 84). The Court does not, however, overlook the fact that the applicants, who had just undergone a dangerous journey on the high seas, were in a situation of vulnerability. Their confinement in conditions which impaired their human dignity thus constituted degrading treatment in breach of Article 3.136.\u00a0\u00a0There has thus been a violation of that Article on account of the conditions in which the applicants were held in the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Conditions on board the ships Vincent and Audace137.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the reception conditions on board the two ships, the Court notes that the first applicant was placed on the Vincent, with some 190 individuals, while the second and third applicants were transferred to the Audace, which held about 150 (see paragraph 10 above). The confinement on the ships began on 22\u00a0September 2011; it lasted about eight days for the first applicant (until 29 September 2011) and about six days (until 27\u00a0September 2011) for the second and third applicants.138.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed that they had been grouped together in the restaurant areas, access to the cabins being prohibited. They also alleged that they had slept on the floor and had had to wait several hours to use the toilets. They could only go outside onto the balconies twice a day for a few minutes at a time (see paragraphs 11 and 109 above).139.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes, however, that those allegations are at least partly contradicted by the decision dated 1 June 2012 of the preliminary investigations judge of Palermo (see paragraph 22 above), who established that the migrants were in good health, were receiving assistance from medical staff and were sleeping in cabins containing bed linen or reclinable chairs (poltrone reclinabili). Moreover, they had access to prayer rooms, the food was satisfactory and clothing had been provided. The ships were supplied with hot water and electricity, and meals and hot drinks were available.140.\u00a0\u00a0The judge\u2019s findings were partly based on the observations of a member of parliament who had visited the ships in the port of Palermo and had talked with some of the migrants. In the Court\u2019s view, the fact that the MP had been accompanied by the deputy commissioner of police and police officers did not, in itself, cast doubt on his independence or on the veracity of his account.141.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing elements preclude a finding that the reception conditions on the ships were incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention.142.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court is prepared to admit that the alleged lack of pertinent information or explanations on the part of the authorities during the applicants\u2019 confinement on the ships might have provoked in them feelings of anxiety and distress. Those feelings were not, however, such as to reach the minimum threshold of gravity required for treatment to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention.143.\u00a0\u00a0It should lastly be noted that the applicants\u2019 allegations that they were insulted and ill-treated by the police or that meals were distributed by throwing the food on the floor (see paragraphs\u00a011 and 109 above) are not based on any objective reports, merely their own statements. Those complaints cannot therefore be upheld by the Court.144.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court takes the view that the conditions in which the applicants were held on the ships Vincent and Audace did not infringe Article 3 of the Convention. There has therefore been no violation of Article 3 on that account.VI.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF PROTOCOL No. 4 TO THE CONVENTION145.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed to have been victims of collective expulsion. They relied on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, which reads as follows:\u201cCollective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.\u201d146.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility147.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants148.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that they had been expelled collectively solely on the basis of their origin and without any consideration of their individual situations. They took the view that the fast-track removal procedures introduced by the Italian authorities pursuant to the bilateral agreements with Tunisia (see paragraphs 28-30 above) did not comply with the guarantees enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. Those procedures, in their submission, entail only the establishment of the alien\u2019s nationality, without any broader examination of his or her personal situation.149.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants observed that immediately after they had landed on Lampedusa, the Italian border authorities had registered their identity and taken their fingerprints. They had subsequently had no oral contact with the authorities in question until they boarded the plane to be returned to Tunis. At that point they had again been asked to give their identity and the Tunisian Consul was then present. In those circumstances, the applicants had difficulty understanding at what point in time the Italian authorities could have gathered the information required for a careful assessment of their individual situations. The refusal-of-entry orders did not, moreover, contain any indication of such an assessment; they were standardised documents indicating only their date of birth and nationality and containing a set phrase to the effect that \u201cnone of the cases [provided for in] Article 10 \u00a7 4 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 [was] at issue\u201d.150.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants lastly argued that the following aspects led to the conclusion that there had been a collective expulsion (they referred, in particular, to Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a027765\/09, \u00a7 183, ECHR 2012, and \u010conka v. Belgium, no. 51564\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 61-63, ECHR 2002-I):\u2013 the large number of Tunisians for whom the outcome had been identical;\u2013 the fact that prior to the impugned operation the Ministry\u2019s note of 6\u00a0April 2011 (see paragraph 29 above) had announced operations of that kind;\u2013 the identical wording of the refusal-of-entry orders;\u2013 the difficulty for the applicants to contact a lawyer.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government151.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that there had been no collective expulsion. They observed that the refusal-of-entry orders at issue had been individual documents drawn up separately for each of the applicants. Those orders had been adopted after a careful examination of each applicant\u2019s situation; they had been translated into Arabic and handed to the applicants, who had refused to sign the record of service. The Government pointed out that, in his decision of 1 June 2012 (see paragraphs 19-24 above), the preliminary investigations judge of Palermo had taken the view that the refusal-of-entry measure was lawful and that the time-limit for the adoption of the orders had to be interpreted in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. The first applicant, who had entered Italy unlawfully on 17 September 2011, had been issued with the order on 29 September 2011; the two others, who had arrived on 18 September, had been returned on 27\u00a0September. In the Government\u2019s view, those periods of twelve and nine days, respectively, could not be regarded as excessive.152.\u00a0\u00a0Individual laissez-passers had been issued to ensure the applicants\u2019 return to Tunisia. The agreements between Tunisia and Italy had contributed to the repression of migrant smuggling, in line with the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In addition, the Government explained, upon their arrival on Lampedusa all the unlawful migrants had been identified by the police in individual interviews with each one, assisted by an interpreter or a cultural mediator. Photographs had been taken and fingerprints recorded.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment153.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present case the applicants were issued with individual refusal-of-entry orders. Those orders nevertheless contained identical wording and the only differences were to be found in the migrants\u2019 identities.154.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has previously found, the fact that a number of aliens are subject to similar decisions does not in itself lead to the conclusion that there is a collective expulsion, if each person concerned has been given the opportunity to put arguments against his expulsion to the competent authorities on an individual basis. The Court has also ruled that there is no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 if the lack of an expulsion decision made on an individual basis is the consequence of the person\u2019s own culpable conduct (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 184).155.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that, unlike the migrants in Hirsi\u00a0Jamaa and Others (cited above, \u00a7 185), the applicants in the present case, together with the other migrants who had arrived on Lampedusa in September 2011, were subjected to an identification procedure. The Government rightly emphasised this point (see paragraph 152 above). The applicants in fact acknowledged that immediately after their arrival on Lampedusa, the Italian border authorities had registered their identities and taken their fingerprints (see paragraph 149 above).156.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is, however, of the opinion that the mere introduction of an identification procedure is not sufficient in itself to rule out the existence of a collective expulsion. It further observes that a number of factors lead to the conclusion that in the present case the impugned expulsion was indeed collective in nature. In particular, the refusal-of-entry orders did not contain any reference to the personal situations of the applicants; the Government failed to produce any document capable of proving that individual interviews concerning the specific situation of each applicant had taken place prior to the issuance of the orders; a large number of individuals of the same origin, around the time of the facts at issue, were subjected to the same outcome as the applicants; and the bilateral agreements with Tunisia (see paragraphs 28-30 above), which have not been made public, provided for the return of unlawful migrants through simplified procedures, on the basis of the mere identification of the person concerned by the Tunisian consular authorities.157.\u00a0\u00a0Those factors suffice for the Court to rule out the existence of sufficient guarantees demonstrating that the personal circumstances of each of the migrants concerned had been genuinely and individually taken into account (see, mutatis mutandis, \u010conka, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 61-63).158.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicants\u2019 expulsion was collective in nature in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. Accordingly there has been a violation of that Article.VII.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 3 AND 5 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 4 OF PROTOCOL No. 4159.\u00a0The applicants complained that they were not afforded an effective remedy under Italian law by which to lodge their complaints under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.They relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d160.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed that allegation.161.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would first observe that, according to its settled case-law, Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention provides a lex specialis in relation to the more general requirements of Article 13 (see Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a031195\/96, \u00a7 69, ECHR 1999-II, and Ruiz Rivera v. Switzerland, no. 8300\/06, \u00a7\u00a047, 18 February 2014). In the present case, the facts giving rise to the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 5 are identical to those already examined under Article 5 \u00a7 4, and are thus covered by the Court\u2019s findings under the latter provision (see De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v.\u00a0the Netherlands, 22\u00a0May 1984, \u00a7 60, Series\u00a0A no. 77, and Chahal, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0126\u00a0and\u00a0146).162.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants relied on Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the Court notes that these complaints are related to those examined above and must also therefore be declared admissible.A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants163.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants noted that the refusal-of-entry orders had provided for the possibility of an appeal against them, within a period of 60 days, to the Justice of the Peace of Agrigento, but had also indicated that such a remedy would not suspend enforcement. The applicants argued that it was clear from the Court\u2019s case-law (they referred in particular to the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0206) that the suspensive nature of a remedy was, in such matters, a condition of its effectiveness. In addition, the applicants denied having received copies of the orders, as was proven, in their view, by the fact that their signatures did not appear on the records of service. Nor had they been able to contact lawyers because, according to them, lawyers had no access to holding facilities and could not be contacted by telephone from inside such premises.164.\u00a0\u00a0As regards, lastly, the decisions of the Justice of the Peace of Agrigento annulling two refusal-of-entry orders (see paragraph\u00a026 above), the applicants observed that they had concerned two migrants who had not yet been removed and who, in accordance with Article\u00a014 of Legislative Decree no. 268 of 1998 had been placed in a CIE (see paragraph\u00a027 above). The migrants in question, they explained, had challenged the lawfulness of the refusal-of-entry measures as the legal basis for their detention in the CIE, and they had been able to do so because they were still on Italian soil. The applicants observed that, unlike those migrants, they themselves could only have challenged their refusal-of-entry orders as the legal basis for their removal, and then only after their return to Tunisia.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government165.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained their argument that the applicants were entitled to appeal against the refusal-of-entry orders to the Justice of the Peace of Agrigento (see paragraph 90 above).B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles166.\u00a0\u00a0Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they may happen to be secured. The effect of that provision is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief. The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint. However, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law. The \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. Nor does the \u201cauthority\u201d referred to in that provision necessarily have to be a judicial authority; but if it is not, its powers and the guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective. Also, even if a single remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so (see, among many other authorities, Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 157, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 197).167.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would further point out that in De Souza Ribeiro v.\u00a0France ([GC], no. 22689\/07, \u00a7 82, ECHR 2012) it held that the effectiveness of the remedy for the purposes of Article 13 required imperatively that the complaint should be subject to close and independent scrutiny and that the remedy should have automatic suspensive effect, in respect of: (a) complaints concerning a removal measure entailing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 and\/or of a violation of the person\u2019s right to life safeguarded by Article 2 of the Convention; and (b) complaints under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (see also \u010conka, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081\u201183, and Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 206).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case168.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would first observe that it declared admissible the applicants\u2019 complaints under the substantive head of Article 3 of the Convention and under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. It has also found a violation of the latter Article, together with a violation of Article 3 on account of the conditions in which the applicants were held in the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola. The complaints lodged by the applicants on these points are therefore \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of Article 13 (see, mutatis mutandis, Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 201).169.\u00a0\u00a0It further observes that the Government have not indicated any remedies by which the applicants could have complained about the conditions of their accommodation in the CSPA or on the ships Vincent and Audace. An appeal to the Justice of the Peace against the refusal-of-entry orders would have served only to challenge the lawfulness of their removal to Tunisia. Moreover, those orders were issued only at the end of their period of confinement in those facilities.170.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of the Convention.171.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complained about the lack of any effective remedy by which to challenge their expulsion from the perspective of its collective aspect, the Court finds that it is not established that such a complaint could not have been raised in an appeal to the Justice of the Peace against the refusal-of-entry orders. It transpires from the decisions of the Agrigento Justice of the Peace adduced by the Government (see paragraph 26 above) that the magistrate examined the procedure followed for the issuance of the refusal-of-entry orders in question and assessed the lawfulness of that procedure in the light of domestic law and the Constitution. There is nothing to suggest that any complaint about a failure to take account of the personal situation of those concerned would have been disregarded by the Justice of the Peace.172.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, however, the orders expressly stipulated that the lodging of an appeal with the Justice of the Peace would not have suspensive effect (see paragraph\u00a014 above). It follows that the remedy in question did not meet the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention, since it did not satisfy the criterion of the suspensive effect, as established in De Souza Ribeiro (cited above). The Court reiterates that the requirement under Article 13 that execution of the impugned measure be stayed cannot be regarded as a subsidiary aspect (see M.S.S. v.\u00a0Belgium and Greece [GC], no.\u00a030696\/09, \u00a7\u00a0388, ECHR 2011, and Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 206).173.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has also been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.VIII.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION174.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage175.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 70,000\u00a0euros (EUR) each for the non-pecuniary damage that they alleged to have sustained. They argued that this amount was justified on account of the seriousness of the violations of which they were victims. The second and third applicants (Mr\u00a0Tabal and Mr Sfar) requested that this sum be paid into their own bank accounts. As to the first applicant, any sum awarded by the Court would have to be paid into the bank account of one of his representatives, Mr S. Zirulia, who would hold it pending its transfer to Mr\u00a0Khlaifia.176.\u00a0\u00a0The Government took the view that the applicants\u2019 requests for just satisfaction were \u201cunacceptable\u201d.177.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that it is appropriate to award each applicant EUR\u00a010,000\u00a0in respect of non-pecuniary damage, amounting to a total of EUR\u00a030,000\u00a0for all three applicants.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses178.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also sought EUR 9,344.51\u00a0for the costs and expenses incurred by them in the proceedings before the Court. That sum was to cover their representatives\u2019 fees (EUR 4,000\u00a0each) and travel expenses for a visit to Tunisia to see their clients (EUR 432.48), together with the translation of the observations in reply (EUR\u00a0912.03). The applicants\u2019 representatives stated that they had advanced the relevant funds and requested that the sum awarded by the Court on that basis be paid directly into their own bank account.179.\u00a0\u00a0The Government made no observations on this point.180.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award, to all the applicants jointly, the total sum claimed for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before it (EUR 9,344.51).C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest181.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27468":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 AND\/OR ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the State authorities had not complied with their procedural positive obligation under Article 3 and\/or Article 8 of the Convention in that they had refused to prosecute the first applicant\u2019s father for the criminal offence of child abuse he had committed against her. They also complained that the domestic authorities had not discharged their positive obligation under either of those Articles in that they had failed to remove the first applicant from her father\u2019s care and thus prevent him from committing further violent acts against her. Those Articles read as follows:Article 3 (prohibition of torture) \u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 8 (right to respect for private and family life)\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ...\u201d105.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those arguments.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that in so far as the applicants complained of a breach of the authorities\u2019 procedural positive obligation under Article\u00a03 of the Convention to investigate the incident of 1\u00a0February\u00a02011, their complaints were inadmissible for non-compliance with the six-month rule. They first explained that the incident in question was to be regarded as a one-off act which had not produced any permanent consequences or a continuous situation. The Government further referred to the Court\u2019s case-law, according to which in the absence of an effective remedy the six-month time-limit begins to run from the moment the event complained of occurs. That was precisely the situation in the present case, where the applicants complained that the response by the domestic authorities to the incident of 1\u00a0February 2011 had not been appropriate.107.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, since the father had been punished for the incident in question by a penal order against the first applicant\u2019s father on 19 April 2011, the six-month time-limit had started to run at the latest on that date, whereas the applicants had not lodged their application with the Court until 3\u00a0January 2013.108.\u00a0\u00a0To the extent that the applicants complained of breaches of the authorities\u2019 positive obligations under Articles\u00a03 and\/or 8 of the Convention in the custody proceedings, the Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. In particular, the Government argued that those complaints were premature because the custody proceedings were still pending (see paragraphs 60-81 above), and that the applicants had not (fully) availed themselves of domestic remedies for the excessive length of proceedings (see paragraphs 79-80 and 92-93 above). The Government therefore invited the Court to declare those complaints inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, both in respect of the length of the proceedings and in respect of the other alleged breaches of positive obligations in those proceedings.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants109.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the alleged non-compliance with the six-month rule (see paragraphs 106-07 above), the applicants explained that their complaint that the domestic authorities had failed to comply with their procedural positive obligation was primarily directed against those authorities\u2019 refusal to prosecute the first applicant\u2019s father for the criminal offence of child abuse. In that respect they had exhausted domestic remedies by taking over the prosecution as injured parties in the role of (subsidiary) prosecutors, and had lodged their application with the Court within six months of the last domestic decision rendered in that regard.110.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not reply to the Government\u2019s argument concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraph 108 above) because it had been raised for the first time on 26 February 2014 in the Government\u2019s comments on the applicants\u2019 observations of 9 December 2013.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with the six-month rule111.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the Government\u2019s objection regarding the alleged non-compliance by the applicants with the six-month rule (see paragraphs 106-107 above), the Court first reiterates that the procedural positive obligation under Article 3 of the Convention requires States to conduct effective official investigations capable, inter alia, of leading to the punishment of those responsible (see paragraph 136 below). That being so, the Court finds it sufficient to note that the penal order of 19 April 2011, whereby the first applicant\u2019s father was sentenced to a fine, was set aside and that the criminal proceedings against him are still pending (see paragraphs 37 and 51 above). Accordingly, the six-month time-limit has not even started to run yet, much less expired, as the Government suggested. It follows that the Government\u2019s inadmissibility objection based on non-compliance with the six-month rule must be dismissed.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies112.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s argument that the applicants failed to pursue the domestic length-of-proceedings remedies, the Court notes that it is not the length of the proceedings which is at issue in the present case. Rather, the question is whether in the circumstances of the case seen as a whole the State could be said to have complied with certain positive obligations under Article 3 and\/or 8 of the Convention (see Remetin v.\u00a0Croatia, no. 29525\/10, \u00a7 75, 11 December 2012).113.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s objection as regards non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies must be rejected.114.\u00a0\u00a0 To the extent that the Government\u2019s non-exhaustion objection rests on the fact that the custody proceedings are still pending and that therefore the applicants\u2019 complaints under Article 3 and\/or 8 of the Convention concerning the alleged breach of the positive obligation to prevent future violent acts against the first applicant are premature, the Court considers that this argument concerns only the merits of those complaints, rather than their admissibility. It will therefore be examined accordingly (see paragraphs\u00a0153\u201162 below).3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion as to the admissibility115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government116.\u00a0\u00a0The Government emphasised that the documents in the case drawn up by various experts in psychiatry and psychology suggested that the first applicant was traumatised by the highly conflictual relationship of her separated parents. In particular, those experts had regarded her as a child drawn into a conflict of loyalties and thus torn between her parents, both of whom she loved.117.\u00a0\u00a0Not even the diagnosis of child abuse made by a psychiatrist in the opinion of 19 February 2011 (see paragraph 19 above), on which the applicants had relied heavily in support of their allegations that the first applicant had been abused by her father, suggested otherwise. Namely, the code (T74.8) under the International Classification of Diseases the psychiatrist had used on that occasion merely indicated some form of maltreatment, without specifying whether it was physical or psychological (as such abuses were classified under different codes), or whether it had been perpetrated solely by her father.118.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the alleged breach of the procedural obligation under Article\u00a03 or 8 of the Convention, the Government argued that the domestic authorities\u2019 reaction to the incident of 1 February 2011 had been prompt, without any unexplained delays or obstructions, and detailed. In particular, the police had reacted immediately after the applicants had reported the incident, and had conducted interviews with all the participants and other individuals who could have had knowledge of it, and of events that had preceded it (see paragraphs 13, 15-17, 21 and 24 above).119.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the alleged breach of positive obligations under Article\u00a03 or 8 of the Convention, the Government submitted that the judicial authorities had decided promptly on the second applicant\u2019s request for a provisional measure and, on the basis of an opinion given by the local social welfare centre, refused her request for an interim custody order (see paragraph\u00a067 above). That decision had been made only after a careful examination of all the evidence presented and after establishment of all the relevant facts, with the best interests of the first applicant as the primary consideration. The first-instance court had given sufficient reasons for its decision, which thus could not be regarded as arbitrary. The Government averred in that connection that since they had heard the parties directly and examined evidence the domestic courts were in a better position than the Court to assess the evidence, establish the relevant facts, and make a decision.120.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, while the custody proceedings were pending before the first-instance court, the social authorities had imposed the child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority (see paragraph 82 above), with a view to monitoring the situation in the first applicant\u2019s family and reacting promptly if changed circumstances so required.121.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, in the course of the first-instance custody proceedings an extensive psychiatric and psychological assessment had been made by forensic experts who, together with a number of other witnesses, had been examined by the first-instance court (paragraphs 66, 69\u201170 and 75), with a view to establishing whether the change in the first applicant\u2019s family situation justified a reversal of the custody order.122.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, those experts had suggested that the behaviour of the first applicant\u2019s mother (the second applicant) was unpredictable, and that she placed her needs before those of her child. It was therefore better in the given circumstances for the first applicant to continue to live with her father and his family, where she had been living since early childhood, and whose home was a better and safer environment for her development. Therefore, not only was it unnecessary to separate the first applicant from her father, but it would be counterproductive. The experts had also found that what was detrimental to the first applicant\u2019s development was the conflict between her parents. All the experts and social welfare professionals had warned both parents about it, and it was the principal reason for imposing the child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority.123.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, it could not be argued that while the custody proceedings were pending the first applicant was at risk of being abused.124.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicants\u2019 objections that the first applicant had not been heard in the custody proceedings, nor had a special representative (see paragraph 129 below), the Government first noted that the domestic authorities had eventually assigned her a guardian ad litem (see paragraph\u00a073 above) whose role was to protect the first applicant\u2019s interests and that, contrary to the applicants\u2019 view, neither the European Convention on the Exercise of Children\u2019s Rights nor the domestic law provided for an obligation to assign her any other special representative (see paragraphs\u00a084 and 98 above). Furthermore, from the latest decisions adopted in both the criminal proceedings for bodily injury and the custody proceedings (see paragraphs 47 and 77 above) it was evident that the first applicant would be given a chance to express her views.125.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing arguments, the Government invited the Court to find that there had been no violation of either Article 3 or Article 8 of the Convention in the present case.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants126.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants reiterated their view (see paragraph 104 above) that prosecuting the first applicant\u2019s father (only) for the criminal offence of inflicting bodily injury was not sufficient for the domestic authorities to meet their positive obligations under Articles 3 and\/or 8 of the Convention. Rather, he should have been prosecuted for the criminal offence of child abuse (see paragraph 86 above). By charging the first applicant\u2019s father with the less serious offence of bodily injury entailing a modest penalty the prosecuting authorities had acted in his favour. Besides, even those criminal proceedings had already been pending for more than four years, and there was no indication that they would be over soon and that he would be punished.127.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the custody proceedings and the obligation to protect the first applicant from future violence by her father, the applicants argued that precisely because the domestic prosecuting and judicial authorities had failed to adequately prosecute him, judicial and social authorities and the forensic experts in the custody proceedings had been reluctant to find that the first applicant had been abused by him and to protect her from further violence by removing her from his custody.128.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in particular pointed to a flaw in the combined expert opinion of 29 December 2011, namely to the fact that the forensic experts who had prepared it had expressly refused to reply to the family court\u2019s question whether the first applicant had been abused, and if so by whom (see paragraphs 66, 70 and 75 above). That shortcoming had had wider repercussions, because that expert opinion had also been consulted by the prosecuting and judicial authorities which had eventually refused the applicants\u2019 attempts to prosecute the first applicant\u2019s father for the criminal offence of child abuse (see paragraphs 55 and 57-58 above).129.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants particularly emphasised the fact that neither in the criminal proceedings nor in the custody proceedings was the first applicant heard, although the forensic experts regarded her as being of above-average intellectual capacities and she on multiple occasions before various professionals had unequivocally expressed the wish to live with her mother,even though her age and maturity so permitted. The first applicant\u2019s precarious position had been further exacerbated by the fact that it took the domestic authorities more than a year and a half before she finally had a special representative assigned to her in the custody proceedings (see paragraph 73 above), as required by the European Convention on the Exercise of Children\u2019s Rights (see paragraph 98 above).130.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicants pointed out that the custody proceedings had, like the criminal proceedings for bodily injury, also already been pending for more than four years, and there was no indication that they would soon be completed, or what would be their outcome. Because of their inordinate length they had lost their initial purpose, and the first applicant had started exhibiting signs of psychological damage, which the applicants had wished to prevent by instituting those proceedings and removing her from her father\u2019s care (see paragraph 33-34 above).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the first applicant131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects, and in some instances the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, for example, A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 20, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VI, and Costello-Roberts v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 247\u2011C).132.\u00a0\u00a0Treatment has been found by the Court to be \u201cdegrading\u201d, and thus falling within the scope of the prohibition set out in Article\u00a03 of the Convention, if it causes in its victim feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority (see, for example, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 167, Series A no. 25, and Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7 203, ECHR\u00a02012); if it humiliates or debases an individual (humiliation in the victim\u2019s own eyes, see Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 32, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011VIII; and\/or in other people\u2019s eyes, see Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 34529\/10, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2013 (extracts)), whether or not that was the aim (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000\u2011IV), if it breaks the person\u2019s physical or psychological resistance or drives him or her to act against his or her will or conscience (see Jalloh v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7 68, ECHR 2006\u2011IX), or\u00a0if it shows a lack of respect for, or diminishes, human dignity (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v.\u00a0Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0118 and 138, 17\u00a0July 2014).133.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicants alleged that in the period between February 2008 and April 2011 the first applicant had been exposed to physical and psychological abuse by her father (see paragraph 52 above). In particular, they claimed that the first applicant\u2019s father had sworn at her, uttered vulgar expressions against her, and called her names such as \u201cstupid\u201d or \u201ccow\u201d, and that he had threatened that he would cut off her long hair and ensure that she never saw or heard from her mother. They also claimed that he had frequently forced her to eat food she did not like and, when she refused, grabbed her chin and shoved the food in her mouth. He had sometimes even smeared the food all over her face. The applicants further claimed that the first applicant\u2019s father had often threatened her with physical violence, had hit her on the leg with a hairbrush on one occasion, and had sometimes grabbed her arm and squeezed it so hard that she had bruises afterwards. This had culminated in the incident of 1 February 2011, when he had allegedly hit her in the face and squeezed her throat while verbally abusing her.134.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court itself notes that in her statements to the police, those given before various clinical experts and those before the forensic experts who examined her in the custody proceedings, the first applicant stated on a number of occasions that she was afraid of her father (see paragraphs 15, 19-20, 23, 28-29 and 32 above). She also stated, inter alia, that when her father had smeared the food over her face she had felt embarrassed because she had been made to look ugly (see paragraph 29 above). It follows that, if the applicants\u2019 allegations are true, the abuse complained of instilled in the first applicant feelings of fear and shame, and on one occasion even caused her physical injury.135.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the Court, having regard in particular to the first applicant\u2019s young age (she was nine years old at the time of the incident of 1\u00a0February 2011), considers that the cumulative effect of all the above-described acts of domestic violence (see, mutatis mutandis, Sultan \u00d6ner and Others v. Turkey, no. 73792\/01, \u00a7 134, 17 October 2006) would, if they were indeed perpetrated, render the treatment she was allegedly exposed to sufficiently serious to reach the threshold of severity required for Article 3 of the Convention to apply. Having regard to its case-law (see paragraph\u00a0132 above), the Court finds that such treatment could be regarded as \u201cdegrading\u201d.136.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that Article 1 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, imposes on States positive obligations to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are protected against all forms of ill-treatment prohibited under Article 3, including where such treatment is administered by private individuals. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, against such serious breaches of personal integrity (see, for example, A. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 22, and Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, \u00a7 159, ECHR 2009, as well as the Council of Europe Recommendation on integrated national strategies for the protection of children from violence, cited in paragraph 103 above). The Court has also acknowledged the particular vulnerability of victims of domestic violence and the need for active State involvement in their protection (see Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, no. 71127\/01, \u00a7 65, 12 June 2008, and Opuz, cited above, \u00a7 132). Those positive obligations, which often overlap, consist of: (a) the obligation to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities knew or ought to have known (see, for example, \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no.\u00a041526\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 138\u2011139, ECHR 2012), and (b) the (procedural) obligation to conduct an effective official investigation where an individual raises an arguable claim of ill-treatment (see, for example, Dimitar Shopov v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 17253\/07, \u00a7 47, 16 April 2013).137.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court first observes that the applicants reported the events of 1 February 2011 to the police authorities the next day. During the interview with the police the first applicant stated that her father had hit her in the face the day before, and mentioned other instances of domestic violence complained of (see paragraph 15 above). She later repeated those allegations before various clinical experts (see paragraphs 19 and 23 above), and before the forensic experts in the custody proceedings (see paragraphs 28-29 above).138.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the injury the first applicant allegedly sustained on 1\u00a0February 2011 was medically documented. In particular, the next day she was diagnosed by an ophthalmologist with bruising of the left lower eyelid (see paragraph 13 above). The opinion obtained from the forensic expert in the course of the criminal proceedings against the first applicant\u2019s father for bodily injury states that she had indeed sustained an injury around that time and that it was possible, though not certain, that it had been inflicted in the way she had described (see paragraph 44 above).139.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the remaining allegations of (mostly psychological) abuse, the Court notes that various therapists and the forensic experts in the custody proceedings established that the first applicant was a traumatised child (see paragraphs 19-20, 23, 25 and 69 above).140.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, being fully aware that the manipulation of children and false accusations of child abuse are common occurrences in highly conflictual relationships between separated parents, considers that this evidence (see the three preceding paragraphs) is sufficient to render the applicants\u2019 claim brought before the domestic authorities that the first applicant had been abused by her father \u201carguable\u201d. It was thus capable of triggering the State\u2019s (procedural) positive obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to investigate. The \u201carguable\u201d character of the applicants\u2019 claim is therefore not called into question by the fact that the Government\u2019s submission relied on (see paragraphs 116-17 above) the possibility that the first applicant had been traumatised by her separated parents\u2019 conflictual relationship, rather than by the alleged ill-treatment by her father.141.\u00a0\u00a0Likewise, once the applicants had reported to the authorities that the first applicant had been abused by her father and had presented the above evidence, those authorities must have been aware that she could be at risk of being subjected to such treatment (again). Accordingly, the State\u2019s positive obligation to protect her from future ill-treatment was also engaged.142.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, and in particular to the fact that the first applicant is both a child and an alleged victim of domestic violence, the Court considers that the present case gave rise to the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention as regards that applicant.143.\u00a0\u00a0That being so, the Court considers that in so far as the first applicant complained about the State\u2019s failure to discharge its positive obligations in relation to violent acts allegedly perpetrated against her by her father, her complaints under Article 8 of the Convention are absorbed by her complaints under Article 3 thereof.144.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must further ascertain whether the domestic authorities complied with their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.(i)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the alleged breach of the (procedural) positive obligation to investigate145.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the positive obligation of the domestic authorities to conduct an effective official investigation into the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment, the Court first notes that those authorities decided to prosecute the first applicant\u2019s father only for the injuries allegedly sustained during the incident of 1 February 2011 (see paragraphs 21 and 35 above). In other words, the domestic authorities decided to prosecute only what appears to be the most serious in a series of violent acts against the first applicant rather than charging her father (also) with a criminal or minor offence(s) capable of covering all the instances of ill-treatment she had allegedly sustained (see paragraphs 86-89 above), which would have enabled those authorities to address the situation in its entirety.146.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court also notes that under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see Article 19 thereof and points 40-41 of the General Comment thereto, cited in paragraphs 94 and 96 above) all reports of violence against children, including those within the family, must be appropriately investigated (but not necessarily prosecuted).147.\u00a0\u00a0However, even if prosecuting the first applicant\u2019s father only for the criminal offence of bodily injury was not in the given circumstances contrary to the State\u2019s procedural positive obligation to conduct an effective investigation into allegations of ill-treatment, the Court considers that in the present case the domestic authorities nevertheless failed to comply with that obligation. That is so because the criminal proceedings for bodily injury they did institute have so far lasted more than four years and two months, during which time the case has remained pending before the first-instance court (see paragraphs\u00a035-51 above).148.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court reiterates that for the investigation required by Article 3 of the Convention to be regarded as \u201ceffective\u201d, it must not only be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible; a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is also implicit in that context (see, for example, W. v. Slovenia, no. 24125\/06, \u00a7 64, 23 January 2014). Moreover, when the official investigation has led to the institution of proceedings in the national courts, the proceedings as a whole, including the trial stage, must satisfy the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court has already held that the protection mechanisms available under domestic law should operate in practice in a manner allowing for the examination of the merits of a particular case within a reasonable time (see, for example, W. v. Slovenia, cited above, \u00a7 65).149.\u00a0\u00a0In that regard the Court first notes that the first applicant\u2019s father was indicted within two months of the alleged commission of the offence and that the penal order against him was issued less than a month after that (see paragraphs 35-36 above). It thus cannot but be concluded that at that stage the domestic authorities demonstrated exceptional promptness.150.\u00a0\u00a0However, substantial delays occurred once the first applicant\u2019s father challenged the penal order which was then automatically set aside and the criminal proceedings resumed. In particular, from the Government\u2019s submission it would appear that in the period between the penal order being challenged on 4 May 2011 and the first hearing in the case being scheduled on 7 May 2013 the proceedings were at a complete standstill for two years (see paragraphs 37-38 above). The Government did not provide any explanation for that delay.151.\u00a0\u00a0Further delays occurred once the trial court decided to hear the first applicant, because neither the court nor the police authorities were equipped with a video-link device (see paragraphs 47-50 above). At a time when this or similar technology is easily available, the Court finds it difficult to justify such a delay, which has so far lasted more than a year.152.\u00a0\u00a0The result of these delays on the part of the domestic authorities is that in the more than four years and five months since the first applicant was injured the domestic authorities have not established by a final judicial decision whether her injuries were inflicted by her father and, if so, determined his criminal liability in that regard and imposed a penalty. In such circumstances, the Court concludes that those authorities have failed to comply with the requirement of promptness implicit in their procedural positive obligation under Article 3 of the Convention (see, a fortiori, Remetin v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 7446\/12, \u00a7 120, 24 July 2014).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the alleged breach of the positive obligation to prevent ill-treatment153.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset the Court finds it important to emphasise that the applicants did not argue that the domestic authorities had breached their positive obligation by failing to prevent the alleged acts of domestic violence against the first applicant that had already occurred. Rather, they complained that after the incident of 1 February 2011 those authorities had breached that positive obligation by leaving the first applicant in her father\u2019s custody, and thus had failed to prevent the recurrence of domestic violence against her.154.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the Court\u2019s task is to determine whether since the incident of 1 February 2011 the domestic authorities have taken all reasonable measures to prevent potential ill-treatment of the first applicant by her father, that is to prevent a risk which even the applicants themselves have not argued has ever materialised.155.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court notes that on 30 March 2011, some two months after the incident of 1 February 2011, the second applicant instituted proceedings to have the custody order of 24 August 2007 reversed (see paragraphs 22 and 60 above) and the first applicant thereby removed from her father\u2019s care. At the same time she asked the first-instance court to issue a provisional measure in the form of an interim custody order, whereby she would have been temporarily awarded custody of the first applicant (see paragraph 60 above).156.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that in its recommendation of 12 May 2011 the local social welfare centre stated that at the time there was nothing to suggest that by staying in her father\u2019s home the first applicant would be at risk (see paragraph 65 above). Nevertheless, the centre\u2019s opinion was incorrectly formulated in that the relevant risk it was required to assess was the risk of abuse of the first applicant rather than any risk to her life.157.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard the Court finds it important to note that the local social welfare centre was familiar with the first applicant\u2019s situation, because in the period between 7 November 2006 and 31 August 2008 it carried out a child protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority in her family (see paragraph 11 above). Following the incident of 1\u00a0February 2011 the local social welfare centre again, on 22\u00a0September 2011, imposed the same measure, which lasted until 31\u00a0March 2014 (see paragraph 82 above). This means that the situation in the first applicant\u2019s family was closely monitored by the social authorities during that period. Moreover, nothing in the reports of the supervising officer suggests that during that period the first applicant was, or risked being, ill-treated (see paragraph 83 above).158.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that some two months after the institution of custody proceedings, on 7\u00a0June 2011 the first-instance court refused the second applicant\u2019s request for a provisional measure (see paragraph 67 above). In so deciding it relied primarily on the above-mentioned recommendation of the local social welfare centre, while also taking into account other evidence, in particular two conflicting opinions of clinical psychiatrists (see paragraphs 19 and 25 above) and the fact that criminal proceedings for bodily injury against the first applicant\u2019s father were still pending. It follows that its refusal to order the drastic measure proposed by the second applicant (see in this connection points 40-42 of General Comment no. 8 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child in paragraph 96 above) was based on the absence of sufficient proof that the abuse had taken place and after careful consideration of all relevant materials (see, mutatis mutandis, M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a022457\/08, \u00a7 115, 15 November 2011).159.\u00a0\u00a0The combined expert opinion from forensic experts in psychiatry and psychology of 29 December 2011, obtained in the context of the same custody proceedings, stated that there were no contraindications to the first applicant\u2019s continuing to live with her father (see paragraph 70 above). As regards the applicants\u2019 argument that those experts had not replied to the family court\u2019s question whether she had been abused, and if so by whom (see paragraphs 70 and 128 above), the Court finds it evident that the experts would not have recommended that she continue living with her father if they considered that she had been at risk of ill-treatment.160.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to find that in the period after 1 February 2011 the domestic authorities took reasonable steps to assess and weigh the risk of potential ill-treatment of the first applicant by her father and to prevent it.161.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, while the length of the custody proceedings, which have so far lasted more than four years and three months, is indeed regrettable and is relevant in a different context (see paragraphs 182-84 and 188-89 below), it is not of decisive importance in the context of this complaint, and thus cannot call into question the Court\u2019s finding that the State has complied with its positive obligation to protect the first applicant from possible ill-treatment by her father (see, mutatis mutandis, M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 117).162.\u00a0\u00a0This also means that the applicants\u2019 complaints concerning the alleged breach of the positive obligation to prevent ill-treatment cannot be considered premature just because the custody proceedings are still pending, as the Government argued (see paragraphs\u00a0108 and 114 above).(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion as to the merits163.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that in the present case there has been, as regards the first applicant, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the breach by the domestic authorities of their (procedural) positive obligation to conduct an effective investigation into allegations of ill-treatment, and no violation of that Article on account of their obligation to prevent such treatment.(b)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the second applicant164.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the second applicant, the Court reiterates its finding that in the case of \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia the ill-treatment to which the second applicant\u2019s son had been exposed in that case had had an adverse effect on her private and family life (see \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2012). It also held that, by failing to put in place adequate and relevant measures to prevent further ill-treatment of her son, the State authorities had not only breached their positive obligation under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of him but also their positive obligation under Article\u00a08 in respect of her (see \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 153, ECHR 2012).165.\u00a0\u00a0However, in the present case the Court, in view of its above finding under Article 3 of the Convention that the State has adequately discharged its positive obligation to prevent ill-treatment of the first applicant (see paragraphs 160 and 163 above), considers that the domestic authorities have also complied with their positive obligation towards the second applicant under Article 8 of the Convention.166.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the present case as regards the second applicant concerning the alleged breach of the State\u2019s positive obligation to prevent violence against her daughter, the first applicant.II.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION167.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, and that it is not bound by the characterisation given by the applicant or the Government. By virtue of the jura novit curia principle, it has, for example, considered of its own motion complaints under Articles or paragraphs not relied on by the parties and even under a provision in respect of which the Court had declared the complaint to be inadmissible while declaring it admissible under a different one. A complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on (see, for example, \u015eerife Yi\u011fit v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no. 3976\/05, \u00a7 52, 2 November 2010).168.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that various therapists and the forensic experts in the custody proceedings have established that the first applicant is a traumatised child (see paragraphs 19-20, 23, 25, 69 and 139 above). It further notes that in her statements to the police, those given before various clinical experts, and those before the forensic experts who examined her in the custody proceedings the first applicant stated on a number of occasions that she wanted to live with her mother, the second applicant (see paragraphs 19-20, 23-24, 28, 32, 34 and 69 above). The Court also observes that in her school essay of 27 October 2014 the first applicant stated that she had started cutting herself and later explained before a clinical psychologist that she had done that, inter alia, because of \u201cinability to manage her own time and refusal to let her live with her mother, which would make her happy\u201d and \u201cbecause she was not allowed to choose with whom to live\u201d (see paragraphs 33-34 above). The report of that psychologist suggests that the first applicant started self-harming because of frustration resulting from limitation of her freedom of action (see paragraph 34 above).169.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court reiterates that the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other\u2019s company constitutes a fundamental element of \u201cfamily life\u201d within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 24 March 1988, \u00a7 59, Series A no. 130, and Gluhakovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 21188\/09, \u00a7 54, 12 April 2011), and that the concept of \u201cprivate life\u201d within the meaning of that Article includes, inter alia, the right to personal autonomy (see, for example, Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 61, ECHR 2002\u2011III) and to physical and psychological integrity (see, for example, X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26\u00a0March 1985, \u00a7 22, Series A no. 91).170.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, in the case of Fern\u00e1ndez Mart\u00ednez v. Spain the Court, as regards the right to private and family life, stressed the importance for individuals to be able to decide freely how to conduct their private and family life, and reiterated that Article 8 also protected the right to self-fulfilment, whether in the form of personal development or from the point of view of the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world, the notion of personal autonomy being an important principle underlying the interpretation of the guarantees laid down in that provision (see Fern\u00e1ndez Mart\u00ednez v. Spain ([GC], no. 56030\/07, \u00a7 126, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).171.\u00a0\u00a0This right to personal autonomy \u2013 which in the case of adults means the right to make choices as to how to lead one\u2019s own life, provided that this does not unjustifiably interfere with the rights and freedoms of others \u2013 has a different scope in the case of children. They lack the full autonomy of adults but are, nevertheless, subjects of rights (see the Preamble to the Optional Protocol [of 19 December 2011] to the Convention on the Rights of the Child [which came into force on 14 April 2014] on a communications procedure in paragraph 95 above). This circumscribed autonomy in cases of children, which gradually increases with their evolving maturity, is exercised through their right to be consulted and heard. As specified in Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 94 above), a child who is capable of forming his or her own views has the right to express them and the right to have due weight given to those views, in accordance with his or her age and maturity, and, in particular, has to be provided with the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting him or her.172.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing considerations, and taking the best interests of the child as a primary consideration, the Court considers that the applicants\u2019 complaints that the domestic authorities have been ignoring the first applicant\u2019s wish to live with her mother, and the fact that she has not yet been heard in the custody proceedings, which have themselves lasted too long (see paragraphs 129-30 above), raise issues regarding the right to respect for private and family life distinct from those analysed in the context of Articles\u00a03 and 8 of the Convention in paragraphs 153-66 above, which thus require separate examination by the Court under the latter Article.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility173.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the Government argued that certain complaints by the applicants under Articles 3 and\/or 8 of the Convention, namely those concerning the alleged breach of the positive obligation to prevent future violent acts against the first applicant, were premature because the custody proceedings were still pending (see paragraph 108 above). In the context of this part of the application, that argument constitutes an inadmissibility objection and has to be examined as such (compare with paragraph 114 above).174.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court reiterates that those custody proceedings have so far been pending for more than four years and three months, and notes that after three and a half years the first applicant started exhibiting self-harming behaviour, which she herself described as a reaction to the frustration resulting from the fact that she was not allowed to live with her mother, the second applicant (see paragraphs 33-34 above). The Court further reiterates that the speed of the domestic proceedings is relevant to whether a given remedy is to be deemed effective and hence necessary in terms of Article\u00a035 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Indeed, the excessive length of the domestic proceedings may constitute a special circumstance which would absolve the applicants from exhausting the domestic remedies at their disposal (see \u0160orgi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 34973\/06, \u00a7\u00a055, 3 November 2011). That is especially so in cases such as the present one, which concerns a continuing situation (highly) prejudicial to the first applicant\u2019s private life (see, mutatis mutandis, X. v. Germany, no. 6699\/74, Commission decision of 15\u00a0December 1977, Decisions and Reports 11, p.\u00a016, at p. 24). Having regard to the particular circumstances mentioned above, the Court considers that in this case the applicants cannot be required to wait any longer for the final outcome of the custody proceedings.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions175.\u00a0\u00a0The arguments of the Government and the applicants reproduced in paragraphs 121-22 and 124 and in paragraphs 129-30 above, respectively, are also relevant for examining the merits of this part of the application.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant176.\u00a0\u00a0While the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by the public authorities, there may in addition be positive obligations inherent in effective \u201crespect\u201d for private and family life, and these obligations may involve the adoption of measures in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection (see, for example, Bevacqua and S., cited above, \u00a7 64).177.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the right to respect for private life, these obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure that right, including both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudicatory and enforcement machinery protecting individuals\u2019 rights, and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific measures (see, for example, P. and S. v. Poland, no. 57375\/08, \u00a7 95, 30 October 2012).178.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the right to respect for family life, these include an obligation on the national authorities to take measures with a view to reuniting parents with their children and to facilitate such reunions. This also applies to cases where contact and custody disputes concerning children arise between parents and\/or other members of the children\u2019s family (see, for example, Gluhakovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 56).179.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that ineffective, and in particular delayed, conduct of custody proceedings may give rise to a breach of positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Eberhard and M. v. Slovenia, nos. 8673\/05 and 9733\/05, \u00a7 127, 1 December 2009, and S.I. v. Slovenia, no. 45082\/05, \u00a7 69, 13 October 2011).180.\u00a0\u00a0It further reiterates that whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by Article 8 (see, for example, W. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, \u00a7\u00a7 62 and 64, Series A no.\u00a0121, and T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28945\/95, \u00a7\u00a072, ECHR 2001\u2011V (extracts)). In particular, in a number of childcare case,s the Court has examined whether the parents had been sufficiently involved in the decision-making process, with a view to establishing whether their rights under Article 8 had been violated (see, for example, W.\u00a0v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 62-68 and 70; Sommerfeld v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 31871\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 66-75, ECHR 2003\u2011VIII (extracts)); and Sahin v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 30943\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 68-78, ECHR 2003\u2011VIII).181.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraphs 94 and 97 above, and in particular paragraph 32 of General Comment No. 12 (2009) on the right of the child to be heard), the Court finds that the same considerations apply mutatis mutandis in any judicial or administrative proceedings affecting children\u2019s rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, in such cases it cannot be said that the children capable of forming their own views were sufficiently involved in the decision-making process if they were not provided with the opportunity to be heard and thus express their views.182.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the custody proceedings have so far been pending for more than four years and three months. Having regard to its case-law (see Eberhard and M., cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0138-42, and Kopf and Liberda v. Austria, no. 1598\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 46-49, 17\u00a0January 2012), the Court considers that this fact alone would be sufficient to find that the respondent State has failed to discharge its positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention, even if the facts of the instant case had not necessitated greater promptness than that normally required in childcare cases.183.\u00a0\u00a0The present case indeed called for greater promptness, because it concerns a traumatised child who, if for no other reason than the fact of her parents\u2019 conflictual relationship, suffered great mental anguish which culminated in self-harming behaviour. However, it would appear that the domestic courts failed to recognise the seriousness and the urgency of the situation. In particular, it appears that they did not understand that the first applicant perceived life with her mother as a way out of her precarious position, and the custody proceedings as instrumental in achieving that goal. The domestic courts therefore did not realise that the protracted character of those proceedings was exacerbating the first applicant\u2019s plight.184.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is particularly struck by the fact that after four years and three months the first applicant has not yet been heard in those proceedings and thus given a chance to express her views on the issue of which parent she wanted to live with. It notes that the County Court had in its decision of 15\u00a0November 2013 instructed the Municipal Court to assess whether the first applicant was able to understand the importance of the proceedings and, if so, allow her to express her opinion and take a statement from her (see paragraph 77 above), although there was nothing to call into question the presumption that the first applicant \u2013 who was at the time twelve years old \u2013 was capable of forming her own views and expressing them (see paragraph 20 of the General Comment No. 12 (2009) on the right of the child to be heard, in paragraph 97 above). In any event, more than a year and seven months have passed without steps being taken to comply even with that instruction. What is even more surprising is that no steps have been taken to accelerate the proceedings even after the first applicant started exhibiting self-harming behaviour.185.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court notes that under the case-law of the Croatian courts, in situations where both parents are equally fit to take care of the child, and the child is, having regard to his or her age and maturity, capable of forming his or her own views and expressing them, the child\u2019s wishes as regards which parent to live with must be respected (see paragraph 85 above). The Court cannot but subscribe to that view, as it considers that otherwise the rule that the views of the child must be given due weight would be rendered meaningless.186.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present case the forensic experts in psychology and psychiatry found that the first applicant\u2019s parents were equally (un)fit to take care of her (see paragraph 69 above), a view that appears to be shared by the local social welfare centre (see paragraph 83 above). Those experts also established that the first applicant expressed a strong wish to live with her mother (see paragraph 69 above). The Court further observes that both her parents live in the same town, and that a reversal of the custody order would therefore not entail the first applicant having to change school or otherwise be removed from her habitual social environment. Moreover, the first applicant, who is an A-grade pupil and whom the experts viewed as being of good or even above-average intellectual capacities (see paragraphs 19-20 above), was nine and a half years old at the start of the proceedings and is now thirteen and a half. It would thus be difficult to argue that, given her age and maturity, she is not capable of forming her own views and expressing them freely. The Court therefore finds that not respecting her wishes as regards the issue of which parent to live with would, in the specific circumstances of the present case, constitute an infringement of her right to respect for private and family life.187.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all of the above, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the present case as regards the first applicant\u2019s right to respect for her private and family life.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant188.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that its above findings concerning the protracted character of the custody proceedings apply equally to the second applicant (see paragraph 182).189.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the present case as regards the second applicant\u2019s right to respect for family life.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION190.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also complained that they had neither had access to court nor an effective remedy to complain of a violation of their rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention because of the refusal by the domestic authorities to allow them to pursue criminal proceedings against the first applicant\u2019s father for the criminal offence of child abuse. They relied on Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1 and Article 13 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:Article 6 (right to a fair hearing)\u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201dArticle 13 (right to an effective remedy)\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d191.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the Convention does not guarantee a right to have criminal proceedings instituted against third persons or to have such persons convicted (see, among many other authorities, Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287\/99, \u00a7 70, ECHR 2004\u2011I, and Krzak v. Poland, no.\u00a051515\/99, \u00a7 24, 6 April 2004).192.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that these complaints are incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of its Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4 thereof.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION193.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage194.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants each claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.195.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that claim.196.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicants suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the first applicant EUR\u00a019,500, to be paid to her guardian ad litem and held until such time as this sum can be administered by the first applicant herself, and the second applicant EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on those amounts.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses197.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed HRK 15,625 for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic authorities and HRK 27,578.47 for those incurred before the Court.198.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested these claims.199.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants jointly the sum of EUR 3,600 for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest200.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27474":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that her removal from Sweden would expose her to a real risk of being subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The submissions of the parties(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that, should the expulsion order against her be enforced, she would face a real risk of either being killed by her uncles because she had refused to agree to a forced marriage before fleeing Somalia or being forced to marry someone against her will again upon return. She also stated that the general situation in Somalia was very severe for women, in particularly for those who lacked a male network. As a consequence, she would risk having to live alone in a refugee camp, which would expose her to serious danger. In this respect, she referred to available country information which, she claimed, the Swedish authorities had ignored.45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant challenged the credibility analysis which had been made by the Migration Board and the Migration Court in her case and which were used by the respondent Government in their submissions. In her view, a general assessment of credibility should not be made; instead, the essential parts of her statement should be assessed. Accordingly, the fact that she had applied for a residence permit in three different countries and there had given different names was of no significance. She argued that the names were essentially just different spellings \u2013 with the addition of her grandfather\u2019s name in one case \u2013 and that it was not her but the respective authorities that had recorded her name in the various applications. In this connection, she also claimed that she had tried to avoid being returned in accordance with the Dublin Regulation to Italy, a country where a young Somali woman like her would be at risk of abuse. Also the fact that she had not initially mentioned her forced marriage to the Swedish authorities had no bearing on her credibility; this was so because she did not see herself as a married woman since the marriage had been forced upon her in the Somali tradition. To acknowledge that marriage would have given it legitimacy and would have involved another violation of her rights.46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further asserted that all her circumstances had been clarified at an oral examination at the Migration Board in January 2013, which was allegedly the first time that she had had a public counsel to assist her. Not having had access to counsel before this interview, she should not be criticised for the fact that some circumstances had come to light late in the asylum proceedings. Also, given that her credibility had been called into question, the Migration Court ought to have held an oral hearing in the case.47.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to her submissions to the Swedish authorities and the Court, the applicant claimed that she had given a highly detailed story and had submitted strong country reports of ill-treatment of women in Somalia to show that she would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 upon return to that country. Contrasting her situation with that of the applicant in the case of K.A.B. v. Sweden (no. 886\/11, 5\u00a0September 2013), she pointed out that that applicant was a man and thus would not face gender-based ill-treatment in Somalia, which allegedly exposed women to a near 100 per cent risk of abuse. In the applicant\u2019s view, discrimination and violence against women had increased significantly in recent years. Also the general security situation in the country had deteriorated since the K.A.B. judgment.48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that, not having been back to Somalia for almost ten years and not having had any contact with her relatives during that period, she no longer had any close connections in the country. Thus, she would have no access to a male network upon return. While gender-based ill-treatment affected all women in Somalia, also those who had a family or social network, she was accordingly particularly vulnerable. The risks facing her were further exacerbated by the fact that there were no functioning authorities in Somalia and she thus had nowhere to turn to get protection.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that the general security situation in Mogadishu remained serious. They further noted that there were reports of general discrimination against women and widespread sexual and gender-based violence in Somalia. Furthermore, since the state was reportedly unable to provide effective protection in south and central Somalia, including Mogadishu, women with no resources or without the protection of a male network were considered likely to be in need of international protection. However, the Government contended that recent country-of-origin information did not suggest that there had been any significant increase in the general level of violence since the Court\u2019s ruling in K.A.B. v.\u00a0Sweden. Thus, allegedly, the Court\u2019s assessment in that case remained valid and the situation in Mogadishu, including the situation for women, was not of such nature as to place everyone who was present in the city at a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. In the Government\u2019s view, the relevant issue in the present case was therefore whether the applicant\u2019s personal situation was such that her return to Mogadishu would contravene that provision.50.\u00a0\u00a0In regard to the applicant\u2019s personal situation, the Government first asserted that it had been thoroughly examined by the Migration Board and the migration courts. The Board had conducted several interviews with the applicant in the presence of an interpreter whom she had confirmed that she had understood well. Moreover, throughout the proceedings, she had been represented by appointed counsel. Her counsel had also been given the opportunity to submit written opinions on the minutes of all interviews held by the Board. Holding that an oral hearing before the Migration Court had not been called for in the circumstances of the case, the Government further pointed out that the applicant and her counsel had been able to argue her case in writing before that court and the Migration Court of Appeal.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Government agreed with the national instances that there were several reasons to seriously question the veracity of the applicant\u2019s statements in the case. They first pointed to the fact that, before arriving in Sweden, she had applied for asylum in Italy and the Netherlands and had, on each occasion, used different names and dates of birth. Furthermore, while she arrived in Sweden in 2007, she had not contacted the Swedish migration authorities to apply for asylum until the end of 2011, and there was thus reason to question her perceived need of protection.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also submitted that the applicant had provided contradictory and altered information in central aspects of her account, for which she had not provided satisfactory explanations. For instance, when she first applied for asylum in 2011 she had claimed that she had left Somalia because of the war, whereas at the interview held in January 2013 she had argued that she feared ill-treatment from her family. Also, whereas she had initially stated that she did not know how she had sustained the injuries in her hip and legs as she had been very little when it had happened, in 2013 she had submitted that the injuries were a result of the abuse she had been subjected to by her male relatives.53.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, in regard to her marital status, the applicant had claimed consistently throughout the initial migration proceedings that she was not married. However, at the interview in January 2013 she had stated that she had left Somalia to escape a forced marriage to an older man arranged by her male relatives. In the Government\u2019s view, the applicant had thus changed her account as regards the main ground for her alleged need for protection. While she had explained before the Migration Court that she did not consider herself to be married, since she had not consented to the marriage or attended a wedding ceremony, the Government contended that it would have been reasonable to expect her not to omit this fundamental aspect of her claim when initially asked to explain why she was in need of protection in Sweden.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further noted that the applicant\u2019s claim in support of her request for a re-examination of her case \u2013 that she had recently been informed that her uncle had joined al-Shabaab, murdered her sister and forced her brother to join al-Shabaab and that she would risk being stoned to death upon return \u2013 had been submitted without any information on how or by whom she had been informed about these events. The Government agreed with the Migration Board that a mere statement from the applicant about her uncle\u2019s actions was not sufficient to assume that she would risk being stoned or subjected to any other ill-treatment if returned to Somalia.55.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the Government asserted that the applicant had failed to substantiate her claim that her family and male relatives had subjected her to ill-treatment or that they would do so in the future. Consequently, also her allegation that, upon return to Mogadishu \u2013 where she had stated that her brother and uncles reside, she would be a lone woman without the protection of a male network lacked credibility. Rather, nothing suggested that she would need to live in a settlement for displaced persons. Accordingly, notwithstanding the security situation in Mogadishu in general, and for women in particular, the Government was of the opinion that the forced return of the applicant to Mogadishu would not give rise to a violation of Article 3.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles56.\u00a0\u00a0It is settled case-law that Contracting States have the right, as a matter of international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens (see, for example, \u00dcner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410\/99, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2006\u2011XII). However, expulsion by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country. In such a case, Article 3 implies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country (Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7 93, ECHR 2014, with further references).57.\u00a0\u00a0The assessment whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces such a real risk inevitably requires that the Court assess the conditions in the receiving country against the standards of Article 3 of the Convention (Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos.\u00a046827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2005-I). These standards imply that the ill-treatment allegedly facing the applicant upon return must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (Tarakhel v. Switzerland, cited above, \u00a7 94). Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranteed, Article 3 of the Convention may also apply where the danger emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials. However, it must be shown that the risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection (K.A.B. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 69).58.\u00a0\u00a0The assessment of the existence of a real risk must necessarily be a rigorous one (Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 128, ECHR 2008). It is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts about it (Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7 214, 28 June 2011). In this respect, the Court acknowledges that, owing to the special situation in which asylum seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of their statements and the documents submitted in support thereof. However, when information is presented which gives strong reasons to question the veracity of an asylum seeker\u2019s submissions, the individual must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged discrepancies (K.A.B. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 70).59.\u00a0\u00a0If the applicant has not been extradited or deported when the Court examines the case, the material point in time must be that of the Court\u2019s consideration of the case. It is the present conditions that are decisive and it is therefore necessary to take into account information that has come to light after the final decision was taken by the domestic authorities (K.A.B. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 71).60.\u00a0\u00a0The assessment must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the removal of the applicant to the country of destination, which should be considered in the light of the general situation there as well as the personal circumstances of the applicant. In this connection, and where it is relevant to do so, the Court will have regard to whether there is a general situation of violence existing in the country of destination. The question for the Court to consider is whether, in all the circumstances of the case before it, substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. If the existence of such a risk is established, the applicant\u2019s removal would necessarily breach Article 3, regardless of whether the risk emanates from a general situation of violence, a personal characteristic of the applicant, or a combination of the two. However, it is clear that not every situation of general violence will give rise to such a risk. On the contrary, the Court has made it clear that a general situation of violence would only be of sufficient intensity to create such a risk \u201cin the most extreme cases\u201d where there was a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence on return (Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 216 and 218, and K.A.B. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 72 and 76).61.\u00a0\u00a0It should finally be mentioned that, in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum applications or verify how the States honour their obligations under the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It must be satisfied, though, that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating from other reliable and objective sources such as, for instance, other contracting or non-contracting states, agencies of the United Nations and reputable non-governmental organisations (K.A.B. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 74).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the circumstances of the present case62.\u00a0\u00a0To begin with, it should be noted that the Migration Board concluded that the applicant originates from Mogadishu and that the Board as well as the Migration Court accordingly examined the general situation in that city and the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances there. In the Court\u2019s view, it is thus clear that, if deported from Sweden, the applicant will be sent to Mogadishu. Moreover, as there is an international airport in Mogadishu, there is no risk that she will have to transit through or end up in other parts of Somalia. The following examination of the case will therefore deal with the issue whether a deportation to Mogadishu would involve a breach of the Convention.63.\u00a0\u00a0In regard to the general situation, the Court found in June 2011 that the violence in Mogadishu was of such a level of intensity that anyone in the city would be at real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 250). In reaching that conclusion, the Court had regard to \u201cthe indiscriminate bombardments and military offensives carried out by all parties to the conflict, the unacceptable number of civilian casualties, the substantial number of persons displaced within and from the city, and the unpredictable and widespread nature of the conflict\u201d (ibid., \u00a7 248).64.\u00a0\u00a0However, in September 2013 the Court drew the opposite conclusion. Taking into account the most recent information about Mogadishu, it found that, although the human rights and security situation in the city was serious and fragile and in many ways unpredictable, it was not of such a nature as to place everyone present there at a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. In this respect, it noted that \u201cal-Shabaab is no longer in power in the city, there is no front-line fighting or shelling any longer and the number of civilian casualties has gone down\u201d (K.A.B. v.\u00a0Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 91).65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is now called upon to assess, for the third time, whether the prevailing level of violence in Mogadishu is of such intensity that anyone in the city would be at real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. In doing so, it will have regard to, among other things, the criteria which it applied on the two earlier occasions and which had been identified by the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal in AM\u00a0& AM ((armed conflict: risk categories) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00091): \u201c[F]irst, whether the parties to the conflict were either employing methods and tactics of warfare which increased the risk of civilian casualties or directly targeting civilians; secondly, whether the use of such methods and\/or tactics was widespread among the parties to the conflict; thirdly, whether the fighting was localised or widespread; and finally, the number of civilians killed, injured and displaced as a result of the fighting\u201d. The Court noted that \u201cwhile these criteria [were] not to be seen as an exhaustive list to be applied in all future cases\u201d, they formed an \u201cappropriate yardstick by which to assess the level of violence in Mogadishu\u201d (Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 241, and K.A.B. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 77 and 86).66.\u00a0\u00a0As has been mentioned above, the Court concluded in K.A.B. v. Sweden that the general situation in Mogadishu was not such that returns to that city would breach Article 3. The question is therefore whether the situation has worsened since then, that is, since September 2013. The UNHCR, reporting in January 2014 on the period that had to a large extent been assessed by the Court in K.A.B., found that, while security in Mogadishu had improved during the preceding few years, al-Shabaab were still able to stage attacks that caused civilian deaths and injuries every week. In 2013 the outright fighting in the city had gone down, but the number of dead and injured civilians had reportedly increased. Government and allied forces often failed to provide protection or security for civilians and were themselves a source of insecurity (see paragraph 35 above). Also in January 2014, the Swedish Migration Board noted that, although the human rights situation was considerably better in areas with a strong presence of AMISOM or the Ethiopian army (thus including Mogadishu) than in areas controlled by al-Shabaab, it was still uncertain whether the police, the courts and other authorities were at all functioning. Moreover, SNAF soldiers were reportedly robbing and raping civilians. These assessments were confirmed in the Migration Board\u2019s report from April 2015 (paragraph 29). The UN Secretary-General reported in May 2015 that the overall security situation in Somalia remained volatile and that attacks continued in Mogadishu, including casualties among government officials, civilians and security personnel (paragraph 39).67.\u00a0\u00a0It is thus clear that the general security situation in Mogadishu remains serious and fragile. The available sources do not, however, indicate that the situation has deteriorated since September 2013. For example, in the Danish\/Norwegian report of March 2014 (see paragraph 25 above), the UNDSS and an international NGO were reported as saying that there had been security improvements since April 2013. Also the conclusions drawn by the United Kingdom Upper Tribunal in MOJ & Ors (paragraphs 31-32) suggest that there has been an improvement. Given the high volume of oral and written evidence examined by the Tribunal, the Court considers that its assessment must be accorded great weight. Among other things, the Tribunal concluded that there had been durable change in the sense that the al-Shabaab withdrawal from Mogadishu was complete and there was no real prospect of a re-established presence within the city. The indiscriminate bombardments and military offensives mentioned by the Court in its 2011 judgment in Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kindom had been replaced by al-Shabaab attacks against carefully selected targets \u2013 politicians, police officers, government officials and those associated with non-governmental and international organisations \u2013 that did not include \u201cordinary civilians\u201d or diaspora returnees. The Tribunal further considered that the areas and establishments at which these attacks were aimed were largely predictable and could be reasonably avoided by the citizens. Moreover, while the statistical information concerning casualty levels was deficient and unreliable, the cessation of confrontational warfare in Mogadishu and the changed type of attacks by al-Shabaab were found to have reduced the level of civilian casualties since 2011. The Tribunal also had regard to the \u201chuge\u201d number of people returning to the city, where new economic opportunities were available.68.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, having regard to the information available concerning the present situation in Mogadishu, the Court finds that the assessment made in K.A.B. v. Sweden (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 87-91) is still valid. Thus, there is no indication that the situation is of such a nature as to place everyone who is present in the city at a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. The Court must therefore establish whether the applicant\u2019s personal circumstances are such that her return to Mogadishu would contravene that provision.69.\u00a0\u00a0It must be stressed at the outset that the profile of the present applicant is different from that of the applicant in K.A.B. v. Sweden. While that case concerned a man born in 1960, the present applicant is a woman, born in 1988, who has been living abroad for almost ten years after having left Somalia when she was 17 years of age.70.\u00a0\u00a0The various reports attest to the difficult situation of women in Somalia, including Mogadishu. The UNHCR has identified women and girls as a particular risk group (see paragraph 37 above). While there has been legislative progress in the form of the development of a sexual offences bill, there are several concordant reports about serious and widespread sexual and gender-based violence in the country (paragraphs 27, 30, 33-34 and 38). Not only civilians but also members of SNAF, AMISOM and other armed forces are perpetrators of abuse against women. Women are unable to get protection from the police and the crimes are often committed with impunity, as the authorities are unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute reported perpetrators. It is also clear that women are generally discriminated against in Somali society and that they hold a subordinate position to men. As shown by the report of the Swedish Migration Board, women are reliant on men in many aspects of societal life (paragraph 30). In the Court\u2019s view, it may be concluded that a single woman returning to Mogadishu without access to protection from a male network would face a real risk of living in conditions constituting inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention.71.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the specific circumstances of the applicant, it should first be noted that she was interviewed by the Migration Board on several occasions with the assistance of an interpreter and that, at least at the lengthy asylum interview in January 2013, she was represented by public counsel. While the Migration Court did not hold an oral hearing in the case, the applicant and her counsel nevertheless had ample opportunities to present her case orally and in writing during the proceedings as a whole. Moreover, both the Migration Board and the Migration Court made careful examinations of the submissions made and delivered decisions containing extensive reasons for their conclusions. In the Court\u2019s view, the domestic authorities have made an adequate investigation and assessment of the applicant\u2019s case.72.\u00a0\u00a0Like the domestic authorities and the respondent Government, the Court has serious misgivings about the veracity of the applicant\u2019s statements. Her use of slightly different names and birth dates in the asylum applications filed in Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden is not of particular importance in this respect. However, it is to be noted that the applicant stayed in Sweden for at least four years without contacting the authorities. Thus, for a considerable period of time, she did not try to regularise her stay in the country by applying for asylum. If the threats against her were real, it was in her own interest to present them to the Migration Board as soon as possible in order to obtain adequate protection. Her explanation \u2013 that she was trying to avoid a transfer to Italy under the Dublin Regulation \u2013 is not convincing. More importantly, while certain details of an asylum seeker\u2019s story may come to light only at a later stage of the proceedings, it is remarkable that, when the applicant applied for asylum in Sweden in December 2011, she did not mention anything relating to the claim which is now her principal reason for fearing a return to Mogadishu. Thus, she did not say that she had been forced to marry an older man and did not claim that she and her secret boyfriend had been beaten by her uncles when they had tried to escape. Furthermore, she stated that she could not remember how she had sustained her hip injuries as she had been very young at the time. The allegations that she had been forcibly married and beaten by her uncles, the latter leading to her hip injuries and a few months\u2019 of hospitalisation, were presented to the Migration Board only after more than a year had passed since her asylum application. Again, her explanation for this omission \u2013 that she did not consider herself to be married \u2013 cannot be accepted. While she may have had good reasons not to characterise herself as a married woman, there was no reason for her to leave out these key events from her initial asylum story if they had actually happened. With respect to the applicant\u2019s claim that one of her uncles had joined al-Shabaab, killed her sister and forced her brother to also join al-Shabaab, the Court notes that this was submitted to the Migration Board in a petition to have the enforcement of her deportation order stopped, at a time when her asylum application had already been finally rejected. It appears that the applicant did not offer any details on how and from whom she had received this information. Having regard to the lack of substantiation and to the available information that there is no forced recruitment to al-Shabaab in Mogadishu (see paragraph 32 above), this claim appears to have been a late invention to bolster the applicant\u2019s case.73.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, the Court considers that there are significant inconsistencies in the applicant\u2019s submissions. The claims concerning her personal experiences and the dangers facing her upon return have not been made plausible. Accordingly, there is no basis for finding that she would return to Mogadishu as a lone woman with the risks that such a situation entails. In this connection, the Court notes that the applicant was informed of the death of her father in 2010 and her mother in 2011, indicating that she has retained contacts in Mogadishu. Moreover, she has family living in the city, including a brother and uncles. She must therefore be considered to have access to both family support and a male protection network. Furthermore, it has not been shown that the applicant would have to resort to living in a camp for refugees and IDPs.74.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, while not overlooking the difficult situation of women in Somalia, including Mogadishu, the Court cannot find, in this particular case, that the applicant would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if returned to that city. Thus, her deportation to Mogadishu would not involve a violation of that provision.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 2 AND 4 OF THE CONVENTION75.\u00a0\u00a0Invoking Articles 2 and 4 of the Convention, the applicant complained that she would risk either to be killed by her uncles because she had refused to agree to a forced marriage before fleeing Somalia or to be forced to marry someone against her will again, the latter equating slavery.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are in substance the same as the one examined above under Article 3. Consequently, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that these complaints must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that, in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.78.\u00a0\u00a0It considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 4 above) must continue in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection (see operative part).","27485":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ADMISSIBILITY21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 5 of the Convention that he had been denied legal assistance while in custody. Under the same provision, he further stated that he had not been able to contact his family, and alleged that the length of time he had spent in custody had been excessive.22.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged under Article 6 of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing. In this respect, he argued that the trial court lacked independence and impartiality, that his request for an additional expert report on the condition of his hand had been refused, and that he had not been given an opportunity to challenge the statements of several accused persons who had testified against him in their own police statements.23.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 14 of the Convention that he had been subjected to discriminatory treatment on account of his Kurdish origin.24.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained that he had been subjected to degrading treatment while in custody in Syria. He alleged in particular that the prison conditions there had been humiliating and that he had been chained and blindfolded while being transferred to Turkey. In this connection, he also alleged that his transfer to Turkey by the Syrian authorities was illegal, as he had a residence permit for Germany.\u00a0The applicant further stated that during his interrogation in Turkey he had been coerced into signing self-incriminating statements. He further alleged that the sentence of aggravated life imprisonment was, by its nature, against the principles of Article 3 of the Convention.A.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints raised under Article 5 of the Convention25.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been denied legal assistance in custody. He also argued that he had not been given an opportunity to contact his family and complained about the length of time he had spent in custody.26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the absence of legal assistance while in custody should be examined under Article 6 of the Convention. As regards the remaining complaints, it notes that the applicant\u2019s time in custody ended on 18 August 2003, whereas the application was introduced on 30 June 2005, more than six months later.27.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application should be rejected as introduced outside the six-month period under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints raised under Article 6 of the Convention1.\u00a0\u00a0Lack of legal assistance28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that he had not received the assistance of a lawyer while in custody.29.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim as the applicant had clearly waived such a right.30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes in the first place that at the material time there was no restriction in law on the availability of legal assistance for those in custody (see, a contrario, Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a036391\/02, \u00a7 14, ECHR\u00a02008, for national legislation, see \u00a7\u00a7 27-29). Furthermore, it is undisputed that the applicant signed two forms explaining arrested persons\u2019 rights, according to which, although the applicant had been reminded of his right to remain silent and to legal assistance, he had stated that he did not require any legal assistance, and had given statements to the gendarmerie and subsequently to the public prosecutor (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above).31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicant did not at any stage state to the trial court that any request that a lawyer be appointed for him had been refused by the domestic authorities. There is no element in the case file indicating that the applicant had not willingly and unequivocally decided to waive his right to legal assistance during his questioning (see\u00a0Ba\u015far v.\u00a0Turkey (dec.), no. 17880\/07, 15 April\u00a02011, and Diri\u00f6z v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a038560\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 28-38, 31\u00a0May 2012).32.\u00a0\u00a0In the circumstances of the present case, the Court concludes that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Independence and impartiality of the trial court33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that, in breach of Article 6 of the Convention, he had not been tried by an independent and impartial court. In this connection, without giving any details, he argued that his trial had commenced before a State Security Court, which, in his opinion, could not be regarded as impartial.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that following the amendment of the Constitution in 1999, the military judges sitting in state security courts were replaced by civilian judges. In the present case, the criminal proceedings against the applicant were initiated in 2001, after the above-mentioned amendment. Furthermore, the Court reiterates that it has examined similar complaints in the past, and has held that there was no breach of Article 6 of the Convention (see \u0130mrek v. Turkey (dec.), no. 57175\/00, 28 January 2003). It finds no particular circumstances in the instant case which would require it to depart from its findings in such earlier cases.35.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Fairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he did not have a fair trial before the national courts. In this respect, he alleged that the national courts had rejected his request for an additional expert report regarding the condition of his injured hand. He further stated that the trial court had failed in its interpretation of domestic law as, in his view, he should not have been convicted under Article 125 of the Criminal Code but under more lenient provisions. The applicant also complained that he had not been given an opportunity to challenge the statements of witnesses who had testified against him.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Government mainly argued that the right to examine witnesses was not unlimited and refers to the statements of the applicant by relying on Latimer v. United Kingdom ((dec.), no.\u00a012141\/04, 31\u00a0May 2005), a case in which the applicant was convicted upon his own statements without the benefit of legal advice.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the High Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see Schenk v. Switzerland, 12\u00a0July 1988, \u00a7 45, Series A no. 140). The Court also notes that as a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them as well as the relevance of the evidence which defendants seek to adduce (see Barber\u00e0,\u00a0Messegu\u00e9 and Jabardo v. Spain, 6 December 1988, \u00a7\u00a068, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0146). The Court finally reiterates that Article 6 \u00a7 3(d) enshrines the principle that before an accused can be convicted, all evidence against him must normally be produced in his presence at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument. Exceptions to this principle are possible but must not infringe the rights of the defence, which, as a rule, require that the accused should be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either when that witness makes a statement or at a later stage of the proceedings (see Al-Khawaja and Tahery v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766\/05 and 22228\/06, \u00a7\u00a0118, ECHR\u00a02011).39.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s case was examined thoroughly at two levels of jurisdiction, and the decisions of the Erzurum Assize Court and the Court of Cassation were delivered on the basis of domestic law and the particular circumstances of the case. In this respect, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s request for an additional expert report was rejected by the domestic court as it was decided that the outcome of such a report would not be decisive. This was on the basis that the participation of the applicant in armed attacks before November 1992, the date on which his right hand had become partially infirm such as to not allow him to use a gun, had been established. According to the court, such a conclusion dispensed with the necessity of establishing his participation or not in the succeeding acts for which he was prosecuted.40.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, although the applicant alleged that his conviction had been based on the incriminating statements of other persons accused of terrorism, the Court observes that neither the applicant nor his lawyers requested at any stage of the proceedings the examination of such witnesses, but rather focused on the alleged incapacity to use a firearm after November\u00a01992, a period which was not taken into consideration by the national court.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant never denied carrying out activities as one of the representatives of the illegal organisation. The admissibility, and reliability, of the confessions which the applicant made during his questioning by the gendarmes and prosecutor were scrutinized on several occasions in full adversarial proceedings during which the applicant was represented by a lawyer. The Assize Court found, having regard to the applicant\u2019s conduct during the interviews, that there was no doubt as to the voluntariness of his initial admissions. In particular, it was not convinced that the applicant was of such vulnerability or had been subjected to such pressure during his detention that reliance on the admissions would be unfair. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds no element or argument in the case file on the basis of which to conclude that the domestic proceedings were unfair or that the defence rights of the applicant were prejudiced.42.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and should be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.C.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint raised under Article 14 of the Convention43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged under Article 14 of the Convention that he had been subjected to discriminatory treatment on account of his Kurdish origin.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined the applicant\u2019s allegations in the light of the evidence submitted to it and considers them unsubstantiated.45.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.D.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints raised under Article 3 of the Convention1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s custody in Syria46.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant firstly complained about the treatment he had been subjected to by the Syrian authorities while in custody in Damascus.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that Syria is not a party to the Convention, and that this part of the application is therefore incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s custody in Turkey48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further alleged that he had been coerced by the gendarmerie into making self-incriminating statements. In this connection, he alleged that he had been subjected to psychological pressure while in custody.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see\u00a0Talat Tepe v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 31247\/96, \u00a7 48, 21 December 2004). Such proof may, however, follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see\u00a0Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 121, ECHR\u00a02000-IV).50.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court observes that the applicant has not submitted any evidence demonstrating that he had been subjected to physical or psychological pressure while in custody. Nor did he argue that he had been unable to obtain, or had been prevented from obtaining, any such evidence. In this connection, the Court notes that the two medical reports included in the case file indicated no signs of ill-treatment on the applicant\u2019s body and at no stage of the domestic proceedings or during the Strasbourg proceedings has the applicant challenged the veracity of these reports or alleged that the doctors who issued them failed to examine him properly. The Court therefore considers that the applicant has not laid the basis of an arguable claim.51.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint related to \u201caggravated life imprisonment\u201d52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further alleged under Article 3 of the Convention that the life sentence imposed on him amounted to inhuman punishment as there was no possibility of review or commutation.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the execution modalities of a criminal sentence were not covered by the Convention and referred to the decision in Sawoniuk v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no.\u00a063716\/00, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011VI).54.\u00a0\u00a0Given the fact that the compatibility with Article 3 of the Convention of a life sentence without possibility of review was examined by the Grand Chamber in the above-mentioned Vinter\u00a0and\u00a0Others judgment (\u00a7\u00a7 104, 107-115, 119, and 123-131), the Court rejects this objection.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further stressed that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as he had not brought such a complaint to the knowledge of the national authorities.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the irreducible nature of the \u201caggravated life imprisonment\u201d arises from national legislation (see paragraph 19 above). As such, the applicant did not have at his disposal effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint. Furthermore, the Government have not shown the existence of any available domestic remedy at the material time. The Court therefore rejects the Government\u2019s objection.57.\u00a0\u00a0As this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds, it must be declared admissible.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant considered that the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of review is incompatible with the requirements of Article\u00a03, which reads as follow:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, in summary, indicated that the Court had underlined in its judgment in Vinter and Others (cited above) that for a criminal who remained a threat to society the goal of rehabilitation might never be fulfilled.A.\u00a0\u00a0General principles relating to the need for a review mechanism in respect of whole life sentences60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that imposing life sentences on adult offenders for especially serious crimes is not in itself prohibited by, or incompatible with, Article 3 or any other Article of the Convention. However, the imposition of an irreducible life sentence on an adult may raise an issue under Article 3 (see Kafkaris, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 97 and 98, and Vinter and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0106 and\u00a0107).61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reaffirmed the two particular but related aspects of this principle in its above-mentioned judgment Vinter and Others as follows (\u00a7\u00a7\u00a0108 and\u00a0109 and the references cited therein):\u201c108.\u00a0\u00a0First, a life sentence does not become irreducible by the mere fact that in practice it may be served in full. No issue arises under Article 3 if a life sentence is de\u00a0jure and de facto reducible. In this respect, the Court would emphasise that no Article\u00a03 issue could arise if, for instance, a life prisoner had the right under domestic law to be considered for release but was refused on the ground that he or she continued to pose a danger to society. This is because States have a duty under the Convention to take measures for the protection of the public from violent crime and the Convention does not prohibit States from subjecting a person convicted of a serious crime to an indeterminate sentence allowing for the offender\u2019s continued detention where necessary for the protection of the public. Indeed, preventing a criminal from re-offending is one of the \u201cessential functions\u201d of a prison sentence. This is particularly so for those convicted of murder or other serious offences against the person. The mere fact that such prisoners may have already served a long period of imprisonment does not weaken the State\u2019s positive obligation to protect the public; States may fulfil that obligation by continuing to detain such life sentenced prisoners for as long as they remain dangerous.109.\u00a0\u00a0Second, in determining whether a life sentence in a given case can be regarded as irreducible, the Court has sought to ascertain whether a life prisoner can be said to have any prospect of release. Where national law affords the possibility of review of a life sentence with a view to its commutation, remission, termination or the conditional release of the prisoner, this will be sufficient to satisfy Article\u00a03.\u201d62.\u00a0\u00a0After examining the elements of European and international law confirming the principle that all prisoners, including those sentenced to life, should be given the opportunity to progress towards rehabilitation and the prospect of being released if they succeed, the Court made specific findings under Article 3 regarding life sentences (Vinter and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0119-122):\u201c119.\u00a0\u00a0(...) the Court considers that, in the context of a life sentence, Article 3 must be interpreted as requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the sense of a review which allows the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds.120.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court would emphasise that, having regard to the margin of appreciation which must be accorded to Contracting States in the matters of criminal justice and sentencing, it is not its task to prescribe the form (executive or judicial) which that review should take. For the same reason, it is not for the Court to determine when that review should take place. This being said, the Court would also observe that the comparative and international law materials before it show clear support for the institution of a dedicated mechanism guaranteeing a review no later than twenty-five years after the imposition of a life sentence, with further periodic reviews thereafter.121.\u00a0\u00a0It follows from this conclusion that, where domestic law does not provide for the possibility of such a review, a whole life sentence will not measure up to the standards of Article 3 of the Convention.122.\u00a0\u00a0Although the requisite review is a prospective event necessarily subsequent to the passing of the sentence, a whole life prisoner should not be obliged to wait and serve an indeterminate number of years of his sentence before he can raise the complaint that the legal conditions attaching to his sentence fail to comply with the requirements of Article\u00a03 in this regard. This would be contrary both to legal certainty and to the general principles on victim status within the meaning of that term in Article 34 of the Convention. Furthermore, in cases where the sentence, on imposition, is irreducible under domestic law, it would be capricious to expect the prisoner to work towards his own rehabilitation without knowing whether, at an unspecified, future date, a mechanism might be introduced which would allow him, on the basis of that rehabilitation, to be considered for release. A whole life prisoner is entitled to know, at the outset of his sentence, what he must do to be considered for release and under what conditions, including when a review of his sentence will take place or may be sought. Consequently, where domestic law does not provide any mechanism or possibility for review of a whole life sentence, the incompatibility with Article 3 on this ground already arises at the moment of the imposition of the whole life sentence and not at a later stage of incarceration.\u201dB.\u00a0\u00a0The present case63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant has been sentenced to an \u201caggravated life sentence\u201d for terrorist activities seeking to destroy the unity of the State and to remove part of the country from the State\u2019s control. Such a penalty means that he will remain in prison for the rest of his life, regardless of any consideration relevant to his dangerousness and without the possibility of release on parole even after a period of detention (see mutatis\u00a0mutandis, \u00d6calan (no. 2), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 182-186, the findings of the Court as to the complaints under Article 7 of the Convention).64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant was sentenced under Article\u00a0125 of the former Criminal Code, and according to Article 107 of Law No.\u00a05275 on the enforcement of sentences and security measures, his situation is clearly excluded from the scope of release on parole or prescription (\u00d6calan (no. 2), cited above, \u00a7\u00a0202).65.\u00a0\u00a0Although release on health grounds is foreseen in domestic law, the Court recalls that such a possibility, or amnesty, was not considered as corresponding to the notion of \u201cprospect of release\u201d on legitimate penological grounds (Vinter and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0129, and \u00d6calan (no.\u00a02), cited above, \u00a7\u00a0203).66.\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, where domestic law does not provide any mechanism or possibility for review of a whole life sentence, the incompatibility with Article 3 on this ground already arises at the moment of the imposition of the whole life sentence and not at a later stage of incarceration (Vinter and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0122).67.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, the Court considers that there is no element or argument in the case-file, or any example of national court decisions, which would allow it to depart from its conclusion in the above-mentioned \u00d6calan (no.\u00a02) judgment. The Court therefore holds that there has been a breach of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it also necessary to underline the fact that the applicant has not sought to argue that there are no longer any legitimate penological grounds for his continued detention, and reiterates that the finding of a violation cannot be understood as giving him the prospect of imminent release (Vinter and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 108, 120 and 131, \u00d6calan (no. 2) cited above, \u00a7 207; see also Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0247\u2011268).III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION69.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage70.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that its finding of a violation of Article\u00a03 constitutes sufficient just satisfaction and accordingly makes no award under this head (see Vinter and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0136).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed 2,207.85 pounds sterling (GBP) for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court as legal work and administrative costs.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not shown that the costs sought had been actually and necessarily incurred.75.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession, the above criteria and to the violation found, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27538":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in police custody in order to make him confess to the crime. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that the applicant\u2019s rights guaranteed by Article 3 of the Convention had been violated and that the domestic remedies had been ineffective in his case.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further stressed that the domestic legal system did, in principle, provide for effective remedies for victims of police ill\u2011treatment. Firstly, there was an effective criminal-law remedy, notably a criminal investigation into the allegations of ill-treatment by police officers which could lead to the conviction of police officers. The Government referred to and submitted a series of judgments delivered by courts in 2008\u20112010 in different regions (the Astrakhan, Kemerovo, Lipetsk, Moscow, Rostov and Ryazan regions and the Republics of Tatarstan and Khakasiya), in which police officers from criminal investigation units and other police staff had been convicted under Article 286 of the Criminal Code of crimes which could qualify as violations of Article 3. The Government submitted further that investigative authorities\u2019 acts and decisions, in particular refusals to open a criminal case, were open to judicial review under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Lastly, civil judicial remedies existed in order to complain about decisions and acts of State organs and their officials and to request compensation for the damage caused.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that the Government do not plead non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and that the complaint is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in police custody62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government have acknowledged a violation of Article 3 in the present case. It has no reason to hold otherwise.63.\u00a0\u00a0After the time spent in police custody the applicant was found to be injured (see paragraphs 13, 16 and 19 above). No plausible explanation was provided for his injuries. The investigative authority\u2019s finding that the applicant had committed an act of self-harm was based on the account of events put forward by the police officers, notably G., who, in the applicant\u2019s submissions, was the officer who had used physical violence against him, and K., who had allegedly been in the room with G. when the applicant\u2019s injuries were sustained. The investigative authority\u2019s failure to verify the two versions of the origin of the applicant\u2019s injuries by using such investigative means as confrontations and identification parades, as pointed out repeatedly by the supervising authorities (see paragraphs 22 and\u00a025\u201126 above), casts doubt on the unconditional preference it gave to the police officers\u2019 version. Furthermore, the finding of self\u2011harm does not accord with the forensic medical expert\u2019s conclusion as to the origin of the injuries, which excluded the possibility that the injuries could have been caused as a result of a fall, that is by a single impact from a flat surface, as was also noted by the supervising authority (see paragraph\u00a022 above), and suggested that they could have been caused by blows from blunt hard objects with a limited contact surface. Lastly, no explanation was provided by the investigative authority for the injuries to the applicant\u2019s back.64.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the detention facilities\u2019 medical records and the forensic medical expert\u2019s conclusions, the injuries to the applicant\u2019s face, back and knees are consistent with his allegations that he was punched and kicked and that his head was struck against the wall with such force that he lost consciousness. These injuries, unaccounted for within the domestic proceedings and acknowledged by the Government, must therefore be considered attributable to a form of ill\u2011treatment for which the authorities were responsible.65.\u00a0\u00a0Strong inferences can be drawn from the evidence to the effect that the ill\u2011treatment occurred during the applicant\u2019s questioning by the police officers about the circumstances of the crime of which he was suspected and that, as a result, the applicant signed the statement of his surrender and confession, which he retracted on the following day as soon as he was given access to a lawyer. The ill-treatment can be regarded as having caused the applicant, who was in a state of particular vulnerability, considerable fear, anguish and mental suffering and driven him to act against his will. Having regard to the nature and circumstances of the ill\u2011treatment, the Court finds that it amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment (see Salman v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000\u2011VII; G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 87-93, ECHR 2010; Nasakin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a022735\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a051-55, 18\u00a0July 2013; and Mostipan v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a012042\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 58-61, 16\u00a0October 2014).66.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 under its substantive head.2.\u00a0\u00a0The State\u2019s obligation to conduct an effective investigation67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, who was found to be injured after the time spent in police custody, stated during his first questioning as a suspect on the following day, in the presence of a lawyer, that he had been subjected to ill\u2011treatment by police officers in order to obtain his confession to the crime (see paragraph 14 above). Three days later he reiterated his complaint before the judge who was examining the investigator\u2019s application for his detention on remand (see paragraph 15 above). On the same day his counsel lodged an application with the investigative authority requesting prosecution of those responsible for the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment (ibid.). On the following day the applicant\u2019s injuries were again recorded on his arrival at the pre-trial detention facility (see paragraph 16 above).68.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities were thus made promptly and sufficiently aware of the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody. The allegation was supported by the detention facilities\u2019 records of his injuries and confirmed by forensic medical evidence, obtained as a result of the very first steps undertaken by the investigative authority charged with the pre\u2011investigation inquiry into his alleged ill\u2011treatment (see paragraph 19 above). The allegation was therefore credible and gave rise to an obligation on the State to carry out an effective investigation.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government have acknowledged that no such investigation took place. The Court, as with regard to the violation of Article 3 in its substantive aspect (see paragraphs 62 and 66 above), has no reason to hold otherwise.70.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, the authorities did not open a criminal case until 5 December 2005, that is, more than three months after they had been made sufficiently aware of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. The prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s version of his ill\u2011treatment by the police officers, which was not excluded on the facts, could only be verified by way of a full investigation for which it was necessary to open a criminal case, given that there was sufficient information disclosing elements of a crime under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 22 above). According to the prosecutor, the pre\u2011investigation inquiry had not reliably established the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained his injuries. In particular, it was not possible in the course of the pre\u2011investigation inquiry to carry out an identification parade, which would have enabled the applicant to identify the police officer who had assaulted him \u2013 even though the applicant \u201cwould most likely [have been] able to identify [him]\u201d \u2013 or a confrontation between them (ibid.).71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously found in Lyapin v. Russia that in the context of the Russian legal system, if credible allegations of treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention are made, then it is incumbent on the authorities to open a criminal case and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures are carried out and which \u2013 according to the Government (see paragraph 60 above) \u2013 constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill\u2011treatment under domestic law. It is not possible to establish within the framework of a \u201cpre\u2011investigation inquiry\u201d the facts of a case, particularly the identity of persons who could have been responsible for the ill-treatment. A \u201cpre\u2011investigation inquiry\u201d alone is not capable of leading to the punishment of those responsible, since the opening of a criminal case and a criminal investigation are prerequisites for bringing charges against the alleged perpetrators, which may then be examined by a court. Confronted with numerous cases of this kind against Russia, the Court has held that it was bound to draw stronger inferences from the mere fact of the investigative authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of serious ill\u2011treatment in police custody. This was indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its obligation under Article 3 to carry out an effective investigation (see Lyapin v.\u00a0Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0129 and 132\u201136, 24\u00a0July 2014).72.\u00a0\u00a0The above findings are fully applicable to the present case. On the facts, the Court notes that the information which the prosecutor assessed as sufficient for bringing criminal proceedings on 5 December 2005 was in the investigative authority\u2019s hands shortly after the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment. Hence, nothing can explain the three-month delay in commencing the criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint. The Court considers that such a delay could not but have had an adverse impact on the investigation, undermining the investigative authority\u2019s ability to secure the evidence concerning the alleged ill\u2011treatment (see Indelicato v.\u00a0Italy, no.\u00a031143\/96, \u00a7\u00a037, 18\u00a0October 2001; Kopylov v. Russia, no.\u00a03933\/04, \u00a7\u00a0137, 29\u00a0July 2010; Eldar Imanov and Azhdar Imanov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a06887\/02, \u00a7\u00a099, 16\u00a0December 2010; and Shishkin v. Russia, no.\u00a018280\/04, \u00a7\u00a0100, 7 July 2011).73.\u00a0\u00a0The ensuing proceedings were marred by the investigative authority\u2019s failure to carry out a complete investigation, as was repeatedly pointed out by its own hierarchy (see paragraph 25 above). They ended with the decision to terminate them on the same ground \u2013 lack of elements of a crime in the acts of the police officers \u2013 and for the same reason \u2013 the statements by police officers\u2019 G. and K. submitting that the applicant had hit his own face against the wall \u2013 as in its initial refusal to open a criminal case and the previous decisions to terminate the proceedings, each of which was set aside as unlawful and unfounded. There is no indication in the materials before the Court that even such obvious investigative measures as identification parades and confrontations, the importance of which was twice noted by the investigators\u2019 superiors, were conducted in the course of the investigation (see paragraphs 22 and 25 above). Equally, the forensic medical expert\u2019s conclusion that the applicant\u2019s injuries could not have been caused by a single impact from a flat surface, to which the investigative authority\u2019s attention was drawn in the decision to open a criminal case (see paragraph\u00a022 above), was ignored (see paragraph 26 above).74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the significant delay in opening the criminal case and commencing a full criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s credible assertion of ill\u2011treatment at the hands of the police, as well as the lack of any meaningful process during the flawed investigation conducted thereafter, show that the authorities did not take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence and did not make a serious attempt to find out what had happened (see, among other authorities, Labita v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0131, ECHR 2000-IV, and Assenov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, 28\u00a0October 1998, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0103 et seq., Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII). They thus failed in their obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment in police custody.75.\u00a0\u00a0By failing in its duty to carry out an effective investigation, the State fostered the police officers\u2019 sense of impunity. The Court stresses that a proper response by the authorities in investigating serious allegations of ill\u2011treatment at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State in compliance with the Article 3 standards is essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion or tolerance of unlawful acts (see, among other authorities, Gasanov v.\u00a0the Republic of Moldova, no.\u00a039441\/09, \u00a7\u00a050, 18\u00a0December 2012; Amine G\u00fczel v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a041844\/09, \u00a7\u00a039, 17\u00a0September 2013; and Mesut Deniz v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a036716\/07, \u00a7\u00a052, 5\u00a0November 2013).76.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural head also.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, had been infringed by the use of the confession extracted from him as a result of ill-treatment in police custody, when he had no access to a lawyer. The Court will examine his complaint under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3\u00a0(c), which, in so far as relevant, provides:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ......3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;...\u201d78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. They pointed out that the statement of the applicant\u2019s surrender and confession was not the sole evidence on which his conviction was based. His guilt had been sufficiently proved by other evidence in the case.79.\u00a0\u00a0In reply to the Court\u2019s questions concerning the relevant domestic law, the Government submitted that while police officers carrying out operative\u2011search activities had no right to question an arrested person (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0434\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e), they could obtain from a suspect a statement of his surrender and confession (\u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u044f\u0432\u043a\u0443 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439). The surrender and confession was regulated by Articles 141 and 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which did not provide for the relevant person\u2019s access to counsel for the defence. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 75 \u00a7 2 (1) of the Code was not applicable to the statement of surrender and confession. However, self-incriminating statements given in the absence of a lawyer by a person who later became a suspect or accused were to be declared inadmissible evidence, if subsequently retracted, pursuant to that provision. The Government did not submit information in support of their observations about the domestic courts\u2019 practice in respect of Article 75\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02\u00a0(1) of the Code, despite being invited to do so by the Court.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that the Government do not plead non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and that the complaint is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that its duty, under Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting States in the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, this being primarily a matter for regulation under national law (see Schenk v.\u00a0Switzerland, 12 July 1988, \u00a7\u00a7 45-46, Series A no. 140).82.\u00a0\u00a0It is therefore not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence \u2013 for example, evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law \u2013 may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. This involves an examination of the unlawfulness in question and, where the violation of another Convention right is concerned, the nature of the violation found (see, inter alia, Khan v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no.\u00a035394\/97, \u00a7 34, ECHR 2000\u2011V; P.G. and J.H. v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 44787\/98, \u00a7 76, ECHR 2001-IX; Allan v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no.\u00a048539\/99, \u00a7 42, ECHR 2002\u2011IX; and G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 163).83.\u00a0\u00a0In determining whether the proceedings as a whole were fair, regard must also be had to whether the rights of the defence have been respected, in particular whether the applicant was given the opportunity of challenging the authenticity of the evidence and of opposing its use (see Panovits v.\u00a0Cyprus, no.\u00a04268\/04, \u00a7\u00a082, 11 December 2008). In addition, the quality of the evidence must be taken into consideration, including whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy (ibid.). Indeed, where the reliability of evidence is in dispute the existence of fair procedures to examine the admissibility of the evidence takes on an even greater importance (see Allan, cited above, \u00a7 47).84.\u00a0\u00a0The right to silence and the privilege against self\u2011incrimination are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6. Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities, thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6. The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused (see Jalloh v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no.\u00a054810\/00, \u00a7\u00a0100, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011IX).85.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court reiterates that a waiver of a right guaranteed by the Convention \u2013 in so far as it is permissible \u2013 must not run counter to any important public interest, must be established in an unequivocal manner and must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to the waiver\u2019s importance (see Sejdovic v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no.\u00a056581\/00, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2006-II).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles in the present case86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the police reopened criminal proceedings into the unsolved robbery of commercial premises on the basis of information reported by Ms R. about, inter alia, the applicant\u2019s alleged involvement in the robbery. The applicant was taken to the police station and interviewed by police officers about the circumstances of the crime. He was subjected to ill\u2011treatment (see paragraph 66 above) and confessed to having participated in the crime. His confession was documented by police officer G. in the statement recording his surrender and confession. That record states that the applicant had been informed of Article 51 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (see paragraph 10 above). Once given access to a lawyer on the following day during his first questioning as a suspect by the investigator, the applicant retracted his confession statement, asserting that it had been given as a result of his ill\u2011treatment by the police officers. He consistently repudiated his confession throughout the ensuing proceedings, in which he was represented by a lawyer. He was able to challenge the admissibility of the statement as evidence at his trial on two grounds, which he has now raised before this Court. Firstly, he asserted that the confession statement had been extracted from him as a result of his ill\u2011treatment by the police officers, and, secondly, that it had been obtained without him having access to a lawyer. The trial court regarded his confession as admissible evidence, considering that the allegations of his ill\u2011treatment were unsubstantiated, that access to a lawyer had not been required by domestic law and that the applicant had been informed of the right not to incriminate himself. In convicting the applicant the trial court relied to a significant extent on his confession (see paragraphs 38-39 above). In the appeal and the supervisory review proceedings the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation endorsed the trial court\u2019s findings in full.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes, firstly, that no assessment was made by the trial court of the medical and witness evidence submitted by the applicant to support his objection on the ground of duress (see paragraph 36 above). In relying on the police officers\u2019 statements denying any wrongdoing on their part and on the internal police inquiry dismissing the applicant\u2019s allegations, the court attached no significance to the police officers\u2019 obvious interest in the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment being rejected. Overall, the trial court\u2019s reasoning for its dismissal of the applicant\u2019s objection displays a failure to conduct its own independent assessment of all the relevant factors with a view to ascertaining whether there were reasons to exclude from evidence the applicant\u2019s confession statement, allegedly \u201ctainted\u201d by a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention, so as to ensure the fairness of the trial, and instead indicates its reliance on the decision of the investigative authority (see paragraphs 37\u201138 above), which the Court has found to have been based on an investigation which did not meet the Article\u00a03 requirements (see paragraph 74 above). This lack of a careful assessment of the quality of the impugned evidence (the applicant\u2019s confession statement) and the circumstances in which it was obtained, which cast doubts on its reliability and accuracy, was not remedied by the higher courts. In consequence, the applicant\u2019s confession obtained as a result of his inhuman and degrading treatment (see paragraph 65 above) was used by the domestic courts as evidence of the applicant\u2019s guilt. In so doing, the domestic courts legalised the police officers\u2019 efforts to use a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d to document the applicant\u2019s confession, obtained under duress, after his apprehension on suspicion of having committed a crime, contrary to the meaning envisaged for such a statement in Article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (voluntary statement by a person about a crime he or she has committed, see paragraph 50 above).88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, which acknowledged that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in breach of Article 3, did not dispute that the applicant\u2019s confession statement had been obtained as a result of such treatment. Rather, they argued that the confession was not the sole evidence on which the applicant\u2019s conviction was based and that other evidence adduced by the prosecution would in any event have secured the applicant\u2019s conviction.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that within the Convention system it has long been recognised that the right under Article 3 not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic society. It is an absolute right, permitting of no exception in any circumstances (see Al\u2011Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763\/97, \u00a7 59, ECHR 2001\u2011XI). Therefore, the use in criminal proceedings of evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 always raises serious issues as to the fairness of the proceedings, even if the admission of such evidence was not decisive in securing a conviction (see Jalloh, cited above, \u00a7 99).90.\u00a0\u00a0Confession statements obtained in violation of Article 3 are inherently unreliable. Furthermore, their use in criminal proceedings is often the reason for which the acts of ill\u2011treatment are committed in the first place. Taking such statements into consideration in finding a person guilty is incompatible with the guarantees of Article 6 (see S\u00f6ylemez v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a046661\/99, \u00a7 122, 21 September 2006). The admission of confession statements obtained in violation of Article 3 renders the proceedings as a whole automatically unfair, irrespective of the probative value of the confession statements and irrespective of whether their use was decisive in securing the defendant\u2019s conviction (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0166 and\u00a0173, and El Haski v. Belgium, no.\u00a0649\/08, \u00a7 85, 25 September 2012).91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found in paragraph 65 above that the applicant\u2019s confession was obtained as a result of the inhuman and degrading treatment to which he was subjected in police custody. The Government\u2019s objection that the applicant\u2019s confession was not the sole or decisive evidence should therefore be dismissed.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes further that before giving the \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d the applicant was not informed of the right to legal assistance. No justification \u2013 other than compliance with the domestic law \u2013 was offered by the domestic courts for the applicant\u2019s initial lack of access to a lawyer in police custody. According to the domestic courts in the applicant\u2019s case, no prior access to a lawyer was required in order to make a statement of surrender and confession. The subsequent use of such a statement in evidence at the trial could not therefore be contested on the ground of the lack of legal advice (see paragraphs 42 and 44-45 above). Such a position complied with the Supreme Court\u2019s case\u2011law on the issue (see paragraphs 51-53 and 56 above).93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that although not absolute, the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial. Early access to a lawyer at the investigation stage of the proceedings serves as a procedural guarantee of the privilege against self\u2011incrimination and a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment, given the particular vulnerability of the accused at that stage of the proceedings (see Salduz v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2008; Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 42310\/04, \u00a7 263, 21 April 2011; and Martin v.\u00a0Estonia, no.\u00a035985\/09, \u00a7 79, 30 May 2013). In order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently \u201cpractical and effective\u201d, Article 6 \u00a7 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction \u2013 whatever its justification \u2013 must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 55). A systematic restriction of the right of access to legal assistance, on the basis of statutory provisions, is sufficient in itself for a violation of Article 6 to be found (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 56; and Dayanan v. Turkey, no.\u00a07377\/03, \u00a7\u00a033, 13\u00a0October 2009).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that irrespective of whether the applicant confessed before or after his arrest was formally recorded (see paragraphs\u00a010 and 12 above), it follows from the facts of the case, which are not disputed by the Government, and in particular from the police officers\u2019 statements, that at the time of his confession the applicant was being held in police custody for the sole reason that he was suspected of having participated in the robbery, that suspicion being based on information reported to the police by Ms\u00a0R. (see paragraphs 6-8 and 32-33 above). The police officers were therefore obliged to provide him with the rights of a suspect, access to a lawyer being one such right (see, mutatis mutandis, Brusco v. France, no.\u00a01466\/07, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a046\u201155, 14 October 2010). This would also correspond to the domestic criminal procedural-law requirement that the right of access to a lawyer arises from the moment of actual arrest (see paragraph 46 above), which accords with the Constitutional Court\u2019s interpretation of the right to legal assistance as arising from the moment of actual restriction of one\u2019s constitutional rights, in particular the right to liberty and security, and not from the moment of the formal recognition of one\u2019s status as a suspect or one\u2019s detention (see paragraphs 48-49 and 54-55 above).95.\u00a0\u00a0The absence of a domestic-law requirement of access to a lawyer for a statement of surrender and confession was used as leeway to circumvent the applicant\u2019s right as a de facto suspect to legal assistance and to admit his statement of surrender and confession, obtained without legal assistance, in evidence to establish his guilt. This has irretrievably prejudiced the rights of the defence. Neither the assistance provided subsequently by a lawyer nor the adversarial nature of the ensuing proceedings and the possibility of challenging the admissibility of the evidence at issue at the trial and on appeal could remedy the defects which had occurred during police custody.96.\u00a0\u00a0Even assuming that the applicant had been informed of the constitutional right not to incriminate himself before making his confession statement, as was found by the domestic courts, he cannot be said to have validly waived his privilege against self-incrimination in view of the Court\u2019s finding that he had given his confession statement as a result of his inhuman and degrading treatment by the police. In any event, no reliance can be placed on the mere fact that the applicant had been reminded of his right to remain silent and signed the relevant record (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 59; and P\u0142onka v.\u00a0Poland, no.\u00a020310\/02, \u00a7 37, 31\u00a0March 2009), especially because the record cited Article 51 of the Constitution without explaining its meaning. Furthermore, since the lack of access to a lawyer in the present case resulted from the systemic application of legal provisions, as interpreted by the domestic courts, and the applicant was not informed of the right to legal assistance before signing the statement of his surrender and confession, the question of the waiver of the right to legal assistance is not pertinent.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the domestic courts\u2019 use in evidence of the statement of the applicant\u2019s surrender and confession obtained as a result of his ill-treatment in violation of Article 3 and in the absence of access to a lawyer has rendered the applicant\u2019s trial unfair.98.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 3 (c) of the Convention in the present case.III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION99.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained, relying on Article\u00a013 of the Convention, about other alleged violations of his rights in the criminal proceedings against him, such as delays in delivering the judgment and in scheduling the appeal hearing, changes in the composition of the bench and the dismissal of his applications for supervisory review of the case. Having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court\u2019s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and\u00a04 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION100.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage101.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the above sum excessive.103.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis and having regard to the nature of the violations found, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a020,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed RUB\u00a0150,000 for the legal costs incurred at the preliminary investigation and before the domestic courts in the criminal proceedings against him and EUR\u00a03,000 for those incurred before the Court.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claims on the ground that there was no proof that they had actually been incurred.106.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. The Court is satisfied that the legal-services contract concerning the domestic proceedings and the legal-services contract concerning the proceedings before the Court, concluded between the applicant and his lawyer, created legally enforceable obligations to pay the amounts indicated therein. It notes, however, that although remedying the violations of Article\u00a06 found by the Court in the present case was the largest part of the legal work in the domestic proceedings, the amount indicated in the former contract also covered other legal work, not relevant to the violations of the Convention found. It also notes that not all of the complaints submitted by the applicant were declared admissible by the Court. Regard being had to the above considerations, the documents in its possession and the criteria in its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a02,500 for legal costs in the domestic proceedings and the sum of EUR\u00a02,800 for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable on the total amount, to be paid directly into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27552":"I.\u00a0\u00a0LOCUS STANDI31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the death of the applicant in 2014, after the introduction of the present application, and of the wish expressed by his widow and his daughter to continue the application before the Court in his name.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the rights under Articles 3, 5 and 13 of the Convention were of an eminently personal and non\u2011transferable nature and that it was therefore no longer justified to continue the examination of the application, which should be struck out of the Court\u2019s list of cases.33.\u00a0\u00a0Insofar as the Government referred to the cases of Bi\u00e7 and Others v.\u00a0Turkey (no. 55955\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 22-23, 2 February 2006), and Sanles and Sanles v.\u00a0Spain (dec.), no. 48335\/99, 26 October 2000), the Court reiterates that it has differentiated between applications where the direct victim had died before the application was lodged with the Court, as in the above two cases, and those where he or she has died after the application was lodged, as in the present application, which was lodged by the applicant himself. In the latter case, the Court has accepted that the next-of-kin or heir may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2014). It is not only material interests which the successor of a deceased applicant may pursue by his or her wish to maintain the application. Human rights cases before the Court generally also have a moral dimension and persons near to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in ensuring that justice is done, even after the applicant\u2019s death (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no.\u00a033071\/96, ECHR 2000-XII). Whether the rights at issue are transferable to an heir willing to pursue an application on behalf of a deceased person is not therefore a decisive factor (see Ergezen v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a073359\/10, \u00a7 29, 8 April 2014).34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus accepts that the applicant\u2019s widow and daughter have a legitimate interest in pursuing the application on his behalf. The Government\u2019s preliminary objection should therefore be dismissed.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the conditions for striking the case out of the list of pending cases, as defined in Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, have not been met, and that it must continue to examine the application at the request of Mrs\u00a0Irina Fartushina and Ms Ksenia Fartushina. The Court will refer to the late Mr Fartushin as \u201cthe applicant\u201d.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated in police custody and that no effective investigation into his complaint had been carried out. He relied on Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits38.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights guaranteed by Article 3. They noted that the investigative authority\u2019s conclusion that the constituent elements of a crime in the actions of the police officers were missing had been arrived at on the basis of the police officers\u2019 own statements, whereas the statements by the applicant\u2019s family members and friends had not been taken into account. The contradictions between those statements had not been reconciled and a reasonable explanation for the applicant\u2019s injuries had not been provided.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s injuries were sustained during his detention in police custody. The State was accordingly under an obligation to provide a plausible explanation of how his injuries had been caused (see Ribitsch v.\u00a0Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no.\u00a0336; and, recently, Bulgaru v.\u00a0the Republic of Moldova, no. 35840\/09, \u00a7\u00a017, 30\u00a0September 2014; and Akt\u00fcrk v. Turkey, no. 70945\/10, \u00a7 33, 13 November 2014). The applicant\u2019s assertion that the injuries were caused as a result of his ill-treatment by police officers was credible, supported by the detention facility records and a forensic medical expert\u2019s report (see paragraphs\u00a015 and 21 above), and were coherent with witness statements (see paragraph\u00a024 above). The State was therefore obliged to carry out an effective official investigation (see, among other authorities, Labita v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).40.\u00a0\u00a0The investigative authorities dismissed the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint, based on the denial by the police officers and the investigator of any wrongdoing on their part, without offering any explanation as to how the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused. They did so as a result of the pre\u2011investigation inquiry and never opened a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. Their citing of N.P.\u2019s statements in support of their decision was not in accordance with the statements themselves, which related to the events of 6 May 2008, whereas the alleged ill\u2011treatment had taken place the previous day (see paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 above).41.\u00a0\u00a0Judicial review of the investigative authorities\u2019 refusals to open a criminal case was inaccessible following the revocation of those decisions by the investigative authorities (see Razzakov v. Russia, no.\u00a057519\/09, \u00a7\u00a061, 5\u00a0February 2015). Thereafter, the domestic courts fully endorsed the most recent refusal to open a criminal investigation (see paragraphs 27-28 and 30 above).42.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of a plausible explanation from the authorities as to the cause of the injuries sustained by the applicant in police custody, the Court finds that his injuries were the result of ill-treatment for which the Government bore responsibility.43.\u00a0\u00a0The ill\u2011treatment was intentional, with the purpose of forcing the applicant to confess to a crime, and caused him considerable fear, anguish and mental suffering. Having regard to the nature and circumstances of the ill\u2011treatment, the Court finds that it amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.44.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the procedural obligation under Article 3, the Court has previously found that in the context of the Russian legal system in cases of credible allegations of treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention, it is incumbent on the authorities to open a criminal case and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures are carried out and which constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill\u2011treatment under the domestic law. The mere fact of an investigative authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of serious ill\u2011treatment in police custody is indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its obligation under Article\u00a03 to carry out an effective investigation (see Lyapin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0129 and 132-36, 24\u00a0July 2014).45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case. It finds that the authorities\u2019 refusal to open a criminal case and conduct a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in police custody amounted to a failure to conduct an effective investigation.46.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 under its substantive and procedural limbs.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 5 of the Convention about his detention at the Sarov police station from 2 p.m. on 5 May 2008 until 8.20 p.m. on 6 May 2008. Article 5 reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;...2.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.5.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights guaranteed by Article 5.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises the fundamental importance of the guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention for securing the right of individuals in a democracy to be free from arbitrary detention by the authorities. It has reiterated in that connection that any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law, but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely, to protect the individual from arbitrariness. In order to minimise the risks of arbitrariness, Article 5 provides a corpus of substantive rights intended to ensure that the act of deprivation of liberty be amenable to independent judicial scrutiny and to secure the accountability of the authorities for that measure (see Kurt v.\u00a0Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0122\u201123, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011III, and Fatma Akaltun F\u0131rat v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a034010\/06, \u00a7 29, 10 September 2013). The requirements of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 with their emphasis on promptness and judicial control assume particular importance in this context (see Kurt, cited above, \u00a7 123). Prompt judicial intervention may lead to the detection and prevention of serious ill\u2011treatment which violates the fundamental guarantees contained in Article\u00a03 of the Convention (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18\u00a0December 1996, \u00a7 76, Reports 1996-VI). What is at stake is both the protection of the physical liberty of individuals as well as their personal security in a context which, in the absence of safeguards, could result in subversion of the rule of law and place detainees beyond the reach of the most rudimentary forms of legal protection (see Kurt, cited above, \u00a7 123).51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the police had information that the applicant had allegedly been involved in the theft which they were investigating. Police officer V. requested the applicant by telephone to come to the police station for questioning. The applicant arrived at the police station at V.\u2019s request at 2 p.m. on 5 May 2008. That fact is confirmed by the police station logbook and the witnesses (see paragraphs 8 and 24 above). The next trace of the applicant\u2019s presence at the police station can be found in the record of his questioning by the investigator as a witness in the theft case (see paragraph 11 above) at midday the following day. According to the complaints lodged with the authorities by the applicant\u2019s wife, his mother and his lawyer, the applicant was not released after entering the police station on 5 May 2008 (see paragraphs 10 and 19 above). The record of his arrest as a suspect was drawn up by the investigator at 8.20\u00a0p.m. on 6\u00a0May 2008 (see paragraph 13 above). The Court also observes that in the course of the official inquiry into the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint of unlawful detention, the investigative authorities did not acknowledge that he had been detained continuously at the police station from 2 p.m. on 5 May 2008 until 8.20 p.m. on 6\u00a0May 2008, and their decision was fully endorsed by the domestic courts (see paragraph 30 above).52.\u00a0\u00a0Having noted the Government\u2019s acknowledgment of a violation of Article 5 in the present case, the Court finds it established that the applicant was detained at the police station continuously from 2 p.m. on 5\u00a0May 2008 until 8.20 p.m. on 6\u00a0May 2008, that is, for more than thirty hours. During that time he was interviewed by the police about his alleged involvement in the theft and was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in order to force him to confess to the theft (see paragraph 43 above).53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that although the applicant was detained from the very beginning as a suspect in a criminal case, his detention was not recorded as such until 8.20 p.m. on 6 May 2008. The lack of any acknowledgment or records of his detention as a suspect in the preceding period led to his being deprived of access to a lawyer and all other rights of a suspect, which meant that he was left completely at the mercy of those holding him. As such, he was vulnerable not only to arbitrary interference with his right to liberty but also to ill-treatment (see paragraph 43 above).54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the applicant\u2019s unrecorded detention was a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article\u00a05 of the Convention, and was incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness and with the very purpose of Article 5. There has accordingly been a violation of this Article (see Belevitskiy v. Russia, no.\u00a072967\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a082-85, 1 March 2007, and Aleksandr Sokolov v. Russia, no.\u00a020364\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a070\u201173, 4 November 2010, in which the Court found a violation in comparable circumstances involving unrecorded detention of persons suspected of having committed criminal offences; see also El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 236-237, ECHR 2012).IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities\u2019 refusal to institute criminal proceedings in respect of his complaints of ill-treatment in police custody and unlawful detention had made it impossible for him to be granted the status of \u201cvictim\u201d, which could have entitled him to compensation for the alleged ill-treatment and unlawful detention. He relied on Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 and 5 of the Convention. Article\u00a013 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that the domestic remedies of which the applicant had availed himself had not been effective. They stressed, however, that the domestic legal system did, in principle, provide for effective remedies for victims of police ill-treatment. Firstly, there was an effective criminal-law remedy \u2013 notably, a criminal investigation into allegations of ill-treatment by police officers \u2013 which could lead to the conviction of police officers. Secondly, investigative authorities\u2019 acts and decisions, in particular refusals to open a criminal case, were amenable to judicial review under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thirdly, there were civil judicial remedies to complain about decisions and acts of State organs and their officials and to request compensation for any damage caused.57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed with the Government\u2019s assertion that there existed effective domestic remedies for ill\u2011treatment in police custody.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 13 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the complaint under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 as submitted by the applicant, who did not attempt to institute any proceedings for compensation, was limited to a general statement without any references to domestic law or practice.\u00a0Having regard to the finding of a violation of Article 3 under its procedural head on account of the respondent State\u2019s failure to carry out an effective investigation, the Court considers that the complaint as submitted does not raise any separate issue in the circumstances of the present case and that it is not necessary to examine it under Article 13, taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.60.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s reference to Article 5 of the Convention, according to the Court\u2019s established case-law the more specific guarantees of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 4 and 5, being a lex specialis in relation to Article\u00a013, absorb its requirements (see Dimitrov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no.\u00a055861\/00, 9\u00a0May 2006). In view of its findings of a violation of Article 5 of the Convention on account of the applicant\u2019s unrecorded detention, the Court considers that no separate issue arises in respect of Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 5 of the Convention in the circumstances of the present case (see, for example, Chitayev v. Russia, no.\u00a059334\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0173 and 204, 18\u00a0January 2007).V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION61.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment.64.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a030,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR\u00a06,018.75 for legal costs and 2,837.48\u00a0Russian roubles for postal expenses incurred before the Court.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment.67.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 4,600 for the proceedings before it, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. This amount is to be paid into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative, as requested by the applicant.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27555":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had not taken steps to safeguard his health and well-being, having failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the treatment provided to the applicant in detention facility no. IZ-24\/1 had been in accordance with the applicable domestic legal norms and Article 3 of the Convention. They further pointed out that the applicant had undergone a number of medical examinations, tests and procedures. He had regularly received prescribed medication and followed a special dietary regimen. They also stressed that test results had revealed no pathology, and that the CD4 cell count tests had shown \u201cpositive dynamics\u201d. The Government concluded by noting that the applicant had been provided with adequate care during the entire period of his detention.51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his claims. He argued that his HIV treatment had been interrupted following his arrest, that he had not been provided with the necessary medical assistance, and that his suffering from cancer and HIV infection had warranted his release.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Verbin\u0163 v.\u00a0Romania, no. 7842\/04, \u00a7 63, 3 April 2012, with further references).54.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III, with further references).55.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7\u00a0208, 13 July 2006; and Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI). In most of the cases concerning the detention of persons who were ill, the Court has examined whether or not the applicant received adequate medical assistance in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to secure the health and well-being of detainees, among other things, as an obligation on the part of the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Khudobin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7\u00a096, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts); Kalashnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7\u00a095, ECHR 2002-VI; and Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094).56.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists that, in particular, authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v.\u00a0Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011; Gladkiy v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a03242\/03, \u00a7\u00a084, 21\u00a0December 2010; Hummatov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos.\u00a09852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29\u00a0November\u00a02007; Melnik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a072286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0104-106, 28 March 2006; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7\u00a0121, 7\u00a0November\u00a02006) and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109, 114; Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a03456\/05, \u00a7\u00a079, 4\u00a0October 2005; and Popov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0211).57.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7\u00a0140, 22\u00a0December 2008).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case58.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant complained of inadequate medical assistance in relation to his three diseases: HIV infection, hepatitis C, and penile cancer. Having assessed the evidence, the Court is not convinced that the quality of the medical care provided to the applicant was inadequate.59.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, regarding the quality of the medical care dispensed in relation to the HIV infection, the Court observes that the authorities became aware that the applicant was suffering from stage 4A HIV on 16\u00a0August 2012, when he was examined by a medical panel upon admission to detention facility no. IZ-24\/1. On the following day the applicant was prescribed a combination of highly active antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), which he regularly received during the entire period of his detention. The Court stresses that the Russian authorities formulated and commenced the antiretroviral therapy in compliance with the guidelines of the World Health Organization in force at the relevant time and the domestic legal requirements.60.\u00a0\u00a0Both handwritten and typed medical records show that the applicant was regularly monitored in relation to his HIV infection. It appears that his treatment was successful, as tests carried out on a regular basis revealed a slight, but steady increase in numbers of CD4 cells.61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant pointed out one specific omission in relation to his HIV treatment, namely that upon his arrest on 13\u00a0August 2012 drugs for the treatment of his HIV infection had been taken from him. The Government disputed that allegation. The Court notes that the case file contains no evidence to show that the police had indeed seized drugs belonging to the applicant at the moment of his arrest. However, even assuming that there had in fact been a three-day long interruption of the antiretroviral therapy, between 13 August 2012, the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, and 16\u00a0August 2012, when the prison doctors prescribed the new drug therapy regimen for him, there is no evidence that it adversely affected the applicant\u2019s condition and rendered the overall care received in detention ineffective. The Court notes that the medical records demonstrate convincingly that the applicant\u2019s condition did not deteriorate in detention and that his HIV infection was not progressing (see paragraph 22 above). The Court is therefore unable to conclude that the treatment received in respect of his HIV infection was inadequate.62.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the applicant\u2019s complaints pertaining to his suffering from hepatitis C (HCV), neither the applicant nor the Government provided any details in relation to that complaint. The copies of the medical file submitted by the Government do not contain any information in that respect. It therefore appears that the applicant did not receive any treatment in relation to hepatitis C. However, given the aggressive nature of the antiretroviral therapy and the increased risk of drug toxicities and drug interactions between some ARVs and anti-HCV drugs, as pointed out in the guidelines of the World Health Organization in force at the relevant time (see paragraph 43 above), the Court considers that the Russian authorities\u2019 decision not to prescribe any treatment for hepatitis C does not appear unreasonable. The Court is also mindful of the fact that the applicant had merely listed hepatitis C as one of the illnesses from which he was suffering and did not make any further submission which could have indicated that the Russian authorities disregarded that diagnosis or refused to address his complaints in this respect.63.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the applicant\u2019s penile cancer, the Court observes that after the applicant\u2019s physical examination proved to be insufficient for the purpose of correct diagnosis and the applicant was offered a biopsy, which is a specific and tailored medical diagnostic procedure, he refused to undergo it, without specifying any reasons (see paragraph 24 above). The Court notes that the European Association of Urology considers biopsy to be a key procedure for diagnosing penile cancer. Hence, the applicant\u2019s refusal to undergo that procedure deprived the Russian authorities of any opportunity to duly diagnose and treat his cancer.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court now turns to the applicant\u2019s final argument, namely that his suffering from cancer and HIV infection had warranted his release. It reiterates its well-established approach that Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, particularly so when the authorities have taken adequate measures to secure his health and well\u2011being, not least through the provision of the requisite medical care, (see Aleksanyan v.\u00a0Russia, cited above, \u00a7 138, with further references). Taking into account its findings pertaining to the quality of the medical assistance afforded to the applicant in detention and bearing in mind that the applicant\u2019s condition was considered stable, with the Russian authorities having effectively addressed his complaints, the Court does not see any reasons to depart from that principle.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the applicant\u2019s medical condition could have made him more vulnerable than the average detainee and that his detention may, to a certain extent, have exacerbated his feelings of distress and helplessness. However, on the basis of the evidence before it and assessing the relevant facts as a whole, the Court does not find it established that the applicant was subjected to ill-treatment that attained a sufficient level of severity to bring it within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention (see, for similar reasoning, Stoyan Mitev v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a060922\/00, \u00a7 73, 7\u00a0January 2010).66.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, the Court considers that the domestic authorities afforded the applicant comprehensive, effective and transparent medical assistance throughout the period of his detention. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 3 OF THE CONVENTION67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time and alleged that the orders for his detention had not been based on sufficient reasons. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cEveryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government opened their line of argument with the submission that the Russian courts had authorised the applicant\u2019s arrest because they had sufficient reason to believe that he had committed \u201cespecially serious\u201d offences, representing a danger to society and punishable by up to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. The fact that the applicant had committed the crimes shortly after his release from prison had served as an additional reason for concluding that he was liable to re-offend. The Government further submitted that no documents had been produced before the courts attesting that the detention had been incompatible with the applicant\u2019s state of health. They stressed that the length of the pre-trial investigation had been due to the fact that his criminal case had been linked to three other cases. They also pointed out that during the hearing of 5\u00a0February 2013 neither the applicant nor his lawyer had objected to the extension of the applicant\u2019s detention. The applicant\u2019s detention had been based on relevant and sufficient grounds and was compatible with the requirement of \u201creasonable time\u201d provided in Article 5 \u00a7 3.69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his claims.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of his or her continued detention. However, after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are found to have been \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed \u201cspecial diligence\u201d in the conduct of the proceedings (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0152 and 153, ECHR 2000-IV).72.\u00a0\u00a0The presumption is in favour of release. As the Court has consistently held, the second limb of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until his conviction, the accused must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continued detention ceases to be reasonable. A person charged with an offence must always be released pending trial unless the State can show that there are \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d reasons to justify his or her continued detention (see, among other authorities, Castravet v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a023393\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a030 and 32, 13\u00a0March 2007; McKay\u00a0v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a0543\/03, \u00a7\u00a041, ECHR 2006-X; Jab\u0142o\u0144ski\u00a0v. Poland, no.\u00a033492\/96, \u00a7\u00a083, 21 December 2000; and Neumeister\u00a0v. Austria, 27 June 1968, \u00a7\u00a04, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a08). Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention cannot be seen as unconditionally authorising detention provided that it lasts no longer than a certain period. Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities (see Shishkov v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a038822\/97, \u00a7\u00a066, ECHR 2003-I).73.\u00a0\u00a0It is incumbent on the domestic authorities to establish the existence of specific facts relevant to the grounds for continued detention. Shifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined cases (see Rokhlina\u00a0v. Russia, no.\u00a054071\/00, \u00a7\u00a067, 7 April 2005, and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 84-85, 26 July 2001). The national judicial authorities must examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty, and must set them out in their decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is not the Court\u2019s task to establish such facts and take the place of the national authorities which ruled on the applicant\u2019s detention. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in the domestic courts\u2019 decisions and of the established facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention (see Korchuganova\u00a0v. Russia, no.\u00a075039\/01, \u00a7\u00a072, 8 June 2006; Ilijkov, cited above, \u00a7 86; and Labita, cited above, \u00a7 152).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention commenced when he was arrested on 13\u00a0August 2012 and ended on 7\u00a0August 2013 when he was released against an undertaking not to leave his place of residence (see paragraphs 6 and 18 above). The period to be taken into consideration therefore lasted for slightly less than twelve months.75.\u00a0\u00a0It is not disputed by the parties that the applicant\u2019s detention was initially warranted by a reasonable suspicion that he had attempted to sell a large quantity of drugs. It remains to be ascertained whether the judicial authorities gave \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d grounds to justify his continued detention and whether they displayed \u201cspecial diligence\u201d in the conduct of the proceedings.76.\u00a0\u00a0The gravity of the charges was one of the factors for the assessment of the applicant\u2019s potential to abscond, reoffend or obstruct the course of justice. However, the Court has repeatedly held that, although the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of an accused absconding or reoffending, the need to continue the deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the offence. Nor can continuation of the detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Panchenko v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a045100\/98, \u00a7 102, 8\u00a0February 2005; Goral v.\u00a0Poland, no.\u00a038654\/97, \u00a7 68, 30 October 2003; Ilijkov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a081; and Letellier v.\u00a0France, 26 June 1991, \u00a7 51, Series A no. 207). The Court will therefore examine whether the other grounds referred to by the domestic courts were sufficient to justify the applicant\u2019s detention.77.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the gravity of the charges against the applicant, the judicial authorities relied on information relating to his behaviour. In particular, they found that his criminal record made him particularly prone to reoffend, abscond or tamper with witnesses.78.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the danger of the applicant\u2019s reoffending, the Court observes that he was arrested shortly after his release, having served a sentence for a similar offence of drug trafficking. The Court reiterates that previous convictions could give a ground for a reasonable fear that the accused might commit a new offence. A judge may take into account the seriousness of the consequences of criminal offences when there is a question of taking into account the danger of seeing such offences being repeated, in order to decide if the person concerned can be released (see Matznetter v. Austria, 10\u00a0November 1969, \u00a7 9, Series A no. 10). In the present case the Russian courts took care to point in their decisions to the seriousness and repeated nature of the criminal offences in question, and the Court agrees with their decision to attach particular importance thereto given extreme difficulties experienced by the national authorities in Europe, while targeting, tracking, arresting and bringing drugs criminals to court (see, mutatis mutandis, Ramanauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no.\u00a074420\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a049 and 53, ECHR 2008 and Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7\u00a077, ECHR 2006\u2011IX). The Court is therefore prepared to accept that the Russian courts thoroughly evaluated the risk of the applicant reoffending. That fact created a strong presumption against the application of alternative measures of restraint in his case.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that the Russian courts cited the applicant\u2019s liability to abscond and tamper with witnesses as additional grounds warranting his detention. The Court does not lose sight that arguments for and against release must not be general and abstract (see Clooth v. Belgium, 12 December 1991, \u00a7 44, Series A no. 225). It reiterates that the Russian courts did not cite any particular instance when the applicant had tried to contact, outside the established legal venues, a witness in the course of the criminal proceedings. There was also no evidence that he had ever made an attempt to flee justice. At the same time, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the applicant had the criminal history of being involved in drug trafficking and was again charged with another count of that offence. The Court notes the domestic courts\u2019 emphasis on the short period which had passed between the previous conviction of the applicant for the drug trafficking and his new arrest. It also does not lose sight of the fact that the applicant\u2019s charges were later amended to include several counts of drug sale committed within an organised group (see paragraph\u00a013 above). In these circumstances the Court is prepared to accept that the Russian courts could have validly presumed that a risk existed that, if released, the applicant might abscond or interfere with the proceedings, given the nature of his alleged criminal activities (see, for similar reasoning, B\u0105k v. Poland, no. 7870\/04, \u00a7 62, 16 January 2007).80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there were relevant and sufficient grounds for the applicant\u2019s continued detention. The assessment of the \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d reasons, however, cannot be detached from the actual length of detention on remand. Accordingly, it remains to be ascertained whether the judicial authorities displayed \u201cspecial diligence\u201d in the conduct of the proceedings.81.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant was held in detention on remand for twelve months. There is nothing in the materials submitted to the Court to show any significant period of inactivity on the part of the prosecution or the court (see, for similar reasoning, Amirov v. Russia, no.\u00a051857\/13, 27\u00a0November 2014; Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108\/11, 5\u00a0February 2013; Sopin v. Russia, no. 57319\/10, 18 December 2012; Arutyunyan v. Russia, no. 48977\/09, 10 January 2012, and Buldashev v. Russia, no.\u00a046793\/06, 18\u00a0October 2011). In this regard, the Court observes that the investigation was of certain complexity, regard being had in particular to the general difficulty of collecting evidence in drug-related offence (see Ramanauskas, cited above, \u00a7 49). An important element in the Court\u2019s assessment of the case is also the fact that after nearly twelve months of applying detention on remand the domestic courts held that the measure was no longer necessary, given the stage that the criminal proceedings had reached and the fact that the risks initially taken into account by the domestic courts were no longer relevant to authorise further detention. The Court notes that the applicant was released from detention on an alternative preventive measure, an undertaking not to leave his town, as soon as the investigation was completed, the case was remitted for trial and the risk of the applicant interfering with the proceedings in his case was brought to a minimum (see Vladimir Solovyev v. Russia, no. 2708\/02, \u00a7 115, 24 May 2007, and Mamedova v. Russia, no. 7064\/05, \u00a7 79, 1 June 2006). In such circumstances, the competent domestic authorities cannot be said to have displayed a lack of special diligence in handling the applicant\u2019s case.82.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lastly claimed that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy for complaining about the lack of the adequate medical assistance, as required under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority ....\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties84.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had had a right to complain of lack of medical care in detention, inter alia, to courts. The detention facility\u2019s administration had not interfered with the applicant\u2019s right to complain to the authorities. However, during the period of his detention the applicant had not raised the issue before the facility\u2019s administration or before other authorities, including courts. Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s allegation of a lack of effective avenues for complaining of inadequate medical care in detention was unsubstantiated.85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his claims.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees the availability at a national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of this Article is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable\u201d complaint under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief (see, as a classic reference, Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, \u00a7 54, Series A no. 131).88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates in this connection that the existence of an actual breach of another provision is not a prerequisite for the application of Article 13 (see, for example, Camenzind v. Switzerland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 53, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011VIII; Hatton and Others v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 130, 137 and 142, ECHR\u00a02003\u2011VIII; Nuri Kurt v. Turkey, no. 37038\/97, \u00a7 117, 29 November 2005; and Ratushna v. Ukraine, no. 17318\/06, \u00a7 85, 2 December 2010). In the present case, even though the Court was eventually persuaded that no violation of Article 3 of the Convention had been proved (see paragraph 66 above), it did not find the applicant\u2019s complaint in that regard to be prima facie untenable (see paragraph 52 above) and reached the aforementioned conclusion only after the examination of its merits. The Court therefore considers that the applicant did raise an arguable claim for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention.89.\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article\u00a013 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint; the \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. At the same time, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law, in the sense either of preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or of providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 157-158, and Wasserman v.\u00a0Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7 45, 10 April 2008).90.\u00a0\u00a0Where the fundamental right to protection against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, the preventive and compensatory remedies must be complementary in order to be considered effective. The existence of a preventive remedy is indispensable for the effective protection of individuals against the kind of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed, the particular importance attached by the Convention to that provision requires, in the Court\u2019s view, that the States Parties establish, over and above a compensatory remedy, an effective mechanism for putting a rapid end to any such treatment. Had it been otherwise, the prospect of future compensation would have legitimised particularly severe suffering in breach of this core provision of the Convention (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 78, 24\u00a0July 2008).91.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant did not attempt to pursue any avenues for exhausting remedies. However, it is not convinced by these submissions. In particular, some of the documents produced by the applicant, such as copies of the letters of 6 and 28 December 2012 from a deputy prosecutor of the Sverdlovsk District prosecutor\u2019s office, show that he had complained to prosecutors in an attempt to draw the authorities\u2019 attention to his state of health (see paragraphs 28 and 29 above).92.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court\u2019s task in the present case is to examine the effectiveness of the various domestic remedies suggested by the Russian Government and not merely to determine whether the applicant had made his grievances sufficiently known to the Russian authorities. The Court has on many occasions examined the effectiveness of the domestic remedies suggested by the Government in cases of applicants complaining of ongoing inadequate medical treatment, such as in the present case. It found, in particular, that in deciding on a complaint concerning breaches of domestic regulations governing the provision of medical care to detainees, the prison authorities would not have a sufficiently independent standpoint to satisfy the requirements of Article 35 of the Convention (see Koryak, cited above, \u00a7\u00a079, and Dirdizov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a075). The Court also stressed that even though review by a supervising prosecutor plays an important part in securing appropriate medical care in detention, a complaint to the supervising prosecutor falls short of the requirements of an effective remedy because of procedural shortcomings that have been previously identified in the Court\u2019s case-law (see Koryak, \u00a7\u00a7 80-81, cited above). Having assessed a civil claim for compensation under the tort provisions of the Civil Code, the Court considered that such a claim could not offer an applicant any redress other than a purely compensatory award and could not put an end to a situation where there is an ongoing violation, such as inadequate medical care (see Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 65-73, 8 January 2013). Moreover, the Court found that such a remedy did not offer reasonable prospects of success, in particular because the award was conditional on the establishment of fault on the part of the authorities, which was extremely improbable in a situation where domestic legal norms prescribed the application of a certain measure, for instance, certain conditions of detention or the level of medical treatment (see A.B. v. Russia, no. 1439\/06, \u00a7\u00a096, 14\u00a0October 2010).93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the domestic courts examined the applicant\u2019s health condition when extending his detention (see paragraph\u00a012 above). However, the only issue addressed by the courts was whether the applicant\u2019s state of health allowed his continued detention. The courts did not assess the effectiveness of the medical care afforded to him in detention. The Government also did not argue that the courts in the detention proceedings could have provided the applicant with compensatory or, what is more important, preventive redress, such as correction of his therapy, prescription of additional medical procedures, and so on. The scope of the detention proceedings was purely limited to the examination of the grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention or release.94.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above considerations, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous findings and concludes that the legal avenues put forward by the Government did not constitute an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.95.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, the Court finds that the applicant did not have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaint, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION96.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage97.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant asked the Court to award an unspecified amount in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment on the applicant\u2019s claim.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses100.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit a claim for costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on this account.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27589":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that, if extradited to Kyrgyzstan, he would be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment because he belonged to the Uzbek ethnic minority. He referred to various sources, including publications by the UN Committee against Torture, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the provision of temporary asylum to the applicant could be viewed as a reason for declaring his complaint under Article\u00a03 of the Convention inadmissible. They referred in this connection to the inadmissibility decision in the case of Tukhtamurodov v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a021762\/14, 20\u00a0January 2015.46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the only reason for granting him temporary asylum had been the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court upon presentation of his case before the Court. This was a common administrative practice with the sole purpose of ensuring his continued stay in Russia whilst his case was being considered by the Court. The decisions granting him temporary asylum therefore affected neither his status nor the likelihood of his being extradited to Kyrgyzstan if his temporary asylum were not extended, thus facing the risk of torture. The applicant stressed that in contrast to the case of Tukhtamurodov, where the national courts had cancelled the applicant\u2019s extradition order, in his case the national courts had upheld the extradition order and he therefore continued to face imminent risk of being extradited to Kyrgyzstan.47.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Government may be understood to argue that the applicant had lost his victim status, the Court reiterates that an individual may no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention where the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, the breach of the Convention and afforded redress (see, among many authorities, Achour v. France (dec.) no.\u00a067335\/01, 11\u00a0March 2004, where the authorities cancelled the expulsion order against the applicant, and Amuur v. France, 25\u00a0June 1996, \u00a7\u00a036, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011III).48.\u00a0\u00a0As to the specific category of cases involving expulsion measures, the Court has consistently held that an applicant cannot claim to be the \u201cvictim\u201d of a measure which is not enforceable. It has adopted the same stance in cases where the execution of the deportation or extradition order has been stayed indefinitely or otherwise deprived of legal effect and where any decision by the authorities to proceed with deportation can be appealed against before the relevant courts (see Karimov v. Russia, no.\u00a054219\/08, \u00a7\u00a089, 29\u00a0July 2010, with further extensive references).49.\u00a0\u00a0The present application concerns the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kyrgyzstan where, according to him, he would face a serious risk of ill\u2011treatment by the authorities on account of his Uzbek ethnic origin. The Court observes firstly that the decision concerning the applicant\u2019s extradition was made final by the Russian authorities on 30\u00a0January 2014 (see paragraph 20 above) and secondly that the decisions granting the applicant temporary asylum were taken by the Russian authorities in April 2014 and April 2015 only as a result of the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in the applicant\u2019s case and the impossibility of foreseeing the duration of those proceedings (see paragraphs 32-33 above). Clearly, the fact that the applicant had been granted temporary asylum did not constitute an acknowledgment, either explicit or implicit, on the part of the Russian authorities that there had been or might have been a violation of Article 3 or that the applicant\u2019s extradition order had been deprived of its legal effect.50.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant may claim to be a \u201cvictim\u201d for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention (compare Karimov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a086-91; Niyazov v. Russia, no.\u00a027843\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0104-107, 16 October 2012; Tukhtamurodov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a037-39; and Khamrakulov v. Russia, no.\u00a068894\/13, \u00a7\u00a061, 16\u00a0April 2015).51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention had been thoroughly studied by the domestic courts in the proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s extradition and those concerning his request for refugee status. The domestic courts rightly rejected the references made by the applicant\u2019s representative to various reports describing the general situation regarding the allegedly widespread ill-treatment of ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan as being too general and insufficient for the purposes of blocking the applicant\u2019s extradition. The Government expressed their firm belief that any risk of ill-treatment that might arise from the general situation in Kyrgyzstan has been completely excluded in the circumstances of the present case since the applicant\u2019s extradition has been requested through official channels with the provision of the necessary guarantees. They further submitted that it was highly unlikely that the Kyrgyz authorities \u2013 who in 2014 had demonstrated their openness and commitment to cooperating with international organisations in fighting the ill-treatment and discrimination of ethnic Uzbeks \u2013 would breach those guarantees. The Government went on to affirm that no instances of non-compliance by the Kyrgyz authorities with the guarantees given in respect of extradited ethnic Uzbeks had been recorded so far in the course of the cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Russia.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan had expressly undertaken to ensure that Russian diplomatic representatives would be given access to the applicant in the event of his extradition. They further noted with regret that, by forbidding extradition in cases similar to the present case, the Court had not yet given the Russian authorities an opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of such \u201cdiplomatic supervision\u201d in practice. At the same time, within the framework of the above mechanism, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kyrgyz Prosecutor General\u2019s Office had provided information to the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office concerning the fate of several ethnic Uzbeks previously extradited to Kyrgyzstan for criminal prosecution. The information in question proves that the Kyrgyz authorities had abided by their assurances not to subject these persons to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, thus demonstrating the unbiased attitude \u2013 and in certain cases even specific loyalty \u2013 of Kyrgyz justice towards this category of persons. The Government cited the examples of three individuals of Uzbek ethnic origin who had received a suspended sentence and had been released on parole, or whose criminal case had been dismissed. The Government further informed the Court that on 30\u201131 July and 21\u00a0November 2014, and again on 24\u00a0February 2015 the diplomats of the Consulate General of Russia in Osh and of the Russian Embassy in Kyrgyzstan had visited six non-Kyrgyz persons (two of them ethnic Uzbeks charged with particularly grave crimes including aggravated murder, and one of whom had also been charged with participation in mass disorders) extradited to Kyrgyzstan earlier. The latter were satisfied with the conditions of their detention and denied having been subjected to any form of ill-treatment during preliminary investigations. No violations of their procedural rights, including the right to defence, had been recorded by the Kyrgyz law-enforcement bodies.54.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the applicant\u2019s individual situation, the Government noted that after the events of June 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, the applicant had repeatedly been invited by the Kyrgyz investigative bodies for questioning as a witness. In June 2011 the applicant had learned that criminal proceedings had been opened against him and he had moved to a different city in Kyrgyzstan, to his sister\u2019s home, where he had stayed for seven months. Afterwards, in March 2012, the applicant had left Kyrgyzstan for Russia. The declared aim of his trip was employment. The applicant had not requested refugee status or temporary asylum before his departure from Kyrgyzstan or directly after his arrival in Russia, and it was not until April 2013 that his request for refugee status had been lodged. The applicant had not been subjected to ill-treatment or ethnic discrimination by the Kyrgyz authorities before the institution of the criminal proceedings in question. His allegations about the extortion of money during the criminal proceedings were not supported by any evidence. Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s wife and one of his daughters continued to reside in Kyrgyzstan, and there is no evidence that they had been subjected to ill-treatment or ethnic discrimination by the Kyrgyz authorities.55.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Government expressed doubts that the applicant would face a real, immediate and foreseeable risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of his return to Kyrgyzstan.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint. Relying on reports by major international organisations, he argued that the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan had not improved since the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev (cited above) and that a serious risk of being subjected to ill-treatment remained for ethnic Uzbeks like him who stood accused of involvement in the June 2010 events.57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed with the Government as to the thoroughness of the assessment by the Russian courts of his arguments concerning the risk of ill-treatment in the event of his extradition to Kyrgyzstan. He noted in this respect that the decision of the Moscow City Court of 20 May 2014 had not even mentioned his arguments or references to international reports.58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further submitted that the diplomatic assurances relied on by the Government could not suffice to protect him against the risk of ill\u2011treatment in the light of the criteria established in the case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom (no.\u00a08139\/09, \u00a7\u00a0189, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). He noted, in particular, the absence of any long-established reciprocal communication between Russia and Kyrgyzstan aimed at enforcing such guarantees, the absence of any independent monitoring mechanism leading to effective protection against torture and ill-treatment in practical terms, and the absence of an effective system of protection against torture in Kyrgyzstan.59.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the applicant argued that the fact that he had not been ill\u2011treated before he had managed to leave Kyrgyzstan did not reduce the risk of his being ill-treated in the event of his return.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles60.\u00a0\u00a0For a summary of the relevant general principles emerging from the Court\u2019s case-law, see Umirov v. Russia (no.\u00a017455\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a092\u2011100, 18\u00a0September 2012).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles in the present case61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Russian authorities ordered the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kyrgyzstan. The extradition order has not been enforced as a result of the application by the Court of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Court will therefore assess whether the applicant faces the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in the event of his extradition to Kyrgyzstan \u2013 the material date for the assessment of that risk being that of the Court\u2019s consideration of the case \u2013 taking into account the assessment made by the domestic courts (see Gayratbek Saliyev v. Russia, no. 39093\/13, \u00a7\u00a060, 17 April 2014).62.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the general human rights climate in the requesting country, the Court makes the following observations. In a previous case concerning extradition to Kyrgyzstan it found that in 2012 the situation in the south of the country was characterised by torture and other ill\u2011treatment of ethnic Uzbeks by law-enforcement officers. Such incidences had increased in the aftermath of the events of June 2010 and remained widespread and rampant, being aggravated by the impunity of law\u2011enforcement officers. Moreover, the Court established that the issue needed to be seen in the context of the rise of ethno\u2011nationalism in the politics of Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the south, the growing interethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, continued discriminatory practices faced by Uzbeks at institutional level and the under\u2011representation of Uzbeks in, amongst others, law-enforcement bodies and the judiciary (see Makhmudzhan Ergashev, cited above, \u00a7 72). As is clear from the reports by UN bodies and reputable NGOs, the situation in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan had not improved since 2012. In particular, various reports are consistent in their descriptions of biased attitudes based on ethnicity in investigations, prosecutions, condemnations and sanctions imposed on ethnic Uzbeks who have been charged and convicted in relation to the 2010 events in the Jalal-Abad Region. They also agree about the lack of full and effective investigations into the numerous allegations of torture and ill\u2011treatment imputable to Kyrgyz law-enforcement agencies, arbitrary detention and the excessive use of force against Uzbeks allegedly involved in the events of June 2010. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the current overall human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan remains highly problematic (see Gayratbek Saliyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a061; Kadirzhanov and Mamashev v. Russia, nos.\u00a042351\/13 and 47823\/13, \u00a7\u00a091, 17 July 2014; and Mamadaliyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a060).63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will now examine whether there are any individual circumstances substantiating the applicant\u2019s fears of ill-treatment (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos.\u00a046827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7\u00a073, ECHR 2005\u2011I). It reiterates in this respect that where an applicant alleges that he or she is a member of a group that is systematically exposed to the practice of ill-treatment, the protection of Article 3 comes into play when the applicant establishes \u2013 where necessary on the basis of information contained in recent reports by independent international human\u2011rights protection bodies or non-governmental organisations \u2013 that there are good reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and in his or her membership of the group concerned. In those circumstances, the Court will not then insist that the applicant demonstrate the existence of further special distinguishing features (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 132, ECHR 2008, and NA. v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a025904\/07, \u00a7 116, 17 July 2008).64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, unlike other Russian cases involving extradition to Kyrgyzstan previously examined by the Court, in the present case the domestic authorities considered the applicant\u2019s arguments, supported by various UN sources and NGO\u2019s reports, as regards the existence of a widespread practice of tortures and other ill-treatment of ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of prosecution of the June 2010-related offences. They considered, however, that these circumstances could not in themselves be considered sufficient for refusing the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kyrgyzstan. Relying on Article\u00a03 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 and the legal position of the UN Committee against Torture, the Russian Supreme Court stressed that the refusal of an extradition would be possible not only where the existence of gross and mass violations of human rights would be established in a requesting State, but also where it would be established that an individual concerned would run a personal risk of torture if returned to his or her country. In making an assessment of the applicant\u2019s personal risk of ill\u2011treatment in case of his return to Kyrgyzstan, the Supreme Court held that the latter did not belong to any political or other party, organisation or group in opposition to the present government of Kyrgyzstan, that while living in Kyrgyzstan he had not been subjected to any torture, inhuman or degrading treatment by the authorities, that he had arrived in Russia many months after the crimes of which he stood accused had been committed in June 2010, that his wife and daughter remained in the Kyrgyz Republic, and that no evidence had therefore been provided to show that he or his relatives were persecuted by the Kyrgyz authorities. The applicant\u2019s argument as to his Uzbek ethnic origin which gave him reason to believe that he would be subjected to repressive criminal prosecution and unfair conviction was dismissed as unsubstantiated. The Court further notes that the domestic courts attached particular importance to the diplomatic assurances provided by the Kyrgyz authorities, which were sufficient, in their view, to eliminate the risk of the applicant\u2019s being subjected to inhuman treatment in the event of his extradition (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above).65.\u00a0\u00a0While the Court welcomes the approach adopted by the domestic courts in the present case, which is an important development in handling similar cases, it cannot nevertheless agree with their conclusion as to the absence of substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would face a real, immediate and foreseeable risk of ill-treatment if returned to Kyrgyzstan. The Court notes, in particular, that the applicant is an ethnic Uzbek charged with a number of serious offences allegedly committed in the course of the violent inter-ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in June 2010. Given the widespread use by the Kyrgyz authorities of torture and ill-treatment in order to obtain confessions from ethnic Uzbeks charged with involvement in the interethnic riots in the Jalal-Abad Region, which has been reported by both UN bodies and reputable NGOs, the Court is satisfied that the applicant belongs to a particularly vulnerable group, the members of which are routinely subjected to treatment proscribed by Article\u00a03 of the Convention in the requesting country (see Gayratbek Saliyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a062, and Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a092).66.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the diplomatic assurances provided by the Kyrgyz authorities, the Court reiterates that they are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment. There is an obligation to examine whether these assurances provide, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant will be protected against the risk of ill-treatment. The weight to be given to assurances from the receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances prevailing at the material time (see Saadi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0148, and Othman (Abu Qatada), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0187-89).67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, according to the assurances provided by the Kyrgyz authorities to the Russian Federation, the applicant would have the benefit of legal assistance, he would not be extradited to a third State, he would be prosecuted only for the offence for which he was being extradited, he would not be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, he would be prosecuted for an ordinary criminal offence devoid of any political character or discrimination on any ground, he would be able to freely leave Kyrgyzstan after he had stood trial and served a sentence, and Russian diplomats would be given access to him (see paragraph 17 above).68.\u00a0\u00a0Even accepting that the assurances in question were not couched in general terms, the Court observes that Kyrgyzstan is not a Contracting State to the Convention, nor have its authorities demonstrated the existence of an effective system of legal protection against torture that could act as an equivalent to the system required of Contracting States. While those assurances appear to be formally binding on the local authorities, the Court has serious doubts, in view of the poor human-rights record in the south of the country, whether the local authorities there can be expected to abide by them in practice (see Makhmudzhan Ergashev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a035-46). Furthermore, it has not been demonstrated before the Court that Kyrgyzstan\u2019s commitment to guaranteeing access to the applicant by Russian diplomatic staff would result in effective protection against proscribed ill-treatment in practical terms, as it has not been shown that the aforementioned staff would be in possession of the expertise required for effective follow-up of the Kyrgyz authorities\u2019 compliance with their undertakings. Nor was there any guarantee that they would be able to speak to the applicant without witnesses. In addition, their potential involvement was not supported by any practical mechanism setting up a procedure by which the applicant could lodge his complaints with them or facilitating their unfettered access to detention facilities (see Mamadaliyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a069). The fact that six non-Kyrgyz persons, only two of whom were ethnic Uzbeks, were visited in Kyrgyzstan by Russian diplomatic staff after their extradition cannot be considered to constitute a sufficient demonstration of the existence of a monitoring mechanism in the requesting country (see, by contrast, Othman (Abu Qatada), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 189-204).69.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the Court cannot accept the Government\u2019s assertion that the assurances provided by the Kyrgyz authorities are sufficient to eliminate the risk of his exposure to ill-treatment in the requesting country.70.\u00a0\u00a0Considering the attested widespread and routine use of torture and other ill-treatment by law-enforcement agencies in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in respect of members of the Uzbek community, to which the applicant belongs, the impunity of law\u2011enforcement officers and the absence of sufficient safeguards for the applicant in the requesting country, the Court finds it substantiated that the applicant would face a real risk of exposure to treatment proscribed by Article 3 if returned to Kyrgyzstan.71.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kyrgyzstan would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his appeals against the detention orders of 22 April and 13 September 2013 had not been examined \u201cspeedily\u201d and that there had been no effective procedure by which he could challenge his detention after 30\u00a0January 2014. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, which reads:\u201c4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility73.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings concerning the appeal against the extension order of 22\u00a0April 2013 had been lodged outside the six-month time-limit provided by Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant introduced his complaints under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention on 4\u00a0March 2014. Bearing in mind the six\u2011month requirement laid down in Article 35 \u00a7 1, the Court considers that it is not competent to examine the complaint concerning the extension ordered on 22\u00a0April 2013 and upheld on 12 July 2013.75.\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, in so far as the applicant complained under Article 5 \u00a7 4 about the excessive length of the proceedings concerning the appeal against the extension order of 13\u00a0September 2013 and about his inability to obtain a review of his detention after 30\u00a0January 2014, the Court finds that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established. Therefore, they must be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0Speediness of review on appeal76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s lawyer had lodged an appeal against the extension order of 13 September 2013 on 19\u00a0September 2013. Although the appeal was dispatched by post on 20\u00a0September 2013, it was not until 21\u00a0October 2013 that the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok received it, although there are no documents disclosing the reasons for this delay. On 23 October 2013 a copy of the appeal was forwarded to the applicant and the local prosecutor\u2019s office, who were invited to submit their comments by 28\u00a0October 2013. On 31 October 2013 the Leninskiy District Court forwarded the case file to the Primorye Regional Court for examination. On 6 November 2013 the appeal hearing was scheduled and the parties were informed accordingly. The appeal was examined on 7\u00a0November 2013, that is to say seventeen days after its receipt. In view of the above circumstances, the length of the proceedings concerning the appeal against the extension order of 13\u00a0September 2013 cannot be regarded as breaching the requirement of \u201cspeediness\u201d under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the Government had not provided any evidence that it had actually taken more than a month to deliver the appeal sent by the applicant\u2019s representative, such delay being very unusual for postal delivery within the same city. The Post of Russia is in any event a State-owned entity and it is for the domestic authorities to facilitate its operation in a way that does not contribute to any violation of the rights of detainees. Furthermore, the Government did not adduce any reasonable justification for the subsequent seventeen-day delay.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged inability to obtain a review of detention78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant did in fact have the opportunity after 30\u00a0January 2014 to initiate a review of the lawfulness of his detention and to apply for release, as is required by Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. They submitted, in particular, that the domestic legal system provided for an application for the release of individuals detained pending extradition under Articles 119-122 of the CCrP. The Government claimed, furthermore, that the applicant could also have asked a prosecutor to reconsider the imposition of custodial detention under Article 110 of the CCrP after the interim measures had been applied by the Court. They illustrated the application of this legal provision by reference to the case of Kadirzhanov and Mamashev (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a034, 35, 111, 113 and 131), where Mr\u00a0Kadirzhanov \u2013 who had been held in custody pending extradition and in respect of whom the Court had applied interim measures pursuant to Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court \u2013 was released on the basis of a prosecutor\u2019s decision at the request of his lawyer. The Government further stated that, although the interim measure had been applied by the Court on 28\u00a0January 2014, the Supreme Court was not competent to take a decision on the applicant\u2019s release from custody during the court hearing of 30\u00a0January 2014 because the scope of that hearing had been limited to reviewing the decision of the Primorye Regional Court of 1\u00a0November 2013 and the latest extension order had been delivered by a different court.79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed that the interval between the instances of \u201cautomatic periodic review\u201d of the lawfulness of his detention pending extradition had been excessively long, as he had not been able to ask the domestic courts to reconsider the issue of custodial detention after 30\u00a0January 2014. Moreover, he disagreed with the Government\u2019s assertion that it had been open to him to initiate proceedings for release under Article\u00a0110 of the CCrP, as in his view it had been incumbent on the State agencies to initiate such proceedings of their own motion. He further claimed that the application procedure under Articles\u00a0119-122 of the CCrP could not be regarded as an effective remedy in his case as it was applicable only to parties to criminal proceedings instituted in Russia. Moreover, any prosecutor\u2019s decision taken on the basis of that procedure could only be challenged in court under Article 125 of the CCrP, which does not empower a court to order a detainee\u2019s release, even if it finds the impugned detention order unlawful or unjustified (see Zokhidov v. Russia, no.\u00a067286\/10, \u00a7\u00a0188, 5 February 2013).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Speediness of review on appeal(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention enshrines the right to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of detention, and to an order terminating it if it proves to be unlawful (see Baranowski v. Poland, no.\u00a028358\/95, \u00a7\u00a068, ECHR 2000\u2011III). Article 5 \u00a7 4 does not compel the Contracting States to set up a second level of jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention. However, where domestic law provides for an appeal, the appellate body must also comply with the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4, for instance as concerns the speediness of the review in such appeal proceedings. Accordingly, in order to determine whether or not there has been compliance with the requirement that a decision be given \u201cspeedily\u201d, it is necessary to effect an overall assessment where the proceedings have been conducted at more than one level of jurisdiction (see Mooren v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a011364\/03, \u00a7\u00a0106, 9\u00a0July 2009). At the same time, the standard of \u201cspeediness\u201d is less stringent when it comes to proceedings before an appellate court (see Lebedev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a04493\/04, \u00a7\u00a096, 25\u00a0October 2007).81.\u00a0\u00a0Although the number of days taken by the relevant proceedings is obviously an important element, it is not necessarily in itself decisive for the question of whether a decision has been delivered with the requisite speed (see Merie v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a0664\/05, 20 September 2007). What is taken into account is the diligence shown by the authorities, any delay attributable to the applicant, and any delay-inducing factors for which the State cannot be held responsible (see Jablonski v. Poland, no.\u00a033492\/96, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a091-94, 21 December 2000). The question whether the right to a speedy decision has been respected must thus be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case (see Rehbock v. Slovenia, no.\u00a029462\/95, \u00a7\u00a084, ECHR 2000-XII).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it is undisputed between the parties that the appeal against the detention order of 13\u00a0September 2013 was lodged by the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 19\u00a0September 2013 and dispatched by post on 20\u00a0September 2013. It is further undisputed that the Primorye Regional Court examined the above appeal on 7\u00a0November 2013, forty-eight days after it had been lodged.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government have not argued, and the Court does not find any indication to suggest, that any delay in the examination of the applicant\u2019s appeal against the detention order of 13\u00a0September 2013 can be attributable to his conduct. In the absence of any explanation from the Government capable of justifying such delay, the Court considers that the amount of time it took the Primorye Regional Court to examine the applicant\u2019s appeal against the first-instance detention order in the present case can only be characterised as inordinate. This is not reconcilable with the requirement of \u201cspeediness\u201d, as set out in Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention (see Khamrakulov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a079-81).84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus finds that there has been a violation of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged inability to obtain a review of detention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that forms of judicial review satisfying the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4 may vary from one domain to another, and will depend on the type of deprivation of liberty in issue. It is not out of the question for a system based on an automatic periodic review of the lawfulness of detention by a court to satisfy the requirements of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 (see Megyeri v. Germany, 12 May 1992, \u00a7 22, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0237\u2011A). However, long intervals in the context of such an automatic periodic review may give rise to a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 (see, among other authorities, Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24\u00a0September 1992, \u00a7 77, Series A no. 244). By virtue of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04, a detainee is entitled to ask a \u201ccourt\u201d having jurisdiction to decide \u201cspeedily\u201d whether or not his or her deprivation of liberty has become \u201cunlawful\u201d in the light of new factors which have emerged subsequent to the initial decision to order his or her remand in custody (see Ismoilov and Others, no.\u00a02947\/06, \u00a7\u00a0146, 24 April 2008). The requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4 as to what may be considered a \u201creasonable\u201d interval in the context of periodic judicial review also varies from one domain to another, depending on the type of deprivation of liberty in question (see, for a summary of the Court\u2019s case-law in the context of detention for the purposes set out in sub-paragraphs (a), (c), (e) and (f) of Article 5 \u00a7 1, Abdulkhakov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0212-14).86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it is not its task to attempt to rule as to the maximum period of time between reviews which should automatically apply to a certain category of detainees. The question of whether the periods comply with the requirement must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case (see Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, 21\u00a0October 1986, \u00a7 55, Series A no. 107, and Oldham v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a036273\/97, \u00a7\u00a031, ECHR 2000-X). The Court must, in particular, examine whether any new relevant factors that have arisen in the interval between periodic reviews have been assessed, without unreasonable delay, by a court having jurisdiction to decide whether or not the detention has become \u201cunlawful\u201d in the light of these new factors (see Abdulkhakov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0215).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in the context of reviewing the applicant\u2019s detention, the Government referred to the possibility of the applicant\u2019s lodging an application under Articles 119-122 of the CCrP (see paragraphs\u00a037-40 above) and the possibility of his asking a prosecutor to release him under Article\u00a0110 of the CCrP (see paragraph 34 above) after the interim measures had been applied by the Court. The Court has previously addressed similar arguments and dismissed them, having found that the Government have not provided any explanation as to the manner in which applications under Articles 119-122 of the CCrP could have amounted to a request for release or periodic judicial review at reasonable intervals of the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition, and that Article\u00a0110 of the CCrP did not provide for a clear mechanism of applying for cancellation or varying the preventive measure in the context of detention pending extradition (see Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0131-32).88.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the lack of a possibility for those detained pending extradition to initiate proceedings for the examination of the lawfulness of their detention is not in itself contrary to Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, provided that periodic judicial reviews of the lawfulness of detention are held at \u201creasonable intervals\u201d (see Abdulkhakov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0210, with further references).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in a number of previous cases against Russia it has accepted that proceedings for the extension of detention pending extradition before a first-instance court amounted to a form of periodic review of a judicial nature (see Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0134; with further references). The Court will therefore have to ascertain whether in the present case such periodic judicial review of the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention was held at a reasonable interval.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that on 13 September 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok extended the applicant\u2019s detention for six months on the grounds that the extradition proceedings were still pending. During the period of detention under consideration, an important development occurred in the applicant\u2019s extradition case. Namely, on 28\u00a0January 2014 the Court applied an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 4 above) with the result that, although on 30\u00a0January 2014 the extradition order was upheld at final instance and the domestic extradition proceedings were thereby terminated, any preparation for the enforcement of the extradition order had to be suspended for an indefinite period of time. The Court considers that this constituted a new relevant factor that might have affected the lawfulness of, and the justification for, the applicant\u2019s continued detention. The applicant was therefore entitled under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 to proceedings to have that new relevant factor assessed by a court without unreasonable delay.91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that slightly over a month after the above new relevant factor emerged, on 7\u00a0March 2014 the deputy Prosecutor of the Primorye Region ordered the applicant\u2019s release in the light of the interim measures applied by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 24 above). The Court considers that a delay slightly exceeding one month in assessing a new relevant factor capable of affecting the lawfulness of detention in the applicant\u2019s case was reasonable (compare to Abdulkhakov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0216, where in similar circumstances it took the domestic authorities three months to review the applicant\u2019s detention and order his release, and Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0137\u201138, where such period also amounted to almost three months).92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds, therefore, that in the applicant\u2019s case the periodic judicial review of his detention was held at a reasonable interval and provided swift assessment of the new relevant factor capable of affecting the lawfulness of his detention.93.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention on this account.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION94.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not claim any damages. Accordingly, there is no call to make an award under this head.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses96.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 2,800 euros (EUR) for his legal representation before the Court (28 hours spent on the case by the lawyer at an hourly rate of EUR\u00a0100 per hour).97.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, although not manifestly excessive in the light of the Court\u2019s case-law, the requested sum was not based on a contract for legal assistance or any other document setting the hourly rate of the applicant\u2019s representative and should therefore be rejected.98.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,800 for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.IV.\u00a0\u00a0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not ask for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if referral of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.101.\u00a0\u00a0It considers that the instruction given to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 4 above) must continue in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection.","27591":"I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS83.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given their similar factual and legal background.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2, 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPLICANTS\u2019 ORDERED EXPULSION TO SYRIA84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their expulsion to Syria, if carried out, would be in breach of their right to life and the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, as provided in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. They also stressed that they had no effective domestic remedies in respect of these violations, in breach of Article 13. The provisions read as follows, in so far as relevant:Article 2\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. ...\u201dArticle 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 13\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Arguments of the parties1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government85.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. At the time of lodging their complaints, their applications for asylum and\/or temporary asylum had not yet been considered in the final instance. Furthermore, they had not lodged their requests until after their arrest for breaching immigration rules.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that during the administrative expulsion proceedings, notably during the court hearings, the applicants had only provided general and summary information about the reasons allegedly preventing their return. The documents to support the claims had only been submitted for the hearing of 27 May 2014 in the Kaluga Regional Court, and had either been outdated, such as \u201cUpdate I\u201d of December 2012 relating to the UNHCR document \u201cInternational Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic\u201d, or so general in nature that they had failed to corroborate the individual circumstances of each applicant. By way of example, the Government submitted copies of two court decisions where Syrian nationals had been able to obtain reversal of the expulsion orders (see paragraphs 71 and 73 above).87.\u00a0\u00a0Specific information, for instance concerning the destruction of their homes and the death of their family members had not been submitted by A.A and L.M. until 27 May 2014. The significant delay in reporting their alleged fears to the Russian authorities raised doubts as to the veracity of their applications.88.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government stressed that on 17 July and 15 October 2014 the applicants had lodged requests not to have their applications for refugee status and temporary asylum reviewed. This inconsistency had prevented the FMS from examining their complaints on the merits. The examination of A.A.\u2019s complaint had been left incomplete in view of his escape from the detention centre in August 2014 and the absence of any contact with the authorities since then. The Government were of the opinion that a further examination of A.A.\u2019s complaint was impossible in the circumstances.89.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Government were of the opinion that the applicants\u2019 claims under Articles 2 and 3 should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies or as manifestly ill-founded.2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants90.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that the question of their expulsion to Syria had been considered and decided primarily within the framework of the administrative proceedings, in which they had submitted extensive documents and arguments pointing to the danger of a violation of Articles 2 and 3 in the event of their return. The judicial decisions of 15 and 16 April and 27 May 2014 had failed to take these arguments into account and had made no effort to dispel them. In the April hearings in the District Court, they had raised their fears of returning to Syria. During the hearing of 27\u00a0May 2014, they had submitted extensive and detailed information about the conflict there and the danger they would face if returned. These documents included UNHCR and FMS documents, other relevant information and their own detailed statements. The applicants stressed that L.M. was a stateless Palestinian and was therefore in particular need of international protection, while A.A. and M.A. were from Aleppo, where fierce fighting had been raging since 2013. A.M specified in addition that several of his family members had been killed by the opposition forces. Following the decision taken at that hearing, the decisions to expel them had entered into force.91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that they had submitted sufficiently detailed, individualised and corroborated evidence to the authorities that they faced a real risk of death and\/or ill-treatment if returned. In addition to general country of origin information speaking of widespread and general violence against civilians, this position had been based on the UNHCR individual assessment letters of the applicants\u2019 situation and supported by the official position of the Federal Bailiff Service and FMS relied on by the applicants about the impossibility of returning to Syria and well-foundedness of their asylum requests.92.\u00a0\u00a0In the circumstances, the judicial decisions to maintain the administrative expulsion as an additional sanction had not been based on an individualised assessment and had failed to take into account the relevant important factors. Despite this weighty and detailed evidence, the decisions of the Regional Court of 27 May 2014 had simply stated that the information about the continuous civil war and the alleged danger to the applicants\u2019 life and safety \u201cdid not constitute sufficient grounds for excluding the application for expulsion\u201d.93.\u00a0\u00a0As to the available remedies, the applicants argued that their claims of a possible breach of Articles 2 and 3 in the event of their return should have been taken into account in the context of the proceedings concerning administrative expulsion. This, in their view, constituted the most appropriate and effective avenue to address the issue. They stressed that the fact that their claims for refugee status and\/or temporary asylum status had been lodged by the time of the hearing in the Regional Court on 27 May 2014 had not prevented that court from confirming the legality of their expulsion, thus nullifying the possible guarantee of non-refoulement contained in the relevant international and domestic legal documents.94.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the District Court had refused to stay the execution of the judgments in question, supporting the view that the expulsion was still possible.95.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Government claimed that the procedure for refugee status and temporary asylum constituted an effective remedy to be used, the applicants stressed that the system in Russia had a number of serious drawbacks which had made it inaccessible for them in practice. In particular, they pointed out that while asylum seekers were notified of the FMS decision not to grant them asylum or refugee status, they had to try and obtain the text of the relevant decision from the FMS themselves. Only once the text had been obtained could the people affected bring a complaint to the competent court. A.A.s first request had therefore been rejected on 26\u00a0March 2014, and the applicant who had no legal aid and spoke no Russian had not been aware of the need to obtain the decision. This information was apparent from the Government\u2019s observations of 10\u00a0September 2014 where they had stressed that A.A. had not taken the necessary steps to obtain the decision of 13 August 2013. The remedies had been inaccessible in practice, and therefore unavailable to the applicants.96.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants next stressed that the \u201cretractions\u201d signed by them at the detention centre had been obtained under duress and in the absence of contact with their representatives, without any understanding of what they had been doing. This was confirmed by the applicants\u2019 subsequent submissions and statements.97.\u00a0\u00a0As to M.A., he had not retracted his latest request for asylum which had been rejected on 19 September 2014. Again, he had been unable to obtain the decision in full and prevented from having any meaningful contact with his relatives or representatives to challenge the decision. This information was fully corroborated by M.A.\u2019s relatives and his complaint.98.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicants\u2019 view, the above circumstances also disclosed a breach of Article 13, since they had failed to obtain a meaningful review of their claims of fear for life and security if returned, in any of the procedures used.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court should first address the Government\u2019s argument of non\u2011exhaustion. It notes that the applicants had raised their fears of treatment in breach of Articles 2 and 3 if returned to Syria in three types of procedure: those concerning their administrative expulsion for illegal residence, and those concerning refugee status and temporary asylum. The applicants claimed that while the administrative expulsion proceedings had been completed and the decisions of the courts to expel them remained in force, the determination of their refugee status and temporary asylum had turned out to be ineffective and inaccessible.100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court first notes that Russian legislation prohibits the removal of persons whose requests for refugee status and\/or temporary asylum are pending (see paragraphs 66 and 67 above). It points out that where an applicant seeks to prevent his or her removal from a Contracting State, a remedy will only be effective if it has automatic suspensive effect. Conversely, where a remedy does have automatic suspensive effect, the applicant will normally be required to use that remedy. Judicial review, where it is available and where the lodging of an application for judicial review will operate as a bar to removal, must be regarded as an effective remedy which, in principle, applicants will be required to exhaust before lodging an application with the Court or indeed requesting interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to delay a removal (see NA. v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7\u00a090, 17 July 2008; and, by contrast, M.A. v Cyprus, no.\u00a041872\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 131-43, 23 July 2013; see also Gayratbek Saliyev v. Russia, no. 39093\/13, \u00a7 41, 17 April 2014, where the Government admitted that the remedies which have no automatic suspensive effect in the context of extradition are not effective).101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further agrees that the successful outcome of proceedings for the determination of refugee status and\/or temporary asylum could offer a real possibility for applicants to regularise their situation and obtain formal guarantees of non-refoulement for the duration of that status. The Court has previously found that such solutions constitute part of an effective national remedy where the regularisation of an applicant\u2019s immigration status through the procedure of temporary asylum and the granting of a temporary residence permit on that basis was accompanied by the annulment of the extradition and\/or expulsion orders (see Tukhtamurodov v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a021762\/14, \u00a7 37, 20 January 2015, and, for similar conclusions in the context of Article 8, Ewalaka-Koumou v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no.\u00a020953\/03, 4 February 2010). The Court regards the relevant information submitted by applicants to the immigration authorities as an integral part justifying their claims of a fear of treatment in breach of Article 3 (see Y. v. Russia, no. 20113\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 87-88, 4 December 2008; Shakurov v. Russia, no. 55822\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 132-13, 5 June 2012; and Kozhayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 60045\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 85-87, 5 June 2012).102.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Court notes that, in the context of Russia, the decision ordering an applicant\u2019s removal from the territory in extradition or administrative expulsion proceedings remains valid despite the lodging of an application for refugee status and\/or temporary asylum. Consequently, in reviewing such complaints the Court has focused primarily on these proceedings as constituting the basis for the complaint brought under Article 3. It has found that while ruling on the question of the possibility of removal, the scope of review by the domestic authorities, including the courts, should include relevant arguments of ill-treatment raised by the applicants, in view of the absolute nature of Article 3 (see Egamberdiyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a034742\/13, \u00a7\u00a044, 26 June 2014, and Khalikov v. Russia, no.\u00a066373\/13, \u00a7 37, 6 July 2015).103.\u00a0\u00a0It should be reiterated, in this respect, that the criteria laid down for granting refugee status are not identical to those used for assessing the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Consequently, the fact that an appeal against such a decision is pending does not, in itself, constitute an obstacle to the Court\u2019s examination of the complaint under Article 3 on the merits if the expulsion or extradition request remains in force (see Kasymakhunov v. Russia, no. 29604\/12, \u00a7 125, 14 November 2013; Rakhimov v. Russia, no.\u00a050552\/13, \u00a7\u00a094, 10 July 2014; and Khalikov, cited above, \u00a7 37). This approach is guided by the general rule that, in the event of there being a number of remedies which an individual can pursue, that person is entitled to choose one which addresses his or her essential grievance (see Croke v. Ireland (dec.), no. 33267\/96, 15 June 1999, and Jeli\u010di\u0107 v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), no.\u00a041183\/02, 15 November 2005).104.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, during the hearings in the District Court on the question of expulsion, the applicants referred to the war and danger to their lives (see paragraph 11 above). Indeed, these statements were rather general, but the applicants do not speak Russian and, while they seem to have had access to an interpreter, had no legal representative to assist them. It is therefore not surprising that their participation was relatively limited. In their statements of appeal the applicants, assisted by representatives, submitted detailed and corroborated information about the situation in Syria, such as heavy fighting raging in the regions of their origin and more individualised assessments produced by the UNHCR (see paragraph 12 above). The decisions of 27 May 2014 were final and confirmed the expulsion orders, which remain valid to date in respect of all three applicants. In a separate ruling of the same date in respect of L.M., the Kaluga Regional Court confirmed the validity of the expulsion order in spite of the pending request for asylum (see paragraph 14 above).105.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the applicants alleged that their confinement in the detention centre had prevented them from effectively participating in the proceedings for the determination of their refugee and asylum status. While they had lodged the relevant requests, they alleged that on two occasions they had been forced to sign papers withdrawing their applications; these withdrawals were later retracted by them as made under duress and in the absence of an interpreter or advice. Numerous complaints lodged by the applicants\u2019 representatives pointed to severe restrictions on communication which could not but have had an effect on the accessibility of the appeal proceedings (see paragraphs 32, 33 and 47-54 above). When one of the applicants, M.A., appealed against the decision not to grant him asylum, he had no opportunity to take part in the proceedings (see paragraph\u00a036). In the circumstances, the Court is bound to conclude that the proceedings concerning the determination of the applicants\u2019 refugee and asylum status were not accessible to them in practice in the present case and therefore, in any event, could not be considered as a remedy to be used.106.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the complaints are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention, and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles108.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles concerning the application of Article\u00a03 have recently been summarised by the Court in Mamazhonov v.\u00a0Russia (no.\u00a017239\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 127-35, 23 October 2014). They also apply with regard to Article 2 of the Convention (see, for example, Kaboulov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 41015\/04, \u00a7 99, 19 November 2009, and M.A. v. Cyprus, cited above, \u00a7 133). In the present case, the issues under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention are indissociable and the Court will therefore examine them together (see K.A.B. v. Sweden, no. 886\/11, \u00a7 67, 5\u00a0September 2013).109.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of applications lodged in Russia, primarily by applicants originating from the countries of Central Asia, the Court has identified the critical elements to be subjected to a searching scrutiny. Firstly, it has to be considered whether an applicant has presented the national authorities with substantial grounds for believing that he faces a real risk of ill\u2011treatment in the destination country. Secondly, the Court will inquire into whether the claim has been assessed adequately by the competent national authorities discharging their procedural obligations under Article 3 of the Convention and whether their conclusions were sufficiently supported by relevant material. Lastly, having regard to all of the substantive aspects of a case and the available relevant information, the Court will assess the existence of the real risk of suffering torture or treatment incompatible with Convention standards (see Mamazhonov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 136-37, with further references).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of substantial grounds for believing that the applicants face a real risk of death and\/or ill-treatment and their assessment by the national authorities110.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court will focus primarily on the examination of the applicants\u2019 complaint in the context of the proceedings under the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraphs 100-04). The Court notes that in these proceedings the applicants challenged the possibility of expulsion. They argued that they originated from Aleppo and Damascus, where heavy and indiscriminate fighting has been raging since 2012. In addition to the general information on the conflict in Syria, they pointed out the practice of the FMS in respect of people originating from Syria and the UNHCR recommendation not to carry out expulsions to Syria, as well as information from the Federal Bailiff Service on the impossibility of ensuring travel there. The applicants referred to a similar case decided in St. Petersburg where the City Court concluded that expulsion could not be carried out and lifted the additional punishment of expulsion (see paragraphs 12 and 72 above). The statements of appeal also referred to the fact that the applicants had sought asylum in Russia (see paragraph 12 above).111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants then submitted to the authorities additional and individualised information about the risks in the event of return during the proceedings aimed at obtaining refugee status and temporary asylum (see paragraphs 37-39 above), which were either rejected or remained incomplete for the reasons stated above (see paragraph 105 above).112.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the arrival of a significant number of asylum seekers from Syria and the need for this group to have international protection could not have been unknown to the relevant authorities, as attested by the position of the FMS which had been brought to the attention of the Regional Court (see paragraph 12 above).113.\u00a0\u00a0In the circumstances, the Court finds that the applicants presented the national authorities with substantial grounds for believing that they faced a real risk to their lives and personal security if expelled. It remains to be addressed whether the claim has been assessed adequately by the competent national authorities.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Duty to assess claims of a real risk of ill-treatment relying on sufficient relevant material114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants argued before the domestic courts that their expulsion would expose them to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3, and in the Government\u2019s opinion this argument had been adequately considered by the domestic courts and rejected.115.\u00a0\u00a0As to the proceedings which had resulted in the expulsion order, the Court notes that the scope of review by the domestic courts was largely confined to establishing that their presence in Russia had been illegal. Both the Maloyaroslavets District Court and Kaluga Regional Court had avoided engaging in any in-depth discussion about the dangers referred to by the applicants and the wide range of international and national sources describing the current situation in Syria. In this connection, the Court reiterates that, in view of the absolute nature of Article 3, it is not possible to weigh the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons put forward for expulsion (see Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no.\u00a030471\/08, \u00a7 91, 22\u00a0September 2009). The courts\u2019 approach in this case is particularly regretful since there exists a national practice whereby the domestic courts, including the Supreme Court, when considering administrative offences in the immigration sphere take into account and accord sufficient weight to the arguments of real risk of ill-treatment advanced by the claimants. As a result of such examination, the expulsion orders can be lifted (see paragraphs 71-73 above).116.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants and the Federal Bailiff Service attempted to reverse the orders of expulsion, or at least to have them suspended; however, the courts remained equally dismissive and focused on the nature of the offences committed rather than on an evaluation of the applicants\u2019 claims made under Articles 2 and 3 (see paragraphs 14-17 above).117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found that the applicants attempted to lodge requests for asylum and refugee status, but were prevented from effectively participating in these proceedings (see paragraphs 101-05 above).118.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court is not persuaded that the applicants\u2019 allegations have been duly examined by the domestic authorities in any of the proceedings employed. It must, accordingly, assess whether there exists a real risk that the applicants would be subjected to treatment proscribed by Articles 2 and\/or 3 if they were removed to Syria.(d)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of a real risk of ill-treatment or danger to life119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that a general situation of violence will not normally in itself entail a violation of Article 3 in the event of expulsion (see H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, \u00a7 41, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011III); however, it has never ruled out the possibility that the general situation of violence in a country of destination may be of a sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any removal to it would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court would adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases of general violence, where there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence on return (see N.A. v.\u00a0the\u00a0United\u00a0Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7\u00a0115, 17 July 2008).120.\u00a0\u00a0As a matter of comparison, when considering situations in different areas of Somalia, the Court concluded that the risks of generalised violence, dire humanitarian conditions and absence of the possibility of relocating internally without the danger of being exposed to a risk of ill-treatment could lead to a finding of breach of Article 3, unless it could be sufficiently demonstrated that special circumstances such as powerful clan or family connections could ensure the individual\u2019s protection (see Sufi and Elmi v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 293-96, 28 June 2011).121.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing the intensity of the conflict in Mogadishu, the Court in Sufi and Elmi (cited above) applied the following criteria which had been identified by the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal in AM\u00a0& AM ((armed conflict: risk categories) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00091, \u00a7 241):\u201c[F]irst, whether the parties to the conflict were either employing methods and tactics of warfare which increased the risk of civilian casualties or directly targeting civilians; secondly, whether the use of such methods and\/or tactics was widespread among the parties to the conflict; thirdly, whether the fighting was localised or widespread; and finally, the number of civilians killed, injured and displaced as a result of the fighting.\u201d122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court noted that \u201cwhile these criteria [were] not to be seen as an exhaustive list to be applied in all future cases\u201d, they formed an \u201cappropriate yardstick by which to assess the level of violence in Mogadishu in the context of that particular case\u201d (ibid). In reaching its conclusion about the level of violence in Mogadishu, the Court in Sufi and Elmi (cited above) had regard to \u201cthe indiscriminate bombardments and military offensives carried out by all parties to the conflict, the unacceptable number of civilian casualties, the substantial number of persons displaced within and from the city, and the unpredictable and widespread nature of the conflict\u201d (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0248).123.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that it has not yet adopted a judgment to evaluate the allegations of a risk of danger to life or ill-treatment in the context of the ongoing conflict in Syria. This is undoubtedly at least in part due to the fact that, as it appears from the relevant UNHCR documents, most European countries do not at present carry out involuntary returns to Syria. In October 2014 the UNHCR \u201cwelcomed the positive protection practices of many European States with respect to Syrian nationals, including a de facto moratoria on returns to Syria, the decision to process Syrian claims in most countries, and high protection rates\u201d The latest UN reports describe the situation as a \u201chumanitarian crisis\u201d and speak of \u201cimmeasurable suffering\u201d of the civilians, massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law by all parties and the resulting displacement of almost half of the country\u2019s population (see paragraphs 76, 77, 80 and 81 above).124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants originate from Aleppo and Damascus, where particularly heavy fighting has been raging. M.A. referred to the killing of his relatives by armed militia who had taken over the district where he lived, and feared that he would be killed too. L.M. is a stateless Palestinian. According to UNHCR, \u201cnearly all the areas hosting large numbers of Palestinian refugees are directly affected by the conflict\u201d. This group was regarded by the UNHCR as being in need of international protection. The Court further notes that the applicants are young men who, in the view of the Human Rights Watch, are in particular danger of detention and ill-treatment (see paragraph 79 above).125.\u00a0\u00a0The above elements are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the applicants have put forward a well-founded allegation that their return to Syria would be in breach of Articles 2 and\/or 3 of the Convention. The Government have not presented any arguments or relevant information that could dispel these allegations, nor referred to any special circumstances which could ensure sufficient protection for the applicants if returned.126.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that if the applicants were expelled to Syria, it would be in breach of Articles 2 and\/or 3 of the Convention.127.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants claimed a breach of Article 13, the Court notes that it has already examined that allegation in the context of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Having regard to these findings, it considers that it is not necessary to examine this complaint separately on the merits (see, among other authorities, Gaforov v. Russia, no. 25404\/09, \u00a7\u00a0144, 21\u00a0October 2010; Khaydarov v. Russia, no. 21055\/09, \u00a7\u00a0156, 20 May 2010; and Khodzhayev v. Russia, no.\u00a052466\/08, \u00a7 151, 12 May 2010).III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION BY THE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION128.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the conditions of their detention in the detention centre for foreign nationals had been incompatible with Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions129.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants listed the following elements as the basis for their complaint under this head: verbal abuse and physical violence by the detention centre staff, limited privacy, limited access to an interpreter and legal aid, lack of opportunity to take walks and have outdoor exercise, and a lack of medical treatment. They referred to their complaints and the affidavits made by themselves and to their representatives. They believed that the cumulative effect of these factors amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. They also referred to the Courts\u2019 previous findings of a violation of Article 3 on account of the conditions of confinement in detention centres for foreign nationals pending expulsion and argued that conditions there, as a rule, were substandard to the requirements of the Convention.130.\u00a0\u00a0The Government were of the opinion that the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention at the centre had not disclosed a violation of Article 3. They referred to the minimum standards established by the relevant legislation (see paragraphs 74 and 75 above) and stressed that these requirements had been complied with at the detention centre in the Kaluga Region. As to the material conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention, the Government pointed out that M.A. and L.M. had been detained in a room measuring 47 square metres and designed to hold six detainees; each having a personal space of almost eight square metres, an individual bed and bedding. The room had large windows with unrestricted access to light and ventilation and artificial light in the evenings, inmates had access to a partitioned toilet, and a shared bathroom was accessible on request (see paragraph 60 above). Exercise could be taken daily (see paragraph 58 above). The centre was staffed with medical professionals who provided the necessary care to the inmates, including the applicants (see paragraph 59 above).B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously found the conditions of detention at some Russian facilities for foreign nationals to be in breach of Article 3 guarantees. In doing so, the Court has had regard to constant overcrowding which was severe enough to justify, in its own right, the finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, seen against the background of virtually non-existent outdoor exercise and deficient hygiene facilities (see Kim v. Russia, no.\u00a044260\/13, \u00a7 32, 17 July 2014).132.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complained about the material conditions, the Government presented a detailed description of the accommodation facilities, accompanied by relevant documents and other evidence. L.M. confirmed in his interview of 17 December 2014 that the material conditions of accommodation had not posed any particular problems in terms of overcrowding, personal space, hygiene and bathing facilities or access to regular outdoor exercise (see paragraph 52 above). M.A. did not make any specific submissions on that subject.133.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the parties\u2019 submissions, the Court is satisfied that the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention at the Kaluga detention centre corresponded to the description contained in the Government\u2019s submissions (see paragraph 129 above). Taking into account the cumulative effect of those elements, it does not appear that the material conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention could be regarded as inhuman or degrading.134.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complained of ill-treatment and verbal abuse by the centre guards, the Court notes that the information about two such incidents in August 2014 had been raised by L.M. and M.A. on 17\u00a0December 2014 during meetings with their representatives (see paragraphs 52 and 53 above). No further details are available; these statements are not corroborated by any other relevant evidence, such as complaints to the relevant authorities or medical evidence.135.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complained of a lack of medical treatment which could reach the threshold of treatment in breach of Article\u00a03, the Court notes that the medical records submitted by the Government indicate that A.A. and L.M. had sought medical assistance on several occasions and that the administered treatment had led to an improvement in their conditions. No medical complaints were raised by the applicants in December 2014 or later. In fact, L.M. indicated that the detention centre had been staffed with four nurses who had administered treatment as needed (see paragraphs 52 and 59 above).136.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above and in the light of all the material in its possession, the Court finds that the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 3 about the conditions of detention does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill\u2011founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION137.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained of a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) and\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04. Article 5 of the Convention reads as follows, where relevant:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition....4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility138.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits139.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will consider firstly whether the possibility of effective supervision over the applicants\u2019 detention existed and, secondly, whether their detention was compatible with the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) (see Kim, cited above, \u00a7 38, and Azimov v. Russia, no.\u00a067474\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 146 et seq., 18 April 2013).1.\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention140.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants stressed that they had no access to effective judicial review of their continued detention. The Government disputed that argument.141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, since its Azimov judgment, which concerned a similar complaint (cited above, \u00a7 153), it has found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 in a number of cases against Russia on account of the absence of any domestic legal provision which could have allowed an applicant to bring proceedings for a judicial review of his detention pending expulsion (see Kim, \u00a7\u00a7 39-43, and Rakhimov, \u00a7\u00a7 148-50, both cited above; Akram Karimov v. Russia, no. 62892\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 199-204, 28 May 2014; and also Egamberdiyev, cited above, \u00a7 64). In the Kim case, the Government acknowledged a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 and, having regard to the recurrent nature of the violation, the Court directed that the Russian authorities should \u201csecure in [their] domestic legal order a mechanism which allows individuals to institute proceedings for the examination of the lawfulness of their detention pending removal in the light of the developments in the removal proceedings\u201d (cited above, \u00a7 71).142.\u00a0\u00a0As in the above cases, the applicants in the present case did not have at their disposal a procedure for a judicial review of the lawfulness of their detention. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention in respect of all three of them.2.\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions143.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed the allegations. They were of the opinion that since the expulsion order remained valid, but was only temporarily stopped through the application of interim measures by the Court, the authorities still had lawful grounds to detain the applicants pending expulsion. They pointed out that the applicants\u2019 illegal residence in Russia was weighted towards maintaining detention as a measure to ensure compliance with the domestic court order. They also pointed out that the relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences did not allow for another measure of restraint, and that there were therefore no grounds for the applicants\u2019 release while the expulsion order remained in force (see paragraph 62 above). The Government were of the opinion that while no time-limit for the applicants\u2019 detention had been stipulated, the maximum term of enforcement of an administrative penalty was two years. The applicants were able to seek a supervisory review of the expulsion and ensuing detention orders if there was a significant change in their circumstances.144.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants stressed that the court decisions did not stipulate the maximum length of this detention. Other than the requirement that the expulsion order be executed within the two-year time-limit, the Code of Administrative Offences did not contain any provisions governing the length of detention pending expulsion, and therefore lacked legal certainty. Moreover, there was a conflict between the position of the Federal Bailiff Service, which was of the opinion that the expulsion could not be carried out and sought to amend the relevant court decisions, and the court decisions confirming the validity of the measure ordered (see paragraphs\u00a015-17 above). Lastly, the applicants claimed that such a long stay in detention significantly exceeded the maximum custodial sentence permissible under the Code of Administrative Offences, and that their detention pending expulsion was of a punitive rather than preventive nature.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment145.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicants\u2019 complaint refers to the period from 15 and 16 April 2014, when the District Court ordered their detention with a view to their administrative removal (\u201cexpulsion\u201d) from Russia (see paragraph 11 above), to the present day. Since administrative removal amounts to a form of \u201cdeportation\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) of the Convention, that provision is applicable in the instant case.146.\u00a0\u00a0Any deprivation of liberty under the second limb of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) will be justified only for as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible under Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) (see\u00a0A.\u00a0and\u00a0Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455\/05, \u00a7 170, ECHR 2009, with further references). The Court also reiterates that deprivation of liberty under Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) of the Convention must conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 \u00a7 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. The notion of \u201carbitrariness\u201d in Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01 extends beyond a lack of conformity with national law, so that deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary, and therefore contrary to the Convention. To avoid being branded as arbitrary, detention under Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the grounds of detention relied on by the Government, the place and conditions of detention must be appropriate, and the length of the detention must not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229\/03, \u00a7\u00a074, ECHR 2008; Azimov, cited above, \u00a7 161; and Rustamov v. Russia, no.\u00a011209\/10, \u00a7\u00a0150, 3\u00a0July 2012, with further references).147.\u00a0\u00a0It is common ground between the parties that the applicants had been residing illegally in Russia before their arrest and had therefore committed an administrative offence potentially punishable by expulsion. The Court is satisfied that on 15 and 16 April 2014 their detention pending expulsion was ordered by the court with jurisdiction in the matter and in connection with an offence punishable by expulsion. The Court accordingly concludes that the initial decision authorising the applicants\u2019 detention was in compliance with the letter of the national law. Furthermore, in view of the succinct arguments about the situation in Syria submitted by the applicants during the court hearings, it could reasonably be said that during this initial period of detention, action was being taken against the applicants with a view to deportation, as it appears that at that stage the authorities were still investigating whether their removal would be possible (see Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, no. 25389\/05, \u00a7\u00a074, ECHR 2007-II).148.\u00a0\u00a0However, in the statements of appeal submitted to the Kaluga Regional Court the applicants clearly indicated, with reference to the relevant Russian sources, that no expulsions to Syria were possible (see paragraph 12). On 27 May 2014 the Regional Court upheld the decisions to expel and detain them, without addressing the arguments concerning the possibility of expulsion. In a separate ruling, the Regional Court refused to endorse L.M.\u2019s request to have the sanction of expulsion lifted, referring only to the administrative offence he had committed (see paragraph 14 above). In June 2014 the Federal Bailiff Service requested the same court to postpone the decisions to expel, indicating that the expulsion could not be carried out. The court again refused, referring to the absence of any legal grounds to postpone the expulsion (see paragraph 15-17 above). As a result, even though there existed sufficient material indicating that no action could be taken with a view to deportation, the applicants\u2019 detention has been validated. L.M. and M.A. remain in detention to date, while A.A. escaped and has been at large since August 2014. Accordingly, in the circumstances of the present case the Court concludes that it cannot be said that after 27\u00a0May 2014 the applicants were persons \u201cagainst whom action [was] being taken with a view to deportation or extradition\u201d. Their detention effectuated after that date was not, therefore, permissible under the exception to the right to liberty set out in Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) of the Convention.149.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that under Russian law there are no provisions which could have allowed the applicants to bring proceedings for a judicial review of their detention pending expulsion, and no automatic review of detention at regular intervals (see Azimov, cited above, \u00a7 153, and the Court\u2019s findings under Article 5 \u00a7 4 above). As a result, even though as noted above no real action has been taken since 27 May 2014 with a view to expulsion, the applicants remain in detention without any indication of the time-limit or conditions related to the possibility of review having been added.150.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court has already pointed to the absence of clarity as regards the applicants\u2019 situation after the expiry of the two-year period for the execution of decisions under Article 31.9 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, since they will clearly remain in an irregular situation in terms of immigration law and could again be liable to expulsion and, consequently, to detention on those grounds (see Egamberdiyev, \u00a7 62, and Azimov, \u00a7 171, both cited above).151.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the maximum penalty for deprivation of liberty for an administrative offence under the Code of Administrative Offences in force is thirty days, and that detention with a view to expulsion should not be punitive in nature and should be accompanied by appropriate safeguards, as established by the Russian Constitutional Court. In the present case, the \u201cpreventive\u201d measure was much heavier than the \u201cpunitive\u201d one, which is not normal (see Azimov, cited above, \u00a7 172).152.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION153.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further complained under Article 34 of the Convention that the restrictions on their contact with their representatives had interfered with their ability to communicate with the Court effectively. They also pointed to a lack of interpreting services, which had further hindered their effective participation in the proceedings before the Court. Article 34 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person ... claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d154.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicants\u2019 submissions. They stated that the restrictions on them meeting with their representatives had been reasonable and had not interfered with their right to communicate with the Court. They noted that the detention centre\u2019s daily routine was applicable to all inmates and not just the applicants; that there had been time available every day to arrange for such meetings; that telephone contact, letters and parcels with the representatives had not been limited and could serve as further means of communication. The Government stressed that while the applicants\u2019 representative Ms Golovanchuk had met with the applicants on 17 December 2014, there had been no requests lodged, or refused, by her on any other occasion.155.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants maintained their complaint.156.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted by Article\u00a034 that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7\u00a0102, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011I). In this context, \u201cpressure\u201d includes not only direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation but also other improper indirect acts or instances of contact designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention remedy. The fact that an individual has actually managed to pursue his application does not prevent an issue arising under Article 34: should the Government\u2019s action make it more difficult for him to exercise his right of petition, this amounts to \u201chindering\u201d his rights under Article 34 (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 105 and 254, Reports 1996-IV). The intentions or reasons underlying the acts or omissions in question are of little relevance when assessing whether Article\u00a034 of the Convention has been complied with; what matters is whether the situation created as a result of the authorities\u2019 act or omission conforms to Article 34 (see Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806\/05, \u00a7 87, 10\u00a0March 2009).157.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found in a number of cases that measures limiting an applicant\u2019s contact with his representative may constitute interference with the exercise of his right of individual petition (see, for example, Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009\/05, \u00a7 140, 27 March 2008, where a ban on lawyer\u2019s visits, coupled with a ban on telephone calls and correspondence, was held to be incompatible with the respondent State\u2019s obligations under Article 34 of the Convention). The Court has, however, accepted that compliance by a representative with certain formal requirements might be necessary before obtaining access to a detainee, for instance for security reasons or in order to prevent collusion or perverting the course of the investigation or justice (see Melnikov v. Russia, no.\u00a023610\/03, \u00a7\u00a096, 14 January 2010). At the same time, excessive formalities in such matters, such as those that could de facto prevent a prospective applicant from effectively enjoying his right of individual petition, have been found to be unacceptable. Where an applicant\u2019s representative, an NGO lawyer, was required to produce a court decision admitting her to act as counsel, such admittance being within the discretionary powers of the trial or appeal judge, this constituted an interference with the exercise of his right of individual petition (see Zakharkin v. Russia, no. 1555\/04, \u00a7 158, 10 June 2010). By contrast, where the domestic formalities were easy to comply with and the applicant concerned had access to other representatives and the resulting delay in meetings was not excessive, no issue arose under Article\u00a034 (see Lebedev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a04493\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 119, 25 October 2007).158.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicants were represented before the Court Ms N. Golovanchuk, a lawyer practising in Moscow. It agrees with the Government that it appears that no other meetings with her were requested or denied, except one which took place on 17 December 2014.159.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Court remarks that in their communication with the domestic authorities and their representative before the Court the applicants relied not only on the meetings with their representative before the Court who is based in Moscow, but also on the possibility of meeting with locally based lawyers and human rights defenders. Numerous complaints indicate that these meetings with the applicants were denied or made subject to formalities that were difficult to overcome (see paragraph 39 above and further). In particular, it appears from the letters from the detention centre that in order to have a meeting with a representative, both an inmate and his representative have to lodge advance written requests, which should also be certified by a notary and drafted in the presence of an interpreter (see paragraph 41 above). These requirements were applied to a member of the bar, Mr P.K., who was refused access to the applicants on the basis of the engagement letter (see paragraph 50 above). Attempts by Ms\u00a0Lyubov M.-E. to meet with the applicants were also rejected (see paragraphs 42 and 43 above). It also appears that the applicants were not given access to a telephone and could not therefore communicate properly with their representatives.160.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the applicants\u2019 claim that they had been forced to sign statements withdrawing their asylum requests and containing a refusal to meet with Ms Lyubov M.-E. (see paragraphs 46 and 47 above). These statements were later retracted by L.M. and M.A. as obtained under duress and without a proper interpreter; both applicants insisted that they had wanted their asylum requests to proceed and to be assisted by Ms\u00a0Lyubov\u00a0M.-E. (see paragraphs 48, 49 and 52-55 above). The Court reiterates that whether or not contact between the authorities and an applicant are tantamount to unacceptable practice from the standpoint of Article 34 must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. In this respect, regard must be had to the vulnerability of the complainant and his or her susceptibility to influence exerted by the authorities (see Knyazev v. Russia, no. 25948\/05, \u00a7\u00a0117, 8\u00a0November 2007, with further references). An applicant\u2019s position might be particularly vulnerable when he is held in custody and has limited contact with his family or the outside world (see Cotle\u0163 v. Romania, no. 38565\/97, \u00a7\u00a071, 3\u00a0June 2003). In addition to being in detention, the applicants in the present case have a very poor command of Russian and have no family or social network, which makes them particularly at risk to unacceptable practice. They complained that the statements in question, which had negative consequences on the proceedings which were of vital interest to them, had been obtained under duress. The Court notes with concern the absence of any meaningful reaction from the relevant authorities to these complaints raising serious allegations of such practice.161.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, despite several attempts to organise meetings, M.A. and L.M. only met once with their representative, on 17 December 2014. M.A. had one more meeting with his brother and sister-in-law on 22 October 2014, which lasted about ten minutes. A.A. did not meet with a representative prior to his escape from the detention centre (see paragraphs\u00a020-22 and 39 above). It does not appear that it was possible for the applicants to have telephone contact or exchange written submissions; in fact, it appears that such attempts had been actively prevented by the administration (see paragraphs 43 and 49 above, in particular).162.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence that the applicants\u2019 communication with their representatives was seriously obstructed. Obtaining permission to have meetings was so difficult that it went beyond the usual formalities and could be regarded as being excessively complicated; for months the applicants remained without any means of communication with their representatives and could not therefore effectively participate in the domestic proceedings or proceedings before this Court.163.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the restrictions on the applicants\u2019 contact with their representatives constituted an interference with the exercise of their right of individual petition which is incompatible with the respondent State\u2019s obligations under Article 34 of the Convention. The Court therefore concludes that the respondent State has failed to comply with its obligations under that provision.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 46 AND 41 OF THE CONVENTIONA.\u00a0\u00a0Article 46 of the Convention164.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant parts of Article 46 of the Convention read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.2.\u00a0\u00a0The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.\u201d165.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that by Article 46 of the Convention the Contracting Parties have undertaken to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case to which they are parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. It follows, inter alia, that a judgment in which the Court finds a breach of the Convention or the Protocols thereto imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and\/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress as far as possible the effects (see Mente\u015f and Others v. Turkey (Article 50), 24\u00a0July 1998, \u00a7 24, Reports 1998-IV; Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos.\u00a039221\/98 and 41963\/98, \u00a7 249, ECHR 2000-VIII; and Maestri v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no. 39748\/98, \u00a7 47, ECHR 2004-I). It is primarily for the State concerned to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used in its domestic legal order to discharge its obligation under Article 46 of the Convention (see Scozzari and Giunta, cited above; Brum\u0103rescu v. Romania (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 28342\/95, \u00a7 20, ECHR\u00a02001-I; and \u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221\/99, \u00a7 210, ECHR\u00a02005-IV).166.\u00a0\u00a0However, with a view to helping the respondent State to fulfil its obligations under Article 46, the Court may seek to indicate the type of individual and\/or general measures that might be taken in order to put an end to the situation it has found to exist (see Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a031443\/96, \u00a7 194, ECHR 2004-V, and Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no.\u00a010249\/03, \u00a7 148, 17 September 2009).167.\u00a0\u00a0In certain situations, the Court can exceptionally indicate the specific remedy or other measure to be taken by the respondent State (see, for instance, Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503\/01, point 14 of the operative part of the judgment, ECHR 2004\u2011II; Oleksandr Volkov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 21722\/11, \u00a7 208, ECHR 2013; Del R\u00edo Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750\/09, \u00a7 139, ECHR 2013; and Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857\/13, \u00a7\u00a0118, 27 November 2014). Whenever the Court takes this adjudicative approach, it does so with due respect for the Convention organs\u2019 respective functions: it falls to the Committee of Ministers to evaluate the implementation of individual and general measures under Article 46 \u00a7 2 of the Convention (see Kudeshkina v. Russia (no.\u00a02) (dec.), no.\u00a028727\/11, \u00a7\u00a058, 17 February 2014, with further references).168.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case the Court considers that it is necessary, in view of its finding of a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention, to indicate individual measures for the execution of this judgment. It has found a violation of that Article and concluded that after 27 May 2014 the applicants\u2019 detention did not fall within the list of exceptions to the right to liberty set out in Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention since no \u201caction [was] being taken with a view to [their] deportation or extradition\u201d. Moreover, as the Court has already found, this detention was not attained by the requisite procedural guarantees, and general measures are expected from the Respondent Government in order to correct this situation (see Kim, cited above, \u00a7 71).169.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and to the urgent need to put an end to the violation of the Convention it has found, the Court considers it incumbent on the respondent State to ensure that applicants L.M. and M.A. are released immediately.B.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention170.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0Damage171.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed that they should be compensated for the suffering endured by them as a result of the violations found and sought compensation in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. They left the amount to the Court\u2019s discretion.172.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that no compensation was necessary.173.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complained under Articles 2 and\/or 3, their forced return to Syria would, if implemented, give rise to a violation of those provisions. Accordingly, no breach of the Convention under that head has yet occurred in the present case. The Court considers that its finding regarding this complaint in itself amounts to adequate just satisfaction for the purposes of Article 41 (see Rakhimov, cited above, \u00a7 156).174.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that it has found other violations of the Convention in the present case. It accepts that the applicants have suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation. The Court therefore awards each applicant 9,000\u00a0euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. In respect of A.A., the Court notes that his whereabouts remain unknown after August 2014. In such circumstances, the Court considers it appropriate for the award to be held by the applicant\u2019s representatives in trust for him until such time as payment to the applicant may be enforced (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7\u00a0215, and point 12 of the operative part, ECHR 2012; Labsi v. Slovakia, no.\u00a033809\/08, \u00a7 155 and point 6 of the operative part, 15 May 2012; and Mamazhonov, cited above, \u00a7 231).2.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses175.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed 8,600 euros (EUR) for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. They submitted that Ms Golovanchuk had spent eighty-six hours on the case, at an hourly rate of EUR\u00a0100.176.\u00a0\u00a0The Government were of the opinion that the claims were unnecessary and unsubstantiated.177.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum as claimed, covering costs under all heads plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.3.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest178.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.VII.\u00a0\u00a0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT179.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.180.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants are still formally liable to administrative removal pursuant to the final judgments of the Russian courts. Having regard to the finding that their removal to Syria would be in breach of Articles 2 and 3, the Court considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 4 above) must remain in force until the present judgment becomes final or until further notice.","27610":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION25.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the Hungarian authorities had failed in their obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the racist attack which he had suffered, and in particular that they had not taken sufficient action to establish a possible racist motive for the assault. He relied on Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention, which read as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 14\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201d26.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government requested the Court to declare the application inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Relying on the Court\u2019s decision in Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi v. Hungary ((dec.), no. 2351\/06, 9\u00a0November 2010), they submitted that the applicant should have made use of substitute private prosecution under section 199(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that in the case of Borb\u00e1la Kiss v. Hungary (no. 59214\/11, 26 June 2012), the Government had argued that Ms Kiss had failed to exhaust domestic remedies by not availing herself of an ordinary remedy, namely substitute private prosecution under section\u00a0199 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Criminal Procedure, seeking the pursuit of discontinued criminal proceedings, but that objection had been dismissed by the Court.In the applicant\u2019s submission, substitute private prosecution had no prospect of success either in his case or in general, given the financial implications and the difficulties in taking supplementary investigative measures. The applicant further pointed out that in the case of Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi (cited above) the Court had not examined the effectiveness of substitute private prosecution.29.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener, the European Roma Rights Centre, submitted that Roma persons could not be expected to pursue substitute private prosecution in cases involving failures by domestic authorities to investigate hate crimes. In its view, the requirement for them to institute substitute private prosecution would give the impression that public authorities have a lesser duty to investigate hate crimes. Furthermore, it would be particularly unfair to require a member of a disadvantaged group to carry out investigative activities. Finally, the third-party intervener considered that if the failure to conduct effective investigations was due to institutional racism, then to require Roma victims to pursue substitute private prosecution would expose them to the consequences of challenging an entrenched aspect of anti-Gypsism.30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention obliges applicants to use first the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. Where there is a choice of remedies open to an applicant, Article 35 must be applied to reflect the practical realities of the applicant\u2019s position in order to ensure the effective protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention (see, inter alia, Hilal v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a045276\/99, 8 February 2000; and Krumpel and Krumpelova v. Slovakia, no.\u00a056195\/00, \u00a7 43, 5 July 2005). Indeed, where an applicant has a choice of remedies and their comparative effectiveness is not obvious, the Court tends to interpret the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies in the applicant\u2019s favour (see Budayeva and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a015339\/02, 21166\/02, 20058\/02, 11673\/02 and 15343\/02, \u00a7 110, ECHR 2008 (extracts), and the cases cited therein). \u00a0Moreover, an applicant who has used a remedy which is apparently effective and sufficient cannot be required also to have tried others \u00a0that were also available but probably no more likely to be successful (see Ivan Vasilev v. Bulgaria, no. 48130\/99, \u00a7 56, 12 April 2007 and the cases cited therein).31.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against Mr E.D. on charges of \u201cviolence against a member of group\u201d. The ensuing proceedings were capable of leading to the identification and, if appropriate, punishment of those responsible.32.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, by virtue of this remedy the State was afforded an opportunity to put matters right. The applicant must therefore be regarded as having brought the substance of his complaint to the notice of the national authorities and as having sought redress through the national channels for his complaint. The applicant was thus not required in addition to pursue the matter by way of substitute private prosecution concerning the same event, which would have had the same objective as his criminal complaint (see, mutatis mutandis, Borb\u00e1la Kiss v. Hungary, cited above, \u00a7\u00a026; and Matko v. Slovenia, no.\u00a043393\/98, \u00a7 95, 2 November 2006). In any case, the applicant complained of the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation conducted by the authorities rather than about the absence of prosecution as such.33.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s reference to the case of Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi, the Court considers that its conclusions cannot be transferred to the present situation, since in that case the applicants did not argue their claim of racial discrimination in the private prosecution whose effectiveness in respect of such complaints could not therefore be examined.34.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s preliminary objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.35.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Government argued that Mr E.D.\u2019s conviction of disorderly conduct had deprived the applicant of his victim status.36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disputed this view submitting that the offence of which Mr E.D. was convicted had nothing to do with his grievance consisting of a racially motivated attack.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the investigation into disorderly conduct did not in any way address the applicant\u2019s allegation of racially biased ill-treatment. Indeed, the hypothesis of the offence of disorderly conduct in section 339 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 19 above) does not contain any element capable of covering a complaint of racially motivated attack.In these circumstances the Court considers that this conviction was not susceptible to redressing the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, and did not deprive the applicant of his victim status. The application therefore cannot be rejected as incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Government lastly submitted that the application was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, since the impugned treatment did not reach the minimum threshold of severity required for Article 3 to come into play. In their view, this was illustrated by the fact that the applicant did not press private charges of bodily assault or infringement of honour.39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested this view saying that the reason for the non-pursuit of such private charges was his loss of trust in the judicial system, rather than any insignificance of the attack on him.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that this issue is closely linked to the merits of the applicant\u2019s Article 3 complaint. Therefore it is necessary to join the Government\u2019s objection to the merits of that question.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further finds that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It finds that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the attack on him had resulted from the fact that he was of Roma origin, and that the authorities were reluctant properly to investigate this. He noted that the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office had dismissed his criminal complaint on the ground that there was no evidence to establish Mr\u00a0E.D.\u2019s criminal responsibility for \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d. He contended that the racist statements of the perpetrator were not given due consideration in order to establish his potentially biased motives. He further submitted that the Prosecutor\u2019s Office should have assessed whether other indicators of racist motives could be identified, including Mr\u00a0E.D.\u2019s affiliation with anti-Roma ideologies or groups, evidenced for example by his choice of music and books.Moreover, the applicant contended that the domestic authorities had failed to take all the necessary measures to identify further witnesses who could have given an account of the fight between him and Mr E.D. He also pointed out that the Prosecutor\u2019s Office had dismissed his request for further investigative measures, including a confrontation between him and Mr E.D.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed that there had been an investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of an attack on him and the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office had established the relevant facts of the case, including the potentially racist motives of the perpetrator. The investigation authorities had heard witness testimonies from the applicant and his girlfriend, as well as the police officers who had arrived at the scene.In so far as any racial motive might have been at the heart of the incident, the Government considered that the investigation had adequately focused on the allegations to that effect. In that context they contested the argument that any criminal offence committed against a member of a minority should be considered as one based on racist bias, since such incidents could have other motives too. They also pointed out that the domestic authorities had discontinued the investigation into \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d, since the racist motives of the perpetrator, and the fact that the reason for the assault was the applicant\u2019s Roma origin itself, could not be established beyond reasonable doubt.(c)\u00a0\u00a0The third party44.\u00a0\u00a0The European Roma Rights Centre viewed the issue in the present case through the lens of \u201canti-Gypsism\u201d and maintained that there was a rise in anti-Roma rhetoric, racism and physical violence against the Roma in Hungary. It pointed to the reports of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, of Amnesty International and of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, all evidencing patterns of anti-Roma attacks, including harassment, assault, or threats, and the growth of paramilitary organisations with racist platforms.45.\u00a0\u00a0It also submitted that the general situation in Hungary showed that there was an institutional racism against Roma within the State bodies, evidenced by the \u201cfailure of the authorities to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin\u201d. It relied on a thematic situation report of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (entitled Racism, discrimination, intolerance and extremism: learning from experiences in Greece and Hungary) which showed that there was a lack of effective implementation of the laws for investigating and prosecuting racially biased crimes. It also pointed out that the report on the visit of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights to Hungary from 1 to 4 July 2014 expressed concerns about the Hungarian authorities\u2019 failure to identify and respond effectively to hate crimes.46.\u00a0\u00a0It further argued that vulnerable victims alleging racially-motivated violence were unlikely to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they were subjected to discrimination, especially when they were also victims of a failure on the part of the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation. It maintained that the Court\u2019s analysis under Article 14 read in conjunction with the procedural limb of Article 2 or Article 3 (see, for example, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, ECHR 2005\u2011VII; and \u0160e\u010di\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 40116\/02, 31 May 2007) was limited in that it had not addressed the question whether the failure to carry out an effective investigation in general had been a result of institutional racism. It invited the Court to find that the failures in the overall investigation into hate crimes were due to discrimination, depriving the Roma of access to the evidence needed to prove a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with the procedural limb of Article 3.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in order to fall within the scope of Article 3, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative by definition, and depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the ill-treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the victim\u2019s sex, age and state of health. Further factors to be taken into account include the purpose of the ill-treatment and the underlying intention or motivation (see, for example, El\u00a0Masri v. \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d [GC], no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7\u00a0196, ECHR 2012). The Court has considered some types of treatment \u201cinhuman\u201d, particularly where it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering, and also \u201cdegrading\u201d because it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000-IV).48.\u00a0\u00a0Even where the victim did not suffer serious or lasting physical injuries, the Court has held that corporal punishment inflicted on an adolescent should be described as \u201cdegrading\u201d in so far as it constituted an assault on \u201cprecisely that which it is one of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, namely a person\u2019s dignity and physical integrity\u201d (see Tyrer v.\u00a0United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, \u00a7 33, Series A no. 26). By the same token, in a case concerning harassment of a person suffering from physical and mental disabilities, the Court ruled that the feelings of fear and helplessness caused by the ill-treatment were sufficiently serious to attain the level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention, even though the applicant had only suffered physical injuries on one occasion (see \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 41526\/10, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2012). The Court has on several occasions examined from the angle of Article\u00a03 situations in which the applicants had not suffered any physical injuries (see, for example, G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2010, concerning threats of torture; and Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0133-34, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, relating to the disappearance of a relative).49.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the European Commission on Human Rights accepted in the context of acts attributable to State officials that discrimination based on race could, in certain circumstances, of itself amount to \u201cdegrading treatment\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 (see Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi, cited above; and East African Asians v.\u00a0United Kingdom, nos. 4626\/70 and others, Commission report of 14\u00a0December 1973, Decisions and Reports 78, pp. 57 and 62, \u00a7\u00a7 196 and 207). Discriminatory remarks and racist insults must in any event be considered as an aggravating factor when considering a given instance of ill-treatment in the light of Article 3 (see Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), nos. 41138\/98 and 64320\/01, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2005-VII (extracts); and B.S. v. Spain, no. 47159\/08, \u00a7 41, 24 July 2012). This approach was confirmed in respect of treatment attributable to private individuals (see Identoba and Others v. Georgia, no. 73235\/12, \u00a7\u00a065, 12\u00a0May 2015; Abdu v. Bulgaria, no. 26827\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 23-24, 11 March 2014; and Koky and Others v. Slovakia, no. 13624\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 223-225, 12 June 2012).50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court moreover reiterates that the obligation on High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, requires them to take steps to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, even administered by private individuals (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a039272\/98, \u00a7\u00a0149, ECHR 2003-XII).51.\u00a0\u00a0Where an individual claims on arguable grounds to have suffered acts contrary to Article 3, that Article requires the national authorities to conduct an effective official investigation to establish the facts of the case and identify and punish those responsible. The Court has held that the foregoing is necessarily true also in cases where the treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention was inflicted by private individuals (see Valiulien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no. 33234\/07, \u00a7 74, 26 March 2013; and \u0160e\u010di\u0107 v.\u00a0Croatia, no. 40116\/02, \u00a7 67, 31 May 2007)For the investigation to be regarded as \u201ceffective\u201d, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means; the authorities must have taken all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident (see Milanovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 44614\/07, \u00a7 86, 14 December 2010).52.\u00a0\u00a0When investigating violent incidents, State authorities have the additional duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to establish whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events. Admittedly, proving racial motivation will often be extremely difficult in practice. The respondent State\u2019s obligation to investigate possible racist overtones to a violent act is an obligation to use best endeavours and not absolute. The authorities must do what is reasonable in the circumstances to collect and secure the evidence, explore all practical means of discovering the truth and deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may be indicative of a racially induced violence (see, Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, no.\u00a015250\/02, \u00a7\u00a069, ECHR 2005\u2011XIII (extracts)).Treating racially induced violence and brutality on an equal footing with cases that have no racist overtones would be to turn a blind eye to the specific nature of acts which are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. A failure to make a distinction in the way in which situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article\u00a014 of the Convention (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos.\u00a043577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 160, ECHR 2005\u2011VII). The Court also reiterates the particular requirement for an investigation into an attack with racial overtones to be pursued with vigour and impartiality, having regard to the need to continuously reassert society\u2019s condemnation of racism in order to maintain the confidence of minorities in the ability of the authorities to protect them from the threat of racist violence (see Amadayev v. Russia, no.\u00a018114\/06, \u00a7 81, 3 July 2014).53.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court has noted in previous cases that as a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting, the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority. They therefore require special protection (see D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325\/00, \u00a7 182, ECHR 2007\u2011IV). The Court considers that when it comes to offences committed to the detriment of members of particularly vulnerable groups, vigorous investigation is required.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the obligation on the authorities to seek a possible link between racist attitudes and a given act of violence is part of the responsibility incumbent on States under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3, but it is also an aspect of the procedural obligations flowing from Article 3 of the Convention. Owing to the interplay of the two provisions, issues such as those raised by the present case may fall to be examined under one of the two provisions only, with no separate issue arising under the other, or may require examination under both Articles. This is a question to be decided in each case depending on the facts and the nature of the allegations made (see Abdu v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 31; B.S. v. Spain, no. 47159\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 59\u201163, 24\u00a0July 2012; Bekos and Koutropoulos, cited above, \u00a7\u00a070).55.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, in view of the allegations made by the applicant to the effect that the ineffectiveness of the investigation stems precisely from the fact that the authorities insufficiently investigated the racist aspects of the acts of violence, the Court considers that the complaint should be considered from the angle of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case(i)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the attack on the applicant reached the minimum threshold of severity56.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicant was involved in a fight with a young man who, according to the applicant, violently attacked him. The medical report issued following the fight specified that he had sustained bruises on his chest, back, neck and face (see paragraph 9 above). These bodily injuries were aggravated by the perceived racist motive for the violence perpetrated: the applicant submitted that before the fight he had been the target of racist insults from three other men and the perpetrator himself.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that in the light of these factors \u2013 and in particular of the potential infringement of human dignity represented by the racial motive, if any, for the violence \u2013 the treatment to which the applicant was subjected falls within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention (see Abdu, cited above, \u00a7 24). The Government\u2019s related objection of incompatibility ratione materiae (see paragraph 38 above) must therefore be dismissed.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was conducted into the motive behind incident58.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant lodged a criminal report with the prosecutor\u2019s office, bringing the alleged racial motive of the attack to the attention of the authorities. In pursuit of his complaint, the prosecutor opened an investigation into the offence of violence against a member of a group within the meaning of section 174\/B of the Criminal Code. In view of the constitutive elements of its hypothesis (see paragraph 19 above), the Court is satisfied that an investigation into this offence was in principle capable of revealing the racist motive behind the incident, if any.It remains to be ascertained whether the investigation undertaken was adequate, that is, sufficiently thorough, for the purposes of Article 3.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls in this connection that the lack of conclusions arising from any given investigation does not, by itself, mean that it was ineffective: an obligation to investigate \u201cis not an obligation of result, but of means\u201d (see Mili\u0107 and Nikezi\u0107 v. Montenegro, nos. 54999\/10 and 10609\/11, \u00a7\u00a098, 28 April 2015).60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the authorities investigating the incident between the applicant and Mr E.D. had before them the statements of the applicant and Ms D.L., who both maintained that before the fight Mr\u00a0E.D. had called the applicant a gypsy.61.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has previously held in the Nachova case concerning statements uttered by law enforcement agents in connection with an operation involving force against persons from an ethnic or other minority, any evidence of racist verbal abuse is highly relevant to the question whether or not unlawful, hatred-induced violence has taken place. Where such evidence comes to light in the investigation, it must be verified and \u2013 if confirmed \u2013 a thorough examination of all the facts should be undertaken in order to uncover any possible racist motives (see Nachova, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0164).Therefore, the impugned utterance, seen against the background of documented existence of prejudice and hostility against the Roma, called for verification as to the motives of the perpetrator, namely, if there were reasons to believe that Mr E.D.\u2019s conduct constituted a hate crime (see paragraph 21 above).62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that under section 174\/B of the Criminal Code, as in force at the material time, violence committed against others for their connection with a particular group was a criminal offence punishable by up to three years of imprisonment. Therefore, the relevant provision prohibited the violence and verbal abuse complained of by the applicant. Investigation was then warranted as to whether the offender had targeted an individual because of his belonging to one of the protected groups. Indeed, the domestic authorities noted that the applicant, a person of Roma origin, had been exposed to violence accompanied by a racist insult and that the crime might have been motivated by bias, and they took steps to establish the motives of Mr\u00a0E.D.63.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, the authorities questioned Mr E.D. about any possible racist background for his acts, albeit in the context of the parallel criminal investigation into the offence of disorderly conduct. His statements were included as documentary evidence in the criminal file concerning the offence of violence against a member of a group.64.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of an admission by Mr E.D. as to the presence of racist motives, the investigation authorities examined whether any such motives could be inferred from the words, actions and circumstances surrounding the incident. In particular, they took into consideration the witness testimonies of the applicant and his girlfriend about Mr E.D.\u2019s racist statements before the fight. To resolve the contradictions between these testimonies and those of Mr E.D., the investigation authorities questioned, in a targeted way, the other witnesses, that is, the two police officers, about any exchanges they might have heard before or during the fight between the applicant and the perpetrator. The officers\u2019 testimonies were not conclusive, since they arrived at the scene after the fight had been over. Furthermore, the identities of the applicant\u2019s acquaintances, whose intervention ended the clash, remained unknown to the Public Prosecutor throughout the investigation. The Public Prosecutor decided not to hold a confrontation between the applicant and Mr E.D. only because it was considered to be devoid of any prospect of success.65.\u00a0\u00a0In any case, the Csongr\u00e1d County Regional Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office appears to have accepted the applicant\u2019s and Ms D.L.\u2019s version of the events, in particular their account of the discriminatory statements made by Mr E.D. (see paragraph 17 above). Even against this background, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office felt unable to determine whether the applicant\u2019s Roma origin had been a relevant factor in the incident. It further noted that it was impossible to establish who had started to fight, especially since Mr\u00a0E.D. was about to leave the scene when the altercation started.66.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation authorities additionally examined whether any inference could be drawn from any other circumstantial evidence. They enquired into Mr E.D.\u2019s comments posted on a social network in order to verify his affiliation with racist ideology and questioned him about the meaning of his posts (see paragraph 14 above). Their ensuing conclusion was that because the posts only revealed that Mr E.D. had insulted an unnamed and unidentifiable person of Roma origin the night before, it could not be established unequivocally and beyond doubt, either from the post or from the subsequent messages, that the insult had taken place because of the victim\u2019s Roma origin. The authorities observed that the incident could have had other motives than racial and were satisfied that although there was a likelihood of racist motives, this could not be established beyond doubt so as to warrant Mr E.D.\u2019s indictment.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that its role is not to rule on the application of domestic law or adjudicate on the individual guilt of persons charged with offences, but to review whether and to what extent the competent authorities, in reaching their conclusion, may be deemed to have submitted the case to the careful scrutiny required by the procedural obligations of the Convention (see Abdu, cited above, \u00a7 33).68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the prosecuting authorities enquired into the allegations made by the applicant as to the racist motives of Mr E.D. and assessed a number of factors brought up by the applicant in substantiation of his claims, including the perpetrator\u2019s biased utterances especially after the fight. The Court is satisfied that they did not treat the case in the same way as one which had no racial overtones.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the authorities\u2019 refusal to indict Mr\u00a0E.D. was based on the argument that his racist motives could not be established \u201cunequivocally and beyond doubt\u201d. In particular, the reasoning went on to say that, first, it was impossible to establish how exactly the fight had started, and that, given certain elements (see paragraph 15 above), it could have had other motives than racial hatred. The Government in their submissions endorsed this view (see paragraph above 43 above). Second, for the authorities, Mr\u00a0E.D.\u2019s posts in social media following the incident, although mentioning the victim\u2019s Roma origin, could not be linked with certainty to the altercation with the applicant and shed no light on his motives.70.\u00a0\u00a0In regard to the first consideration, the Court takes the view that not only acts based solely on a victim\u2019s characteristic can be classified as hate crimes. For the Court, perpetrators may have mixed motives, being influenced by situational factors equally or stronger than by their biased attitude towards the group the victim belongs to. Therefore, it finds it difficult to share the prosecution\u2019s concern about proving that the insult was \u201cprecisely\u201d due to the applicant being a Roma.71.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the second element, the Court notes that Mr\u00a0E.D. specifically mentioned in the social media posts the Roma origin of the victim and the three men who had helped the person get away from the situation (see paragraph 11 above), which corresponded to the applicant\u2019s account of the incident in which he was involved. Moreover, in his testimony given after the incident, Mr\u00a0E.D. went back on what he had stated in this post, confirming that it was related to the incident with the applicant, but denying that he had kicked the victim\u2019s head, making reference to the not-so-severe injuries sustained by the applicant.72.\u00a0\u00a0The prosecuting authorities did not explain why the content of the posts and the applicant\u2019s subsequent testimony could not be unequivocally linked to the impugned events and why Mr E.D.\u2019s motives for the attack on the applicant could not be validly deduced from those posts.73.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court finds it material, in addition to the encouraging comments posted by Mr E.D.\u2019s acquaintances, that one of his posts pointed on the Internet to a film scene containing an overly intolerant and racist message and widely known as such (see paragraph 11 above). The prosecution failed to give any reason why this could not be regarded as an evidence of racially biased motives, especially if viewed together with Mr\u00a0E.D.\u2019s related comment, according to which the list of the types of people loathed by the character speaking in the clip could be completed with \u201csome other types of rubbish living among us\u201d (see paragraph 11 as well as paragraph 21 above on the Conduct of the Offender in the OSCE text).74.\u00a0\u00a0Unimpressed by these elements, the prosecution concluded that Mr\u00a0E.D.\u2019s criminal responsibility for violence against a member of a group could not be established \u201cbeyond any doubt\u201d and discontinued the case, without issuing an indictment.75.\u00a0\u00a0Aware of its subsidiary role, the Court is mindful of it being prevented from substituting its own assessment of the facts for that of the national authorities. Nevertheless, it cannot but note that the prosecuting authorities\u2019 insistence on identifying an exclusive racist motive, their reluctance to link Mr E.D.\u2019s posts to the incident despite remarkable concordances and, lastly, their failure to identify the racist motive in the face of powerful hate crime indicators such as the posts resulted from a manifestly unreasonable assessment of the circumstances of the case (see paragraph 23 above).This impaired the adequacy of the investigation to an extent that is irreconcilable with the State\u2019s obligation in this field to conduct vigorous investigations (see Mili\u0107 and Nikezi\u0107\u00b8 cited above, \u00a7 99).76.\u00a0\u00a0The combined effect of the above considerations is such as to amount to a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION77.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered this claim to be excessive.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage on account of the violation found and awards him the full sum claimed.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not make a costs claim. Consequently, no award is made under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27632":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that if extradited to Kyrgyzstan he would be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment because he belonged to the Uzbek ethnic minority. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pleaded that the applicant had failed to exhaust available effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, they submitted that the applicant had failed to appeal against the refusal to grant him temporary asylum of 26\u00a0November 2013. If the applicant had been granted temporary asylum, his extradition would have been suspended or even rescinded. The Government also submitted that the applicant had failed to lodge a cassation appeal under Chapter 48.1 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d) against the Supreme Court\u2019s appeal judgment of 25\u00a0February 2014 upholding the extradition order.35.\u00a0\u00a0 The applicant submitted that he had exhausted all effective domestic remedies. In addition to challenging the extradition order, he had applied for refugee status, even though in practice such applications did not impede the enforcement of extradition orders. The applicant further submitted that an application for temporary asylum was not an effective remedy on account of its discretionary and temporary nature.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment36.\u00a0\u00a0As for the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant should have lodged cassation appeals pursuant to Chapters 48.1 of the CCrP, the Court observes that they have previously accepted that such appeals did not have \u201cautomatic suspensive effect\u201d, and thus there was no obligation to use that remedy (see Gayratbek Saliyev v. Russia, no.\u00a039093\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a049 and 58, 17\u00a0April 2014). As for temporary asylum, the Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies requires an applicant to have normal recourse to remedies within the national legal system which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. Even if such an application were granted, the remedy would be only temporary, and thus could not afford redress in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. Having regard to the above, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties38.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations. They argued that the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan had improved since the events of June 2010. The Government referred to the work of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010.39.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, Kyrgyzstan had enhanced its cooperation with the UN and other international organisations, and had ratified all fundamental international conventions on human rights. The Kyrgyz Republic also reformed its legislation, including the Constitution, to ensure respect for human rights and protection from discrimination. Kyrgyzstan abolished the death penalty and introduced the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment into its Constitution and Criminal Code.40.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, even if some international reports still voiced concerns as to the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, reference to a general problem concerning human rights observance in a particular country could not alone serve as a basis for refusing extradition in accordance with the Court\u2019s case-law.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further indicated that the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the Kyrgyz Republic had provided the applicant with adequate assurances against the risk of ill-treatment. The Government also referred to additional assurances developed by the Russian and Kyrgyz authorities which would allow Russian diplomatic staff visiting the place of the applicant\u2019s detention to make sure that his rights were being respected. The Government referred in this respect to a letter of 30 July 2013 sent by the Kyrgyz authorities to the Russian Foreign Ministry.42.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, there were no reasons to doubt the assurances provided by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the Kyrgyz Republic, as it had been acting within its competence and the relations between the two countries were based on long and stable cooperation.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that in the course of their cooperation on extradition matters there had been no instances of violations of the assurances provided by Kyrgyzstan. They referred to information from the Kyrgyz Republic regarding the outcomes of criminal prosecution of extradited persons. The Government cited examples of three individuals of Uzbek ethnic origin who had variously received a suspended sentence, been released on parole, and whose criminal case had been dismissed.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to provide substantial evidence that he would risk ill-treatment if extradited to Kyrgyzstan. They submitted that the domestic authorities and courts had thoroughly examined his allegations concerning the risk of ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan in the course of the refugee status and extradition proceedings. The applicant had been able to attend those proceedings and to present his position, and had used his right of appeal against the judgments.45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that he was still at serious and real risk of ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan. He claimed that the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan had not improved since the examination of the Makhmudzhan Ergashev case (see Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia, no.\u00a049747\/11, 16\u00a0October 2012), referring to reports by the UN bodies and reputable international NGOs, as well as to the Court\u2019s case-law.46.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicant\u2019s view, the diplomatic assurances relied on by the Government could not suffice to protect him against the risks of ill\u2011treatment in the light of the criteria established in the case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v.\u00a0the United Kingdom (no. 8139\/09, \u00a7\u00a0189, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). There was no evidence that Russian diplomatic staff actually visited individuals extradited to Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, no monitoring procedure by an independent body had been set up, and Russian diplomatic staff could not be considered sufficiently independent to ensure effective follow-up of Kyrgyzstan\u2019s compliance with their undertakings. The applicant submitted that the Government\u2019s example of three individuals of Uzbek ethnic origin released after their extradition to Kyrgyzstan was not indicative, as none of those individuals had been accused of crimes related to the events of June 2010. He further submitted that Government failed to adduce a copy of the letter of 30 July 2013, concerning the assurances given to the Russian Foreign Ministry, to which they referred in their observations.47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant pointed out that the Russian authorities had failed to assess the risks of ill-treatment in the course of the extradition and refugee status proceedings. In the domestic proceedings he had relied on reports by UN bodies and reputable international NGOs, which had demonstrated that in Kyrgyzstan ethnic Uzbeks who, like him, were suspected of involvement in the violence of June 2010 in Osh, were at increased risk of ill-treatment while detained, and that it was common practice not to investigate instances of torture or inhuman treatment in the requesting country. The applicant claimed that the migration authorities and domestic courts either examined such reports only formally or failed to address them at all.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will examine the merits of this part of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 in the light of the applicable general principles set out in, among other cases, Umirov v. Russia (no. 17455\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a092\u2011100, 18\u00a0September 2012, with further references).49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Russian authorities ordered the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kyrgyzstan. The extradition order has not been enforced as a result of an indication by the Court of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Court will therefore assess whether the applicant faces a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in the event of his extradition to Kyrgyzstan \u2013 the material date for the assessment of that risk being that of the Court\u2019s consideration of the case \u2013 taking into account the assessment made by the domestic courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Bakoyev v. Russia, no.\u00a030225\/11, \u00a7 113, 5 February 2013).50.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the general human rights climate in the requesting country, the Court makes the following observations. In a number of previous cases concerning extradition to Kyrgyzstan it found that the situation in the south of the country was characterised by torture and other ill\u2011treatment of ethnic Uzbeks by law-enforcement officers (see Khamrakulov v. Russia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a065; Mamadaliyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a05614\/13, \u00a7\u00a060, 24 July 2014; Kadirzhanov and Mamashev v. Russia, nos.\u00a042351\/13 and 47823\/13, \u00a7\u00a091, 17 July 2014; Gayratbek Saliyev v.\u00a0Russia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a061; and Makhmudzhan Ergashev v.\u00a0Russia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 71-73). Such incidents had increased in the aftermath of the events of June 2010 and remained widespread and rampant, being aggravated by the impunity of law\u2011enforcement officers. Moreover, the Court established that the issue ought to be seen in the context of the rise of ethnic nationalism in the politics of Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the south, the growing inter-ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, continuing discriminatory practices faced by Uzbeks at the institutional level, and the under\u2011representation of Uzbeks in, amongst others, law-enforcement bodies and the judiciary (see Makhmudzhan Ergashev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a072). As is clear from reports by UN bodies and reputable NGOs, in 2012-14 the situation in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan had not improved. In particular, various reports are consistently in agreement when describing biased attitudes based on ethnicity in investigations, prosecutions, condemnations and sanctions imposed on ethnic Uzbeks charged and convicted in relation to the events in the Osh Region. They also agree about the lack of full and effective investigations into the numerous allegations of torture and ill\u2011treatment imputable to Kyrgyz law-enforcement agencies, arbitrary detention and excessive use of force against Uzbeks allegedly involved in the events of June 2010 (see Khamrakulov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a040-45). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the current overall human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan remains highly problematic (see, mutatis mutandis, Klein v.\u00a0Russia, no. 24268\/08, \u00a7\u00a051, 1 April 2010).51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will now examine whether there are any individual circumstances substantiating the applicant\u2019s fears of ill-treatment (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7\u00a073, ECHR 2005\u2011I). It reiterates in this connection that where an applicant alleges that he or she is a member of a group systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, the protection of Article 3 enters into play when the applicant establishes, where necessary on the basis of information contained in recent reports by independent international human rights protection bodies or NGOs, that there is serious reason to believe in the existence of the practice in question and his or her membership of the group concerned. In those circumstances, the Court will not then insist that the applicant show the existence of further special distinguishing features (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 132, ECHR 2008, and NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7 116, 17 July 2008). The Court considers that this reasoning is of particular relevance in the present case, where the applicant, an ethnic Uzbek, is charged with a number of serious offences allegedly committed in the course of the violence of June 2010 (see, by contrast, Makhmudzhan Ergashev, cited above, \u00a7 73). Given the widespread use by the Kyrgyz authorities of torture and ill-treatment to obtain confessions from ethnic Uzbeks charged with involvement in the inter-ethnic riots in Southern Kyrgyzstan, which has been reported both by UN bodies and reputable NGOs (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above), the Court is satisfied that the applicant belongs to a particularly vulnerable group, whose members are routinely subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention in the requesting country.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the above circumstances were brought to the attention of the Russian authorities (see paragraphs 14, 16, 18 and 20 above). The applicant\u2019s refugee application was rejected as inadmissible by the migration authorities, which found \u2013 and their finding was subsequently confirmed by the domestic courts \u2013 that the applicant was not eligible for refugee status because there was no evidence that he was being persecuted on the grounds of his ethnic origin. The migration authorities considered that the situation in Kyrgyzstan in the aftermath of the June 2010 events had significantly changed, and referred to a number of sources in this regard (see paragraph 21 above). However, the Court considers that the sources relied on by the migration authorities \u2013 mainly news items from newspapers and information agencies \u2013 should be treated with greater circumspection than reports by international organisations and reputable NGOs specialising in human rights issues. The information analysed was not comprehensive, as it had not addressed the thrust of the applicant\u2019s arguments about the risk of ill-treatment by the law-enforcement authorities in Kyrgyzstan.53.\u00a0\u00a0As for the extradition proceedings, the Court notes the summary reasoning put forward by the domestic courts in respect of materials originating from the sources that the Court considers reliable, such as reports by international organisations and reputable NGOs (see paragraphs 17 and 19 above). Both the St\u00a0Petersburg City Court and the Supreme Court of Russia, as far as the situation in Kyrgyzstan was concerned, referred to the decision of 29 May 2013 of the migration authorities, which had clearly failed to touch upon the issue of the risk of ill\u2011treatment.54.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court is not convinced that the issue of the risk of ill-treatment was subjected to a rigorous scrutiny in the refugee status or extradition proceedings (see Abdulkhakov v. Russia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0148).55.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to be considered whether the risk to which the applicant would have been exposed if extradited had been alleviated by the diplomatic assurances provided by the Kyrgyz authorities to the Russian Federation. According to the assurances given, the applicant would not be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and Russian diplomatic staff would be given an opportunity to visit him in the detention facility (see paragraph 17 above).56.\u00a0\u00a0Even accepting for the sake of argument that the assurances in question were not couched in general terms, the Court observes that Kyrgyzstan is not a Contracting State to the Convention, nor have its authorities demonstrated the existence of an effective system of legal protection against torture that could act as an equivalent to the system required of the Contracting States. Moreover, it has not been demonstrated before the Court that Kyrgyzstan\u2019s commitment to guaranteeing access to the applicant by Russian diplomatic staff would lead to effective protection against proscribed ill-treatment in practical terms, as it has not been shown that the aforementioned staff would be in possession of the expertise required for effective follow-up of the Kyrgyz authorities\u2019 compliance with their undertakings. Nor was there any guarantee that they would be able to speak to the applicant without witnesses. In addition, their potential involvement was not supported by any practical mechanism setting out, for instance, a procedure by which the applicant could lodge complaints with them or for their unfettered access to detention facilities (see, mutatis mutandis, Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, no.\u00a031890\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 132-33, 3\u00a0October 2013). There is no evidence that Russian diplomatic staff have visited any individuals in Kyrgyzstan after their extradition. Therefore the assurances provided cannot be considered as an illustration of the existence of a monitoring mechanism in the requesting country (see, by contrast, Othman (Abu Qatada), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 203-04).57.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the Court cannot accept the Government\u2019s assertion that the assurances provided by the Kyrgyz authorities were sufficient to exclude the risk of his exposure to ill-treatment in the requesting country.58.\u00a0\u00a0Considering the attested widespread and routine use of torture and other ill-treatment by law-enforcement agencies in the south of Kyrgyzstan in respect of members of the Uzbek community, to which the applicant belongs, and the absence of sufficient safeguards for the applicant in the requesting country, the Court finds it substantiated that the applicant would face a real risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3 if returned to Kyrgyzstan.59.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kyrgyzstan would, if executed, give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION60.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that he had had no effective remedies in respect of his complaint under Articles 3 of the Convention, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the gist of the applicant\u2019s claim under Article 13, which it finds admissible, is that the domestic authorities failed to carry out a rigorous scrutiny of the risk of ill-treatment the applicant would face in the event of his extradition to Kyrgyzstan. The Court has already examined that submission in the context of Article 3 of the Convention. Having regard to its findings above, the Court considers that there is no need to examine this complaint separately on its merits (see, for a similar approach, Mukhitdinov v. Russia, no. 20999\/14, \u00a7\u00a079, 21 May 2015).III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION62.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant asked the Court to determine the amount.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that a finding of a violation in itself would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that its finding that the applicant\u2019s extradition, if carried out, would breach Article 3 of the Convention constitutes sufficient just satisfaction.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed 140,000 roubles (RUB) and 600 euros (EUR) for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court. He enclosed a number of legal-services contracts between his representatives in the domestic and Strasbourg proceedings, on the one hand, and the non-governmental organisations Human Rights Institute (Moscow) and Memorial (Brussels), on the other hand.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that the applicant did not produce any time-sheets and that his legal expenses had been paid for by third parties.68.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. It transpires from the applicant\u2019s documents that the legal costs in the domestic and Strasbourg proceedings were paid for by two non\u2011governmental organisations. It has not been shown that the applicant himself incurred any costs or is liable to reimburse the amounts paid by the non-governmental organisations. That being so, the Court rejects his claims (see Voskuil v. the Netherlands, no. 64752\/01, \u00a7\u00a092, 22 November 2007, and Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (Article 50), 24 February 1983, \u00a7 22 in fine, Series A no. 59).IV.\u00a0\u00a0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT69.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.70.\u00a0\u00a0It considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court (see above paragraph 4) must continue in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection.","27627":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to torture, as the authorities had failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance between December 2006 and March 2013. The Article he relied on reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaints. In particular, the applicant should have lodged his complaints before the prosecutor\u2019s office which was competent to monitor the observance of correct application of legal acts in detention facilities. The prosecutor\u2019s decisions in this respect are mandatory and should be enforced immediately. The applicant did not complain to a prosecutor about the absence of adequate medical assistance.35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the medical staff had been aware of his condition but he had needed treatment in a specialised hospital.36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already dismissed similar objections based on non-exhaustion, finding the remedy referred to by the Government ineffective on the grounds that it had not been shown that recourse to such proceedings could have brought about an improvement in the applicants\u2019 detention conditions (see Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 69, 28 March 2006; more recently, Buglov v. Ukraine, no. 28825\/02, \u00a7 74, 10 July 2014) and sees no reason to depart from that finding in the present case. The Court therefore considers that this complaint cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers nevertheless that the applicant\u2019s complaint in respect of the period between December 2006 and November 2011 is inadmissible for the following reasons.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case the applicant had been HIV\u2011positive for nearly twenty years. The applicant maintained that he had informed the detention authorities about his HIV status when he was placed in detention in December 2006; the parties did not however submit any evidence to support or to rebut this statement. Even assuming that the authorities of the Illichivsk pre-trial detention facility were aware of the applicant\u2019s HIV status,\u00a0the Court observes that the applicant stayed in the Illichivsk pre-trial detention facility for a maximum of two weeks before being transferred to the SIZO and later to Odessa Correctional Colony No.\u00a014.39.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the medical assistance received by the applicant between January 2007 and November 2011, the Court notes that the applicant did not submit any evidence that he had had any treatment before his placement in detention which needed to be continued, that he had informed the doctors in the SIZO and in Odessa Correctional Colony No.\u00a014 about his health problems, or that he had had any health complaints which had not been properly addressed.40.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint in respect of the period between November 2011 and March 2013 is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that while in detention the applicant had been provided with the necessary medical assistance. The Government noted that there was no evidence that \u201cbefore August 2013\u201d the applicant had informed the detention facilities\u2019 administration about his HIV status. However, the applicant has been HIV-positive for a considerable period of time, and while at liberty he was not having any treatment. Once the applicant\u2019s state of health worsened, he had a number of examinations and was placed in a specialised hospital. There he was supervised by doctors and provided with the necessary medication in full. In particular, the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis in August 2012 and provided with the necessary treatment. Therefore, there was no breach of Article 3 of the Convention in the applicant\u2019s case.43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that no treatment had been provided to him until his state of health had significantly deteriorated. The applicant alleged that the prison authorities had tried to conceal the real situation. In particular, in mid-March 2013 he was requested to sign a paper stating that his CD4+ cell count was 120, which he knew not to be true. The applicant further stated that the medication which had been prescribed to him was never actually administered. In particular, the Government did not submit any evidence in support of their statement that the applicant had received the prescribed medication.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has emphasised on a number of occasions that the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI). A\u00a0lack of appropriate medical care may thus amount to treatment contrary to Article\u00a03 of the Convention (see, among many authorities, Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, 29 November 2007; Ukhan v. Ukraine, no.\u00a030628\/02, 18 December 2008; and Petukhov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a043374\/02, 21October 2010).45.\u00a0\u00a0Other relevant principles determined by the Court in its case-law as regards Article 3 of the Convention in respect of medical treatment in detention are summarised in the case of Sergey Antonov v. Ukraine (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a070-75).46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that from November 2011 the applicant\u2019s state of health apparently worsened, and he was placed in a medical ward. At that time the Odessa Colony authorities enquired of their own motion about the applicant\u2019s HIV status and received confirmation that the applicant was HIV positive.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that despite the information received the applicant\u2019s first CD4+ cell count was performed more than seven months later, and despite the low cell count thus identified and the diagnosis of HIV at clinical stage 4 the applicant started receiving the ART at the end of December 2012, apparently through the assistance of a specialised NGO. This inactivity in itself amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.48.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the applicant\u2019s statements that he did not receive the prescribed medication, the Court reiterates that an unsubstantiated allegation of no, delayed, or otherwise unsatisfactory medical care is normally not sufficient to disclose an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. A credible complaint should normally include, among other things, sufficient reference to the medical condition in question, medical prescriptions that were sought, made or refused, and some evidence \u2013 for instance, expert reports \u2013 capable of disclosing serious failings in the applicant\u2019s medical care (see Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia, no. 57541\/09, \u00a7 80, 24 January 2012).49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that it has already examined a large number of cases against Ukraine raising complaints of inadequate medical services afforded to inmates (see, most recently, Barilo v. Ukraine, no. 9607\/06, 16\u00a0May 2013, and Kushnir v. Ukraine, no. 42184\/09, 11 December 2014). In the absence of an effective remedy in Ukraine to air those complaints (see paragraphs 58-59 below), the Court has been obliged to perform a first-hand evaluation of evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention have been respected.50.\u00a0\u00a0In this respect the Court reiterates that where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d (see Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no.\u00a042310\/04, \u00a7 148, 21 April 2011). However, this task is especially complicated by the need to assess evidence calling for expert knowledge in various medical fields. In this connection the Court emphasises that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). The Court further reiterates that it is not its task to rule on matters lying exclusively within the field of expertise of medical specialists and to establish whether the applicant in fact required such treatment during the relevant period (see E.A. v. Russia, no. 44187\/04, \u00a7 57, 23 May 2013) and whether the choice of treatment methods appropriately reflected the applicant\u2019s needs (see Ukhan, cited above, \u00a7 76, and Okhrimenko v. Ukraine, no. 53896\/07, \u00a7\u00a071, 15\u00a0October 2009). In view of the above and paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants in view of their detention, the Court considers that it is for the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.51.\u00a0\u00a0In line with the principles mentioned above, the Court notes that the evidence submitted by the Government in support of their statement that the applicant\u2019s medical care had been adequate and that he had received the prescribed medication in full is unsatisfactory. The copy of the applicant\u2019s medical file is of very poor quality, very often unreadable, and the information in it is very vague and fragmented. In particular, it is impossible to conclude which complaints of the applicant were addressed and to establish to what extent the prescriptions were followed through.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the issues of inadequate medical assistance for people with HIV in the Ukrainian detention facilities have been already addressed by the Court in a number of cases (see Kats and Others v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 29971\/04, 18 December 2008; Pokhlebin v. Ukraine, no.\u00a035581\/06, 20 May 2010; and Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no.\u00a028005\/08, 14 March 2013). The overall situation in respect of treatment for people with HIV in those facilities is also addressed in the case of Sergey Antonov v. Ukraine (no. 40512\/13, 22 October 2015).53.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above and, in particular, given the failure of the SIZO authorities to promptly provide appropriate treatment for the applicant\u2019s HIV infection, the Court concludes that between November 2011 and March 2013 the applicant was not provided with adequate medical assistance while in detention, which amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had no effective domestic remedy in respect for his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility55.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not submit any observations as to the admissibility of this complaint.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits57.\u00a0\u00a0The parties did not submit any observations as to the merits of this complaint.58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. With reference to its earlier case-law (see, among other authorities, Melnik, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 113-16, and Dvoynykh v. Ukraine, no. 72277\/01, \u00a7 72, 12 October 2006), its recent findings (see Barilo, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 104-05), and the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that the Government have not shown that the applicant had in practice an opportunity to obtain effective remedies for his complaint, that is to say, remedies which could have prevented the violations from occurring or continuing, or could have afforded the applicant appropriate redress.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes, therefore, that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for the applicant\u2019s complaint in respect of the lack of appropriate medical assistance.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION60.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that there had been no violation of the applicant\u2019s rights in the present case, so his claims were groundless. In any event, the Government considered the applicant\u2019s claims excessive.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 910 for costs and expenses.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the amount claimed was excessive and that the services indicated in the legal representation agreement provided by the applicant did not correspond to the actual services provided.66.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the applicant\u2019s lawyer, who represented the applicant throughout the proceedings before the Court, submitted a copy of a legal assistance agreement with the applicant, according to which the lawyer was to represent the applicant at the national level and prepare an application to the Court. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the amount claimed.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27625":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION57.\u00a0\u00a0In his application form of 8 July 2013 the applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had not received adequate medical assistance in detention. In particular, he did not receive ART after his arrest, which, according to the applicant, caused an aggravation of his condition and new health problems such as respiratory distress, diarrhoea, numbness in the left leg, severe headaches, weight loss and weakness. There was no continuous monitoring or diagnostics of his condition, which was aggravated by the presence of HIV, lung and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis, and hepatitis C. According to the applicant, there was no adequate treatment of his tuberculosis and hepatitis C, thus no special treatment and no continuous monitoring. In particular, the standard tuberculosis treatment had no positive effect. The applicant finally complained that his state of health had worsened in detention; moreover, he had had no special diet and only insufficient access to fresh air and natural light in the cell.58.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention, relied on by the applicant, reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not submit any observations on the admissibility of this complaint.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s submissions61.\u00a0In his observations submitted on 20 December 2013, the applicant stated that his complaints covered the period between September 2012 and August 2013 only. In particular, he did not complain about receiving no ART after June 2013, or about his medical treatment in Buchanska Correctional Colony No. 85.62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed with the Government\u2019s statement that he had been provided with adequate medical assistance. In particular, the applicant submitted that he had been admitted to the SIZO on 27 September 2012, but had been diagnosed for the first time as having various conditions only on 8 November 2012. Consequently, for more than forty days he was not diagnosed, and obtained no medical treatment. The applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count was performed for the first time only on 9 January 2013, and the ART was prescribed only on 30 March 2013, nearly six months after the applicant\u2019s arrival at the SIZO. The applicant also stated that there had been no treatment for his hepatitis C or for candidiasis, despite his complaints about weakness and liver pain.63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant noted that the seriousness of his diseases had required constant and systematic monitoring of his treatment and state of health. However, it appears from the medical documents submitted by the Government that in January 2013 the applicant was examined only twice (on 9 and 22 January 2013); in February 2013 he was not examined until 14\u00a0February 2013 (thus remaining without medical attention for twenty-one days). It was noted that on 14 February 2013 the applicant complained of severe deterioration of his general health and of enlarged lymph glands. After that, according to the medical records, the applicant was examined on 21 and 28 February and 7, 14, 21 and 28 March 2013. Later the applicant was examined every five, seven or sometimes every eleven days. However, sometimes the applicant\u2019s complaints (such as that of 14 February 2013 about deterioration of his health and enlarged lymph glands) were not adequately met. The applicant stated that these facts confirmed that the SIZO medical staff had not monitored his health adequately and had made no attempts to monitor the effectiveness of his treatment and its effects on his health. Moreover, sometimes his complaints were not even recorded.64.\u00a0The applicant agreed that his tuberculosis had been treated in the SIZO. However, his other diseases were not treated, and they were serious enough to be life-threatening.65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also pointed out that, according to the document issued by the SIZO authorities, his health had been deteriorating. Moreover, the very fact that the applicant\u2019s state of health improved in July 2013 after his complaint to the European Court of Human Rights (the number of CD4+ cells increased and the tuberculosis \u201cstabilised\u201d) is additional evidence of the absence of proper treatment before July 2013.66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also noted that on 13 July 2013 an ambulance had been called for him, but he had been only given painkillers to relieve his symptoms.67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further stated that on arrival at the Buchanska Correctional Colony in September 2013 he had been hospitalised as an emergency, which, according to him, was evidence that he had not received proper treatment in the SIZO.68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant finally submitted that he had stopped the ART because of a painful reaction to the treatment. However, there was no attempt to determine the cause of the reaction and to consider changing the treatment.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s submissions69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had received the medical assistance he needed for all his health problems throughout the period of his deprivation of liberty. In the SIZO the applicant received ART daily and he recovered from his tuberculosis episode. He was systematically examined and all of his complaints were adequately addressed by the SIZO medical ward staff. Therefore, the Government stated that the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 3 of the Convention had not been breached.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 162, Series A no. 25).71.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002\u2011III, with further references).72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has emphasised on a number of occasions that the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI). A\u00a0lack of appropriate medical care may thus amount to treatment contrary to Article\u00a03 of the Convention (see, among many authorities, Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, 29 November 2007; Ukhan v. Ukraine, no.\u00a030628\/02, 18 December 2008; and Petukhov v. Ukraine, no. 43374\/02, 21\u00a0October 2010).73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. When assessing it, the Court considered that the mere fact that a detainee was seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical assistance was adequate (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 116). The authorities must also ensure that a comprehensive record is kept concerning the detainee\u2019s state of health and the treatment he underwent while in detention (see Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7\u00a083, ECHR 2006\u2011XII (extracts)), that diagnosis and care are delivered promptly and accurately (see Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28\u00a0March 2006; and Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 115), and that where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition supervision is regular, systematic and involves a comprehensive treatment strategy aimed at helping the detainee to recover or preventing the aggravation of his condition, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis (see Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 211, 13 July 2006, and Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 114). The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through (see Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 117, 7 November 2006, and Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 116). At the same time the State\u2019s obligation to cure a seriously ill detainee is one as to means, not as to result (due diligence test) (see Goginashvili v. Georgia, no. 47729\/08, \u00a7 71, 4\u00a0October 2011).74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also held that Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as securing to every detained person medical assistance of the same level as \u201cin the best civilian clinics\u201d (see Mirilashivili v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a06293\/04, 10 July 2007). It further held that it was \u201cprepared to accept that in principle the resources of medical facilities within the prison system are limited compared to those of civil[ian] clinics\u201d (see Grishin v. Russia, no. 30983\/02, \u00a7 76, 15\u00a0November 2007).75.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7\u00a0140, 22\u00a0December 2008).76.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that, according to the applicant, at the moment of his arrest in September 2012 he was suffering from a number of diseases, including HIV infection clinical stage IV. Although the applicant provided no evidence about his state of health and medical treatment (if any) shortly before his arrest, it appears that by September 2012 the applicant had already been HIV positive for at least three years. According to the evidence in the case file, in December 2011 the applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count was already very low and at that time he apparently already needed the ART. However, there is no information as to whether the applicant ever received ART before his arrest and, if he did, whether he informed the SIZO administration about the necessity to re-start\/not to interrupt the ART. The parties, however, agreed that when he arrived at the SIZO the applicant informed the SIZO authorities about his registration as a person with HIV at the Kyiv City Aids Prevention and Control Centre.77.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the other health problems referred to by the applicant, the Court observes that, according to the medical documents submitted by the Government, when the applicant arrived at the SIZO he underwent an initial medical examination. It was noted that the applicant had \u201cno health complaints\u201d. None of the illnesses that the applicant claimed to have at the moment of his arrest (see paragraph 7 above) and which were diagnosed following the subsequent medical examinations, were mentioned in the initial medical examination report.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it is unclear what particular information about his HIV infection status and other diseases the applicant had when he arrived at the SIZO, and what information he gave the SIZO doctors about his health problems. However, even assuming that the applicant stated only that he was registered at the Kyiv Aids Centre, the Court notes that there were no attempts by the SIZO medical staff to clarify with the applicant his exact state of health, whether he had any other HIV-related illnesses, and what kind of treatment he had and\/or currently needed in this respect.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the evidence in the case file includes an advisory opinion issued by the local Aids Centre \u201con request\u201d on 8\u00a0November 2012. It is, however, unclear who requested this opinion, whether the applicant was indeed examined in the Centre on this date, and if it was not the SIZO authorities but the applicant\u2019s lawyer who requested this information when the authorities became aware of it. In any event, the SIZO doctors were aware from his arrest in September 2012 that the applicant had been registered in the Aids Centre, however, the first attempt to find out what kind of medical treatment the applicant required was made in the beginning of January 2013, four months after he entered the SIZO. In particular, by the time the relevant test was performed the applicant\u2019s CD4+ cell count had dropped drastically. In addition, he had a tuberculosis relapse and was finally admitted to the SIZO medical ward in February 2013.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that from the middle of February 2013 onwards the applicant was examined by doctors, was diagnosed, and was prescribed treatment. By July 2013 his CD4+ cell count had increased and he had recovered from the episode of tuberculosis.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the issue of inadequate medical assistance for people with HIV in Ukrainian detention facilities has already been addressed by the Court in a number of cases (see Kats and Others v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 29971\/04, 18 December 2008; Pokhlebin v. Ukraine, no. 35581\/06, 20 May 2010; and Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005\/08, 14 March 2013). In particular, in Kats and Others, despite the authorities\u2019 knowledge that the applicants\u2019 daughter\/mother was HIV-positive, there was no relevant treatment at all, and this led to the person\u2019s death. In Salakhov and Islyamova the first applicant\u2019s treatment for an HIV-related infection was sporadic and irregular. Moreover, the failure of the Ukrainian health care system to adequately address the HIV epidemic was noted in the recent reports cited above (see paragraphs 50-53 above), with prisoners mentioned as one of the most severely affected groups.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case at a particular point in time in 2013 the applicant began receiving treatment which led to an improvement in his health. However,\u00a0this treatment was only begun when the applicant\u2019s condition was already critical.83.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s initial medical examination in September 2012 appears to have been very superficial, and despite the SIZO authorities\u2019 awareness that the applicant was HIV-positive, no attempts were made to seek further information about his HIV-related health issues, and the first CD4+ cell count test was performed only four months after the applicant\u2019s arrival in the SIZO. The results of this test and other available evidence confirm that the applicant\u2019s condition was very serious well before the test.84.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the applicant\u2019s statements that not all his complaints were noted or addressed, and that not all his diseases were treated, in particular, after February 2013, the Court reiterates that an unsubstantiated allegation of no, delayed, or otherwise unsatisfactory medical care is normally not sufficient to disclose an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. A credible complaint should normally include, among other things, sufficient reference to the medical condition in question, medical prescriptions that were sought, made or refused, and some evidence \u2013 for instance, expert reports \u2013 capable of disclosing serious failings in the applicant\u2019s medical care (see Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia, no. 57541\/09, \u00a7\u00a080, 24 January 2012).85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that it has already examined a large number of cases against Ukraine raising complaints of inadequate medical care afforded to detainees (see, among the most recent cases, Barilo v. Ukraine, no. 9607\/06, 16 May 2013, and Kushnir v. Ukraine, no. 42184\/09, 11\u00a0December 2014). In the absence of an effective remedy in Ukraine to air those complaints (see paragraphs 96-97 below), the Court has been obliged to perform a first-hand evaluation of the evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention have been respected.86.\u00a0\u00a0In this respect the Court reiterates that where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d (see Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no. 42310\/04, \u00a7 148, 21 April 2011). However, this task is especially complicated by the need to assess evidence calling for expert knowledge in various medical fields. In this connection the Court emphasises that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v.\u00a0the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). The Court further reiterates that it is not its task to rule on matters lying exclusively within the field of expertise of medical specialists and to establish whether the applicant in fact required such treatment during the relevant period (see E.A., cited above, \u00a7 57) and whether the choice of treatment methods appropriately reflected the applicant\u2019s needs (see Ukhan, cited above, \u00a7 76, and Okhrimenko v. Ukraine, no. 53896\/07, \u00a7 71, 15 October 2009). In view of the above and paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants in view of their detention, the Court considers that it is for the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.87.\u00a0\u00a0In line with the above-mentioned principles the Court considers that on the basis of the medical evidence submitted by the parties and in the absence of any independent medical evaluation of the applicant\u2019s medical file, it cannot conclude whether the applicant\u2019s complaints concerned symptoms of a particular disease for which the applicant was receiving treatment or if they were manifestations of different diseases and required separate attention.88.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court notes that the evidence submitted by the Government in support of their statement that the applicant\u2019s medical care was adequate is unsatisfactory. The copy of the applicant\u2019s medical file is of very poor quality, very often unreadable and the information is very vague and fragmented. In particular, it is impossible to conclude which complaints of the applicant were addressed and to verify to what extent the prescriptions were followed through. Given the applicant\u2019s serious and numerous health problems reflected in his diagnosis, the Court considers, judging from the available material, that the Government failed to provide convincing evidence that the applicant indeed received a medical response to his health needs other than those generated by his tuberculosis and HIV infection (see Ukhan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 79-80, and, mutatis mutandis, Vitkovskiy v. Ukraine, no. 24938\/06, \u00a7 129, 26 September 2013).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finally notes that it is impossible to draw any conclusions about the material conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention given the absence of any particular details from the applicant in this respect (see paragraph 57 above). In particular, the applicant did not submit any observations in respect of his initial complaint, and did not specify in which particular cell he stayed while detained in the Kyiv SIZO.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finally concludes that the failure of the SIZO authorities to promptly diagnose the applicant\u2019s condition and to provide prompt and comprehensive medical assistance to the applicant while in detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had no effective domestic remedy in respect for his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not submit any observations as to the admissibility of this complaint.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits94.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that the national legislation did not provide for effective remedies in respect of lack of adequate medical care in prison. In particular, his lawyer complained to the SIZO authorities and to a court about the applicant\u2019s poor state of health and requested his release so that he could be treated in a specialised institution, but his requests were refused. The court also failed to respond to the SIZO authorities\u2019 request for the proceedings to be accelerated in view of the applicant\u2019s state of health. Also, in the applicant\u2019s view, complaints to a prosecutor and to a court in administrative proceedings are both ineffective, since neither would change the situation at the moment when medical assistance was needed.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant complained that his rights had been violated on 4 July 2013. His complaint was transferred to the State Department for Enforcement of Sentences. Following investigation it was concluded that the SIZO administration and its medical staff had not breached the law. Therefore, the applicant had an effective remedy in respect of his complaints.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. With reference to its earlier case-law (see, among other authorities, Melnik, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 113-16, and Dvoynykh v. Ukraine, no. 72277\/01, \u00a7 72, 12 October 2006), its recent findings (see Barilo, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 104-105), and the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that the Government have not shown that the applicant had in practice an opportunity to obtain effective remedies for his complaint, that is to say remedies which could have prevented the violations from occurring or continuing, or could have afforded the applicant appropriate redress.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes, therefore, that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for the applicant\u2019s complaint in respect of the lack of appropriate medical assistance.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED HINDRANCE OF THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that he had been subjected to psychological pressure in respect of his application before this Court. He relied on Article 34 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person ... The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d.A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions99.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that there had been no hindrance of the applicant\u2019s right of individual petition. Referring to the Court\u2019s case-law, the Government stated that in order to find that the State failed to comply with requirements of Article 34 of the Convention, the applicant\u2019s allegations should be supported by facts and, in particular, the State\u2019s intention to hinder the applicant\u2019s right to lodge an individual petition should be demonstrated (see, among other authorities, Konstantin Markin v.\u00a0Russia [GC], no. 30078\/06, ECHR 2012 (extracts)).100.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s complaints in this respect had been investigated by the State Prison Service and it had been concluded that the SIZO authorities and medical staff had not breached any law. These findings were confirmed by a report by the head of the SIZO medical ward and by explanations given by the applicant\u2019s cellmates.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that there was no evidence in support of the applicant\u2019s statements. Moreover, all his submissions had reached the Court and the applicant was free to present his complaints.102.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that the Government\u2019s arguments were unconvincing. In particular, the investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaints referred to by the Government could not be considered an appropriate one, since the SIZO authorities and medical staff were employed in the prison system. Moreover, the conclusion about absence of any breaches of law was not based on any evidence. In particular, the testimonies of the applicant\u2019s cellmates cannot be regarded as reliable evidence, since they were in custody and thus under the total control of the SIZO authorities.103.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also relied on the Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine carried out by the CPT from 1 to 10\u00a0December 2012 in respect of investigation of complaints about prison officers:\u201cThe CPT cannot conclude that the requirements of an \u201ceffective\u201d investigation have been met in the above cases. On the one hand, it appeared that prosecutors placed a heavy reliance on the material provided by the State Penitentiary Service in their decisions as to whether or not to open criminal proceedings. On the other hand, the lack of confidence expressed by many prisoners interviewed in the capability and determination of the prosecuting authorities to carry out investigations worthy of the name into cases of alleged ill-treatment by penitentiary staff (or fellow inmates at the instigation of staff) must be taken into account. At the end of the 2012 visit, the delegation raised this particular issue with the Prosecutor General.In the CPT\u2019s view, if a body in charge of investigations of this type is to enjoy public confidence, it should not only be independent but should also be seen to be independent of the penitentiary and other law enforcement services.The CPT recommends that steps be taken to set up without delay a national specialised team, whose role is to carry out investigations throughout the country into cases involving alleged ill-treatment inflicted by members of penitentiary staff (or at the instigation of such staff) or any other public officials (such as police officers), and to provide it with its own support staff for the operational conduct of the investigations. Further, the Committee recommends examining the feasibility, in the medium term, of completely separating such a team from the Prosecution Service so as to establish a genuine independent specialised agency for investigations of this type.\u201d104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant finally submitted that the pressure on him was quite strong and his state of health prevented him from analysing the situation. If it had not been for his lawyer the applicant would have withdrawn his application.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates at the outset that a complaint under Article 34 of the Convention is of a procedural nature and therefore does not give rise to any issue of admissibility under the Convention (see Iulian Popescu v.\u00a0Romania, no. 24999\/04, \u00a7 29, 4 June 2013).106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted by Article\u00a034 that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints (see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 105, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV). In this context, \u201cpressure\u201d includes not only direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation, but also other improper indirect acts or contacts designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention remedy (see Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7 159, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011III).107.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, whether or not contacts between the authorities and an applicant are tantamount to unacceptable practices from the standpoint of Article 34 must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. In this respect, regard must be had to the vulnerability of the complainant and his or her susceptibility to influence exerted by the authorities (see Akdivar and Others, \u00a7 105, and Kurt, \u00a7 160, both cited above). The applicant\u2019s position might be particularly vulnerable when he is held in custody with limited contact with his family or the outside world (see Cotle\u0163 v. Romania, no. 38565\/97, \u00a7 71, 3 June 2003).108.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicant stated that he had been intimidated to induce him to make statements that the medical assistance received by him had been adequate and that possible shortcomings such as the absence of ART had to be imputed to the applicant himself. The Government indeed provided a handwritten note signed by the applicant stating that the applicant had no complaints about the SIZO medical staff (see paragraph 34 above), which contradicts his submissions before this Court, both before and after the date on the note. The Government did not specify the circumstances in which this note was obtained. However, the Court is concerned that the note in question was obtained ten days after the Court had invited the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court to ensure that the applicant is provided with the appropriate medical assistance.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the applicant\u2019s allegations about psychological pressure on him had been duly checked and had not proved true. The Court, however, notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint in respect of intimidation was transferred by the prosecutor to the prison authorities, whose subordinates in the first place were suspected of intimidating the applicant. Furthermore, all evidence submitted by the Government originated either from prison staff or from the applicant\u2019s fellow inmates, who were under the control of the prison authorities. Therefore, the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s arguments.110.\u00a0\u00a0Given the applicant\u2019s consistent submissions and in the absence of any other credible explanation about the origin of the note in question, the Court considers that the applicant was indeed approached by the authorities to induce him to make statements which would undermine his application before this Court. In these circumstances the State has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 34 not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual petition.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION111.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage112.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 7,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.113.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that there had been no violation of the applicant\u2019s rights in the present case and that the amount claimed was excessive.114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, ruling on an equitable basis, considers it appropriate to allow the applicant\u2019s claim in full.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses115.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not claim any compensation for costs and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.V.\u00a0\u00a0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that, in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.118.\u00a0\u00a0However, given that the factual circumstances which led to the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in the present case have changed, the Court considers that it is appropriate to discontinue the indication made to the Government under Rule 39 (see paragraph 4 above).","27626":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had not been provided with adequate medical assistance in detention, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint. In particular, the applicant should have lodged a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office, which was competent to monitor compliance with legal acts in detention facilities. The prosecutor\u2019s decisions in this respect are mandatory and should be enforced immediately. The applicant did not complain to a prosecutor about the absence of adequate medical assistance.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that once the applicant had been placed in the SIZO on 1 February 2012 he received prompt treatment in full. Before his placement in detention the applicant was suffering from a number of serious diseases. He was also using drugs. In 1997 he was diagnosed with hepatitis C and in 2008 with pulmonary tuberculosis and HIV. However, while in detention the applicant was under the constant supervision of doctors. In January 2013 he was diagnosed with a tuberculosis relapse and was examined (including examination in the Kyiv City Diagnostics Centre) and received appropriate treatment. Later the applicant was transferred to a specialised tuberculosis hospital in the Zhovtnevska Correctional Colony. In respect of the applicant\u2019s HIV status the Government submitted that since the applicant also had tuberculosis the latter had had to be treated first.36.\u00a0\u00a0The Government concluded that the applicant had been placed in a specialised hospital, had been under constant medical supervision, and had received appropriate medical assistance when needed. The applicant had failed to produce evidence that on any occasion his complaints had not been addressed or that his treatment had led to a worsening of his state of health. Moreover, deterioration of a person\u2019s health does not of itself indicate inadequate medical treatment (see Rudenko v. Ukraine [Committee], no.\u00a05797\/05, \u00a7 94, 25 November 2010). In total, the applicant received special treatment in respect of his diseases, as well as relevant symptomatic treatment which is confirmed by his regular examinations by doctors and prescription of medication. Moreover, the applicant has never complained to the State authorities of inadequate medical treatment. The Government thus considered the applicant\u2019s complaint unsubstantiated.37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted, referring to the Court\u2019s case-law in this respect (see Koval v. Ukraine, no. 65550\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 92-98, 19 October 2006) that there were no effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint. In particular, a complaint to a public prosecutor cannot be considered such a remedy (see Merit v. Ukraine, no. 66561\/01, \u00a7 63, 30 March 2004; mutatis mutandis, Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, no. 54825\/00, \u00a7 116, ECHR 2005\u2011II (extracts); and Salov v. Ukraine, no. 65518\/01, \u00a7 58, ECHR 2005\u2011VIII (extracts)). In particular, the Government have not demonstrated how a complaint to the prosecutor could have provided the applicant with redress for an alleged lack of medical assistance.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already dismissed similar objections based on non-exhaustion, finding the remedy referred to by the Government ineffective on the grounds that it had not been shown that recourse to such proceedings could have brought about an improvement in the applicants\u2019 detention conditions (see Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 69, 28 March 2006; more recently, Buglov v. Ukraine, no. 28825\/02, \u00a7 74, 10 July 2014) and sees no reason to depart from that finding in the present case. The Court therefore considers that this complaint cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not submit observations on the merits.41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment because of the failure to provide him with prompt and adequate medical assistance. He contested the Government\u2019s statement about proper and timely medical treatment provided to him. In particular, instead of improving, the applicant\u2019s health deteriorated. Some of the information submitted by the Government was untrue or contained intentional omissions. The declining number of the applicant\u2019s CD cells confirms this statement; in particular, the applicant\u2019s HIV status progressed from clinical stage 3 to clinical stage 4.42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that he had been HIV-positive since 2008 and had been registered at the Kyiv City Aids Centre since 2011. However, the applicant started receiving the ART only in August 2013.43.\u00a0\u00a0As for the applicant\u2019s other health problems, the applicant noted that the treatment prescribed to him was mainly symptomatic and there was no indication that there had been a comprehensive treatment strategy aimed at curing his illnesses.44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that his relatives had been requested to send in medication which had later been used not by him personally but by the medical unit. In particular, on one occasion the applicant\u2019s relatives were requested to send him four thermometers.45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also noted that his representative had requested the colony on several occasions to provide her with information about the applicant\u2019s state of health, but had received a refusal each time. The applicant stated that the medical documents provided by the Government were contradictory and did not prove that he had actually taken the medication sent in by his family or prescribed to him in detention.46.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the applicant maintained that he had not received proper medical assistance in detention, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has emphasised on a number of occasions that the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI). A\u00a0lack of appropriate medical care may thus amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see, among many authorities, Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, 29 November 2007; Ukhan v. Ukraine, no.\u00a030628\/02, 18 December 2008; and Petukhov v. Ukraine, no. 43374\/02, 21 October 2010).48.\u00a0\u00a0Other relevant principles determined by the Court in its case-law as regards Article 3 of the Convention in respect of medical treatment in detention are summarised in the case of Sergey Antonov v. Ukraine (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a070-75).49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present case the applicant was suffering from various serious diseases before being placed in detention for the period in question (February 2012\u2013January 2014). In particular, he was diagnosed HIV-positive as early as 2008, and the authorities apparently were aware of this and of the advanced stage of his illness (see paragraph 7 above). Although for the majority of time he was in detention the applicant was a patient in various medical facilities, there is no evidence that he received any treatment for his HIV for a considerable period of time. Despite the authorities\u2019 knowledge of the applicant\u2019s HIV status, the ART was prescribed to him only in July 2013, nearly a year and a half after the applicant had been placed in detention.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that at a particular moment it was impossible to prescribe the applicant ART, since his tuberculosis had to be treated first. The Court reiterates that that it is not its task to rule on matters lying exclusively within the field of expertise of medical specialists, or to establish whether the applicant in fact required such treatment during the relevant period (see E.A. v. Russia, no. 44187\/04, \u00a7 57, 23 May 2013) and whether the choice of treatment methods appropriately reflected the applicant\u2019s needs (see Ukhan, cited above, \u00a7 76, and Okhrimenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 53896\/07, \u00a7 71, 15 October 2009). However, even before the applicant had been diagnosed with tuberculosis in January 2013, he had received no ART for ten months.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the issues of inadequate medical assistance for people with HIV in Ukrainian detention facilities have already been addressed by the Court in a number of cases (see Kats and Others v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 29971\/04, 18 December 2008; Pokhlebin v. Ukraine, no.\u00a035581\/06, 20 May 2010; and Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no.\u00a028005\/08, 14 March 2013). In particular, in the case of Kats and Others cited above, despite the authorities\u2019 knowledge that the applicants\u2019 daughter\/mother was HIV-positive there was no relevant treatment at all, which led to the person\u2019s death. In the case of Salakhov and Islyamova v.\u00a0Ukraine the first applicant\u2019s treatment for an HIV-related infection was sporadic and irregular. The overall situation in respect of treatment for people with HIV in detention is also addressed in the case of Sergey Antonov v. Ukraine (no. 40512\/13, 22 October 2015).52.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s allegations that there was no comprehensive treatment strategy aimed at tackling his other health problems, the Court reiterates that an unsubstantiated allegation of no, delayed, or otherwise unsatisfactory medical care is normally not sufficient to disclose an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. A credible complaint should normally include, among other things, sufficient reference to the medical condition in question, medical prescriptions that were sought, made or refused, and some evidence, such as expert reports, which was capable of disclosing serious failings in the applicant\u2019s medical care (see Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia, no. 57541\/09, \u00a7 80, 24 January 2012).53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that it has already examined a large number of cases against Ukraine raising complaints of inadequate medical services afforded to inmates (see, among the most recent ones, Barilo v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 9607\/06, 16 May 2013, and Kushnir v. Ukraine, no.\u00a042184\/09, 11 December 2014). In the absence of an effective remedy in Ukraine to air those complaints, the Court has been obliged to perform a first-hand evaluation of the evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention have been respected.54.\u00a0\u00a0This task is especially complicated by the need to assess evidence calling for expert knowledge in various medical fields. In this connection the Court emphasises that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d (see Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no. 42310\/04, \u00a7 148, 21 April 2011). In that role, paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants in view of their detention, the Court considers that it is for the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.55.\u00a0\u00a0In line with the above-mentioned principles, the Court notes that the evidence submitted by the Government in support of their statement that the applicant\u2019s medical care was adequate and that he received the prescribed medication in full is unsatisfactory. The copy of the applicant\u2019s medical file is of very poor quality and very often unreadable. Very often it is impossible to conclude which complaints of the applicant were addressed or to establish to what extent the prescriptions were followed through.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, however, notes that it is not contested by the applicant that he had made a full recovery from his tuberculosis.57.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, the Court concludes that given, in particular, the failure of the SIZO authorities to promptly provide the relevant HIV treatment, the applicant was not provided with adequate medical assistance while in detention, which amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION58.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that there had been no violation in the applicant\u2019s case and that the amount claimed was excessive.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 850 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not submit any comments in respect of this claim.64.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, given that the applicant had already been granted EUR 850 under the legal aid scheme, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27647":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to police brutality while he had been detained incommunicado between 12 and 16 August 2005. He also complained about lack of an effective investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment. Article\u00a03 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility64.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not raise any objection as regards the admissibility of these complaints.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged lack of an effective investigation(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that there had been prima facie evidence in favour of his allegations of ill-treatment which warranted an investigation by the authorities in conformity with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. In this connection he referred to his injuries, whose nature and number had been specified in the expert report. The possible origin of the injuries specified in the report (blunt dynamic force) corresponded to the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had been beaten, while being held incommunicado, with a plastic bottle and a rubber tube (see paragraph 23 above). The number and location of the injuries on his body suggested that they had been inflicted when he had been in a position of restricted freedom to move (restrained) by people who had full control over him. If the authorities had carried out a medical check-up after he had been arrested and before he had been detained, his injuries would have been brought to light in good time. The medical examination of 19 August 2005 was not followed up by an effective investigation by the relevant authorities. The public prosecutor did nothing to investigate his allegations. Likewise, the trial judge had been focused on examining the criminal case against the applicant. The courts had summarily concluded that the applicant\u2019s statement of 8 November 2005 was self-serving and was aimed at avoiding criminal responsibility. Lastly, his criminal complaint submitted to the public prosecutor was to no avail.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Government67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that in the criminal proceedings against him the applicant had presented three different accounts of events. Allegations of ill-treatment were firstly raised in his second statement of 19\u00a0August 2005. These allegations lost all credibility after the medical examination of 19 August 2005 specified that the applicant\u2019s injuries were at least seven days old. In order to harmonise his allegations of police brutality with the date of his injuries, on 8 November 2005 he had provided a third version of events in which he had stated, for the first time, that he had been kidnapped by the police on 12 August and held incommunicado until 16 August 2005. They further argued that the applicant and witnesses examined at the trial (see paragraphs 32 and 34 above) had provided inconsistent evidence regarding the date of his alleged disappearance. While the medical evidence attested to his injuries, that evidence was insufficient to conclude that those injuries were related to his allegations of kidnapping and ill-treatment by the police. Accordingly, the applicant had not laid a prima facie case of ill-treatment that would warrant an investigation of his allegations. The latter showed the applicant was intending to avoid criminal liability for the charges against him.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. Such an investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice, and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28\u00a0October\u00a01998, \u00a7\u00a0102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII; Corsacov v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 18944\/02, \u00a7\u00a068, 4 April 2006; and Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7 60, 14\u00a0October 2010).69.\u00a0\u00a0Any investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened, and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or to use as the basis of their decisions (see Assenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 103, and Bat\u0131 and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7 136, ECHR\u00a02004\u2011IV). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see El Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 183, ECHR 2012, and the references cited therein).70.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the investigation should be independent of the executive (see O\u011fur v. Turkey [GC], no. 21594\/93, \u00a7\u00a7 91-92, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011III, and Mehmet Emin Y\u00fcksel v. Turkey, no. 40154\/98, \u00a7 37, 20\u00a0July 2004). Independence of an investigation implies not only the absence of a hierarchical or institutional connection, but also independence in practical terms (see Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 83-84, Reports 1998\u2011IV).71.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the victim should be able to participate effectively in the investigation (see El Masri, cited above, \u00a7 185).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles in the present case72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset as incontrovertible that the applicant had numerous injuries (haematomas) on various parts of his body. That the applicant had bodily injuries was firstly brought to light on 19 August 2005, at the applicant\u2019s second examination by the investigating judge in the detention center in Skopje. At this juncture, the Court notes that it was not informed by any party, nor was any document brought to its attention to that effect, that a prison doctor had examined the applicant before that date (see paragraph 58 above). On 19 August 2005 the applicant displayed his injuries in the presence of the investigating judge, the public prosecutor engaged in the criminal case against him, and the court-appointed lawyer (see paragraph 15 above). The investigating judge noted some injuries in the record of the applicant\u2019s examination of that date (see paragraph 18 above). The nature and position of the injuries were further specified in detail in the expert report of 19 August 2005 (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above). This report was commissioned by the investigating judge and drawn up by the Forensic Institute (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above). The report also established that the injuries had been the result of the use of \u201cblunt dynamic force\u201d. Injuries on the applicant\u2019s arms had been inflicted by exerting pressure, possibly by hands, and the remaining injuries had been caused by beatings. Lastly, the medical report established that the injuries, given their colour at the time of examination, were at least seven days old, which meant that they had been inflicted not later than 12 August 2005. The findings noted in the expert report were further confirmed in the statement, which one of the experts involved in drawing up the report gave at the trial in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer (see paragraph 35 above).73.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant\u2019s depositions of 19 August 2005, the above injuries were inflicted \u201con 16 August 2005 [when he was] beaten and intimidated by police to oblige him to say what they wanted him to\u201d (see paragraph 15 above).74.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s opinion, the nature, number and position of the injuries on the applicant\u2019s body, coupled with the applicant\u2019s assertion that they had been inflicted by the police in order to extract a confession from him in relation to the incident of 15 July 2005, were sufficient, as early as 19\u00a0August 2005, to raise a reasonable suspicion that they could have been imputed to the State authorities, as indicated by the applicant. The Court considers that at that moment the applicant laid the basis of a prima facie case of misconduct on the part of the security forces of the respondent State, which warranted an investigation by the authorities in conformity with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant\u2019s injuries detailed in the expert report of 19 August 2005, which were brought to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities at the time, gave rise ipso facto to an obligation under Article 3 of the Convention on the State to carry out an effective investigation (see El Masri, cited above, \u00a7 186). However, the public prosecutor took no action to investigate the applicant\u2019s allegations, notwithstanding that she had been present on 19 August 2005 when he had displayed the injuries and had been aware of the experts\u2019 findings. No attempt was made by the public prosecutor to hear evidence from the applicant or to follow any possible lead regarding the alleged ill-treatment.75.\u00a0\u00a0The public prosecutor remained inactive after the hearing of 8\u00a0November 2005, when the applicant gave another statement regarding his alleged ill-treatment, in which he had described the location and time, as well as the manner and means by which the injuries had been inflicted. He stated that on 12 August 2005 he had been abducted by members of the special police forces, who had hooded him and driven him to an unknown location which he had later discovered was a house in the city of Veles; that he had been interrogated by police officers, some of whom were uniformed and wore masks and others were in plain clothes, in connection with the bombing of 15 July 2005; that he had been held under water in a swimming pool, threatened with a dog, handcuffed and hit with a plastic bottle and a rubber tube. He had also been threatened that his father would be killed.76.\u00a0\u00a0As noted by the domestic courts, the time of the applicant\u2019s alleged abduction and ill-treatment, as described in this statement, corresponded to the medical evidence (the expert report of 19 August 2005) as regards the age of his injuries. Furthermore, the means by which some of the injuries had been inflicted, as identified in that statement (plastic bottle and rubber tube), corresponded to the type of force (blunt dynamic force) and manner (beatings) described in the expert report.77.\u00a0\u00a0Despite these developments, the prosecuting authorities took no action, although allegations of extrajudicial abduction by police and detention of suspects in clandestine locations were already the subject of public debate as early as 2001 and remained a matter of public record in the following years (see paragraphs 57-61 above). Some of the relevant material referred to the applicant\u2019s case as such. Although nothing suggests that the applicant, at that time, brought this material to the attention of the public prosecutor, it is only reasonable to suppose that it did not remain unknown to the State authorities.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint of ill-treatment submitted in 2007 (see paragraph 48 above) was to no avail. The prosecuting authorities took no investigative measure and did not contact the Ministry of the Interior to obtain additional information, a step which is routinely taken in similar circumstances (see Ja\u0161ar v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 69908\/01, \u00a7 21, 15 February 2007; Sulejmanov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 69875\/01, \u00a7\u00a028, 24\u00a0April 2008; D\u017eeladinov and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 13252\/02, \u00a7 40, 10 April 2008; Trajkoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 13191\/02, \u00a7 15, 7\u00a0February\u00a02008; and El Masri, cited above, \u00a7 187). That a considerable time elapsed between the date of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment and his submitting a criminal complaint on 7\u00a0March 2007 is not a determining factor for the applicant\u2019s complaint under this head, since in any event victims of alleged violations of their rights under Article 3 of the Convention are not required to pursue the prosecution of State agents on their own. This is a duty of the public prosecutor, who is better placed in that respect (see Stojn\u0161ek v.\u00a0Slovenia, no.\u00a01926\/03, \u00a7 79, 23\u00a0June 2009, and Ota\u0161evi\u0107 v. Serbia, no.\u00a032198\/07, \u00a7\u00a025, 5\u00a0February 2013).79.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court observes that it is unable to draw any conclusion as to the alleged investigation carried out by the Interior Ministry\u2019s sector for internal control and professional standards (see paragraphs 59-61 above) since it was not informed by the Government (see paragraph 67 above), nor was any document brought to its attention to that effect, that there had indeed been such an investigation.80.\u00a0\u00a0Against this background, the Court concludes that there was no investigation of the applicant\u2019s allegations that the police had ill-treated him. Thus, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its procedural part.2.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant during his unacknowledged detention between 12 and 16 August 2005(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the court record regarding his arrest of 16 August 2005 did not prove that he had indeed been detained on that date. The nature and number of bodily injuries specified in the expert report, as well as the date when they had possibly been inflicted, confirmed his account of events concerning his incommunicado detention for several days prior to his detention on 16 August 2005. His statement of 16 August 2005 was unlawful, since it had been given under duress occasioning serious fear and threats to his life and the lives of his parents. In his statement of 8\u00a0November 2005, which, unlike his statements of 16 and 19 August 2005, was given before the trial judge, the applicant had provided a sufficiently detailed account of his abduction and ill-treatment. It would have been unreasonable to expect him to provide a more detailed description of the relevant events. He concluded that the Government \u201cdid not provide sufficient explanation for the summary conclusion of its authorities regarding the alleged torture\u201d.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted, relying on documentary evidence, that it was undisputed that the applicant had been detained on 16 August 2005. They contested as unsubstantiated the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had been held incommunicado and ill-treated by police. In this connection they argued that the applicant had provided three inconsistent accounts of events, which had varied according to the circumstances of the case and the evidence as it had become available. In his statement of 19 August 2005 the applicant had alleged that he had been ill-treated while detained in the police station on 16 August 2005. In his statement of 8 November 2005 he had provided a different version of events, which would match the medical expert evidence which had become available in the meantime, regarding the age of the injuries. This latter version of events was short on detail: specifically, it did not contain a description of the men who had allegedly held him incommunicado (their age, how they communicated, and so on). Nor did the applicant describe how he was kept and fed. Furthermore, his testimony of that date was inconsistent with the statements made by the applicant\u2019s mother and father in the pre-trial proceedings (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). Furthermore, the statement by the applicant\u2019s father regarding the applicant\u2019s alleged disappearance was inconsistent with the testimony of A.A. (see paragraph 32 above). That the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment were not credible was further supported by the fact that the applicant\u2019s parents, who lived in a single economic unit with the applicant, did not report that their son had gone missing for four days.83.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Government concluded that it could not be established \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d that the applicant had been abducted by police on 12 August 2005, held for four days incommunicado, and ill-treated by the police. The domestic courts, which had examined the applicant\u2019s case at three levels of jurisdiction, had provided sufficient reasons why those allegations could not be regarded as established \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0Establishment of the facts in the present case(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0General principles84.\u00a0\u00a0In cases in which there are conflicting accounts of events, the Court is inevitably confronted when establishing the facts with the same difficulties as those faced by any first-instance court. It reiterates that, in assessing evidence, it has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, it has never been its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that standard. Its role is not to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States\u2019 responsibility under the Convention. The specificity of its task under Article 19 of the Convention \u2013 to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention \u2013 conditions its approach to the issues of evidence and proof. It adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (see Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012, and the cases cited therein).85.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it is to be recalled that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. The Court reiterates its case-law under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to the effect that where the events in issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a023657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII; and Rupa v. Romania (no. 1), no. 58478\/00, \u00a7 97, 16\u00a0December 2008). In the absence of such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government (see Orhan v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7 274, 18 June 2002).(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles in the present case86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations of abduction, incommunicado detention and ill-treatment by the police. Having regard to their denial and the absence of any investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations (see paragraph 80 above), the Court considers that an issue arises as to the burden of proof in this case and in particular as to whether it should shift from the applicant onto the Government.87.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection it emphasises that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case. Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d, even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place (see El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 155).88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes first of all that the applicant\u2019s grievances raised before it are identical to those which he advanced before the judicial authorities of the respondent State in the criminal proceedings against him (see paragraphs 22-47 above). The 2006 CPT Report regarding the respondent State which referred to the applicant\u2019s case (see paragraph 58 above), contained sufficiently coherent description of the circumstances regarding the place, time and duration of his unacknowledged detention. The alleged incident happened when allegations of extrajudicial abduction by police and detention of suspects in unacknowledged locations in the respondent State were discussed by relevant fora (see paragraphs 57, 58 and\u00a061 above). In this connection the Court underlines the \u201cstriking similarity\u201d which the CPT noted in its 2004 Report (see paragraph 57 above) between two cases of alleged abduction, incommunicado detention and ill\u2011treatment by the police. The Court notes that the methods employed for the applicant\u2019s alleged abduction (that it was carried out by men wearing masks; that hoods were used; that he was placed in a car and transported to a house) were similar with those used in the two cases discussed in 2004 CPT Report, as well as regarding F.R., the co-defendant in the applicant\u2019s case, who was allegedly abducted on 14 August 2005 (see paragraph 58 above). Allegations of deprivation of liberty of a person in an extraordinary place of detention outside any judicial framework were found, admittedly under different circumstances, convincing and established beyond reasonable doubt by the Court in the El-Masri case (see, El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 167 and 236).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant was arrested on 16 August 2005 at 12.30 a.m. near a department store in a suburb of Skopje, far from his house and the B.P. police station which had been attacked in the incident of 15 July 2005. According to him, he had been left there, \u201cwet\u201d and unable to walk, after he had been released by his captors from the house in Veles. As noted in the record of his arrest, he had been apprehended since he \u201cwas not in possession of any identification document and (due to) his suspicious movement in the vicinity of buildings which are targets for criminal offences\u201d. The record contained no further detail. It did not specify that the applicant was suspected of being involved in the bomb incident of 15\u00a0July 2005, but it nevertheless triggered investigating measures related to that incident (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above).90.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court observes the applicant\u2019s numerous injuries on various parts of his body (see paragraph 72 above). The time, manner and means by which those injuries had been allegedly inflicted, as described by the applicant, corresponded to the findings of the medical experts which became available during the criminal proceedings. The Court has already found that their nature, number and position on the body were sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that they could have been imputed to the State authorities (see paragraph 74 above).91.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court is satisfied that in the special circumstances of the case there is prima facie evidence in favour of the applicant\u2019s version of events and that the burden of proof should shift to the Government.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations that he had been abducted, held incommunicado and ill-treated by the police for several days before 16 August 2005 as unsubstantiated (see paragraphs 82 and 83 above). Similarly, the domestic courts rejected these allegations because they had not been supported by any evidence (see paragraphs 42 and 45 above). In so doing they analyzed the applicant\u2019s depositions made before the judicial authorities.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant raised these allegations for the first time at the hearing dated 8 November 2005 during his first examination by the trial judge (see paragraph 23 above). Admittedly, as argued by the Government and the domestic courts, he did not mention them in his depositions made before the investigating judge. According to the applicant, this was due to fear that he would be beaten and killed (see paragraph 15 above). The Court does not consider it unreasonable that a victim of an ordeal, as alleged by the applicant, may feel constrained to disclose the truth soon after his release. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely to expect from a victim of a clandestine operation organized and executed by law-enforcement forces of a State, as alleged by the applicant, to secure any tangible evidence in order to shed direct light on events which lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities. The Court accepts that the evidence produced by the applicant\u2019s parents (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above) did not fully match the applicant\u2019s version of events. However, that does not, in its view, refute the fact that the applicant\u2019s whereabouts were unknown before his arrest of 16 August 2005. In this latter context was A.A.\u2019s statement given at the trial (see paragraph 32 above).94.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the Government have failed to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation as to the origin of the applicant\u2019s injuries and the actual circumstances in which they were inflicted. The lack of any investigation contributed to their inability in this respect. Accordingly, they did not provide satisfactory explanations to account for the applicant\u2019s fate between 12 and 16 August 2005 to meet their burden of proof.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0General principles95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999-V, and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV). The Court has confirmed that even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 79, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, and Labita, cited above, \u00a7 119). The nature of the offence allegedly committed by the applicant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3 (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 87, ECHR 2010).96.\u00a0\u00a0In order for ill-treatment to fall within the scope of Article 3, it must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7\u00a067, ECHR 2006\u2011IX). Further factors include the purpose for which the treatment was inflicted together with the intention or motivation behind it (compare, Egmez v. Cyprus, no. 30873\/96, \u00a7 78, ECHR 2000-XII; and Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222\/99, \u00a7 53, 30 September 2004).97.\u00a0\u00a0Treatment has been held by the Court to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7 120). Treatment has been considered \u201cdegrading\u201d when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance (see Hurtado v. Switzerland, 28\u00a0January 1994, opinion of the Commission, \u00a7 67, Series A no. 280, and Wieser v.\u00a0Austria, no. 2293\/03, \u00a7 36, 22 February 2007).98.\u00a0\u00a0In order to determine whether any particular form of ill-treatment should be classified as torture, the Court must have regard to the distinction drawn in Article 3 between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. This distinction would appear to have been embodied in the Convention to allow the special stigma of \u201ctorture\u201d to attach only to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering (see El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 197). In addition to the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element, as recognised in the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which came into force on 26 June 1987, which defines torture in terms of the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim, inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or intimidating (Article 1 of the United Nations Convention) (see \u0130lhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277\/93, \u00a7 85, ECHR 2000\u2011VII).(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles in the present case99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found that the applicant\u2019s account is sufficiently persuasive and that his allegations under this Article are established \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. It remains to be ascertained whether the treatment to which he was subjected infringed his rights under Article 3 of the Convention.100.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s ordeal started on 12 August 2005 when considerable number of police officers abducted him near his house in Skopje. He was forcibly put in a car, hooded and driven to an unknown location until he arrived in a house in Veles. He was interrogated in relation to the incident of 15 July 2005 by uniformed people wearing masks and people in plain clothes. The applicant remained captured for three days, during which he was beaten with a plastic bottle and rubber tube all over his body. According to the medical evidence, he had twenty-seven bruises on his back, chest, stomach, arms and legs and the left buttock. During his detention, the applicant was held on several occasions under water in a swimming pool while his legs and arms were handcuffed, which made him being in a state of vulnerability. He was also threatened with a dog, which, in the Court\u2019s view, was not a spontaneous act, but it was premeditated and calculated in a deliberate and intentional manner.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is convinced that the applicant\u2019s abduction and incommunicado detention for three days in a house, an extraordinary place of detention outside any judicial framework, which was covertly organised and executed by the security forces of the respondent State, intimidated the applicant on account of his apprehension as to what would happen to him next and must have caused him emotional and psychological distress. He undeniably lived in a permanent state of anxiety owing to his uncertainty about his fate. The actual treatment during the interrogation sessions to which he was subjected must be regarded as having caused him considerable physical pain, fear, anguish and mental suffering. The Court notes that the above-mentioned measures were used in combination and were intentionally meted out to the applicant with the aim of extracting a confession about his alleged involvement in the bomb incident of 15\u00a0July\u00a02005 (see, mutatis mutandis, Dikme v. Turkey, no. 20869\/92, \u00a7\u00a7 82 and 95, ECHR 2000\u2011VIII).102.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, such treatment amounted to torture in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION103.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention in that his conviction had been based on his confession statement of 16 August 2005, which had allegedly been obtained under duress. The relevant part of Article 6 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cIn the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility104.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not raise any objection as regards the admissibility of these complaints.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions106.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant referred to the relevant case-law of the Court arguing that he had not had a fair trial, because his conviction had been based on unlawfully obtained evidence, namely his statement of 16 August 2005 obtained in violation of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention. Despite the fact that the courts had admitted other evidence, the authorities had failed to take reasonable measures to adduce evidence in order to establish the credibility of the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the police and court records regarding the applicant\u2019s detention and examination before the investigating judge had been drawn up in accordance with law. The applicant had not appealed against any of these records, although he was entitled to do so (see paragraph 14 above). They reiterated that his confession statement of 16\u00a0August 2005 had been detailed, concise and consistent. It had to be analysed together with other admitted evidence, namely search records, evidence regarding conversation on mobile phones between the co-defendants at the relevant time, as well as statements by witnesses proposed by the applicant (the latter evidence was proposed as regards the applicant\u2019s whereabouts at the time of the explosion, and not regarding his alleged abduction by police on 12 August 2005). The domestic courts had made a detailed examination of this evidence and given sufficient reasons for their judgments.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the use of evidence obtained in violation of Article 3 in criminal proceedings raises serious issues as to the fairness of such proceedings. The Court has found in respect of confessions, as such, that the admission of statements obtained as a result of torture as evidence to establish the relevant facts in criminal proceedings rendered the proceedings as a whole unfair. This finding applied irrespective of the probative value of the statements and irrespective of whether their use was decisive in securing the defendant\u2019s conviction (G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 165 and 166). Any other conclusion would only serve to legitimate indirectly the sort of morally reprehensible conduct which the authors of Article 3 of the Convention sought to proscribe (see Jalloh, cited above, \u00a7 105, and Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no.\u00a036549\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 64-66, ECHR 2007). It notes in this connection that Article 15 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (see paragraph 56 above) provides that statements which are established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be used in evidence in proceedings against a victim of torture. The Macedonian criminal law also provided that criminal convictions could not be based on evidence obtained in violation of human rights and freedoms, including the prohibition of torture (see paragraph 52 above).109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the proceedings before the domestic courts the applicant claimed that his confession statement of 16 August 2005 during his interrogation by the investigating judge had been unlawfully obtained, namely that it had been made under duress. The trial court cited this statement and regarded it as reliable. The Court of Appeal found no doubts as to its credibility and stated that \u201c(it was) an act of acceptance and remorse for the unlawful actions\u201d (see paragraph 45 above). The domestic courts used that statement as evidence in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. They expressly based their findings of fact concerning the execution of the crime committed by the applicant \u2013 and thus the findings decisive for the applicant\u2019s conviction for terrorism on the confession statement made by the applicant.110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its above finding that the applicant had been subjected to torture by the security forces of the respondent State during his unacknowledged detention between 12 and 16 August 2005. In the absence of any plausible explanation, it finds that the applicant\u2019s confession statement of 16 August 2005 was made as a consequence of that treatment and the fear that he had experienced thereafter. In such circumstances, it considers that the use of such evidence rendered the applicant\u2019s trial as a whole unfair.111.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION112.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that there had been no effective remedy in respect of his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. Article 13 reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions113.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant did not have an \u201carguable claim\u201d of violation of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention.114.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the public prosecutor\u2019s failure to decide his criminal complaint had prevented him from taking over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor. Furthermore, he maintained that there was a practice in the respondent State on the part of the prosecuting authorities not to investigate cases of alleged ill-treatment by law-enforcement officials.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment115.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the grounds on which it has found a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3, the Court declares the complaint under this head admissible, but finds that no separate issue arises under Article 13 of the Convention (see Ja\u0161ar, cited above, \u00a7 62; Sulejmanov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a055; and D\u017eeladinov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 77).IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION116.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage117.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed non-pecuniary damage in the range between 3,000 and 7,000 euros (EUR) \u201cdepending on the number of violations found\u201d. He did not claim any compensation for pecuniary damage.118.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim as unsubstantiated.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage as a result of the violation found. It awards him EUR\u00a07,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage as requested, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses120.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 1,010 for costs and expenses incurred \u201cin the Strasbourg proceedings\u201d. This figure concerned legal fees for his legal representation for the preparation of the application and the comments submitted in reply to the Government\u2019s observations; consultation with the applicant and his mother; for submission of the criminal complaint before the public prosecutor; as well as for postal expenses (copy of payment slip in support). The applicant\u2019s representative stated that he had represented the applicant pro bono, and requested that any award under this head be paid directly to him.121.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested these claims as unsubstantiated and excessive.122.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see Editions Plon v. France, no. 58148\/00, \u00a7 64, ECHR\u00a02004\u2011IV). In the present case, regard being had to the available material and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the full sum claimed by the applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. This amount is to be paid into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27650":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 3 of the Convention16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that given the poor general reception conditions of asylum seekers in Italy and the lack of proper care for his mental illness, if removed to that country he would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 provides as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that according to its well-established case-law the expulsion of an asylum seeker by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving country. In such circumstances, Article 3 implies an obligation not to expel the individual to that country (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7\u00a0July\u00a01989, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a090-91, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0161; Vilvarajah and Others v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, \u00a7 103, Series A no. 125; H.L.R.\u00a0v.\u00a0France, 29 April 1997, \u00a7\u00a034, Reports 1997-III; Jabari v. Turkey, no.\u00a040035\/98, \u00a7 38, ECHR 2000\u2011VIII; and Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948\/04, \u00a7 135, ECHR 2007\u2011I; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 152, ECHR 2008; M.S.S., cited above, \u00a7 365).18.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to persons suffering from serious mental illness, the Court recalls that in Bensaid v. the United Kingdom (no. 44599\/98, ECHR\u00a02001-I), which concerned the removal from the United Kingdom of an Algerian national who was a schizophrenic, the Court unanimously rejected the complaint under Article 3 (\u00a7\u00a7 36-40), considering that the case did not disclose the exceptional circumstances where the applicant was in the final stages of a terminal illness and had no prospect of medical care or family support (compare and contrast with D. v. the United Kingdom, \u00a7 53, 2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III).19.\u00a0\u00a0In a subsequent case, concerning the removal of a Moroccan national from Finland to Morocco (S.B. v. Finland (dec.), no. 17200\/11, \u00a7 36, 24\u00a0June 2014) the Court found that mental health care was available in Morocco, that treatment for depression as well as for anxiety disorders was in general available in outpatient and inpatient clinics and that the applicant also had access to the anti-depressant medication which had been prescribed for her. It therefore considered that the applicant would have access to treatment for her severe depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and generalised anxiety disorder in Morocco and was therefore not at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if removed to Morocco.20.\u00a0\u00a0In a more recent judgment (A.S. v. Switzerland, no. 39350\/13, 30\u00a0June 2015) the Court examined the case of another Syrian national to be removed from Switzerland to Italy under the Dublin Regulation and also suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and back pain.In A.S. v. Switzerland, the Court considered that the applicant was not critically ill and there was no indication that, if returned to Italy, he would not receive appropriate psychological treatment and would not have access to anti-depressants of the kind that he was receiving in Switzerland (\u00a7 36).Accordingly, the Court found that the implementation of the decision to remove the applicant to Italy would not give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (\u00a7 38).21.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, the present case cannot be distinguished from A.S. v. Switzerland.Moreover, the Court reiterates that the overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot in itself act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 114-115).The applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be declared inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Article 8 of the Convention22.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 8 of the Convention the applicant alleged that, by severing his relationship with his sister and with his sister\u2019s husband, who both lived in Switzerland, his removal to Italy would violate his right to respect for his family life. He also contented that as he was in a particularly vulnerable situation and dependent on his sister due to his mental illness, his removal to Italy would also violate his right to respect for his private life. Article 8 reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d23.\u00a0\u00a0In A.S. v. Switzerland, which is similar to the present case, as the applicant had two sisters living in Switzerland, the Court noted that the applicant\u2019s presence on Swiss territory had been accepted by the domestic authorities for a very short period of time (four months) and only for the purpose of examining his status as an asylum seeker and complying with their relevant obligations under the Dublin Regulation and national law (\u00a7\u00a049). The Court recalled that it had already held that there would be no family life, within the meaning of Article 8, between parents and adult children or between adult siblings unless they could demonstrate additional elements of dependence (ibid.). It considered that assuming that the applicant and his sisters had maintained family ties when they were living in Syria and assuming that additional elements of dependence could be demonstrated in the applicant\u2019s case, it could not be argued that the tolerance by the domestic authorities of the applicant\u2019s presence on Swiss territory for a lengthy period of time had enabled him to establish and develop strong family ties in Switzerland.Bearing in mind the margin of appreciation afforded to States in immigration matters, the Court found that a fair balance had been struck between the competing interests at stake, namely the personal interests of the applicant, in establishing any family life in Switzerland on the one hand and, on the other, the public order interests of the respondent Government in controlling immigration (ibid., \u00a7 51).As to the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the fact that his removal to Italy would have prevented him from continuing to benefit from the support of his sisters in the context of his therapy, the Court recalled that it had already been dealt with under Article 3 and it did not consider it necessary to examine it again under Article 8 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7 52).24.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, again, the present case cannot be distinguished from A.S. v. Switzerland. On the one hand, the applicant lodged his application for asylum the very same day he entered Swiss territory on 29\u00a0December 2012 (see paragraph 3 above) and the FMO rejected it on 22\u00a0February 2013 (see paragraph 5 above). His presence on Swiss territory was therefore tolerated by the domestic authorities for less than two months and only for the purpose of examining his status as an asylum seeker and complying with their relevant obligations under the Dublin Regulation and national law (see paragraph 24 above). Assuming that the applicant and his sister had maintained family ties when they were living in Syria and assuming that any elements of dependence could be demonstrated in the applicant\u2019s case, it cannot be argued that he had established and developed strong family ties in Switzerland with his sister, who had herself arrived in Switzerland only a few days before the applicant and was at that time tolerated on Swiss territory only for the duration of her own asylum application (see paragraph 4 above).25.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 8 are manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.C.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 13 combined with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention26.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained in very general terms that he had been denied an effective remedy in respect of his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention because the Federal Administrative Court \u201cfailed to take account of his right to respect for his private and family life and his right to be free from torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment\u201d. Article\u00a013 of the Convention provides:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that an applicant\u2019s complaint alleging that his or her removal to a third State would expose him or her to treatment prohibited under Article 3 of the Convention \u201cmust imperatively be subject to close scrutiny by a \u2018national authority\u2019\u201d (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 198, ECHR 2012 and Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 126). That principle has led the Court to rule that the notion of \u201ceffective remedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article\u00a03 requires, firstly, \u201cindependent and rigorous scrutiny\u201d of any complaint made by a person in such a situation, where \u201cthere exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3\u201d and, secondly, \u201cthe possibility of suspending the implementation of the measure impugned\u201d (ibid.).28.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court notes that following the decision of the FMO of 22 February 2013 to reject his asylum application and return him to Italy, the applicant was able to lodge an application with the Federal Administrative Court. He submitted before that court that his removal to Italy would be in breach of his rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention in view of the reception conditions in Italy and the severance of his ties with his sister and his brother in law (see paragraph 4 above). The appeal was lodged with the Federal Administrative Court on 30 April 2013 and that court delivered its judgement promptly on 28 May 2013. The judgment was fully reasoned, addressed in detail the complaints raised by the applicant, in particular in the light of this Court\u2019s case-law, and did not contain the slightest trace of arbitrariness (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 130).29.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, as the Court has already noted in the Tarakhel judgment (\u00a7 131), the Federal Administrative Court normally undertakes a thorough examination of each individual situation and does not hesitate to invoke the \u201csovereignty clause\u201d contained in Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation.30.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that, assuming that the applicant had arguable claims, he had available to him an effective remedy. Accordingly, his complaint under Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.31.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 26 November 2015.Marialena TsirliLuis L\u00f3pez GuerraDeputy RegistrarPresident","27652":"25.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they, if transferred to Italy, would be exposed to a risk of being subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention due to the difficult living conditions of asylum-seekers in Italy. Article 3 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the relevant principles under Article 3 of the Convention as set out recently in its judgment in the case of Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 93-99 and 101-104, including that to fall within the scope of Article 3 the ill\u2011treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants\u2019 situation, namely a single mother with two daughters of, respectively, 16 and 18 years old, is one of the relevant factors in making this assessment.27.\u00a0\u00a0The material date for making this assessment is the actual date of expulsion. However, if an applicant has not yet been removed when the Court examines the case, the relevant time for assessing the existence of the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 will be that of the proceedings before the Court (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2008, and A.L. v. Austria, no. 7788\/11, \u00a7 58, 10 May 2012).28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants are to be considered as asylum-seekers in Italy as, if transferred to Italy, they will have to file an asylum request there.\u00a0\u00a0It thus has to be determined whether the situation in which the applicants are likely to find themselves in that capacity can be regarded as incompatible with Article 3, taking into account their situation as an asylum-seeking single mother with one adult and one minor daughter and, as such, belonging to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 97; and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7 251).29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the current situation in Italy for asylum\u2011seekers can in no way be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment, cited above, and that the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 114-115).30.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicants\u2019 personal situation, the Court has noted that the Italian Government have been duly informed by the Netherlands authorities about the applicants\u2019 family situation and their scheduled arrival. Further, \u2013taking into account that the first applicant refused to give her consent to the transfer of medical data about her to the Italian authorities \u2013 they have been informed that the first applicant will be escorted in order to avert the risk of suicide. The Court understands from the circular letter dated 8 June 2015 (see paragraph 17 above) that the applicants, being a family with a minor child, will be placed in one of the 161 reception facilities in Italy which have been earmarked for families with minor children.31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has noted the applicants\u2019 concern that the 161 places earmarked so far will be insufficient but, in the absence of any concrete indication in the case file, does not find it demonstrated that the applicants will be unable to benefit from such a place when they arrive in Italy.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that the applicants have not demonstrated that their future prospects, if returned to Italy as a family, whether taken from a material, physical or psychological perspective, disclose a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3. The Court has found no basis on which it can be assumed that the applicants will not be able to benefit from the available resources in Italy for an asylum-seeking single mother with one or more minor children or that, in case of health-related or other difficulties, the Italian authorities would not respond in an appropriate manner. The first applicant having refused to give consent to communicate her medical data to the Italian authorities, it cannot be said that the latter have not been duly notified of her mental health condition, or that she runs a real risk of not receiving the required medical care in Italy. Moreover, the Netherlands authorities, acting pre-emptively, will provide escort during her transfer to Italy in view of any risk of suicide. In any event, it will remain possible for the applicants to file a fresh application with the Court (including the possibility of requesting an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court) should that need arise.33.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4.For these reasons, the Court unanimouslyDeclares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 26 November 2015.Marialena TsirliLuis L\u00f3pez Guerra\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident\u00a0","27667":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in IZ\u201130\/1 in Astrakhan were incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s submissions regarding the conditions of his detention on remand in IZ-30\/1 are presented in paragraphs 62-64 above.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in IZ-30\/1 were incompatible with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the overcrowding.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it examined the conditions of detention in IZ\u201130\/1 between 2005 and 2008 and established that there was severe overcrowding in the facility (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a042525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 20-21, 134\u201138, 10 January 2012).85.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the information submitted by the applicant and the Government\u2019s acknowledgement that the conditions of his detention on remand during the periods in question had been inadequate, and given its own findings in the case of Ananyev and Others, cited above, the Court finds that the applicant was detained in cramped and inadequate conditions in IZ-30\/1. The Court therefore considers that the applicant was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 OF THE CONVENTION (FAIR TRIAL)86.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) and (d) of the Convention that the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings against him was undermined because he had not been provided with a lawyer after his arrest, had been ordered to pay legal aid fees for representation in supervisory review proceedings, and because he had not been able to question a witness against him.A.\u00a0\u00a0Legal assistance87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the trial in his case had not been fair because he had not been provided with a lawyer immediately after his arrest and because the court had ordered him to reimburse the State for legal aid fees incurred during the examination of his case in the third set of supervisory review proceedings. He relied on Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention which, in the relevant part, read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ......3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:... (c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require ...\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0Lack of legal assistance after arrest(a)\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicant had not raised his complaint of a lack of legal assistance upon arrest with the domestic courts.89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that he had raised complaints in this regard with both the domestic courts and the Prosecutor\u2019s Office.90.\u00a0\u00a0Having examined the applicant\u2019s case file, the Court finds that the court records and grounds of appeal contain sufficiently clear and specific allegations that the applicant had not been provided with a lawyer immediately after his arrest. Moreover, it is clear from these documents and the respective judgments that these complaints were understood by the domestic courts as such, but were dismissed. Consequently, the Court concludes that the applicant\u2019s complaint was brought to the attention of the domestic courts competent to deal with it. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection as to non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies.91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Merits(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that on 5 June 2004 the applicant had been informed, immediately after his arrest, of his right to a lawyer from the moment of his arrest but that the applicant had not requested legal assistance. In any event, Article 51 of the CCrP did not require a lawyer to be present at the time of arrest. The applicant had also been informed of his right to remain silent and his wife had been notified of his arrest. The Government further claimed that, under Article 202 of the CCrP, the presence of a lawyer had not been mandatory when the applicant\u2019s fingerprints and palm prints had been taken in order to promptly preserve the traces of the crime, and that the applicant in any event had not requested a lawyer at the time of his arrest and had subsequently used the results of the forensic examination as exculpatory evidence during his trial. Lastly, they contended that the applicant had been scheduled to be questioned on 6\u00a0June 2004 as a suspect but had invoked his right not to incriminate himself and refused to answer questions \u2013 even in the presence of lawyer Or.93.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that on 5 June 2004 he had requested a lawyer immediately after his arrest but that the investigator had told him he did not need a lawyer, as no investigative measures were being carried out at that time. He further contended that his relatives had only learned of his arrest some four days after his arrest, while they were trying to locate his whereabouts. He stated that a lawyer who could have informed him of his rights should have been present when the investigator had ordered the expert examination of his fingerprints and palm prints. He also stated that he had not been questioned on either 5 or 6 June 2006. He further submitted that the original arrest record of 5 June 2004 had been lost from his criminal case file, and that a copy of it, as well as the interrogation report of 6\u00a0June 2004 submitted by the Government with their observations, had been forged. He maintained that on 6 June 2004 he had met his lawyer, Or., for the first time during the hearing on his pre-trial detention.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0General principles94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the requirements of Article 6 \u00a7 3 are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 \u00a7 1. The applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 should therefore be examined together (see Van Geyseghem v. Belgium [GC], no.\u00a026103\/95, \u00a7 27, ECHR 1999\u2011I).95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, although not absolute, the right under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial (see Krombach v. France, no.\u00a029731\/96, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2001\u2011II). The question, in each case, is whether the restriction on the right to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer, in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, has deprived the accused of a fair hearing (see John Murray v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996, \u00a7 63, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I).96.\u00a0\u00a0The requirements of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) of the Convention may also be relevant before a case is sent for trial if and in so far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with those requirements (see Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24\u00a0November\u00a01993, \u00a7\u00a036, Series A no. 275).97.\u00a0\u00a0In this respect, the Court emphasises the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which the offence charged will be considered at the trial. At the same time, an accused often finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal procedure tends to become increasingly complex, notably with respect to the rules governing the gathering and use of evidence. In most cases, this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer, whose task is, among other things, to help to ensure respect of the right of an accused not to incriminate himself. This right indeed presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression, in defiance of the will of the accused (see Pishchalnikov v. Russia, no. 7025\/04, \u00a7 69, 24\u00a0September\u00a02009, with references cited therein).98.\u00a0\u00a0Against this background, the Court finds that in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently \u201cpractical and effective\u201d Article 6 \u00a7 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify the denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction \u2013 whatever its justification - must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used to secure a conviction (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7 55, 27 November 2008).(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant was informed of his right to legal counsel immediately after his arrest, in accordance with Article 49 \u00a7 3 (3) of the CCrP (see paragraphs 11 and 70 above). According to the record of the applicant\u2019s arrest, he did not request counsel and made no other comments at the time of his arrest (see paragraphs 13 and 59 above). In this regard the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s general allegations concerning the falsification of the record of his arrest were duly examined and dismissed as unsubstantiated by the Astrakhan Regional Court and the Court accepts these findings (see paragraph 59 above).100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that when the police proceeded to have the applicant\u2019s fingerprints and palm prints taken they confined themselves to promptly recording the gathered material for the purposes of investigating a criminal offence (see paragraphs 11, 14, 15 and 75 above). According to the applicant\u2019s own submissions, the police did not question him after his arrest (see paragraphs 12 and 93 above).101.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, the Court observes that the record of arrest did contain a statement made by the applicant at the time of his arrest (see paragraph 11 above). However, it does not appear from the materials before the Court that the applicant provided this statement in response to questions by the police.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that when the applicant was scheduled to be questioned on 6 June 2006, his lawyer, Or., was present but the applicant refused to testify and made no other comments (see paragraph 16 above).103.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, when the District Court was examining the applicant\u2019s case it took the record of the arrest into account as evidence that the applicant had been caught after \u201cwitnesses and eyewitnesses indicated that the applicant had committed a criminal offence\u201d (see paragraph 11 above). The District Court did not regard the applicant\u2019s statement contained in the record of his arrest as a separate statement concerning the charges (see, for similar reasoning, Blaj v. Romania, no. 36259\/04, \u00a7 96, 8\u00a0April 2014). Furthermore, the applicant did not allege, before either the domestic courts or this Court, that he had given any statements \u2013 either immediately after his arrest or later \u2013 without the benefit of legal advice or under duress. Neither he nor his appointed counsel sought to have the statement contained in the record of his arrest excluded from the evidence and he did not explain in either his observations or his original application to the Court whether and how any such statements had been taken into account by the District Court in finding him guilty or had impaired the overall fairness of the proceedings against him.104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant only complained about his fingerprints and palm prints having been taken in his lawyer\u2019s absence. However, in any case, the District Court did not admit as evidence the forensic examination report on the applicant\u2019s fingerprints, and the forensic reports on the applicant\u2019s palm prints served as exculpatory evidence at the trial (see paragraphs 45-47 above).105.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, given the circumstances of the present case, the Court concludes that the applicant\u2019s right to counsel upon arrest was not restricted and the absence of a lawyer at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest did not prejudice the overall fairness of the proceedings against the applicant.106.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 \u00a7 1.2.\u00a0\u00a0Recovery of legal fees for representation in the third set of supervisory review proceedings(a)\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility107.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pleaded that the applicant had not appealed against the court order for the recovery of legal aid fees.108.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his claim.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will first consider the Government\u2019s plea of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies and notes that under Russian law at the time, the applicant could have raised a supervisory review complaint with the Supreme Court of Russia against the order to pay costs issued by the Presidium of the Regional Court (see paragraph 78 above). However, the Court reiterates that the supervisory review appeal available at the relevant time in Russia was not regarded as an effective remedy to be exhausted in criminal proceedings (see Berdzenishvili v.\u00a0Russia, (dec.), 29\u00a0January 2004, no. 31697\/03). Accordingly, the applicant was not required to raise his complaint in such proceedings before bringing it to the Court. The Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objection as to non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies.110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Merits(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions111.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not applied to be exempted from reimbursing legal aid fees.112.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that he had had insufficient financial means when the authorities had appointed a legal aid lawyer to represent him in the supervisory review proceedings, and that they should not have sought from him the reimbursement of his legal aid fees.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the CCrP regards counsel\u2019s fees as \u201clitigation costs\u201d to be borne, in general, by the party concerned. It thus appears that even if a convicted defendant has been provided with \u201cfree\u201d legal assistance, he may still be required to pay for it after his trial (see paragraph\u00a076 above).114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant was represented by lawyers Or., M. and I. before and during the first-instance trial and during the appeal proceedings (see paragraphs 16, 18 and 21 above) and by lawyer K. in the third round of supervisory review proceedings (see paragraph 56 above).115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes from the material before it that the State covered the costs of the applicant\u2019s legal assistance throughout the proceedings. It only sought to recover legal fees paid to K. in respect of the third set of supervisory review proceedings; the amount claimed (EUR 30) does not appear excessive.116.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the applicant could have applied for a total or partial waiver of legal fees on account of indigence (see paragraph 76 above and Orlov v. Russia, no. 29652\/04, \u00a7 113, 21\u00a0June\u00a02011). In this connection, the Court considers it acceptable, under the Convention, that the burden of proving insufficient means should be borne by the person who pleads such insufficiency (see Orlov, cited above, \u00a7 114, citing Croissant v. Germany, 25 September 1992, \u00a7\u00a7 33 and 34, Series A no.\u00a0237\u2011B). However, the applicant did not submit any financial or other documents to support his claim for exemption on the grounds of indigence and did not cite any impediment to his obtaining such documents.117.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, considering that the applicant had a benefit of free legal assistance throughout the proceedings and that he did not apply to have waived legal fees paid to K. and given the amount of legal fees, the reimbursement order does not appear to have adversely affected the overall fairness of the proceedings against the applicant.118.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) on account of the recovery of legal fees from the applicant.B.\u00a0\u00a0Absence of witness119.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained that the trial in his case had not been fair because the court had not obtained the attendance of witness B. for the prosecution. He relied on Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cIn the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ......3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...(d)\u00a0\u00a0to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him ...\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility120.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions121.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the proceedings against the applicant had been fair. In particular, they submitted that witness B. had not participated in the hearing of the applicant\u2019s case because he was suffering from a serious oncological condition (cancer) that had left him unable to speak. They further alleged that they had taken all necessary steps to ensure B.\u2019s participation in the proceedings against the applicant. Furthermore, the courts had assessed B.\u2019s pre-trial testimony along with other evidence, including statements of fourteen prosecution and defence witnesses questioned in court, pre-trial statements of five more witnesses and twenty pieces of documentary and physical evidence.122.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that B.\u2019s condition did not prevent him from appearing in court and if he could not speak, he could have responded to questions in writing. Furthermore, the applicant contended that B.\u2019s pre-trial testimony had been the sole basis for his conviction, and the District Court had not taken into account the testimony of other witnesses when it had found him guilty. Lastly, he alleged that the authorities should have conducted a pre-trial confrontation between him and B.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment123.\u00a0\u00a0In the case of Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom ([GC] nos.\u00a026766\/05 and 22228\/06, \u00a7 118, ECHR 2011), the Court held that Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) enshrines the principle that, before an accused can be convicted, all evidence against him must normally be produced in his presence at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument. Exceptions to this principle are possible but must not infringe the rights of the defence which, as a rule, require that the accused should be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either when that witness makes his statement or at a later stage of the proceedings.124.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, as regards witnesses, the Court reiterates that there are two requirements which follow from this principle. Firstly, there must be a good reason for the non-attendance of a witness. Secondly, when a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on statements that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or have examined, whether during the investigation or at trial, the rights of the defence may be restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 (the so-called \u201csole or decisive rule\u201d) (see Al-Khawaja, cited above, \u00a7 119). Where the conviction is based solely or decisively on the evidence of absent witnesses, the Court will inquire in each case whether there are sufficient counterbalancing factors in place, including measures that permit a fair and proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence to take place (ibid., \u00a7 147).125.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the prosecution summoned B. as a witness to the hearing of the applicant\u2019s case twice. He did not appear because he was gravely ill and unable to speak (see paragraphs 31 and 50 above). The Court accepts the illness as the reason for the absence in accordance with the domestic law. In the light of the above and on the basis of the material before it, the Court therefore considers that B.\u2019s confirmed poor physical condition significantly impaired him and was a good reason for his non-attendance of the trial.126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will also examine whether B.\u2019s pre-trial statements were sole or decisive evidence of the applicant\u2019s guilt. The applicant alleged that in finding him guilty, the District Court had only relied on B.\u2019s pre-trial testimony, without taking into account the testimony of other witnesses. However, witness O. who bought drugs from the applicant together with B. in December 2003, testified about the deal and the applicant questioned him in court. Furthermore, according to the trial transcript, the accuracy of which the applicant did not dispute, the applicant had no objections to the admission of O.\u2019s pre-trial statement as evidence (see paragraph 25 above). In this regard, the Court notes that O. and B.\u2019s pre-trial testimony was identical. In particular, they both testified during the pre-trial investigation that they had met the applicant in Astrakhan in November 2003, that he had sold them heroin in December 2003, and that they had transported it to Voronezh (see paragraphs 26 and 32 above). Furthermore, the District Court also heard six police officers who had organised and participated in the undercover operation themselves, and testified about the applicant\u2019s involvement in the sale of drugs (see paragraphs 27, 28 and 38 - 40 above). The applicant was able to question all of them in court and did not repudiate their testimony in his observations to the Court. The District Court also admitted pre-trial statements of two absent police officers and three absent attesting witnesses, as well as a significant amount of documentary and physical evidence (see paragraphs 34 - 36 and 46 above).127.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s conviction cannot be said to have been based solely or to a decisive degree on B.\u2019s pre-trial statement. The Court does not therefore find it necessary to assess whether a pre-trial confrontation or other counterbalancing factors should have been in place to compensate for B.\u2019s absence from the applicant\u2019s trial.128.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that there was no violation of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention on account of the absence of witness B. from the applicant\u2019s trial.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8 AND 34 OF THE CONVENTION129.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained that his correspondence with the Court had been opened and read by the detention facility\u2019s administration, which had also refused to send some of his letters to the Court. He relied on Articles 8 and 34 of the Convention, which read:Article 8\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201dArticle 34\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined complaints concerning the monitoring of correspondence between applicants and the Court under Article 8 of the Convention, under Article 34, or under both provisions (see, with further references, Shekhov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 12440\/04, \u00a7 53, 19 June 2014).131.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court is master of the characterisation to be given to the facts of the case, and having regard to the nature of the interference and the contents of the applicant\u2019s submissions, it considers that the matters relating to the correspondence between the applicant and the Court should be examined under Articles 8 of the Convention.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties133.\u00a0\u00a0The Government denied hindering the effective exercise of the applicant\u2019s right of petition. They claimed that some of the Court\u2019s letters had been opened by prison employees, but maintained that they had not been censored. They had been opened for registration purposes only and had been handed over to the applicant in their entirety. One letter had been sent to him after a four-day delay, but this was due to an omission by one of the prison employees who had been duly reprimanded.134.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his claims.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment135.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant claimed that at least seven of the Court\u2019s letters had been opened by the prison administration. The Government stated that the letters had been opened for registration purposes only, without being read. The Court considers that the opening of the letters addressed to the applicant constituted an interference with his rights under Article 8.136.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that interference with Article 8 rights must be applied \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d; it must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims listed in paragraph 2; and, in addition, must be justified as being \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d.137.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that at the relevant time, Article 91 of the Code of Execution of Sentences expressly prohibited the monitoring of correspondence between a detainee and the Court (see paragraph 79 above). The applicant\u2019s correspondence with the Court was privileged and not subject to monitoring. Thus, the Court\u2019s letters were opened in breach of domestic law, which provided for no exception to the regulation in question.138.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above finding, it is not necessary to ascertain whether the other requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 were complied with.139.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the opening of the applicant\u2019s correspondence with the Court.IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION140.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court has examined the other complaints submitted by the applicant under Article 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 7, Article 8 and Article 14 of the Convention. Having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court\u2019s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill\u2011founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION141.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage142.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed compensation in respect of pecuniary damage, leaving the amount to be awarded to the Court\u2019s discretion. The Government submitted that the applicant did not claim any at all. The Court observes that the applicant failed to substantiate his claim of pecuniary damage incurred and, for that reason, rejects it.143.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage for a violation of Article 3 of the Convention and EUR\u00a0100,000 for the interference with his correspondence.144.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the acknowledgment of a violation, if found by the Court, would constitute sufficient just satisfaction in the present case. They contested the claim for compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage by the applicant as unsubstantiated, excessive and out of line with the awards made by the Court in similar cases.145.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant\u2019s suffering caused by the conditions of detention on remand and his frustration with the monitoring of his correspondence with the Court cannot be compensated for by the mere finding of a violation; however, the sums claimed by him appear to be excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis and having regard to the nature of the violations found, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a09,800 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses146.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed, in general terms, compensation in respect of legal costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court, leaving the amount to be awarded to the Court\u2019s discretion.147.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant did not claim any compensation in respect of costs and expenses, and therefore no award should be made.148.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to the fact that the applicant has been granted legal aid, the Court rejects the applicant\u2019s additional claim for costs and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest149.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27693":"31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that her transfer to Italy would violate her rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. Article 2 of the Convention provides:\u201c 1. Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.\u201d32.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 provides:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that it is more appropriate to deal with the complaint under Article 2 in the context of its examination of the related complaint under Article 3, and will proceed on this basis (see J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 48839\/09, \u00a7 37, 20 December 2011).34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the relevant principles under Article 3 of the Convention, as set out recently in its judgment in the case of Tarakhel (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 93-99 and 101-104), including that, to fall within the scope of Article 3, ill\u2011treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. In determining whether it has been shown that the applicant runs a real risk of suffering treatment proscribed by Article 3 if transferred to Italy, the Court will examine the issue in the light of all the material placed before it or, if necessary, material obtained proprio motu (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a037201\/06, \u00a7 128, ECHR 2008).35.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant was diagnosed as HIV-positive after her arrival in the Netherlands. As the material date for making the assessment under Article 3 is the actual date of expulsion (see Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 133, and A.L. v. Austria, no. 7788\/11, \u00a7 58, 10 May 2012), the applicant\u2019s health condition is a relevant factor to be taken into account by the Court, together with the fact that she is the mother of a five-year-old child.36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant is to be regarded as an asylum-seeker in Italy as, even though she was admitted to Italy in the past as an alien requiring subsidiary protection, the validity of her Italian residence permit has expired in the meantime. Consequently, she will have to file an asylum request in Italy. It therefore has to be determined whether the situation in which the applicant is likely to find herself in that capacity can be regarded as incompatible with Article 3, taking into account her medical condition and her situation as a single mother with a minor daughter, as such belonging to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 97, and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 251, ECHR 2011).37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the current situation in Italy for asylum-seekers can in no way be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment (cited above), and that the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot, in themselves, act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 114-115).38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Italian Government have been duly informed by the Netherlands authorities that the applicant is an HIV\u2011positive single mother with a minor child, and about their scheduled transfer to Italy. The Court understands from the circular letter dated 8\u00a0June 2015 (see paragraph 21 above) and from the letter of 4 May 2015 from the Head of Office of the Italian Ministry of the Interior, Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration (see paragraph 22 above) that the applicant and her child will be assigned one of the 161 places in reception facilities in Italy which have been reserved for families with minor children.39. The Court has noted the applicant\u2019s concern that the 161 places earmarked so far will be insufficient, but, in the absence of any specific indication in the case file, it does not find it established that none of these places will be available to the applicant when she arrives in Italy with her child.40.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s health condition, the Court notes that the applicant does not contend that the necessary treatment for her condition is unavailable in Italy. Her fear is rather that she will not be provided with the necessary care and medication in a timely manner after her transfer to Italy. However, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s submissions do not include any detailed information about her current state of health or the treatment she currently receives, or about whether her transfer to Italy will have consequences for her health, and, if so, the nature and scope of those consequences (compare with N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565\/05, ECHR 2008, 27 May 2008; Arcila Henao v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a013669\/03, 24 June 2003; and Ndangoya v. Sweden (dec.), no. 17868\/03, 22\u00a0June 2004). As the Italian authorities have duly been informed by the Netherlands authorities about the applicant\u2019s individual circumstances (see paragraph 37 above), and noting that the applicant has a statutory right in Italy to be registered in the Italian national health system, the Court does not find it established that she will have no access to the treatment which she requires.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further finds that the applicant has not demonstrated that her future prospects, if returned to Italy with her child, whether considered from a material, physical or psychological perspective, disclose a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3. The Court has found no basis on which it can be assumed that the applicant will not be able to have access to the available resources in Italy for an asylum-seeking single mother with a minor child, or that, in the event of health-related or other difficulties, the Italian authorities would not respond in an appropriate manner. In any event, it will remain possible for the applicant to lodge a fresh application with the Court (including a request for an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court) should that need arise.42.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 10 December 2015.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Stephen PhillipsLuis L\u00f3pez GuerraRegistrarPresident","27728":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained about the conditions of her detention. She considered that the situation was in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The Government48.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not brought her complaint before the domestic authorities. They considered that the applicant had a twofold remedy, namely constitutional redress proceedings to challenge the conditions of her detention while she was in detention and an action for damage in tort after she left detention. They further noted that an action under the European Convention Act was not subject to any time-limits.49.\u00a0\u00a0As to the constitutional jurisdictions, the Government submitted that they had wide ranging powers to deal with Convention violations. Such proceedings could also be heard with urgency, reducing the time span of such proceedings to two months from filing. The Government noted that the Court had previously criticised the duration of such proceedings. Nevertheless, a fresh assessment according to prevailing circumstances had to be done in each case. In the Government\u2019s view any delays in constitutional proceedings were counterbalanced by the fact that those jurisdictions could issue interim orders pending proceedings. They cited for example a decree in the case of Emanuel Camilleri vs Inspector Louise Callejja and the Commissioner of Police (no. 50\/2013) where the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction released a sentenced person from prison pending the proceedings given the particular circumstances of that case, namely where the main witness, who had testified in the applicant\u2019s trial which had ultimately returned a guilty verdict, was now being tried for perjury in connection with her testimony. Thus, in the Government\u2019s view, in the absence of speedy proceedings there nevertheless existed a speedy interim remedy which could be decreed by the constitutional jurisdictions under Article 46 (2) of the Constitution and Article 4 (2) of the European Convention Act. Despite the exceptional circumstances of the case, the example went to show that releasing persons from prison by means of an interim measure was indeed a possibility which could be used by the constitutional jurisdictions, and the applicant had not proved the contrary.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the applicant could also avail herself of the services of a legal-aid lawyer (governed by Article 911 et seq. of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure).51.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further relied on the Court\u2019s general principles cited in Abdi Ahmed and Others v. Malta\u00a0((dec.), no.\u00a043985\/13, 16\u00a0September 2014) and to its findings in that case, where the Court had established that the situation having ended, the duration of proceedings no longer rendered the remedy ineffective. The Court had also noted that the applicant had the same chances of lodging domestic proceedings as she had to lodge international proceedings, namely by means of NGO lawyers.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the applicant could also have instituted an action for damages in tort where she, as a released detainee, could have obtained damage for loss sustained on the account of her conditions of detention, if she could have proved on the basis of probabilities that she had suffered damage and that such damage was attributable to the Government\u2019s acts or omissions.53.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government it was evident that these remedies were effective. They formed part of the normal process of redress, were accessible, and offered reasonable prospects of success where this was justified.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that there existed no effective domestic remedy which should have been used; in fact most of the Government\u2019s arguments had already been rejected by the Court in its judgment in the case of Aden Ahmed v. Malta (no. 55352\/12, 23 July 2013) concerning an immigrant detained at around the same time as the applicant in the present case. The Court\u2019s conclusions in that case were in line with the findings of the European Commission Directorate-General for Justice in a report entitled The EU Justice Scoreboard \u2013 A tool to promote effective justice and growth (2013), which showed that the Maltese judicial system was one of the systems with the longest delays among the member States. By means of example, the case of The Police vs\u00a0Pauline Vella\u00a0(42\/2007), lodged in 2007, which looked at the conditions of detention at Mount Carmel Hospital, was decided on appeal on 30\u00a0September 2011.55.\u00a0\u00a0As to the use of interim measures by the constitutional jurisdictions, the applicant submitted that in the very specific circumstances of the example given by the Government, the first-instance constitutional jurisdiction itself repeatedly stressed, in its decree, the exceptional nature of interim orders. It finally considered that that specific case was serious enough to warrant such a measure. The applicant considered that the circumstances of that case, which pointed towards a wrongful conviction, could not be compared to that of the applicant, and nothing indicated that persons in the applicant\u2019s position would obtain provisional release pending a complaint on conditions of detention.56.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, one could not rely on the findings of this Court in Abdi Ahmed and Others (dec.), cited above, which concerned significantly different circumstances, and where, the moment the application was filed, preventive action was no longer necessary. However, in the present case, when the applicant applied to the Court she was still in detention, and thus preventive action was still necessary, but was not available due to the excessive duration of constitutional redress proceedings.57.\u00a0\u00a0 Lastly, the applicant also referred to the Court\u2019s considerations regarding a lack of a proper structured system enabling immigration detainees to have concrete access to effective legal aid.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment58.\u00a0The Court refers to its case-law concerning exhaustion of domestic remedies, in particular in connection with complaints regarding conditions of detention, as reiterated in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 54-58, with references therein).59.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the Court notes firstly, that the circumstances of the present case are different to those in the case of Abdi Ahmed and Others v. Malta ((dec.), no. 43985\/13, 16 September 2014), relied on by the Government. That case concerned a determination as to whether, following the Court\u2019s decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to indicate to the Government that they should desist from deporting the applicants - a decision which had been respected by the Maltese Government - the applicants in that case had access to an effective remedy (for the purposes of, inter alia, their Article\u00a03 complaint, which did not concern conditions of detention) which they were required to use before continuing their application before this Court.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case, when the applicant lodged her application with the Court (on 4 February 2013) complaining, inter alia, about her conditions of detention, the applicant was still in detention, and thus, apart from requiring a remedy providing compensation, she required a preventive remedy capable of putting an end to the allegedly ongoing violation of her right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court will thus proceed to assess the matter.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already considered in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a073) that it had not been satisfactorily established that an action in tort may give rise to compensation for any non-pecuniary damage suffered and that it clearly was not a preventive remedy in so far as it cannot impede the continuation of the violation alleged or provide the applicant with an improvement in the detention conditions (see Torreggiani and Others v.\u00a0Italy, nos. 43517\/09, 46882\/09, 55400\/09, 57875\/09, 61535\/09, 35315\/10 and 37818\/10, 8 January 2013, particularly \u00a7 50, and the case-law cited therein). It thus concluded that it cannot be considered an effective remedy for the purposes of a complaint about conditions of detention under Article\u00a03 (see also, Mikalauskas v. Malta, no. 4458\/10, \u00a7 49, 23 July 2013). Nothing has been brought to the attention of the Court which could cast doubt on that conclusion.62.\u00a0\u00a0As to constitutional redress proceedings, again, in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 61-63), the Court held that such an action provides a forum guaranteeing due process of law and effective participation for the aggrieved individual. In such proceedings, courts can take cognisance of the merits of the complaint, make findings of fact and order redress that is tailored to the nature and gravity of the violation. These courts can also make an award of compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage and there is no limit on the amount which can be awarded to an applicant for such a violation. The ensuing judicial decision will be binding on the defaulting authority and enforceable against it. The Court was therefore satisfied that the existing legal framework rendered this remedy capable, at least in theory, of affording appropriate redress. However, given the delay in those proceedings, the Court held that while it could not rule out that constitutional redress proceedings dealt with urgently (as should be the case concerning complaints of conditions of detention) may in future be considered an effective remedy for the purposes of such complaints under Article 3, the then state of domestic case-law could not allow the Court to find that the applicant was required to have recourse to such a remedy. In the present case the Government have not submitted any further examples enabling the Court to revisit its conclusion concerning the delay in such proceedings. On the contrary, they appear to acknowledge the existence of such delays, arguing however that such delays are counterbalanced by the possibility of interim measures being issued by constitutional jurisdictions pending proceedings.63. In this connection, the Court notes that the example put forward by the Government is indeed very specific and unrelated to circumstances such as those of the present case. Accepting that the provision of examples may be more difficult in smaller jurisdictions, such as in the present case, where the number of cases of a specific kind may be fewer than in the larger jurisdictions, nevertheless the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s example concerning a case of conditions of detention did not have such a measure applied, despite the excessive duration, extending to four years. Similarly, the case of Tafarra Besabe Berhe, referred to by the applicant (in her submissions below, at paragraph 111) concerning the lawfulness of immigrants\u2019 detention and the conditions of such detention, which was still pending six years after it was lodged, also does not appear to have applied such a measure. Admittedly, the Court is aware that no examples may exist because applicants fail to make such requests. However, in the absence of any other comparable examples, the Court finds no indication that the constitutional jurisdictions would be willing on a regular basis to release immigrant detainees pending a decision on their claims on conditions of detention.64.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that, in circumstances such as those of the present case, the hypothetical possibility that interim measures may be issued pending proceedings does not make up for deficiencies detected in the remedy at issue \u2013 a remedy which would be effective both as a preventive and a compensatory remedy, if it were carried out in a timely manner. Thus, current domestic case-law does not allow the Court to find that the applicant was required to have recourse to such a remedy.65.\u00a0\u00a0Further, by their unsubstantiated allegation (see paragraph 50 above) the Government have not dispelled the Court\u2019s previously expressed concerns about the accessibility of such remedies in the light of the apparent lack of a proper structured system enabling immigration detainees to have concrete access to effective legal aid (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a066).66. In conclusion, none of the remedies put forward by the Government, alone or in aggregate, satisfy the requirements of an effective remedy in the sense of preventing the alleged violation or its continuation in a timely manner. It follows that the Government\u2019s objection is dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant considered the conditions of detention to be basic. She noted in particular the lack of access to constructive or recreational activities, insufficient provision of basic needs, lack of information, difficulties communicating with the outside world, limited access to open air, and obstacles in obtaining the most basic services. Other factors which had to be taken into consideration were her young age and her inability to communicate in English.69.\u00a0\u00a0 Each zone (measuring 300 sq. m according to a M\u00e9decins Sans Fronti\u00e8res report) consisted of a landing, three adjacent dormitories all opening on to a narrow corridor, nine or ten showers and toilets, a small room used as a kitchen with one or two hotplates, a common room containing metal tables and benches screwed to the ground, and one television. Free movement between zones was not possible, and for most of the day the detainees were confined to their respective zones.70.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further submitted that conditions in her zone were particularly difficult in the summer months, as it became crowded because of increased arrivals. When the zone was at its full capacity (sixty people), bearing in mind the areas of the dormitories and the common areas, each detainee had an average 5 sq. m. of shelter space, which meant that in August, when the applicant\u2019s zone hosted sixty-nine persons, the average shelter space was of 4.3 sq. m. She further noted that between her arrival in May and July 2012 the detainees were not allowed out of the zone, and thus they spent twenty-four hours inside the cramped space. The applicant felt that it was difficult to live in a room with twenty women, each having different sleeping times, who were noisy when it suited them, and where basic necessities were lacking.71.\u00a0\u00a0 The applicant particularly complained about the lack of warm clothing, which was never adequately dealt with by the detention centre authorities. The situation was made worse by the lack of heating, the fact that the building was exposed to the elements and had missing windowpanes.72.\u00a0\u00a0 The food provided was also of poor quality, lacked variety and was culturally inappropriate. According to reports by M\u00e9decins Sans Fronti\u00e8res and the JRS (relevant links submitted to the Court) the diet provided had led to a number of gastrointestinal problems among detainees.73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained about the difficulties she had in obtaining information about her situation and the ongoing age assessment procedure. Detainees had nothing to do all day except watch television, and only very limited access (one and half hours) to the open air, in a small dusty yard \u2013 indeed she rarely used the yard, for fear of verbal abuse by male detainees who would look at her and sometimes address questions to her \u2013 a treatment she found to be humiliating and inappropriate for a Somali woman. She noted that the books in the library were in English, and that the classes held by Integra mentioned by the Government only started after her release as did the telephone service offered by the Red Cross. Any other projects did not consist of more than one activity per week.74.\u00a0\u00a0Detainees had limited contact with the outside world, as no Internet was available and telephone credit was insufficient for overseas calls. Moreover, in the applicant\u2019s case, her mobile phone had been confiscated on arrival, exacerbating her sense of isolation.75.\u00a0\u00a0The detention centre lacked female staff, and only one woman worked on the shift with the zones. This meant that all the care of detained women was carried out by male staff (most having a security background) who guarded the facility, conducted headcounts (in the dormitories twice daily, including the mornings when the women were asleep), took care of the distribution of basic necessities, including items of personal hygiene and underwear, and accompanied them to medical appointments. This state of affairs was confirmed by a local report drawn up by a Maltese magistrate (the Valenzia Report). The applicant also referred to international reports on the matter (see paragraphs 42 and 43 above), and considered that the situation was even more frustrating given that under the domestic system there was no mechanism to complain about ill-treatment or abuse by detention staff.76.\u00a0\u00a0 Thus, given her young age and all the factors mentioned above, the applicant considered that she had suffered a breach of Article 3, despite the absence of any medical condition affecting her.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government77.\u00a0\u00a0As to the structure of Hermes Block, the Government submitted that it consisted of three equally sized rooms that together had a total capacity to accommodate sixty people. Records held by detention services showed that during the period that the applicant was housed in Hermes Block, in the month of May 2012, there were sixty-one occupants, while during the peak August month there were sixty-nine detainees.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the zones were well kept and that the Government provided shelter, food, clothing, and medical assistance to migrants. In the Government\u2019s view the facility catered for all the needs of the migrants. Gates which separated the different zones were intended to protect the migrants, and separation was provided in relation to migrants having different ethnicities and religious beliefs as well as gender.79.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, upon arrival an emergency bag is distributed, containing a towel, two bed sheets, a pair of flip-flops, two T\u2011shirts, two pairs of shorts, a face soap, a shower gel (which can also be used as shampoo), a bar of laundry soap, a toothbrush and toothpaste, a pillow and pillow case, toilet paper, a plastic cup, a plate and cutlery set, a blanket, a five-euro telephone card, a packet of sanitary towels, and a quilt (for winter arrivals only). A second bag is supplied on the second day, containing bras and underwear, slippers or running shoes, a tracksuit, and other items of clothing. Further supplies are provided on a regular basis, such as cleaning products every two weeks in order to secure the cleanliness of the areas. The applicant was also given clothing and supplies to cater for her personal hygiene, and had access to sanitary facilities equipped with hot and cold water, as well as secluded showers.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that whilst in detention the applicant was housed in a sheltered compound with adequate bedding and was provided with three meals a day on a daily basis. Meals were provided from a pre\u2011set menu, however, particular dietary requests were regularly respected and the food supplied respected the relevant religious traditions. The detention centres had a medical practitioner and a nurse who provided on\u2011site treatment and could make referrals to hospital treatment, and \u201ccustody clinics\u201d are set up in all compounds housing migrants.81.\u00a0\u00a0Immigration detainees are provided with telephone cards and various telephones can be found in the detention centre. Moreover, the Red Cross also operates a mobile phone calling service on a daily basis. Interpreters are provided for free at the detention centres and while the applicant was in detention, two female detention officers were assigned to the zones where females were held. The detainees are further provided with stationery and books on request. They have access to a television, as well as a kitchen offering basic cooking facilities and a common room with tables and benches. They are free to practise their religion and have unlimited access to NGOs and legal assistance (sic). They also have the opportunity to attend language and integration classes provided by NGOs.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that access to outside exercise was limited to one and a half hours daily per zone. If one zone refused to use its time the allotted time would be added to that of the other zones. During the period of April to July 2012 access to the yard had only been limited because of the significant number of break-outs, and thus was justified for security reasons. According to the Government, on various occasions it was the migrants themselves who refused to go out into the yard. They further noted that the applicant had never complained to the detention officers about any verbal abuse, nor had she ever enquired with the same officers about her age assessment procedure.83.\u00a0\u00a0As to the absence of heating (which was installed after the applicant\u2019s release), the Government considered that this was counterbalanced by the provision of warm clothing and blankets. In Malta winters were mild and while the coldest temperatures were experienced from January to March, the applicant, who had started her detention in May, had been released in February. The Government also noted that the detention centre made prompt arrangements to remedy broken windows.84.\u00a0\u00a0As to the detention staff, the Government considered that it was not debasing to have male staff, given that they were trained. As to the headcounts, they considered that in any event female detainees had to dress appropriately even with respect to other detainees in the dormitory. The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegation that there was no complaint mechanism, and alleged that instances of misbehaviour were brought to the attention of the Head of Detention Services, either directly by the detainee or through NGOs. Without giving examples, the Government alleged that such complaints were investigated and, where necessary, disciplinary proceedings undertaken.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to the Court\u2019s case-law (Sizarev v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 17116\/04, 17 January 2013; Selcuk and Akser v. Turkey, nos.\u00a023184\/94 and 23185\/94, 24 April 1998; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a02346\/02, ECHR\u00a02002\u2011III); and particularly Aden Ahmed (cited above), and the principles cited therein. They considered that the conditions of detention at issue could not be compared to those in facilities in respect of which the Court had found a violation (for example, Dougoz v. Greece, no.\u00a040907\/98, ECHR 2001\u2011II; S.D. v. Greece, no. 53541\/07, 11\u00a0June 2009; and A.A. v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a012186\/08, 22\u00a0July 2010). While shared facilities could create some discomfort, this could not reach the relevant Article\u00a03 threshold. In the present case the applicant had been given ample personal space with adequate ventilation and bedding as well as exercise time. She had a balanced and varied diet, and in the absence of heating was supplied with blankets in the winter months, and would have been provided with more had she asked for them. Ceiling fans helped with the heat of the summer months. The Government distinguished the case from that of Aden Ahmed (cited above) in that the detention period in the present case was shorter, and the applicant was not particularly fragile. Bearing in mind all the above, and the fact that the applicant was not a minor, the Government considered that there had not been a violation of Article\u00a03.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, ill\u2011treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article\u00a03 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a03, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3. However, the absence of such a purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos.\u00a029787\/03 and 29810\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 95-96, 24 January 2008).87.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 3, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject the individual to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see Riad and Idiab, cited above, \u00a7\u00a099; S.D. v. Greece, cited above, \u00a7 47; and A.A. v.\u00a0Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a055). When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz, cited above, \u00a7 46). The length of the period during which a person is detained in specific conditions also has to be considered (see, among other authorities, Alver v.\u00a0Estonia, no.\u00a064812\/01, \u00a7\u00a050, 8\u00a0November 2005, and Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a086).88.\u00a0\u00a0The extreme lack of personal space in the detention area weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were \u201cdegrading\u201d from the point of view of Article 3 (see Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no. 53254\/99, \u00a7\u00a036, 7\u00a0April 2005, and Yarashonen v. Turkey, no. 72710\/11, \u00a7 72, 24 June 2014, and, for a detailed analysis of the principles concerning the overcrowding issue, see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0143\u201148, 10 January 2012). The provision of four square metres of living space remains the acceptable minimum standard of multi-occupancy accommodation (see Hagy\u00f3 v. Hungary, no. 52624\/10, \u00a7 45, 23 April 2013; Torreggiani and Others, cited above, \u00a7 76, and Tunis v.\u00a0Estonia, no.\u00a0429\/12, \u00a7\u00a044, 19 December 2013, and the cases cited therein). The Court also takes into account the space occupied by the furniture items in the living area in reviewing complaints of overcrowding (see Petrenko v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a030112\/04, \u00a7 39, 20 January 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a041833\/04, \u00a7 87, 27 January 2011; and Yarashonen, cited above, \u00a7 76).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that, quite apart from the necessity of having sufficient personal space, other aspects of physical conditions of detention are relevant for the assessment of compliance with Article 3. Such elements include access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygiene requirements (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 149 et seq. for further details, and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 222, ECHR 2011). The Court notes in particular that the Prison Standards developed by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture make specific mention of outdoor exercise and consider it a basic safeguard of prisoners\u2019 well-being that all of them, without exception, be allowed at least one hour of exercise in the open air every day and preferably as part of a broader programme of out\u2011of\u2011cell activities (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 150).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that\u00a0having regard to the numbers provided by the applicant and confirmed by the Government, and the measurements provided by the applicant and not contested by the Government, on regular months of her detention (excluding August) during which sixty or fewer than sixty people were detained in her zone, and sixty-one being held in May, the applicant had at least 5 square metres of shelter space in her zone. Such a measurement does not refer only to the space available in her dormitory, but to the entirety of the space to which she had access in her zone. However, given that the applicant had in fact the opportunity to move around in the zone, the Court considers that there is no reason why the entirety of the area should not be taken into consideration for the purposes of her living space. Even considering that in reality this space should be significantly lower in view of the fixtures in the rooms, both the common rooms and the dormitories (see Yarashonen, \u00a7 76, and Torreggiani and Others, \u00a7 75, both cited above), the Court considers that the ultimate living space over those months did not go below the acceptable minimum standard of multi-occupancy accommodation.The same must be said for the month of August, where the applicant\u2019s zone had sixty-nine inmates, and thus her average shelter space was 4.3\u00a0square metres. Further, the Court notes that in certain months, as for example at the time of the introduction of the application (see paragraph\u00a022 above), the applicant was sharing her zone with only twenty-five people, thus her living space during that period was ample, and at least double that mentioned above. In these circumstances the Court cannot find that the overcrowding was so severe as to justify in itself a finding of a violation of Article\u00a03.91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will thus continue to assess the other aspects of the conditions of detention which are relevant to the assessment of the compliance with Article 3.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that even scarce space in relative terms may in some circumstances be compensated for by the freedom to spend time away from the dormitory rooms (see Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, \u00a7 103 and\u00a0107, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII, and Nurmagomedov v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a030138\/02, 16 September 2004). The Court observes that while it is true that adjacent to the dormitories the applicant could move around in the common room as well as the corridors, by the Government\u2019s own admission, during the period of April to July 2012, access to the yard was limited because of the significant number of break-outs. In the Government\u2019s view this limitation was justified for security reasons. The Court observes that no specific date as to when this limitation came to an end in July 2012 was submitted by any of the parties, thus, the applicant having been detained on 27\u00a0May 2012, this meant that the applicant had no access to any outdoor exercise for anything between about five and nine weeks.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that access to outdoor exercise is a fundamental component of the protection afforded to those deprived of their liberty under Article 3, and as such it cannot be left to the discretion of the authorities (see Yarashonen, cited above, \u00a7 78); according to the CPT, all detainees, even those confined to their cells as a punishment, have a right to at least one hour of exercise in the open air every day regardless of how good the material conditions might be in their cells (see the CPT standards, document no. CPT\/Inf\/E (2002) 1\u2011Rev. 2013, \u00a7 48). These standards also say that outdoor exercise facilities should be reasonably spacious and whenever possible provide shelter from inclement weather (see Neshkov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, nos. 36925\/10, 21487\/12, 72893\/12, 73196\/12, 77718\/12 and 9717\/13, \u00a7 234, 27 January 2015, with further references).\u00a0The physical characteristics of outdoor exercise facilities are also relevant. For instance, an exercise yard that is just two square metres larger than the cell, is surrounded by three-metre-high walls, and has an opening to the sky covered with metal bars and a thick net does not offer inmates proper opportunities for recreation and recuperation (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0152, with further references).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already had occasion to comment on the yard referred to in the present case, in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7 96), where it noted that it was considerably small for use by sixty people (recreation being available in one zone at a time), it was secured on three sides by wire fencing topped with barbed wire, and left much to be desired given that it was the only outdoor access enjoyed by detainees for a limited time daily. Further, it is not disputed that in the present case there was not even any access to this yard for an unspecified period of time. The Court considers that the Government\u2019s security argument is no justification, and indeed the authorities should be in a position to provide safe exercise space irrespective of any fears of breakouts. The latter concerns may be addressed by other relevant measures falling under the authorities\u2019 responsibility, without impinging on the well-being of all the detainees indiscriminately.95.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, the Court has already found that the detention of an asylum seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals, has been considered to be degrading treatment (see Tabesh v. Greece, no. 8256\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 38 to 44, 26\u00a0November 2009). Moreover, the Court highlights that the detention in the present case was imposed in the context of immigration, and was therefore a measure which is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled their own country. However, in the present case, the Court notes the uncertainty of the period during which no access to the yard was possible, a period of between five and nine weeks. Given the unspecified duration of this limitation which appears to have been due to specific circumstances occurring at the time, the Court considers that while the situation was highly regrettable, this element on its own cannot be considered as reaching the relevant threshold, even if accompanied by the fact that applicant did not benefit from regular recreational activities indoors either. This is so, particularly given that the applicant herself admitted that she often did not choose to make use of the allotted yard time. It is however, a matter which must be given its due importance when assessing the cumulative effects of detention.96.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the other aspects raised by the applicant, the Court reiterates that suffering from cold and heat cannot be underestimated, as such conditions may affect one\u2019s well-being, and may in extreme circumstances affect health (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094). Nevertheless, the applicant admits that ceiling fans were in place, and despite the fact that Malta is an extremely hot country in the summer months the Court considers that the authorities cannot be expected to provide the most advanced technology. However, the Court is concerned by the applicant\u2019s allegation that detainees suffered from the cold despite the distribution of blankets (see paragraph 23 above). Little comfort can be found in the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant was only detained until February, given that January and February are the coldest months. However, the Court welcomes the Government\u2019s action in this regard, and notes that heating has now been installed. While the latter action had no consequence for the applicant, who had been released by then, the Court observes that the provision of blankets must have aided the situation to some extent.97.\u00a0\u00a0For the same reasons as those given in various reports (see paragraphs 40, 43-44 above), the Court also finds disconcerting the lack of female staff in the centre (see also Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 95). The Government admitted that only two females had been working in the detention centre at the time, and did not dispute that only one of them was working in the applicant\u2019s zone. The Government\u2019s submission that male staff were trained to distribute intimate products, even if it were true, cannot counteract the degree of discomfort to the female detainees who were for the most time dealt with and surrounded by male officers for their detention over several months. Of some apprehension, is also the fact that little privacy is found in the dormitories, which moreover lack any type of furniture where individuals could store their personal belongings.98.\u00a0\u00a0Against these factors of concern, the Court, however, observes that according to the CPT report cited above (paragraph 40), various improvements have been put in place, both structurally and activity wise, at Lyster barracks. No concern seems to arise about the hygiene facilities, and the applicant has had access to a common area equipped with a television, as well as telephone cards and three meals a day. The meals of which the applicant complains do not appear to have been entirely unbalanced or to have affected her health, nor has the applicant explained what made them culturally inappropriate. Further, the applicant\u2019s basic needs have been seen to by the distribution of materials free of charge, and even if it is regrettable that certain materials were not readily available, the applicant was not left unclothed or in unhygienic conditions \u2013 even if partly with private help.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that this situation and the aforementioned conditions persisted for a period of eight months and ten days, a period which it appears could have been shorter had it not been for the applicant\u2019s claim that she was a minor \u2013 a claim which turned out to be untruthful. In this connection the Court also highlights the importance of individuals being informed of the stage of their claims to avoid any further anxiety but it also considers that applicants should pursue the matter with the appropriate avenues, or detention officers, orally or in writing.100.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, while it is true that the applicant, being an asylum-seeker, was particularly vulnerable because of everything she had been through during her migration and the traumatic experiences she was likely to have endured previously (see M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7 232), a state of vulnerability which exists irrespective of other health concerns or age factors, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the applicant in the present case was not more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker detained at the time (see, a contrario, Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 97-99).101. To sum up, while remaining concerned about the lack of access to outdoor exercise, as well as the lack of heating and of female staff, at the time, given the sufficient living space, the provision of basic as well as other needs and appropriate hygienic standards, the Court is of the opinion that the cumulative effect of the conditions complained of did not reach the threshold of Article 3. It follows that in the present case the Court considers that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in Hermes Block did not amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of the Convention.102.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION103.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that she did not have a remedy which met the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4, as outlined in the Court\u2019s jurisprudence, to challenge the lawfulness of her detention. The provision reads as follows:\u201cEveryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection ratione materiae104.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that Article 5 \u00a7 4 did not apply to the present case since, according to the Court\u2019s case-law, such a remedy is no longer required once an individual is lawfully free. They noted that the applicant had been released on 7 February 2013.105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant noted that she was entitled to raise this complaint, since she had not had such a remedy during her detention, and had instituted proceedings before the Court while she was still in detention.106.\u00a0\u00a0While it is true that Article 5 \u00a7 4 cannot be relied on by a person who has been lawfully released (see Stephens v. Malta (no.\u00a01), no. 11956\/07, \u00a7 102, 21\u00a0April 2009), the Court notes that when the applicant lodged her application with the Court she was still detained and she was precisely complaining that she did not have an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of her detention during the time she was detained. She is not complaining of the absence of such a remedy following her release. In consequence the provision is applicable (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0105).107.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant109.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant relied on the Court\u2019s findings in Louled Massoud v.\u00a0Malta (no. 24340\/08, 27 July 2010), where the Court held that the available remedies in the Maltese domestic system were ineffective and insufficient for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4. In respect of Article\u00a025\u00a0A\u00a0(6) of the Immigration Act, she added that, as a rule, the Board granted bail in connection with removal orders, but has done so at least once in connection with a challenge as to the lawfulness of detention under Regulation\u00a011(10). Nevertheless, bail could only be granted against a financial deposit (usually around 1,000 euros (EUR)) as well as a third-party guarantee showing that the applicant will have accommodation and subsistence, conditions which were unlikely to be fulfilled by immigrants arriving by boat (as opposed to those overstaying visas). In any event the applicant highlighted that a request for bail concerned temporary release and was independent from a review of the lawfulness of the detention.110.\u00a0\u00a0Following the Louled Massoud judgment the only change in the law concerned the transposition of the EU Return Directive. Nevertheless, the \u201cnew\u201d remedy envisaged, namely an application to the Immigration Appeals Board pursuant to Regulation 11\u00a0(10) of the mentioned directive, also failed to meet the requirements of speediness, accessibility and certainty. Further, it was not even clear whether such a remedy was available in cases such as that of the applicant, in view of the limitations under Regulation 11 (1). This also appeared to be the case given the lack of reference to this remedy by the Government in their first round of observations. Also, there was no information on the possibility of using this remedy to challenge the lawfulness of detention, nor any access to legal aid to attempt the remedy. In any event, to the applicant\u2019s knowledge, of four such applications lodged only one had been determined before the claimants in those cases were released (between two and nine months after the application had been lodged), and the only one determined was decided twelve months after it was lodged.111.\u00a0\u00a0As to constitutional proceedings, the applicant relied on the Court\u2019s previous findings, and considered that there were no reasons to alter those findings. Indeed, the three cases concerning lawfulness of detention under Article 5 which were pending before the constitutional jurisdictions while the applicant was detained only showed the excessive duration of such proceedings. Indeed the case of Tafarra Besabe Berhe v. Commissioner of Police (27\/2007) showed that requests for hearing with urgency were of little avail, since the case remained pending six years after it was filed, on 8\u00a0May 2007. The case of Essa Maneh Et vs Commissioner of Police\u00a0(53\/2008) lodged on 16 December 2009, was also still pending on appeal (in January 2015). A further example, Maximilain Ciantar vs\u00a0AG\u00a0(35\/2010), had been lodged on 31 May 2010 and had ended on appeal only on 7 January 2011. Neither was there any evidence to suggest that the Court Practice and Procedure and Good Order Rules cited by the Government had had any effect on the efficacy and speed of proceedings, as shown by the domestic case-law cited.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government112.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations concerning the complaint under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 the Government submitted that the Court\u2019s findings in Aden Ahmed and Suso Musa, both cited above, concerning the ineffectiveness of constitutional proceedings should be revisited by the Court, given the evidence that showed that constitutional jurisdictions could give interim relief pending proceedings (see paragraph 49 above). The Government also contended that it was impossible (sic) to provide a number of examples, given the limitations on small States.113.\u00a0\u00a0On indication by the applicant, the Government submitted in their last round of observations that the remedy provided by Regulation 11 was available to the applicant, and could have allowed her release.114. In connection with their objection of domestic remedies under Article 5 \u00a7 1, the Government made reference to subsidiary legislation 12.09, namely the Court Practice and Procedure and Good Order Rules dealing also with constitutional matters, which emphasised the need for speedy resolution of such matters. Secondly, they noted that it was possible for an applicant to request that a case be dealt with, heard and concluded with urgency. The Government strongly objected to the fact that the Court was allowing applicants in cases involving irregular immigrants to circumvent domestic remedies. They considered that this could only be done when there were no effective remedies. They also claimed that the applicant had not lodged a request for bail before the Immigration Appeals Board.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its general principles concerning Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04, as established in its case-law and reiterated in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0113\u2011114, and 120).116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has repeatedly examined in detail the remedies available in Malta for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4, and has held that applicants seeking to challenge the lawfulness of their immigrant detention, in the Maltese context, did not have at their disposal an effective and speedy remedy under domestic law (see, for example, Aden Ahmed and Suso Musa, both cited above, \u00a7 60 and 123 respectively). Nevertheless, the Government claimed that the Court\u2019s findings should be revised concerning constitutional redress proceedings, despite their inability to submit any examples. They also submitted that the remedy provided by Regulation\u00a011 was available to the applicant and they referred to the possibility of applying for bail before the IAB.117. As to the remedy provided by Regulation 11, the Court observes that the latter regulation states that the provisions of Part IV of the subsidiary legislation 217.12, do not apply to individuals apprehended or intercepted in connection with irregular crossing by sea. The Court notes that Regulation 11 is part of Part IV of the subsidiary legislation mentioned, and the applicant was intercepted in connection with an irregular crossing by sea. Despite the Court\u2019s findings in the cases of Suso Musa and Aden Ahmed (both cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58-59 and \u00a7\u00a7 121-122 respectively) that, even assuming that such a remedy applied in the applicant\u2019s case, it was also not effective, the Government failed to explain why such a remedy was still available to the applicant despite such limitation and the circumstances as appeared at the time. In any event, again, the Court notes that not one example was put forward by the Government concerning this remedy, and the examples referred to by the applicant, which, while lacking appropriate substantiation have not been disputed by the Government, continue to show the ineffectiveness of the remedy. Thus, the Court finds no reason to alter its conclusions in Suso Musa and Aden Ahmed (both cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a058-59 and \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0121\u2011122 respectively). Similarly, in reply to an unexplained statement by the Government concerning a request for bail under Article\u00a025\u00a0A\u00a0(6) of the Immigration Act, the Court reiterates its findings in Suso Musa (\u00a7\u00a7\u00a056\u201158) to the effect that this was also not an effective remedy.118.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, in the absence of any further dispute concerning the Court\u2019s findings in relation to remedies other than constitutional redress proceedings, the Court finds no reasons to re-examine the situations already examined in previous cases (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0115\u2011124; Suso\u00a0Musa, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 52-61; and Louled Massoud, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a042\u201147). In particular it notes that in the judgment of Suso Musa, cited above, the Court called for general measures in this connection, and the case remains under consideration by the Committee of Ministers and has not yet been closed.119.\u00a0\u00a0As to constitutional redress proceedings, while the illustration of the practical effectiveness of a remedy with examples of domestic case-law may be more difficult in smaller jurisdictions (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 63), the Court cannot ignore the fact that the examples from the Maltese context previously brought to the Court\u2019s attention, and reiterated by the applicant in the present case, continue to show that constitutional redress proceedings, are not effective for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4, in view of their duration.120.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as, in connection with constitutional redress proceedings, the Government relied on the possibility of obtaining interim relief pending lengthy proceedings, the Court refers to its findings at paragraph 64 in fine, above, and for those reasons considers that it is unlikely that constitutional jurisdictions would be willing on a regular basis to release immigrant detainees pending a decision on their claims of unlawful detention. It follows that, in the Court\u2019s view, constitutional redress proceedings are still not an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4.121.\u00a0\u00a0It follows from the above that it has not been shown that the applicant had at her disposal an effective and speedy remedy under domestic law by which to challenge the lawfulness of her detention.122.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention has therefore been violated.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION123.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that her continued detention for more than eight months was arbitrary and unlawful, as it did not fall under either of the two limbs under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f). In any event the law was not precise and did not provide for procedural safeguards. Moreover, her continued detention could not be considered reasonably required for the purpose, nor closely connected to the purpose of preventing an unauthorised entry. Furthermore, she had been detained in conditions which were not appropriate for a young single asylum seeker. She relied on Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201d124.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies125.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not brought her complaint before the domestic authorities. She had not filed a request for bail before the IAB, nor had she filed constitutional redress proceedings.126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already held that the applicant did not have at her disposal an effective and speedy remedy by which to challenge the lawfulness of her detention (see paragraph 121 above). It follows that the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant128.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that her initial detention was for the purpose of deportation as a result of the Removal Order and was in line with Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act. Nevertheless once she applied for asylum, she could no longer be detained under either limb as, in her view, Maltese law provided that once such application was lodged the asylum seeker \u201cshall not be removed ... and the applicant shall be allowed to enter or remain in Malta pending a final decision\u201d (see Suso Musa, cited above, \u00a7\u00a031). However, even assuming that her detention was to be considered as falling under the first limb, she considered that an eight-month detention was arbitrary, as it exceeded the time reasonably required for its purpose, and thus could not be closely connected to the purpose of preventing an unauthorised entry.129.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, she submitted that she had not been kept in conditions which were appropriate for a young single female, and that she had no access to procedural safeguards.130.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that in spite of the fact that the AWAS procedure can contribute to the continued detention of individuals detained in terms of the Immigration Act, it was not adequately regulated by law or by publicly available rules or procedures. The only reference to age assessment procedures was that in the Government\u2019s policy document and subsidiary legislation (see relevant domestic law above). She considered that seven and a half months to reach a determination on her age was unjustifiable irrespective of the result of that process. The applicant submitted that had she withdrawn her claim that she was a minor, she would have been released before, especially because she knew that she would likely get protection, as she was from South Central Somalia. However, the fact that she maintained her claim indicated that she strongly believed that she was a minor. Indeed the applicant noted that according to the Aditus report (see paragraph 42 above, in fine), age assessment was not always accurate. As to the duration of her detention, the applicant relied on the Court\u2019s findings in Suso Musa, cited above.131.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the five day detention following the grant of subsidiary protection, the applicant considered that this period did not come under any of the list of exceptions under Article 5 and had no basis in domestic law. Moreover, while a delay of a few hours to carry out administrative formalities might be justified (she referred to Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011IV), five days to conduct medical clearance, which consisted of a simple chest X-ray, and to find a place in an Open Centre was not justified.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government132.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty was required for the purpose of repatriation (until she was granted subsidiary humanitarian protection), at the same time they also submitted that it fell within the first limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f). They noted that practically all immigrants reaching Malta did not carry documents and thus ascertaining their identities upon entry was a lengthy process which was dependent on the cooperation of the migrants themselves.133.\u00a0\u00a0 The Government considered that the detention was carried out in good faith, as the centre at issue had been set up especially for that purpose, and the detention had fulfilled all the conditions indicated by the Court in Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC] (no. 13229\/03, ECHR 2008). They also considered that detention was based in law and was not discriminatory, nor was it applied across the board. Indeed they noted that vulnerable persons, including unaccompanied minors, women with children, pregnant women, elderly persons and disabled persons were not subject to detention, more than would be necessary until medical clearances were obtained. The Government claimed that since many persons alleged to pertain to such categories, procedures were in place to screen such requests accurately and expeditiously. As an example they submitted that in the first half of the year of 2012, out of 1, 065 persons who arrived in Malta irregularly, seventy\u2011five claimed to be minors. AWAS processed and determined all the cases and forty-six persons were issued with a care order. They further noted that age assessment of persons who were quite young was fast tracked as in such cases there was little difficulty in assessing the age. On the other hand with teenagers or alleged teenagers, close to the age of adulthood, the procedure involved more steps and thus inevitably took longer.134.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicant had only claimed to be a minor at a later stage, after having originally claimed she was twenty-six. The interviews in her respect were inconclusive, and it was only the bone density test which confirmed that she was not a minor \u2013 a decision to this effect was issued on 14 January 2013 and her asylum claim was decided in her favour two weeks later. The Government submitted that had the applicant not lied, her asylum claim would have been processed without the need to assess her age and she would surely have been released from detention earlier, given that, at the domestic level, subsidiary protection was regularly granted to Somalis.135.\u00a0\u00a0As to the detention following the subsidiary protection decision of Saturday 2\u00a0February 2013, the Government considered that since medical clearance needs to be given and accommodation found for the migrant, the lapse of five days before her release could not be considered incompatible with Article\u00a05, particularly because such waiting time had been in the interest of the applicant.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles136.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty. The text of Article 5 makes it clear that the guarantees it contains apply to \u201ceveryone\u201d (see Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no.\u00a010593\/08, \u00a7 224, ECHR 2012). Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of those grounds (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a013229\/03, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2008). One of the exceptions, contained in sub\u2011paragraph (f), permits the State to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context.137.\u00a0\u00a0In Saadi (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a064-66) the Grand Chamber interpreted for the first time the meaning of the first limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f), namely, \u201cto prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country\u201d. It considered that until a State had \u201cauthorised\u201d entry to the country, any entry was \u201cunauthorised\u201d and the detention of a person who wished to effect entry and who needed but did not yet have authorisation to do so, could be, without any distortion of language, to \u201cprevent his effecting an unauthorised entry\u201d (\u00a7 65). However, detention had to be compatible with the overall purpose of Article\u00a05, which was to safeguard the right to liberty and ensure that no\u2011one should be dispossessed of his or her liberty in an arbitrary fashion\u00a0(ibid., \u00a7\u00a066).138.\u00a0\u00a0The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law\u00a0(see Suso Musa, cited above, \u00a7\u00a097).139.\u00a0\u00a0Under the sub-paragraphs of Article 5 \u00a7 1 any deprivation of liberty must, in addition to falling within one of the exceptions set out in sub\u2011paragraphs\u00a0(a)\u2011(f), be \u201clawful\u201d. Where the \u201clawfulness\u201d of detention is at issue, including the question whether \u201ca procedure prescribed by law\u201d has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. It is a fundamental principle that no detention which is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 \u00a7 1 and the notion of \u201carbitrariness\u201d in Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 extends beyond lack of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary and thus contrary to the Convention (see Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 67).140.\u00a0\u00a0To avoid being branded as arbitrary, detention under Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that \u201cthe measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country\u201d; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued (ibid., \u00a7 74; see also A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455\/05, \u00a7 164, ECHR 2009, and Louled Massoud, cited above, \u00a7\u00a062).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant, an asylum seeker, was kept in detention for eight months and ten days, from the date of her arrival by boat on 27 May 2012 to 7\u00a0February 2013, the date of her release following a decision of 2 February 2013 to grant her subsidiary protection, awaiting the outcome of age assessment procedures and\/or the outcome of her application for asylum, and subsequently her actual release.142.\u00a0\u00a0It is noted that the applicant does not complain about the lawfulness and compliance with Article 5 of her detention between 27 May 2012 and a few days later (an unspecified day in June), when she applied for asylum (see paragraph 128 above, in primis).143.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will assess compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the subsequent periods separately.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Pending her asylum claim ( June 2012 \u2013 2 February 2013)144.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant has been detained in accordance with the provisions of the Immigration Act (Articles\u00a05 and\u00a014(2), Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta). While expressing reservations about the quality of all the applicable laws seen together in such context, the Court has already accepted that in cases similar to those of the applicant, the detention had a sufficiently clear legal basis, and that up to the decision on an asylum claim, such detention can be considered to fall under the first limb of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f), namely to \u201cprevent effecting an unauthorised entry\u201d\u00a0(see Suso Musa, cited above, \u00a7 99). There is no reason to find otherwise in the present case.145.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to be determined whether the detention in the present case was not arbitrary, namely whether it was carried out in good faith; whether it was closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; whether the place and conditions of detention were appropriate and whether the length of the detention exceeded that reasonably required for the purpose pursued.146.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already noted a series of odd practices on the part of the domestic authorities when dealing with immigrant arrivals and subsequent detentions and it expressed its reservations as to the Government\u2019s good faith in applying an across-the-board detention policy (save for specific vulnerable categories) and the by-passing of the voluntary departure procedure (see Suso Musa, cited above \u00a7 100) - reservations which it maintains, noting that the two practices persisted in the present case (see paragraphs 7 and 10 above).147.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, the focus of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerns the fact that she was detained despite the fact that at the time she was an alleged minor. The Court considers that the necessity of detaining children in an immigration context must be very carefully considered by the national authorities. It is positive that in the Maltese context, when an individual is found to be a minor, the latter is no longer detained, and he or she is placed in a non-custodial residential facility, and that detention of minors should be no longer than what is absolutely necessary to determine their identification and health status (see paragraphs 31 and 36 above). An issue may however arise, inter alia, in respect of a State\u2019s good faith, in so far as the determination of age may take an unreasonable length of time - indeed, a lapse of various months may also result in an individual reaching his or her majority pending an official determination.148.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court is, on the one hand, sensitive to the Government\u2019s argument that younger looking individuals are fast tracked, and that the procedure is lengthier only in cases of persons close to adulthood, as well as their statement that only forty-six of seventy-five alleged minors\u00a0(in 2012) were actually minors. On the other hand, the Court observes that in 2012, out of 1,065 arrivals only seventy-five individuals claimed to be minors, that is, less than 10 %. In this connection, the Court considers that despite the fact that \u201cborderline\u201d cases may require further assessment, the numbers of alleged minors per year put forward by the Government cannot justify a duration of around seven months to determine the applicant\u2019s claim. Indeed, the Government have not explained why it was necessary for the applicant in the present case to wait for two months for her first age assessment interview (see paragraph 14 above) and a further two months to perform an X-ray on her wrist (see paragraph 15 above) following a second interview, and more than three months to have a decision following a standard medical test (see paragraph 14 above).149.\u00a0However, in the circumstances of the present case the Court cannot ignore that the applicant turned out to be an adult (compare Ahmade v.\u00a0Greece, no. 50520\/09, \u00a7 79, 25 September 2012), and whether willingly or unwillingly, such false claims burden the system. Moreover, this result casts doubts on the applicant\u2019s version of events concerning the first statement she made to the authorities about her age (see paragraph\u00a011 above), and in any event there is no indication that the applicant\u2019s first statement to the authorities had been erroneously written down by the authorities in bad faith (compare, Aarabi v. Greece, no. 39766\/09, \u00a7\u00a044, 2\u00a0April 2015).150.\u00a0\u00a0As to whether the detention was closely connected to the ground of detention relied on, the Court notes that the purpose of the detention fell under the first limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) namely to prevent an unauthorised entry, and in practice to allow for the applicant\u2019s asylum claim to be processed. It is true that the asylum claim could not be processed before the applicant\u2019s age was determined, given that a number of procedural safeguards are attached to asylum claims lodged by minors. However, considering that age assessment is a preliminary step of an asylum assessment, as regrettable as the delay in determining the applicant\u2019s age may have been in the present case, it cannot be said that the seven months of detention until her age was determined, as well as the subsequent two weeks until her asylum claim was verified, were not closely connected to the ground relied on.151.\u00a0\u00a0As to the place and conditions of detention, the Court notes that the applicant in the present was an adult, and, as held above (paragraph\u00a0102), the conditions of detention in Lyster barracks did not amount to a violation of Article 3.152.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the Court considers that despite the lack of procedural safeguards (as shown by the finding of a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4, at paragraph 121 above) the overall duration of the applicant\u2019s detention for the purposes of the first limb of the provision which amounted to a total of around eight months (June 2012 \u2013 2 February 2013) is not unreasonable for the purpose pursued.153.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, while the Court expresses reservations about the duration of such age-assessment procedures, bearing in mind all the above, the Court considers that in the present case, the applicant\u2019s detention during the relevant period was in compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 1. Accordingly, there has been no violation of that provision.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Following the acceptance of her asylum claim (2-7 February 2013)154.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court observes that the applicant remained in detention for five days following a decision granting her subsidiary protection. It reiterates that no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of the grounds announced in Article 5 \u00a7 1.155.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed the Government did not rely on any of the listed grounds, and thus, in principle, the detention during this period cannot be considered in compliance with the relevant provision.156.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, the Court observes that, in the criminal detention context, for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c), detention ceases to be justified \u201con the day on which the charge is determined\u201d and that, consequently, detention after acquittal is no longer covered by that provision. However, \u201csome delay in carrying out a decision to release a detainee is often inevitable, although it must be kept to a minimum\u201d (see Labita v.\u00a0Italy\u00a0[GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 171, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).157.\u00a0\u00a0Applying these principles mutatis mutandis to the immigration context, the Court could accept that the original detention falling under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f), some delay may be envisaged in informing the applicant, as an immigration detainee, that she was granted subsidiary protection status and in actualising her release. However, in the present case the applicant was detained for five more days following that decision, and the reasons advanced by the Government cannot justify such duration. It has not been suggested that the applicant would have been homeless and destitute in those five days had it not been for the lodging proposed by the Government, nor can it be accepted that an individual is detained for five days, without any lawful ground, pending a medical clearance based on a simple X-ray.158.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, this supplementary period of detention did not come within sub\u2011paragraph 1 (f), or any other sub-paragraph, of Article 5.159.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 concerning the applicant\u2019s detention following the determination of her asylum claim.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 2 OF THE CONVENTION160.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained under Article 5 \u00a7 2 that the Return Decision and Removal Order, provided to her in English, a language she did not understand, did not contain sufficient information enabling her to challenge her detention. The provision reads as follows:\u201c\u00a0Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.\u201d161.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. Without prejudice to the latter objection, they considered that in the absence of a remedy the complaint had been lodged out of six months from the date when the applicant was detained.162.\u00a0\u00a0As to the merits, the Government submitted that the applicant was served with a removal order and a booklet containing information on her rights. In practice, detainees are also informed orally about this, when they are put on a bus following their arrival. Once they arrive at the detention centre they are orally informed by the staff of the detention centre about their detention and their rights in detention. The immigrants have access to interpreters as well as to NGOs, and also have an interview with the Commissioner for Refugees.163.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that, at the time, she was not in a position to raise a complaint and institute legal proceedings due to the difficulties faced by detainees in pursuing such proceedings.164.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the only documents she received concerning her detention, namely copies of the Return Decision and Removal Order, were standard forms, in English - a language she could not read or understand. Their content solely indicated the reasons why she had been declared a prohibited immigrant in terms of Article 5 of the Immigration Act and stated that in terms of the same provision she would remain in custody until her removal was affected. Thus, this information could not have enabled her, if she deemed fit to challenge the lawfulness of her detention.165.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the absence of a remedy (see paragraph\u00a0121 above), in principle, the six-month time-limit must be calculated from the date of the omission complained of (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 69).166.\u00a0\u00a0Even assuming that in the early stages of her detention the applicant was unable to contest such a measure because of her inability to understand the factual circumstances and her lack of knowledge of the English language, the Court observes that no specific reasons have been brought to the Court\u2019s attention, explaining why she was able to bring proceedings around eight months after her arrival and subsequent detention, but not two months earlier, in order to comply with the six-month rule.167.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances the Court considers that, the applicant having been informed of the reasons of her detention on 27 May 2012, and having lodged her application on 4 February 2013, the complaint is inadmissible for non-compliance with the six-month rule set out in Article 35 \u00a7 1 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION168.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage169.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, as a result of the violations of Article 3 and 5 in the present case.170.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the claim made by the applicant was excessive, and noted that such awards were made by the Court only in cases of excessive beatings by the authorities and other serious Article\u00a03 violations. They considered that a sum of EUR 3,000 would suffice in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, given the circumstances of the case.171.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 solely in relation to a five day period, as well as a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4. In that light it considers it equitable to award the applicant EUR\u00a04,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses172.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 4,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, representing sixty hours of legal work charged at an hourly rate of EUR 60, as well as clerical costs of EUR 400.173.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that such an award should not exceed EUR\u00a02,000.174.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the above criteria and the documents in its possession, as well as to the fact that most of the applicant\u2019s complaints have not been upheld, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,500 covering costs for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest175.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27743":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that, due to his Uzbek ethnic origin, he would face a real risk of ill-treatment if extradited to Kyrgyzstan. He argued that he belonged to a specific group, namely, ethnic Uzbeks suspected of involvement in the violence of June 2010, the members of which were systematically tortured by the Kyrgyz authorities. He also complained that his arguments concerning the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment in the requesting country had not received genuine and thorough consideration by the Russian authorities.The applicant relied on Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, which read as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 13\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0MeritsThe parties\u2019 submissions29.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan had improved since the events of June 2010. International and national commissions of inquiry into the conflict of June 2010 had been established. The Government referred in particular to the work of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the events in southern Kyrgyzstan in June\u00a02010.30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that Kyrgyzstan had enhanced its cooperation with the UN and other international organisations, and had ratified all fundamental international conventions on human rights. In particular, Kyrgyzstan had been a party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10\u00a0December 1984 since 5 September 1997, and to its Optional Protocol of 18\u00a0December 2002 since 29 December 2008. In accordance with that Protocol, international experts regularly visited detention facilities in Kyrgyzstan to monitor the situation in respect of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.31.\u00a0\u00a0The Kyrgyz Republic had also amended its legislation, including the Constitution, to ensure respect for human rights and protection from discrimination. It had abolished the death penalty and introduced prohibition of torture and ill-treatment into its Constitution and Criminal Code. On 7 June 2012 a law establishing a National Centre for the prevention of torture, abuse or any other kind of inhuman or degrading treatment had been enacted.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that, even if some international reports still voiced concerns about the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, reference to a general problem concerning human rights observance in a particular country could not alone serve as a basis for refusing extradition in accordance with the Court\u2019s case-law.33.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further indicated that the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the Kyrgyz Republic had provided the applicant with adequate guarantees against the risk of ill-treatment. It had issued assurances that there were no political grounds for his prosecution, which was not connected with his ethnic origin or religion, that he would not suffer torture or other cruel or degrading treatment, and that his rights to defence would be protected. The Government also referred to additional guarantees developed by the Russian and Kyrgyz authorities which would allow Russian diplomatic staff visiting the place of the applicant\u2019s detention to make sure that his rights were being respected.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government asserted that there were no reasons to doubt the guarantees provided by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office of the Kyrgyz Republic, as it had been acting within its competence and the relations between the two countries were based on long and stable cooperation.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that in the course of their cooperation on extradition matters there had been no instances of violations of the guarantees provided by Kyrgyzstan. They referred to information from the Kyrgyz Republic regarding the outcomes of criminal prosecution of extradited persons. According to that information, in 2012-13 out of 109\u00a0extradited individuals, fifty-five had been sentenced to imprisonment, including seventeen suspended sentences, and fifty-four cases had been closed on various grounds. The Government cited examples of three individuals of Uzbek ethnic origin who had received a suspended sentence, had been released on parole or whose criminal case had been dismissed.36.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to provide substantial evidence that he would face a risk of ill-treatment if extradited to Kyrgyzstan. They submitted that the domestic authorities and courts had thoroughly examined his allegations concerning the risk of ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan in the course of the asylum and extradition proceedings. The applicant had been able to attend those proceedings and to present his position, and had used his right to appeal against the judgments.37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that he was still at a serious and real risk of ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan. He claimed that the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan had not improved since the examination of the Makhmudzhan Ergashev case (see Makhmudzhan Ergashev, cited above), referring to reports by the UN\u00a0Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and respected international NGOs, as well as to the Court\u2019s case-law.38.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicant\u2019s view, the diplomatic assurances relied on by the Government did not suffice to protect him against the risks of ill\u2011treatment in the light of the criteria established in the case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v.\u00a0the United Kingdom (no. 8139\/09, \u00a7 189, ECHR\u00a02012 (extracts)). There was no evidence that Russian diplomatic staff actually visited individuals extradited to Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, no independent monitoring procedure by an independent body had been set up and Russian diplomatic staff could not be considered sufficiently independent to ensure effective follow-up of Kyrgyzstan\u2019s compliance with its undertakings. The applicant submitted that the Government\u2019s example of three individuals of Uzbek ethnic origin released after their extradition to Kyrgyzstan was not indicative, as none of those individuals had been accused of crimes related to the events of June 2010.39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further submitted that the Russian authorities had failed to assess the risks of ill-treatment in the course of the extradition and refugee status proceedings. He claimed that the migration authorities and domestic courts either examined such risks formally or failed to address them at all.C.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will examine the merits of this part of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 in the light of the applicable general principles reiterated in, among other cases, Umirov v. Russia (no.\u00a017455\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a092\u2011100, 18\u00a0September 2012, with further references) and Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 67, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011I).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Russian authorities ordered the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kyrgyzstan. The extradition order has not been enforced as a result of an indication by the Court of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Court will therefore assess whether it could be reasonably said that the applicant faces a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in the event of his extradition to Kyrgyzstan \u2013 the material date for the assessment of that risk being that of the Court\u2019s consideration of the case \u2013 taking into account the assessment made by the domestic courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Bakoyev v. Russia, no. 30225\/11, \u00a7\u00a0113, 5 February 2013).42.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the general human rights climate in the requesting country, the Court observes the following. In a previous case concerning extradition to Kyrgyzstan it found that in 2012 the situation in the south of the country was characterised by torture and other ill\u2011treatment of ethnic Uzbeks by law-enforcement officers, which had increased in the aftermath of the events of June 2010 and remained widespread, aggravated by the impunity of law-enforcement officers. Moreover, the Court established that the issue ought to be seen in the context of the rise of ethno\u2011nationalism in the politics of Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the south, the growing inter-ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, continued discriminatory practices faced by Uzbeks at institutional level and the under\u2011representation of Uzbeks in, amongst others, law-enforcement bodies and the judiciary (see Makhmudzhan Ergashev, cited above, \u00a7 72). As is clear from reports by UN bodies and reputable non-governmental organisations, in 2012-13 the situation in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan had not improved. In particular, various reports are consistent when describing biased attitudes based on ethnicity in investigations, prosecutions, condemnations and sanctions imposed on ethnic Uzbeks charged and convicted in relation to the events of June 2010. The reports also describe a lack of full and effective investigations into the numerous allegations of torture and ill-treatment imputable to Kyrgyz law\u2011enforcement agencies, arbitrary detention and excessive use of force against Uzbeks allegedly involved in the events of June 2010 (see paragraphs 21-26). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the current overall human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan remains highly problematic (see Gayratbek Saliyev v. Russia, no. 39093\/13, \u00a7 61, 17\u00a0April 2014).43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will now examine whether there are any individual circumstances substantiating the applicant\u2019s fears of ill-treatment (see Mamatkulov and Askarov [GC], cited above, \u00a7\u00a073). It reiterates in this respect that where an applicant alleges that he or she is a member of a group that is systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, the protection of Article 3 enters into play when the applicant establishes \u2013 where necessary on the basis of information contained in recent reports by independent international human rights protection bodies or non-governmental organisations \u2013 that there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and his or her membership of the group concerned. In those circumstances the Court will not insist that the applicant show the existence of further special distinguishing features (see Saadi v.\u00a0Italy\u00a0[GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 132, ECHR\u00a02008, and NA. v.\u00a0the\u00a0United\u00a0Kingdom, no.\u00a025904\/07, \u00a7 116, 17 July 2008). The Court considers that this reasoning is of particular relevance in the present case, where the applicant, an ethnic Uzbek, is charged with a number of serious offences allegedly committed in the course of the violence of June 2010 (see, by contrast, Makhmudzhan Ergashev, cited above, \u00a7 73). Given the widespread use by the Kyrgyz authorities of torture and ill\u2011treatment in order to obtain confessions from ethnic Uzbeks charged with involvement in the inter-ethnic riots in June 2010, which has been reported by both UN bodies (see paragraphs 21-22 above) and reputable NGOs (see paragraphs 23-26 above), the Court is satisfied that the applicant belongs to a particularly vulnerable group, the members of which are routinely subjected to treatment proscribed by Article\u00a03 of the Convention in the requesting country.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the above circumstances were brought to the attention of the Russian authorities (see paragraphs 12 and 15 above). The applicant\u2019s application for refugee status was rejected as inadmissible by the migration authorities, which found \u2013 and that finding was subsequently confirmed by the domestic courts \u2013 that he was not eligible for refugee status because there was no evidence that he was being persecuted on the grounds of his ethnic origin (see paragraph 16 above). In view of the above, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s arguments in respect of the risk of ill-treatment were not addressed properly at the domestic level. As for the extradition proceedings, the Court notes the reasoning put forward by the Supreme Court and its failure to take into account materials originating from reliable sources, such as reports by international NGOs (see paragraph 13 above). In such circumstances, the Court is not convinced that the issue of the risk of ill\u2011treatment was subjected to rigorous scrutiny in the asylum or extradition proceedings (see Abdulkhakov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0148).45.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to be considered whether the risk to which the applicant would have been exposed if extradited was alleviated by the diplomatic assurances provided by the Kyrgyz authorities to the Russian Federation. According to the assurances given, the applicant would not be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and Russian diplomatic staff would be given an opportunity to visit him in the detention facility (see paragraph 14 above).46.\u00a0\u00a0Even accepting for the sake of argument that the assurances in question were not couched in general terms, the Court observes that Kyrgyzstan is not a Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights, nor have its authorities demonstrated the existence of an effective system of legal protection against torture that could act as an equivalent to the system required of Contracting States. Moreover, it has not been demonstrated before the Court that Kyrgyzstan\u2019s commitment to guaranteeing access to the applicant by Russian diplomatic staff would lead to effective protection against proscribed ill\u2011treatment in practical terms, as it has not been shown that the aforementioned staff would be in possession of the expertise required for effective assessment of the Kyrgyz authorities\u2019 compliance with their undertakings. Nor was there any guarantee that they would be able to speak to the applicant without witnesses. In addition, their potential involvement was not supported by any practical mechanism setting out, for instance, a procedure by which the applicant could lodge complaints with them or for their unfettered access to detention facilities (see, mutatis mutandis, Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, no.\u00a031890\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 132-33, 3\u00a0October 2013).47.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court cannot accept the Government\u2019s assertion that the assurances provided by the Kyrgyz authorities were sufficient to exclude the risk of his exposure to ill-treatment in the requesting country.48.\u00a0\u00a0Considering the attested widespread and routine use of torture and other ill-treatment by law-enforcement agencies in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in respect of members of the Uzbek community, to which the applicant belongs, the impunity of law\u2011enforcement officers and the absence of sufficient safeguards for the applicant in the requesting country, the Court finds it substantiated that the applicant would face a real risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3 if returned to Kyrgyzstan.49.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kyrgyzstan would be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Article 13 in conjunction with Article 350.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already examined the substance of this complaint in the context of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 44 above). Having regard to the finding relating to Article 3 (see paragraph 49 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine this complaint separately on the merits (see, with further references, Makhmudzhan Ergashev, cited above, \u00a7 79).II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION51.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant relied on the Court to determine the exact amount of the financial award for non\u2011pecuniary damage.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government suggested that, were the Court to find any violation of the Convention in the applicant\u2019s case, such a finding in itself would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that its finding under Article 3 amounts in itself to adequate just satisfaction for the purposes of Article 41.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses55.\u00a0\u00a0Under the head of costs and expenses the applicant claimed RUB\u00a0155,000 (approximately EUR 3,523 at the material time) in respect of his representation by Ms Tseytlina and Mr Golubok before the domestic authorities and EUR 600 in respect of the legal assistance before the Court provided by these lawyers. He also claimed RUB\u00a013,000 (approximately EUR\u00a0310) for various postal and administrative expenses in the proceedings before the Court.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the lawyers\u2019 fees and other expenses were exaggerated.57.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. The applicant did not submit any documents confirming the payment of postal expenses. The Court therefore rejects this part of the claim.58.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the legal fees, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 3,523 in respect of the applicant\u2019s representation in the domestic proceedings and EUR\u00a0600 in respect of the legal assistance provided by Mr\u00a0Golubok and Ms Tseytlina before the Court, plus any tax which may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.III.\u00a0\u00a0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT60.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until: (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if referral of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 4 above) must remain in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection.","27796":"I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: THE LOCUS STANDI OF THE APPLICANT\u2019S PARTNER64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must first address the issue of Ms Yusupova\u2019s entitlement to pursue the application introduced by the applicant.65.\u00a0\u00a0It reiterates that on 8 April 2015 the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the Court that the applicant had died on 14 October 2014 and that his partner wished to take his place in the proceedings before the Court.66.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant\u2019s lawyer, Ms Yusupova had been the applicant\u2019s partner for several years up until his death. As is apparent from the letters, certificates and telegram (see paragraphs 51-54 above), the Russian authorities accepted Ms Yusupova as the applicant\u2019s partner. The Government did not argue otherwise, leaving the issue of Ms\u00a0Yusupova\u2019s standing in the proceedings for the Court to decide.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously considered similar requests (see, for example, Kova\u010di\u0107 and Others v. Slovenia [GC], nos. 44574\/98, 45133\/98 and 48316\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 189-192, 3 October 2008, and Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000-XII), having examined whether or not the persons wishing to pursue the proceedings were close relatives of the applicant (see Scherer v. Switzerland, 25 March 1994, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a031\u201132, Series A no. 287, and Th\u00e9venon v. France (dec.), no. 2476\/02, ECHR 2006-III) and whether the rights concerned were transferable. It continued the examination of cases involving pecuniary claims that were transferable to the deceased applicant\u2019s heirs (see, for example, Ahmet Sad\u0131k v.\u00a0Greece, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 26, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V). The Court has also considered whether the particular case at issue involved an important question of general interest transcending the person and the interests of the applicant (see Bi\u00e7 and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a055955\/00, \u00a7 23, 2\u00a0February 2006; Marie\u2011Louise Loyen and Bruneel v.\u00a0France, no. 55929\/00, \u00a7 29, 5 July 2005; and Karner v.\u00a0Austria, no.\u00a040016\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 25-27, ECHR 2003\u2011IX).68.\u00a0\u00a0In a more recent case Ergezen v. Turkey (no. 73359\/10, \u00a7 29, 8\u00a0April 2014) the Court has applied a less restrictive approach, having held that the decisive point was not whether the rights in question were or were not transferable to the heirs wishing to pursue the procedure, but whether the heirs could in principle claim a legitimate interest in requesting the Court to deal with the case on the basis of the applicant\u2019s wish to exercise his or her individual and personal right to lodge an application with the Court. It has also stated that human rights cases before the Court generally have a moral dimension and persons near to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in ensuring that justice be done, even after the applicant\u2019s death (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011XII).69.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that Ms Yusupova wished it to continue with the examination of the application lodged by the applicant. The Court has previously recognised the locus standi of a de facto partner in the situation of the applicant\u2019s death, referring to the existence of a \u201cfamily\u201d for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention (see Velikova v.\u00a0Bulgaria (dec.), no. 41488\/98, 18 May 1999). In the case at hand, the evidence convincingly shows that the applicant and Ms Yusupova were in a close relationship which equated to \u201cfamily ties\u201d (see paragraphs 51-54 above). The Court is therefore satisfied that the first condition of close kinship is met.70.\u00a0\u00a0In the case of Koryak v. Russia (no. 24677\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 58-68, 13\u00a0November 2012) the Court allowed the next of kin to continue proceedings before it after the death of the direct victim. The circumstances of the Koryak case and the present one are similar. Both cases concern the quality of medical assistance provided to a seriously ill detainee coupled with the question of the existence of effective domestic remedies. Likewise in the present case the Court considers that Ms Yusupova has a legitimate interest in pursuing the application on his behalf and that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires a continuation of the examination of the case.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had not taken steps to safeguard his health and well-being, having failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lastly claimed that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy for complaining about these violations of the guarantee against ill-treatment, as required under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority ....\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties73.\u00a0\u00a0The Government put forward two lines of argument.74.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, they argued that the applicant\u2019s claim should be rejected owing to \u201cpartial non-exhaustion of domestic remedies\u201d. They stated that the applicant should have raised his complaint before the domestic authorities, including the detention facilities\u2019 administration, a prosecutor\u2019s office or a court. However, he had only complained to the Federal Service of the Execution of Sentences in the Volgograd Region and had requested early release on medical grounds.75.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, they argued that the applicant had been subjected to regular medical examinations whilst in detention and that his health status had been duly monitored by medical specialists, who had provided him with the requisite medical assistance and treatment. In 2008 the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis had been successfully treated. His subsequent refusal to take medication resulted in a rapid deterioration of his health. The Government supported their line of reasoning with certificates showing that facility no.\u00a0IZ-34\/1 had several doctors and that the required medicines were always in stock. The Government did not submit the applicant\u2019s medical records for the periods 18 October 2007 to 19 October 2012, 27 May to 21 October 2013 and 16 December 2013 to 14 October 2014, nor any information concerning the quality of the medical services available in facility no.\u00a0IZ\u201134\/5 or colony no. IK-154\/9.76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the authorities of facility no. IZ-34\/5 had not provided him with thorough medical examinations or adequate medical treatment and that he had received no medical attention or medication in colony no. IK-154\/9, despite his numerous requests for medical aid and anti-relapse treatment. He had only had access to basic anti-fever drugs. The temporary detention facility had not been equipped to accommodate seriously ill detainees. It had not had a resident doctor and medicines had often been out of stock. There was a delay in his transfer to institution no.\u00a0LIU-15, by which time his tuberculosis had become barely curable. The applicant also submitted that he had had no access to pulmonary anti\u2011tuberculosis surgery in institution no. LIU-15.77.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the applicant argued that his numerous complaints to the authorities, including oral complaints to the detention authorities, had been fruitless and that he had therefore had no effective remedy by means of which to complain about the quality of his treatment.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government raised an objection in respect of the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. This issue is closely linked to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint that he did not have at his disposal an effective remedy for his complaints concerning the absence of effective medical care. It is therefore necessary to join the Government\u2019s objection to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies and alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention obliges those seeking to bring a case against a State before the Court to first use the remedies provided by the national legal system. Consequently, States are exempted from answering for their acts before an international body until they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. The rule is based on the assumption \u2012 reflected in Article 13 of the Convention, with which it has close affinity \u2012 that there is an effective remedy available to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d under the Convention and to provide appropriate relief. Moreover, it is an important aspect of the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights (see Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 152, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Handyside v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, \u00a7 48, Series A no. 24).81.\u00a0\u00a0An applicant is normally required to have recourse only to those remedies that are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the alleged breaches. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see, inter alia, Vernillo v. France, 20 February 1991, \u00a7 27, Series A no. 198, and Johnston and\u00a0Others v. Ireland, 18 December 1986, \u00a7 22, Series A no. 112). It is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available both in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints, and offered reasonable prospects of success. However, once this burden of proof has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact used or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances exempting him or her from the requirement.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that the application of this rule must make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied in the context of the machinery for the protection of human rights that the Contracting Parties have agreed to set up. Accordingly, it has recognised that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Cardot v. France, 19\u00a0March 1991, \u00a7\u00a034, Series A no. 200). It has further recognised that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically: in reviewing whether it has been observed it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of each individual case (see Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6\u00a0November 1980, \u00a7 35, Series A no. 40). This means, amongst other things, that \u2012 realistically \u2012 account must be taken not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate, as well as the personal circumstances of the applicants (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 65-68, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV).83.\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article\u00a013 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint; the \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. At the same time, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law, in the sense of either preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 157-158, and Wasserman v.\u00a0Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7 45, 10 April 2008).84.\u00a0\u00a0Where the fundamental right to protection against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, the preventive and compensatory remedies must be complementary in order to be considered effective. The existence of a preventive remedy is indispensable for the effective protection of individuals against the kind of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed, the particular importance attached by the Convention to that provision requires, in the Court\u2019s view, that the States Parties establish, over and above a compensatory remedy, an effective mechanism in order to put a rapid end to any such treatment. Were it otherwise, the prospect of future compensation would legitimise particularly severe suffering in breach of this core provision of the Convention (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 78, 24\u00a0July 2008).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case85.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant only \u201cpartially exhausted\u201d the domestic remedies. The Court is not convinced by this submission. The documents produced by the applicant, such as copies of letters from various domestic authorities, show that he complained to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Volgograd Region and that the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Volgograd Region also dealt with his complaints (see paragraph 19 above). The applicant therefore attempted to draw the authorities\u2019 attention to his state of health. This fact alone has on many occasions been sufficient for the Court to dismiss a Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion (see, for instance, Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, \u00a7\u00a078, 5\u00a0February 2013).86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that it has on many occasions examined the effectiveness of the domestic remedies suggested by the Government, namely lodging a complaint with the authorities of a detention facility, prosecutor\u2019s office or a court (see, among many other authorities, Gorbulya v. Russia, no.\u00a031535\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 56-58, 6 March 2014; and Reshetnyak v. Russia, no.\u00a056027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 65-73, 8\u00a0January 2013). In the aforementioned cases the Court established that none of the legal avenues put forward by the Government constituted an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his or her complaints under Article\u00a03 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Government\u2019s objections of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies were dismissed.87.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the applicant\u2019s grave health problems and the seriousness of his allegations about the way they were faced, the Court considers that he had an \u201carguable claim\u201d of inadequate medical care in detention and that the authorities, accordingly, had an obligation to ensure the availability of an effective remedy to deal with the substance of his complaint. Taking into account the circumstances of the present case and the aforementioned case\u2011law, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous findings on the issue. It concludes that the legal avenues put forward by the Government did not constitute an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.88.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and finds a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violations of Article 3 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles as to the Court\u2019s evaluation of the facts and burden of proof89.\u00a0\u00a0In cases in which there are conflicting accounts of events, the Court is inevitably confronted, when establishing the facts, with the same difficulties as those faced by any first-instance court. It reiterates that, in assessing evidence, it has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, it has never been its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that standard. Its role is to rule not on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States\u2019 responsibility under the Convention. The specificity of its task under Article 19 of the Convention \u2013 to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention \u2012 conditions its approach to the issues of evidence and proof. In proceedings before the Court there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions. In accordance with its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (see Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012, and the cases cited therein).90.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. The Court reiterates its case-law under Articles\u00a02 and 3 of the Convention to the effect that \u2012 where the events at issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody \u2012 strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries, damage and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV; Salman v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII; and Oleg Nikitin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a036410\/02, \u00a7\u00a045, 9 October 2008). In the absence of such an explanation the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the respondent Government (see, for instance, Buntov v. Russia, no.\u00a027026\/10, \u00a7 161, 5\u00a0June 2012 and Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7\u00a0274, 18\u00a0June 2002).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0General principles as regards the standards of medical care for detainees91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0162, Series A no. 25).92.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III, with further references).93.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7\u00a0208, 13\u00a0July 2006). In most cases concerning the detention of sick people, the Court has examined whether or not the applicant received adequate medical care in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to assure the health and well-being of detainees as an obligation on the part of the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094; Khudobin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts); and Kalashnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI).94.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists, in particular, that authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko, cited above, \u00a7 100; Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21\u00a0December 2010; Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29\u00a0November 2007; Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0104-106, 28 March 2006; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7\u00a0121, 7\u00a0November 2006) and that \u2012 where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition \u2012 supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at successfully treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109 and 114, and Sarban v. Moldova, no.\u00a03456\/05, \u00a7\u00a079, 4\u00a0October 2005). The Court reiterates that medical treatment within prison facilities must be appropriate and comparable to the quality of treatment which the State authorities have committed themselves to providing for the entirety of the population. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each detainee must be guaranteed the same level of medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no.\u00a02447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012).95.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves a fair degree of flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7\u00a0140, 22\u00a0December 2008).(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case96.\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court will firstly determine the place and period of the applicant\u2019s detention in 2007\u20112009, as these circumstances were disputed between the parties.97.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to a certificate issued by the head of facility no. IZ-34\/1, the Government asserted that from 15 July 2007 to 22 October 2009 the applicant had been detained in that facility. The applicant, however, insisted that from 18 October 2007 to 27 June 2009 he had been detained in facility no. IZ-34\/5.98.\u00a0\u00a0The reliability of the Government\u2019s submissions is compromised by ample evidence submitted by the applicant. Thus, according to the Town Court\u2019s judgment of 28 May 2008, the applicant was arrested and placed in custody on 16 October 2007, and not on 15 July 2007 as the Government argued (see paragraph 8 above). The appeal judgment of 9\u00a0September 2008 indicated that on 16 October 2007 the applicant was placed in facility no.\u00a0IZ-34\/5 (see paragraph 9 above). In its letter of 29 April 2008 the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Volgograd Region also confirmed that from 18 October 2007 he was kept in facility no.\u00a0IZ\u201134\/5 (see paragraph 19 above). A number of letters in 2008 and 2009 were dispatched from and received by the applicant in facility no. IZ-34\/5 (see paragraph 10 above).99.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances the Court accepts that after his arrest on 16 October 2007 and until 27 June 2009 the applicant was detained in facility no. IZ-34\/5 and not in facility no. IZ-34\/1, as submitted by the Government.100.\u00a0\u00a0As to whether the applicant was afforded adequate medical care whilst in detention the Court\u2019s task is complicated by the need to assess evidence that calls for expert knowledge in various medical fields. In this connection it emphasises that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, and recognises that it must be cautious in assuming the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d (see, mutatis mutandis, Georgiy Bykov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7\u00a051, 14 October 2010 and Ribitsch v. Austria, 4\u00a0December 1995, \u00a7 32, Series A no. 336).101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined a large number of cases against Russia raising complaints of inadequate medical services afforded to inmates (see, among the most recent ones, Patranin v. Russia, no. 12983\/14, 23\u00a0July 2015; Gorelov v. Russia, no. 49072\/11, 9 January 2014; Budanov v. Russia, no.\u00a066583\/11, 9 January 2014; Bubnov v. Russia, no. 76317\/11, 5\u00a0February 2013; Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461\/10, 27 November 2012; and Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, 8 January 2013). In the absence of any effective remedy in Russia to handle those complaints, the Court has been obliged to perform a first \u2012 hand evaluation of the evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention had been respected. In that role, paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants in view of their detention, the Court has called on the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the parties\u2019 argument that the applicant had been infected with hepatitis C and had had a history of tuberculosis treatment prior to his arrest in October 2007. That shows that he belonged to a category of detainees who require special medical attention in order to prevent a relapse of their tuberculosis. In 2009 his tuberculosis recurred, he started coughing up blood, and several years later he died from tuberculosis whilst in detention. These circumstances seen in their entirety amounted to a prima facie claim of inadequate medical assistance. The fact that at the relevant period the applicant was under the authorities\u2019 control, and was therefore particularly vulnerable, shifted the burden of proof onto the respondent Government. The latter had to show that the authorities had taken adequate steps to safeguard the applicant\u2019s health and well-being by providing him with adequate medical care.103.\u00a0\u00a0However, despite the Court\u2019s request to be provided with medical documents covering the entire period of the applicant\u2019s detention, the Government failed to provide any documents relating to the applicant\u2019s treatment in facility no. IZ-34\/5 and colony no. IK-154\/9. The Court therefore accepts the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the absence of regular medical examinations and anti-relapse treatment in those facilities for a period of two years from October 2007 to October 2009. This in itself casts serious doubts on the authorities\u2019 fulfilment of their obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.104.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court considers it necessary to look more closely at the quality of the medical treatment the applicant received in institution no.\u00a0LIU-15.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that on 29 October 2012, the date of the applicant\u2019s first admission to institution no. LIU-15, he was subjected to a number of basic clinical tests and examinations. He was placed on a drug regimen the same day. However, despite the authorities\u2019 knowledge of the applicant\u2019s long-term affliction with tuberculosis and his remaining a smear-positive \u2012 and thus tuberculosis-active \u2012 patient for an unusually long period, it was not until 11\u00a0February 2013, that is to say over five years after his arrest and the authorities\u2019 resultant responsibility to address the applicant\u2019s health issues, that a drug susceptibility test was performed for the first time (see paragraph 33 above). That test is the primary requirement established by the World Health Organization for the correct diagnosis and treatment of all previously treated tuberculosis patients, such as the applicant, given the particularly high risk they run of suffering from drug-resistant tuberculosis. The test would not only have allowed the efficient finalising of diagnostic procedures and allocation of the applicant\u2019s case to a standard treatment category, but would also have guided the choice of appropriate regimen adjustments in line with the results of the test. The delay in conducting the applicant\u2019s test was a breach of the WHO\u2019s recommendations and risked depriving the treatment the applicant received of its major therapeutic effects (see Kushnir v. Ukraine, no. 42184\/09, \u00a7\u00a0146, 11 December 2014; Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, \u00a7\u00a086, 8\u00a0January 2013; and Pakhomov v. Russia, no. 44917\/08, \u00a7 67, 30\u00a0September 2010).106.\u00a0\u00a0While the Court finds the absence of proper and timely testing for the purpose of establishing the most adequate treatment formula to be the major flaw in the medical care afforded to the applicant whilst in detention, it is also mindful of another serious deficiency in the medical services the applicant received in institution no. LIU-15. Although the authorities were aware of his hepatitis C, they took no steps to consider whether the applicant\u2019s treatment regimen was compatible with his liver disease, even when the applicant directly asked them to do so. The first liver function test was not performed until 8 February 2013 (see paragraph 33 above), that is to say more than three months after the initiation of the applicant\u2019s new chemotherapy regimen and more than five years after the authorities became aware of his medical condition. The applicant was prescribed hepatoprotectors at the end of October 2013 (see paragraph 41 above). Such reluctance on the part of the authorities ran counter to the WHO recommendation to perform liver function tests at the start of and during tuberculosis treatment, and to give fewer hepatotoxic drugs to patients with serious liver diseases (see paragraph 63 above).107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes the Government\u2019s argument that the deterioration in the applicant\u2019s health in institution no. LIU-15 was aggravated by his refusal to take some of the prescribed medicines. However it does not, in any event, considers that as decisive. The documents provided by the Government, in particular the epicrisis of 27 February 2013 and the regime violation record, drawn up on 6\u00a0March 2013, made no mention of the duration of the applicant\u2019s refusal to take drugs or specific instances or dates when such refusals had been recorded (see paragraph 34 above). The Court is also mindful of the legitimacy of whatever refusal on the part of the applicant, given that, as is apparent from the documents presented, he had cited his failing liver and the need to address his hepatitis C as the reason underlying his refusal. Moreover, the Court did not find any evidence in the documents presented that, having encountered the applicant\u2019s refusal, the authorities provided supervision and support to assist him in completing the full course of treatment. In any event, the fact that on some occasions in February and March 2013 the applicant did indeed refuse to take certain drugs cannot explain the rapid deterioration of his health throughout the entire period of his detention and exonerate the authorities for having failed to provide necessary medical assistance.108.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court finds that the aforementioned deficiencies in the applicant\u2019s treatment during his detention between 16\u00a0October 2007 and 15 May 2013 are sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the authorities failed to take the steps necessary to safeguard his health and well-being, and to provide him with adequate medical assistance.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the applicant was released on 15\u00a0May 2013 and spent the subsequent two months of his detention in a civilian hospital undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. From the date of his renewed arrest in July 2013 until 21 October 2013 the applicant \u2012 who at that time was suffering from a severe and extremely advanced stage of tuberculosis and was in need of a comprehensive and complex in-patient treatment \u2012 had no access to the requisite medical aid (see paragraph 39 above). The Court finds it unacceptable that for those three months he was left without vital medical assistance that may have enabled him to fight the illnesses that were threatening his life. The Court has not been persuaded that there was no causal link between the lack of treatment in that period and the subsequent rapid deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health leading to his death.110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court was not provided with any information describing the applicant\u2019s treatment in institution no. LIU-15 during the last months of his life. As a result it is not in a position to properly assess the quality of the medical services afforded to the applicant during that period. However, it appears that, by that time, the applicant\u2019s health had been undermined to such an extent that recovery was barely possible.111.\u00a0\u00a0However even without the above conclusion, the Court\u2019s finding of serious deficiencies in the applicant\u2019s treatment during the major period of his detention would still remain. The applicant did not receive comprehensive, effective and transparent medical treatment for his illness whilst he was in detention and the Court finds that, as a result of this lack of adequate medical treatment, the applicant was exposed to prolonged mental and physical suffering that diminished his human dignity. The authorities\u2019 failure to provide the applicant with the medical care he needed amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convection.112.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court concludes there was a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION113.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage1.\u00a0\u00a0Pecuniary damage114.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage caused as a result of the expenses incurred by his relatives in supporting him whilst in detention and on account of the anti-tuberculosis surgery which arguably should have been performed to improve his health.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the claim was unsubstantiated.116.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the fact that the applicant did not provide the Court with evidence in support of this claim, the Court is unable to accept it.2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-pecuniary damage117.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.118.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this claim was excessive.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, considers it reasonable to award EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid in full to Ms Yusupova, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses120.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 100 for postal services, photocopying and telephone expenses to be paid directly to him and EUR\u00a03,750 for legal costs to be paid into the bank account of his representative.121.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the claim was ill-founded.122.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, and bearing in mind that the applicant was granted EUR 850 in legal aid for his representation by Mr E. Markov, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court, of which EUR 100 is to be paid to Ms Yusupova and EUR 1,900 into the bank account of Mr\u00a0E.\u00a0Markov, the lawyer who represented the applicant in the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27793":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had not taken steps to safeguard his health and well-being, having failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lastly claimed that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy whereby to complain about these violations of the guarantee against ill-treatment, as required under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government put forward two lines of argument.40.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, they argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies. They stated that the applicant should have raised his complaint before domestic authorities, including the detention administrations, a prosecutor or a court. However, he had failed to do so.41.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, they argued that the applicant had been provided with adequate medical care in detention. According to the Government, the opinions provided by Dr K. were refuted by an ample body of credible medical documents, such as a number of expert reports prepared by various medical specialists.42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints. He stated that he was in need of brain surgery and in-patient treatment in a specialised medical institution and that the detention authorities were unable to provide either of these. The applicant supported his arguments with the certificate issued by Drs K. and T. (see paragraphs 21 and 27 above). The applicant also asserted that authorities had disregarded his doctor\u2019s recommendations, having sent him to a colony in a northerly region to serve his sentence. He insisted that the cold could have led to an increased risk to his life and limb. Finally, the applicant alleged that he had no effective remedy by which to complain about the poor quality of his medical treatment.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government raised the objection of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies. This issue is closely linked to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint that he did not have at his disposal an effective remedy whereby to air his dissatisfaction with the quality of the medical care afforded to him in detention. It is therefore necessary to join the Government\u2019s objection to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies and alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention obliges those seeking to bring a case against a State before the Court to first use the remedies provided by the national legal system. Consequently, States are exempted from answering for their acts before an international body before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. The rule is based on the assumption \u2012 reflected in Article 13 of the Convention, with which it has close affinity \u2012 that there is an effective remedy available to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d under the Convention and to provide appropriate relief. Moreover, it is an important aspect of the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights (see Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 152, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Handyside v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, \u00a7 48, Series A no. 24).46.\u00a0\u00a0An applicant is normally required to have recourse only to those remedies that are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the alleged breaches. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see, inter alia, Vernillo v. France, 20 February 1991, \u00a7 27, Series A no. 198).47.\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint; the \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. At the same time, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law, in the sense of either preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 157-158, and Wasserman v.\u00a0Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7 45, 10 April 2008).48.\u00a0\u00a0Where the fundamental right to protection against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, the preventive and compensatory remedies must be complementary in order to be considered effective. The existence of a preventive remedy is indispensable for the effective protection of individuals against the kind of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed, the particular importance attached by the Convention to that provision requires, in the Court\u2019s view, that the States Parties establish, over and above a compensatory remedy, an effective mechanism in order to put a rapid end to any such treatment. Were it otherwise, the prospect of future compensation would legitimise particularly severe suffering in breach of this core provision of the Convention (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 78, 24\u00a0July 2008).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case49.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies and that he should have at least raised his complaints before the administrations of the detention facilities, a prosecutor or a court.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has on many occasions examined the effectiveness of the domestic remedies suggested by the Government in cases of applicants complaining of ongoing inadequate medical treatment, such as in the present case. It has found, in particular, that in deciding on a complaint concerning breaches of domestic regulations governing the provision of medical care to detainees, the prison authorities would not have a sufficiently independent standpoint to satisfy the requirements of Article\u00a035 of the Convention (see Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, \u00a7\u00a079, 13\u00a0November 2012, and Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461\/10, \u00a7\u00a075, 27\u00a0November 2012). The Court has also stressed that even though review by a supervising prosecutor plays an important part in securing appropriate medical care in detention, a complaint to the supervising prosecutor falls short of the requirements of an effective remedy because of the procedural shortcomings that have been previously identified in the Court\u2019s case-law (see Koryak, \u00a7 80-81, cited above). Having assessed a civil claim for compensation under the tort provisions of the Civil Code, the Court has held that such a claim could not offer an applicant any redress other than a purely compensatory award, and could not put an end to a situation where there is an ongoing violation, such as inadequate medical care (see Reshetnyak v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 65-73, 8 January 2013). Moreover, the Court has found that such a remedy did not offer reasonable prospects of success, in particular because the award was conditional on the establishment of fault on the part of the authorities, which was extremely improbable in a situation where domestic legal norms prescribed the application of a certain measure, for instance certain conditions of detention or level of medical treatment (see A.B. v. Russia, no. 1439\/06, \u00a7 96, 14\u00a0October 2010).51.\u00a0\u00a0Having declared the applicant\u2019s claim of inadequate medical care in detention admissible (see paragraph 44 above), and given the applicant\u2019s health problems and the seriousness of his allegations, the Court finds that it was arguable. Accordingly, the respondent State had an obligation to ensure the availability of an effective remedy to deal with the substance of his complaint. Taking into account the circumstances of the present case and the aforementioned case-law, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous findings on the issue. It concludes that the legal avenues put forward by the Government did not constitute an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.52.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection alleging the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and finds that the applicant did not have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaint, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violations of Article 3 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0162, Series A no. 25).54.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, 2002\u2011III, with further references).55.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7\u00a0208, 13\u00a0July 2006). In most cases concerning the detention of sick people, the Court has examined whether or not the applicant received adequate medical care in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to assure the health and well-being of detainees as an obligation on the part of the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094; Khudobin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts); and Kalashnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI).56.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists, in particular, that authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v.\u00a0Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011; Gladkiy v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a03242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21\u00a0December 2010; Hummatov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos.\u00a09852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29\u00a0November 2007; Melnik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0104-106, 28 March 2006; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7\u00a0121, 7\u00a0November\u00a02006) and that \u2011 where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition \u2012 supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at successfully treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109 and 114, and Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a03456\/05, \u00a7\u00a079, 4\u00a0October 2005). The Court further reiterates that medical treatment within prison facilities must be appropriate and comparable to the quality of treatment which the State authorities have committed themselves to providing for the entirety of the population. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each detainee must be guaranteed the same medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7\u00a066, 7\u00a0February 2012).57.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court applies a degree of flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7\u00a0140, 22\u00a0December 2008).58.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of an effective remedy to air complaints of inadequate medical services afforded to inmates, the Court may find itself obliged to perform the first-hand evaluation of evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention had been respected (see Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, 13 November 2012; Dirdizov v. Russia, no.\u00a041461\/10, 27 November 2012; Reshetnyak v. Russia, no.\u00a056027\/10, 8\u00a0January 2013; Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108\/11, 5 February 2013; Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, 5 February 2013; Bubnov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a076317\/11, 5 February 2013; Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, 9\u00a0January 2014, and Gorelov v. Russia, no. 49072\/11, 9 January 2014; Amirov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 51857\/13, 27 November 2014, \u00a7 90). In that role, paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants in view of their detention, the Court consistently calls on the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case59.\u00a0 Turning to the present case the Court observes that the parties provided contradictory medical opinions assessing the state of the applicant\u2019s health and his medical needs. While the applicant submitted certificates stating that brain surgery and in-patient treatment were required (see paragraphs 11, 20, 21 and 27 above), the Government referred to medical reports and opinions proclaiming the sufficiency of out-patient treatment based on proper supervision and appropriate drug therapy (see paragraphs 18, 22, 24 and 28 above).60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore finds itself in a situation in which it has to undertake a first-hand evaluation of the evidence before it in order to determine whether or not the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention have been respected.61.\u00a0\u00a0Seeing no grounds to doubt the independence or competence of the doctors who prepared the opinions and reports for the parties, the Court will pay particular regard to the amount of factual information accessible to them to arrive at their conclusions.62.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court notes that the reports by the expert commissions and panels, and the records and certificates issued by the doctors in the detention facilities and prison hospitals \u2012 as submitted by the Government \u2012 were based on the applicant\u2019s complete medical history, with personal first-hand examinations and check-ups of the applicant forming a major part of the health assessment process. Drs K. and T. did not possess the same knowledge of the applicant\u2019s situation. Thus, Doctor T. was not the applicant\u2019s attending doctor, having never seen \u2012 let alone examined \u2011 the applicant during his stay in the hospital. He was not in close contact with him and based his opinion purely on medical documents drafted in 1997-1998 during the applicant\u2019s stay in a civilian hospital (see paragraph 11 above). Dr K. saw the applicant on only two occasions (see paragraphs 20 and 23 above), and conducted a primarily visual examination of the patient. His recent opinion was drafted almost a year after his last visit to the applicant (see paragraph 23 above). The Court does not see any reason to conclude that Drs K. and T. were denied access to the applicant or to his complete medical file.63.\u00a0\u00a0 In these circumstances, the Court is prepared to attach particular weight to the medical evidence submitted by the Government. It is also mindful of the vagueness of the wording of the medical reports submitted by the applicant, particularly when they dealt with the signs of his deteriorating health. The opinions submitted by the applicant did not make any reference to objective data, such as specific information regarding the size of the applicant\u2019s cyst and the progress of its growth. The Court therefore has no choice but to reject the applicant\u2019s argument \u2012 based exclusively on the disputed medical reports \u2012 that he was in need of urgent brain surgery and\/or required long-term in-patient treatment in a specialised hospital and that his detention in a northerly region posed a particular threat to his health.64.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the medical history of the applicant, as submitted by the Government, the Court observes that in detention the applicant remained under close dynamic medical supervision by a number of specialists, including a neurologist. The prison authorities were compliant with the requirement to maintain a complete medical file and to send it promptly to every detention facility to which the applicant was transferred. The prisons\u2019 medical personnel were therefore immediately aware of his health problems and were in a position to duly respond to them should the need arise (see paragraph 26 above). The applicant was transferred, without any particular delay, subsequent to the prison doctors\u2019 recommendations, to specialist medical institutions for an in-depth analysis of his condition (see paragraphs\u00a016 and 17 above). The only occasion which fell outside that rule was in September 2011 when Gaaza prison hospital refused to admit the applicant, given the absence of an appropriate specialist (see paragraph 19 above). While the Court considers that event unfortunate, it does not see any evidence that the applicant persisted in his complaint about headaches which was what led to the decision to take him to Gaaza hospital, or that his condition deteriorated as a result of the refusal to admit him.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that, apart from the incident in September 2011 described above, the prison medical personnel made use of various medical procedures, including some high-tech and very complex ones, to assess the progress of the applicant\u2019s illness, prescribe appropriate drug therapy, and to adjust his treatment when necessary (see paragraphs 14, 17 and 24 above). The applicant\u2019s secondary illness, tuberculosis, was promptly and efficiently brought under control and treated (see paragraph 16 above). There is no objective data suggesting any serious deterioration in the applicant\u2019s health throughout the years of his detention which the Court can attribute to the authorities\u2019 negligence or failure to provide the applicant with the adequate medical care.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is aware of the fact that in the ten years prior to the applicant\u2019s arrest, and despite the doctors\u2019 recommendations, he did not take any steps to keep his condition under control. He neither subjected himself to appropriate diagnostic procedures nor underwent in-patient treatment in a civil hospital (see paragraph 11 above).67.\u00a0\u00a0Before drawing its final conclusion in respect of the applicant\u2019s treatment, the Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as ensuring that every detainee should receive medical care at the same level as that offered \u201cin the best civilian clinics\u201d (see Mirilashivili v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no. 6293\/04, 10 July 2007). It has further held that it is \u201cprepared to accept that, in principle, the resources of medical facilities within the penitentiary system are limited compared to those of civilian clinics\u201d (see Grishin v. Russia, no. 30983\/02, \u00a7 76, 15 November 2007).68.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing this in mind, the Court concludes that the domestic authorities afforded the applicant appropriate medical care as guaranteed by Article 3 of the Convention.69.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION70.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.","27794":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION12.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of poor sanitary conditions in the cells in which he had been kept at the prison in Wronki, and in particular he complained that the toilet facilities were not properly separated from the rest of the cell. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d13.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility14.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions15.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he was a victim of degrading treatment at Wronki Prison on account of the poor sanitary conditions in the cells where he was serving his sentence. The toilet facilities were not properly separated from the cells. The only method of separation consisted of a fibreboard partition 1.20 m high without a door, which did not provide even a minimum level of privacy and breached his right to the dignity of his person.16.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that between 31 March 2010 and 6\u00a0December 2011 the applicant had been detained in Wronki Prison. During that period he had been placed in ten different cells. None of the cells had been overcrowded. All the cells were equipped with ventilation and windows that could be opened. The ventilation facilities were checked every four months. As regards heating, the Government submitted that the heating system in Wronki Prison was automatic and that the temperature in the cells depended on the air temperature outside. The cells were thus properly ventilated and heated. They further submitted that at the request of the applicant the windows had been sealed and the heaters replaced with new ones. He had also been granted permission to use an additional reading lamp, had received personal hygiene items as provided for by domestic law and had constant access to running water from a tap.17.\u00a0\u00a0The Government admitted that in seven of the ten cells in which the applicant had been kept, the toilet had been separated from the rest of the cell by a fibreboard partition without doors. In the three other cells in which the applicant had been detained at the prison, the toilet had been fully separated off.18.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Government submitted that the applicant had been allowed to leave his cell for various activities organised within the prison, such as volleyball and basketball. He was able likewise to participate in cultural and educational activities, and had access to a library and a day room with a television.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles19.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. The Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim\u2019s conduct (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).20.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has held on many occasions, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article\u00a03. Although the question whether the purpose of the treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a067\u201168 and 74, ECHR 2001-III, and Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, \u00a7\u00a0101, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011VIII).21.\u00a0\u00a0Measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve an inevitable element of suffering or humiliation. Nevertheless, the level of suffering and humiliation involved must not go beyond that which is inevitably connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment.22.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of prisoners, the Court has emphasised that a detained person does not lose, by the mere fact of his incarceration, the protection of his rights guaranteed by the Convention. On the contrary, persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them. Under Article 3 the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured. (see\u00a0Vala\u0161inas, cited above, \u00a7 102, and Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7\u00a094, ECHR 2000-XI).23.\u00a0\u00a0When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7\u00a046, ECHR 2001-II). The length of the period during which a person is detained in the particular conditions also has to be considered (see, among other authorities, Alver v.\u00a0Estonia, no. 64812\/01, 8\u00a0November 2005).24.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of prison conditions the Court has frequently found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in cases which involved overcrowding in prison cells (see, among many other authorities, Lind v.\u00a0Russia, no. 25664\/05, \u00a7 59, 6 December 2007, and Orchowski, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0135). However, in other cases where the overcrowding was not so severe as to raise an issue in itself under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court noted other aspects of the physical conditions of detention as being relevant for its assessment of compliance with that provision. Such elements included, in particular, the availability of ventilation, access to natural light or air, the adequacy of heating arrangements, compliance with basic sanitary requirements and the possibility of using the toilet in private. Thus, even in cases where a larger prison cell was at issue \u2013 measuring between 3 and 4\u00a0sq. m per inmate \u2013 the Court found a violation of Article 3 since the space factor was coupled with an established lack of ventilation and lighting (see, for example, Babushkin v. Russia, no. 67253\/01, \u00a7 44, 18 October 2007; Ostrovar v. Moldova, no. 35207\/03, \u00a7 89, 13 September 2005; and Peers, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 70-72), or with a lack of basic privacy in the detainee\u2019s everyday life (see, mutatis mutandis, Belevitskiy v. Russia, no.\u00a072967\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a073-79, 1 March 2007; Vala\u0161inas, cited above, \u00a7 104; Khudoyorov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a06847\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 106-107, ECHR 2005\u2011X (extracts); and Novoselov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 66460\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 32, 40-43, 2 June 2005).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case25.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was detained in Wronki Prison between 31 March 2010 and 6\u00a0December 2011, that is, for one year and eight months. During this time he was placed in ten different cells, three of which had sanitary facilities completely separated from the rest of the cell (see paragraph 17 above).26.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s allegations as regards insufficient ventilation and heating and a lack of light in the cells in which he was kept were not confirmed in the proceedings before the domestic courts (see paragraph\u00a08 above) which examined his claim of a violation of his personal rights. The courts did confirm, however, that the sanitary facilities situated at the entrance to seven of his cells had indeed only been separated from the rest of the cell by a fibreboard partition and had no doors (see paragraphs 8 and 17 above).27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in previous cases where the insufficient partition between sanitary facilities and the rest of the cell was at issue, other aggravating factors were present and only their cumulative effect allowed it to find a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see Canali v.\u00a0France, no. 40119\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a052-53, 25 April 2013, and Peers, cited above, \u00a7\u00a073). In contrast, in the present case, as appears from the Government\u2019s submissions, confirmed by the findings made by the domestic courts, the only hardship that the applicant had to bear was the insufficient separation of the sanitary facilities from the rest of the cell. Apart from that, the cells were properly lit, heated and ventilated. The applicant also had access to various activities outside the cells (see paragraphs 8 and 16 above).28.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into consideration the foregoing, the Court considers that the overall circumstances of the applicant\u2019s detention in Wronki Prison cannot be found to have caused distress and hardship which exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention or went beyond the threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention.29.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of this provision in the present case.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTIONA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the circumstances of the present case amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:\u201c1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the sanitary facilities were only separated from the rest of the cell by a fibreboard partition that was 1.20 m high and had no doors. He had requested that the prison authorities at least provide a curtain to separate the sanitary facilities from the rest of the cell in a way that would provide for a minimum of privacy. His requests were, however, refused on the grounds that domestic law did not contain special rules as regards the way in which sanitary facilities should be separated from the rest of the cell.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment on those submissions. They submitted, however, that even though the sanitary facilities had indeed not been completely separated from the rest of the cell, the applicant had been ensured a sufficient degree of privacy.33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that even though a measure falls short of treatment prohibited by Article 3, it may fall foul of Article\u00a08 of the Convention (see, in another factual context, Wainwright v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no.\u00a012350\/04, \u00a7\u00a043, ECHR 2006\u2011X).35.\u00a0\u00a0Prisoners in general continue to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention, save for the right to liberty, where lawfully imposed detention expressly falls within the scope of Article\u00a05 of the Convention (see Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no.\u00a02) [GC], no.\u00a074025\/01, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2005-IX).36.\u00a0\u00a0Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference. In addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in ensuring that respect for private and family life is effective. Those obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private and family life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. The boundaries between the State\u2019s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In particular, in both instances regard must be had to the fair balance to be struck between the competing interests (see Odi\u00e8vre v.\u00a0France [GC], no.\u00a042326\/98, \u00a7 40, ECHR 2003\u2011III, and Evans v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339\/05, \u00a7 75, ECHR 2007\u2011I).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the principles to the circumstances of the present case37.\u00a0\u00a0As noted above, the applicant was detained in Wronki Prison, and in seven of the ten cells where he was kept, the sanitary facilities were only separated from the rest of the cell by a fibreboard partition. The sanitary facilities were situated at the entrance to the cell and had no doors.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has frequently found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of poor conditions of detention where the lack of a sufficient divide between the sanitary facilities and the rest of the cell was just one element of those conditions (see paragraph 24 above with further references). It therefore follows from the Court\u2019s case-law that the domestic authorities have a positive obligation to provide access to sanitary facilities which are separated from the rest of the prison cell in a way which ensures a minimum of privacy for the inmates. The Court observes that according to the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (\u201cCPT\u201d), a sanitary annex which is only partially separated off is not acceptable in a cell occupied by more than one detainee (CPT\/Inf (2012) 13, \u00a7 78, and 2nd General Report (CPT\/Inf (92) 3), \u00a7 49). In-cell toilets should be provided with a full partition extending up to the ceiling (CPT\/Inf (2015) 12, \u00a7\u00a074). In particular, the CPT has recommended, after visits to Polish prisons, that a full partition be installed in all in-cell sanitary annexes (see, for example, CPT\/Inf (2014)\u00a021, \u00a7\u00a061, and CPT\/Inf (2011) 20, \u00a7\u00a7 105 and 106).39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that between 31 March 2010 and 6\u00a0December 2011 the applicant was placed in ten cells, seven of which had sanitary facilities which were not fully separated off. In those cells he had to use the toilet in the presence of other inmates and was thus deprived of a basic level of privacy in his everyday life. The applicant raised the matter with the prison authorities and requested that at least a curtain be hung in place to separate off the sanitary facilities. The prison authorities replied that domestic law did not set out specific regulations as regards the way in which sanitary facilities were to be fitted and separated off in prison cells (see paragraph 31 above).40.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that in the present case the domestic authorities failed to discharge their positive obligation of ensuring a minimum level of privacy for the applicant when he was detained in Wronki Prison.41.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into consideration the above, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION42.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 32,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered this claim excessive.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR\u00a01,800 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not make any claim for costs and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27807":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTIONA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the factual basis of a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant\u2019s son had not been established beyond all reasonable doubt. They argued that the death of the applicant\u2019s son had been the result of his throwing himself out of a window on the fifth floor. Sergey Lykov had committed this suicidal act, they asserted, on account of an unhappy set of personal circumstances, which the police officers had not been in a position either to foresee or to prevent. According to the Government, the forensic doctor had been unable to determine whether certain injuries could be attributed to reasons other than the fall \u2013 in particular the use of handcuffs, a struggle or ill-treatment.111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested that argument. She noted that the existence of a torture session inflicted on her son had been attested by the statements of witness P., who had been present in the police premises. She thus dismissed as absurd the version of suicide, since her son had never expressed any intention whatsoever of taking his own life. Moreover, the applicant pointed out the contradictions which, in her opinion, undermined this version: if \u2013 as the Government implicitly alleged \u2013 her son had simply preferred death to the perspective of going to prison, she could hardly see why he would have decided to confess to an offence that had been unknown to the police themselves up until that point (see paragraph 16 above). For the remainder, the applicant considered that it could not be excluded that the act of defenestration was more a gesture of despair than an act of suicide as such. Referring to the Mikheyev judgment (Mikheyev v. Russia, no.\u00a077617\/01, 26\u00a0January 2006), she supposed that her son, after several hours of unbearable torture, had been in such a state of mind that he saw no other solution but to throw himself from the window to escape his suffering.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 2 ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention, one which, in peace time, admits of no derogation under Article 15. Together with Article 3, it enshrines one of the basic values of democratic societies. The Court reiterates that the first sentence of Article 2 enjoins the Contracting States not only to refrain from the taking of life \u201cintentionally\u201d or by the \u201cuse of force\u201d disproportionate to the legitimate aims referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of the second paragraph of that provision, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see Kleyn and Aleksandrovich v. Russia, no. 40657\/04, \u00a7 43, 3 May 2012, and Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458\/02, \u00a7\u00a0174, ECHR 2011 (extracts)).114.\u00a0\u00a0The obligations on Contracting States take on a particular dimension where detainees are concerned since detainees are entirely under the control of the authorities. In view of their vulnerability, the authorities are under a duty to protect them. The Court has accordingly found, under Article 3 of the Convention, that, where applicable, it is incumbent on the State to give a convincing explanation for any injuries suffered in custody or during other forms of deprivation of liberty, which obligation is particularly stringent where that individual dies (see Slimani v. France, no. 57671\/00, \u00a7\u00a027, ECHR 2004\u2011IX (extracts)). In the absence of such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government (see El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7 152, ECHR 2012, and Mikheyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0102).115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that Article 2 may imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual from the acts of another individual or, in certain particular circumstances, from himself or herself (see Tanribilir v. Turkey, no.\u00a021422\/93, \u00a7\u00a070, 16\u00a0November 2000; Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2001\u2011III; and Opuz v. Turkey, no.\u00a033401\/02, \u00a7\u00a0128, ECHR 2009).However, this obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, without losing sight of the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. Not every claimed risk to life, therefore, can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising (see Keenan, cited above, \u00a7 90, and Ta\u00efs v. France, no.\u00a039922\/03, \u00a7\u00a097, 1\u00a0June 2006).116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that Article 3 of the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV). Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a0114, ECHR 2014). In respect of a person deprived of his or her liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his or her own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4\u00a0December 1995, \u00a7\u00a038, Series A no.\u00a0336, and Selmouni v. France [GC], no.\u00a025803\/94, \u00a7\u00a099, ECHR 1999\u2011V).117.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18\u00a0January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0161, Series A no. 25). However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries or death occurring during that detention (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000\u2011VII, and Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, \u00a7 181).118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that when it comes to establishing the facts, it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its task and must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case. Where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court\u2019s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and it is for the latter to establish the facts on the basis of the evidence before them. Though the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic courts and remains free to make its own assessment in the light of all the material before it, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by the domestic courts (see Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, \u00a7 180; G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7\u00a093, ECHR 2010; and Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and Fecire Tun\u00e7 v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a024014\/05, \u00a7 182, 14\u00a0April 2015).119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must be especially vigilant in cases where violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention are alleged (see, mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch, cited above, \u00a7 32). When there have been criminal proceedings in the domestic courts concerning those same allegations, it must be borne in mind that criminal-law liability is distinct from international-law responsibility under the Convention. The Court\u2019s competence is confined to the latter. Responsibility under the Convention is based on its own provisions which are to be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention, taking into account any relevant rules or principles of international law. The responsibility of a State under the Convention, arising for the acts of its organs, agents and servants, is not to be confused with the domestic legal issues of individual criminal responsibility under examination in the national criminal courts. The Court is not concerned with reaching any findings as to guilt or innocence in that sense (see Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0182, and Av\u015far v. Turkey, no. 25657\/94, \u00a7\u00a0284, ECHR 2001\u2011VII).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention120.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court takes note of the evidence submitted by the applicant party. Relying on the assertions of eyewitness P., who accompanied Sergey Lykov and who was present at the first alleged torture session and had subsequently heard cries, the applicant has submitted a coherent and specific account of the ill-treatment to which her son was allegedly subjected (see paragraph 7 above). In addition, in support of this account, the applicant refers to the autopsy report, which details several hematoma and scratches on the trunk and lower and upper limbs which did not result from the fall from the window (see paragraph 28 above). With regard to the bruise on the right carpus and the scratch on the right forearm, the forensic doctor had noted that such marks were generally held to be signs of struggle or self-defence (ibid.). The Court further observes that neither of the parties alleges that Sergey Lykov already had these injuries when he arrived at the police station.121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is incumbent on the State in such circumstances to provide a plausible explanation of how the injuries found on the victim\u2019s body were caused and to produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the veracity of the victim\u2019s allegations, particularly if those allegations are backed up by medical reports (see Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7\u00a087, and Mi\u017eig\u00e1rov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, no.\u00a074832\/01, \u00a7\u00a085, 14\u00a0December 2010)122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government interpret the above-mentioned report by the forensic doctor as attributing all of Mr Lykov\u2019s injuries to his fall from the fifth floor and thus as refuting the allegations of ill-treatment... However, as the Court has noted above, this report indicates that the forensic doctor found the presence of injuries which were unrelated to the fall from the window and which are generally attributed to acts of struggle or self-defence. In addition, the Court considers that it is appropriate to have regard to the explanations provided by P., who described, in a detailed and coherent manner, the violence perpetrated against Sergey Lykov and himself. The Court sees no reason to call into question the testimony by P.: his account is consistent with the nature and position of the injuries identified on Sergey Lykov\u2019s body (see paragraphs 38 and 39 above). Moreover, as the Court has established above, from September 2009, that is, before the autopsy report was submitted, witness P. gave the relevant domestic authorities several opportunities to verify his allegations, including those concerning Sergey Lykov (see paragraphs 39, 42 and 46 above). However, on each occasion the relevant authorities ignored his complaints and proposals to provide witness statements ...Lastly, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s version is all the more credible in that the authorities have never \u2013 either at the domestic level, or in the proceedings before this Court \u2013 provided an explanation for those injuries that were not sustained by Mr Lykov as a result of the fall.123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the decision to close the investigation (see paragraph 18 above) was based on statements containing obvious contradictions, especially with regard to the chronological sequence of events (see paragraphs 19, 20 and 22 above). The Court notes in this respect that the investigative authorities failed to re-establish the exact chronology of the events occurring between the arrest of P. and the applicant\u2019s son and the latter\u2019s throwing himself from the window, and to resolve the contradictions between the various statements.124.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, the Court is not convinced by the version advanced by the Government \u2013 namely, that all the injuries resulted from Mr Lykov\u2019s suicide. The Government have not submitted sufficient information to suggest that the observed injuries which were not attributable to the fall originated in something other than the infliction of ill-treatment in the police premises on the afternoon and evening of 9\u00a0September 2009. In consequence, the Court considers it established that Sergey Lykov was subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.125.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court has already held that there is no more important safeguard against ill-treatment than the requirement to record without delay all information relating to a person\u2019s arrest in the relevant custody ledgers (see Timurta\u015f v. Turkey, no.\u00a023531\/94, \u00a7 105, ECHR 2000\u2011VI). It reiterates that the three relevant rights \u2013 the right of the person detained to have the fact of his detention notified to a third party of his choice, the right of access to a lawyer, and the right to request a medical examination by a doctor of his choice \u2013 must apply as from the very outset of deprivation of liberty, regardless of how it may be described under the legal system concerned (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a036391\/02, \u00a7\u00a054, ECHR 2008; Martin v. Estonia, no.\u00a035985\/09, \u00a7\u00a079, 30\u00a0May 2013; and Zayev v. Russia, no.\u00a036552\/05, \u00a7\u00a086, 16\u00a0April 2015). The Court concludes that these rights, the purpose of which is precisely to prevent police abuse, were not respected in Mr Lykov\u2019s case.126.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing the seriousness of the established facts, the Court takes into consideration the intensity of the acts in question, the fact that they were inflicted, were that the case, in an intentional manner by State agents acting in the exercise of their duties, as well as the circumstances in which those acts took place.With regard to the intensity of the acts of violence, the Court notes that, according to P.\u2019s version, on which the Court has based its findings (see paragraph 122 above), the police officers inflicted several blows on the victim by striking his head against hard surfaces \u2013 the ground, a cupboard and a table (see paragraphs 7 and 122 above). Those blows, already sufficiently painful in themselves, were accompanied by several sessions of asphyxiation (ibid.), treatment that was also liable to cause severe pain and suffering to the victims. The Court notes that an element of humiliation was added to the victim\u2019s physical suffering, since Sergey Lykov was subjected to this treatment in a naked state, with his hands and feet bound (see paragraphs 7, 8 and 122 above).The Court reiterates that the treatment complained of took place in the course of unrecorded detention, which could only have aggravated the victim\u2019s state of vulnerability; held in police custody, he was deprived over a period of several hours of the procedural safeguards to which a person in that situation was normally entitled (see paragraph 125 above).The Court further observes that the above-mentioned ill-treatment was inflicted with the intention of extracting a confession (see paragraphs 7 and 11 above).Having regard to the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the acts of violence committed against the person of Sergey Lykov, considered as a whole, caused \u201csevere\u201d pain and suffering and were particularly serious and cruel. Such conduct must be regarded as acts of torture for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention (see Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7 115, 24\u00a0July 2014).127.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing enables the Court to conclude that the treatment to which the victim was subjected on 9\u00a0September 2009 entailed a substantive violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Article 2 of the Convention128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the present case contains nothing from which it might be concluded beyond all reasonable doubt that Mr Lykov\u2019s death was intentionally caused by the State agents. The applicant and the Government agree on the fact that the victim threw himself from the window. They disagree only on the question whether this action was sudden and unforeseeable by the police officers, so that the authorities are exonerated of all liability, or whether this act was a gesture of despair provoked by the ill-treatment. The Court considers it necessary to focus on the question of whether the authorities could be held responsible for the victim throwing himself from the window.129.\u00a0\u00a0In considering persons who are detained or placed in police custody, and thus in a relationship of dependence comparable to that in which Mr Lykov found himself, the Court has accepted a positive obligation to protect the individual, including against himself. In addition, even where there is insufficient evidence to enable the Court to find that the authorities knew or ought to have known that the detained person was at risk of suicide, police officers must take certain basic precautions in order to minimise any potential risk (see Keller, cited above, \u00a7\u00a082, and Mi\u017eig\u00e1rov\u00e1, cited above, \u00a7\u00a089).130.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court does not find it necessary to establish whether or not the authorities who arrested Mr Lykov had information about the existence of personal circumstances liable to push him to suicide, which, were it available, ought to have encouraged them to act in such a way as to prevent a possible suicide attempt. The Court considers that the victim\u2019s vulnerability at the precise moment when he threw himself from the window resulted, first and foremost, from the torture to which he had been subjected by the police officers. The Court has already had to assess a case in which the ill-treatment inflicted was of such intensity that it pushed the victim to throw himself from a window to escape his suffering (see Mikheyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0135). In the present case, the Court has established that Mr Lykov had been tortured in the presence of P. (see paragraph\u00a0127 above). In addition, it cannot be excluded that the victim was tortured afterwards, in so far as P. claims to have heard his cries throughout the following hour (see paragraph 8 above). Moreover, the Court also notes that during this period Mr Lykov confessed and threw himself from the window (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above). The Court notes that the victim entered the building alive and died on account of the fall from the fifth floor of the police station. Firstly, the Court considers that the Government\u2019s version of suicide for personal reasons is not satisfactory. It failed to take account of the established fact that the applicant was being tortured (see paragraphs\u00a0120-127 above), or of his unrecorded detention ... Secondly, the Court cannot draw any decisive conclusion from the investigation, which it has found to be ineffective (see paragraph 109 above). Accordingly, having found that neither the Government nor the national investigation have provided a satisfactory explanation for the victim\u2019s death, the Court considers that the Russian authorities are responsible for Sergey Lykov\u2019s fatal fall from the window.131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that its jurisdiction is limited to ruling on the State\u2019s responsibility under the Convention; the individual liability of the individuals involved is a matter for the domestic courts alone. In consequence, the Court considers that it is not for it to discuss in the present case the individual liability for negligence of any police officers present in view of their insufficient supervision of the victim\u2019s conduct.With this clarification, the Court is of the view that the Russian authorities must be held responsible, having regard to the Convention, for the death of Mr Lykov, who was tortured during a period of unrecorded detention, when he was deprived of all the rights which should normally have been afforded to persons in custody (see paragraph 125 above).(c)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusions132.\u00a0\u00a0The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to be able to conclude that there has been a substantive violation of Article 2 and Article\u00a03....","27847":"I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS29.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given their similar factual and legal background.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained under Article 3 in respect of the conditions of their detention in Lyster Barracks, they relied on Aden Ahmed v.\u00a0Malta (no. 55352\/12, 23 July 2013). The provision reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d31.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The Government32.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had not brought their complaints before the domestic authorities. They considered that the applicants had a twofold remedy, namely constitutional redress proceedings to challenge the conditions of their detention while they were in detention and an action for damage in tort after they left detention. They further noted that an action under the European Convention Act was not subject to any time-limits.33.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Constitutional jurisdictions, the Government submitted that they had wide ranging powers to deal with Convention violations. Such proceedings could also be heard with urgency, reducing the time span of such proceedings to two months from filing. The Government noted that the Court had previously criticised the duration of such proceedings. Nevertheless, a fresh assessment according to prevailing circumstances had to be done in each case. In the Government\u2019s view any delays in constitutional proceedings were counterbalanced by the fact that those jurisdictions could issue interim orders pending proceedings. They cited for example a decree in the case of Emanuel Camilleri vs Inspector Louise Callejja and the Commissioner of Police (no. 50\/2013) where the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction released a sentenced person from prison pending the proceedings given the particular circumstances of that case, namely where the main witness, who had testified in the applicant\u2019s trial which had ultimately returned a guilty verdict, was now being tried for perjury in connection with her testimony. Thus, in the Government\u2019s view, in the absence of speedy proceedings there nevertheless existed a speedy interim remedy which could be decreed by the constitutional jurisdictions under Article 46 (2) of the Constitution and Article 4 (2) of the European Convention Act. Despite the exceptional circumstances of the case, the example went to show that releasing persons from prison by means of an interim measure was indeed a possibility which could be used by the constitutional jurisdictions, and the applicants had not proved the contrary.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the applicants could also avail themselves of the services of a legal-aid lawyer (governed by Article 911 et seq. of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure).35.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further relied on the Court\u2019s general principles cited in Abdi Ahmed and Others v. Malta ((dec.), no.\u00a043985\/13, 16\u00a0September 2014) and to its findings in that case, where the Court had established that the situation having ended, the duration of proceedings no longer rendered the remedy ineffective. The Court had also noted that the applicants had the same chances of lodging domestic proceedings as they had to lodge international proceedings, namely by means of NGO lawyers.36.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the applicants could also have instituted an action for damages in tort where the applicants could have obtained damage for loss sustained on the account of their conditions of detention, if they could prove on the basis of probabilities that they had suffered damage and that such damage was attributable to the Government\u2019s acts or omissions.37.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government it was evident that these remedies were effective. They formed part of the normal process of redress, were accessible, and offered reasonable prospects of success where this was justified.38.\u00a0\u00a0Under this heading, the Government also noted that after lodging their application while the applicants were in detention it had taken them a number of months to inform the Court of their release, and thus they had not been diligent.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0 The applicants39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that there existed no effective domestic remedy which should have been used; in fact most of the Government\u2019s arguments had already been rejected by the Court in its judgment in the case of Aden Ahmed v. Malta (no. 55352\/12, 23 July 2013) concerning an immigrant detained at around the same time as the applicants in the present case. The Court\u2019s conclusions in that case were in line with the findings of the European Commission Directorate-General for Justice in a report entitled The EU Justice Scoreboard \u2013 A tool to promote effective justice and growth (2013), which showed that the Maltese judicial system was one of the systems with the longest delays among the member States. By means of example, the case of The Police vs Pauline Vella (42\/2007), lodged in 2007, which looked at the conditions of detention at Mount Carmel Hospital, was decided on appeal on 30 September 2011.40.\u00a0\u00a0As to the use of interim measures by the constitutional jurisdictions, the applicants submitted that in the very specific circumstances of the example given by the Government, the first-instance constitutional jurisdiction itself repeatedly stressed, in its decree, the exceptional nature of interim orders. The applicants considered that the circumstances of that case, which pointed towards a wrongful conviction, could not be compared to that of the applicants, and nothing indicated that persons in the applicants\u2019 position would obtain provisional release pending a claim on conditions of detention.41.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, one could not rely on the findings of this Court in Abdi\u00a0Ahmed and Others (dec.), cited above, which concerned significantly different circumstances, and where, the moment the application was filed, preventive action was no longer necessary. However, in the present case, when the applicants applied to the Court they were still in detention, and thus preventive action was still necessary, but was not available due to the excessive duration of constitutional redress proceedings.42.\u00a0\u00a0 Lastly, the applicants also referred to the Court\u2019s considerations regarding a lack of a proper structured system enabling immigration detainees to have concrete access to effective legal aid.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its case-law concerning exhaustion of domestic remedies, in particular in connection with complaints of conditions of detention, as reiterated in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 54-58, with references therein).44.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the Court notes that the circumstances of the present case are different to those in the case of Abdi Ahmed and Others v. Malta\u00a0(dec.), cited above, relied on by the Government. That case concerned a determination as to whether following the Court\u2019s decision to apply a Rule\u00a039 injunction indicating to the Government that they should desist from deporting the applicants - a decision which had been respected by the Maltese Government - the applicants in that case had access to an effective remedy (for the purposes of, inter alia, their Article 3 complaint, which did not concern conditions of detention) which they were required to use before continuing their application before this Court.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case, when the applicants lodged their applications with the Court (on 13 August 2013) complaining, inter alia, about the conditions of their detention, the applicants were still in detention, and thus, apart from requiring a remedy providing compensation, they were required to have a preventive remedy capable of putting an end to the ongoing violation of their right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court will thus proceed to assess the matter.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already considered in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7 73) that it had not been satisfactorily established that an action in tort may give rise to compensation for any non-pecuniary damage suffered and that it clearly was not a preventive remedy in so far as it cannot impede the continuation of the violation alleged or provide the applicant with an improvement in the detention conditions (see Torreggiani and Others v.\u00a0Italy, nos. 43517\/09, 46882\/09, 55400\/09, 57875\/09, 61535\/09, 35315\/10 and 37818\/10, \u00a7 50, 8 January 2013, and the case-law cited therein). It thus concluded that it cannot be considered an effective remedy for the purposes of a complaint about conditions of detention under Article 3 (see, also Mikalauskas v. Malta, no. 4458\/10, \u00a7 49, 23 July 2013). Nothing has been brought to the attention of the Court which could cast doubt on that conclusion.47.\u00a0\u00a0As to constitutional redress proceedings, again, in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 61-63), following a thorough assessment, the Court held that while it could not rule out that constitutional redress proceedings dealt with urgently (as should be the case concerning complaints of conditions of detention) may in future be considered an effective remedy for the purposes of such complaints under Article 3, the then state of domestic case\u2011law could not allow the Court to find that the applicant was required to have recourse to such a remedy. In the present case the Government have not submitted any further examples enabling the Court to revisit its conclusion concerning the delay in such proceedings. On the contrary, they appear to acknowledge the existence of such delays, arguing however that such delays are counterbalanced by the possibility of interim measures being issued by constitutional jurisdictions pending proceedings.48.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court notes that the example put forward by the Government is indeed very specific and unrelated to circumstances such as those of the present case. Accepting that the provision of examples may be more difficult in smaller jurisdictions, such as in the present case, where the number of cases of a specific kind may be fewer than in the larger jurisdictions, nevertheless the Court notes that the applicants\u2019 example concerning a case of conditions of detention did not have such a measure applied, despite the excessive duration, extending to four years. Similarly, the case of Tafarra Besabe Berhe, referred to by the applicants (in their submissions below, at paragraph 109 below) concerning the lawfulness of immigrants\u2019 detention and the conditions of such detention, which was still pending six years after it was lodged, also does not appear to have applied such a measure. Admittedly, the Court is aware that no examples may exist because applicants fail to make such requests. However, in the absence of any other comparable examples, the Court finds no indication that the constitutional jurisdictions would be willing on a regular basis to release immigrant detainees pending a decision on their claims on conditions of detention.49.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that, in circumstances such as those of the present case, the hypothetical possibility that interim measures may be issued pending proceedings does not make up for deficiencies detected in the remedy at issue \u2013 a remedy which would be effective both as a preventive and a compensatory remedy, if it were carried out in a timely manner. Thus, current domestic case-law does not allow the Court to find that the applicants were required to have recourse to such a remedy.50.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the Government have not dispelled the Court\u2019s previously expressed concerns about the accessibility of such remedies in the light of the apparent lack of a proper structured system enabling immigration detainees to have concrete access to effective legal aid (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a066).51. In conclusion, none of the remedies put forward by the Government, alone or in aggregate, satisfy the requirements of an effective remedy in the sense of preventing the alleged violation or its continuation in a timely manner. It follows that the Government\u2019s objection is dismissed.52.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court finds that Government\u2019s comment at paragraph 38 above has no bearing on the examination of this objection.2.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 observations(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants considered the conditions of detention to be basic. They noted in particular the lack of access to constructive or recreational activities, insufficient provision of basic needs, lack of information, difficulties communicating with the outside world, limited access to open air, and obstacles in obtaining the most basic services. Other factors which had to be taken into consideration were their young age, their inability to communicate in any language except Somali, and the fact that the detention centre was staffed exclusively by men (most having a security background) despite them being young females.55.\u00a0\u00a0In their view all the above had a greater toll given their personal circumstances and situations while they were in detention (as explained in the Facts, above), as well as the traumas they suffered before their arrival in Malta. Both applicants claimed to have experienced physical symptoms and psychological ill-health which they linked to their long-term detention.56.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed to have had trouble sleeping, which was made worse by noise from the other detainees. She claimed she had been to the clinic several times and that \u201conce she felt chest pain\u201d. The second applicant also claimed to have been ill and that she had been hospitalised for a week in June 2013, only after a number of complaints. Previously, she had informed the doctor that she was having gastric problems and had been coughing blood; nothing had been done about the matter other than the administration of paracetamol. For four months she had also been worried about a swelling in her neck, but she only had it examined when she was in hospital in June 2013. She considers that her health had deteriorated in detention, her memory was impaired and she always felt weak. She relied on the referral to AWAS for release on grounds of vulnerability, which was made in June 2013, by a Jesuit Refugee Service representative, and which reads as follows:\u201cDeka has been complaining of several medical ailments, including vomiting blood for which she has been treated but to no avail. ... She is suffering from constant nausea, stomach pain, headaches and has lost a lot of weight over the past couple of months. Deka is very worried about her medical condition, especially since she has no control over her food and treatment as she is in detention.... She needs to be released from detention as soon as possible so that she can get the care and treatment she requires.\u201d57.\u00a0\u00a0 The applicants submitted that each zone (measuring 300\u00a0sq.\u00a0m according to a M\u00e9decins Sans Fronti\u00e8res report) consisted of a landing, three adjacent dormitories all opening on to a narrow corridor, nine or ten showers and toilets, a small room used as a kitchen with one or two hotplates, a common room containing metal tables and benches screwed to the ground, and one television. There was no room to store food or other materials. Free movement between zones was not possible, and for most of the day the detainees were confined to their respective zones.58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that conditions in their zone were particularly difficult in the summer months, as it became crowded because of increased arrivals. When the zone was at full capacity (sixty people), bearing in mind the areas of the dormitories and the common areas, each detainee had an average 5 sq.m of shelter space, which meant that in August, when the applicants\u2019 zone had sixty-nine inmates, the average shelter space was of 4.3 sq. m. At a different point in her submissions the first applicant claimed they were sometimes ninety in a zone (see also paragraph 18 above). The zone was much less crowded in the winter months. The applicants felt that it was difficult to live in a room with around twenty women without privacy. Moreover, they were sometimes abused by other detainees and attacked, life was stressful and fighting was regular.59.\u00a0\u00a0Windows were barred and most of them glazed with opaque Perspex (which was removed in the summer months for air, though they then let air through in the cold winter months). On the one hand, in summer the facility was often crowded and heat would become oppressive despite ceiling fans. On the other hand, in winter it was unbearably cold as the facility was not heated and, moreover, was exposed to the elements as there were no adjoining buildings.60.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had nothing to do all day except watch television, and only very limited access (one and half hours) to the open air in a small dusty yard. The first applicant claimed that it was however too hot to stay in the yard in summer, and the second applicant stated she rarely used the yard given her ill-health. They noted that most of the books in the library were in English and that the classes held by Integra had only operated for the first three months of their twelve\u2011month\u2019 detention. Other projects did not consist of more than one activity per week.61.\u00a0\u00a0Detainees had limited contact with the outside world, as no Internet was available and telephone credit was insufficient for overseas calls.62.\u00a0The detention centre lacked female staff, and only one woman worked on the shift with the zones. This meant that all the care of detained women was carried out by male staff (most having a security background) who guarded the facility, conducted headcounts (in the dormitories twice daily, including the mornings when the women were asleep \u2013 thus the applicant had to sleep fully clothed including headscarf), took care of the distribution of basic necessities, including items of personal hygiene and underwear, and accompanied them to medical appointments. This state of affairs was confirmed by a local report drawn up by a Maltese magistrate (the Valenzia Report). The applicant referred to international reports on the matter (see paragraphs 24-25 above), and considered that the situation was even more frustrating given that under the domestic system there was no mechanism to complain about ill-treatment or abuse by detention staff.63.\u00a0\u00a0 The food provided was also of poor quality, lacked variety and was culturally inappropriate. The second applicant noted that they were fed pasta, rice, chicken, milk and water. She felt that such foods were not suitable for her medical needs and as a result she often would not eat. She also complained that it took her a long time and various complaints until she could get mineral water instead of the water usually served.64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also complained about the difficulties they had in obtaining information about their situation which with their prolonged detention caused them a lot of frustration, despair, unhappiness, and loneliness. Relying on a report entitled Becoming Vulnerable in Detention, National Report on Malta, July 2010, they highlighted that prolonged detention caused significant deterioration in physical and mental well-being.65.\u00a0\u00a0 Both applicants complained about their access to medical care and the quality of medical care provided. While not doubting the efficacy of the medical personnel providing a service, given that they were more often than not communicating with migrants with little or no knowledge of English, it was difficult to understand how they could provide a quality service in an average of six minutes per patient (in the light of the Government submissions, see paragraph 74 below). The applicants again referred to the CPT report and the JRS Malta report, Bridging Borders, (see paragraphs\u00a023 and 27 above).66.\u00a0\u00a0 Give their situation and all the factors mentioned above, the applicants considered that they had suffered a breach of Article 3.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that as shown by the calculations made by the applicants, the zones in which they were held were never overcrowded and they never had an individual space of less than 4\u00a0sq.\u00a0m.. They considered that although some discomfort arises from living with other persons, this did not reach the threshold of Article 3.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that whilst in detention the applicants were housed in a sheltered compound with adequate bedding and were provided with three meals a day on a daily basis (the menu changed on a daily basis and food was prepared in different ways) and mineral water. Meals were provided from a pre-set menu, however, particular dietary requests were regularly respected and the food supplied respected the relevant religious traditions.69.\u00a0\u00a0 According to the Government, upon arrival an emergency bag is distributed and a second bag is supplied on the second day. Further supplies are provided on a regular basis to cater for the migrants\u2019 well-being, including that of the applicants, who did not have the financial means to purchase supplies. Every two weeks new cleaning products were supplied to each room in order to secure the cleanliness of the areas. The applicants were also given clothing and supplies to cater for their personal hygiene, and had access to sanitary facilities equipped with hot and cold water, as well as secluded showers.70.\u00a0\u00a0The detention centre is equipped with ceiling fans which can be used in the summer months. As to heating (which was installed after the applicants\u2019 release), the Government admitted that at the time of the applicants\u2019 detention there was no heating, but in their view this was counterbalanced by the provision of warm clothing and blankets - extra blankets were in fact available on request. They considered that in Malta winters were mild and the coldest temperatures were felt from January to March.71.\u00a0\u00a0Immigration detainees are provided with telephone cards and various telephones can be found in the detention centre. Interpreters are provided for free at the detention centres. The detainees are further provided with stationery and books on request. They have access to a television, as well as a kitchen offering basic cooking facilities and a common room with tables and benches. They are free to practise their religion and have unlimited access to NGOs and legal assistance (sic). They also have the opportunity to attend language and integration classes provided by NGOs. In 2013 the immigrants also had the opportunity to take part in an EU funded project (SPARKLET) which provided, inter alia, educational and cultural activities. The Government submitted that access to the Internet and mobile phones was restricted for security reasons.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that access to outside exercise was limited to one and a half hours daily per zone. They also noted that the applicants were given information on their arrival, by means of an information leaflet and verbally, and that the Commissioner for Refugees held information sessions with the aid of interpreters.73.\u00a0\u00a0As to detention staff, the Government submitted that there were two female staff assigned to the single female zones, while female police officers acted as escorts when female detainees had to attend off-site medical appointments. In any event they considered that it was not debasing to have male staff, given that they were trained to cater for female detainees and to provide them with the necessary supplies, including intimate personal items. As to the headcounts, the Government submitted that in any event female detainees had to dress appropriately even with respect to other detainees in the dormitory. The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegation that there was no complaint mechanism, and alleged that instances of misbehaviour were brought to the attention of the Head of Detention Services, either directly by the detainee or through NGOs. Without giving examples, the Government alleged that such complaints were investigated and, where necessary, disciplinary proceedings undertaken.74.\u00a0\u00a0The detention centres had a medical practitioner and a nurse who provided on-site treatment and could make referrals to hospital treatment, and \u201ccustody clinics\u201d are set up in all compounds housing migrants. The Government explained that medical services at the Safi Detention Centre had been outsourced since April 2007. Two doctors and two nurses visited the detention centres every day (except weekends) between 8.00 am and 3.00 pm (nurses) and 9.00 am and 1.00 pm (doctors). On a daily basis each doctor examined forty persons, meaning that 400 patients were examined each week. The clinics on site, at each of the compounds in Safi, were refurbished and equipped with basic medical equipment. During silent hours (when doctors were not present) detainees were allowed to visit the nearest health centre to see a doctor. Furthermore, nurses from the Malta Memorial District Nursing Association (MMDNA) reported at detention centres during weekdays (in the evening) and weekends (both morning and evenings) to dispense medicines. In the event that migrants requiring mental health support, the doctor would refer them for further treatment at Mount Carmel Hospital (the State mental health hospital) and other referrals to the State General Hospital were made if specialised attention was necessary.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government distinguished the case from that of Aden Ahmed, who had been particularly vulnerable. Indeed, in the present case, according to the Government the applicants could not be considered to fall under any specific category of vulnerable individuals, neither could they be considered to be seriously ill or even to be suffering from ill-health. Indeed the first applicant who alleged that she had visited the clinic on several occasions, had only been administered paracetamol and advised to drink water, which was clearly evidence of no serious sickness. The second applicant, who alleged that she had gastric problems, had been hospitalised and had been physically unwell had not substantiated her allegations. In the Government\u2019s view the fact that a particular treatment was administered but no special diet provided was a result of a diagnosis on the second applicant which established that no such treatment was required. The Government also noted that in their affidavits to the Court the applicants had themselves acknowledged that they had been given medical assistance whenever it was requested and that medical personnel operated the clinics on site. The Government also insisted that language barriers were overcome by interpreters on site as well by migrants who were conversant with English and French as were the medical officers. Moreover, according to the Government a number of medical officers were foreign, and they spoke various languages which migrants understood.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that they could not be held responsible for ill-treatment suffered before the applicants reached Malta. Referring to the applicants\u2019 claims that they continued to experience physical symptoms and psychological ill-health linked to their long-term detention, the Government submitted that a certain level of anxiety was inevitable in detention, nevertheless this could not reach the threshold of Article 3.77.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, in the Government\u2019s view there was no violation of Article\u00a03 in the circumstances of the present case.2.\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article\u00a03 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a03, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3. However, the absence of such a purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article\u00a03\u00a0(see Riad and Idiab v.\u00a0Belgium, nos.\u00a029787\/03 and 29810\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a095\u201196, 24\u00a0January 2008).79.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 3, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject the individual to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see Riad and Idiab, cited above, \u00a7\u00a099; S.D. v. Greece, no. 53541\/07, \u00a7 47, 11 June 2009; and A.A. v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a012186\/08, \u00a7\u00a055, 22\u00a0July 2010). When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7\u00a046, ECHR 2001\u2011II). The length of the period during which a person is detained in specific conditions also has to be considered (see, among other authorities, Alver v. Estonia, no. 64812\/01, \u00a7\u00a050, 8\u00a0November 2005, and Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 86).80.\u00a0\u00a0The extreme lack of personal space in the detention area weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were \u201cdegrading\u201d from the point of view of Article 3 (see Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no. 53254\/99, \u00a7\u00a036, 7\u00a0April 2005, and Yarashonen v. Turkey, no. 72710\/11, \u00a7 72, 24 June 2014, and, for a detailed analysis of the principles concerning the overcrowding issue, see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0143\u201148, 10 January 2012). The provision of four square metres of living space remains the acceptable minimum standard of multi-occupancy accommodation (see Hagy\u00f3 v. Hungary, no. 52624\/10, \u00a7 45, 23 April 2013; Torreggiani and Others, cited above, \u00a7 76, and Tunis v.\u00a0Estonia, no.\u00a0429\/12, \u00a7\u00a044, 19 December 2013, and the cases cited therein). The Court also takes into account the space occupied by the furniture items in the living area in reviewing complaints of overcrowding (see Petrenko v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a030112\/04, \u00a7 39, 20 January 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a041833\/04, \u00a7 87, 27 January 2011; and Yarashonen, cited above, \u00a7 76).81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that, quite apart from the necessity of having sufficient personal space, other aspects of physical conditions of detention are relevant for the assessment of compliance with Article 3. Such elements include access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygiene requirements (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 149 et seq. for further details, and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 222, ECHR 2011). The Court notes in particular that the Prison Standards developed by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture make specific mention of outdoor exercise and consider it a basic safeguard of prisoners\u2019 well-being that all of them, without exception, be allowed at least one hour of exercise in the open air every day and preferably as part of a broader programme of out\u2011of\u2011cell activities (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 150).82.\u00a0\u00a0Cases concerning allegations of inadequate conditions of detention do not lend themselves to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges something must prove that allegation) because in such instances the respondent Government alone have access to information capable of corroborating or refuting these allegations. Accordingly, applicants might experience certain difficulties in procuring evidence to substantiate a complaint in that connection. Still, in such cases applicants may well be expected to submit at least a detailed account of the facts complained of and provide \u2013 to the greatest possible extent \u2013 some evidence in support of their complaints (see Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a032362\/02, \u00a7 45, 20 May 2010). However, after the Court has given notice of the applicant\u2019s complaint to the Government, the burden is on the latter to collect and produce relevant documents. A failure on their part to submit convincing evidence on material conditions of detention may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant\u2019s allegations (see Gubin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a08217\/04, \u00a7\u00a056, 17\u00a0June 2010, and Khudoyorov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a06847\/02, \u00a7\u00a0113, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011X (extracts)).83.\u00a0\u00a0Failure to provide proper medical aid to a detainee would not fall under Article 3 unless there was an actual detriment to his physical or mental condition, or avoidable suffering of a certain intensity, or an immediate risk of such detriment or suffering (see Lebedev v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a013772\/05, \u00a7\u00a0176, 27\u00a0May 2010).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that\u00a0the applicants submitted that in August, which appears to be one of the peak months for immigrant arrivals, there were sixty-nine detainees in their zone \u2013 a statement not contested by the Government. Nevertheless, the first applicant also claimed twice during her submissions that there were over ninety; however no indications were given as to when this occurred, or how long it lasted. Given the global statements in their submissions, as well as the fact that August is a peak month, the Court considers it unlikely that the applicants\u2019 zone hosted ninety people or more in any other given month. Thus, in the absence of any details concerning the contradictory allegation, the Court cannot consider it to be substantiated.85.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the measurements provided by the applicants and not contested by the Government, in regular months of their detention (excluding August) during which sixty or fewer than sixty people were detained in the zone, the applicants had at least 5 sq. m of shelter space in their zone. Such a measurement does not refer only to the space available in the dormitory, but to the entirety of the space to which they had access in the zone. However, given that the applicants had in fact the opportunity to move around in the zone, the Court considers that there is no reason why the entirety of the area should not be taken into consideration for the purposes of calculating living space. Even considering that in reality this space should be significantly lower in view of the fixtures in the rooms (both the common rooms and the dormitories) (see Yarashonen, \u00a7 76, and Torreggiani and\u00a0Others, \u00a7 75, both cited above) the Court considers that the ultimate living space over those months did not go below the acceptable minimum standard of multi-occupancy accommodation.86.\u00a0\u00a0The same must be said for the month of August, where the applicants\u2019 zone had sixty-nine inmates, and thus the average shelter space was 4.3 sq. m per person. Further, the Court notes that in certain months, as admitted by the applicants they shared the zone with much fewer detainees, thus their living space during those months was considerably greater. In these circumstances the Court cannot find that the overcrowding was so severe as to justify in itself a finding of a violation of Article 3.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will thus continue to assess the other aspects of the conditions of detention which are relevant to the assessment of the compliance with Article 3.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that even scarce space in relative terms may in some circumstances be compensated for by the freedom to spend time away from the dormitory rooms (see Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, \u00a7\u00a0103 and\u00a0107, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII, and Nurmagomedov v.\u00a0Russia\u00a0(dec.), no.\u00a030138\/02, 16 September 2004). Access to outdoor exercise is a fundamental component of the protection afforded to those deprived of their liberty under Article 3 (see Yarashonen, cited above, \u00a7 78); Outdoor exercise facilities should be reasonably spacious and whenever possible provide shelter from inclement weather (see Neshkov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, nos. 36925\/10, 21487\/12, 72893\/12, 73196\/12, 77718\/12 and\u00a09717\/13, \u00a7 234, 27 January 2015, with further references).\u00a0The physical characteristics of outdoor exercise facilities are also relevant (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 152, with further references).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already had occasion to comment on the yard referred to in the present case, in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7 96), where it noted that it was considerably small for use by sixty people (recreation being available in one zone at a time), it was secured on three sides by wire fencing topped with barbed wire, and left much to be desired given that it was the only outdoor access enjoyed by detainees for a limited time daily. Nevertheless, the Court observes that the applicants had access to this yard on a daily basis, and it was of their own motion that they sometimes opted not to make use of it. Furthermore, adjacent to the dormitories the applicants could move around in the common room as well as the corridors. In consequence, while the recreation yard would benefit from some improvements, including a form of shelter from the sun and the rain, it cannot be said that the applicants were denied, by the authorities, their time of exercise in the open air. Some sort of recreation was also available indoors, even though this may not have been regular or frequent.90.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the other aspects raised by the applicants, the Court reiterates that suffering from cold and heat cannot be underestimated, as such conditions may affect one\u2019s well-being, and may in extreme circumstances affect health (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 94). Nevertheless, the applicants admit that fans were in place, and despite the fact that Malta is an extremely hot country in the summer months the Court considers that the authorities cannot be expected to provide the most advanced technology. However, the Court remains concerned by the applicants\u2019 allegation that detainees suffered from the cold. Little comfort can be found in the Government\u2019s argument that January to March are the coldest months (see paragraph 70 above) given that the applicants were in fact detained also during those cold months. However, the Court welcomes the Government\u2019s action in this regard, and notes that heating has now been installed. While the latter action had no consequence for the applicants, who had been released by then, the Court observes that the provision of blankets must have aided the situation to some extent, and it does not transpire that the applicants suffered any health related concerns in this connection.91.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the staff at the detention centre, for the same reasons as those given in various reports (see paragraphs 24-25 above), the Court finds disconcerting the lack of female staff in the centre (see also Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 95). Indeed only two females had been working in the detention centre during part of the applicants\u2019 detention. The Government\u2019s submission that males were trained to distribute intimate products, even if it were true, cannot counteract the degree of discomfort to the female detainees who were for the most time dealt with and surrounded by male officers for their detention over several months.92.\u00a0\u00a0Against some factors which remain of concern, the Court, however, also observes that according to the CPT report cited above (paragraph 23), various improvements have been put in place, both structurally and activity wise, at Lyster Barracks. No concern seems to arise about the hygiene facilities, and the applicants have had access to a common area equipped with a television, as well as telephone cards and three meals a day. The meals of which the applicants complain do not appear to have been entirely unbalanced, nor has it been established that the second applicant\u2019s ill-health was directly linked to the food provided. Moreover, while it is regrettable that it might have taken a while, the authorities acceded to her request to be given mineral water, a standard which did not apply to all detainees. Further, the applicants had access to a library, and while English might not have been their preferred language they could only gain by access to such books, which would have allowed them to get acquainted with the language - the ignorance of which caused many of their ailments. Nor can the Government be blamed for disallowing the use of the Internet.93.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, while the fact that the detention centre was basic cannot in itself raise an issue (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 92), improvement remains called for in the various areas examined above, and especially in so far as little privacy is found in the dormitories, which moreover lack any type of furniture where individuals could store their personal belongings. The Court highlights that, the detention in such centres is imposed in the context of immigration, and is therefore a measure which is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences, but to the applicants as asylum seekers.94.\u00a0\u00a0In relation to the applicants\u2019 state of health the Court observes that, in respect of the first applicant she only claims to have been \u201cill\u201d, but failed to give any details as to her condition or how many times she sought a doctor. As to the second applicant, while she did explain her condition, she failed to give relevant details such as specific dates of when she was unwell and for how long, nor has she substantiated any of her illnesses by means of any documentation. The Court observes that she must, at least, have had some form of documentation given to her when in the State hospital if nowhere else, yet none has been submitted to the Court. The only document she submitted was her AWAS referral request which is not signed by a doctor nor has it been approved by AWAS. Thus, the applicants have not proved that they were particularly ill (compare Aden Ahmed, \u00a7 97). In the light of the preceding considerations, the Court considers that while it is true that the applicants, being asylum-seekers, were particularly vulnerable because of everything they had been through during their migration and the traumatic experiences they were likely to have endured previously (see M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7 232), a state of vulnerability which exists irrespective of other health concerns or age factors, they cannot be said to have been particularly vulnerable also because of their health. In consequence, they cannot objectively be considered to be more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker detained at the time.95.\u00a0\u00a0As to the medical assistance they received on site, the Court notes that while the applicants complained that doctors were not always available, the Government gave a clear picture of the availability of medical staff on site, and the Court does not find it particularly inadequate, though there is room for improvement. Indeed, two nurses and two doctors were present on site, five days a week for seven and four hours each day respectively and the Court has no reason to doubt the Government\u2019s statement that during silent hours ill detainees were allowed to attend the nearest health centre. It would however, be of concern, if the latter was not ensured, particularly in serious cases, and if such \u201creferrals\u201d depended on arbitrary assessments. Nevertheless, the applicants have not claimed, or in any event given details, as to any occasion were they had requested to be seen by a doctor during both normal or silent hours and that those requests were refused. Similarly, they have not claimed that they required treatment which was not available on site and which was not given to them, indeed as shown by the second applicant\u2019s own statements, she was hospitalised in the State hospital for a week when it was necessary. Further, while the applicants\u2019 claim that communication was difficult due to language barriers, the Court has no reason to doubt the Government\u2019s statement that interpreters were present at the centre on a daily basis \u2013 again it has not been claimed that the applicants requested assistance in this connection and were refused.96.\u00a0\u00a0While the Court reiterates that the mere fact that a detainee is seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical care provided was adequate (see Hummatov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 116, 29 November 2007), the Court considers that the applicants failed to show that they were not given adequate medical treatment, nor as mentioned above, has it been shown that any alleged failures in treating the applicants or in the treatment prescribed, caused, or gave rise to any risk of an actual detriment to the applicants\u2019 physical or mental condition (see Lebedev (dec.), cited above, \u00a7\u00a0176).97.\u00a0\u00a0This having been said the Court finds it regrettable that the Government failed to submit any documents related to the applicants\u2019 state of health. The Court reiterates that the authorities must ensure that a comprehensive record is kept of the detainee\u2019s state of health and his treatment while in detention (see, for example, Khudobin v. Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7\u00a083, ECHR 2006-XII), that the diagnoses and care are prompt and accurate (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115, and Melnik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a072286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006), and that where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at curing the detainee\u2019s diseases or preventing their aggravation, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109 and\u00a0114; Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7\u00a079, 4 October 2005; and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 211, 13\u00a0July\u00a02006).98.\u00a0\u00a0Having examined the relevant circumstances of the present case taken as a whole, although the applicants\u2019 detention persisted for almost twelve months, the Court is of the opinion that the cumulative effect of the conditions complained of did not reach the threshold of Article 3. It follows that in the present case the Court considers that the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention in Lyster Barracks did not amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of the Convention.99.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 3 of the ConventionIII.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION100.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also complained that they did not have a remedy which met the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4, as outlined in the Court\u2019s jurisprudence, to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. The provision reads as follows:\u201cEveryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection ratione materiae102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that Article 5 \u00a7 4 did not apply to the present case since, according to the Court\u2019s case-law, such a remedy is no longer required once an individual is lawfully free.103.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants noted that they were entitled to raise this complaint, since they had not had such a remedy during their detention, and they had instituted proceedings before the Court while they were still in detention.104.\u00a0\u00a0While it is true that Article 5 \u00a7 4 cannot be relied on by a person who has been lawfully released (see Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), no.\u00a011956\/07, \u00a7 102, 21\u00a0April 2009), the Court notes that when the applicants lodged their applications with the Court they were still detained and they were precisely complaining that they did not have an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of their detention during the time they were detained. They are not complaining of the absence of such a remedy following their release. In consequence the provision is clearly applicable (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 105).105.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.2. Conclusion106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants107.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants relied on the Court\u2019s findings in Louled Massoud v.\u00a0Malta (no. 24340\/08, 27 July 2010), whereby the Court held that the available remedies in the Maltese domestic system were ineffective and insufficient for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4. In respect of Article\u00a025\u00a0A\u00a0(6) of the Immigration Act, they added that as a rule the Board granted bail in connection with removal orders, but has done so at least once in connection with a challenge as to the lawfulness of detention under Regulation\u00a011(10) (see paragraph 22). Nevertheless, bail could only be granted against a financial deposit (usually around 1,000 euros (EUR)) as well as a third-party guarantee showing that applicants will have accommodation and subsistence, conditions which were unlikely to be fulfilled by immigrants arriving by boat (as opposed to those overstaying visas). In any event the applicants highlighted that a request for bail concerned temporary release and was independent from a review of the lawfulness of the detention.108.\u00a0\u00a0Following the Louled Massoud judgment the only change in the law concerned the transposition of the EU return directive. Nevertheless, the \u201cnew\u201d remedy envisaged, namely an application to the immigration Appeals Board in terms of Regulation 11\u00a0(10), also failed to meet the requirements of speediness, accessibility and certainty. Further, it was not even clear whether such a remedy was available in cases such as that of the applicants, in view of the limitations under Regulation 11 (1). Also, there was no information on the possibility of using this remedy to challenge the lawfulness of detention, nor any access to legal aid to attempt the remedy. In any event, in the applicants\u2019 knowledge, of four such applications lodged only one had been determined before the claimants in those cases were released (between two and nine months after the application had been lodged), and the only one determined was decided twelve months after it was lodged.109.\u00a0\u00a0As to constitutional proceedings, the applicants relied on the Court\u2019s previous findings, and considered that there were no reasons to alter those findings. Indeed, the three cases concerning lawfulness of detention under Article 5 which were pending before the constitutional jurisdictions while the applicants were detained only showed the excessive duration of such proceedings. Indeed the case of Tafarra Besabe Berhe v.\u00a0Commissioner of Police (27\/2007) showed that requests for hearing with urgency were of little avail, since the case remained pending six years after it was filed, on 8 May 2007. The case of Essa Maneh Et vs Commissioner of Police (53\/2008) lodged on 16 December 2009, was also still pending on appeal (in January 2015). A further example, Maximilain Ciantar vs\u00a0AG\u00a0(35\/2010), had been lodged on 31 May 2010 and had ended on appeal only on 7 January 2011. Neither was there any evidence to suggest that the Court Practice and Procedure and Good Order Rules cited by the Government had had any effect on the efficacy and speed of proceedings, as shown by the domestic case-law cited.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this review was provided by Article 409A of the Maltese Criminal Code, and even if that were not so, it could be provided by means of proceedings before the constitutional jurisdictions. In their observations concerning the complaint under Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a04 the Government submitted that Court\u2019s findings, in Aden Ahmed and Suso Musa, both cited above, concerning the ineffectiveness of constitutional proceedings should be revisited by the Court, given the evidence that showed that constitutional jurisdictions could give interim relief pending proceedings (see paragraph 33 above). The Government also contended that it was impossible (sic) to provide a number of examples, given the limitations on small States.111. In connection with their objection of domestic remedies under Article 5 \u00a7 1, the Government made reference to subsidiary legislation 12.09, namely the Court Practice and Procedure and Good Order Rules dealing also with constitutional matters, which emphasised the need for speedy resolution of such matters. Secondly, they noted that it was possible for an applicant to request that a case be dealt with, heard and concluded with urgency. The Government strongly objected to the fact that the Court was allowing applicants in cases involving irregular immigrants to circumvent domestic remedies. They considered that this could only be done when there were no effective remedies. They also claimed that the applicants had not lodged a request for bail before the Immigration Appeals Board.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment112. The Court refers to its general principles concerning Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04, as established in its case-law and reiterated in Aden Ahmed\u00a0(cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0113\u2011114, and 120).113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has repeatedly examined in detail the remedies available in Malta for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4, and has held that applicants seeking to challenge the lawfulness of their immigrant detention, in the Maltese context, did not have at their disposal an effective and speedy remedy under domestic law. Nevertheless, the Government claimed that the Court\u2019s findings should be revised concerning constitutional redress proceedings, despite their inability to submit any examples. They also submitted that the remedy provided by Regulation 11 was available to the applicant and they referred to the possibility of applying for bail before the IAB.114. As to the remedy provided by Regulation 11, the Court observes that the latter regulation states that the provisions of Part IV of the subsidiary legislation 217.12, do not apply to individuals apprehended or intercepted in connection with irregular crossing by sea. Now, there is no doubt that Regulation 11 is part of Part IV of the subsidiary legislation mentioned, and that the applicants were intercepted in connection with an irregular crossing by sea. Despite the Court\u2019s findings in the cases of Suso\u00a0Musa and Aden Ahmed (both cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58-59 and \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0121\u201122 respectively), where the Court found that, even assuming that such a remedy applied in the applicant\u2019s case, it was also not effective, the Government failed to explain why such a remedy was still available to the applicants despite such limitation and the circumstances as appeared at the time. In any event, again, the Court notes that not one example was put forward by the Government concerning this remedy, and the examples referred to by the applicants, which, while lacking appropriate substantiation have not been disputed by the Government, continue to show the ineffectiveness of the remedy. Thus, the Court finds no reason to alter its conclusions, in Suso\u00a0Musa and Aden Ahmed (both cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58-59 and \u00a7\u00a7 121-122 respectively). Similarly, in reply to an unexplained statement by the Government concerning a request for bail under Article 25 A (6) of the Immigration Act, the Court reiterates its findings in Suso Musa (\u00a7\u00a7 56-58), to the effect that this was also not an effective remedy.115.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, in the absence of any further dispute concerning the Court\u2019s findings in relation to remedies other than constitutional redress proceedings, the Court finds no reasons to re-examine the situations it has already examined in previous cases (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0115\u2011124; Suso Musa, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 52-61, 23 July 2013; and Louled Massoud, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 42-47, 27 July 2010). In particular it notes that in the judgment of Suso Musa, cited above, the Court called for general measures in this connection, and the case remains under consideration by the Committee of Ministers and has not yet been closed.116.\u00a0\u00a0As to constitutional redress proceedings, the Court reiterates that\u00a0the Government should normally be able to illustrate the practical effectiveness of a remedy with examples of domestic case-law and while it is ready to accept that this may be more difficult in smaller jurisdictions, such as in the present case, where the number of cases of a specific kind may be fewer than in the larger jurisdictions (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a063), the Court cannot ignore that the examples from the Maltese context previously brought to the Court\u2019s attention, and again reiterated by the applicant in the present case, continue to show that constitutional redress proceedings, are not effective for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4, in view of their duration.117.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as in connection with constitutional redress proceedings, the Government relied on the possibility of obtaining interim relief pending lengthy proceedings, the Court refers to its findings at paragraph 48 in fine, above, and for those reasons considers that it is unlikely that constitutional jurisdictions would be willing on a regular basis to release immigrant detainees pending a decision on their claims of unlawful detention. It follows that, in the Court\u2019s view, constitutional redress proceedings are still not an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4.118.\u00a0\u00a0It follows from the above that it has not been shown that the applicants had at their disposal an effective and speedy remedy under domestic law by which to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.119.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention has therefore been violated.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION120.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further complained under Article 5 \u00a7 1 that their prolonged detention for nearly twelve months was arbitrary and unlawful, as it did not fall under either of the two limbs under the mentioned provision. In any event, even assuming it fell under the first limb, the law was not precise and did not provide for procedural safeguards. Moreover, their continued detention could not be considered reasonably required for the purpose, nor closely connected to the purpose of preventing an unauthorised entry. Furthermore they had been detained in conditions which were not appropriate. They relied on the Court\u2019s findings in Suso Musa v.\u00a0Malta (no.\u00a042337\/12, 23 July 2013). The provision reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ... (f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201d121.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies122.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had not brought their complaint before the domestic authorities.123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already held that the applicants did not have at their disposal an effective and speedy remedy by which to challenge the lawfulness of their detention (see paragraph 118 above). It follows that the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants125.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that their initial detention was for the purpose of deportation as a result of the removal order and was in line with Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act. Nevertheless once they applied for asylum, they could no longer be detained under either limb as, in their view, Maltese law provided that once such application was lodged the asylum seeker \u201cshall not be removed ... and the applicant shall be allowed to enter or remain in Malta pending a final decision\u201d. Admitting that their detention was imposed in accordance with the provisions of the immigration Act and in line with Government policy on detention of irregular arrivals, they considered that, even assuming that their detention was to be considered as falling under the first limb, a twelve month detention was arbitrary, as it exceeded the time reasonably required for its purpose, and thus could not be closely connected to the purpose of preventing an unauthorised entry.126.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, they submitted that they had not been kept in conditions which were appropriate for young single females, and noted that they were detained in the same centre as that in issue in the case of Aden Ahmed, cited above, in respect of which the Court had found a violation. In the present case they highlighted, the crowding in the zones, making the noise unbearable and condition difficult; the limited opportunities for recreation; the poor quality of the food; the fact that the facility was staffed almost exclusively by men; the difficulty contacting family and the lack of access to basic services, including information, psychological support and medical treatment.127.\u00a0\u00a0They further claimed that they had no access to procedural safeguards, as had been established by the Court in previous judgments against Malta. Indeed at no point had there been a review to determine whether their detention remained closely connected to the purpose pursued. They believed that this was so particularly in view of the fact that the laws regulating detention of asylum seekers were vague at best; the lack of clarity was compounded by the fact that several matters were regulated not by law but by policy, which by its very nature was subject to change by the Government at their discretion, without the need for parliamentary approval. Neither the Immigration Act nor the Refugees Act contained any provisions specifically regulating the detention of asylum seekers. Moreover, the legal rules regulating the maximum length of detention for asylum seekers, fixed at the time of the present case at twelve months, were anything but clear. Similarly, the exceptions to detention, such as those regarding release from detention on grounds of vulnerability, were also prescribed by policy and there were no clear publicly available rules regulating the procedure to be followed, the criteria to be applied, or the time-limit within which a decision was to be taken in such cases. Further, the law failed to provide either an automatic judicial review of the initial administrative decision to detain, or a speedy judicial remedy by which a detainee may challenge the lawfulness of their detention (see also submissions regarding Article 5 \u00a7 4 above). Detainees were not provided with information about the existing remedies, such as they are, in a consistent, effective and systematic manner, and consequently they cannot use them - the only information provided by the authorities was that provided in the leaflet (see paragraph 8 above). They noted that not only did the content of that document leave much to be desired in terms of quantity and quality of information provided, but it was also given to the applicants in a language that they could not understand, much less read or write. In addition, although in theory detainees may be entitled to legal aid, in practice it was extremely difficult, not to say impossible, for them to gain access to the legal aid system because they were deprived of their liberty.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government128.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 detention was legitimate under the first limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f). They noted that practically all immigrants reaching Malta did not carry documents and thus ascertaining their identities upon entry was a lengthy process which dependent on the cooperation of the migrants themselves. They noted that in the present case the applicants\u2019 asylum claim had been decided at first instance within three months, and eventually they had been released after a total of nearly twelve months, even though their appeal had not yet been decided, it followed that the circumstances were more favourable than those in Suso Musa, relied on by the applicants.129.\u00a0\u00a0 The Government considered that the detention was carried out in good faith, as the centre at issue had been set up especially for that purpose, and the detention had fulfilled all the conditions indicated by the Court in Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC] (no. 13229\/03, ECHR 2008). They also considered that detention was based in law (Article 5 of the Immigration Act) and was not discriminatory, nor was it applied across the board.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles130.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty. The text of Article 5 makes it clear that the guarantees it contains apply to \u201ceveryone\u201d (see Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no.\u00a010593\/08, \u00a7 224, ECHR 2012). Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of those grounds (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a013229\/03, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2008). One of the exceptions, contained in sub\u2011paragraph (f), permits the State to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context.131.\u00a0\u00a0In Saadi (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a064-66) the Grand Chamber interpreted for the first time the meaning of the first limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f), namely, \u201cto prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country\u201d. It considered that until a State had \u201cauthorised\u201d entry to the country, any entry was \u201cunauthorised\u201d and the detention of a person who wished to effect entry and who needed but did not yet have authorisation to do so, could be, without any distortion of language, to \u201cprevent his effecting an unauthorised entry\u201d\u00a0(\u00a7 65). However, detention had to be compatible with the overall purpose of Article\u00a05, which was to safeguard the right to liberty and ensure that no\u2011one should be dispossessed of his or her liberty in an arbitrary fashion\u00a0(ibid., \u00a7\u00a066).132.\u00a0\u00a0The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law\u00a0(see Suso Musa, cited above, \u00a7\u00a097).133.\u00a0\u00a0Under the sub-paragraphs of Article 5 \u00a7 1 any deprivation of liberty must, in addition to falling within one of the exceptions set out in sub\u2011paragraphs\u00a0(a)\u2011(f), be \u201clawful\u201d. Where the \u201clawfulness\u201d of detention is at issue, including the question whether \u201ca procedure prescribed by law\u201d has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. It is a fundamental principle that no detention which is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 \u00a7 1 and the notion of \u201carbitrariness\u201d in Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01 extends beyond lack of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary and thus contrary to the Convention (see Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 67).134.\u00a0\u00a0To avoid being branded as arbitrary, detention under Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that \u201cthe measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country\u201d; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued (ibid., \u00a7 74; see also A. and Others v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455\/05, \u00a7 164, ECHR 2009, and Louled Massoud, cited above, \u00a7\u00a062).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case135.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that both applicants have been detained for two days less than twelve months. It further notes that compatibility with the Convention of the applicants\u2019 detention for the first few days until they filed their asylum claim is not in dispute. The applicants are also ready to admit that initially, following their asylum claim, their detention was also justified under the first limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f).136.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicants have been detained in terms of the provisions of the Immigration Act (Articles 5 and 14(2), Chapter\u00a0217 of the Laws of Malta). While expressing reservations about the quality of all the applicable laws seen together in such context, the Court has already accepted that in cases similar to those of the applicants, the detention had a sufficiently clear legal basis, and that up to the decision on an asylum claim, such detention can be considered to fall under the first limb of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f), namely to \u201cprevent effecting an unauthorised entry\u201d (see Suso Musa, cited above \u00a7 99). There is no reason to find otherwise in the present case.137.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complained about the quality of the rules regulating the release from detention on ground of vulnerability procedure (paragraph\u00a0127), the Court considers that there is room for improvement. Nevertheless, given that the provisions mentioned above - which provide a lawful basis for immigration detention - do not exempt vulnerable individuals from detention, the legal framework regulating the procedure for release of vulnerable individuals is not subject to the same scrutiny.138.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to be determined whether the detention in the present case was not arbitrary, namely whether it was carried out in good faith; whether it was closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; whether the place and conditions of detention where appropriate and whether the length of the detention exceeded that reasonably required for the purpose pursued.139.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already noted a series of odd practices on the part of the domestic authorities when dealing with immigrant arrivals and subsequent detentions and it expressed its reservations as to the Government\u2019s good faith in applying an across-the-board detention policy (save for specific vulnerable categories) (see Suso Musa, cited above \u00a7 100) - reservations which it maintains, particularly given that despite previous findings, the Government still fail to explain, in what way it is not an across-the board detention policy (with some exceptions).140.\u00a0\u00a0As to whether the detention was closely connected to the ground of detention relied on. The Court notes that the purpose of the detention fell under the first limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1, namely to prevent an unauthorised entry, and in practice to allow for the applicants\u2019 asylum claims to be processed. Indeed the Court has no doubt that the applicants\u2019 detention at least in the first few months, was to enable the determination of their asylum claim, and thus to find out their identity and other relevant information enabling the processing of the claim. The Court however notes that the applicants received a decision at first instance on their asylum claims within three months of them having applied for asylum. The subsequent nine months which they spent in detention were spent awaiting the outcome of the pending appeal against the decision rejecting their claim for asylum. The Court considers that the connection with the ground of detention becomes less evident, as months go by and after a first-instance decision has been issued, particularly because their identity should by then have been determined. Nevertheless, given the refusal decision, and the continued assessment of their asylum appeal to enable a determination as to whether the applicants could in fact enter the country, it cannot be said that such a period of detention was not connected to the ground relied on.141.\u00a0\u00a0As to the place and conditions of detention, the Court notes that while improvements would be welcome, as held above (paragraph 98), in the circumstances of the present case the conditions of detention in Lyster Barracks did not amount to a violation of Article 3.142.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the length of detention, the Court observes that the applicants were held in Lyster Barracks detention centre for a bit less than twelve months (August 2012 \u2013 14 August 2013), they were released on the latter date even before a final decision on their asylum claims had been reached. The asylum proceedings were pending throughout the applicants\u2019 detention, and it has not been claimed that during that time the national authorities were not taking the necessary steps to establish the veracity and validity of the applicants\u2019 asylum claims. While it is true that the Court has already considered periods of three and six months\u2019 detention pending a determination of an asylum claim to be unreasonably lengthy, when coupled with inappropriate conditions (see, respectively, Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, no.\u00a015297\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 94-95, 13 December 2011, and Suso Musa, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0102), in the absence of inappropriate conditions of detention a period of five months pending an asylum determination has not been considered unreasonable (see, for example, Nassr Allah v. Latvia, no.\u00a066166\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a060\u201161, 21 July 2015).143.\u00a0\u00a0While it is true that a period of nearly twelve months cannot but be considered lengthy, in the above-mentioned circumstances, and given the absence of inappropriate conditions of detention, the Court can accept that such a duration was overall reasonable for the purpose pursued, despite the lack of procedural safeguards (as shown by the finding of a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4, at paragraph 119 above). Indeed, the Court reiterates that in the above-mentioned Suso Musa judgment, it called on the respondent State to envisage taking the necessary general measures to, inter alia, limit detention periods so that they remain connected to the ground of detention applicable in an immigration context (\u00a7 123). It further notes that at the time of the present case, the Government\u2019s practice was also not to detain more than twelve months, as opposed to the eighteen months which were applied in practice previously (compare Louled Massoud, cited above, \u00a7 16).144.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, while the Court expresses reservations about the duration of such detention and the across the board detention policy, bearing in mind all the above, the Court considers that in the present case, the applicants\u2019 detention during the relevant period was in compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 1, and thus there has been no violation of that provision.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION145.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage146.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, as a result of the violations of Article 3 and 5 in the present case.147.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the claim made by the applicants was excessive, and noted that such awards were made by the Court only in cases of excessive beatings by the authorities and other serious Article\u00a03 violations. They considered that a sum of EUR 3,000 would suffice in non-pecuniary damage, given the circumstances of the case.148.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has only found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 in that light it considers it equitable to award the applicants EUR 4,000 each\u00a0in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses149.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed EUR 4,000 each for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, representing 60 hours of legal work charged at an hourly rate of EUR 60, as well as clerical costs of EUR 400.150.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that such an award should not exceed EUR\u00a02,000.151.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the above criteria and the documents in its possession, as well as to the fact that most of the applicants\u2019 complaints have not been upheld, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,000, jointly, covering costs for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest152.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27897":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPLICANT\u2019S EXPULSION TO KYRGYZSTAN40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that, owing to his Uzbek ethnic origin, he would face a serious risk of ill-treatment if expelled to Kyrgyzstan. In his application form he relied on Article 3 of the Convention. In his observations on the admissibility and merits of the application of 28 August 2015, the applicant raised for the first time a complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. Being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Margareti\u0107 v. Croatia, no.\u00a016115\/13, \u00a7 75, 5\u00a0June 2014), the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s grievances fall to be examined solely under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations. They submitted that the applicant\u2019s removal from Russia had been ordered by the domestic courts in full compliance with Article 18.8 \u00a7 3 of the CAO and that the administrative sanction had been proportionate to the administrative offence committed.42.\u00a0\u00a0The domestic courts had not found any circumstances that would exclude the possibility of applying the sanction in question to the applicant. The applicant had been made aware of his procedural rights; he had admitted his guilt before the District Court and yet had not mentioned any risk of ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan. The Appeal Court had examined the allegations of the risk of ill-treatment raised in the appeal statement and found that the materials submitted had not demonstrated any violations of the applicant\u2019s rights; moreover, it had not been the judge\u2019s task to assess the actions of law\u2011enforcement agencies of a third country. The Appeal Court had requested information from the Moscow FMS with regard to the applicant\u2019s asylum application and had been notified of its decision of 12\u00a0March 2015.43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant had participated in the court hearings at two instances and had had an ample opportunity to make complaints under Articles 3 and\u00a05 of the Convention, which he had made use of.44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant had not lodged any complaints about the domestic courts\u2019 decisions under Articles 30.9-12 of the CAO.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted the following arguments to demonstrate that human rights protection mechanisms in Kyrgyzstan had been improving: Kyrgyzstan was a party to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Optional Protocol to it; the Kyrgyz Constitution guaranteed fair trial and proscribed capital punishment, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment; the Kyrgyz Criminal Code criminalised torture and was based on the principles of lawfulness and equality before the law; Kyrgyzstan was a vice-president of the UN Human Rights Council and rapporteur of its bureau; since June 2010 the country had undergone positive changes, including adopting a new Constitution, parliamentary and presidential elections, the setting up of domestic and international commissions to investigate the Jalal\u2011Abad violence, reform of legislation in order to bring it into compliance with UN standards and on 7 June 2012 a law had been adopted with a view to creating a national anti-torture centre. The Government suggested that the overall human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan had not called for a total ban on extradition from the Council of Europe\u2019s Member States.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further claimed that given that Kyrgyz authorities had not requested the applicant\u2019s extradition there had been no grounds to assume that the applicant would be arrested and prosecuted if returned to the country of origin.2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant emphasised that the domestic authorities had failed to properly examine his allegations of the risk of ill-treatment in Kyrgyzstan. He noted that the Code of Administrative Offences did not stipulate an obligation to assess a risk of ill-treatment in the course of expulsion proceedings. The Appeal Court had refused to examine in detail the allegations made in the appeal statement referring to territorial jurisdiction; thus, the applicant\u2019s serious claims of risk of the proscribed treatment had been left unscrutinised. Nor had these claims been analysed in the course of the proceedings relating to the application for refugee status.48.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the supervisory review proceedings under Articles\u00a030.12\u201114 of the CAO have no suspensive effect, they could not be considered an effective remedy to be exhausted.49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, an ethnic Uzbek charged by the Kyrgyz authorities in absentia in connection with the Jalal-Abad riots, belonged to a vulnerable group even in the absence of a formal extradition request. The fact that Kyrgyzstan had ratified international human rights instruments did not exclude the possibility that the applicant as a member of a vulnerable group would face a serious risk of ill\u2011treatment if returned to the country owing to the fact that there was an administrative practice of ill\u2011treatment of ethnic Uzbeks as reported, in particular, by Amnesty International and the UN Universal Periodic Review.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government briefly stated that the applicant had not lodged any complaints under Articles 30.9-12 of the CAO (see paragraph 44 above). However, in the absence of any detailed submissions clarifying the issue it is not ready to treat the Government\u2019s remark as a plea of non-exhaustion of effective domestic remedies that would require its assessment.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles52.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court will examine the merits of this part of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention in the light of the applicable general principles reiterated in, among other cases, Umirov v. Russia (no.\u00a017455\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a092\u2011100, 18 September 2012, with further references).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Russian authorities ordered the applicant\u2019s expulsion from Russian territory. Although the country of destination was not determined in the court decisions ordering the expulsion, given that the applicant holds Kyrgyzstani nationality it appears reasonable to assume that if removed from Russian territory he would find himself in Kyrgyzstan.54.\u00a0\u00a0The expulsion order has not been enforced as a result of an indication by the Court of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Court will therefore assess whether the applicant faces a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of his removal from Russia to Kyrgyzstan \u2013 the material date for the assessment of that risk being that of the Court\u2019s consideration of the case \u2013 taking into account the assessment made by the domestic courts (see Gayratbek Saliyev v. Russia, no.\u00a039093\/13, \u00a7 60, 17 April 2014).55.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the general human rights climate in the presumed receiving country, the Court observes the following. In the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev (cited above, \u00a7 72) concerning extradition to Kyrgyzstan the Court found that in 2012 the situation in the south of the country was characterised by torture and other ill\u2011treatment of ethnic Uzbeks by law-enforcement officers, which had increased in the aftermath of the events of June 2010 and remained widespread and rampant, and was aggravated by the impunity of the law\u2011enforcement officers involved. Moreover, the Court established that the issue ought to be seen in the context of the rise of ethno\u2011nationalism in the politics of Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the south, the growing inter-ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, the continued discriminatory practices faced by Uzbeks at an institutional level and under\u2011representation of Uzbeks in, amongst other areas, law-enforcement bodies and the judiciary. In its subsequent cases the Court observed that in 2012-13 the situation in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan had not improved. In particular, various reports had been consistently in agreement when describing biased attitudes based on ethnicity in investigations, prosecutions, convictions and sanctions imposed on ethnic Uzbeks charged and convicted in relation to the events in Jalal\u2011Abad Region, as well as a lack of full and effective investigations into the numerous allegations of torture and ill-treatment imputable to Kyrgyz law\u2011enforcement agencies, arbitrary detention and excessive use of force against Uzbeks allegedly involved in the events of June 2010 (see Gayratbek Saliyev, cited above, \u00a7 61; Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above, \u00a7 91; and Khamrakulov\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 68894\/13, \u00a7 65, 16 April 2015). The Court observes that it follows from the reputable NGOs\u2019 reports above that no significant progress has been made in the human rights field in Kyrgyzstan in the course of 2014\u201115 (see paragraphs 38-39 above). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the current overall human rights situation in that State remains highly problematic (see Gayratbek Saliyev, cited above, \u00a7 61).56.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court will now examine whether there are any individual circumstances substantiating the applicant\u2019s fears of ill-treatment (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7\u00a073, ECHR 2005\u2011I). It reiterates in this respect that where an applicant alleges that he or she is a member of a group systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, the protection of Article 3 of the Convention enters into play when the applicant establishes, where necessary on the basis of information contained in recent reports by independent international human rights protection bodies or non-governmental organisations, that there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and his or her membership of the group concerned. In those circumstances the Court will not then insist that the applicant show the existence of further special distinguishing features (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 132, ECHR\u00a02008, and NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7 116, 17 July 2008). The Court considers that this reasoning is of particular relevance in the present case, where the applicant, an ethnic Uzbek, is charged in Kyrgyzstan with a number of serious offences allegedly committed in the course of the violence of June 2010 (see Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above, \u00a7 92). Given the widespread use by the Kyrgyz authorities of torture and ill-treatment in order to obtain confessions from ethnic Uzbeks charged with involvement in the inter-ethnic riots in the Jalal-Abad Region, which has been reported by both UN bodies and reputable NGOs (see paragraphs\u00a037-39 above), the Court is satisfied that the applicant belongs to a particularly vulnerable group, the members of which are routinely subjected in Kyrgyzstan to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the above circumstances were brought to the attention of the Russian authorities in two sets of proceedings: the administrative removal proceedings and those ensuing from the applicant\u2019s application for refugee status (see paragraphs\u00a013 and\u00a018 above).58.\u00a0\u00a0The information available to the Court regarding the refugee status proceedings is scarce. It is clear that the applicant\u2019s refugee application was rejected as inadmissible by the Moscow FMS and that the applicant\u2019s appeal against the rejection is currently pending at the national level. However, given that no copy of the decision of 12 March 2015 has been provided by the parties (see paragraph 19 above), the Court is unable to assess its contents and reasoning.59.\u00a0\u00a0As for the administrative removal proceedings, the Court notes the summary reasoning put forward by the Appeal Court when dismissing the applicant\u2019s allegations of the risk of ill-treatment, in particular, by the finding that the documents submitted by the applicant had not demonstrated \u201ca breach of rights and freedoms of the person in question\u201d (see paragraph\u00a016 above). It reiterates in this connection that requesting an applicant to produce \u201cindisputable\u201d evidence of a risk of ill-treatment in a third country would be tantamount to asking him to prove the existence of a future event, which is impossible, and would place a clearly disproportionate burden on him. Any such allegation always concerns an eventuality, something which may or may not occur in the future. Consequently, such allegations cannot be proven in the same way as past events. The applicant must only be required to show, with reference to specific facts relevant to him and to the class of people he belongs to, that there is a high likelihood that he would be ill-treated (see, with further references, Rakhimov v. Russia, no. 50552\/13, \u00a7\u00a093, 10 July 2014). In such circumstances, the Court is not convinced that the issue of the risk of ill\u2011treatment was subjected to rigorous scrutiny in the refugee status or expulsion proceedings (see Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no.\u00a014743\/11, \u00a7\u00a0148, 2\u00a0October 2012, and Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above, \u00a7 94).60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the Government\u2019s submissions regarding recent developments in Kyrgyzstan in the field of human rights (see paragraph 45 above). It cannot, however, agree with their assumption that the advances mentioned, such as ratification of international human rights instruments or parliamentary and presidential elections, albeit welcome, would suffice to drastically ameliorate the general human rights situation in a country.61.\u00a0\u00a0Nor is the Court convinced by the Government\u2019s argument that in the absence of an extradition request there are no grounds to suggest that the applicant would face criminal charges in Kyrgyzstan (see paragraph 46 above). There are no elements in the present case that would enable the Court to conclude that the charges brought against the applicant on account of his alleged involvement in the Jalal-Abad violence (see paragraph 10 above) have been dropped or have become time-barred. Accordingly, it is highly probable that, once in Kyrgyzstan, the applicant would be arrested and charged on the basis of the warrant of 26 June 2012.62.\u00a0\u00a0Considering the attested widespread and routine use of torture and other ill-treatment by law-enforcement agencies in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in respect of members of the Uzbek community, to which the applicant belongs, the impunity of law\u2011enforcement officers and the absence of sufficient safeguards for the applicant in the requesting country, the Court finds it substantiated that the applicant would face a real risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Kyrgyzstan.63.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s forced return to Kyrgyzstan, in the form of expulsion or otherwise, would be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that on 24 February 2015 he had been beaten by police officers at the detention centre for aliens and that there had been no meaningful domestic investigation into the incident. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention.A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. They submitted that, according to the information provided by the administration of the detention centre for aliens, the applicant had not complained of alleged violence or his state of health and that he had not been medically examined since February 2015. There had been no cameras installed on the detention centre\u2019s premises.66.\u00a0\u00a0The detention centre for aliens had employed only civilian guards to ensure order on the premises. There had been no information concerning police involvement in the activities of those civilian guards on 24 February 2015.67.\u00a0\u00a0Measures were being taken to investigate the beatings of the applicant.2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant emphasised at the outset that the Government had not provided the entire investigation file in connection with the alleged ill\u2011treatment as the Court had requested.69.\u00a0\u00a0In support of his allegations the applicant submitted two photos \u2013 one picturing him sitting and wearing a striped T-shirt and another showing his back with the T-shirt pulled up so that large purple-red hematomas in the shape of long stripes were visible.70.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant pointed out that the investigation had been flawed from the very beginning as the authorities had failed to interview him and to carry out a medical examination after the alleged beatings. Moreover, the applicant had not been informed which organisation had been in charge of the investigation nor had he been notified of any progress thereof.71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant asserted that he had been in a vulnerable position while in the detention centre for aliens and that his complaints about his state of health could have been ignored by its administration.72.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant invited the Court to shift the burden of proof to the respondent Government and, in the absence of a satisfactory and convincing explanation as to the origins of his injuries obtained while in detention, to find violations of Article 3 of the Convention in its substantive and procedural limbs.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Indeed the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a value of civilisation closely bound up with respect for human dignity. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions, and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2 of the Convention even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned (see, with further references, Bouyid\u00a0v.\u00a0Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 81, 28\u00a0September 2015).75.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that it is at dispute between the parties whether the applicant sustained injuries from officers belonging to the special police squad while in the detention centre for aliens. It considers that an issue arises as to the burden of proof in this case and in particular as to whether it should shift from the applicant onto the Government (see El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 154, ECHR 2012).76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates in this connection that allegations of ill\u2011treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0161, Series A no. 25). Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events at issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000\u2011VII). In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government (see, among other authorities, El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0152). That is justified by the fact that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 83).77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a028883\/95, 4 April 2000). However, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny (see Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no.\u00a024271\/03, \u00a7 51, 14 October 2010). In the absence of any findings by the domestic investigation authorities in respect of the alleged proscribed treatment, it thus becomes incumbent on the Court to establish the basic facts of the case at hand.78.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the instant case, the Court notes that it does not have at its disposal any medical certificate confirming the fact that on 24 February 2015 the applicant sustained any injuries. It recognises, however, that it may prove difficult for detainees to obtain evidence of ill\u2011treatment by their warders (see, mutatis mutandis, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 125, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011IV). Bearing in mind that the applicant\u2019s lawyers informed the investigation authorities of refusals by the medical staff of the detention centre for aliens to duly record injuries reported by the detainees (see paragraph 24 above), the Court considers it plausible that the applicant experienced difficulties in obtaining a medical certificate attesting to the injuries sustained. Noting that the applicant\u2019s account of the alleged ill-treatment has remained detailed, specific and consistent, the Court is ready to accept the photos submitted by the applicant (see paragraph 69 above) as \u201cappropriate evidence\u201d of his allegations of beatings while in the detention centre for aliens. In view of the above, the Court is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence in favour of the applicant\u2019s version of events and that the burden of proof should accordingly shift to the Government.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, however, did not comment on the photos submitted by the applicant. Nor did they deny that the applicant had sustained injuries while in the detention centre for aliens. Instead, the Government submitted that the applicant had not sought medical help (see paragraph 65 above). It remains unclear, however, why the applicant was not examined by a medical expert following lodging a complaint (on 26\u00a0February 2015) about the ill-treatment (see paragraph 24 above).80.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of any plausible version of the events put forward by the Government, the Court considers that it can draw inferences from the available material and the authorities\u2019 conduct and finds the applicant\u2019s allegations sufficiently convincing and established to the requisite standard of proof (see El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 167).81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will now turn to the Government\u2019s assertion that the detention centre for aliens employed only civilians to maintain order on its premises (see paragraph 66 above). Assuming that no police officers or representatives of any other law\u2011enforcement agency were present in the detention centre on 24\u00a0February 2015, the Court cannot accept the implied suggestion of unaccountability on the part of the respondent State for actions of those unnamed civilians. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive in a democratic State that unidentified persons not belonging to any State agency were permitted to freely operate unsupervised in a facility for detention of those deprived of liberty and thus under control of the State without imputability of their actions to the State in question as it would clearly run counter the very idea of the rule of law. The Court thus considers that, irrespective of whether the persons who in the applicant\u2019s submission had beaten him formally belonged to any State agency, their actions are imputable to the respondent State.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds, accordingly, that on 24 February 2015 the applicant was beaten by State agents while in the detention centre for aliens.83.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 of the Convention at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0131).85.\u00a0\u00a0An obligation to investigate is not an obligation of result, but of best endeavours: not every investigation should necessarily come to a conclusion which coincides with the applicant\u2019s account of events. However, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7\u00a0107, 26 January 2006).86.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation into allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough. That means that the authorities must make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis for their decisions (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 103 et seq., Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness accounts and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of the applicable standard (see Mikheyev, cited above, \u00a7 108).87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that the Government did not provide any information as to whether a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment had been initiated. Instead, they claimed that unspecified measures were being taken to investigate the alleged beatings of the applicant (see paragraph 67 above). The Government did not provide any explanation as to the nature of such measures or the legal framework governing them. The applicant, in his turn, submitted that he had not been informed of any progress in the investigation. Even more strikingly, he claimed that not once had he been interviewed or medically examined by any domestic authority in connection with the alleged ill\u2011treatment (see paragraph 70 above).88.\u00a0\u00a0Despite the Government\u2019s failure to provide an account of the measures purportedly taken to investigate the applicant\u2019s beatings while in detention at the hands of State agents, the Court is not precluded from assessing whether the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention in its procedural limb have been met in the present case.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously ruled that in the context of the Russian legal system a \u201cpre\u2011investigation inquiry\u201d alone is not capable of leading to the punishment of those responsible, since the opening of a criminal case and a criminal investigation are prerequisites for bringing charges against the alleged perpetrators which may then be examined by a court. The Court drew strong inferences from the mere fact of the investigative authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of serious ill\u2011treatment while in custody, regarding it as indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its obligation under Article\u00a03 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation (see Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 135-36, 24\u00a0July 2014).90.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that, in the absence of a full\u2011fledged criminal investigation opened in connection with credible allegations of ill-treatment, it is not necessary for the Court to examine in detail the measures taken at the national level with a view to identifying specific deficiencies and omissions on the part of the investigative authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, Zelenin\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a021120\/07, \u00a7 59, 15\u00a0January 2015).91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers, accordingly, that the refusal to open a criminal case into the applicant\u2019s credible allegations of ill-treatment while in the detention centre for aliens amounted to a failure to carry out an effective investigation as required by Article 3 of the Convention.92.\u00a0\u00a0The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 AND 4 OF THE CONVENTION93.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of the fact that his detention in the detention centre for aliens was arbitrary as its time-limits were not foreseeable and that there were no avenues to obtain judicial review of its lawfulness. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (f) and 4 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition....4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government refrained from making any submissions on the admissibility and merits of this part of the application merely stating that there had been no violations of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (f) and 4 of the Convention.95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed that his detention, which commenced on 28\u00a0January 2015, had been arbitrary and thus unlawful from the outset. In any event, it would have ceased to be lawful once the expulsion proceedings had been suspended. The CAO did not establish any time-limits for detention of persons awaiting administrative removal; the domestic courts had failed to specify any time-limits in their judgments; accordingly, the applicant could not foresee the length of his detention. Noting that his detention had largely exceeded the maximum penalty in the form of deprivation of liberty under the CAO and referring to the case of Azimov\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia (no.\u00a067474\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 172-73, 18 April 2013), the applicant claimed that his detention pending expulsion was of a punitive nature rather than of a preventive one. The applicant also noted that the Appeal Court had failed to analyse his allegations of the breach of his right to liberty. Lastly, the applicant reiterated that he had had no possibility to initiate judicial review of the lawfulness of his prolonged detention as required by Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will consider firstly whether there was a possibility of effective supervision of unlawful or arbitrary detention and secondly whether the applicant\u2019s detention was compatible with the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention (see, with further references, Kim v.\u00a0Russia, no. 44260\/13, \u00a7\u00a038, 17 July 2014).(a)\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the purpose of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention is to ensure for individuals who are arrested and detained the right to judicial supervision of the lawfulness of the measure to which they are thereby subjected. A remedy must be made available during a person\u2019s detention to allow that person to obtain a speedy judicial review of the legality of the detention, capable of leading, where appropriate, to his or her release. The existence of the remedy required by Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention must be sufficiently certain, not only in theory but also in practice, failing which it will lack the accessibility and effectiveness required for the purposes of that provision (see, with further references, Azimov, cited above, \u00a7 150).99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention in a number of judgments concerning Russia on account of the absence of any domestic legal provision which could have allowed an applicant to initiate a judicial review of his detention pending expulsion (see Azimov, cited above, \u00a7 153; Kim, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 39-43; Rakhimov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0148\u201150; Eshonkulov v. Russia, no. 68900\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 57-60, 15\u00a0January\u00a02015; and L.M. and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos. 40081\/14, 40088\/14 and 40127\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 140-42, 15\u00a0October 2015). In the Kim case, the Government acknowledged a violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 4 of the Convention and, having regard to the recurrent nature of the violation, the Court directed that the Russian authorities should \u201csecure in its domestic legal order a mechanism which allows individuals to institute proceedings for the examination of the lawfulness of their detention pending removal in the light of the developments in the removal proceedings\u201d (see Kim, cited above, \u00a7 71).100.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, the applicant in the present case throughout the term of his detention pending expulsion (administrative removal) did not have at his disposal any procedure for a judicial review of its lawfulness.101.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention102.\u00a0\u00a0It is well established in the Court\u2019s case-law on Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention that all deprivation of liberty must not only be based on one of the exceptions listed in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) but must also be \u201clawful\u201d. Where the \u201clawfulness\u201d of detention is at issue, including the question whether \u201ca procedure prescribed by law\u201d has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. This primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the Convention. The \u201cquality of the law\u201d implies that where a national law authorises a deprivation of liberty, it must be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application to avoid all risk of arbitrariness. The standard of \u201clawfulness\u201d set by the Convention requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person \u2013 if need be, with appropriate advice \u2013 to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see, with further references, Del R\u00edo Prada v. Spain [GC], no.\u00a042750\/09, \u00a7 125, ECHR 2013).103.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was detained on 27 January 2015 pending enforcement of the District Court\u2019s decision ordering his expulsion (administrative removal) from Russia, and remains in detention to the present day.104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that the Government have not invoked any of the sub-paragraphs of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention as grounds capable of justifying the applicant\u2019s detention (see paragraph 94 above). It observes, however, that it has found in a number of cases against Russia concerning detention of foreign nationals pending their administrative removal that such removal amounted to a form of \u201cdeportation\u201d in terms of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) of the Convention, and that consequently that provision was applicable (see Azimov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0160; Kim, cited above, \u00a7 48; Egamberdiyev\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a034742\/13, \u00a7 58, 26\u00a0June\u00a02014; Rakhimov, cited above, \u00a7 124; and Khalikov\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 66373\/13, \u00a7 69, 26\u00a0February\u00a02015).105.\u00a0\u00a0Despite the present case\u2019s obvious similarities to those cited above, owing to the Government\u2019s lack of comment on the applicant\u2019s allegations, the Court does not deem it appropriate to assess compatibility of the applicant\u2019s detention pending expulsion with the standards set by Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 (f) of the Convention. Given that the thrust of the applicant\u2019s complaint is that Russian domestic law, in particular, the Code of Administrative Offences, contains no provisions governing the length of detention pending administrative removal, and that as a result of such lacunae the applicant has found himself in a situation lacking legal certainty (see paragraph 95 above), the Court will limit its analysis to establishing whether the applicant\u2019s detention has been \u201clawful\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that, when ordering the applicant\u2019s detention pending expulsion, the District Court did not set any time-limits for it (see paragraph 12 above). Likewise, the Appeal Court remained silent on the matter (see paragraph 16 above). Article 27.19 of the CAO devoted to the placement of persons awaiting administrative removal in detention centres for aliens does not provide for any time-limits of their detention (see paragraph 32 above). The only guidance available to the applicant to envision a maximum length of his detention pending expulsion would be Article\u00a031.9 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, which stipulates that an expulsion decision remains enforceable within two years from the date of its entry into force (see paragraph 34 above). This provision would imply that after the expiry of the two-year term a person detained pending enforcement of an administrative removal order should be released. It may happen in the present case; however, the possible implications of Article\u00a031.9 \u00a7 1 of the CAO for the applicant\u2019s detention are a matter of interpretation, and the rule limiting the duration of detention of an illegal alien is not set out clearly in law. It is also unclear what will happen after the expiry of the two-year time-limit, since the applicant will clearly remain in an irregular situation in terms of immigration law and will again be liable to expulsion and, consequently, to detention on those grounds (see Azimov, cited above, \u00a7 171; Akram Karimov\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 62892\/12, \u00a7 191, 28 May 2014; Egamberdiyev, cited above, \u00a7 92; and Khalikov, cited above, \u00a7 73).107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s findings regarding the lack of judicial review of the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s continuing detention (see paragraph 100 above) are of utmost relevance in connection with the alleged lack of legal certainty of the applicant\u2019s detention as it follows that the Russian legal system did not provide for a procedure capable of preventing the risk of arbitrary detention pending expulsion (see Kim, cited above, \u00a7 53).108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the recent developments in domestic law introduced by the new Code of Administrative Procedure in force as of 15\u00a0September 2015 (see paragraph 35 above). However, these amendments have so far been of no bearing on the applicant\u2019s detention. Accordingly, the Court is not called upon to assess them in abstracto.109.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the instant case the domestic law governing the applicant\u2019s detention has not met the \u201cforeseeability\u201d requirement implicit in Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.110.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court observes that the maximum penalty in the form of deprivation of liberty for an administrative offence under the Code of Administrative Offences is thirty days (see paragraph 28 above) and that detention with a view to expulsion should not be punitive in nature and also should be accompanied by appropriate safeguards, as established by the Russian Constitutional Court (see paragraph 36 above). In this case the \u201cpreventive\u201d measure, in terms of its gravity, was much more serious than the \u201cpunitive\u201d one, which is not normal (see Azimov, cited above, \u00a7 172; Kim, cited above, \u00a7 55; Akram Karimov, cited above, \u00a7 192; and Egamberdiyev, cited above, \u00a7 63).111.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the Court finds that the deprivation of liberty in the instant case was not \u201clawful\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, for lack of a legal basis of the requisite quality to satisfy the general principle of legal certainty.112.\u00a0\u00a0There has, therefore, been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that, in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.114.\u00a0\u00a0It considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 4 above) must continue in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection (see operative part).V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION115.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage116.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he had experienced distress and frustration because of the risk of expulsion to Kyrgyzstan and his irregular detention and thus sustained non\u2011pecuniary damage. He asked the Court to establish the appropriate amount of compensation to be awarded.117.\u00a0\u00a0The Government suggested that, were the Court to find any violation of the Convention in the applicant\u2019s case, such a finding in itself would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that no breach of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant\u2019s expulsion has yet occurred in the present case. However, it has found that the decision to expel the applicant would, if implemented, give rise to a violation of that provision. The Court considers that its finding regarding this part of the application in itself amounts to adequate just satisfaction for the purposes of Article 41 of the Convention. Nonetheless, considering the above findings of violations of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs on account of the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment and of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention, the Court, making an assessment on an equitable basis, awards the applicant 26,000\u00a0euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses119.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on his representative\u2019s detailed timesheets, the applicant also claimed EUR\u00a05,300 for the costs and expenses incurred at the national level and before the Court.120.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the representative\u2019s fees were not shown to have been actually paid or incurred.121.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.122.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the legal fees, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria (see Fadeyeva v. Russia, no. 55723\/00, \u00a7\u00a0147, ECHR 2005\u2011IV), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 5,300, plus any tax which may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount, to be paid to his representative\u2019s bank account.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27919":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of the inhuman conditions of his detention, the lack of medical treatment and a suitable diet for his dental problems and of ill-treatment by a prison guard. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government objected that the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies in respect of his complaint concerning the alleged ill-treatment by a prison guard. They contended that the applicant had not appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 27 November 2013 before the superior prosecutor and subsequently before the courts as provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure.64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he had never received this prosecutor\u2019s decision.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the decision in question was sent to the applicant on 12 December 2013 and that the applicant did not contest it before the superior prosecutor and the courts (see paragraphs 52 and 53 above).It follows that this part of the complaint must be rejected under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.66.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the complaints concerning the conditions of detention, the lack of medical treatment and the diet provided, the Court notes that they are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint concerning the material conditions of detention(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of severe overcrowding, the poor quality of the food and drinking water, the inadequate provision of hot water and no provision of clothing or toiletries. He alleged that his numerous complaints concerning these detention conditions remained unresolved by the prison authorities. Referring to the reports of the Romanian Helsinki Committee quoted in the case of Iacov Stanciu (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 146-63) the applicant contended that the conditions he described had also been confirmed by the above-mentioned organisation after its visits to the prisons of Gala\u0163i, Rahova and Jilava.68.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the information submitted on the general conditions of detention (see paragraphs 12-26 above), the Government stressed that the domestic authorities had taken all necessary measures in order to ensure that the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention had been adequate.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that under Article 3 of the Convention the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity; that the manner and method of execution of the measure of detention do not subject him\/her to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention; and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well\u2011being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000-XI, and En\u0103\u015foaie v. Romania, no. 36513\/12, \u00a7\u00a046, 4\u00a0November 2014).70.\u00a0\u00a0When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR\u00a02001-II, and Todireasa v. Romania (No.2), no. 18616\/13, \u00a7 54, 21\u00a0April 2015).71.\u00a0\u00a0A serious lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as a factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the detention conditions described are \u201cdegrading\u201d from the point of view of Article\u00a03 (see En\u0103\u015foaie, cited above, \u00a7\u00a047, and Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no.\u00a053254\/99, \u00a7\u00a039, 7 April 2005).72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that, in addition to overcrowding, other aspects of the physical conditions of detention are relevant for its assessment of compliance with Article 3 (see Babushkin v. Russia, no. 67253\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 44 and 48, 18 October 2007, and Iacov Stanciu, cited above, \u00a7 169). The Court has found that the following conditions of detention raise an issue under Article 3 of the Convention: lack of appropriate furniture in the cells; poor sanitary facilities, such as a limited number of toilets and sinks for a large number of detainees; sinks in cells providing only cold water for a wide range of needs (personal hygiene, washing clothing and personal objects, cleaning the toilets); limited access to hot showers; poor sanitary conditions in general; and poor quality food (see Iacov Stanciu, cited above, \u00a7 175).73.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant complained of the inhuman conditions in which he had been detained for a period of one year and three months in Gala\u0163i, Rahova and Jilava Prisons.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that there had been overcrowding in all of the detention facilities in which the applicant had been held. More specifically, the statistics provided by the Government in reply to the applicant\u2019s allegations of overcrowding show that most of the time the applicant\u2019s personal space was significantly less than that required by the Court\u2019s case-law. The Court points out that those figures were even lower in reality, given that the cells also contained beds and other items of furniture. This state of affairs in itself raises an issue under Article 3 of the Convention (see Iacov Stanciu, cited above, \u00a7 173; Cotle\u0163 v. Romania (No\u00a02), no. 49549\/11, \u00a7 34, 1 October 2013; and Todireasa, cited above, \u00a7\u00a057).75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained of the poor quality of food and drinking water and the inadequate provision of hot and cold water. These allegations were not refuted by the Government, who merely declared that the quality and quantity of food and water had been in accordance with the regulations and budgetary constraints, and that hot and cold water had been provided in accordance with a schedule established by the prison administration. Moreover, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the poor quality of drinking water in Jilava Prison were confirmed by the domestic courts (see paragraph 31 above). As for the provision of hot and cold water, no details were given by the Government on whether the schedules set by the prison administration had actually been adapted to the number of prisoners.76.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the provision of toiletries and clothes, it is evident from the Government\u2019s submissions that the applicant had not been provided with enough of these items so as to be able to maintain adequate personal hygiene. For example, during the period spent in Gala\u0163i Prison the applicant received one tube of toothpaste in four months and one bar of soap per month, which he was supposed to use for daily hand washing as well as for showering (see paragraph 15 above). No information was submitted by the Government with respect to the other two prisons of which the applicant complained. As far as clothing is concerned the Government merely quoted the text of the regulation governing the provision of clothing to prisoners but did not submit any document to show whether the applicant had actually received the necessary clothing (see paragraphs 24 and 34 above).77.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the conditions of detention in Gala\u0163i, Rahova and Jilava Prisons correspond to the specific findings of the Romanian Helsinki Committee on their visits to these prisons, as well as to the general findings of the CPT in respect of Romanian prisons (see paragraphs 60 and 61 above).78.\u00a0The Court has frequently found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the lack of personal space afforded to prisoners, unsatisfactory sanitary conditions and the poor quality of food in Gala\u0163i, Rahova and Jilava Prisons (see Toma Barbu v. Romania, no. 19730\/10, 30 July 2013; Iacov Stanciu, cited above; and Porumb, cited above). In the case at hand the Government failed to put forward any argument or information that would allow the Court to reach a different conclusion. Not only do the above conditions not satisfy the European standards established by the CPT, but, as the Court has already stated, the cumulative effect of overcrowding in large-capacity \u2013 and sometimes also insalubrious \u2013 dormitories, poor quality food and poor hygiene conditions can prove detrimental to prisoners (see Todireasa, cited above, \u00a7 61).79.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that, cumulatively, all the above-mentioned conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention caused him harm that exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and thus reached the minimum level of severity necessary to constitute degrading treatment within the meaning of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint concerning medical treatment(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the prison authorities had failed to provide him with adequate medical treatment for his periodontitis. More specifically, his doctor\u2019s recommendation in 2009 that he be given a dental prosthesis and moved to a semi-liquid or liquid diet had never been acted on by the authorities. As a result, he had had to endure constant pain and hunger, he had lost almost 70 % of his teeth and had developed an ulcer and gastroduodenitis. He had brought this situation to the attention of the competent authorities on numerous occasions but to no effect. The applicant contended that the regulations which provided that the cost of dental prostheses for prisoners who do not have any income shall be supported jointly by the social security scheme and the prison\u2019s budget were ineffective since there was no special budget allocated for prosthetic work for prisoners and, according to the information submitted by the national authorities, only two prisoners had benefited from this system of payment between 2012 and 2013. The applicant concluded that the suffering he had endured because of the authorities\u2019 inaction for a period of more than five\u00a0years had gone beyond the threshold necessary to constitute degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed that the applicant had received a special diet for sick prisoners made up of easily chewable food. As regards medical treatment, the applicant had been adequately treated for his dental problems. In addition, on several occasions the applicant had refused to be transported to prison hospitals in order to receive medical treatment and, for example, on one occasion he had refused to be transported for treatment to another prison equipped with a dental facility. Moreover, he had never specifically requested a dental prosthesis and had failed to inform the authorities about his financial situation in order to be able to benefit from the provisions of Order no. 429\/C\/125 of 7 February 2012.The Government concluded that the national law and the domestic system had offered the applicant effective access to adequate dental treatment.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has emphasised on a number of occasions that a lack of appropriate medical treatment in prison may by itself raise an issue under Article 3, even if the applicant\u2019s state of health does not require his\/her immediate release. The State must ensure that given the practical demands of imprisonment, the health and well-being of a detainee are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him\/her with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 93-94, ECHR 2000-XI; Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05 \u00a7 90, 4 October 2005; and Cirillo v. Italy, no. 36276\/10, \u00a7 35, 29 January 2013).83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that medical treatment within prison facilities must be appropriate and comparable to the quality of treatment which the State authorities have committed themselves to providing for the entirety of the population. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each detainee must be guaranteed the same medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Cara-Damiani v.\u00a0Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012).84.\u00a0\u00a0The mere fact that a detainee is seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical assistance was adequate (see Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos.\u00a09852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 116, 29 November 2007). The authorities must also ensure that a comprehensive record is kept concerning the detainee\u2019s state of health and his or her treatment while in detention (see, for example, Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2006\u2011XII), that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115, and Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006), and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at curing the detainee\u2019s illnesses or preventing their aggravation, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 114; Sarban, cited above, \u00a7 79; and Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 211, 13 July 2006). The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually carried out (see Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a032362\/02, \u00a7 69, 20 May 2010).85.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the mere fact of a deterioration of the applicant\u2019s state of health, albeit capable of raising, at an initial stage, certain doubts concerning the adequacy of the treatment in prison, does not suffice as such for a finding of a violation of the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention, if, on the other hand, it can be established that the relevant domestic authorities have in timely fashion resorted to all reasonably possible medical measures in a conscientious effort to hinder development of the disease in question. Indeed, the State\u2019s obligation to cure a seriously ill detainee is one of means, not of result (see, among other authorities, Goloshvili v. Georgia, no. 45566\/08, \u00a7 38, 20 November 2012 and Cirillo, cited above, \u00a7 37).86.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that in July 2009 the applicant was diagnosed with periodontitis (I and II degree), and frontal, lateral and terminal edentulism and was prescribed a dental prosthesis. Four years and seven months later, on 24 February 2014 when the applicant had been taken to the hospital for congestion and swelling of the gums, his condition had developed into chronic apical periodontitis and generalised stomatitis.87.\u00a0\u00a0Despite his initial diagnosis and its development, the Court notes that the applicant was constantly treated on a symptomatic basis, with antibiotics and anti-inflammatory drugs. No comprehensive record was kept of the progression of the disease and the percentage of teeth lost by the applicant. In addition, no therapeutic strategy was set up, aimed at, to the extent possible, curing the applicant\u2019s periodontitis or preventing its aggravation along with the loss of additional teeth and the generalised inflammation of his gums.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes, following the Government\u2019s submission, that the applicant refused medical treatment on several occasions. Nevertheless, it is not evident from the file that the applicant was offered prosthetic treatment for his periodontitis which he refused (see paragraph 44 above). It also is not evident that the applicant contributed in any way to the worsening of his condition (contrast Epners-Gefners v. Latvia, no. 37862\/02, \u00a7 44, 29 May 2012, and V.D. v. Romania, no. 7078\/02, \u00a7 100, 16 February 2010).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also stressed that the doctor\u2019s prescription for a prosthesis had not been implemented because the applicant had not requested either the device or the payment of his contribution to the treatment from the prison budget. In this regard the Court observes that the applicant alerted the authorities with respect to his situation on numerous occasions. More specifically, on five occasions the applicant complained of unbearable toothache and requested a treatment for this condition without receiving any relevant response from the prison authorities (see paragraph 49 above). In addition, the applicant lodged complaints before the post-sentencing judge on three other occasions drawing the authorities\u2019 attention to the fact that his dental problems were so severe as to prevent him from eating the food served in prison. All these requests had been rejected as being ill-founded (see paragraphs 45-48 above). Moreover, it is evident from the file that the prison authorities were well aware of the applicant\u2019s lack of financial means (see paragraphs 15, 20 and 26 above).90.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to an eventual request by the applicant for a co-payment from the prison budget of the cost of the prosthetic treatment, the Court notes that the regulations in place until 2012 had already been analysed and declared ineffective in the case V.D. (cited above, \u00a7 96) where the Court found a systemic problem caused by the flaws of the medical insurance system for ensuring dental care for detainees deprived of any financial means. On 7 February 2012 a new regulation entered into force providing that in cases where prisoners did not have the necessary financial means, their part of the costs was to be covered by the prison administration from a special budget. However, on this point the Government submitted that there was no special budget allocated for this type of expense and within a period of one year only two prisoners in the whole of the Romanian penal system actually benefited from this financial aid (see paragraph 59 above). In view of the above the Court considers that the Government has yet to prove the effectiveness of the new system put in place in 2012.91.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, having in mind the applicant\u2019s psychiatric pathology (see paragraph 39 above), the Court recalls that it has previously held in cases involving people with mental disabilities that consideration has to be given to their vulnerability, in particular their inability in some cases to plead their case coherently\u00a0(see V.D., cited above, \u00a7 87, and B. v. Romania (no.2), no.\u00a01285\/03, \u00a7 78, 19 February 2013).\u00a0On this point, the Court notes that the applicant should have never been placed in prison but rather committed to a psychiatric hospital as ordered by the domestic courts at the time of his criminal conviction in 2007 and as restated by his doctor in 2011.92.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, in view of the above and having in mind the particular circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the applicant cannot be reproached for not having lodged yet another more specific request as suggested by the Government.93.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the authorities\u2019 failure to provide the prescribed liquid or semi-liquid diet, the Court observes that in July 2009 the applicant was prescribed a diet of liquid or semi-liquid food until the prosthesis was in place. This initial recommendation was entirely overlooked by the prison authorities who only gave the applicant this type of diet for limited periods of time (see paragraphs 14, 18 and 25 above). Moreover, the applicant\u2019s complaints in this respect lodged with the post-sentencing judge and subsequently with the courts were rejected without having been thoroughly analysed for reasons including budgetary constraints or even because the prison authorities had stated that there had been no prescription for such a diet in the applicant\u2019s medical file (see paragraphs 45-48 above).94.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the applicant was not provided with adequate medical care and a suitable diet for his periodontitis, which in itself, having regard to the long period concerned and to the consequences for the applicant\u2019s health, caused the applicant suffering attaining the threshold of inhuman and degrading treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention.There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION95.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage96.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the suffering he had endured due to the inhuman conditions of his detention, the lack of adequate treatment and a suitable diet for his periodontitis and his ill-treatment by a prison guard.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s claims were excessive.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the current case it has found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on two separate counts due to the inhuman living conditions in the prisons where the applicant was detained and the lack of adequate medical care and a suitable diet for his periodontitis. Consequently, having regard to the circumstances of the case seen as a whole and deciding on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 11,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses99.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 5,192.5 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. More specifically, EUR 4,892.5 in lawyer\u2019s fees, to be paid directly to the lawyer\u2019s account, and EUR 300 for technical support and various correspondence costs incurred by the Romanian Helsinki Committee to be paid directly to that organisation\u2019s account. The applicant submitted a contract signed by his representative and a detailed document indicating the number of hours worked in preparing the case. He also submitted an agreement signed with the Helsinki Committee by which the latter committed to offer technical support and to pay the correspondence fees incurred before the Court.100.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the number of hours worked in connection with the case indicated by the lawyer had been, to a certain extent, excessive. They considered that given the subject matter of the case a diligent lawyer would have needed less time to work on it. They further submitted that the EUR 300 requested by the Helsinki Committee was not supported by any proof.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in order for costs and expenses to be reimbursed under Article 41, it must be established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118\/93, \u00a7 62, ECHR\u00a01999-VIII, and Cobzaru v. Romania, no. 48254\/99, \u00a7 110, 26 July 2007). In accordance with Rule 60 \u00a7 2 of the Rules of Court, itemised particulars of all claims must be submitted, failing which the Chamber may reject the claim in whole or in part.102.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, having regard to the above criteria and to the itemised list submitted by the applicant, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 3,000 in respect of lawyer\u2019s fees, less the sum already received under this head in legal aid (EUR 850), making a total of EUR 2,150, to be paid directly into the bank account indicated by the applicant\u2019s representative.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27924":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated during his arrest by the police, and that the domestic authorities had failed to investigate his allegation of ill-treatment. Article 3 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant by the police(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment during his arrest by the police. In this connection, they relied on the conclusions of the additional \u201ccommission forensic report\u201d of 24 August 2012, according to which the injuries found on the applicant\u2019s body had resulted from his body coming into contact with angular protruding parts of the police vehicle during his arrest. The Government also noted that the applicant had not complained of ill\u2011treatment when he had been taken to the temporary detention centre after his arrest and that the clothes he had been wearing on the day of his arrest had not been damaged.71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disputed the Government\u2019s submissions. He maintained that on 21 June 2012 six or seven plain-clothes police officers had assaulted him near the Neftchilar metro station in Baku. Without revealing their official identification, they had restrained his arms and had begun to beat him in various parts of his body. They had then handcuffed him and dragged him into their car, where they had continued to beat him.72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further submitted that the State had failed to provide a plausible explanation for the injuries found on his body. In this connection, he disputed the conclusions of the forensic report of 24 August 2012. He pointed out that there had been no reason for conducting an additional forensic examination and that it had not been done in order to complete the investigation, but to cover up for those who had beaten him up. He also argued that the experts could not have concluded that his injuries had resulted from his body coming into contact with angular protruding parts of the vehicle without examining the vehicle in question, which they had failed to do. He further argued that the conclusions of the forensic report of 24\u00a0August 2012 contradicted the arrest techniques used by the police. In this connection, he submitted that, when an arrested person was placed in a vehicle, there was always at least one police officer already inside. Therefore, only one side of the applicant\u2019s body could have made contact with the vehicle whereas there had been injuries on both sides of his body.73.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener \u2012 the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights \u2012 submitted that the situation of human rights defenders in Azerbaijan was of great concern and that the present case was an illustration of a serious and systematic human rights problem in Azerbaijan. He submitted that the arrest and detention of the applicant in June 2012 was part of a more general crackdown on human rights defenders in Azerbaijan, which had intensified over the summer of 2014. In the Commissioner\u2019s view, the prosecution of human rights defenders and prominent journalists in Azerbaijan constituted reprisals against those who had co-operated with the Council of Europe and other organisations by denouncing human rights violations in the country.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions, and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2, even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 93, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII, and Selmouni v. France [GC], no.\u00a025803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999\u2011V).75.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. Assessment of this minimum level depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0162, Series A no. 25; Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7 91, ECHR\u00a02000-XI; and Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a067, ECHR 2001-III). The Court has considered treatment to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because, inter alia, it was premeditated, applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. It has deemed treatment to be \u201cdegrading\u201d because it was such as to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7 92).76.\u00a0\u00a0As to the distribution of the burden of proof, the Court reiterates that where an individual, when taken into police custody, is in good health, but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see Tomasi v.\u00a0France, 27 August 1992, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0108-11, Series A no. 241\u2011A, and Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7\u00a087). The Court attaches particular importance to the circumstances in which force is used (see G\u00fczel \u015eahin and Others v. Turkey, no. 68263\/01, \u00a7 50, 21 December 2006, and Timtik v. Turkey, no. 12503\/06, \u00a7 49, 9 November 2010). When the police or other agents of the State, in confronting someone, have recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by the person\u2019s own conduct, it diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 of the Convention (see Kop v. Turkey, no.\u00a012728\/05, \u00a7 27, 20 October 2009, and Timtik, cited above, \u00a7 47).77.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, among many other authorities, Av\u015far v. Turkey, no. 25657\/94, \u00a7 282, ECHR 2001-VII). The Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be cautious in assuming the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see, for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). Nevertheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must apply particularly thorough scrutiny, even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place (see Av\u015far, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 283-84, and Muradova v. Azerbaijan, no.\u00a022684\/05, \u00a7 99, 2 April 2009).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the parties are in dispute about the question of whether the applicant was subjected to the use of force by the police at all (see Rizvanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 31805\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 46-48, 17\u00a0April 2012, and compare with Muradova, cited above, \u00a7 107). In particular, while the Government rejected the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment allegations, relying on the conclusions of the forensic report of 24 August 2012 that the injuries found on the applicant\u2019s body resulted from his body coming into contact with angular protruding parts of the vehicle during his arrest, the applicant maintained his complaint that he had been beaten up by the police during his arrest.79.\u00a0\u00a0In view of all the materials in its possession, the Court points out that although the parties put forward differing versions of how the applicant sustained his injuries, other findings relating to the injuries found on the applicant\u2019s body and the facts concerning his arrest by the police are not in dispute.80.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the existence of abrasions on the applicant\u2019s left calf and right thigh was confirmed by the forensic reports of both 23 June 2012 and 24 August 2012, and the Government did not dispute that fact in the domestic proceedings or before the Court. The expert reports also confirmed that the time at which the injuries had been inflicted corresponded to 21\u00a0June 2012. In addition, the parties did not dispute the fact that on 21 June 2012 the police arrested the applicant and took him to the NDMIA.81.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the parties\u2019 differing versions concerning the cause of the applicant\u2019s injuries, the Court notes that the forensic expert who examined the applicant only one day after his arrest concluded that the injuries found on the applicant\u2019s body could have been inflicted in the circumstances and at the time indicated in the descriptive part of the decision, in other words as a result of being beaten by the police during his arrest (see paragraph 27 above). However, the forensic experts who examined the applicant more than two months after his arrest found that the injuries in question had been caused by the applicant\u2019s body coming into contact with angular protruding parts of the vehicle when he was put in the police car (see paragraph 37 above).82.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court observes that, although the forensic report of 24 August 2012 found that the injuries had been caused by the applicant\u2019s body coming into contact with angular protruding parts of the vehicle, it failed to specify the parts of the vehicle in question. In particular, it is not clear from the forensic report which parts of the vehicle could have caused such injuries following contact with the applicant\u2019s body. Moreover, the Court agrees with the applicant\u2019s assertion that in order to come to such a conclusion, not only should the applicant\u2019s body have been examined but also the vehicle in question. However, the experts failed to do the latter.83.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the Court notes that the very fact that those injuries were inflicted in the course of the applicant\u2019s arrest by the police raises a serious issue under Article 3 of the Convention and it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation for such a situation. However, in the present case the Government contented themselves with submitting that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been sustained when his body had come into contact with angular protruding parts of the police vehicle during his arrest, without giving any explanation or account of the events to explain why the applicant\u2019s arrest was carried out in such a way as to cause him to sustain those injuries. Neither the investigating authorities, nor the domestic courts in their decisions gave any explanation in this respect. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the respondent Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and to submit any evidence or plausible explanation refuting the applicant\u2019s account of events. Therefore, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s account of events was accurate and that the injuries found on his body were sustained as a result of the use of force by the police against him during his arrest on 21 June 2012.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will consequently examine whether the use of force against the applicant was excessive.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers in this connection that it has not been shown that the recourse to physical force against the applicant was made strictly necessary by his own conduct. It is undisputed that the applicant did not use violence against the police or pose a threat to them. It has not been shown that there were any other reasons justifying the use of force for his arrest. Therefore, the Court cannot but conclude that the use of force was unnecessary, excessive and unacceptable (see Najafli v. Azerbaijan, no.\u00a02594\/07, \u00a7 39, 2 October 2012, and Rizvanov, cited above, \u00a7 50).86.\u00a0\u00a0As to the seriousness of the act of ill-treatment, the Court considers that although the injuries sustained by the applicant did not require any important medical intervention, they must have caused him physical pain and suffering. The ill-treatment and its consequences must also have caused him considerable mental suffering, diminishing his human dignity. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the ill-treatment complained of was sufficiently serious to attain the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 and to be considered as inhuman and degrading treatment.87.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.2.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged failure to carry out an effective investigation(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the domestic authorities had conducted an effective investigation of the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill\u2011treatment. In this connection, they pointed out that the investigating authorities had ordered forensic examinations of the applicant, had interviewed the applicant and the police officers involved in his arrest, and had examined the applicant\u2019s clothes. The Government further submitted that the domestic courts had also duly examined the applicant\u2019s claim.89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disputed the Government\u2019s submissions, maintaining that the domestic authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into his ill-treatment.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment90.\u00a0\u00a0Where an individual raises an arguable claim that he or she has been ill-treated by the police in breach of Article 3, that provision \u2012 read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d \u2012 requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. This investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice, and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see Assenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 102, and Labita\u00a0v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).91.\u00a0\u00a0An investigation into allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough, meaning that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill\u2011founded conclusions to close their investigation or to form the basis of their decisions (see Assenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 103 et seq.). They must take all steps reasonably available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard. Moreover, there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the complainant must be afforded effective access to the investigatory procedure (see Bat\u0131 and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0134 and 137, ECHR 2004\u2011IV).92.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the investigation must be expeditious. In cases under Articles\u00a02 and 3 of the Convention, where the effectiveness of the official investigation is at issue, the Court has often assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time (see Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933\/04, \u00a7 135, 29 July 2010). Consideration was given to the starting of investigations, delays in taking statements (see Timurta\u015f v. Turkey, no. 23531\/94, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2000-VI, and Tekin v. Turkey, 9 June 1998, \u00a7 67, Reports 1998\u2011IV), and the length of the initial investigation (see Indelicato v. Italy, no. 31143\/96, \u00a7 37, 18 October 2001).93.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that although the applicant raised an arguable claim, supported by the medical evidence, that he had been beaten up by the police during his arrest on 21 June 2012, following a criminal inquiry the Deputy Prosecutor General refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment which was confirmed by the domestic courts. It remains to be assessed whether the criminal inquiry was effective, as required by Article 3.94.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court observes numerous shortcomings in the criminal inquiry carried out by the domestic authorities.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court firstly observes that the criminal inquiry was not expeditious. In particular, even though the applicant complained of his ill\u2011treatment to the investigator at the Nizami District Police Office in a prompt manner on the day of his arrest and was promptly examined the next day by an expert who found injuries on his body, the investigating authorities failed to launch a criminal inquiry at least until 31 July 2012 (see\u00a0paragraph 31 above). In the meantime, the applicant\u2019s complaint was transferred first to the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office and then to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office; the only action taken by the investigating authorities was to interview the applicant at the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office on 29 June 2012. The Court notes that this delay by the investigating authorities cannot be attributed to the applicant.96.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Court notes that the domestic authorities failed to take all the measures reasonably available to them to secure the evidence concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. In particular, although it was undisputed by the parties that the applicant had been arrested by six or seven police officers, the investigating authorities questioned only four of the police officers involved in the applicant\u2019s arrest. The Court further notes that the statements of the police officers were identical in their wording (see\u00a0paragraph 32 above). Moreover, despite a clear contradiction between the statements of the police officers and the applicant\u2019s statement, the investigator in charge of the case did not order a face-to-face confrontation between the applicant and the police officers. The Court also cannot overlook the fact that, although the applicant explicitly asked the domestic courts to hear the police officers who had participated in his arrest and the experts who had examined him, the domestic courts\u2019 decisions were silent on this point. No explanation was provided by the Government as to why the domestic authorities had failed to carry out those investigative measures.97.\u00a0\u00a0Thirdly, the Court notes that the investigating authorities failed to keep the applicant informed of the progress of the investigation and to provide him with the decisions taken within the criminal inquiry. In particular, the applicant was not provided with copies of the forensic reports and obtained them only in the course of the proceedings before the Nasimi District Court. Moreover, the applicant learned about the existence of the Deputy Prosecutor General\u2019s decision of 27 August 2012 refusing to institute criminal proceedings only in the course of the proceedings before the Nasimi District Court.98.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the investigation of the applicant\u2019s claim of ill-treatment was ineffective. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION99.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been arrested and detained in the absence of a \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d that he had committed a criminal offence. He also complained that the domestic courts had failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the necessity of his detention pending trial. Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;...3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201d100.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener \u2012 the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights \u2012 submitted that in Azerbaijan pre-trial detention was used as a tool of punishment to silence those expressing dissenting views, including to prevent them from providing information to international human rights bodies.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not raise any objection as regards the admissibility of the applicant\u2019s complaints raised under Article 5 of the Convention.102.\u00a0\u00a0However, as it appears from the applicant\u2019s submissions that on 22\u00a0November 2013 the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention delivered an opinion concerning his pre-trial detention, the Court considers it necessary to satisfy itself that the applicant\u2019s complaints raised under Article 5 of the Convention comply with the admissibility criteria laid down in Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 (b) of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c... 2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under Article\u00a034 that ...(b)\u00a0\u00a0is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information. ...\u201d103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates at the outset that Article 35 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Convention is intended to avoid a situation where several international bodies would be simultaneously dealing with applications which are substantially the same. A situation of this type would be incompatible with the spirit and the letter of the Convention, which seeks to avoid a plurality of international proceedings relating to the same cases (see, among others, Smirnova v. Russia, (dec.) nos. 46133\/99 and 48183\/99, 3\u00a0October 2002, and Celniku v. Greece, no. 21449\/04, \u00a7 39, 5 July 2007). In determining whether its jurisdiction is excluded by virtue of this Convention provision, the Court would have to decide whether the case before it is substantially the same as a matter that has already been submitted to a parallel set of proceedings and, if that is so, whether the simultaneous proceedings may be seen as \u201canother procedure of international investigation or settlement\u201d within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a02 (b) of the Convention.104.\u00a0\u00a0Assessment of the similarity of cases would usually involve comparing the parties in the respective proceedings, the relevant legal provisions relied on by them, the scope of their claims and the types of redress sought (see Vesa Peltonen v. Finland (dec.), no. 19583\/92, 20\u00a0February 1995; and OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, no.\u00a014902\/04, \u00a7 521, 20 September 2011). In other words, an application is considered \u201csubstantially the same\u201d where it concerns the same persons, facts and complaints (see Savda v. Turkey, no. 42730\/05, \u00a7 68, 12 June 2012, and G\u00fcrdeniz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 59715\/10, \u00a7 41, 18 March 2014).105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s analysis of the character of parallel proceedings would not be limited to a formal verification but would extend, where appropriate, to ascertaining whether the nature of the supervisory body, the procedure it follows and the effect of its decisions are such that the Court\u2019s jurisdiction is excluded by Article 35 \u00a7 2 (b) (see OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos, cited above, \u00a7 522, and Savda, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 69-70).106.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that it has already examined the procedure followed by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and concluded that it constituted \u201canother procedure of international investigation or settlement\u201d for the purposes of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 (b) of the Convention (see Peraldi v. France (dec.), no.\u00a02096\/05, 7 April 2009; G\u00fcrdeniz, cited above, \u00a7 39, and U\u00e7a v. Turkey (dec.), no. 73489\/12, \u00a7 42, 30 September 2014). It sees no reason to depart from that conclusion in the instant case.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must therefore determine whether the complaints raised by the applicant under Article 5 of the Convention are \u201csubstantially the same\u201d as the matter submitted to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.108.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that opinion no. 59\/2013 of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of 22 November 2013 concerned the same applicant and his detention pending trial within the criminal proceedings instituted against him following his arrest on 21 June 2012. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found, having examined the facts relating to the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention and relying specifically on Articles 9, 11 and 19 of the UDHR and Articles 9, 12 and 19 of the ICCPR, that his detention had been arbitrary and fell \u201cwithin categories II and III of the arbitrary detention categories referred to by the Working Group when considering cases submitted to it\u201d. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 5 of the Convention concerning his detention pending trial raised in his application before the Court were substantially the same as the matter submitted to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and dealt with in its opinion no. 59\/2013 of 22 November 2013.109.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 5 of the Convention must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION110.\u00a0\u00a0On 6 March 2015 the applicant introduced a new complaint, arguing that the suspension of his representative\u2019s licence to practise law and the impossibility of meeting his representative in the prison had amounted to a breach of his right of individual petition under Article 34 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government111.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s right of individual petition under Article 34 had not been infringed. They pointed out that the suspension of the licence to practise law of the applicant\u2019s representative had not been related to statements or submissions he had made within the proceedings of the present case.112.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s inability to meet his representative in the prison, the Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s representative had failed to submit a valid authority form to the Court and to the prison authorities. They further submitted that the fact that the applicant\u2019s representative had been able to submit to the Court very detailed and voluminous observations should be taken into account in the examination of the applicant\u2019s allegation that his right of individual application had been breached. The Government lastly pointed out that, although Mr Bagirov\u2019s licence had been suspended on 10 December 2014, they had not objected to him representing the applicant before the Court. Therefore, this fact confirmed that the Government had no intention of hindering the effective exercise of the applicant\u2019s right of individual petition under Article 34 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant113.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint, pointing out that the suspension of his representative\u2019s licence to practise law had been politically motived. The aim of the measure had been to silence Mr\u00a0Bagirov as an independent advocate and was part of a general campaign to crack down on civil society in the country.114.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also submitted that his representative had been refused permission to meet with him in the prison. The impossibility of meeting his representative had amounted to an infringement of the effective exercise of his right of individual petition under Article 34 of the Convention. The applicant also argued that his representative had submitted a valid authority form to the Court and to the domestic authorities.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment115.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, a complaint under Article 34 of the Convention is of a procedural nature and therefore does not give rise to any issue of admissibility under the Convention (see Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, \u00a7 105, Reports 1998\u2011IV, and Cooke v. Austria, no. 25878\/94, \u00a7 46, 8\u00a0February 2000).116.\u00a0\u00a0It is of utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition guaranteed by Article 34 of the Convention that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 105, Reports 1996\u2011IV, and Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7 159, Reports 1998\u2011III). In this context, \u201cany form of pressure\u201d includes not only direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation, but also other improper indirect acts or contacts designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention complaint or having a \u201cchilling effect\u201d on the exercise of the right of individual petition by applicants and their representatives (see Kurt, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 160 and 164; Tanr\u0131kulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763\/94, \u00a7 130, ECHR 1999\u2011IV; and Fedotova v. Russia, no. 73225\/01, \u00a7 48, 13 April 2006).117.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that an individual has managed to pursue his application does not prevent an issue arising under Article 34: should the Government\u2019s action make it more difficult for the individual to exercise his right of petition, this amounts to \u201chindering\u201d his rights under Article 34 (see\u00a0Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7 105). The intentions or reasons underlying the acts or omissions in question are of little relevance when assessing whether Article 34 of the Convention was complied with; what matters is whether the situation created as a result of the authorities\u2019 act or omission conforms to Article 34 (see Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no.\u00a039806\/05, \u00a7 87, 10 March 2009). Moreover, the Court must assess the vulnerability of the complainant and the risk of his being influenced by the authorities. An applicant\u2019s position might be particularly vulnerable when he is held in custody with limited contacts with his family or the outside world (see Cotle\u0163 v. Romania, no. 38565\/97, \u00a7 71, 3 June 2003).118.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes at the outset that the applicant raised two complaints under Article\u00a034 of the Convention. Firstly, he complained that the suspension of his legal representative\u2019s licence to practise had been related to the latter\u2019s involvement in the protection of human rights as an independent advocate. Secondly, he complained that the impossibility of meeting his representative in the prison had amounted to a violation of the respondent State\u2019s obligation not to hinder the effective exercise of his right of individual petition.119.\u00a0\u00a0As to the first complaint, the Court notes that Mr Bagirov has already lodged a separate application with the Court (application no.\u00a028198\/15) concerning the suspension of his licence to practise law on 10\u00a0December 2014. The Court considers that, when deciding the present case, it should avoid prejudging any issues which might be raised in that application, and should therefore leave unaddressed the applicant\u2019s argument in the present case that the suspension of Mr Bagirov\u2019s licence was part of a general crackdown campaign against human-rights lawyers and activists. Instead, the Court will focus on the narrower issue specific to the present case \u2013 whether the applicant\u2019s inability to meet his representative, as such, amounted to a breach of his rights under Article 34 of the Convention.120.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case it is not in dispute that, following the suspension of his licence to practise law on 10 December 2014, Mr Bagirov was refused permission to meet with the applicant. In this connection, the Court observes at the outset that, although the Government argued that Mr\u00a0Bagirov had failed to present a valid authority form to the Court and the domestic authorities, it is apparent from the documents in the case file that the applicant submitted to the Court two valid authority forms (dated 17\u00a0November 2012 and 30 January 2013, and signed by the applicant and Mr Bagirov), a copy of which were transmitted to the Government by the Court when the present application was communicated. As regards Mr\u00a0Bagirov\u2019s alleged failure to submit a valid power of attorney to the domestic authorities, the Court observes that the Government themselves submitted to the Court in their observations a copy of mandate (order) no.\u00a0017422 from the ABA, according to which Mr Bagirov represented the applicant in the domestic criminal proceedings. In any event, when the domestic authorities refused Mr Bagirov permission to meet with the applicant, they relied not on the absence of his power of attorney, but on the suspension of his licence to practise law of 10 December 2014 (see\u00a0paragraph 57 above).121.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the issue before the Court is whether the impediments to communication between the applicant and his representative placed by the prison authorities on the grounds that Mr Bagirov\u2019s licence to practise had been suspended, amounted to a failure to comply with the respondent State\u2019s obligation not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of petition under Article 34 of the Convention.122.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court observes that it has already found a violation of the right of petition under Article 34 of the Convention in various circumstances where an applicant in detention had been prevented from communicating freely with his representative before the Court. In particular, the Court considered that Article 34 of the Convention had been breached where the applicant had been unable to discuss with his representative issues concerning the application before the Court without their being separated by a glass partition (see Cebotari v. Moldova, no.\u00a035615\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a058-68, 13\u00a0November 2007); where the applicant had been \u00a0unable to communicate with his representative before the Court during his treatment in hospital (see Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009\/05, \u00a7\u00a0140, ECHR 2008); and where the applicant\u2019s contacts with his representative before the Court had been restricted on the grounds that the representative was not a professional advocate and did not belong to any Bar association (see Zakharkin v. Russia, no. 1555\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 157-60, 10 June 2010). The Court has, however, accepted that compliance by a representative with certain formal requirements might be necessary before obtaining access to a detainee, for instance for security reasons or in order to prevent collusion or perversion of the course of the investigation or justice (see Melnikov v. Russia, no.\u00a023610\/03, \u00a7 96, 14\u00a0January 2010). At the same time, excessive formalities in such matters, such as those that could de facto prevent a prospective applicant from effectively enjoying his right of individual petition, have been found to be unacceptable. By contrast, where the domestic formalities were easy to comply with, no issue arose under Article 34 (see Lebedev v. Russia, no. 4493\/04, \u00a7 119, 25\u00a0October 2007).123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present case, although it was clear that Mr Bagirov\u2019s request for a meeting with the applicant was related to the applicant\u2019s pending case before the Court (see paragraph 55 above), the domestic authorities did not allow such a meeting. The only reason for refusing to allow the applicant\u2019s representative to meet him was that his licence to practise law had been suspended on 10 December 2014 (see\u00a0paragraph 57 above). However, the Court notes that the suspension of Mr Bagirov\u2019s licence, which prevented him under domestic law from representing applicants in domestic criminal proceedings, could not be interpreted as a measure limiting his rights in the representation of applicants before the Court. Given that under Rule 36 \u00a7 4 (a) of the Rules of Court, permission to represent an applicant may be granted to a non\u2011advocate, the Contracting States must ensure that non-advocate representatives are allowed to visit detainees who have lodged or intend to lodge an application with the Court under the same conditions as advocates (see Zakharkin, cited above, \u00a7 157).124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that, although the domestic law does not provide for any special rules for detainees to receive visits by their representatives before the Court, it does not limit such visits to the professional advocates belonging to the Bar Association. In particular, Article 81.7 of the CEP specifically provides that detainees also have the right to meet with persons other than advocates entitled to provide them with legal assistance (see paragraph 59 above).125.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant\u2019s representative was able to submit to the Court very detailed and voluminous observations and that this fact should be taken into consideration in the examination of the complaint, the Court notes that a failure by the respondent Government to comply with their procedural obligation under Article 34 of the Convention does not necessarily require that the alleged interference should have actually restricted, or had any appreciable impact on, the exercise of the right of individual petition. The Contracting Party\u2019s procedural obligations under Articles 34 and 38 of the Convention must be enforced irrespective of the eventual outcome of the proceedings and in such a manner as to avoid any actual or potential chilling effect on the applicants or their representatives (see Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 55508\/07 and 29520\/09, \u00a7 209, ECHR 2013).126.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the respondent State has failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION127.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage128.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.129.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the amount claimed by the applicant was unsubstantiated and excessive. They further submitted that EUR 13,000 would constitute reasonable compensation for the non\u2011pecuniary damage allegedly sustained by the applicant.130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation, and that compensation should thus be awarded. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant the sum of EUR 13,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses131.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and before the Court. He also claimed a further EUR 868 for translation costs. In support of his claim, the applicant submitted two contracts which his brother had concluded with his representative and with a translator. He also produced two documents detailing the specific legal and translation services provided by his representative and the translator.132.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the amount claimed for costs and expenses incurred before the Court was excessive and asked the Court to apply a strict approach in respect of the applicant\u2019s claims.133.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Having regard to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,500 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest134.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27934":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that on 18 March 2004 he had been ill\u2011treated by police officers and that the domestic authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the alleged ill-treatment. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted at the outset that the applicant had failed to exhaust the effective domestic remedies available to him as he had not challenged the town prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s refusal to investigate the alleged ill-treatment of 18 June 2004 before a court. They further stated that the applicant\u2019s allegations had not been supported by any medical certificates or other evidence and that the applicant had described the events in vague terms. The bruise under the applicant\u2019s right eye noted upon arrival at the IVS on 19 March 2004 had been a result of the fight with \u201cDima\u201d. They concluded that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant insisted that he had exhausted the domestic remedies available to him in the circumstances of the case referring to the following: firstly, he had learned of the refusal of 18 June 2004 on 29 June 2004 while studying the criminal case file shortly before the commencement of the trial against him; secondly, the Regional Court had examined the allegations of ill-treatment in detail \u2013 in particular, it had requested an expert medical report and had questioned several witnesses including the police officers allegedly involved; lastly, the issue of ill\u2011treatment had been brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of Russia on appeal. The applicant further maintained his complaint about the ill-treatment and emphasised the lack of an effective investigation into it pointing out, in particular, that the investigative authorities had not even attempted to establish which injuries had been inflicted in the course of the fight with \u201cDima\u201d.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility52.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the Government\u2019s plea of non-exhaustion, the Court observes that the applicant indeed failed to seek judicial review of the town prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s refusal to investigate the alleged ill-treatment of 18\u00a0June 2004. \u00a0It reiterates, however, that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 69, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV).53.\u00a0\u00a0It has not been disputed between the parties that the applicant raised his complaints of ill-treatment before the Regional Court during the trial proceedings against him, complaining of police brutality and the prosecutor\u2019s indifference to his claims. The Regional Court did not refuse to entertain his complaints for failure to comply with any formal requirements: it took cognisance of the merits of those complaints by examining the applicant, the police officers and other witnesses and examining the inquiry materials, and upheld the conclusions of the prosecutor\u2019s office. The Supreme Court of Russia endorsed the Regional Court\u2019s findings in that respect. The Government did not argue that in pursuing this avenue of judicial review, the applicant had removed from the domestic courts the option of examining the relevant issues. In those circumstances, where the courts have already embarked on the analysis of an applicant\u2019s complaints, the Court does not find it unreasonable that the applicant did not lodge the same complaints with the same courts (see Akulinin and Babich v. Russia, no. 5742\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a031-32, 2 October 2008; Vladimir Fedorov v. Russia, no.\u00a019223\/04, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a047\u201149, 30 July 2009; and Lopata v. Russia, no. 72250\/01, \u00a7\u00a0107, 13\u00a0July\u00a02010). In such circumstances the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has stated on many occasions that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim\u2019s conduct (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0119, ECHR 2000-IV, and Selmouni\u00a0v.\u00a0France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7\u00a095, ECHR 1999\u2011V).56.\u00a0\u00a0Allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence (see, among many other authorities, Keller v. Russia, no.\u00a026824\/04, \u00a7 114, 17 October 2013). To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d, but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see\u00a0Ireland v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a025, and Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 82, 28 September 2015).57.\u00a0\u00a0In relation to detainees, the Court has emphasised that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect their physical well-being (see, with further references, Bobrov\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 33856\/05, \u00a7 33, 23 October 2014). Where an individual claims to have been injured as a result of ill\u2011treatment in custody, the Government are under an obligation to provide a complete and sufficient explanation as to how the injuries were caused (see\u00a0Ribitsch v. Austria, 4\u00a0December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 336). In the absence of such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government (see, with further references, Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 83).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further recalls that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such State agents unlawfully and in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, that provision \u2013 read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d \u2013 requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see Assenov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a0102, Reports 1998\u2011VIII).59.\u00a0\u00a0An obligation to investigate \u201cis not an obligation of result, but of means\u201d: not every investigation should necessarily be successful or come to a conclusion which coincides with the claimant\u2019s account of events; however, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Zelenin v. Russia, no. 21120\/07, \u00a7 42, 15 January 2015).60.\u00a0\u00a0An investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough. This means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill\u2011founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis for their decisions (see Assenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 103 et seq.). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and so forth (see, with further references, Korobov and Others v. Estonia, no.\u00a010195\/08, \u00a7 113, 28 March 2013). Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see\u00a0Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7 108, 26 January 2006).61.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the investigation must be expeditious. In cases examined under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, where the effectiveness of an official investigation is at issue, the Court has often assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 133 et seq.). Consideration has been given to the starting of investigations, delays in taking statements (see\u00a0Timurta\u015f\u00a0v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 23531\/94, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2000-VI, and Tekin\u00a0v.\u00a0Turkey, 9\u00a0June 1998, \u00a7 67, Reports 1998-IV), and the length of time taken to complete the initial investigation (see Indelicato v. Italy, no.\u00a031143\/96, \u00a7 37, 18\u00a0October 2001).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the events of 18 March 2004, the date on which the applicant was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment, are disputed between the parties. However, it is common ground between them that the X-ray of 30 March 2004 showed that the applicant had three fractured ribs (see paragraph 24 above).63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the course of the proceedings before it the Government have not put forward any explanation as to the origin of the fractures in question as they chose to comment only on the bruise under the applicant\u2019s right eye. That compels the Court to establish the facts, drawing such inferences as it deems appropriate from that attitude (see Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386\/10, \u00a7 132, ECHR 2013 (extracts)).64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the materials in its possession demonstrate that the applicant was not examined by a doctor or other medical professional upon placement in the IVS despite the fact that he had visible bruising on his face which was noted, in particular, by the deputy head of the facility (see paragraphs 18, 27 and 37 above). It emphasises in this connection that the CPT regards a right of access to a doctor for detained persons during their custody by law-enforcement agencies as one of the three fundamental safeguards against ill-treatment (see paragraph 47 above). In the absence of any explanation for such an omission put forward by the respondent Government, the Court cannot but conclude that the failure on the part of the IVS personnel to ensure that the applicant\u2019s injuries were immediately examined and documented by a doctor divested the applicant of an important safeguard against a breach of Article 3 of the Convention (compare \u0130lhan v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a022277\/93, \u00a7 87, ECHR 2000\u2011VII; Barabanshchikov v. Russia, no.\u00a036220\/02, \u00a7 46, 8 January 2009; Davitidze v. Russia, no. 8810\/05, \u00a7\u00a095, 30 May 2013; and Zayev v. Russia, no. 36552\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 85-86, 16 April 2015).65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the only medical evidence available in the present case, namely the X-ray examination of 30 March 2004, showed fractures of three ribs in an early stage of recovery (see paragraph 24 above). When dismissing the allegations of ill-treatment, the Regional Court relied heavily on the findings of N. who had concluded that the fact that the rib fractures had begun to knit by 30\u00a0March 2004 to be sufficient to refute the applicant\u2019s version of the events of 18 March 2004. The Court observes, however, that the Regional Court was made aware of the fact that N. regarded his expertise in reading X\u2011rays insufficient to assess the rib fractures without external assistance (see paragraph 34 above). Moreover, N.\u2019s assessment of the fractures as \u201cconsiderably old\u201d does not appear to be sufficiently precise to dismiss with certainty the claim that the applicant had sustained injuries twelve days prior to the X-ray.66.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the applicant presented a sufficiently detailed and consistent account of the beatings by the police officers on 18 March 2004 and, accordingly, raised an arguable claim of alleged ill-treatment.67.\u00a0\u00a0Since no credible account of how the fractures to the applicant\u2019s ribs had been caused was given either at the domestic pre-investigation inquiry stage or before the Court, it considers that the respondent Government failed to discharge their burden of proof and that it was not satisfactorily established that the applicant\u2019s account of events was inaccurate or otherwise erroneous (see Ryabtsev v. Russia, no. 13642\/06, \u00a7 74, 14\u00a0November 2013, and Zelenin, cited above, \u00a7 49). In such circumstances the Court does not deem it necessary to assess the Government\u2019s assertion that the injuries could have been inflicted in the fight with \u201cDima\u201d on 11\u00a0March 2004.68.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing in mind the authorities\u2019 obligation to account for injuries caused to persons within their control in custody, the Court concludes that the applicant\u2019s injuries, at least in part, were the result of treatment he underwent while in police custody for which the respondent State bore responsibility.69.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the circumstances of the ill-treatment, its physical and mental effects and the applicant\u2019s health, the Court finds that the accumulation of the acts of physical violence inflicted on the applicant amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.70.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of the above provision under its substantive limb.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it is not disputed by the parties that the State was under a procedural obligation, arising from Article 3 of the Convention, to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the town prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations. It is not convinced, however, that the inquiry in question was sufficiently thorough and effective to meet the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.73.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, the Court has previously ruled that in the context of the Russian legal system a \u201cpre\u2011investigation inquiry\u201d alone is not capable of leading to the punishment of those responsible, since the opening of a criminal case and a criminal investigation are prerequisites for bringing charges against the alleged perpetrators which may then be examined by a court. The Court drew strong inferences from the mere fact that the investigative authority had refused to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of serious ill\u2011treatment in police custody, regarding it as indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation (see Lyapin v.\u00a0Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 135-36, 24 July 2014). Moreover, the Court found that as a result of their refusals to open a criminal case, the town prosecutor\u2019s office had never conducted a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures could be carried out, including questioning, confrontation, identification parade, search and seizure, and crime reconstruction (ibid., \u00a7 132).74.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court also considers in the instant case that the refusal to open a criminal case into the applicant\u2019s credible allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of the police officers on 18 March 2004 amounted to a failure to carry out an effective investigation as required by Article 3 of the Convention. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for the Court to examine in detail the pre\u2011investigation inquiry conducted in the applicant\u2019s case, with a view to identifying specific deficiencies and omissions on the part of the investigators (see\u00a0Zelenin, cited above, \u00a7 59).75.\u00a0\u00a0The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that he had been convicted on the basis of his confession given under duress and without a lawyer present. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a71 and 3 (c) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ......3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require ...\u201d77.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the record of the first interview of 19 March 2004 conducted without a lawyer present (see paragraph 17 above) had been declared inadmissible evidence by the Regional Court and that accordingly in that part of the applicant\u2019s complaint was manifestly ill\u2011founded. With regard to the statement of surrender and confession, the Government admitted that it had been made without a lawyer present; they noted, however, that the applicant had waived the right to legal assistance in writing and that in his appeal of 14\u00a0December 2004 he had invoked the fact of surrender and confession as a mitigating circumstance. The Government stated that the applicant\u2019s conviction had been based on various pieces of evidence, in particular, the record of the second interview of 19 March 2004 (see paragraph 19 above), the investigative re-enactment record, witnesses\u2019 statements and other unspecified evidence. They concluded that the applicant\u2019s complaint was manifestly ill-founded.78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that, because of the ill-treatment he had sustained at the hands of the police, he could not be said to have waived his right to legal assistance on 19 March 2004. Moreover, the statement of surrender and confession had been written on 18\u00a0March 2004, that is to say before the statement declining legal assistance had been put in writing. He concluded that there had been no clear and unequivocal waiver of his right to legal assistance in his case and that, consequently, his Convention right of access to a lawyer had been breached. He further pointed out that the self\u2011incriminatory statement made under duress without the benefit of legal advice had served as the sole evidence of his guilt.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence \u2013 for example, evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law \u2013 may be admissible. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. This involves an examination of the unlawfulness in question and, where the violation of another Convention right is concerned, the nature of the violation found (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7 163, ECHR 2010).81.\u00a0\u00a0The right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6 of the Convention. Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities, thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6 of the Convention. The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7 100, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011IX).82.\u00a0\u00a0Confession statements obtained in violation of Article 3 of the Convention are inherently unreliable. Furthermore, their use in criminal proceedings is often a reason for which the acts of ill-treatment are committed in the first place. Taking such statements into consideration in finding a person guilty is incompatible with the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention (see S\u00f6ylemez v. Turkey, no.\u00a046661\/99, \u00a7 122, 21 September 2006).83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found in earlier cases, in respect of confessions as such, that the admission of statements obtained as a result of torture (compare \u00d6rs and Others v. Turkey, no. 46213\/99, \u00a7 60, 20 June 2006; Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 36549\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 63, 64 and 66, ECHR 2007\u2011III; Levin\u0163a v. Moldova, no. 17332\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 101 and 104-05, 16 December 2008; Hajnal v. Serbia, no. 36937\/06, \u00a7 113, 19 June 2012), or of other ill\u2011treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention (see S\u00f6ylemez, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0107 and\u00a0122\u201124; Iordan Petrov v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a022926\/04, \u00a7 136, 24 January 2012; and Nasakin v. Russia, no. 22735\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 98-100, 18 July 2013) as evidence in establishing the relevant facts in criminal proceedings rendered the proceedings as a whole unfair. The use of evidence secured as a result of a violation of one of the core and absolute rights guaranteed by the Convention always raises serious issues as to the fairness of the proceedings, even if the admission of such evidence was not decisive in securing a conviction (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 165).84.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, it is not disputed between the parties that the self-incriminating statement of surrender and confession made by the applicant without a lawyer present, following his arrest and placement in police custody, formed part of the evidence adduced against him in the course of the criminal proceedings. The Regional Court did not find the statement inadmissible and referred to it when finding the applicant guilty and convicting him.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, however, asserted that the applicant had waived his procedural rights, relying on his written statements of 19 March 2004 (see paragraphs 15\u201116 above). The Court reiterates in this connection that a waiver of a right guaranteed by the Convention \u2013 in so far as it is permissible \u2013 must not run counter to any important public interest, must be established in an unequivocal manner and must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to the waiver\u2019s importance (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a056581\/00, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2006-II). In the circumstances of the present case it finds it impossible to agree with the Government\u2019s waiver claim as the written statements of 19\u00a0March\u00a02004 were clearly made after the statement of surrender and confession had been drawn up on 18 March 2004. Most importantly, the applicant cannot be said to have validly waived his privilege against self-incrimination in view of the Court\u2019s finding in paragraph 69 above that he had sustained the ill-treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore finds that the domestic courts\u2019 use of the applicant\u2019s surrender and confession statement as evidence in establishing the applicant\u2019s guilt \u2013 irrespective of the probative value of that statement and irrespective of whether its use was decisive in securing the applicant\u2019s conviction \u2013 has rendered the applicant\u2019s trial unfair.87.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.88.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court does not deem it necessary to examine separately the part of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning lack of access to a lawyer.III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant raised a number of other complaints under various Convention provisions. Having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION90.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage for the cost of medical treatment that he would require as a result of the ill-treatment. In particular, he claimed that his hearing had been impaired and that he had developed heart pains. He also requested EUR\u00a06,000 allegedly embezzled from him by a lawyer previously retained by him.92.\u00a0\u00a0He further claimed EUR 300,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused by the ill-treatment. He also claimed EUR 650,000 in compensation for his detention.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the claims in respect of pecuniary damage were not supported by evidence. They further asserted that the claims in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage were excessive.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it considers that the applicant must have suffered non\u2011pecuniary damage on account of the breaches of his Convention rights which cannot be compensated for by mere findings of violations and awards the applicant EUR 19,500 under that head.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 1,640 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court corresponding to 24.5 hours\u2019 work on the part of his representative. An itemised schedule of these costs was submitted.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government asserted that the applicant\u2019s claims under this head were not supported by evidence.97.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, and bearing in mind that the applicant was granted EUR 850 in legal aid for his representation by Ms\u00a0Preobrazhenskaya, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 790 for costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before it.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27943":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to provide her son with adequate medical care while he was in detention and were thus responsible for his death. She also complained that the investigation into his death had been neither adequate nor effective.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the above complaints fall to be examined under Article 2 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads:\u201c1. Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not challenged the investigator\u2019s decision of 31 December 2011 refusing to initiate a criminal investigation into the matter (see paragraphs 60 and 63 above). They therefore asserted that she had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies before making her application to the Court, contrary to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. In the alternative, the Government contended that these complaints were manifestly ill-founded.72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained her complaint that the domestic investigation into the death of her son could not be regarded as effective, and that this therefore exempted her from the obligation to pursue the remedy proposed by the Government.73.\u00a0\u00a0As a preliminary issue, the Court notes that, where a violation of the right to life is alleged, the Convention institutions have accepted applications from relatives of the deceased (see Kats and Others v. Ukraine, no. 29971\/04, \u00a7\u00a094, 18 December 2008, with further references). Therefore, the applicant, who is the mother of the deceased, can claim to be a victim of the alleged violations under Article 2 of the Convention.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies, referred to in Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, obliges applicants to first use the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 also requires that the complaints intended to be brought subsequently before the Court should have been made to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements laid down in domestic law, but there is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16\u00a0September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 65-67, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV).75.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the Government\u2019s objection, the Court observes that it raises issues concerning the effectiveness of the criminal investigation in establishing the facts regarding the events of which the applicant complained and responsibility for those events. It is therefore closely linked to the merits of her complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention. In these circumstances, the Court joins the Government\u2019s objection to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this part of the application is neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged failure of the Ukrainian authorities to protect K.\u2019s right to life77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that her son had died in detention because he had not received timely and adequate medical care. More specifically, she submitted that there had never been any medical supervision or treatment for him in respect of his HIV infection. The applicant further complained that K. had not had his lungs X-rayed until almost one year after testing positive for HIV, a delay which was excessive. Given that tuberculosis was often provoked by the HIV infection, it was not unlikely, in her opinion, that her son had already been suffering from tuberculosis for a long time before that diagnosis had been established. The applicant also criticised the medical treatment eventually provided for K. in respect of tuberculosis. The details of her complaint are reproduced in paragraph\u00a061\u00a0above. As is clear from that paragraph, this complaint had already been raised at national level.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that K.\u2019s health had been given proper attention. They observed that he had been examined by doctors on many occasions and that he had been prescribed and had received appropriate medical treatment.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has emphasised on many occasions that people in custody are in a vulnerable position, and that authorities are under a duty to protect their health and well-being (see Naumenko v. Ukraine, no.\u00a042023\/98, \u00a7\u00a0112, 10 February 2004, and Dzieciak v. Poland, no. 77766\/01, \u00a7 91, 9\u00a0December 2008). This implies an obligation on the authorities to provide detainees with the medical care necessary to safeguard their lives (see Ta\u00efs v. France, no.\u00a039922\/03, \u00a7\u00a098, 1\u00a0June 2006, and Huylu v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a052955\/99, \u00a7 58, 16 November 2006).80.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the authorities must account for the treatment of people who are deprived of their liberty. Where a detainee dies as a result of a health problem, the State must offer both a reasonable explanation as to the cause of death and details regarding the treatment administered to the person concerned prior to his or her death (see Kats and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0104).81.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s son died on 7 November 2011 of a number of HIV-related illnesses, while in custody and having been under the authorities\u2019 control since 26 December 2009. In order to establish whether or not the respondent State complied with its obligation to protect life under Article 2 of the Convention, the Court must examine whether the relevant domestic authorities did everything reasonably possible, in good faith and in a timely manner, to try to avert the fatal outcome. Whether or not the authorities\u2019 efforts could in principle have averted it is not decisive when examining the discharge by the State of its positive obligation to protect the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s health and life (see Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005\/08, \u00a7 180, 14\u00a0March 2013).82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that K. had several health-related concerns during his detention. In April 2010 he underwent surgery twice in respect of injuries sustained in unclear circumstances (see paragraphs 11 and 12\u00a0above) and his spleen was removed. He received medical treatment as an in-patient until 18 June 2010, first in a civilian hospital and later in the SIZO\u2019s medical unit. There is no indication that the treatment received was deficient or that the injuries in question had led to a deterioration of K.\u2019s health in the long run.83.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court notes that, on 17 May 2010, the applicant\u2019s son also tested positive for HIV, and that that diagnosis was confirmed on 23\u00a0June 2010. It is not in dispute that the authorities were aware of his HIV status. With reference to the recommendations of the World Health Organisation detailed in paragraph 68 above and to the standards adopted at national level, there is no indication in the material at the Court\u2019s disposal that an immunological assessment of K.\u2019s condition by means of a CD4 count test was carried out at any point, or that he received any treatment in that regard.84.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, as the Government have confirmed, after K. tested HIV-positive, he was left with virtually no medical supervision for about ten months, until he was X-rayed on 20 April 2011 (see paragraphs\u00a043-45 above). Even if, as submitted by the Government, K. had not complained about this, it was the authorities\u2019 duty to ensure proper monitoring of his health, given the seriousness of his diagnosis and the inherent risk of concomitant illnesses.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the X-ray procedure (eventually carried out on 20\u00a0April 2011) revealed that K. was also suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis and he was diagnosed with chronic gastritis and hepatitis in remission.86.\u00a0\u00a0It was acknowledged by the Ukrainian authorities in their progress report to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV\/AIDS for the period between January 2010 and December 2011 that \u201ctuberculosis continue[d] to be the most widespread AIDS-related disease in Ukraine [and was] diagnosed in 5,745 cases (62.5%) out of 9,189 new AIDS cases\u201d (see Sergey\u00a0Antonov, cited above, \u00a7 51).87.\u00a0\u00a0It was within the period covered by that report that K. tested HIV positive while in detention, was left without further medical attention for about ten months, was then diagnosed with tuberculosis and died of HIV related illnesses six and a half months later.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in this connection that the WHO has also recommended that patients infected with both HIV and tuberculosis should begin antiretroviral therapy as soon as possible after starting tuberculosis treatment (see E.A. v. Russia, no. 44187\/04, \u00a7 35, 23 May 2013). In the present case, antiretroviral therapy was never even considered, let alone offered to K.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has only very limited information as regards K.\u2019s treatment for tuberculosis. It remains unclear which medications he was given and whether his resistance to them was ever verified. Although the SIZO management informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that K.\u2019s X-rays of 13\u00a0October 2011 had revealed that his treatment for tuberculosis was evolving positively, subsequent events clearly undermined the accuracy of that statement, as less than a week later, on 18\u00a0October 2011, K.\u2019s health deteriorated to such an extent as to warrant his urgent hospitalisation. He died on 7 November 2011, less than a month later.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already addressed in a number of cases the issue of inadequate medical assistance for people with HIV in Ukrainian detention facilities (see, for example, Kats and Others, cited above; Pokhlebin v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 35581\/06, 20\u00a0May 2010; and Salakhov and Islyamova v.\u00a0Ukraine, cited above).91.\u00a0\u00a0Likewise, the Court has found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention as a result of poor medical assistance and inadequate protection against tuberculosis in Ukrainian detention facilities (see, for instance, Yakovenko v. Ukraine, no.\u00a015825\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a097-102, 25 October 2007; Pokhlebin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 63-68; Kondratyev v. Ukraine, no.\u00a05203\/09, \u00a7\u00a072, 15\u00a0December 2011; and Kushnir v. Ukraine, no.\u00a042184\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 142-150, 11 December 2014).92.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, given the delays and serious deficiencies in the diagnosis and treatment of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s HIV, tuberculosis and concomitant illnesses, the Court does not consider that the authorities adequately discharged their positive obligation to protect the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s health and life. As the Court has already held in paragraph 81 above, whether or not their efforts could in principle have averted the fatal outcome is not decisive for this conclusion.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of the substantive limb of Article\u00a02 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged failure to carry out an adequate investigation into K.\u2019s death94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the investigation into the circumstances of the death of the applicant\u2019s son had been prompt and thorough. In this connection, they observed that an on-site inspection had been carried out the day after the death, and shortly thereafter a post-mortem report had been completed. In the Government\u2019s view, the fact that no third-party involvement in K.\u2019s death had been established could not be regarded as an indication of the ineffectiveness of the investigation.95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained her complaint.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held on many occasions that, where lives have been lost in circumstances potentially engaging the responsibility of the State, Article 2 of the Convention entails a duty on the part of the State to ensure, by all means at its disposal, an adequate investigative response, judicial or otherwise. The essential purpose of such an investigation is to establish the facts, secure the effective implementation of domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, identify any persons at fault and thus ensure their accountability (see Pearson\u00a0v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom (dec.), no. 40957\/07, \u00a7 67, 13\u00a0December 2011, with further references). That is the case, for instance, where a person dies in custody in suspicious circumstances (even where the apparent cause of death is a medical condition), which, as a rule, raises the question of whether the State has complied with its positive obligation to protect that person\u2019s right to life (see Slimani v. France, no. 57671\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a030 and 34, ECHR 2004-IX (extracts); Kats and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115; Geppa v.\u00a0Russia, no. 8532\/06, \u00a7\u00a071, 3\u00a0February 2011; and Makharadze and\u00a0Sikharulidze v. Georgia, no. 35254\/07, \u00a7 87, 22 November 2011). A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its capability of establishing the circumstances of the case or the person responsible is liable to fall foul of the required standard of effectiveness (see, for example, Dzieciak v. Poland, no. 77766\/01, \u00a7 105, 9\u00a0December\u00a02008, with further references).97.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that a procedural obligation arose under Article 2 of the Convention to investigate the circumstances of the death of the applicant\u2019s son (see Slimani, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 29-34, and Kats and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0117).98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the police did indeed take certain investigative measures without delay. On 8 November 2011, for example, they inspected K.\u2019s body and concluded that there was no indication of a violent death. However, there had never been any suspicion of a violent death. The autopsy report of 10 November 2011 established that K. had died of a number of HIV-related diseases. Accordingly, an effective investigation into his death would imply an assessment of the quality of the medical treatment, which had been provided. That was the applicant\u2019s key complaint, in support of which she submitted quite specific allegations warranting verification (see paragraph 61 above). Nonetheless, the issue of K.\u2019s medical treatment remained unaddressed. It does not appear from the file that, after his death, his medical records were examined in detail or that medical personnel from the civilian hospital which treated him or personnel from the SIZO were questioned. Disregarding the facts and the applicant\u2019s complaints, the authorities stuck to their line of reasoning: nobody had killed K. in the hospital where he had been treated and had died.99.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that the authorities failed to carry out a thorough and effective investigation into the allegations that the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s death was caused by inadequate medical treatment following almost two years in detention.100.\u00a0\u00a0The\u00a0Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, previously joined to the merits (see paragraph 75 above), as the Court considers that, even if the applicant had been duly and promptly informed of the decision of 31 December 2011, the applicant cannot be reproached for not seeking the repeated reopening of an investigation which is found to be ineffective, and finds that there has also been a violation of Article\u00a02 of the Convention under its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION101.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that that her son had been ill-treated in custody, and that there had been no effective domestic investigation into the matter. She relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Locus standi102.\u00a0\u00a0Although the respondent State did not raise any objection as to the Court\u2019s jurisdiction ratione personae, the Court considers of its own motion that this issue calls for examination (see Sejdi\u0107 and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996\/06 and 34836\/06, \u00a7\u00a027, ECHR\u00a02009).(a)\u00a0\u00a0General case-law principles103.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 34 of the Convention, an applicant must be able to claim \u201cto be the victim of a violation ... of the rights set forth in the Convention ...\u201d. In order to claim to be a victim of a violation, a person must be directly affected by the impugned measure (see Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378\/05, \u00a7 33, ECHR 2008). The\u00a0Court interprets the concept of \u201cvictim\u201d autonomously and irrespective of domestic concepts such as those concerning an interest or capacity to act (see Sanles Sanles v.\u00a0Spain (dec.), no. 48335\/99, ECHR 2000\u2011XI).104.\u00a0\u00a0This criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way (see Karner v. Austria, no. 40016\/98, \u00a7 25, ECHR 2003\u2011IX). The Court has acknowledged that human rights cases before it generally also have a moral dimension and persons near to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that justice is done even after the applicant\u2019s death (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no.\u00a033071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII). Accordingly, the Court normally permits the next of kin to pursue an application where the original applicant has died after lodging an application with the Court. However, the issues involved are different where the direct victim dies before his or her complaint is brought before the Court (see Fairfield v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a024790\/04, ECHR 2005-VI). Although the locus standi of a victim\u2019s next of kin has been recognised where the victim had died or disappeared in circumstances which were alleged to engage the responsibility of the State (see paragraph 73 above with further references), the Court\u2019s approach has been more restrictive in cases where the alleged violation of the Convention was not closely linked to disappearances or deaths giving rise to issues under Article 2.105.\u00a0\u00a0As regards complaints of ill-treatment of deceased relatives under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court has accepted the locus standi of applicants only in cases where the ill-treatment was closely linked to the death or the disappearance (see De Donder and De Clippel v.\u00a0Belgium, no.\u00a08595\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a053-62, 6 December 2011, and Kaburov v.\u00a0Bulgaria (dec.), no.\u00a09035\/06, 19 June 2012).106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court highlighted the strictly personal nature of the Article 3 right at stake in the Kaburov case, but did not exclude the possibility that it might recognise locus standi in the context of complaints under Article\u00a03 for applicants who complained of treatment concerning their late relative exclusively, where such applicants \u201cshow either a strong moral interest, besides the mere pecuniary interest in the outcome of the domestic proceedings, or other compelling reasons, such as an important general interest which requires their case to be examined\u201d (\u00a7\u00a056). Furthermore, the Court attached weight to the fact that the applicant had lodged his application many years after the end of the investigation, \u201cthe effectiveness of which would have been the most important, if not the only, issue of general interest in [that] case\u201d (\u00a7 57).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant\u2019s son took place on 10 April 2010 at the latest (see, in particular, paragraphs 11 and 27 above). More than eight months later, on 29\u00a0December 2010, K. signed an authority form authorising a lawyer to represent him in the proceedings before the Court. K. died on 7\u00a0November\u00a02011, about eleven months later. At that time, he had never lodged an application before the Court. It was the applicant who complained to the Court in her own name, four months after the death of her son.108.\u00a0\u00a0It neither follows clearly from the case-file materials nor has it been submitted by the applicant that there was a causal link between the alleged ill-treatment of her son prior to or on 10 April 2010 and his death one year and seven months later. It therefore remains to be seen whether the applicant has demonstrated a strong moral interest or shown that there are other compelling reasons, such as an important general interest, for the Court to examine her Article 3 complaints.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court attaches weight to the fact that, unlike in the case of Kaburov (cited above), where the applicant claimed only pecuniary compensation in respect of a relative\u2019s death, in the present case the applicant has been seeking an effective investigation into her son\u2019s ill-treatment for several years at domestic level (see paragraph 13 above). Immediately after his death in November 2011 she was granted status as K.\u2019s successor in the criminal investigation into the matter, which then continued until after March 2014 (see paragraphs\u00a035-40 above).110.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court is mindful of the following circumstances. As established by unequivocal medical evidence, the applicant\u2019s son sustained serious injuries necessitating a surgical intervention on the morning of 10\u00a0April 2010 and those injuries occurred about twelve hours prior to that surgery (see paragraphs 27 and 32 above). K. himself consistently denied ill-treatment in the course of the domestic investigation (see paragraphs\u00a019, 22, 26 and 34 above). It is clear that his injuries were sustained while in the SIZO and he was returned to the same detention facility after his discharge from hospital, where he was surrounded by the same people as before, without the perpetrators of his ill-treatment having been identified. It should also be noted that he was, at the time, already seriously ill and that he eventually died of numerous illnesses, having been left without proper medical care.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in its case-law it has shown particular consideration for a victim\u2019s vulnerability, especially with regard to factors such as age, sex or disability which may have rendered them unable to lodge a complaint with the Court, due regard also being had to the connections between the person lodging the application and the victim (see, for example, Y.F. v. Turkey, no. 24209\/94, \u00a7 31, ECHR 2003\u2013IX, and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7\u00a0103, ECHR 2014). The circumstances of the present case indicate that the applicant\u2019s son was particularly vulnerable during his detention, if not when he entered the SIZO certainly from the moment when he incurred and was recovering from the serious injuries inflicted in April 2010.112.\u00a0\u00a0Once she was informed of her son\u2019s injuries, the applicant complained to the prosecuting authorities about the assault in the SIZO, was granted victim status as her son\u2019s successor into the investigation of ill-treatment after his death and promptly lodged an application with the Court.113.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, in addition to the previous grounds, the Court emphasises that the effective investigation of alleged ill-treatment within prisons by prison staff or tolerated by prison staff is a matter of general interest which requires this case to be examined.114.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the foregoing considerations and in the particular circumstances of this case, the Court accepts the applicant\u2019s locus standi in respect of her complaints under Article\u00a03 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies115.\u00a0\u00a0The Government observed that the applicant had not challenged the decision of the Shevchenkivskyy Prosecutor\u2019s Office of 26 August 2011 (see paragraph 33 above). They therefore asserted that she had not exhausted the domestic remedies and invited the Court to declare her complaint inadmissible on those grounds.116.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the above arguments.117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government\u2019s objection is partly linked to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint as regards the effectiveness of the domestic investigation into the allegation of her son\u2019s ill-treatment. However, it observes that the applicant did not need to challenge the refusal of the prosecutor of 26 August 2011 to institute criminal proceedings, regardless whether this remedy was effective or not, because the criminal investigation into the ill-treatment of her son was pending in parallel proceedings. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.3.\u00a0\u00a0Otherwise as to admissibility118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that these complaints are neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. The Court therefore declares them admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant\u2019s son in detention119.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that her son had sustained serious injuries during his detention in the Kyiv SIZO, leading to hospitalisation and surgery. She emphasised that the authorities had failed to make any meaningful efforts to explain the origin of those injuries.120.\u00a0\u00a0The Government denied any ill-treatment of K. They pointed out the discrepancies between his and the applicant\u2019s statements in that connection (see paragraph 19 above). The Government further observed that the timing of K.\u2019s injuries, as established by the medical evidence, did not correspond to that suggested by either the applicant or K. himself (see paragraphs 13, 19, 27 and 32 above).121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, where a person is injured while in detention or otherwise under the control of the police, any such injury will give rise to a strong presumption that the person was subjected to ill-treatment (see Bursuc v. Romania, no.\u00a042066\/98, \u00a7 80, 12 October 2004). It is incumbent on the State in such circumstances, where the events in issue lie wholly, or largely, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, to provide a plausible explanation of how the injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011V).122.\u00a0\u00a0It is an established fact in the present case that the applicant\u2019s son sustained serious injuries in detention. The absence of any explanation by the Government for those injuries constitutes sufficient grounds for the Court to conclude that they were the result of ill\u2011treatment while in detention (see Doroseva v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 39553\/12, \u00a7 30, 28\u00a0April 2015).123.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.2.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ineffectiveness of the domestic investigation124.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained her complaint that the domestic investigation into the matter was in breach of the requirements of Article 3.125.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the domestic authorities had done everything possible to establish the truth about K.\u2019s injuries and to bring those responsible to account.126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. As with an investigation under Article 2, such an investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice, and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000-IV).127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the domestic investigation, although confronted with an established fact that the applicant\u2019s son had sustained serious injuries in a detention facility, failed to establish what had in fact happened to him, yet this was not seen as an obstacle to dismissing the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated (compare with Lotarev v. Ukraine, no. 29447\/04, \u00a7 91, 8 April 2010).128.\u00a0\u00a0Although K. denied having been ill-treated shortly before his hospitalisation, the accuracy of that denial was undermined by several forensic medical expert reports (see, in particular, paragraphs 27 and 32 above). At no point did the authorities try to make sure that no pressure had been put on K. or, in the event that it had, to protect him. Nor did they establish with whom he had had contact at the time of his injuries, the records of who occupied his cell not having been kept (see paragraph 35 above). Instead, they limited themselves to initiating a criminal investigation into the infliction of K.\u2019s injuries by unidentified individuals.129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the investigation appears to have stalled between 2012 and 2014, as the Government neither referred to any investigative steps taken during that period, nor explained such inactivity (see paragraphs 41 and 42 above). Furthermore, although the investigation was formally relaunched in March 2014, there is no information as to what investigative measures followed, if any, nor to any conclusions reached.130.\u00a0\u00a0In summary, the Court concludes that the domestic authorities failed to ensure an effective and independent investigation into the circumstances in which the applicant\u2019s son sustained serious injuries while in detention. The Court thus finds that there has also been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION131.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that she did not have an effective domestic remedy in respect of the above complaints. She relied on Article\u00a013 of the Convention, which provides as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is linked to those examined above, and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.133.\u00a0\u00a0However, having regard to its findings under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention regarding the circumstances of K.\u2019s death and the failure of the authorities to carry out an effective investigation into the latter and into his alleged ill-treatment in detention (see paragraphs 100 and 130 above), the Court does not find it necessary to also examine this issue in the context of Article 13 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION134.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage135.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.136.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim as unsubstantiated and exorbitant.137.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant suffered non-pecuniary damage, which cannot be compensated for by the mere finding of a violation of her Convention rights. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a08,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses138.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court, to be paid directly to her representative, Mr\u00a0Zarutskyy.139.\u00a0\u00a0The Government observed that the applicant had not submitted any documents in substantiation of this claim. They therefore invited the Court to reject it.140.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the material in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to allow the applicant\u2019s claim for costs and expenses and to award her the sum of EUR 2,000, to be paid to her representative directly.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27969":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been taken to police station no.\u00a02 and held there in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ...(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits48.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. In particular, they submitted that the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty from 7\u00a0p.m. to 8 p.m. on 15\u00a0February 2005 had been effected in breach of Articles 91 and 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which regulated the grounds and procedure for the arrest of a suspect in criminal proceedings, and Article 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the enhanced guarantees for a juvenile suspect in case of arrest in criminal proceedings.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that according to both parties on 15\u00a0February 2005 the applicant was held at police station no. 2 for at least one hour. While the only official document related to the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty on the above date is the record of his being conveyed to the police station as an administrative offender (see paragraph 18 above), it appears from the evidence in the domestic inquiry that the real reason for the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty was a suspicion that he had committed a theft (see statements by lawyer S. and police officers E., P. and K. in paragraphs 23-25 and 28 above, and the investigator\u2019s findings in paragraph\u00a042 above). Indeed, it is on the ground of the authorities\u2019 failure to follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure for the arrest of the applicant, a minor at the time, as a suspect in criminal proceedings that the Government have acknowledged a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in the present case.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises the fundamental importance of the guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention for securing the right of individuals in a democracy to be free from arbitrary detention by the authorities. It has reiterated in that connection that any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law, but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see Kurt v.\u00a0Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0122\u201123, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011III, and Fatma Akaltun F\u0131rat v. Turkey, no.\u00a034010\/06, \u00a7\u00a029, 10\u00a0September 2013). What is at stake is both the protection of the physical liberty of individuals and their personal security in a context which, in the absence of safeguards, could result in subversion of the rule of law and place detainees beyond the reach of the most rudimentary forms of legal protection (see Kurt, cited above, \u00a7 123).51.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the applicant\u2019s detention at police station no. 2 on suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence in breach of the procedure provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure for the arrest of a juvenile suspect in criminal proceedings amounted to a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been tortured on 15 February 2005 at police station no. 2 and that no effective investigation into his complaint had been carried out. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the case documents refuted the applicant\u2019s arguments. In particular, had the applicant been handcuffed, tied and hung, as alleged by him, his extremities would have born abrasions or other marks. However, the ambulance team had found no such injuries during his examination. The only injuries found on him were on his face and those had been self\u2011inflicted. Therefore, the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d had not been reached in the present case. The Government further argued that a prompt, independent and comprehensive investigation had been carried out into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment by police.54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant agreed that the injury over the left eyebrow had been sustained as a result of his hitting the glass of the bookcase. However, as regards the concussion, it could have been sustained as a result of his being punched on his head by the police officers.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that to assess the evidence on which to base the decision whether there has been violation of Article 3 it adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25; and, recently, Uzeyir Jafarov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no. 54204\/08, \u00a7 57, 29\u00a0January 2015; and Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 82, 28 September 2015). However, where an individual is taken into police custody in good health and is found to be injured on release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 336, and Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR 1999\u2011V). Where the events in issue lie wholly or in large part within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7\u00a0100, ECHR 2000\u2011VII, and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 83).57.\u00a0\u00a0Where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. Such an investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice, and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).58.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that after the time spent in police custody the applicant was found to be injured. The Court will first examine whether the Government discharged their burden of proof (see paragraph 56 above).59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant did not deny the act of self\u2011harm explaining it by his fear that his ill-treatment would continue and as a way to stop it (see paragraphs 10 and 31 above). Nor did he deny that the abrasion on his face could have been sustained as a result of that act, as claimed by the Government. The Government, however, did not comment on the applicant\u2019s other injuries. Apart from the injury on the face, the applicant had bruises on the scalp which, according to the forensic medical expert, could have been inflicted by hard blunt objects shortly before he was taken to hospital on 15\u00a0February 2005 (see paragraph 33 above). The expert\u2019s finding is consistent with the allegation of the applicant being punched on the head. Neither the Government\u2019s submissions nor the evidence in the case file suggest that all of the \u201cbruises\u201d (plural) on the scalp could have been sustained as a result of a single impact of the applicant\u2019s head with the glass. As regards the concussion, according to the forensic medical expert opinion it could have been caused either by the applicant hitting the bookcase with his head or by being punched on the head (see the expert\u2019s statements in paragraph\u00a041 above). The Court notes that the ambulance medical assistant N., who examined the applicant shortly after his head had been hit against the glass of the bookcase, did not detect symptoms of concussion (see N.\u2019s statements in paragraph 37 above). This gives some credence to the applicant\u2019s assertion that he had been punched on the head after being seen by the ambulance team.60.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it is not to be overlooked that both the act of self\u2011harm and the alleged ill-treatment by police officers occurred during the applicant\u2019s unlawful detention in police custody (see paragraph 51 above), while he was entirely under the control of police officers, which made him \u2013 a minor at the time \u2013 particularly vulnerable. His questioning by police officers in those circumstances resulted in his confession to the theft of which they suspected him (see statements by police officer K. in paragraph\u00a028 above).61.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant\u2019s alleged handcuffing, tying and hanging ought to have left abrasions or other traces on the applicant\u2019s extremities (which lasted about eight minutes as concerned one episode, see paragraph 11 above) is not based on any medical opinion.62.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court finds that the Government have not satisfactorily established that all the applicant\u2019s injuries were caused otherwise than by the treatment he underwent while in police custody. The State therefore bears responsibility for the ill\u2011treatment complained of, which was serious enough to amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.63.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the procedural obligation of the State to carry out an effective official investigation, the Court has previously found that in the context of the Russian legal system in cases of credible allegations of treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention, it is incumbent on the authorities to open a criminal case and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures are carried out and which constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill\u2011treatment under the domestic law. The mere fact of an investigating authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of serious ill\u2011treatment in police custody is indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its obligation under Article\u00a03 to carry out an effective investigation (see Lyapin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0129 and\u00a0132-36, 24\u00a0July 2014).64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case. While the applicant made a credible assertion of ill-treatment by police officers, the investigating authority dismissed his allegations as manifestly ill\u2011founded on the basis of the results of the preliminary inquiry, and refused to open a criminal investigation. As regards the judicial review of the investigating authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal case, while noting that such important investigative measure as an identity parade, which would enable the applicant to identify the police officers who had allegedly subjected him to ill-treatment, could only be carried out once a criminal case was opened, the domestic courts did not indicate why they regarded the investigator\u2019s refusal to open a criminal case as \u201creasoned and logical\u201d (see paragraphs 44-45 above). The Court would further note that despite being alerted promptly about the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment at the police station (see paragraphs 19-21 above), the authorities carried out the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination only with a month\u2019s delay (see paragraph 33 above). At that time the expert\u2019s opinion was sought about the applicant\u2019s being \u201cbeaten up by police officers\u201d and no information was given to the expert about the applicant\u2019s hitting the bookcase. Though that information was later communicated to the expert and his opinion was sought (see paragraph 41 above), such an important question \u2013 as to whether all of the bruises on the applicant\u2019s head could have been sustained as a result of a single impact against the glass \u2013 was never put to a medical expert. Furthermore, it does not appear that the police premises were searched for the objects \u2013 a rope and metal bar \u2013 allegedly used for the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the authorities failed in their obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment in police custody.66.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the Court holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 in its substantive aspect, as well as under its procedural head.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into his complaint of ill-treatment in police custody, and that their refusal to open a criminal case had made it impossible for him to be granted the status of \u201cvictim\u201d, which could have entitled him to compensation for the alleged ill-treatment. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. In particular, they submitted that the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence as the ground for the termination of criminal proceedings or refusal to institute criminal proceedings, did not imply the absence of an act as a result of which harm had been sustained. What it did imply was that the act and harm, if inflicted, did not fall within the sphere of interests protected by the criminal law. However, the act and harm in question could fall within the sphere of interests protected by the law on administrative offences or civil law on tort. Accordingly, decisions for termination of criminal proceedings or refusal to initiate criminal proceedings did not prevent the lodging of a civil-law action seeking compensation for the harm sustained. In civil proceedings a court would establish the fact of harm and the causal link between the harm and the acts of the respondent. The right to bring a civil action where, as in the present case, a decision not to initiate criminal proceedings had been taken, followed from the constitutional interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Government referred to decision no.\u00a090-O of 24 February 2005 of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted in reply to the Government\u2019s observations that he had been denied an effective remedy for his complaint about his ill\u2011treatment in police custody, since no effective investigation into his complaint had been carried out by the domestic authorities.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is closely linked to the issue raised under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention and that it should therefore be declared admissible.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that this complaint, as submitted by the applicant, who did not attempt to institute any proceedings for compensation, was limited to a general statement, without any references to domestic law or practice.\u00a0Having regard to the finding of a violation of Article 3 under its procedural head on account of the respondent State\u2019s failure to carry out an effective investigation, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine this complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION72.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim.75.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis and having regard to the nature of the violations found, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a026,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 5,697.75 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim.78.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 4,600 for the proceedings before it. This amount is to be paid into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative, as requested by the applicant.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","27996":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the Government\u2019s failure to have his medical examination performed with a view to answering the three questions asked by the Court had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rule of Court and had thus violated his right to individual application. He relied on Article 34 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201dRule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.2.\u00a0\u00a0Where it is considered appropriate, immediate notice of the measure adopted in a particular case may be given to the Committee of Ministers.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any interim measure it has indicated.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties28.\u00a0\u00a0The Government opened their argument with an assertion that it could not be inferred from Article 34 of the Convention or \u201cfrom any other source\u201d that the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court was legally binding. They further stressed that the Rules of Court, and accordingly the interim measure applied, did not have binding force on the State Party and that, accordingly, their failure to submit answers to the questions raised by the Court in its letter of 17 October 2014 did not entail a violation of Article 34, or of any other provision of the Convention.29.\u00a0\u00a0The Government continued by arguing that the applicant\u2019s right to communicate with the Court had in no way been interfered with. The applicant had retained counsel, who had submitted his application to the Court. The applicant and his counsel had continued to communicate freely with the Court and still did so. Lastly, the Government submitted that in response to the questions in the letter of 17 October 2014 they had provided the Court with medical reports prepared by specialists from the prison hospital whose independence and competence \u201cdid not raise any doubts\u201d, particularly in view of the fact that they had repeatedly recommended the applicant\u2019s release on grounds of ill health. The Government also stressed that in their response of 7 November 2014 they had already answered the three questions raised.30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the situation was analogous to the case of Amirov (cited above) in which the Court had found a violation of Article 34 of the Convention following the Government\u2019s failure to comply with an interim measure imposed under Rule 39. As in the Amirov case (ibid.), the Russian authorities had again failed to comply with an order by the Court to provide an expert opinion by independent medical specialists assessing the applicant\u2019s state of health.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, pursuant to Article 34 of the Convention, Contracting States undertake to refrain from any act or omission that may hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application, and this has been consistently reaffirmed as a cornerstone of the Convention system (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2005\u2011I). Although the object of Article 34 of the Convention is essentially that of protecting an individual against any arbitrary interference by the authorities, it does not merely compel States to abstain from such interference. In addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there are positive obligations inherent in Article 34 of the Convention requiring the authorities to furnish all the necessary facilities to make possible the proper and effective examination of applications. Such an obligation will arise in situations where applicants are particularly vulnerable (see Naydyon v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a016474\/03, \u00a7 63, 14 October 2010; Savitskyy v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a038773\/05, \u00a7\u00a0156, 26 July 2012; and Iulian Popescu v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a024999\/04, \u00a7\u00a033, 4\u00a0June 2013).32.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s established case-law, a respondent State\u2019s failure to comply with an interim measure entails a violation of the right of individual application (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0125, and Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743\/11, \u00a7 222, 2 October 2012). The Court cannot emphasise enough the special importance attached to interim measures in the Convention system. Their purpose is not only to enable an effective examination of the application to be carried out, but also to ensure that the protection afforded to the applicant by the Convention is effective. Such measures subsequently allow the Committee of Ministers to supervise the execution of the final judgment. Interim measures thus enable the State concerned to discharge its obligation to comply with the final judgment of the Court, which is legally binding by virtue of Article 46 of the Convention (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, \u00a7 125; Shamayev and Others v.\u00a0Georgia and Russia, no. 36378\/02, \u00a7 473, ECHR 2005\u2011III; Aoulmi v.\u00a0France, no. 50278\/99, \u00a7\u00a0108, ECHR 2006\u2011I; and Ben Khemais v. Italy, no. 246\/07, \u00a7\u00a082, 24\u00a0February 2009).33.\u00a0\u00a0The crucial significance of interim measures is further highlighted by the fact that the Court issues them, as a matter of principle, only in truly exceptional cases and on the basis of a rigorous examination of all the relevant circumstances. In most of these cases, the applicants face a genuine threat to life and limb, with the ensuing real risk of grave, irreversible harm in breach of the core provisions of the Convention. The vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system not only underpins their binding legal effect on the States concerned, as upheld by the established case-law, but also requires that the utmost importance be attached to the question of the States Parties\u2019 compliance with the Court\u2019s indications in that regard (see, inter alia, the firm position on that point expressed by the States Parties in the Izmir Declaration and by the Committee of Ministers in Interim Resolution CM\/ResDH(2010)83 in the above-mentioned case of Ben\u00a0Khemais). Any laxity on this question would unacceptably weaken the protection of the core rights in the Convention and would not be compatible with its values and spirit (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July\u00a01989, \u00a7\u00a088, Series A no. 161); it would also be inconsistent with the fundamental importance of the right of individual petition and, more generally, undermine the authority and effectiveness of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order (see Mamatkulov and\u00a0Askarov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 100 and 125, and, mutatis mutandis, Loizidou v.\u00a0Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, \u00a7 75, Series A no. 310).34.\u00a0\u00a0Article 34 of the Convention will be breached if the authorities of a Contracting State fail to take all the steps which could reasonably be taken in order to comply with an interim measure indicated by the Court (see Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806\/05, \u00a7 88, 10 March 2009). It is for the respondent Government to demonstrate to the Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 92-106; see also Aleksanyan v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046468\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 228-32, 22 December 2008, in which the Court concluded that the Russian Government had failed to honour their commitments under Article 34 of the Convention as a result of their failure to promptly transfer a seriously ill applicant to a specialised hospital and to subject him to an examination by a mixed medical commission including doctors of his choice, in disregard of an interim measure imposed by the Court under Rule\u00a039).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case35.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that in a letter sent on 16 October 2014 it indicated to the Russian Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, that the applicant should be immediately examined by medical experts independent from the penal system with a view to determining three issues: (1) whether the treatment he was receiving in the prison hospital was adequate for his condition; (2) whether his state of health was compatible with the conditions of his detention; and (3) whether the applicant\u2019s condition required his placement in a specialised hospital or his release. The Government responded by submitting the applicant\u2019s medical record drawn up by the detention authorities, certificates prepared by the acting head of the prison hospital, and copies of the applicant\u2019s complaints to various officials. They further cited two medical reports of 13 March and 1 July 2014, each prepared by doctors from the prison tuberculosis hospital. The Government themselves answered the three questions put by the Court (see paragraphs\u00a020-23 above).36.\u00a0\u00a0Following the communication of the case, the Government insisted that they had fully complied with the interim measure by submitting the two medical reports and by providing detailed answers to the Court\u2019s questions in their letter of 7 November 2014. The Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument. It reiterates that the aim of the interim measure in the present case \u2013 as formulated in the Court\u2019s decision of 16\u00a0October 2014, of which the Government were notified in a letter of 17 October 2014 \u2013 was to obtain an independent medical expert assessment of the state of the applicant\u2019s health, the quality of the treatment he was receiving and the adequacy of the conditions of his detention in view of his medical needs. That expert evidence was necessary to decide whether, as the applicant argued, his life and limb were at real risk as a result of the alleged lack of requisite medical care in detention. In addition, the Court was concerned with the contradictory nature of the evidence collected by the applicant and submitted with his application and his request for an interim measure, in particular the medical certificate from the applicant\u2019s prison hospital confirming the unavailability of the necessary drugs (see paragraph 13 above), and the findings of the Russian courts that the applicant was receiving the necessary medical assistance. The interim measure in the present case was therefore also meant to ensure that the applicant could effectively pursue his case before the Court (see, mutatis mutandis, Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009\/05, \u00a7 141, ECHR 2008).37.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst the formulation of an interim measure is one of the elements to be taken into account in the Court\u2019s analysis of whether a State has complied with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention, the Court must have regard not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the interim measure indicated (see Paladi, cited above, \u00a7 91) and, indeed, to its very purpose. The main purpose of the interim measure, as indicated by the Court in the present case \u2013 and the Government did not claim to be unaware of this \u2013 was to prevent the applicant\u2019s exposure to inhuman and degrading suffering in view of his poor health and his remaining in a prison hospital that was \u2013 according to him \u2013 unable to ensure that he received adequate medical assistance. There could have been no doubt about either the purpose or the rationale of that interim measure.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not need to assess the professional expertise or qualifications of the doctors who prepared the medical reports of 13\u00a0March and 1 July 2014, or their independence from the penal system, as it considers that their opinion as reflected in the two reports did not provide any answers to the three questions put by the Court. The aim of the two medical examinations, the results of which were set out in those reports, was to compare the applicant\u2019s medical condition with the exhaustive list of illnesses provided for by the Government decree, and which could have warranted his release. At no point during the examinations did the doctors from the prison hospital assess the applicant\u2019s state of health independently from that list or evaluate whether his illness, given its current manifestation, nature and duration, required his transfer to a specialised hospital. Nor did they pay any attention to the quality of the medical care he had been receiving while in detention, or to the conditions in which he was being detained. The reports therefore have no relevance to the implementation of the interim measure indicated by the Court to the Russian Government in the present case (see, for similar reasoning, Amirov, cited above, \u00a7 91).39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that they themselves had responded to the three questions put by the Court in its decision of 16\u00a0October 2014. The Court notes in this connection that in view of the vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system, they must be strictly complied with by the State concerned. The Court cannot conceive, therefore, of allowing the authorities to circumvent an interim measure such as the one indicated in the present case by replacing expert medical opinion with their own assessment of the applicant\u2019s situation. Yet that is exactly what the Government did in the present case (see paragraphs 20-23 above). In so doing, the State has frustrated the purpose of the interim measure, which sought to enable the Court, on the basis of relevant, independent medical opinion, to effectively respond to and, if need be, prevent the possible continued exposure of the applicant to physical and mental suffering in violation of the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention (see Khloyev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 46404\/13, \u00a7 67, 5 February 2015, and Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005\/08, \u00a7\u00a0222, 14 March 2013.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not demonstrate any objective impediment preventing compliance with the interim measure (see Paladi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a092). Consequently, the Court concludes that the State has failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by it in the present case under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in breach of its obligation under Article 34 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been unable to obtain effective medical care while in detention, which had put him in a life-threatening situation and subjected him to severe physical and mental suffering, in violation of the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties42.\u00a0\u00a0Having referred to the general principles laid down by the Court in a number of judgments concerning the standards of medical care of detainees (see Aleksanyan, cited above; Mirilashvili v.\u00a0Russia, no. 6293\/04, 11\u00a0December 2008; Mouisel v. France, no. 67263\/01, ECHR 2002\u2011IX; and Kalashnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 47095\/99, ECHR 2002\u2011VI), the Government stressed that the applicant had received comprehensive medical care in detention. They relied on documents enclosed with their reply of 7\u00a0November 2014. The Government further submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies. They stressed that a complaint to the administration of the detention facility, the regional department for execution of sentences or a prosecutor\u2019s office could have resulted in the \u201ctermination of a violation\u201d and could have prevented \u201cthe occurrence of negative consequences\u201d, while a complaint to a court could have led to appropriate redress. The applicant, however, while applying to the Russian courts, had always sought his release and had never attempted to assess the quality of the medical care afforded to him. The Government noted that a Russian court had performed that assessment on 28 November 2014, having ordered the applicant\u2019s release. The Government concluded by stressing the full capacity of the Russian judicial system, based on the principle of humanism, to effectively protect human rights, including those of the applicant.43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the medical care he had received in detention had been extremely ineffective and had led to a steady deterioration in his health. The applicant stressed that he was seriously ill and that his illness was life-threatening. His illness had rapidly progressed, having moved from stage III B to the critical IV B stage in merely three months. He was in desperate need of chemotherapy and radiotherapy, the specific medical treatment for a patient in his condition. However, the treatment had never been provided because, as was evident from the statements of Dr B. made in open court, as well as the findings of the Regional Court on 28 November 2014, the prison hospital had not had the necessary equipment or medicine to provide the treatment.44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further addressed the Government\u2019s objection of non\u2011exhaustion. In particular, he noted that the Government had provided the Court with his complaints to various Russian officials, including the head of the prison hospital, a prosecutor\u2019s office and the prison service. Thus, the authorities had been well aware of his grievances. Moreover, he had brought a claim before a Russian court, which, despite clear evidence to the contrary, had considered that he had received adequate medical care and had refused to release him.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to bring his grievances to the attention of the Russian authorities, including the courts, and submitted that his complaint should be rejected for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its earlier finding that, at present, the Russian legal system does not offer an effective remedy for the alleged violation, or the continuation of such a violation, which could provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his allegedly inadequate medical care in detention. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Dirdizov v. Russia, no.\u00a041461\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 80-90, 27 November 2012) in respect of this part of the application.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles(i)\u00a0\u00a0As to the Court\u2019s evaluation of the facts and the burden of proof48.\u00a0\u00a0In cases in which there are conflicting accounts of events, the Court is inevitably confronted with the same difficulties as those faced by any first-instance court when establishing the facts. It reiterates that, in assessing evidence, it has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, it has never been its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that standard. Its role is not to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability, but on Contracting States\u2019 responsibility under the Convention. The specific nature of its task under Article 19 of the Convention \u2013 to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention \u2011 determines its approach to issues of evidence and proof. In proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts conclusions that are, in its view, supported by a free evaluation of all the evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions. In accordance with its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specific nature of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (see Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012, and the cases cited therein).49.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. The Court reiterates its case-law under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to the effect that where the events at issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries, damage and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII; and Oleg Nikitin v. Russia, no.\u00a036410\/02, \u00a7\u00a045, 9 October 2008). In the absence of such an explanation the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the respondent Government (see, for instance, Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7\u00a0274, 18 June 2002, and Buntov v. Russia, no. 27026\/10, \u00a7 161, 5\u00a0June 2012).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0As to the application of Article 3 of the Convention and standards of medical care for detainees50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Verbin\u0163 v.\u00a0Romania, no. 7842\/04, \u00a7 63, 3 April 2012, with further references).51.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 of the Convention (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR\u00a02002-III, with further references).52.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI, and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 208, 13 July 2006). In most cases concerning the detention of persons who were ill, the Court has examined whether or not the applicant received adequate medical assistance in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 of the Convention does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to secure the health and well-being of detainees, among other things, as an obligation on the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094; Kalashnikov, cited above, \u00a7 95; and Khudobin v. Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7\u00a096, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)).53.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists that, in particular, authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Hummatov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29 November 2007; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko, cited above, \u00a7 100; Gladkiy v. Russia, no.\u00a03242\/03, \u00a7\u00a084, 21 December 2010; Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11\u00a0October 2011; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7 121, 7 November 2006), and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 114; Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7\u00a079, 4\u00a0October 2005; and Popov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0211). The Court further reiterates that medical treatment within prison facilities must be appropriate and comparable to the quality of treatment which the State authorities have committed themselves to providing for the entirety of the population. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each detainee must be guaranteed the same medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7\u00a0February 2012).54.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves to itself sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, determining it on a case\u2011by\u2011case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan, cited above, \u00a7 140).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case55.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant suffers from an oncological illness, non-Hodgkin lymphoma, with lesions affecting his cervical, axillary and abdominal lymph nodes. Both parties acknowledge the high-grade or aggressive, and thus life-threatening, nature of the applicant\u2019s condition, given the progress of the cancer in less than four months (see paragraphs 10 and 14 above).56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s main contention was that he did not receive vital chemo- and radiotherapy for his illness. The Government disagreed. They insisted that he had received comprehensive medical assistance in detention. They also pointed to the applicant\u2019s alleged refusals, in March and June 2014, to undergo chemotherapy (see paragraph 20 above).57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already stressed the difficult task it faces in evaluating the differing and even mutually contradictory evidence submitted by the parties in the present case (see paragraph 36 above). Its task has been further complicated by the need to assess evidence calling for expert knowledge in various medical fields. In this connection, it emphasises that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d (see, mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 32, Series A no. 336, and Georgiy\u00a0Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7 51, 14 October 2010).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined a large number of cases against Russia raising complaints of inadequate medical services afforded to inmates (see, among the most recent examples, Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, 13\u00a0November 2012; Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461\/10, 27 November 2012; Reshetnyak v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56027\/10, 8 January 2013; Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no.\u00a046108\/11, 5 February 2013; Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, 5\u00a0February 2013; Bubnov v. Russia, no. 76317\/11, 5 February 2013; Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, 9 January 2014; and Gorelov v. Russia, no.\u00a049072\/11, 9\u00a0January 2014). In the absence of an effective remedy in Russia to air those complaints, the Court has, of necessity, to undertake the role of a court of first instance and performed a first-hand evaluation of the evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention had been observed. In that role, paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants in view of their detention, the Court has called on the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.59.\u00a0\u00a0Coming back to the medical reports and certificates submitted by the applicant in the present case, the Court is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence in favour of his submissions and that the burden of proof should shift to the respondent Government.60.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its findings under Article 34 of the Convention, the Court is prepared to draw inferences from the Government\u2019s conduct and, having closely scrutinised the evidence submitted by them in support of their position, it finds that they have failed to demonstrate conclusively that the applicant received effective medical treatment for his illnesses while in detention. The evidence in question is unconvincing and insufficient to rebut the applicant\u2019s account of the treatment to which he was subjected in detention. In such circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s allegations have been established to the requisite standard of proof. The Court\u2019s conclusion becomes even more salient in view of the decision of the Chelyabinsk Regional Court on 28 November 2014 to authorise the applicant\u2019s release, given the prison authorities\u2019 inability to provide adequate treatment for him (see paragraph 24 above).61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus finds that the applicant was left without the essential medical care for his illnesses. He did not receive cancer-related treatment and the medical supervision afforded to him was insufficient to maintain his health. There was no thorough evaluation of his condition. The medical personnel at the prison hospital did not take any steps to deal with the rapid progress of his illness. The Court expresses its concern with the findings of the Russian lower-instance court, which despite clear evidence to the contrary, including the statements by the attending prison doctor, concluded that the applicant had been provided with proper medical care (see paragraph 16 above). The Court is equally concerned with the documents prepared by the Russian prison authorities and submitted to it by the Government, from which it appears that the sole reason for the applicant not receiving medical treatment was not the absence of the necessary equipment or medication, but rather his alleged refusal to submit to that treatment. The Court finds it particularly striking that the documents in question were prepared by the Russian authorities in October 2014, after the doctor from the same hospital had confirmed in open court that the authorities were unable to treat the applicant owing to the lack of equipment and drugs.62.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, the Court considers that the lack of comprehensive and adequate medical treatment had the effect of exposing the applicant to prolonged mental and physical suffering and constituted an affront to his human dignity. The authorities\u2019 failure to provide the applicant with the medical care he needed thus amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention.63.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there was a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION64.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the claim was unsubstantiated.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant the sum claimed in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage in full, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 1,000 in legal fees for his representation before the Court. The applicant supported his claim with a schedule signed by his lawyer, Ms Khrunova, describing the amount of work done at each stage of the proceedings before the Court.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not provided a copy of the contract with his lawyer.70.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the above criteria, and to the documents in its possession, including the documents prepared by the applicant\u2019s lawyer in the course of the proceedings before the Court and the detailed schedule of work done, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 covering costs for the proceedings before it, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount. The sum is to be paid into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28027":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated during his detention, and that the investigation into his allegation of ill-treatment had been ineffective. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The alleged ill-treatmenta.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that in response to his legitimate refusal to return to the cell in protest against the disorder created and the destruction of food and personal belongings, and until such time as these events were properly recorded in a report, the masked men attempted to put him into the cell by force. He resisted by sitting down and clinging to the cell door. He was then hit and the cell door was slammed against his foot several times, causing him severe pain. His reading glasses were smashed.38.\u00a0\u00a0For an unexplained reason, unlike all the previous searches of his cell, the search by masked men on 28 October 2006 was not carried out in the presence of a doctor. The video material submitted to the prosecutor was selective or edited, and included only approximately six minutes of recording, while the search took about thirty minutes.39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant referred to the many witness statements, complaints of ill-treatment by the other detainees of cell no. 20, and medical reports confirming his version of events, notably the injury to his foot.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that neither the applicant nor any other detainee had been ill-treated. The video made during the search did not confirm his version of events, but rather showed his provocative and uncooperative behaviour. There was no report about any use of force on that day.41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not have a broken bone, but only contusion, as established by a forensic report dated 31 October 2007 (see paragraph 12 above). In addition, he had suffered since 2005 from deep vein thrombophlebitis in his right foot. He had also swallowed an object and at the relevant time was suffering from pain in the stomach, and according to the prison feldsher there was no need to call an ambulance for him to have treatment (see paragraph 24 above).42.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, it could not be ruled out that the injury to the applicant\u2019s foot had been self-inflicted in order to accuse the prison personnel of violence against him. He had been known in the past for numerous acts of self-mutilation (he had swallowed various objects) and was heard immediately after the search threatening to injure himself, as is also recorded on the video in the file. That video also recorded blows to the cell door, which could have been the origin of the applicant\u2019s injury. In addition, one of the detainees present in the cell on the relevant date declared that he had no complaints against the prison staff.b.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment43.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions, and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999\u2011V, Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 93, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, and, more recently, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2015). Where an individual is taken into police custody in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation as to the cause of the injury, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, \u00a7 61, Reports\u00a01996\u2011VI, and Selmouni, cited above \u00a7 87).44.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that, according to a prison supervisor, on 28 October 2006 the applicant had not complained of any health problems before the search. However, immediately after it he complained of sharp pain in his foot, and declared that he had been injured by the masked men during the search (see paragraph 23 above). He was then seen by a nurse, who found that his foot was swollen and noted that the other detainees were agitated and were asking for medical assistance to be given to the applicant (see paragraph 21 above).45. In the Court\u2019s opinion, the question whether the applicant had a broken bone or a lesser injury is much less important than the origin of such an injury caused to a person while he is deprived of his liberty. For the Court, the statements by some of the prison staff mentioned in the preceding paragraph, together with those of the detainees in cell no. 20 who confirmed the applicant\u2019s version of events (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above), are sufficient to establish that the applicant did not have any injury to his foot before the search, and that such an injury appeared after that search. It is therefore for the Government to provide a plausible explanation as to the cause of the injury.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the Government\u2019s assertion that, in the absence of any evidence corroborating the applicant\u2019s allegations, the injury must have been self-inflicted, the more so as he was known for previous acts of self-mutilation and had threatened further such acts at the end of the search. However, it observes that this version of events is contradicted by the statements of four witnesses (co-detainees in cell no. 20, see paragraph 18 above) and a prison supervisor, who declared that immediately after the search the applicant complained of pain in his foot (see paragraph 23 above).47.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Government have failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the applicant\u2019s foot injury. Since the injury appeared while the applicant was detained in prison, and since his allegation is supported by the statements of a number of witnesses, including prison staff and medical personnel, and by forensic reports in the file, the Court concludes that it was the result of treatment during the search. Immediately after the incident the applicant complained about sharp pain in his leg and he was urgently brought to a hospital for treatment, his leg having been fixed in plaster (see paragraph 10 above). In the Court\u2019s view, the presence of an actual bodily harm and of pain sufficiently intense so as to require urgent medical assistance at a hospital attains a minimum level of severity so as to fall within the scope of Article 3. It must be qualified as inhuman treatment within the meaning of that provision (see, amongst many other authorities, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 86 et seq., ECHR 2015).48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also considers that the manner in which the search of the applicant\u2019s cell was conducted raises a separate issue under Article 3 of the Convention. Those who conducted that search should have known that the cell was reserved for people undergoing medical treatment, and that at least some of the inmates, including the applicant, had psychiatric problems, while three of them had disabilities (see paragraph 7 above). Given the particular vulnerability of such inmates, it could be expected that any actions in their respect such as searches of their cell would be carried out with special precautions against unnecessarily affecting their psychological state. Indeed, the applicant\u2019s unchallenged submission (see paragraph 37 above) that before the search of 28 October 2006 all previous such actions had taken place in the presence of a doctor would suggest that the prison authorities were well aware of this special situation in cell no. 20.49.\u00a0\u00a0However, the search during 28 October 2006 was different not only owing to the absence of a doctor, but also to what appears to have been a rough handling of the detainees\u2019 food and belongings. In this respect the Court notes that, besides the concordant statements of the five detainees in the cell, several prison staff members confirmed seeing considerable disorder in the cell (see paragraphs 19, 21 and 23 above), while a report confirmed that the applicant\u2019s reading glasses had been broken (see paragraph 28 above).50.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the video material filmed during the search, the Court notes that it was significantly shorter than the length of the search. Moreover, near the end of the film the applicant asked for the interior of the cell to be filmed, to show the mess left there, but either no such recording was made, or it was not included on the disk submitted to the prosecutor (see paragraph 28 above).51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it has found in a number of cases concerning Prison no. 13 that the quantity and quality of food there were substandard (see, for instance, Rotaru v. Moldova, no. 51216\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 34 and 37, 15\u00a0February 2011; Ciorap v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 3), no. 32896\/07, \u00a7 36, 4 December 2012; and Segheti v. the Republic of Moldova, no.\u00a039584\/07, \u00a7 31, 15 October 2013). Given that the applicant tried to cope with this situation by consuming food sent to him by his relatives (see paragraph 9 above), its destruction during the search may have further increased his suffering. The Court is also mindful that a prison cell is the place where a detainee spends a significant amount of his time. Causing disorder and the destruction of food, reading glasses and other belongings there, in the absence of any specific need, was even more degrading to the applicant.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the search of 28 October 2006 not only failed to take special precautions against unnecessarily disturbing the applicant as a mentally ill and disabled person undergoing medical treatment in a cell reserved for that purpose, but in fact humiliated him without any need, amounting to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.53.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of that provision in its substantive limb.2.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation of the alleged ill-treatmenta.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the investigation had been ineffective. He was not heard by the prosecutor until 16 February 2007, almost four months after the incident, when he was recognised as an injured party for the first time. He was not sent a copy of the decision to initiate the criminal investigation of 8\u00a0December 2006 until 28 February 2007.55.\u00a0\u00a0He questioned the integrity of the video recording relied on by the prosecutor, since it recorded only six minutes out of a total of over thirty minutes filmed. Moreover, four of his cellmates lodged complaints about ill-treatment that day and were recognised as injured parties, which contradicted the Government\u2019s submission that no other complaints had been made.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations had been thorough and effective. All the reports related to the search and the video filmed there were analysed by the prosecutor before a decision was taken. Moreover, after the first time the investigation was discontinued the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office ordered a more thorough investigation, ensuring that all aspects of the case were examined. After examining all the relevant materials in the file and carrying out a significant number of investigative acts, while observing the applicant\u2019s rights, the prosecutor adopted a well-reasoned decision to discontinue the investigation, since there was no evidence that a crime had been committed.57.\u00a0\u00a0 It was evident from the video of the events that no force had been used and that it was the applicant who had acted in a provocative manner. There was no other evidence to the contrary, and a final court decision had confirmed the lawful and well-founded character of the prosecutor\u2019s decision (see paragraph 32 above). The simple allegations made by the applicant, in the absence of any evidence to support them, could not lead to any other result than dismissing them as ill-founded.b.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, having regard to the general duty on the State under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention\u201d, the provisions of Article 3 require by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of State authorities (see, for instance, Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 114-123). The kind of investigation that will achieve those purposes may vary according to the circumstances. However, whatever the method of investigation, the authorities must act as soon as an official complaint has been lodged. Even when, strictly speaking, no complaint has been made, an investigation must be started if there are sufficiently clear indications that torture or ill-treatment has been used (see, among other authorities, \u00d6zbey v. Turkey (dec.), no. 31883\/96, 8 March 2001).59.\u00a0\u00a0It is beyond doubt that a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. A prompt response by the authorities in investigating allegations of ill-treatment may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see, among other authorities, Indelicato v. Italy, no. 31143\/96, \u00a7 37, 18 October 2001, Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7 323, ECHR 2014 (extracts), and Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and Fecire Tun\u00e7 v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014\/05, \u00a7 178, 14\u00a0April 2015). While there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, it may generally be regarded as essential for the authorities to launch an investigation promptly in order to maintain public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and to prevent any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see Buzilo v. Moldova, no. 52643\/07, \u00a7 30, 21\u00a0February 2012).60.\u00a0\u00a0An investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions (see, mutatis mutandis, Assenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 103 et seq.). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see Tanr\u0131kulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763\/94, \u00a7 104 et seq., ECHR 1999-IV, and G\u00fcl v. Turkey, no. 22676\/93, \u00a7\u00a089, 14 December 2000). Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of those responsible for them will risk falling foul of this standard.61.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the authorities were aware of the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment on the day it was made (see, for instance, paragraphs 21-23 above). However, there was apparently no immediate response to these allegations. On 31\u00a0October 2006 the applicant made a formal complaint. However, it was only on 8\u00a0December 2006 that a criminal investigation was initiated.62.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court reiterates that it has already found that \u201cin accordance with Articles 93, 96 and 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no investigative measures at all could be taken in respect of the offence allegedly committed ... unless criminal proceedings were formally instituted\u201d (see Gu\u0163u v. Moldova, no. 20289\/02, \u00a7 61, 7 June 2007; M\u0103t\u0103saru and Savi\u0163chi v. Moldova, no. 38281\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 25 and 90, 2\u00a0November 2010; and Gasanov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 39441\/09, \u00a7\u00a053, 18 December 2012). It follows that by not initiating a proper criminal investigation for more than a month after becoming aware of the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment (until 8 December 2006, see paragraph 14 above) the investigator knowingly prevented any evidence obtained during that period from being used in court. That evidence included the first three medical examinations (of 28 October, 28 November and 1 December 2006, see paragraphs 10 and 12 above). Given how crucial the first days are for establishing the existence and nature of any injury before the passage of time heals it, and given the seriousness of the allegation, supported by the evidence that the applicant had to be taken to a hospital to treat his foot, the delay of more than a month before instituting a criminal investigation is incompatible with the procedural obligations under Article 3 of the Convention (see, for instance, P\u0103dure\u0163 v. Moldova, no. 33134\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 64 and 68, 5 January 2010).63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the first medical examination was carried out by a doctor at the hospital with a view to treating the applicant\u2019s injury, but not to fully resolve all related issues such as the cause of that injury. Given the applicant\u2019s allegation and its denial by the prison staff, a forensic examination would have been required as soon as possible to ascertain all the aspects of the applicant\u2019s injury. However, such an examination was not carried out until a month after the event (see paragraph 12 above). No explanation for this delay is apparent from the file.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that at no time did the authorities interview the masked men who had been accused of ill-treating the applicant. It has, in the past, expressed concern about incidents involving armed and masked police officers taking part in interventions against individuals, as well as the failure to identify and question such officers (see, for instance, Ku\u010dera v.\u00a0Slovakia, no. 48666\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 122-124, 17 July 2007, Rachwalski and Ferenc v. Poland, no. 47709\/99, 28 July 2009, Hristovi v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a042697\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a080-93, 11 October 2011 and Ataykaya v. Turkey, no.\u00a050275\/08, \u00a7 53, 22\u00a0July 2014).65.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the video material filmed during the event, the Court notes that it lasts for less than seven minutes, while the search lasted approximately thirty minutes. It is also clear that the footage includes scenes from both the start of the search and its end, which implies that the filming did not start near the end of the search in response to the applicant\u2019s disobedience. During the investigation the applicant and the other detainees who had complained of ill-treatment declared that the recording was incomplete (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). The Court further notes that while a compact disk was handed to the public prosecutor, the officer who had filmed the event, or at least certain parts of it, declared that he had filmed it on an 8 mm video cassette (see paragraph 26 above).66.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, where there was controversy as to the contents and integrity of the video, it is unclear why the investigator did not ask for the original video cassette, but contented himself with viewing whatever part of the video had been submitted to him on a compact disk (see paragraph 28 above). It is to be noted that content saved in an electronic form on a compact disk is easily editable to exclude parts of the recording, much less so than content on the original video cassette. Given that the video was of such crucial importance, providing objective evidence of what had happened (the prosecutor\u2019s final conclusion being in large part based on it, see paragraph 29 above), the failure to obtain the original cassette is a serious flaw in the investigation, leading to the conclusion that the authorities did not \u201ctake all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident\u201d (see paragraph 60 above).67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment started with an unexplained delay which, under the applicable domestic law, prevented the evidence gathered during the crucial initial month from being used in court. Moreover, the authorities failed to take all reasonable steps to secure the evidence concerning the incident, by failing to obtain one of the most objective types of evidence that was available, namely the original of the video recording of the event.68.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention also in its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 369.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.71. The Court notes that, in view of its conclusions concerning the complaints under Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 53 and 68 above), the applicant had an arguable claim within the meaning of Article\u00a013 of the Convention. Accordingly, this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.72.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the findings relating to Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 53 and\u00a068 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine separately whether in this case there has been a violation of Article 13 (see, among other authorities, I.G. v. Moldova, no.\u00a053519\/07, \u00a7 45, 15 May 2012).III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION73.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Pecuniary damage74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 500 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage. He relied on documents confirming the purchase of new reading glasses, crutches and a stick which he used while recovering from his foot injury.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the sum claimed was excessive.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the expenses for the equipment mentioned by the applicant were a direct consequence of the injury caused to him and which has led the Court to find a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The Government did not submit that any of those expenses had been covered by the State. The Court therefore allows in full the applicant\u2019s claim for pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Non-pecuniary damage77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 60,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He referred to the Court\u2019s case-law concerning similar cases.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the sum claimed was excessive.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have been caused a certain amount of suffering as a result of the violation of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention. Deciding on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR\u00a09,000.C.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 1,500 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court. He submitted receipts for translation of submissions and postal charges.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the sum claimed was excessive.82.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 150 covering costs under all heads.D.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28029":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in the LIU OF-73\/3 medical facility had violated Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility22.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the complaint was inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies because the applicant had not applied to a court of general jurisdiction to complain of inadequate conditions of his detention or brought a claim for compensation. The applicant disagreed.23.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already examined the effectiveness of various domestic remedies suggested by the Russian Government, including civil claims for compensation, in a number of cases concerning inadequate conditions of detention (see Fetisov and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a043710\/07, 6023\/08, 11248\/08, 27668\/08, 31242\/08 and 52133\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a082-87, 17\u00a0January 2012; Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a093-118, 10 January 2012; and, specifically with regard to post\u2011conviction detention facilities, Sergey Babushkin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a05993\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a041-45, 28 November 2013; Reshetnyak v. Russia, no.\u00a056027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a056\u201180, 8 January 2013; and Kulikov v. Russia, no.\u00a048562\/06, \u00a7 31, 27\u00a0November 2012) and concluded that for the time being, the Russian legal system did not have an effective remedy for such grievances. The Court finds no reason to depart from these findings in the present case and dismisses the Government\u2019s objection as to the non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies. It also notes that this complaint is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties24.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention had been satisfactory. The population on all wards of the LIU OF\u201173\/3 facility had never exceeded their intended capacity and the applicant had at least three square metres of floor space at his disposal, as well as an individual sleeping place. They also argued that all wards in the facility had enough light.25.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his allegation of overcrowding. He further claimed that the living space available to him on all wards was far below the accepted standard, and that the floor space was taken up by bed stands and bunks.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment26.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of deprivation of liberty, the Court has consistently stressed that, to fall under Article 3 of the Convention, the suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that which is inevitably connected with detention.\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a092-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7\u00a0208, 13 July 2006).27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates, in particular, that a serious lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as a factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the detention conditions described are \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention and may disclose a violation,\u00a0 both alone or taken together with other shortcomings (see, amongst many other authorities, Ananyev and others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0146-49, and Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no.\u00a053254\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 39-40, 7\u00a0April 2005).28.\u00a0\u00a0According to the floor plans and ward population registers provided by the Government, the applicant had between 2.7 and 3.7 square metres of personal space during his detention. In ward 25, where he spent more than eight months (see paragraph 8 above), he had only 2.7 square metres of floor space at his disposal, which is even below the domestic standard of three square metres per inmate in a medical facility (see paragraph 19\u00a0above). Whereas the provision of four square metres remains the desirable standard of multiple-occupancy accommodation, the Court recalls that where the applicants have at their disposal less than three square metres of floor surface, the overcrowding must, in general, be considered to be so severe as to justify a finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see Ananyev and others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 144-45, with further references). Further, the applicant alleged, and it was not disputed by the Government, that the space between two bunks, lengthwise, was as narrow as fifty centimetres. This arrangement left him with very little space in which to move around easily.29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the correctional institution at issue was a medical facility designed for convicts suffering from tuberculosis and drug addiction. The applicant was admitted on account of his poor health \u2013 he suffered from hepatitis, tuberculosis and HIV and was thus particularly vulnerable. The fact that he had to share overcrowded wards for more than ten months with a large number of sick and occasionally infected inmates with minimal distance separating their sleeping places is a further indication of degrading treatment exceeding the minimum threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention. The Court has previously found that lengthy detention of an ailing applicant in cramped conditions without a minimum level of privacy amounts to inhuman treatment (see Reshetnyak, cited above, \u00a7 97).30.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the overcrowding, the applicant\u2019s situation was exacerbated by restricted access to daylight. The prosecutor\u2019s report of 11\u00a0October 2010 noted that the windows in all wards were equipped with metal shutters blocking access to daylight (see paragraph 11 above). The Court reiterates in this regard that restrictions on access to natural light and air owing to the fitting of louvre shutters seriously aggravate the situation of detainees in already overcrowded cells and weigh heavily in favour of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 153-54, with further references).31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the effect of overcrowding, aggravated on account of a lack of daylight, exposed the applicant to treatment which was inhuman and degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a breach of this provision in relation to the conditions in which he was held in the OF-73\/3 facility.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTIONA.\u00a0\u00a0Restrictions on family visits32.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the unaffordable cost of using the facilities in the OF-73\/3 medical facility for long-term family visits violated Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life\u00a0...2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the visiting fees had been introduced by an internal order of the medical facility authorities. They had been fully paid by the applicant\u2019s daughters, who had stayed with their father for one day. They covered maintenance and the depreciation of visiting room equipment. The applicant maintained his complaint.3.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The existence of an interference35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates at the outset that it is an essential part of a detainee\u2019s right to respect for family life that the authorities enable him or, if need be, assist him in maintaining contact with his close family because during imprisonment a detainee continues to enjoy all fundamental rights and freedoms, save for the right to liberty (see Khoroshenko v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a041418\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 106 and 116, ECHR 2015, with further references). The Court further recalls that an interference with a prisoner\u2019s right to respect for his family life does not need to amount to an outright ban on family visits, but can consist in various other measures taken by the prison authorities. The Court has thus frequently found that limitations on frequency and duration of family visits, supervision over those visits and subjection of a detainee to special visiting arrangements constitute an interference with the applicants\u2019 rights under Article 8 of the Convention (see Ferla v. Poland, no. 55470\/00, \u00a7 38, 20 May 2008, and Van der Ven v.\u00a0the Netherlands, no. 50901\/99, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2003\u2011II).36.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the medical facility\u2019s administration authorised the applicant to meet his daughters. This visit was however cut short from three days to just one because neither the applicant nor his children could afford the recently introduced fee for family visits. Therefore, what is at stake in the present case is a further financial restriction making the exercise of the applicant\u2019s statutory right to a long-term family visit conditional on his ability to pay for it. The Court considers that, as this measure caused the applicant to reduce the duration of an authorised family visit, it amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his family life, which gives rise to a breach of Article 8 of the Convention unless it can be shown that it was \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d, pursued one or more legitimate aims as defined in Article 8 \u00a7 2 and was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d to achieve those aims.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Was the interference \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d?37.\u00a0\u00a0On the lawfulness aspect, the Court observes that the visiting fees were introduced by an order of the medical facility authorities and covered a portion of the electricity, water and heating bills, the cost of bed linen and a fraction of staff salaries. The Ministry-approved Internal Regulations of Correctional Facilities allow for charging prisoners or their family members only for \u201cadditional services\u201d during family visits (see paragraph 20 above). It is also noteworthy that the director of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences pointed out to the head of the medical facility that the practice of charging inmates for using visiting rooms was contrary to the Code on the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 13 above). The cost of providing the detainees with acceptable conditions for meeting their families was therefore to be met by the prison authorities rather than the detainees or their families.38.\u00a0\u00a0While neither the applicant nor his daughters requested any special visiting arrangements or additional equipment for the visiting room, they were expected to contribute to prison staff salaries and the payment of service charges, which cannot be considered as \u201cadditional services\u201d. As there was no basis in Russian law for shifting the cost of basic services onto visiting family members, the restriction in question appears to have been an unauthorised initiative by the medical facility authorities. The Court also observes in this respect that the visiting fees were abolished shortly after the applicant\u2019s daughters\u2019 first visit, because the applicant was able to have another family visit several months later, this time free of charge (see paragraph 15 above).39.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court considers that the interference at issue cannot be regarded as having been \u201cprescribed by law\u201d. In the light of this finding, it is not necessary to assess whether the other conditions set out in Article 8 \u00a7 2 of the Convention have been complied with.40.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the unlawful restriction on family visits.B.\u00a0\u00a0Opening of the applicant\u2019s correspondence with the Court41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that his correspondence with the Court had been opened and read by the correspondence department of the OF-73\/2 correctional facility. The Court considers that the matters relating to this part of the application should be examined under Article 8 of the Convention.1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the Court\u2019s letter of 1 April 2009 had been opened for registration only and had been handed over to the applicant. They denied that opening the letter amounted to monitoring of the applicant\u2019s correspondence. The applicant maintained his complaint.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that opening the letter addressed to the applicant constituted interference with his right to respect for his correspondence (see Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826\/03, \u00a7 197, 22 May 2012, and Demirtepe v. France, no. 34821\/97, \u00a7 26, ECHR 1999\u2011IX (extracts)). The purpose of opening the Court\u2019s correspondence to him is of no relevance, especially considering that incoming mail can be registered without opening envelopes.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that interference with Article 8 of the Convention rights must be \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d, pursue one or more of the legitimate aims listed in Article 8 \u00a7 2 and, in addition, be justified as being \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d (see, among many other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 179, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that at the relevant time, Article 91 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences expressly prohibited monitoring correspondence between a detainee and the Court (see paragraph 18 above). The applicant\u2019s correspondence with the Court was privileged and not subject to monitoring. The Court\u2019s letter was therefore opened in breach of domestic law.47.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above finding, it is not necessary to ascertain whether the other requirements of Article 8 \u00a7 2 were complied with. The Court considers that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the opening of the applicant\u2019s correspondence with the Court.III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained of other violations of the Convention. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that they are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION49.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 60,000,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Government found this claim excessive.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant EUR 6,500 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not claim any costs or expenses. Accordingly, there is no call to make an award under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28032":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION47.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Articles 3, 8 and 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the Romanian authorities had breached their positive obligation to protect her from inhuman and degrading treatment and to protect her right to respect for her private life.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case and it does not consider itself bound by the characterisation given by an applicant. A complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on (see Guerra and Others v. Italy [GC], 19 February 1998, \u00a7 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011I). Therefore, having regard to the nature and the substance of the applicant\u2019s complaints in this particular case, the Court finds that they fall to be examined primarily under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 148), which read as follows in their relevant parts:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 8\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that Romanian law and practice did not provide effective protection of children against rape and sexual abuse. In particular, since the crime of rape required a lack of consent on the victim\u2019s part, the applicant complained that, in the absence of any traces of violence on her body and because of the authorities\u2019 refusal to take into consideration that her attitude regarding the incidents was related to her young age, it had been impossible for her to prove her lack of consent. The applicant maintained that the existence of legislation \u2012 open to interpretation \u2012 which permitted consideration of the possibility that an eleven-year-old girl might have expressed valid consent to a sexual act with a man forty-one years older than her amounted to a failure of the State to abide by its obligation to undertake measures to protect her integrity and private life. She also stated that, by setting at fifteen the age of consent for sexual intercourse and at the same time limiting the prosecution of rape to cases where the victims had offered resistance, the authorities had left children insufficiently protected against rape.51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further alleged that the investigation conducted by the authorities into her case had lacked effectiveness, since they had based their decisions solely on the statements of the alleged perpetrators and members of their family and had disregarded essential evidence such as her psychiatric examination. No consideration had been given to important factors such as the applicant\u2019s young age, her vulnerability, or the special psychological aspects of rape committed against a minor. The applicant emphasised that the domestic courts had attributed greater importance to the forensic medical certificate stating that the applicant had had no signs of violence on her body and had failed to even mention the findings of the psychiatric examination which had concluded that she had showed signs of post-traumatic stress and did not have the capacity to foresee the consequences of her acts.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the investigation had been thorough and effective. All possible steps had been taken to gather the necessary evidence and to establish the facts, and in the absence of \u201cdirect\u201d proof of rape, the national authorities had taken into consideration all the circumstances of the case. The Government further alleged that, from the examples of domestic practice submitted, certain general principles might be derived. First, when the victim is so young that it is impossible to establish his\/her consent to the sexual act, the act is to be classified as rape \u2013 for example in cases where the victims are between six and nine years old. Secondly, when the victim is not so young for the act to be automatically classified as rape, but is not yet fifteen and gives her\/his consent to the sexual act, the law provides that her\/his will is not valid because of the victim\u2019s young age and classifies the act as the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor. The domestic courts have made a distinction between the two crimes, holding that the victim\u2019s failure to defend herself\/himself or to express her\/his will must be established on a case-by-case basis and it is possible that a fourteen-year-old girl may find herself unable to express her consent, while a much younger victim may have the capacity to defend herself and express her will.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government concluded that, even if domestic law did not specifically set an age limit for a minor\u2019s capacity to express valid consent to a sexual act, such a limit was established through the clear practice of the domestic courts. Moreover, even at international level there were no binding instruments setting such an age limit.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation of the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals. These measures should provide effective protection, in particular, of children and other vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge (see Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392\/95, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2001-V; M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, no. 40020\/03, \u00a7 99, 31 July 2012; and O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).55.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, positive obligations on the State are also inherent in the right to effective respect for private life under Article 8; these obligations may involve the adoption of measures even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals is, in principle, within the State\u2019s margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts such as rape, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal-law provisions. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection (see C.A.S. and C.S. v.\u00a0Romania, no. 26692\/05, \u00a7 71, 20 March 2012).56.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of children who are particularly vulnerable, the measures applied by the State to protect them against acts of violence falling within the scope of Articles 3 and 8 should be effective and include not only reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had, or ought to have had, knowledge but also effective deterrence against such serious breaches of personal integrity (see M. P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a022457\/08, \u00a7 108, 15 November 2011). Such measures must be aimed at ensuring respect for human dignity and protecting the best interests of the child (see C.A.S. and C.S. v.\u00a0Romania, cited above, \u00a7 82).57.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding, more specifically, serious acts such as rape and the sexual abuse of children, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, it falls to the member States to ensure that efficient criminal law provisions are in place (see, M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0153). This obligation also stems from a number of international instruments, such as Chapter VI, \u201cSubstantive criminal law\u201d, of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse or Articles 19 and 34 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraphs 38 and 45 above).58.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning such serious acts, the State\u2019s positive obligation under Articles 3 and 8 to safeguard the individual\u2019s physical integrity may also extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of the criminal investigation (see, among other authorities, C.A.S. and C.S. v.\u00a0Romania, cited above \u00a7 72; M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109\u201110; and M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 152) and to the possibility of obtaining reparation and redress (see, mutatis mutandis, C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, cited above \u00a7 72), although there is no absolute right to obtain the prosecution or conviction of any particular person where there were no culpable failures in seeking to hold perpetrators of criminal offences accountable (see, for example, Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a032457\/04, \u00a7 64, 27 November 2007, and Szula v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 18727\/06, 4 January 2007).59.\u00a0\u00a0On the basis of the above principles, the Court has previously found that States have a positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal-law provisions that effectively punish rape and to apply them in practice through effective investigation and prosecution (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 153). In addition, in accordance with contemporary standards and trends in the area, the member States\u2019 positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention must be seen as requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution of any non-consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by the victim (ibid., \u00a7 166).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present case60.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court\u2019s task is to examine whether or not the practice of the domestic courts and the application of the impugned legislation in the case at hand, combined with the alleged shortcomings in the investigation, had such significant flaws as to amount to a breach of the respondent State\u2019s positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 167).61.\u00a0\u00a0The issue before the Court is limited to the above. The Court is not concerned with allegations of errors or isolated omissions in the investigation; it cannot replace the domestic authorities in the assessment of the facts of the case, nor can it decide on the alleged perpetrator\u2019s criminal responsibility (ibid., \u00a7168).62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that the authorities\u2019 attitude in her case was rooted in defective legislation and a predominant practice of not making a context-sensitive assessment of the evidence, more specifically failing to take into account age-specific behaviours, and generally prosecuting perpetrators for rape against minors only where there is evidence of physical resistance.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that Article 197 of the Romanian Criminal Code does not mention any requirement of physical resistance by the victim and defines rape in a manner which does not differ significantly from the wording found in statutes of other member States as the Court described them in M.C. v. Bulgaria (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 74 and 88 \u2013 100).64.\u00a0\u00a0What is decisive, therefore, is the meaning given by the investigative authorities and the courts to words such as \u201cconstraint\u201d and \u201cthe victim\u2019s lack of capacity to express his\/her will\u201d in cases where the victim is under fifteen, the legal age of consent to sexual intercourse.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes from the examples of case-law submitted by the parties in the present case that the Romanian courts were united in the opinion that a minor victim\u2019s consent to sexual intercourse must be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, the issue lies with the courts\u2019 practice in analysing the existence of consent and their difficulties to adopt a child-sensitive approach in the assessment of the facts of the cases before them. More specifically, the majority of the convictions for rape were adopted in cases involving violence (see paragraph 35 above). In a significant number of cases, the victim\u2019s consent to the sexual acts was inferred from facts which were more akin to child-specific reactions to trauma, such as the fact that the victims did not tell their parents or did not scream for help (see paragraph 33 above). In less than half of the examples had the judges ordered psychiatric or psychological examinations of the victims in order to verify the existence of their capacity to give valid consent to the sexual acts (see paragraphs 33, 35 and 36 above). In very few of the cases submitted as examples \u2012 four, to be precise \u2012 did the courts consider that victims could not have expressed valid consent due to their very young age, ranging from six to twelve years old (see paragraph 34 above). In view of the above, it cannot be concluded that a settled and consistent practice had been developed by the national courts in order to clearly differentiate between cases of rape and those of sexual intercourse with a minor.66.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the particular facts of the applicant\u2019s case, the Court notes that the Romanian authorities were confronted with two conflicting versions of the events and little direct evidence. The Court does not underestimate the efforts made by the investigators and the prosecutors in their work on the case.67.\u00a0\u00a0After the primary phase of the investigation, the police forwarded the case to the prosecutor\u2019s office for continued investigations into rape. A few months later, the conclusions of a psychiatric evaluation of the applicant ordered by the police were made available to the prosecutor. The report found that the applicant had difficulties in foreseeing the consequences of her acts and, due to her young age, had insufficient discernment. However, based on the statements of the accused, the other four perpetrators and two witnesses who were about the same age as the applicant and were, in addition, related to all the perpetrators, it was assumed that the applicant had given her consent to the sexual acts and J.V. was indicted only for the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor.68. The Court further observes that the domestic courts, more specifically the court of first instance and the court of final appeal, endorsed the reasoning put forward by the prosecutor without analysing the conclusions of the psychiatric report ordered during the preliminary investigation. In addition, without explaining why, the domestic courts chose to attach more weight to the statements given by J.V., F.B., P.B. and A.B. and by the two witnesses from their family, thereby concluding that it was the applicant who had provoked J.V. to have sex with her. The other alleged perpetrators were never heard as witnesses before the courts and hence the applicant\u2019s allegations that they had threatened to beat her and also threatened her with a knife, or that they might have had an interest in testifying for J.V. had never been examined (see paragraphs 23 and 25 above).69.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, no consideration was given by the courts to the difference in age between the applicant and J.V. or the obvious physical difference between them. The courts also failed to examine whether any reasons existed for the applicant to falsely accuse J.V. of rape.70.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the domestic courts failed to demonstrate a child-sensitive approach in analysing the facts of the case and held against the applicant facts that were, in reality, consistent with a child\u2019s possible reaction to a stressful event, such as not telling her parents. This approach was aggravated by the fact that no psychological evaluation was ever ordered by the domestic courts for the purposes of obtaining a specialist analysis of the applicant\u2019s reactions from the point of view of her age and to determine the existence of possible psychological consequences of the alleged abuse against her.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus considers that the authorities failed to explore the available possibilities for establishing all the surrounding circumstances and did not assess sufficiently the credibility of the witnesses who had themselves been accused in the case or were related to those accused.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, while in practice it may sometimes be difficult to prove lack of consent in the absence of \u201cdirect\u201d proof of rape, such as traces of violence or direct witnesses, the authorities must nevertheless explore all the facts and decide on the basis of an assessment of all the surrounding circumstances. The investigation and its conclusions must be centred on the issue of non-consent (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 181).73.\u00a0\u00a0That was not done in the applicant\u2019s case. Like in the similar case of M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, the Court finds in the current case too that the authorities\u2019 failure to investigate sufficiently the surrounding circumstances was the result of their having attached little or no weight at all to the particular vulnerability of young persons and the special psychological factors involved in cases concerning the rape of minors (ibid. \u00a7 183).74.\u00a0\u00a0To summarise, without expressing an opinion on the guilt of J.V., the Court finds that the investigation of the applicant\u2019s case and, in particular, the approach taken by the national courts, in the context of a lack of a consistent national practice in the field, fell short of the requirements inherent in the States\u2019 positive obligations to apply effectively a criminal-law system punishing all forms of rape and sexual abuse against children.75.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of the respondent State\u2019s positive obligations under both Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION76.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Documents such as a school report and an evaluation of the applicant\u2019s emotional state by the child protection services were submitted in support of the allegation that the abuse and the subsequent investigation caused the applicant emotional suffering and negatively affected her school performance. The applicant also mentioned that her suffering had been further aggravated by the fact that she had become pregnant as a result of the abuse.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the amount claimed was excessive.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered distress and psychological trauma resulting at least partly from the shortcomings in the authorities\u2019 approach in the present case. Making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards her EUR 9,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 790 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. More specifically, EUR 630 (2,860 Romanian lei (ROL)) in lawyer\u2019s fee and EUR 160 (720 ROL) in translation fees. She submitted invoices in support of these amounts and a contract signed with her lawyer for legal representation before the Court.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the applicant had failed to submit a detailed hourly time sheet in order to justify her lawyer\u2019s fee.82.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s established case-law, costs and expenses will not be awarded under Article 41 unless it is established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and were also reasonable as to quantum. Furthermore, legal costs are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see Beyeler v. Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 33202\/96, \u00a7 27, 28 May 2002). In the circumstances of the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers that the lawyer\u2019s fee is not excessive. Accordingly, it awards the sum of EUR 790 in respect of costs and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28034":"I.\u00a0\u00a0SCOPE OF THE CASE53.\u00a0\u00a0In his observations in response to those of the Government, the applicant additionally complained under Article 6 of the Convention of ineffective legal representation by legal-aid lawyers during the initial stage of the criminal proceedings against him.54.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, this new complaint is not an elaboration of his original complaints to the Court on which the parties have commented. The Court considers, therefore, that it is not appropriate to take this matter up in the context of the present case (see Piryanik v. Ukraine, no. 75788\/01, \u00a7 20, 19 April 2005).II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his pre-trial detention in Kharkiv SIZO had been poor. He further stated that, from 6\u00a0October 2005 to 5 May 2009, during his pre-trial detention in Donetsk SIZO, he had been handcuffed whenever he had left his cell, including during family visits and daily walks. The applicant considered such treatment to be inhuman and degrading. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention concern two distinct issues, namely the allegedly unacceptable conditions of his detention in Kharkiv SIZO and his handcuffing in Donetsk SIZO. The Court will deal with these matters in turn.A.\u00a0\u00a0Conditions of detention in Kharkiv SIZO1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this aspect of the case was inadmissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They contended that the applicant could have raised his complaints before the public prosecutor in charge of supervising the general lawfulness of conduct in penal institutions. Any decision taken by the prosecutor could be further challenged before the domestic courts.58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the effectiveness of the above remedy. Referring to the relevant case-law of the Court (see Pokhlebin v, Ukraine, no. 35581\/06, \u00a7 41, 20 May 2010), he asserted that the problem complained of was of a structural nature.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already dismissed similar objections by the Government on a number of occasions, finding the remedy referred to by the Government ineffective on the ground that it had not been shown that recourse to such proceedings could have brought an improvement in the applicant\u2019s detention conditions (see, for example, Savinov v. Ukrane, no\u00a05212\/13, \u00a7 36, 22 October 2015). The Court sees no reason to depart from that finding in the present case and therefore considers that this complaint cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. The Court therefore declares it admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits61.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention requires States to ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000-XI).62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates, in particular, that a serious lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as a factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the detention conditions described are \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 and may disclose a violation, both alone or taken together with other shortcomings (see, amongst many other authorities, Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no.\u00a053254\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 39-40, 7\u00a0April 2005 and Ananyev and others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0146-149, 10 January 2012). Whereas the provision of four square metres remains the desirable standard of multiple-occupancy accommodation, the Court has found that where the applicants have at their disposal less than three square metres of floor surface, the overcrowding must, in general, be considered to be so severe as to justify a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see mutatis mutandis Ananyev and others v. Russia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 144 and\u00a0145).63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case the applicant has provided some details concerning the size of the particular cell in which he stayed during specific periods of time, the number of inmates accommodated therein or other arrangements in the cell. The Government alleged that the applicant\u2019s complaints had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and that his suffering had not attained the minimum level of severity. They provided a description of the conditions in which the applicant had been detained, disputed the size of the cell and cast doubt on the testimonies of the applicant\u2019s alleged cellmates, while also admitting that records concerning persons who were held in Kharkiv SIZO with the applicant had been destroyed.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not find it necessary to resolve the factual dispute between the parties as, in any event, the available evidence indicates that during his stay in Kharkiv SIZO the applicant lacked personal space. In particular, as reported by the Government, the cells, which were designed for eight inmates and measured 24.2 square metres, allowed some three square metres of floor space per inmate. The Government did not actually state how many inmates occupied these cells at the relevant time, the records having been destroyed.65.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, given that the cells also contained sanitary facilities, furniture and fittings, the personal space available to detainees was further reduced.66.\u00a0\u00a0Of the other elements relevant for the assessment of the conditions of detention, special attention must be paid to the availability and duration of outdoor exercise and the conditions in which prisoners could take it. The Court has found a violation of Article 3 because the lack or short duration of outdoor exercise was a factor that further exacerbated the situation of the applicant, who was confined to his cell for all or the rest of his time (see Ananyev and others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 149-151 and the case-law cited therein).67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes from the material in the case file concerning the SIZO regime that the applicant and his cellmates had no freedom of movement and were confined to their cell for most of the day.68.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of its case-law (see, among other authorities, Ananyev and others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 160-166, Melnik v. Ukraine, cited above, \u00a7 103, Gorbatenko v. Ukraine, no. 25209\/06, \u00a7 139, 28 November 2013, and Iglin v. Ukraine, no. 39908\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 51-52, 12 January 2012), the Court finds that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in SIZO no. 27, in particular the lack of personal space afforded to the applicant, combined with the lack of access to outdoor activities for almost three months of his detention, amounted to degrading treatment. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this respect.69.\u00a0\u00a0In view of those findings, the Court does not find it necessary to address the applicant\u2019s allegation that he shared the cell with detainees infected with tuberculosis.B.\u00a0\u00a0Handcuffing in Donetsk SIZO70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, as he had not lodged the relevant complaint before the prosecutor\u2019s office. Further, they denied that the applicant had been handcuffed during family visits and daily walks, and argued that his allegations to that effect were not supported by any evidence.71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the remedy referred to by the Government was not effective, as the handcuffing of life prisoners when outside their cells was prescribed by the domestic legislation and therefore constituted a structural problem.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not find it necessary to determine whether, as the Government argued, the applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as it finds that this complaint is, in any event, inadmissible for the reasons given below.73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently stressed that measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve an element of suffering and humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. As indicated in paragraph 61 above, the State must ensure that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship exceeding that unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94).74.\u00a0\u00a0Handcuffing does not normally give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where the measure has been imposed in connection with lawful detention and does not entail the use of force or public exposure exceeding what is reasonably considered necessary (see Gorodnitchev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 52058\/99, \u00a7 108, 24 May 2007, and Kucheruk v. Ukraine, no.\u00a02570\/04, \u00a7 139, ECHR 2007\u2011X).75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s submissions concerning this part of his complaint are limited to a general complaint about the conditions of detention applicable to life-sentence prisoners, which provided for what he considered unjustified handcuffing. Neither in his initial submissions nor in his observations in response to those of the Government did the applicant provide any details concerning the contested measure, including the manner in which it had been applied. He believed that there had been no grounds to handcuff him as he had behaved well, but did not demonstrate the nature and extent of the suffering and humiliation caused to him by the restriction complained of and failed to substantiate whether that suffering went beyond that inevitably connected with his lawful detention (see, mutatis mutandis, Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, and Okhrimenko v. Ukraine, no.\u00a053896\/07, \u00a7\u00a098, 15 October 2009).76.\u00a0\u00a0Unlike in the case of Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no. 23893\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 150-63, 15 May 2012), where the impugned measure, by which the prisoner is escorted by three wardens and a guard dog, was used on a life prisoner who was completely blind and required outside assistance to manage aspects of his daily life, in the present case there is no evidence that the applicant underwent suffering that would allow the Court to decide on the merits of his complaint as it stands.77.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that this complaint, as presented by the applicant, does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Nonetheless, the Court notes, as it did in paragraph 162 of the Kaverzin judgment, that the regulations appeared to allow the authorities to use the impugned measure of restraint on all male life prisoners, without giving consideration to their personal situation and the individual risk they might or might not present. Even in the absence of the particular vulnerability of the applicant as in Kaverzin, the application of such rules, in the absence of an individual assessment, could give rise to problems pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention.78.\u00a0\u00a0It follows, however, given the generality of the applicant\u2019s complaint in the instant case, that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that neither at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings nor during the trial did he have at his disposal an effective procedure to obtain judicial review of the lawfulness of his continued detention. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions80.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had had, at his disposal, an effective procedure to challenge his detention. In particular, by virtue of Article 165 of the CCP it had been open to him during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings to lodge an appeal against the court decision of 4\u00a0January 2002 to extend his detention, but he had not done so. Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 263 and 274 of the CCP, the applicant\u2019s right to apply for release during the judicial stage of the proceedings had not been restricted, but he had refrained from introducing such an application. They thus claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust the effective remedies available to him.81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not dispute the fact that he had not challenged the court decision of 4 January 2002, but claimed that he had lodged numerous applications for release during the trial, both when challenging the court\u2019s decisions on the merits of the case and as separate petitions, but they had remained unexamined. He provided copies of the relevant submissions before the domestic courts. Referring to the relevant provisions of the domestic legislation and the absence of domestic case-law in support of the Government\u2019s arguments, the applicant argued that, in fact, no effective remedies in terms of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 had existed either at the investigation stage of the proceedings or during the trial. Lastly, he submitted that the situation giving rise to his complaint was similar to one which the Court had already found to be indicative of a systemic breach of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 (citing, in this respect, Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no. 42310\/04, \u00a7 248, 21\u00a0April 2011).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s detention on remand was extended on a number of occasions during the pre-trial investigation, namely on 4 January, 7\u00a0March and 8 April 2002, and twice during the trial. It also notes that, as of 7 March 2002, the decisions taken by the domestic courts extending the applicant\u2019s detention and referring his case to a trial were not amenable to appeal (see paragraphs 19, 22 and 26 above).(a)\u00a0\u00a0Detention between 4 January and 7 March 200283.\u00a0\u00a0It is not disputed by the parties that the applicant did not appeal the court ruling of 4 January 2002, even though Article 165-3 of CCP provided for such a possibility (see paragraph 47 above). The Court cannot examine in abstracto the quality of a judicial review which was not sought by the applicant and did not therefore take place (see, for example, Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, cited above, \u00a7 246).84.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the lack of an effective procedure to challenge the lawfulness of his continued detention between 4 January and 7 March 2002 is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Detention after 7 March 200285.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the Government\u2019s objections as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the period in question are closely linked to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. It therefore joins them to the merits.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that no effective procedure existed, either under domestic law or in practice, by which he could have obtained a judicial review of the lawfulness of his continued detention.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment on the merits but referred to their submissions concerning the admissibility of this part of the case (see paragraph 80 above).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention entitles arrested or detained persons to a review bearing upon the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the \u201clawfulness\u201d, in Convention terms, of their deprivation of liberty. This implies that a procedure for review of the lawfulness of detention must be available in the domestic legal system. Such a procedure must be in conformity with the principles established in the Court\u2019s case-law (see Molodorych v. Ukraine, no.\u00a02161\/02, \u00a7 97, 28 October 2010).90.\u00a0\u00a0The opportunity to initiate such a procedure must be provided soon after the person is taken into detention and, if necessary, at reasonable intervals thereafter. The review procedure must be conducted with due diligence (see, for example, Sergey Volosyuk v. Ukraine, 1291\/03, 12 March 2009).91.\u00a0\u00a0The requirement of procedural fairness under Article 5 \u00a7 4 does not impose a uniform, unvarying standard to be applied irrespective of the context, facts and circumstances. Although it is not always necessary that an Article 5 \u00a7 4 procedure be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6 for criminal or civil litigation, it must have a judicial character and provide guarantees appropriate to the type of deprivation of liberty in question (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a03455\/05, \u00a7 203, ECHR 2009, with further references). The possibility for a detainee to be heard, either in person or through some form of representation, features among the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty (see Kampanis v. Greece, 13\u00a0July 1995, \u00a7 47, Series A no. 318\u2011B). Furthermore, although the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to set up a second level of jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention, \u201ca State which institutes such a system must in principle accord to detainees the same guarantees on appeal as at first instance\u201d (see, for example, Navarra v.\u00a0France, 23\u00a0November 1993, \u00a7 28, Series A no. 273\u2011B).92.\u00a0\u00a0The question whether a person\u2019s right under Article 5 \u00a7 4 has been respected has to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case (see Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29468\/95, \u00a7 84, ECHR 2000\u2011XII).93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will examine in turn the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the pre-trial and judicial stages of proceedings.1.\u00a0\u00a0Inability to obtain judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention during the pre-trial investigation after 7 March 200294.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that two court rulings authorising the applicant\u2019s detention after 7 March 2002 and before his committal for trial were not amenable to appeal under domestic law.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that, on 7 March and 8 April 2002, the domestic court examined the prosecutor\u2019s request for an extension of the applicant\u2019s detention in the absence of the applicant, who was legally unrepresented at the time, and in the presence of the prosecutor and the investigator. Moreover, that court failed to address some essential aspects of the applicant\u2019s detention and to refer to any specific considerations justifying its continuation, merely referring to the gravity of the charges against him and the need to carry out further investigative measures (see and compare Molodorych v. Ukraine, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0108 and 110, and Svershov v. Ukraine, no. 35231\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 71-72, 27 November 2008).96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not suggest that any other remedies existed at the time, either in law or in practice, enabling the applicant to initiate a judicial review of the lawfulness of his continued pre-trial detention after 7\u00a0March 2002. In those circumstances, the Court concludes that the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention were not respected during that period of the applicant\u2019s detention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Inability to obtain judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention during the trial97.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that, during the trial, he had lodged numerous applications for release before the trial court and had repeatedly enquired about the outcome of consideration of his petitions, but to no avail.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment on the applicant\u2019s allegations.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, at the judicial stage of the proceedings, the applicant lodged at least three applications to change the preventive measure (see paragraphs 27, 28 and 34 above).100.\u00a0During the trial stage, the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention was considered by the domestic courts on two occasions: the Court of Appeal, when it remitted the case for additional investigation; and the Supreme Court of Ukraine, when it considered the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal against the remittal. The decisions of both courts did not state any grounds for the applicant\u2019s continued detention (see paragraphs 28-29 above). The Court has already examined, in a number of other cases against Ukraine, the issue of reviewing the lawfulness of continued detention after the completion of pre-trial investigations and found, inter alia, that owing to a lack of clear provisions obliging trial courts to give reasons for their decisions authorising detention or to fix the term of such detention, the Ukrainian law, as it stood at the relevant time, did not provide a procedure that satisfied the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention (see Kharchenko v. Ukraine, no. 40107\/02, \u00a7 100, 10 February 2011; and, for a more recent authority, Taran v. Ukraine, no. 31898\/06, \u00a7 81, 17 October 2013). The Court sees no reason to depart from its earlier case-law in the present case and finds that there has been a breach of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention in respect of the period in question.3.\u00a0\u00a0Overall conclusion101.\u00a0\u00a0In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that neither at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, after 7 March 2002, nor during the trial did the applicant have at his disposal an effective procedure to obtain judicial review of the lawfulness of his continued detention. It therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objections as to the admissibility of this part of the application and finds a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention in respect of both periods.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION102.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his rights of defence had not been respected in the criminal proceedings against him, as he had not been legally represented during the initial stage of the investigation or before the Supreme Court.103.\u00a0\u00a0This complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c), the relevant part of which reads as follows:\u201c3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0No access to a lawyer at the initial stage of the investigation1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility104.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the above complaint. They specified that the applicant had not raised before the domestic courts all the occurrences of the alleged violation of his rights of defence which he had mentioned in his application before the Court.105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed. He stated that he had duly raised the details of his complaint in his submissions before the domestic authorities.106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it transpires from the applicant\u2019s submissions before the domestic courts, including his cassation appeals, that he persistently stated that at the initial stages of the investigation all of the interviews had been conducted in the absence of his lawyer, in violation of his rights of defence. He complained that some of the interview records had been used as evidence against him, while others had been declared inadmissible by the trial court.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is thus satisfied that the applicant duly raised this complaint in the course of the criminal proceedings against him and therefore rejects the Government\u2019s objection.108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions109.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that, after being arrested on 11 November 2001, he had met his lawyer in private on 21 October 2002. On the day of his arrest, having been subjected to ill-treatment by the police, he made false confessions to a number of robberies and a murder. Despite that fact, the murder and robbery charges were investigated separately until April 2002. He was questioned without a lawyer on a number of occasions under the pretext that the interview concerned the robbery charges for which legal representation was not obligatory. While not contesting that he had voluntarily waived his right to a lawyer when questioned on the robbery charges, the applicant averred however that, being legally unqualified, he had not been fully aware of \u2013 and no one had explained to him \u2013 the possible negative consequences of waiving that right. In particular, he was not informed that the testimonies he had given in the absence of a lawyer at the pre-trial investigation would prevail over those given at trial. After having obtained an opportunity to consult a lawyer, he had retracted his confessions and consistently pleaded innocent throughout the further proceedings. He further pointed out that the necessary procedural guarantees in order for his waivers to be accepted by the authorities, such as a lawyer\u2019s presence or a video recording, had not been provided. The applicant also stressed that in the course of those interviews, during which he had not been represented, he had been questioned about the murder whereas such a charge required mandatory legal assistance. Moreover, those testimonies were used as evidence by the trial court to secure his conviction. Lastly, the applicant argued that, in the interests of justice, he should have been legally represented from the very outset of the proceedings, given the complexity of the case, the number of serious charges against him and the possible sentence he faced.110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disagreed. They pointed out that in the proceedings regarding the murder charges, the applicant had always been represented by a lawyer, as legal representation had been mandatory under domestic law. At the initial stage of the investigation of the robberies, the applicant had, of his own volition, waived his right to legal representation and, having been fully informed of his procedural rights, had signed waivers to that effect on 12 November, 12 and 13 December 2001. There had been no reason, under the terms of the domestic legislation, not to accept the waivers. As from 12 March 2002, once all the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been joined, he had been represented by a lawyer during the pre-trial investigation.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment111.\u00a0\u00a0Article 6 \u00a7 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such a restriction \u2013 whatever its justification \u2013 must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will, in principle, be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police questioning without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7 55-57, 27 November 2008 and Dvorski v. Croatia, no. 25703\/11, \u00a7 80, 20 October 2015).112.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that, at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest, he was suspected of having committed a robbery. On 12 and 13 November 2001 he was questioned as an accused in the context of those proceedings. Before being questioned he waived his right to a lawyer. In this connection, the Court recalls that the waiver of a right guaranteed by the Convention \u2013 insofar as it is permissible \u2013 must be established in an unequivocal manner and must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance (see Colozza v. Italy, judgment of 12 February 1985, Series A no. 89, p. 14, \u00a7 28; Oberschlick v.\u00a0Austria (no. 1), judgment of 23 May 1991, Series A no. 204, p. 23, \u00a7 51; and Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2006\u2011II). The robbery of which the applicant had been suspected did not require mandatory legal representation under domestic law. In addition, when admitting as evidence the applicant\u2019s statements concerning his involvement in the robbery, given in the absence of the lawyer, and finding him guilty as charged, the trial court found no grounds to believe that the respective waivers had not been genuine or impermissible (see paragraph 35 above).113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus concludes that it was the applicant\u2019s own choice not to have a lawyer during the interviews on the robbery charges, and that the authorities thus cannot be held responsible for the fact that he was not legally represented in the course of the referred investigative actions and, respectively, for the consequences it entailed for the applicant\u2019s conviction.114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot, however, reach the same conclusion as regards the applicant\u2019s defence rights in the context of the murder charges against him in view of the following.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, on the day of his arrest, the applicant made statements, from which it became clear that he was testifying to committing not only the robbery but a number of other criminal offences, including aggravated murder. It considers that from that time the investigator had every reason to suspect him of premeditated murder for profit. Accordingly, the applicant was entitled to have access to a lawyer as from the first interview concerning the murder. Furthermore, under domestic law, the applicant was entitled to mandatory legal representation as regards the murder for profit charges as he faced the possibility of life imprisonment.116.\u00a0\u00a0While the Court is unable, on the basis of the documents before it, to decide if the applicant made those statements on his own initiative or at the instigation of the authorities, nothing suggests that once the applicant testified about the murder he was formally admitted to the murder proceedings or that he was offered any legal assistance in connection with that charge. At the same time, it is clear from the additional interview record of 13 November 2001 that, following his testimonies, the applicant was asked further questions regarding the murder. It also follows from the case file - and this was not disputed by the parties - that the applicant had never waived his right to be legally represented when questioned on the murder charges.117.\u00a0\u00a0Further, as indicated by the applicant, on 21 November 2001 he was formally questioned for the first time as a suspect in the murder proceedings and gave a detailed account of the incident at issue. No lawyer was present during that questioning.118.\u00a0\u00a0The above circumstances demonstrate that the applicant\u2019s right of access to a lawyer in the murder proceedings was restricted at least until 22\u00a0November 2001, when he was charged with the crime in the presence of his lawyer (see paragraph 14 above). The Court does not discern any compelling reason for restricting the applicant\u2019s right to a lawyer until that date.119.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court considers that that restriction prejudiced the applicant\u2019s defence rights. It notes that the relevant part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 6 October 2005 shows that, when convicting the applicant for murder, the trial court relied, among other evidence, on testimonies given by the applicant as a suspect and an accused, \u201cincluding in the presence of a lawyer\u201d (see paragraph 35 above). Having noted that, throughout the trial, the applicant had consistently claimed that he was innocent and retracted all of the self-incriminating statements given at earlier stages of the proceedings, the court dismissed as unsubstantiated his allegation that the relevant statements had been obtained in violation of his rights of defence. It noted that those statements had been made in the presence of a lawyer. That position was upheld, without providing further details, by the Supreme Court of Ukraine, when it dismissed the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal.120.\u00a0\u00a0It thus follows that the applicant\u2019s testimonies, given at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, were relied on by the courts. However, the general wording of the relevant part of the judgment and, in particular, the absence of any reference to the dates of the interview records, makes it unclear which particular statements by the applicant were admitted as evidence. The Court finds in this context that the phrase \u201c... including in the presence of a lawyer\u201d implies that some of the testimonies admitted in evidence were given in the absence of a lawyer. In those circumstances, there is clearly an inconsistency in the Court of Appeal\u2019s further statement that no violation of the applicant\u2019s rights of defence occurred as all the evidence had been given in the presence of a lawyer.121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also points out that, in a separate ruling which accompanied the main judgment in the case, the Court of Appeal referred to pieces of evidence which it considered to be inadmissible as they had been obtained in violation of the defendants\u2019 procedural rights, including the rights of defence (see paragraph 36 above). The statements made by the applicant on 11, 12, 13 and 21 November 2001 were not listed among the pieces of inadmissible evidence.122.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, the Court cannot but conclude that when establishing the applicant\u2019s guilt on murder charges, the domestic court relied on statements he had made at the initial stage of the investigation in the absence of a lawyer. Although there was other evidence against the applicant, the significant likely impact of his initial confessions on the further development of the criminal proceedings against him and the fact that they clearly played an important role in the judgments of the domestic courts cannot be ignored by the Court (see Leonid Lazarenko v. Ukraine, no.\u00a022313\/04, \u00a7 57, 28 October 2010).123.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c), in conjunction with Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Absence of legal representation in connection with the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal124.\u00a0\u00a0Although the Government did not submit any observations on the question of the six-month rule, the Court reiterates that that rule reflects the wish of the Contracting Parties to prevent past decisions from being called into question after an indefinite lapse of time. It thus serves the interests not only of the respondent Government but also of legal certainty as a value in itself. It marks out the temporal limits of supervision carried out by the organs of the Convention and signals to both individuals and State authorities the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible. It is therefore not open to the Court to set aside the application of the six-month rule solely because a Government have not made a preliminary objection based on it (see Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a034979\/97, ECHR 2000\u2011I).125.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the final decision in the applicant\u2019s criminal case was given by the Supreme Court of Ukraine on 19 October 2006, while the case file suggests that it was in his letter of 21 January 2010, that is some three years later, when the applicant first mentioned to this Court that he had not been represented by a lawyer in the cassation proceedings. The Court therefore concludes that the complaint was introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention (see Dudnik and Others v. Ukraine (dec.), nos.\u00a09408\/05, 10642\/05 and 26842\/05, 20 November 2007).V.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION126.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained that he had been ill-treated by the police; that an unlawful search had been carried out in his house by the investigative authorities; that the decision to put him on the wanted list and to order his arrest had been unlawful; that he had been brought before a judge approximately two months after his arrest; that the refusal to appoint his sister, who had been questioned as a witness, and mother, as his defence counsel had been unlawful; that the length of the criminal proceedings against him had been excessive; that the judicial authorities had failed to grant him enough time to study the case file, had not heard all of the witnesses on his behalf, and had incorrectly interpreted the evidence in his case, which had led to his conviction in spite of his innocence; and that he had been unlawfully placed in the high-security wing of SIZO No. 5 after delivery of the judgment of 6 October 2005. The applicant relied on Articles\u00a03, 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention in making the above complaints.127.\u00a0\u00a0Following communication of the application to the respondent Government, the applicant additionally invoked Article 8 of the Convention in connection with the facts of the present case.128.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the material before it, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the provisions relied on by the applicant.129.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION130.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage131.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused by the alleged ill-treatment, the lack of an effective procedure to initiate a review of the lawfulness of his detention and the breach of his defence rights.132.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment on that claim.133.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it has found violations of Articles 3, 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04, and 6 \u00a7 3 (c) of the Convention in the present case. As regards the violation of this last provision, the Court cannot speculate as to the outcome of the proceedings against the applicant. The finding of a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(c) in the present case does not imply that the applicant was wrongly convicted. The Court notes that Article 445 of the CCP and Section 10 of the Law on the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights allow for the possibility of a reopening of proceedings (see paragraphs 50-51 above) and considers that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction (see Lazarenko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a065). As regards the violations of Articles 3 and 5 \u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention, ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 10,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses134.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 3,085 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, to be paid into his lawyer\u2019s account directly. In support of his claim, he submitted a legal assistance contract signed by him and Mr Tarakhkalo on 10 August 2011. It stipulated an hourly fee of EUR\u00a095. According to the contract, payment was due after completion of the proceedings in Strasbourg and within the limits of the sum awarded by the Court in respect of costs and expenses. The applicant also submitted a report of 7 September 2011 on the work completed under the aforementioned contract. It specified that Mr Tarakhkalo had worked on the case for twenty-nine hours (EUR 2,755) and that he had incurred administrative and postal costs totalling EUR 220 and EUR 110 respectively.135.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that, given the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaints, the claim for legal work expenses was exaggerated. They further noted that the applicant had failed to submit proof that the administrative and postal costs had actually and necessarily been incurred as he had provided no relevant bills or receipts.136.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,250, covering costs under all heads (which is equal to EUR 2,100 less EUR 850, the sum received by way of legal aid) to be transferred directly to the account of the applicant\u2019s lawyer.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest137.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28052":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had not taken steps to safeguard his health and well-being, having failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d53.\u00a0\u00a0He also claimed that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy whereby to complain about this violation of the guarantee against ill-treatment, as required by Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority ....\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties1.\u00a0\u00a0Applicant\u2019s submissions54.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, the applicant stated that on numerous occasions he had not been provided with the medication prescribed for treating his ulcer, brain cyst, myopia and degenerative disc disease. He further claimed that the ulcer treatment had been ineffective. He had never been tested for H.pylori or provided with anti-recurrence treatment. The doctors merely provided symptomatic treatment to deal with the acute stage of his illnesses, having failed to adopt a long-term therapeutic strategy. His gastritis had developed in detention, in the end becoming a chronic condition. He had not been provided with any treatment for Raynaud\u2019s syndrome and no septal surgery had been performed to improve his breathing.55.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the applicant claimed that he had had no effective remedy whereby to complain about the deficiencies in his treatment.2.\u00a0\u00a0Government\u2019s submissions56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government put forward two lines of argument. Firstly, they argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. They stated that the applicant should have raised his complaint before the domestic authorities, including the administration of the detention facilities, a prosecutor or court. He had failed to do so. This failure could not be explained by a fear of pressure or persecution by the prison authorities, as he had sent over a thousand complaints and applications to various authorities during his detention.57.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Government argued that the applicant had been provided with adequate medical care in detention. He had undergone regular medical check-ups and had been seen by the prison doctors and admitted to the prison hospital when necessary. His state of health had not warranted his release from detention on medical grounds.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government raised the objection of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies. This issue is closely linked to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint that he did not have at his disposal an effective remedy whereby to air his dissatisfaction with the quality of the medical care afforded to him in detention. It is therefore necessary to join the Government\u2019s objection to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies and alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles60.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court reiterates that States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. Those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system (see, among many other authorities, Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138\/10, \u00a7115, 23 February\u00a02016; Gherghina v. Romania [GC] (dec.), no. 42219\/07, \u00a7 84, 9 July\u00a02015; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7 70, 25 March 2014 and Akdivar and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, 16\u00a0September 1996, \u00a7 65, Reports 1996\u2011IV).61.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 116; Gherghina, cited above, \u00a7 85; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7 71 and Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7 66). To be effective, a remedy must be capable of directly redressing the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7116; Gherghina, cited above, \u00a7\u00a085; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7 74 and Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a056581\/00, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2006\u2011II).62.\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article\u00a013 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint; the \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. At the same time, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law, in the sense of either preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 157-158, ECHR 2000\u2011XI and Wasserman v.\u00a0Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7\u00a045, 10\u00a0April 2008).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case63.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies. The Court is not convinced by this submission. He complained about his poor health and of the authorities\u2019 failure to address his health concerns to a court in the course of the criminal proceedings against him, and brought a claim in court against the prison authorities (see paragraphs\u00a015, 21 and 39 above). Those were clear attempts to draw the authorities\u2019 attention to his state of health. This alone has been sufficient for the Court to dismiss a Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion (see, for instance, Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, \u00a7\u00a078, 5\u00a0February 2013).64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that it has on many occasions examined the effectiveness of the domestic remedies suggested by the Government, namely a complaint to the administration of a detention facility, a prosecutor\u2019s office or a court (see, among many other authorities, Patranin v.\u00a0Russia, no. 12983\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 86-88, 23 July 2015; Gorbulya v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a031535\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 56-58, 6 March 2014; and Reshetnyak v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a056027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 65-73, 8\u00a0January 2013). In the aforementioned cases the Court established that none of the legal avenues put forward by the Government constituted an effective remedy which could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his or her complaints under Article\u00a03 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Government\u2019s objections of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies were dismissed.65.\u00a0\u00a0Having declared the applicant\u2019s claim of inadequate medical care in detention admissible (see paragraph 59 above), and given the applicant\u2019s health problems and the seriousness of his allegations, the Court finds that it was \u201can arguable claim\u201d. Accordingly, the respondent State had an obligation to ensure the availability of an effective remedy to deal with the substance of his complaint. Taking into account the circumstances of the present case and the aforementioned case-law, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous findings on the issue. It concludes that the legal avenues put forward by the Government did not constitute an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.66.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and finds that the applicant did not have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaint, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violations of Article 3 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0162, Series A no. 25).68.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, 2002\u2011III, with further references).69.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7\u00a0208, 13\u00a0July 2006). In most cases concerning the detention of sick people, the Court has examined whether or not the applicant received adequate medical care in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to assure the health and well-being of detainees as an obligation on the part of the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094; Khudobin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts); and Kalashnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI).70.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists, in particular, that authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v.\u00a0Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011; Gladkiy v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a03242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21\u00a0December 2010; Hummatov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos.\u00a09852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29\u00a0November 2007; Melnik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0104-106, 28 March 2006; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7\u00a0121, 7\u00a0November\u00a02006) and that \u2011 where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition \u2012 supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at successfully treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109 and 114). The Court further reiterates that medical treatment within prison facilities must be appropriate and comparable to the quality of treatment which the State authorities have committed themselves to providing for the entirety of the population. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each detainee must be guaranteed the same medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Cara-Damiani v.\u00a0Italy, no.\u00a02447\/05, \u00a7\u00a066, 7\u00a0February 2012).71.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves a fair degree of flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. This standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7\u00a0140, 22\u00a0December 2008).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case72.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset the Court notes that on several occasions before his arrest the applicant was treated in civilian hospitals for his brain and spinal injuries, knee pain and a duodenal ulcer. In detention his health deteriorated, suffering in particular of duodenitis, chronic gastritis and Raynaud\u2019s syndrome. His ulcer recurred frequently and his musculoskeletal disorders progressed further. Given this deterioration, the Court finds it necessary to assess the quality of the medical care afforded to him by the Russian penal authorities in order to determine whether the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention have been respected.73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that following the applicant\u2019s arrest the authorities became promptly aware of his many health problems (see paragraph 12 above). However, they did no more than check whether he was fit for detention. During the first two years of his detention they did not subject him to any medical supervision. They only became attentive to his health problems after his health had worsened to the extent that he could no longer take part in court hearings (see paragraph 15 above). The Court finds unacceptable the unrebutted lax attitude of the prison authorities towards the applicant (see paragraph 13 above) for such a lengthy period of time.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes the applicant\u2019s argument that on a number of occasions the authorities failed to provide him with the prescribed drugs. Taking into account the fact that at the relevant time the applicant was under the authorities\u2019 control, and was therefore particularly vulnerable, the Court considers that the burden is on the Government to prove that the prescribed medication was given to the applicant. Under Russian law, each dose of prescribed drugs must be recorded in a detainee\u2019s personal medical file (see paragraph 44 above). However, the Government failed to submit any documents recording the applicant\u2019s drug intake in October 2007 and March and October 2009, and in the period between September 2010 and March 2011 (see paragraphs 17-20 and 22 above). At the same time, the evidence submitted by the parties clearly indicates that it was the applicant\u2019s mother who replaced the authorities and sent the required medication, or at least some of it, to the applicant to comply with the doctors\u2019 advice (see paragraphs 17, 24 and 41 above). The Court considers the authorities\u2019 failure to provide the applicant with some of the required medication to be a serious shortcoming. This is particularly so in view of the applicant\u2019s lengthy history of suffering from an ulcer and the frequency of its recurrence. The Court is not convinced that the authorities properly assessed the complications of the applicant\u2019s condition or attempted to determine the cause of the frequent ulcer recurrence.75.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the above the Court finds another major flaw in the medical care afforded to the applicant in detention that is the failure to perform the H.pylori test required for ulcer diagnosis and treatment. The importance and value of this test may be seen from the authoritative medical recommendations listed in paragraphs 47-49 above.76.\u00a0\u00a0The facts of the case show that the management of the applicant\u2019s treatment had no strategy aimed at reducing the frequency of recurrence. His treatment lacked foresight and was therefore patently ineffective. Moreover, it seems that the authorities never assessed the compatibility of the applicant\u2019s treatment with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs for degenerative disc disease with his ulcer disease, even though such medication may induce gastrointestinal bleeding and deterioration of the patient condition (see paragraph 49 above).77.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court reiterates the Government\u2019s submission that the applicant refused to take certain, nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, citing fears of further deterioration of his condition. The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s fears seem to be supported by the findings of the international medical community (see paragraph 49 above). The Court would once again stress that the authorities failed to create the necessary conditions for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 116), by failing to ensure that the applicant received the proper medication under supervision and observation by the prison medical staff and adhered to the prescribed regimen, an important factor in the effective treatment of any illness.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is also mindful of other shortcomings in the applicant\u2019s treatment, including his delayed admission to the prison hospital in October 2007 (see paragraph 17 above). His admission was required so that he could be correctly diagnosed and prescribed adequate treatment for the severe stomach pain related to his ulcer disease. Although his transfer to hospital was not urgent, the authorities should have acted with sufficient promptness to ensure his timely inpatient treatment. However, it took several months to transfer him from the remand prison to the hospital located in the same town. Having regard to the fact that while waiting to be transferred the applicant did not receive any drugs aimed at least at relieving his severe stomach pain, the Court finds that situation unsatisfactory.79.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court considers regrettable that the authorities did not duly assess the need for the applicant\u2019s inpatient treatment in 2010, when recurrence of the ulcer was particularly severe and recommendations for inpatient treatment were made on two occasions by civilian specialists (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above).80.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court considers that the aforementioned shortcomings in the treatment of the applicant\u2019s ulcer, taken cumulatively, show that the authorities failed to ensure prompt and effective medical care that involved a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at successfully treating his health problems. In these circumstances, it does not need to proceed with an examination of the quality of the medical assistance the applicant received in respect of his remaining medical conditions.81.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, the Court finds that the authorities\u2019 failure to provide the applicant with the medical care he needed in the serious condition, in which he found himself, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION82.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage1.\u00a0\u00a0Pecuniary damage83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 12,300 Russian roubles (RUB) (251 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the claim was ill-founded.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim in full.2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-pecuniary damage86.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 370,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this claim was ill-founded and excessive.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis and given the information that it has, considers it reasonable to award EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 10,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court for his legal representation, to be paid to the bank account of his representative; RUB 4348.8 (EUR 90) for postage and photocopying expenses and RUB 30,790.8 (EUR 630) for travel expenses. To support these claims the applicant submitted a copy of the contract concluded with his lawyer, a time sheet, postage receipts and train tickets.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this claim was ill-founded.91.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, and bearing in mind that the applicant was granted EUR 850 in legal aid for his representation by Ms N. Alekseyeva, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,090 in compensation for the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant in the proceedings before the Court. This comprises EUR 1,000 for legal costs, to be paid to the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative and EUR\u00a090 for postage expenses, to be paid to the applicant, plus any tax than may be chargeable on the latter amount.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28050":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION32.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in the correctional colony were inhuman and degrading and that he did not have an effective domestic remedy for his grievances. The invoked provisions of the Convention read as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 13\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties33.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, the Government put forward two lines of argument. Firstly, they argued that the applicant\u2019s claim should be rejected because he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. They stressed that he had not challenged the refusal to release him on health grounds by way of the new cassation appeal procedure. Secondly, they argued that the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention did not breach Article 3 of the Convention as he had been provided with adequate medical care and until September 2014 had been assisted in his daily needs by an assigned inmate.34.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention, the Government stated that the gist of the applicant\u2019s grievances was that the outcome of the proceedings for his release on health grounds had been unfavourable. However, that could not be interpreted as an absence of effective domestic remedies, because those proceedings had fully satisfied the \u201ceffective remedy\u201d requirements within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention.35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints. He stated that the conditions of his detention were inhuman and degrading, in particular because the authorities did not provide him with equipment and assistance necessary for a blind detainee. He further stated that there was no other remedy for him to exhaust. He had unsuccessfully attempted to draw the attention of the authorities to the incompatibility of his condition with his further detention. His application for early release had been rejected.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility36.\u00a0\u00a0The Government have raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. The Court considers that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies is closely linked to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint that he did not have at his disposal an effective remedy for the complaint that he was being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by being detained in inadequate conditions. The Court thus finds it necessary to join the Government\u2019s objection to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies and alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. Those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system (see, among many other authorities, Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138\/10, \u00a7115, 23 February\u00a02016; Gherghina v. Romania [GC] (dec.), no. 42219\/07, \u00a7 84, 9 July\u00a02015; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos.\u00a017153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7 70, 25 March 2014 and Akdivar and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, 16\u00a0September 1996, \u00a7 65, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV).39.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7116; Gherghina, cited above, \u00a7 85; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7 71 and Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7 66). To be effective, a remedy must be capable of directly redressing the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7116; Gherghina, cited above, \u00a7\u00a085; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7 74 and Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a056581\/00, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2006\u2011II).40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that the application of the rule must make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied in the context of a machinery for the protection of human rights that the Contracting Parties have agreed to set up. Accordingly, it has recognised that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Cardot v.\u00a0France, 19\u00a0March 1991, \u00a7\u00a034, Series A no. 200). It has further recognised that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically: in reviewing whether it has been observed, it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of each individual case (see Van Oosterwijck v.\u00a0Belgium, 6\u00a0November 1980, \u00a7 35, Series A no. 40). This means, amongst other things, that it must take realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate, as well as the personal circumstances of the applicants (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 65-68).41.\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article\u00a013 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint; the \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. At the same time, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law, in the sense either of preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or of providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0157-158, ECHR 2000\u2011XI and Wasserman v.\u00a0Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7\u00a045, 10\u00a0April 2008).42.\u00a0\u00a0Where the fundamental right to protection against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, the preventive and compensatory remedies have to be complementary in order to be considered effective. The existence of a preventive remedy is indispensable for the effective protection of individuals against the kind of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed, the particular importance attached by the Convention to that provision requires, in the Court\u2019s view, that the States Parties establish, over and above a compensatory remedy, an effective mechanism in order to put an end to any such treatment rapidly. Had it been otherwise, the prospect of future compensation would have legitimised particularly severe suffering in breach of this core provision of the Convention (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7\u00a078, 24\u00a0July 2008).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case43.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant had failed to pursue his application for early release by means of the new cassation procedure, which they claimed could have been an effective avenue for complaining of the poor conditions of his detention. The Court observes, however, that it has previously dismissed that legal avenue as ineffective for an application for early release, because the Government had been unable to provide examples of domestic case-law demonstrating the practical effectiveness of that remedy (see Semikhvostov v. Russia, no. 2689\/12, \u00a7\u00a067, 6\u00a0February\u00a02014). In the present case, the Government have also failed to explain how the new cassation procedure would work in respect of an inmate\u2019s complaint, particularly when it concerns specific problems of conditions of detention. The Court\u2019s doubts in this respect are strengthened by the refusal of the Russian courts at two instances to authorise the applicant\u2019s early release, referring merely to the gravity of the charges against him and the fact that he had served only a small part of his sentence (see paragraph 18 above). The Russian courts did not make any attempt to examine the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention or to assess whether they were compatible with his disability. The Court has already examined a list of other domestic legal avenues available in Russian law and practice and found that none of them constituted an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and to provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress in connection with the complaints of unsatisfactory conditions of detention (see Gorbulya v. Russia, no.\u00a031535\/09, \u00a7 57, 6 March 2014 and Reshetnyak, cited above, \u00a7\u00a080).44.\u00a0\u00a0Having declared the applicant\u2019s claim of inadequate conditions of detention admissible (see paragraph 37 above), and in view of his health problems and the seriousness of his allegations, the Court finds that it was \u201can arguable claim\u201d. Accordingly, the respondent State had an obligation to ensure that an effective remedy was available to deal with the substance of his complaint. Taking into account the circumstances of the present case and the aforementioned case-law, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous findings on the issue. It concludes that the legal avenues put forward by the Government did not constitute an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.45.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and finds that the applicant did not have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaints, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violations of Article 3 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles46.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0162, Series A no. 25).47.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s psychological and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III, with further references).48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to release a detainee on health grounds, even if he is suffering from a condition that is particularly difficult to treat. However, this provision does require the State to ensure that prisoners are detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method in which the measure is enforced do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Meln\u012btis v. Latvia, no.\u00a030779\/05, \u00a7 69, 28 February 2012).49.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court has considered that where the authorities decide to place and keep a disabled person in detention, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to the special needs resulting from his disability (see Helhal v. France, no.\u00a010401\/12, \u00a7\u00a050, 19 February 2015; Zarzycki v. Poland, no. 15351\/03, \u00a7 102, 12\u00a0March 2013; Z.H. v. Hungary, no. 28937\/11, \u00a7\u00a029, 8 November 2012; Jasinskis v.\u00a0Latvia, no. 45744\/08, \u00a7\u00a059, 21\u00a0December 2010; and Farbtuhs v.\u00a0Latvia, no.\u00a04672\/02, \u00a7 56, 2 December 2004).50.\u00a0\u00a0In the above-cited case of Farbtuhs, the Court noted that the prison authorities had permitted family members to stay with the applicant for twenty-four hours at a time and that this had taken place on a regular basis. In addition to being cared for by his family, the applicant, who had a physical disability, was assisted by the medical staff during working hours and was helped by other inmates outside working hours on a voluntary basis. The Court expressed its concerns in the following terms (\u00a7 60):\u201cThe Court doubts the appropriateness of such a solution, leaving as it did the bulk of responsibility for a man with such a severe disability in the hands of unqualified prisoners, even if only for a limited period. It is true that the applicant did not report having suffered any incident or particular difficulty as a result of the impugned situation; he merely stated that the prisoners in question sometimes \u2018refused to cooperate\u2019, without mentioning any specific case in which they had refused. However, the anxiety and unease which such a severely disabled person could be expected to feel, knowing that he would receive no professional assistance in the event of an emergency, in themselves raise a serious issue from the standpoint of Article 3 of the Convention.\u201d51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also held that detaining a disabled person in a prison where he could not move around and, in particular, could not leave his cell independently, amounted to degrading treatment (see Vincent v. France, no.\u00a06253\/03, \u00a7 103, 24 October 2006). Similarly, the Court has found that leaving a person with a serious physical disability to rely on his cellmates for assistance with using the toilet, bathing and getting dressed or undressed contributed to its finding that the conditions of detention amounted to degrading treatment (see Engel v. Hungary, no. 46857\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a027 and 30, 20\u00a0May 2010).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will start by examining the issue of the personal space afforded to the applicant, a focal point of the Court\u2019s assessment in many cases on conditions of detention (see Mela v. Russia, no. 34044\/08, \u00a7\u00a061, 23\u00a0October 2014; Klyukin v. Russia, no. 54996\/07, \u00a7 55, 17 October\u00a02013; and Geld v. Russia, no. 1900\/04, \u00a7 24, 27 March 2012). It will then proceed to examine other relevant factors.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that it is common ground between the parties that since 10 February 2010 the applicant has been detained in a correctional colony, that is to say a type of facility designed for the long\u2011term accommodation of convicted detainees for the entire duration of their sentences. He is detained in a dormitory with forty\u2013five other inmates, and is thus afforded 2.82 square metres of personal space. Much of the dormitory floor area is taken up by furniture such as bunk beds, bed stands and chairs (see paragraph 11 above).54.\u00a0\u00a0In a number of cases where the applicants had at their disposal less than three square metres of floor surface in a prison cell where they remained locked up most of the time, the Court considered the overcrowding to be so severe as to justify of itself a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see, for example, Tatishvili v. Greece, no. 26452\/11, \u00a7 43, 31\u00a0July 2014; Nieciecki v. Greece, no. 11677\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 49-51, 4 December\u00a02012; Dmitriy Sazonov v. Russia, no. 30268\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 31-32, 1 March 2012; and Melnik v. Ukraine, no.\u00a072286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 102-03, 28 March 2006).55.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court has sometimes found it unnecessary to determine how much personal space should be allocated to a detainee in terms of the Convention. It has mostly concentrated on other aspects, such as the duration of detention in particular conditions, the opportunities for outdoor exercise, and the physical and mental condition of the detainee (see Trepashkin v. Russia, no. 36898\/03, \u00a7 92, 19 July 2007, and Kadi\u0137is v.\u00a0Latvia (no. 2), no. 62393\/00, \u00a7 52, 4 May 2006). The Court considers that this is the approach that should be taken in the present case.56.\u00a0\u00a0When assessing the issue of overcrowding in post-trial detention facilities such as correctional colonies, as opposed to pre-trial detention facilities and high-security prisons where inmates are confined to their cell for most of the day, the Court has held that the personal space in the dormitory should be viewed in the context of the applicable regime. The fact that detainees in correctional colonies enjoy a wider freedom of movement during the daytime may ensure that they have unobstructed access to natural light and air (see Insanov v. Azerbaijan, no.\u00a016133\/08, \u00a7\u00a0120, 14 March 2013).57.\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, even in cases where inmates appeared to have sufficient personal space at their disposal and where a larger prison cell was at issue \u2013 measuring in the range of three to four square metres per inmate \u2011 the Court noted other aspects of physical conditions of detention as being relevant for the assessment of compliance with Article 3. It found a violation of that provision, since the space factor was coupled with an established lack of ventilation and lighting (see, for example, Vlasov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 78146\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 81 and 84, 12 June 2008) and a lack of outdoor exercise (see Longin v. Croatia, no. 49268\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 60-61, 6\u00a0November 2012).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the fact that a disabled detainee was afforded less than three square metres of personal space causes concern as to whether the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention were complied with.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention cannot be assessed in isolation from his disability.60.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court observes that the applicant was in need of constant assistance. Before September 2014 such assistance was provided by an inmate assigned by the prison administration. After the latter\u2019s release, the applicant was left to fend for himself (see paragraph 15 above). The Court notes that the applicant was not provided with any basic items or devices which would have facilitated his stay in the detention facility, such as a walking stick (see paragraph 14 above). The premises of the facility were not adapted for visually impaired or blind people (see paragraph 11 above).61.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the applicant was not able to move about freely within the detention facility. His freedom of movement and his access to outdoor exercise were hampered by his disability. As he had no work, he was in practice confined to the dormitory, which seriously aggravated his conditions of detention, making them comparable to those of a remand prison.62.\u00a0\u00a0Another aggravating factor is the fact that the applicant was detained with a large number of inmates.\u00a0 His dormitory housed forty-six prisoners. The very principle of so many detainees being held in the same dormitory has previously given rise to serious concern on the part of the Court and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (\u201cthe CPT\u201d). Reporting on the conditions of detention in correctional facilities in Eastern Europe, the CPT found, in particular, that high-capacity dormitories frequently accommodated prisoners in extremely cramped and insalubrious conditions and inevitably entailed a lack of privacy for prisoners in their everyday lives (see Fetisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 43710\/07, 6023\/08, 11248\/08, 27668\/08, 31242\/08 and 52133\/08, \u00a7 137, 17 January 2012, and also the relevant extracts from the CPT reports cited in paragraph 29 above). In cases where the applicants were housed, together with dozens of other inmates, in a dormitory in which they had at their disposal only minimal personal space, the Court has held that the level of privacy available to them was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention (see Butko v. Russia, no. 32036\/10, \u00a7 59, 12 November 2015; Yepishin v.\u00a0Russia, no. 591\/07, \u00a7 65, 27 June 2013; Kulikov v. Russia, no.\u00a048562\/06, \u00a7\u00a037, 27 November 2012; Iacov Stanciu v. Romania, no. 35972\/05, \u00a7\u00a0177, 24\u00a0July 2012, and Samaras and Others v. Greece, no. 11463\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a051-66, 28 February 2012). Although the applicant shared his dormitory with fewer inmates than did the applicants in the aforementioned cases, their number was sufficient to cause him additional significant distress.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is particularly concerned about the poor quality of the assistance provided by the inmate assigned to help the blind applicant with his everyday needs. It has already found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in circumstances where prison staff felt that they had been relieved of their duty to provide security and care to more vulnerable detainees by making their cellmates responsible for providing them with daily assistance or, if necessary, with first aid (see Semikhvostov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 2689\/12, \u00a7 85, 6 February 2014, and Kaprykowski v.\u00a0Poland, no.\u00a023052\/05, \u00a7 74, 3 February 2009). It is clear that in the present case the help offered by the applicant\u2019s fellow inmate did not form part of any organised assistance by the State to ensure that the applicant was detained in conditions compatible with respect for his human dignity. It cannot therefore be considered suitable or sufficient.64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s situation further deteriorated after the release in September 2014 of the inmate who had been helping him. There is no credible evidence to confirm that assistance by other inmates was offered to the applicant but that he refused it. However, even if it were the case, the Court finds the applicant\u2019s refusal to be legitimate (see Semikhvostov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a085).65.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court is particularly concerned that despite the existing legal provision and the conclusion by the medical commission explicitly calling for the applicant\u2019s release on health grounds (see paragraph 17 above), the applicant still remains in detention without any measures having been taken by the Russian authorities to alleviate the suffering he has already had to endure on a daily basis for a number of years.66.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all circumstances mentioned above, the Court is convinced that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s dentition, exacerbated by his blindness, amount to \u201cinhuman and degrading treatment\u201d within the meaning of the Convention.67.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION68.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage1.\u00a0\u00a0Pecuniary damage69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 90,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage. He stated that this sum consisted of the amount of his lost wages and the cost of his medical treatment.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the claim was ill-founded.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the claim is unsubstantiated and that, in any event, there is no causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged.2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-pecuniary damage72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 90,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.73.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the claim was excessive.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, considers it reasonable to award EUR 15,000 in respect of compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 1,750 for legal services incurred in the proceedings before the Court and EUR 450 for postal and other expenses.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed that the applicant had not provided any evidence in support of his claim to show that those expenses had indeed been incurred.77.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Having received no documents substantiating the applicant\u2019s expenses, such as an agreement with the lawyer, the Court is unable to grant the applicant\u2019s claim. It therefore rejects the claim in full.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28049":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had not taken steps to safeguard his health and well-being, having failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy to complain about those violations of the guarantee against ill-treatment, as required under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority ....\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government put forward two lines of argument.67.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, they argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. He should have raised his complaint before the domestic authorities, including the administration of the detention facilities, a prosecutor\u2019s office or a court, but had failed to do so.68.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Government argued that the applicant had undergone regular medical examinations and tests while in detention, including coronary angiographies. His state of health had been duly monitored by medical specialists, who had provided him with the required medical assistance and treatment. He was often examined by independent medical consultants, whose opinion was taken into account by his doctors. The applicant was provided with drug therapy, but on several occasions he refused to comply with doctors\u2019 recommendations and to take the prescribed medicines. Therefore the deterioration of his health should not be attributed to the State authorities, which had duly discharged their obligations under Article 3 of the Convention. The Government supported their arguments with a certificate issued on 9 December 2013 by the administration of medical ward no.\u00a013 stating that there had never been any problems in supplying the medication required by the applicant.69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints. He argued that he had not been afforded the required medical assistance or all of the prescribed medications, that the authorities had significantly delayed his first coronary angiography examination and the heart surgery, and that his frequent transfers between various medical and detention facilities had run counter to the doctors\u2019 recommendations.70.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant argued that his and his wife\u2019s numerous complaints to various authorities about the lack of adequate medical care had been unsuccessful and that he therefore had no effective means of complaining about the poor quality of his medical treatment.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. This issue is closely linked to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint that he did not have at his disposal an effective remedy to air his dissatisfaction with the lack of effective medical care. It is therefore necessary to join the Government\u2019s objection to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies and alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. Those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system (see, among many other authorities, Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138\/10, \u00a7115, 23 February\u00a02016; Gherghina v. Romania [GC] (dec.), no. 42219\/07, \u00a7 84, 9 July\u00a02015; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos.\u00a017153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7 70, 25 March 2014 and Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16\u00a0September 1996, \u00a7 65, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV).74.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 116; Gherghina, cited above, \u00a7 85; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7 71 and Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7 66). To be effective, a remedy must be capable of directly redressing the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 116; Gherghina, cited above, \u00a7\u00a085; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7 74 and Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a056581\/00, \u00a7 46, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011II).75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that the application of this rule must make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied in the context of machinery for the protection of human rights which the Contracting Parties have agreed to set up. Accordingly, it has recognised that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Cardot v. France, 19\u00a0March 1991, \u00a7\u00a034, Series A no. 200). It has further recognised that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically: in reviewing whether it has been observed, it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of each individual case (see Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6\u00a0November 1980, \u00a7 35, Series A no. 40). This means, amongst other things, that \u2012 realistically \u2012 account must be taken not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned, but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate, as well as the personal circumstances of the applicants (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 65-68).76.\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article\u00a013 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint; the \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. At the same time, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law, in the sense of either preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 157-58, and Wasserman v.\u00a0Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7 45, 10 April 2008).77.\u00a0\u00a0Where the fundamental right to protection against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, the preventive and compensatory remedies must be complementary in order to be considered effective. The existence of a preventive remedy is indispensable for the effective protection of individuals against the kind of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed, the particular importance attached by the Convention to that provision requires, in the Court\u2019s view, that the States Parties establish, over and above a compensatory remedy, an effective mechanism in order to put a rapid end to any such treatment. Were it otherwise, the prospect of future compensation would legitimise particularly severe suffering in breach of this core provision of the Convention (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 78, 24\u00a0July 2008).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case78.\u00a0\u00a0 Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies. The Court is not convinced by this submission. The documents produced by the applicant, such as copies of letters to and from various domestic authorities, show that the complaints concerning the quality of the medical treatment afforded to him were raised before, inter alia, the Department of the Federal Service for Execution of Sentences in the St\u00a0Petersburg and Leningrad Region, the Investigative Committee of the Leningrad Region, the Representative of the Russian President to the North\u2011West Federal Circuit, the Ombudsmen of St Petersburg, and the administration of medical wards no. 78 (see paragraphs 18, 35, and 47 above). The Court therefore finds that the applicant took the necessary steps to draw the attention of the authorities to the issue of the medical care afforded to him in detention, and thus provided them with an opportunity to put right the alleged violations. This has been sufficient for the Court on many occasions to dismiss a Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion (see, for instance, Gurenko v. Russia, no.\u00a041828\/10, \u00a7 78, 5\u00a0February 2013).79.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court\u2019s task in the present case is to examine the effectiveness of various domestic remedies suggested by the Russian Government, and not merely to determine whether the applicant made his grievances sufficiently known to the Russian authorities. In this connection, the Court has on many occasions examined the effectiveness of the domestic remedies suggested by the Government in cases of applicants complaining of ongoing inadequate medical treatment, such as in the present case. It found, in particular, that in deciding on a complaint concerning breaches of domestic regulations governing the provision of medical care to detainees, the prison authorities would not have a sufficiently independent standpoint to satisfy the requirements of Article\u00a035 of the Convention (see Dirdizov v. Russia, no.\u00a041461\/10, \u00a7\u00a075, 27\u00a0November 2012 and Koryak v.\u00a0Russia, no. 24677\/10, \u00a7\u00a079, 13 November 2012). The Court also stressed that even though review by a supervising prosecutor played an important part in securing appropriate medical care in detention, a complaint to the supervising prosecutor fell short of the requirements of an effective remedy, because of the procedural shortcomings that had been previously identified in the Court\u2019s case-law (see Koryak, \u00a7 80-81, cited above). Having assessed a civil claim for compensation under the tort provisions of the Civil Code, the Court considered that such a claim could not offer an applicant any other redress than a purely compensatory award, and could not put an end to a situation where there was an ongoing violation, such as inadequate medical care (see Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 65-73, 8 January 2013). Moreover, the Court found that such a remedy did not offer reasonable prospects of success, in particular because the award was conditional on the establishment of fault on the part of the authorities, which was extremely improbable in a situation where domestic legal norms prescribed the application of a certain measure, for instance certain conditions of detention or the level of medical treatment (see A.B. v. Russia, no. 1439\/06, \u00a7\u00a096, 14\u00a0October 2010).80.\u00a0\u00a0Having declared the applicant\u2019s claim of inadequate medical care in detention admissible (see paragraph 72 above), and given the applicant\u2019s health problems and the seriousness of his allegations, the Court finds that it was \u201can arguable claim\u201d. Accordingly, the respondent State had an obligation to ensure the availability of an effective remedy to deal with the substance of his complaint. Taking into account the circumstances of the present case and the aforementioned case-law, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous findings on the issue. It concludes that the legal avenues put forward by the Government did not constitute an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.81.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s objection as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and finds that the applicant did not have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaint, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violations of Article 3 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles as regards the standards of medical care for detainees82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0162, Series A no. 25).83.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III, with further references).84.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7\u00a0208, 13\u00a0July 2006). In most cases concerning the detention of sick people, the Court has examined whether or not the applicant received adequate medical care in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to assure the health and well-being of detainees as an obligation on the part of the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094; Khudobin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts); and Kalashnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI).85.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of an effective remedy to air complaints of inadequate medical services afforded to inmates, the Court may find itself obliged to perform a first-hand evaluation of evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention have been respected (see Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, 13 November 2012; Dirdizov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a041461\/10, 27 November 2012; Reshetnyak v. Russia, no.\u00a056027\/10, 8\u00a0January 2013; Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108\/11, 5 February 2013; Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, 5 February 2013; Bubnov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a076317\/11, 5 February 2013; Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, 9\u00a0January 2014, and Gorelov v. Russia, no. 49072\/11, 9 January 2014; Amirov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 51857\/13, 27 November 2014, \u00a7 90). In that role, paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants in view of their detention, the Court consistently calls on the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned has received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.86.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists, in particular, that authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko, cited above, \u00a7 100; Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21\u00a0December\u00a02010; Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29\u00a0November 2007; Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0104-06, 28 March 2006; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7\u00a0121, 7\u00a0November\u00a02006) and that \u2012 where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition \u2012 supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at successfully treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109 and 114, and Sarban v. Moldova, no.\u00a03456\/05, \u00a7\u00a079, 4\u00a0October 2005).87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that medical treatment within prison facilities must be appropriate and comparable to the quality of treatment which the State authorities have committed themselves to providing for the entirety of the population. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each detainee must be guaranteed the same medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Cara-Damiani v.\u00a0Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7\u00a066,\u00a07\u00a0February 2012).88.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves a fair degree of flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7\u00a0140, 22\u00a0December 2008).89.\u00a0\u00a0While the mere fact that an applicant\u2019s state of health has deteriorated may raise, at an initial stage, certain doubts concerning the adequacy of his or her treatment in prison, it cannot suffice, by itself, for a finding of a violation of the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention if, on the other hand, it can be established that the relevant domestic authorities have provided in a timely fashion all reasonably available medical care in a conscientious effort to hinder development of the disease in question (see, among other authorities, Goginashvili v. Georgia, no. 47729\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 69-71, 4 October 2011).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case90.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset the Court notes that before his arrest the applicant was afflicted with various cardiovascular and kidney diseases, had had a stroke, a closed craniocerebral injury, and myocardial infraction. A number of the illnesses had already progressed to advanced stages. The authorities became aware of his poor health immediately upon his admission to the detention facility.91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant identified two major deficiencies in the medical care afforded to him in detention.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, he argued that on several occasions between 2010 and 2013 he had not been given some of the prescribed drugs. His argument finds some support in the entries made in his medical record on 14 December 2010, 1 July, 11 and 25\u00a0August 2011 and 20 January 2012 (see paragraphs 20, 33, 35 and 39 above). However, there is no evidence \u2011 and the applicant makes no specific allegations \u2013 that the failures were long-lasting or that they had any impact on the applicant\u2019s state of health. Moreover, it appears that the applicant also contributed to the interruption of the drug regimen and thus the possible shortcomings in his therapy, having occasionally refused to take drugs or to agree to intravenous therapy and medical examinations (see paragraphs 14, 32 and 41 above). Against this background the Court cannot conclude \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d that the failures to ensure the applicant\u2019s unrestricted access to medicine rendered ineffective the medical assistance provided to him throughout his detention.92.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the applicant submitted that one of the two prescribed coronary angiography examinations had been delayed. The Court notes that it was indeed the case that such an examination was first recommended by Dr F., a cardiologist chosen by the applicant\u2019s wife, on 2 March 2011, and that it was performed slightly over nine months later, on 8 December\u00a02011 (see paragraphs 26 and 37 above). The Court further notes that during that period, the applicant was taken to hospital in April 2011, and examined on a number of occasions. In particular, he was examined in hospital by Dr F. and two other doctors, and again after his transfer to prison on 18\u00a0May 2011. Dr\u00a0F. again recommended a coronary angiography in July 2011, but the recommendation was not repeated after examinations in August 2011 by Dr\u00a0F. and a prison doctor. Dr G. considered in September 2011 that an angiogram was vital, notwithstanding the risks, and the applicant was transferred to hospital for that purpose in October 2011. After a series of tests, the examination was performed on 8 December 2011. Whilst the examination could have been carried out more quickly, the Court has not been provided with any material which could suggest that the delay in providing this diagnostic (rather than curative) measure, even if taken cumulatively with the occasional interruptions in the applicant\u2019s drug therapy mentioned in the previous paragraph, could lead to a conclusion that the medical assistance rendered to him in detention was ineffective and inadequate.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the management of the applicant\u2019s coronary diseases from 2010 to 2014 resulted in its successful treatment by means of re-vascularisation surgery, an installation of a coronary stent, recommended by the applicant\u2019s cardiologists. The applicant promptly recovered from secondary diseases such as a respiratory disease and pharyngitis (see paragraphs 24 and 50 above). His chronic illness did not exhibit significant signs of progress, save for a kidney disease that progressed to the next stage during his detention (see paragraph 36 above). Taking into account the difficulties in treating chronic diseases, particularly in detention where the process is complicated by inevitable negative factors, including stress, the Court is satisfied with the outcome of the applicant\u2019s treatment. However, this finding does not suffice and the Court has to examine the process of the treatment itself.94.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court notes that the applicant remained under close medical attention in detention. His serious heart conditions were noted by the authorities in the first days after his arrest (see paragraph 12 above). Shortly thereafter, the prison doctor recommended in-patient treatment and the applicant was taken to a prison hospital (see paragraph 13 above). Having undergone various medical tests in the hospital, he was prescribed and administered drug therapy. He was taken to prison hospitals and medical wards on a regular basis (see paragraphs 17, 23, 27, 37, 38, 42, 44, 48, 49, 51 and 55 above). The medical specialists, including cardiologists and nephrologists, monitored the effectiveness of his treatment and adjusted it where necessary. The Court considers particularly important the fact that the authorities allowed independent doctors to visit the applicant in detention and to include their opinions on his treatment regimen in his medical records for further consideration by the prison doctors (see paragraphs 20, 22, 26, 28, 29, 33, 35, 36 and 43 above).95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is mindful of the applicant\u2019s remaining arguments pertaining to the alleged delay of the coronary surgery and the frequent transfers between detention facilities. The Court notes that his medical documents showed that when heart surgery was recommended for the first time at the end of 2011, it was not considered to be an urgent necessity but was to be carried out in due course (see paragraph 37 above). The surgery was performed immediately after the urgency had arisen (see paragraph 55 above). Lastly, there is nothing to suggest that the applicant\u2019s transfers between the facilities had any significant impact on his health or the quality of the medical treatment, given that the continuity of his treatment was preserved.96.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of foregoing considerations, the Court is not convinced that the applicant did not receive adequate medical assistance in detention. Accordingly, it finds no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION97.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant only claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage to cover his medical expenses.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s claim was ill\u2011founded.100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects the claim in full.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses101.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not specify the sum claimed in respect of costs and expenses.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s claim was unsubstantiated by evidence.103.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court reinstates that according to its case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case the applicant has failed to mention the amount of his costs and expenses or to provide any documents in that regard; the Court therefore rejects the claim of compensation for costs and expenses.","28055":"I.\u00a0\u00a0SCOPE OF THE CASE BEFORE THE GRAND CHAMBER90.\u00a0\u00a0In their submissions before the Grand Chamber, the Government invited the Court to refine the Chamber\u2019s reasoning in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention relating to the hearing of 11 April 2005. For his part, the applicant maintained his complaints under Article 6 of the Convention that he had had insufficient time to study the case file and that the court-appointed counsel had been ineffective.91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, according to its case-law, the \u201ccase\u201d referred to the Grand Chamber is the application as it has been declared admissible (see D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325\/00, \u00a7 109, ECHR 2007-IV, and K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702\/94, \u00a7\u00a0141, ECHR 2001-VII). It notes that, in its judgment of 14 November 2013, the Chamber declared inadmissible the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article\u00a06 that he had had insufficient time to study the case file and that the court-appointed counsel had been ineffective, as well as his complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 4 relating to the hearing held on 11 April 2005. Accordingly, these complaints are not within the scope of the case before the Grand Chamber.II.\u00a0\u00a0THE GOVERNMENT\u2019S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, in their written submissions of 20 May 2014, contended for the first time that the applicant had neither exhausted domestic remedies nor complied with the six-month time-limit as required by Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in respect of his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention, and his complaints under Article 6 relating to the pre-investigation inquiry.A.\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies93.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention relating to the alleged lack of medical care in the temporary detention centre, the Government submitted that, after his release, the applicant could have instituted civil proceedings which was a domestic remedy capable of affording him adequate redress in the form of monetary compensation for any damage caused to him.94.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6 relating to the pre-investigation inquiry, the Government contended that the applicant had failed to lodge a complaint with the domestic courts under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, according to which anyone whose legitimate rights and interests had been affected by a decision not to institute criminal proceedings could appeal against that decision to a court.95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not expressly respond to the Government\u2019s objections, but submitted that the Chamber had made a correct assessment of his complaints.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, any plea of inadmissibility must, in so far as its character and the circumstances permit, be raised by the respondent Contracting Party in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a079, 17 July 2014; Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 41, ECHR 2006\u2011II; and K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, \u00a7 145). The Chamber ruled on the admissibility and merits of the application in its judgment of 14\u00a0November 2013. The Court observes that the Government did not raise either of these two objections in their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case before the Chamber, or at any other point during the Chamber proceedings.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Government have not claimed that there were any exceptional circumstances that could have dispensed them from the obligation to raise these objections in a timely manner. The Court therefore holds that the Government are estopped from raising their preliminary objections of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies at the present stage of the proceedings (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev, \u00a7 82, and Sejdovic, \u00a7\u00a042, both cited above).98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s preliminary objections must therefore be rejected.B.\u00a0\u00a0Six-month time-limit99.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicant had failed to lodge with the Court his complaint under Article 3 relating to the lack of medical care in the temporary detention centre within the six-month time-limit provided for in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. They submitted that the applicant\u2019s grandfather had only raised this complaint, in a summary fashion, in a letter of 30 November 2005 to the prosecution authorities who had replied on 16 December 2005, more than six months before the application was lodged on 1 November 2006.100.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, the applicant had also failed to comply with the six-month time-limit with regard to his complaint under Article 6 relating to the pre-investigation inquiry, since the revised ruling refusing to initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant had been made on 6 July 2005 and a reply to the applicant\u2019s grandfather\u2019s last complaint concerning this matter to the prosecution authorities had been given on 16\u00a0December 2005.101.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not address the Government\u2019s objections but maintained that the Chamber\u2019s judgment was correct.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not raise their objections as to non-compliance with the six-month rule in the proceedings before the Chamber, and the Chamber did not examine the issue. However, the Court has already held that the six-month rule is a public policy rule and that, consequently, it has jurisdiction to apply it of its own motion (see Sabri G\u00fcne\u015f v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396\/06, \u00a7 29, 29 June 2012; Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, \u00a7 85; Ble\u010di\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532\/00, \u00a7 68, ECHR 2006-III; and Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979\/97, ECHR 2000\u2011I). Furthermore, the Court has decided that, notwithstanding the requirements of Rule 55, Governments are not estopped from raising the issue of the six-month rule before the Grand Chamber (see Sabri G\u00fcne\u015f, cited above, \u00a7 30).103.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Grand Chamber has jurisdiction to examine the issue of compliance with the six-month rule in relation to the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention as well as under Article 6 concerning the pre-investigation inquiry.1.\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with the six-month time-limit in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions104.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that it appeared from paragraph 40 of the Chamber judgment that the applicant\u2019s grandfather had lodged only one complaint with the prosecution authorities, dated 4 October 2005, concerning the quality of medical care in the temporary detention centre. This was more than one year prior to the applicant lodging the application with the Court on 1 November 2006. However, the Government argued that the complaint of 4 October 2005 had not contained any grievances concerning the lack of medical care and, moreover, a reply had been prepared on 9\u00a0November 2005 by the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Sovetskiy district of Novosibirsk. Furthermore, they stated that a similar complaint, in which the grievances had been set out in a summary fashion and sent by the applicant\u2019s grandfather to the prosecution authorities on 30 November 2005, had been replied to on 16 December 2005 by the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Novosibirsk region. However, the Government stressed that this was still outside the six\u2011month time-limit.105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not reply to this objection in his submissions to the Grand Chamber.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, as a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant (see Dennis and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 76573\/01, 2 July 2002). Moreover, Article 35 \u00a7 1 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to seize the Court of his complaint before his position in connection with the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level. Where, therefore, an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 \u00a7 1 to take the start of the six-month period from the date when the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos.\u00a016064\/90 and 8 others, \u00a7 157, ECHR 2009, and Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 46477\/99, 7 June 2001).107.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court has to ascertain whether the applicant had an effective remedy available to him and, if so, whether he made use of it and then seized the Court within the required time-limit. In doing so, the Court will not consider whether the applicant should have made use of civil proceedings since it has found above (see paragraphs\u00a096\u201198) that the Government are estopped from raising an objection of non-exhaustion at this stage of the proceedings.108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that, on 28 February 2005, the applicant\u2019s grandfather lost his status as the applicant\u2019s guardian and that he was only reinstated at some point at the beginning of 2006. Thus, during the entire period when the grandfather was not the guardian, the applicant appears to have been under the guardianship of the State, and the grandfather had no legal rights to represent the applicant or defend his interests. Since the applicant was released from the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders on 23 March 2005, he had at that time only the State to protect his interests. Consequently, the authorities were under no legal obligation during that period of time to reply to the grandfather\u2019s complaints concerning the applicant since he was not his guardian.109.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court observes that the grandfather continued to endeavour to protect the applicant\u2019s interests. Hence, it appears from the grandfather\u2019s letter of 30 November 2005 to a Deputy Prosecutor General that he had been informed that his complaint of 4 October 2005 to the Prosecutor General had been sent to various prosecutors\u2019 offices. Moreover, in his letter of 30 November 2005, the grandfather did indeed repeat the complaints regarding the applicant\u2019s treatment in the temporary detention centre and his poor health which he had already set out in his previous letter of 4\u00a0October 2005 (see paragraph 46 above). The Court notes that the prosecutor\u2019s reply of 9 November 2005 and the regional prosecutor\u2019s reply of 16 December 2005 nevertheless contained no information in response to the grandfather\u2019s complaints concerning the applicant\u2019s medical condition or the authorities\u2019 failure to treat him while in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders.110.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court has regard to the fact that, once reinstated as the applicant\u2019s guardian, the grandfather pursued the matter of the legality of the applicant\u2019s detention and, within the framework of those proceedings, raised the issue of the applicant\u2019s frail health and the lack of medical treatment. In particular, in the complaint against the decision of 21\u00a0February 2005, which was examined by the President of the Novosibirsk Regional Court on 29 May 2006, the grandfather cited the applicant\u2019s diagnosis and the impossibility for him of being detained in the absence of medical advice. The President of the Regional Court responded in its judgment that the fact that the applicant suffered from various illnesses could not serve as a ground for quashing the decision of 21 February 2005, given that it had already been enforced in March 2005.111.\u00a0\u00a0Against this background the Court finds that, in the absence of any answer from the prosecutors\u2019 offices to the grandfather\u2019s complaints in October and November 2005, the grandfather, once reinstated as the applicant\u2019s guardian, used other possible avenues to argue the applicant\u2019s case pertaining to his poor health and the lack of medical treatment in the temporary detention centre. Since the only concrete answer he received to that complaint was through the judgment of 29\u00a0May 2006 when, in essence, he was told that there was no point in complaining any further as the applicant\u2019s detention had already ended, the Court considers that, in the specific circumstances of the present case, the six-month period should be calculated from that date, as further complaints to the authorities would have had no prospects of success. Noting that the application was lodged with the Court on 1 November 2006, it follows that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 fall within the six-month time-limit.112.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection must therefore be dismissed.2.\u00a0Compliance with the six-month time-limit in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6 concerning the pre-investigation inquiry(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions113.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month time-limit in so far as his complaint under Article 6 related to the pre-investigation inquiry, since the revised ruling refusing to initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant had been made on 6 July 2005 and a reply to the applicant\u2019s grandfather\u2019s last complaint on this matter to the prosecution authorities had been given on 16 December 2005.114.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, the Government stressed that the present case involved two separate sets of proceedings, not one as found by the Chamber in its judgment. The first of these \u2013 the pre-investigation inquiry, conducted in accordance with Chapters 19 and 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure \u2013 was to verify information on an alleged crime and decide whether there was sufficient evidence that a crime had been committed and whether to institute criminal proceedings. The second set \u2013 the proceedings deciding on the placement of the applicant in the temporary detention centre, conducted in accordance with Chapter 3.1 of the Minors Act \u2013 did not require a pre-investigation inquiry to be conducted and were not limited in scope to information obtained during the inquiry. Thus, the outcome of the first set of proceedings did not, in itself, constitute a decisive ground for initiating the second set of proceedings, as exemplified in the applicant\u2019s case where only the last two inquiries, out of five, had been followed by the second set of proceedings for his placement in the temporary detention centre, and then because it had become obvious that other preventive measures had been unsuccessful. Hence, the Government found no grounds for treating the two sets of proceedings as a single process, as the Chamber had done in its judgment, and argued that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6 should be examined separately in respect of each set of proceedings in question.115.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not explicitly address the Government\u2019s objection or whether the two sets of proceedings should be considered separately or together. However, he maintained that the Chamber\u2019s judgment was correct and should be followed.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will firstly consider the Government\u2019s claim that the pre-investigation inquiry and the proceedings leading to the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre should be considered separately, since the result on this point will determine whether or not the Court needs to consider the Government\u2019s objection relating to the six-month rule.117.\u00a0\u00a0While the Court acknowledges that the pre-investigation inquiry and the placement proceedings were, formally, two unrelated procedures, governed by separate legal rules, it notes that in the present case there was a close link, both in law and in fact, between them. In particular, the domestic courts gave as the main reason for the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre that he had committed a delinquent act punishable by the Criminal Code. The District Court referred at length to the witness statements made by S. and his mother in its judgment, and relied on those and the pre-investigation inquiry\u2019s findings when making its ruling (see paragraph 27 above). Moreover, both the District Court and the Regional Court found that the placement of the applicant in the temporary detention centre was necessary to prevent him from committing further delinquent acts, which shows that the placement was a direct consequence of the outcome of the pre-investigation inquiry.118.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Court finds that the two sets of proceedings should be considered together as a single set of proceedings for the purposes of the present case, and will proceed with its examination of the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6 on this basis. The Government\u2019s objection as to compliance with the six-month time-limit in relation to the pre-investigation inquiry must, therefore, be rejected since the final domestic decision, regarding the proceedings as a whole, was taken on 29 May 2006 when the President of the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the initial judgment ordering the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile delinquents. Since the application was lodged with the Court on 1\u00a0November 2006, it was introduced within the six-month time-limit.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection must therefore be dismissed.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION120.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had not received adequate medical care while in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders and that the conditions of his detention there had been inhuman, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment121.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber found that the lack of adequate medical treatment for the applicant in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article\u00a03. It noted in particular that, despite its request for a copy of the applicant\u2019s medical records from the temporary detention centre, the Government had failed to produce one, claiming that the records had been destroyed in accordance with domestic regulations which had not been submitted to the Court or published or made accessible to the public. Moreover, the Chamber observed that the normal time-limit for storage of medical records was ten years in the Russian Federation. Thus, since the applicant\u2019s grandfather had repeatedly informed the authorities of the applicant\u2019s health problems, the Chamber found no reason to doubt that the staff at the temporary detention centre had been made aware of his state of health. There was no evidence that the applicant had been examined during his detention by a neurologist or psychiatrist or that he had received any of his prescribed medication. The Chamber found this lack of medical attention, resulting in the applicant being hospitalised a day after his release, unacceptable.122.\u00a0\u00a0In view of its finding of a violation due to the lack of medical treatment, the Chamber did not consider it necessary to examine the remainder of the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3.B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant123.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant emphasised that, at the time of being placed in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, he was suffering from neurosis, ADHD, psychopathic conduct and enuresis. While he acknowledged that these conditions did not require immediate medical aid at the time of being detained, he emphasised that the pressure exerted on him throughout his detention at the police station and the questioning there, together with the thirty days at the temporary detention centre, had resulted in a sharp exacerbation of all of his conditions and an immediate need for medical treatment. This had been proved by the medical certificates submitted by him during the proceedings before the Chamber, which confirmed that he had been forcibly hospitalised in a psychiatric hospital immediately upon release from the temporary detention centre. He argued that there were no other possible causes for the worsening of his conditions.124.\u00a0\u00a0In his view, the Russian authorities had failed to take timely measures to avoid his illnesses getting worse. In particular, he alleged that, when requesting that he be placed in the temporary detention centre, the head of the Sovetskiy district Police Department was required to submit to the District Court a decision by the relevant health-care facility on the presence or absence of contraindications of a medical nature, including a psychiatric examination, against placing him in the temporary detention centre. However, no such decision had been submitted either to the court or the temporary detention centre.125.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further maintained his submissions before the Chamber, claiming that both he and his grandfather had informed the teachers and employees of the temporary detention centre of his illnesses and had asked that he have unrestricted access to the bathroom. However, this had been ignored and he had suffered badly, both psychologically and physically, owing to his enuresis.126.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all of the circumstances of his case, the applicant maintained that the conditions in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, at the time of his stay there, had been incompatible with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government127.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 did not disclose any violation of that provision.128.\u00a0\u00a0They reiterated that the applicant\u2019s personal file from the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, which might have included a medical record describing the applicant\u2019s health on admission, had been destroyed in accordance with the instructions in force at the time (see paragraph 73 above). Moreover, other medical records and logbooks from the temporary detention centre for the period of the applicant\u2019s stay had been destroyed as soon as they were no longer \u201cneeded\u201d, as no time-limits for keeping such documents existed at the material time. Order no. 340 of 12 May 2006, referred to in paragraph 34 of the Chamber judgment, had come into force only after those documents had been destroyed.129.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Government noted that the applicant\u2019s \u201caccounting and statistical record\u201d from his stay at the temporary detention centre in September 2004 and in February 2005 had been retained since its storage period was unlimited in accordance with Order no. 215 of 2 April 2004 (see paragraph 74 above). According to the Government, the Court had mistakenly called these records \u201cmedical records\u201d in paragraphs 32 and 90 of the Chamber judgment and had therefore reached a wrong conclusion in paragraph 90.130.\u00a0\u00a0They further stated that, since they had only been given notice of the present case on 1\u00a0October 2010, more than five and a half years after the events in question and following the destruction of most of the relevant records, they had to rely on the report by the head of the temporary detention centre, dated 28 December 2010, and the explanation of a supervisor at the same centre, dated 23\u00a0December 2010 (see paragraph 41 above). From these documents it appeared that all children kept at the temporary detention centre, including the applicant, had been examined daily by the medical staff. This was further supported by the \u201cdaily routine\u201d approved on 17 January 2013 and submitted to the Court. Moreover, children could ask for medical assistance at any time; there were properly equipped medical rooms; access to toilets was not restricted; and special night-time arrangements were made for children suffering from enuresis. No complaints had been made by the applicant concerning any of these matters during his stay at the temporary detention centre. In this respect, the Government pointed out that minors kept in the temporary detention centre could receive unrestricted visits and telephone calls from their relatives, provided that they did not interfere with the activities foreseen in the daily schedule. The applicant\u2019s grandfather had never claimed to have been prevented from visiting the applicant and did not appear to have made any written or oral complaints during such visits.131.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government submitted that, according to the staff schedule of the temporary detention centre in force from 18 June 2003 to 3\u00a0October 2005, a psychiatrist, a paediatrician, a doctor\u2019s assistant and a nurse were present at the centre. An information note further stated that the quality of medical care and the living conditions at the temporary detention centre had not been subject to any departmental or other inspection during 2004 or 2005. In view of all of the above, and since the applicant had not submitted any documents to substantiate his claims, the Government argued that there was no indication that the temporary detention centre was not suitable to accommodate, for a maximum period of thirty days, a child suffering from enuresis and a behavioural disorder.132.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the applicant\u2019s health, the Government pointed out that his enuresis was not mentioned in any medical documents submitted by the applicant (issued after 2003) nor in the applicant\u2019s \u201caccounting and statistical record\u201d from the temporary detention centre. Moreover, the degree of manifestation of this illness was not mentioned in any of the available documents. Turning to the applicant\u2019s behavioural disorder, the Government noted that, according to the extract from medical history no.\u00a03624 (submitted by the applicant to the Court in October 2007), the applicant had suffered from a social behavioural disorder at the material time which seemed to be a result of external factors rather than of his other illnesses. In their view, the applicant had failed to submit any medical certificate to substantiate the allegation that this disorder prevented his placement in the temporary detention centre. He had also failed to produce a report by a medical expert confirming that his stay at the temporary detention centre had caused his health to deteriorate.133.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Government considered that the applicant\u2019s complaints did not disclose a violation of Article 3.3.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener134.\u00a0\u00a0The Mental Disability Advocacy Center (\u201cthe MDAC\u201d) stressed that children with mental disabilities faced a \u201cdouble disadvantage\u201d \u2013 both as children and as individuals with mental disabilities. These children were particularly vulnerable to violations of their rights and had additional needs which had to be protected through stringent and effective safeguards. The MDAC referred to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted on 13 December 2006, UNTS 2515 \u2013 \u201cthe CRPD\u201d) and in particular its main object to ensure equality and non-discrimination in all domains (Article 5 \u00a7 2). It further referred to the CRC, emphasising that the best interests of the child should always be a primary consideration and that States Parties undertook to ensure the child such protection and care as was necessary for his or her well-being (Article 3 \u2013 see paragraph 81 above). Moreover, Article\u00a023 of the CRC specifically related to children with disabilities and the MDAC observed that the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its General Comment No.\u00a09 (2006), set out further guidance as to the treatment of children with disabilities in conflict with the law. Thus, the Committee stated that \u201cchildren with disabilities in conflict with the law should not be placed in a regular juvenile detention centre by way of pre-trial detention nor by way of a punishment\u201d (see paragraph 83 above). The MDAC emphasised that the Court had held that States had an obligation to take particular measures to provide effective protection of vulnerable persons from ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge (they referred to Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392\/95, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2001-V).C.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles135.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic society, prohibiting in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see, among other authorities, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7 201, ECHR 2012). However, to come within the scope of the prohibition contained in Article 3, the treatment inflicted on or endured by the victim must reach a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is a relative one, depending on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see M.S. v. the United Kingdom, no. 24527\/08, \u00a7 38, 3 May 2012, and Price v. the United Kingdom, no. 33394\/96, \u00a7 24, ECHR 2001\u2011VII).136.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 further imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical care (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI; Mouisel v. France, no.\u00a067263\/01, \u00a7 40, ECHR 2002-IX; and Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 93, 26 October 2006). Thus, the Court has held on many occasions that lack of appropriate medical care may amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see, for example, M.S. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a044\u201146; Wenerski v. Poland, no. 44369\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 56-65, 20 January 2009; and Popov v. Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 210-13 and 231-37, 13\u00a0July\u00a02006).137.\u00a0In this connection, the \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court reiterates that the mere fact that a detainee is seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical assistance was adequate (see Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 116, 29 November 2007). The authorities must also ensure that a comprehensive record is kept concerning the detainee\u2019s state of health and his or her treatment while in detention (see Khudobin, cited above, \u00a7 83), that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Melnik v. Ukraine, no.\u00a072286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-06, 28 March 2006, and Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115), and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis (see Popov, cited above, \u00a7 211; Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 114; and Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857\/13, \u00a7 93, 27 November 2014). The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through (see Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 117, 7 November 2006, and Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 116). Furthermore, medical treatment provided within prison facilities must be appropriate, that is, at a level comparable to that which the State authorities have committed themselves to provide to the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this does not mean that every detainee must be guaranteed the same level of medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012).138.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008). When dealing with children, the Court considers that, in line with established international law, the health of juveniles deprived of their liberty shall be safeguarded according to recognised medical standards applicable to juveniles in the wider community (see, for example, Rules 57, 62.2, 62.5, 69.2, and 73 (d) of the 2008 European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures, Article 3 \u00a7 3 of the CRC, and Rules 49-53 of the Havana Rules in paragraphs 79, 81 and 87 above). The authorities should always be guided by the child\u2019s best interests, and the child should be guaranteed proper care and protection. Moreover, if the authorities are considering depriving a child of his or her liberty, a medical assessment should be made of the child\u2019s state of health to determine whether or not he or she can be placed in a juvenile detention centre.139.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further stresses that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. In assessing evidence, the Court has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, it has never been its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that standard. Its role is not to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States\u2019 responsibility under the Convention. In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7\u00a0147, ECHR 2005\u2011VII, with further references; Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2000\u2011IV; Amirov, cited above, \u00a7 80; and Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7 121, 10\u00a0January 2012).140.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection it should be noted that the Court has held that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges something must prove that allegation). According to the Court\u2019s case-law under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries, damage and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999\u2011IV; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII; and Amirov, cited above, \u00a7 92). In the absence of such an explanation the Court can draw inferences that may be unfavourable for the respondent Government (see, for instance, Orhan v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7 274, 18\u00a0June 2002, and Buntov v. Russia, no.\u00a027026\/10, \u00a7 161, 5 June 2012).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes from the outset that both the applicant\u2019s young age and his state of health are circumstances of relevance in assessing whether the minimum level of severity has been attained (see paragraph 135 above) and it will have particular regard to the principles set out in paragraph 138 above.142.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that the Government have submitted numerous documents in support of their submissions before the Grand Chamber to show that the conditions at the temporary detention centre were good and that medical treatment was provided. However, the great majority of these documents date from 2008 to 2014, several years after the applicant\u2019s stay at the temporary detention centre and, consequently, do not shed light on the conditions in the centre during his placement there. Moreover, as concerns the report by the head of the temporary detention centre, dated 28 December 2010, and the explanation of a supervisor at the centre, dated 23 December 2010, the Court finds it unlikely that they would remember whether or not one child, who had stayed at the temporary detention centre for thirty days almost six years earlier, had complained of the conditions or access to the toilets. It has also on previous occasions found that reports or certificates like those submitted by the Russian Government were of little evidentiary value as they lacked references to original documentation held by the relevant prison or detention centre (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 124, with further references).143.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, while the Court does not question the submission that some of the documents from the temporary detention centre relating to the applicant may have been destroyed in accordance with the relevant rules in force at that time, this does not absolve the Government from the obligation to support their factual submissions with appropriate evidence (ibid., \u00a7 125).144.\u00a0\u00a0The parties have submitted a number of relevant documents that allow the Court to examine the applicant\u2019s complaints in depth. In particular, it finds it established through the medical certificates submitted by the applicant that he was examined by a neurologist and a psychiatrist on 27 December 2004 and 19 January 2005, that is, only slightly over a month before being placed in the temporary detention centre. At that time, medication was prescribed for him, as well as regular supervision by a neurologist and a psychiatrist and regular psychological counselling for his ADHD. It has further been established through medical records that the applicant was hospitalised the day after his release from the temporary detention centre and treated for neurosis and ADHD. He remained in hospital at least until 12 April 2005, thus for approximately three weeks.145.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s grandfather submitted medical certificates at the detention hearing on 21 February 2005 to show that the applicant suffered from ADHD, thereby ensuring that the authorities were aware of his condition. In this connection, the Court observes that an officer from the Juveniles Inspectorate was present at the hearing on 21 February 2005 and that, in accordance with section 31.2 of the Minors Act, a representative of the temporary detention centre was also required to be present. Since the applicant\u2019s grandfather drew attention to the applicant\u2019s medical condition during the hearing, the relevant authorities responsible for the applicant\u2019s placement at the temporary detention centre were made aware of his condition.146.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, even if the applicant\u2019s personal file from the temporary detention centre has been destroyed, the Court considers that there is sufficient evidence to show that the authorities were aware of the applicant\u2019s medical condition upon his admission to the temporary detention centre and that he was in need of treatment. Moreover, the fact that he was hospitalised the day after his release, and kept in the psychiatric hospital for almost three weeks, provides an indication that he was not given the necessary treatment for his condition at the temporary detention centre. The applicant has thereby provided the Court with a prima facie case of lack of adequate medical treatment. Having regard to the considerations set out above (see paragraphs 142-43 above) concerning the documents submitted by the Government and the lack of any other convincing evidence, the Court finds that the Government have failed to show that the applicant received the medical care required by his condition during his stay at the temporary detention centre where he was kept for thirty days without the right to leave and entirely under the control and responsibility of the staff at the centre. In these circumstances, the authorities were under an obligation to safeguard the applicant\u2019s dignity and well-being, and are responsible under the Convention for the treatment he experienced (see M.S. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 44).147.\u00a0\u00a0As concerns the applicant\u2019s enuresis, the Court notes that it is not mentioned in the medical certificates of 27 December 2004 and 19 January 2005 and that it was not the reason for his hospitalisation following his detention. Thus, in the Court\u2019s view, the applicant has not submitted sufficient prima facie evidence to show whether and, if so, to what extent he suffered from enuresis on admission to the temporary detention centre and whether the personnel at the centre were, or should have been, aware of it. Since most of the medical certificates and files from the temporary detention centre concerning the applicant have been destroyed, it appears difficult to obtain any clarification on this point. On the other hand, the Court has already found it established that the applicant suffered from ADHD.148.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 3 on account of the lack of necessary medical treatment at the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, having regard to his young age and particularly vulnerable situation, suffering as he was from ADHD.149.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.150.\u00a0\u00a0In view of this finding of a violation of Article 3, and like the Chamber in its judgment, the Court does not find it necessary to examine the remainder of the applicant\u2019s complaints under this provision.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01 OF THE CONVENTION151.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his detention in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders had violated Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(a)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;(b)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;(d)\u00a0\u00a0the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;(e)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment152.\u00a0\u00a0In its judgment, the Chamber found that the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre amounted to a deprivation of liberty since the centre was closed and guarded, inmates were routinely searched on admission, all personal belongings were confiscated, and a disciplinary regime was applied to the inmates.153.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber further considered that the detention had not been intended for educational supervision within the meaning of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01 (d) since, under domestic law, temporary detention centres were designed for the temporary detention of minors while more appropriate accommodation was being sought, such as a return to the family or placement in an educational institution. Moreover, domestic law did not provide for any educational activities in the centres. Thus, the Chamber concluded that the temporary detention centres were not designed to provide educational supervision, and that the applicant\u2019s detention in the centre had not been \u201cfor the purpose of\u201d educational supervision, since he had been placed there for \u201cbehaviour correction\u201d and the prevention of further delinquent acts.154.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber then found that the applicant\u2019s detention could not be \u201creasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence\u201d, within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c), since neither the domestic authorities nor the Government had mentioned any concrete and specific delinquent acts which the applicant had to be prevented from committing. Moreover, Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) required that detention to prevent a person from committing an offence was \u201ceffected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority\u201d, which was not the case for the applicant, who had been placed in the temporary detention centre by order of a court at the end of the proceedings against him.155.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber further considered that since the applicant had not been convicted of an offence because he had not reached the statutory age of criminal responsibility, his detention could not be regarded as \u201clawful detention after conviction by a competent court\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (a). Furthermore, it found that the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty did not fall under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Convention and that sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) were clearly not relevant in the present case. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the applicant\u2019s detention in the temporary detention centre had not had any legitimate purpose under Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 and had accordingly been arbitrary.B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant156.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant agreed with the reasoning in the Chamber judgment in relation to Article 5 \u00a7 1. He had been placed in the temporary detention centre for thirty days for the \u201ccorrection of conduct\u201d, which did not involve \u201ceducational supervision\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (d). In his view, the temporary detention centre was in no sense an institution intended for educational supervision and, according to section 22 of the Minors Act, its tasks did not include carrying out educational work with the minor. In fact, according to domestic legislation, temporary detention centres were not included in the system of educational institutions. The applicant emphasised that special closed institutions existed that did have the specific task of bringing up and educating children and young persons of deviant behaviour.157.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, section 22(4)(2) of the Minors Act contained a list of situations in which a minor could be placed in a temporary detention centre (see paragraph 66 above) and the applicant\u2019s situation did not fall under any of these. He emphasised that his identity had been known as had his place of residence and that his guilt in respect of the allegation of extortion had never been established by a court verdict. Furthermore, the applicant noted that, under section 22(6) of the Minors Act, a minor should only be kept in a temporary detention centre for the minimum time necessary for putting his or her affairs in order, and no more than thirty days. This implied that the purpose of the temporary detention centre was not educational supervision, but solely the detention of minors until such time as they could be handed over to their guardian or placed in a special educational institution. In any event, the Government had not submitted any relevant documents confirming that the applicant had received any individual precautionary instructions or had any school lessons while detained in the centre.158.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant submitted that his placement in the temporary detention centre did not serve any of the purposes listed in Article 5 \u00a7 1 (a), (b), or (c) either.159.\u00a0\u00a0He concluded that his detention had been unlawful as it fell outside the scope of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government160.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicant\u2019s detention in the temporary detention centre had been in accordance with Article 5 \u00a7 1 (d) of the Convention since his placement had been ordered precisely for the purposes of \u201ceducational supervision\u201d. They noted that the national courts had authorised the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre to prevent him from committing further offences \u2013 by correcting his behaviour through individual preventive work \u2013 in accordance with section\u00a022(2)(4) of the Minors Act. They observed that other preventive measures taken earlier had not resulted in the improvement of the applicant\u2019s behaviour and that his family had been unable to ensure proper supervision. In relation to this, the Government emphasised the applicant\u2019s troubled background with alcoholic parents, placements in orphanages, anti\u2011social and aggressive behaviour and commission of offences which had led to his being placed under the preventive supervision of the Juveniles Inspectorate between 2002 and 2005. They noted that the case file concerning the preventive supervision of the applicant had been destroyed in 2011.161.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Government submitted that individual preventive work, foreseen by the Minors Act, included an element of \u201ceducational supervision\u201d, and its implementation at the temporary detention centre had been expressly required in the applicant\u2019s situation. While the applicant\u2019s personal file from the centre had been destroyed in accordance with domestic rules, the Government relied on other documents that indirectly confirmed that individual preventive work had been carried out with the applicant during his stay, such as an undated personality profile (\u0445\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0430) of the applicant issued by the temporary detention centre at the request of his representative (submitted to the Court by the applicant\u2019s grandfather in 2007). They further relied on a number of documents to demonstrate that temporary detention centres in general were designed to provide \u201ceducational supervision\u201d and secondary-school education, such as the staff schedule approved on 18 June 2003, the contracts of 1 September 2004 and 1 September 2005 between the temporary detention centre and school no. 15 of Novosibirsk on the provision of education to minors placed at the centre, and the licence issued to that school for the period from 4 September 2002 until 19 June 2007 to work with the educational and consultation centre of the temporary detention centre.162.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also claimed that the regime in closed educational institutions, as foreseen by section 15(4) of the Minors Act, was similar to the regime in temporary detention centres, as specified in section 22(2)(4) of the Minors Act. Although the emphasis was placed differently in the wording of the two provisions, the essence, methods and aims of the work conducted with the minors were the same in both places. The difference was merely in the duration of the stay. The main objects of the closed educational institutions, as specified in section 15 of the Minors Act, were fully applicable to temporary detention centres.3.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener163.\u00a0\u00a0The MDAC pointed out that, pursuant to Article 37 (b) of the CRC, the arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child must be in conformity with the law and used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible time (see paragraph 82 above). It further observed that the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its General Comment No. 9 (2006), stated that \u201c[c]hildren with disabilities in conflict with the law should not be placed in a regular juvenile detention centre by way of pre-trial detention nor by way of a punishment. Deprivation of liberty should only be applied if necessary with a view to providing the child with adequate treatment ... and the child should be placed in an institution that has specially trained staff\u201d (see paragraph 83 above). Moreover, Rule 28 of the Havana Rules (see paragraph 87 above) provided that \u201c[t]he detention of juveniles should only take place under conditions that took full account of their particular needs, status and special requirements according to their age, personality, sex and type of offence, as well as mental and physical health, and which ensured their protection from harmful influences and risk situations\u201d.C.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment164.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the Government have not maintained their claim that the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre fell outside the scope of Article 5 of the Convention on the ground that the placement did not constitute a deprivation of liberty. In any event, the Court confirms the Chamber\u2019s finding that the applicant\u2019s placement for thirty days in the temporary detention centre amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1, noting in particular that the centre was closed and guarded, with twenty-four-hour surveillance of inmates to ensure that they did not leave the premises without authorisation, and with a disciplinary regime enforced by a duty squad (see paragraphs 71-72 above).165.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the applicant has submitted that his placement in the temporary detention centre fell outside the scope of all sub-paragraphs of Article 5 \u00a7 1 while the Government, in their submissions to the Grand Chamber, have claimed that the placement was in accordance with Article 5 \u00a7 1 (d), without arguing that it could also fall under one of the other sub-paragraphs of the said provision. In view of this, and agreeing with the Chamber\u2019s findings that the applicant\u2019s detention did not come within the scope of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (a), (b), (c), (e) or (f) of the Convention (see paragraphs 117-27 of the Chamber judgment), the Court will focus its examination on whether or not the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre was in accordance with Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 (d).166.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the list of exceptions to the right to liberty set out in Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 is an exhaustive one and only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his liberty (see, among many others, Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, \u00a7 25, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011IV). Moreover, in the context of the detention of minors, the words \u201ceducational supervision\u201d must not be equated rigidly with notions of classroom teaching: in the context of a young person in local-authority care, educational supervision must embrace many aspects of the exercise, by the local authority, of parental rights for the benefit and protection of the person concerned (see P. and S. v. Poland, no. 57375\/08, \u00a7\u00a0147, 30 October 2012; D.G. v. Ireland, no. 39474\/98, \u00a7 80, ECHR 2002\u2011III; and Koniarska v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 33670\/96, 12\u00a0October 2000).167.\u00a0\u00a0Further, detention for educational supervision pursuant to Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7 1 (d) must take place in an appropriate facility with the resources to meet the necessary educational objectives and security requirements. However, placement in such a facility does not necessarily have to be immediate. Sub-paragraph (d) does not preclude an interim custody measure being used as a preliminary to a regime of supervised education, without itself involving any supervised education. In such circumstances, however, the interim custody measure must be speedily followed by actual application of a regime of educational supervision in a setting (open or closed) designed\u00a0\u2013 and with sufficient resources \u2013 for the purpose (see Bouamar v. Belgium, 29 February 1988, \u00a7\u00a7 50 and 52, Series A no. 129, and D.G. v. Ireland, cited above, \u00a7\u00a078).168.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, it appears from the relevant provisions in the Minors Act that a placement in such a centre should be of a temporary character \u2013 as the name itself indicates \u2013 and for the shortest possible time, thirty days at the most. Thus, for instance, a minor may be placed there while his identity and place of residence are established or for the time necessary to prepare his transfer to, or return following an escape from, a closed educational institution (section 22(2)(4-6) of the Minors Act). However, none of these grounds is relevant in the present case since the applicant\u2019s placement was for the purpose of \u201ccorrecting his behaviour\u201d. In any event, the various reasons provided for in the Minors Act for placing a minor in a temporary detention centre indicate that its purpose is interim accommodation only until a permanent solution is found and not for \u201ceducational supervision\u201d.169.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, and contrary to the Government\u2019s claims, the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre cannot be compared to a placement in a closed educational institution, which is a separate and long-term measure intended to try to help minors with serious problems (compare A. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 51776\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 66-74, 29 November 2011). As noted above, placement in a temporary detention centre is a short-term, temporary solution, and the Court fails to see how any meaningful educational supervision to change a minor\u2019s behaviour and offer him or her appropriate treatment and rehabilitation, can be provided during a maximum period of thirty days.170.\u00a0\u00a0As concerns the Government\u2019s submission that the applicant did receive schooling in the temporary detention centre, the Court finds that the documents relied on by the Government show that an agreement existed with a local school to provide education to the juveniles at the temporary detention centre during the time that the applicant was there. In this connection, the Court considers that, in order to avoid gaps in their education, schooling in line with the normal school curriculum should be standard practice for all minors deprived of their liberty and placed under the State\u2019s responsibility, even when they are placed in a temporary detention centre for a limited period of time,. This is also supported by international instruments dealing with the deprivation of liberty of minors (see, for instance, Rules 77, 78.3 and 78.5 of the 2008 European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions and measures; Guidelines 21 and 28 of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child friendly justice; Rule 26.2 of the Beijing Rules; and Rule 38 of the Havana Rules. All of these sources are cited above in paragraphs 79, 80, 86 and 87 respectively). Consequently, while the Court accepts that some schooling was provided in the centre, it considers that this does not substantiate the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant\u2019s placement was \u201cfor the purpose\u201d of educational supervision. On the contrary, the centre was characterised by its disciplinary regime rather than by the schooling provided.171.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers it to be of importance that none of the domestic courts examining the applicant\u2019s detention order stated that the placement was for educational purposes. Instead, they referred to \u201cbehaviour correction\u201d and the need to prevent him from committing further delinquent acts, neither of which is a valid ground covered by Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(d) of the Convention. In fact, the Court observes that the purpose of \u201cbehaviour correction\u201d coincides with the aims of criminal punishment found in Article 43 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code and in Article 87 \u00a7 2 of the Code for minors between 14 and 18 years of age (see paragraphs 57-58 above).172.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre did not fall under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(d) of the Convention. Since it has already established that the detention did not fall within the ambit of any of the other sub-paragraphs of this provision, it follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1.V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION173.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that the proceedings relating to his placement in the temporary detention centre had been unfair. In particular, he alleged that he had been questioned by the police without his guardian, a defence lawyer or a teacher present and that he had not had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him during the proceedings. He relied on Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Convention, which in their relevant parts read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ......3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:... (c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;(d)\u00a0\u00a0to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Applicability of Article 6 to the present case1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions174.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, in their submissions before the Grand Chamber, the Government considered that the court hearing of 21 February 2005 ordering the applicant\u2019s detention in the temporary detention centre should be examined for compliance with the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, instead of Article 6, since it concerned the imposition of a measure for the purposes foreseen by Article 5 \u00a7 1 (d). In this connection they noted that the Chamber had already examined another court hearing, namely that of 11 April 2005 relating to the applicant\u2019s appeal against his placement in the temporary detention centre, for compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 4. Moreover, the Court had previously relied on this provision in relation to similar measures (in Ichin and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 28189\/04 and 28192\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 41 and 43, 21 December 2010, and A. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 81 and 107).175.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the Government maintained their stance that Article 6 of the Convention was not applicable to the proceedings in the present case.176.\u00a0\u00a0They contended that, as far as the pre-investigation inquiry was concerned, it had only involved one informal act with the participation of the applicant \u2013 the questioning \u2013 which should not be confused with a formal interview. They further reiterated that the pre-investigation inquiry concerned only the establishment of the facts and could not lead to the imposition of any punishment and thus did not involve the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The inquiry could only lead to a decision whether or not to institute criminal proceedings. Since the applicant was under the age of criminal responsibility, the institution of criminal proceedings was excluded. Thus, as in the situation of a mentally ill defendant, the possibility of conviction was completely excluded. Referring to Kerr v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no.\u00a063356\/00, 23 September 2003) and Antoine v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 62960\/00, 13 May 2003), the Government observed that, for exactly these reasons, the Court had found that Article 6 was not applicable to criminal proceedings in respect of mentally ill defendants.177.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the proceedings leading to the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre, the Government argued that Article 6, under its criminal head, was not applicable. They referred to sections 22(2)(4) and 31.1(2) of the Minors Act and to the domestic court rulings of 21 February 2005 and 29 May 2006. In their view, these sources confirmed that the purpose of the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre had been to prevent him from committing further offences, by correcting his behaviour, and not to punish him for the latest offence he had committed. Thus, the domestic courts had examined not only the circumstances of the latest offence, but the entire record of the applicant\u2019s anti-social and delinquent behaviour, as well as his living conditions and family situation, and had concluded that he lacked the necessary supervision and that the preventive measures previously put in place had been inadequate. Consequently, the domestic court could not, and had not, established the applicant\u2019s guilt in respect of a crime but had merely assessed the sufficiency of the evidence confirming his commission of an act prohibited by the Criminal Code. This could not amount to a \u201cdetermination of a criminal charge\u201d within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 1. Furthermore, the court hearing of 21 February 2005 had been conducted in accordance with the procedure foreseen by the Minors Act, not by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had expressly stated that this procedure under the Minors Act constituted a type of civil proceedings (finding of 14 May 2013, no. 690-O).178.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the applicability of Article 5 \u00a7 4 and maintained that the Chamber\u2019s approach had been the correct one and that the proceedings fell within the scope of Article 6 and should be considered in terms of compliance with that provision. He contended that his placement in the temporary detention centre had not been aimed at educational supervision but to punish him for the crime he had allegedly committed. In his view, the authorities had used the placement as a measure of criminal prosecution since they were prevented from instituting criminal proceedings against him on account of his age.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment179.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in its judgment, the Chamber came to the conclusion that the proceedings against the applicant constituted criminal proceedings within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention (see paragraph 149 of the Chamber judgment). It held as follows.\u201c139.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the concept of a \u2018criminal charge\u2019 within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 1 is an autonomous one. The Court\u2019s established case-law sets out three criteria, commonly known as the \u201cEngel criteria\u201d (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, \u00a7 82, Series A no. 22), to be considered in determining whether or not there was a \u2018criminal charge\u2019 within the meaning of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The first criterion is the legal classification of the offence under national law, the second is the very nature of the offence, and the third is the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring. The second and third criteria are alternative, and not necessarily cumulative. This, however, does not exclude a cumulative approach where separate analysis of each criterion does not make it possible to reach a clear conclusion as to the existence of a criminal charge (see, in particular, Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 30-31, ECHR 2006\u2011XIV, and Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39665\/98 and 40086\/98, \u00a7\u00a082, ECHR 2003\u2011X).140.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that, after establishing that the applicant\u2019s actions contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion, the domestic authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings against him because he was under the statutory age of criminal responsibility ... Subsequently, in separate proceedings, a court ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days on the ground that he had committed a delinquent act \u2013 extortion \u2013 and it was necessary to \u2018correct his behaviour\u2019 and prevent him from committing further delinquent acts ...141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the Government\u2019s argument that the proceedings against the applicant were not classified as criminal under domestic law. It has already recognised that States, in the performance of their task as guardians of the public interest, are entitled to create or maintain a distinction between different categories of offences for the purposes of their domestic law and to draw a dividing line between what belongs to the criminal sphere and what does not. By removing certain forms of conduct from the category of criminal offences under domestic law, the law-maker may be able to serve the needs of the proper administration of justice, as well as the interests of the individual, as in the present case for example, by exempting minors under a certain age from criminal liability for their actions according to the level of development of their mental and intellectual capacities. Nevertheless, the legal characterisation of the procedure under national law cannot be the sole criterion of relevance for the applicability of Article 6. Otherwise, the application of this provision would be left to the discretion of the Contracting States to a degree that might lead to results incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention (see \u00d6zt\u00fcrk v. Germany, 21 February 1984, \u00a7 49, Series A no. 73; Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, \u00a7 68, Series A no. 80; Ezeh and Connors, cited above, \u00a7 83; and Matyjek v. Poland (dec.), no. 38184\/03, \u00a7 45, 30 May 2006). In view of the above, the fact that the proceedings against the applicant were not classified as criminal under Russian law has only a formal and relative value; the \u2018very nature of the offence is a factor of greater import\u2019 (see Ezeh and Connors, cited above,\u00a0\u00a7\u00a091).142.\u00a0\u00a0It was not disputed before the Court that the delinquent act imputed to the applicant corresponded to an offence in the ordinary criminal law. Indeed, the decision not to institute criminal proceedings stated that \u2018[the applicant\u2019s] actions ... contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion, punishable by Article 163 of the Criminal Code\u2019 ... At the same time, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the criminal charges against the applicant were not pursued on the ground that he had not reached the statutory age of criminal responsibility. It is, however, not necessary to decide whether, despite the indisputably criminal nature of the imputed offence, the fact that criminal prosecution of the applicant was legally impossible because of his age removed the proceedings against him from the ambit of the criminal limb of Article 6. The Court will instead concentrate on the third criterion: the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the applicant risked incurring.143.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that under Russian law a minor who has committed a delinquent act before reaching the statutory age of criminal responsibility may be placed in a closed educational institution for up to three years, or in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for up to thirty days ... In the present case, within a month of the refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant, the local department of the interior asked a court to place him in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders on the ground that he had committed a delinquent act for which he could not be held criminally liable because of his age. Referring to his unruly way of life and previous delinquent acts, the local department of the interior claimed that it was necessary to detain the applicant in order to \u2018correct\u2019 his behaviour and prevent him from committing further delinquent acts ... The District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days for \u2018behaviour correction\u2019, on the grounds that he had not \u2018drawn proper conclusions\u2019 from his previous placements in that centre and had committed a further delinquent act ... The Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal, referring to the fact that the applicant had committed a delinquent act punishable by the Criminal Code and to his family situation and poor school performance. It found that his placement in the centre was necessary to prevent him from committing further delinquent acts ...144.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is not oblivious to the fact that the decision to place the applicant in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders was taken in separate proceedings which were formally unrelated to the criminal pre-investigation inquiry regarding the applicant. However, taking into account that the domestic courts referred to the fact that the applicant had committed a delinquent act as the main reason for his placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, and that in their decisions they extensively relied on the documents obtained and the findings made during the criminal pre-investigation inquiry, the Court considers that there was a close link, both in law and fact, between the criminal pre-investigation inquiry and the placement proceedings. Indeed, the wording of the applicable legal provisions and of the judicial decisions, both cited in paragraph 143 above, clearly shows that the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders was a direct consequence of the local department of the interior\u2019s finding that his actions had contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion.145.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found that the placement in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders amounted to a deprivation of the applicant\u2019s liberty ... There is therefore a presumption that the proceedings against the applicant were \u2018criminal\u2019 within the meaning of Article 6, a presumption which was rebuttable only in entirely exceptional circumstances and only if the deprivation of liberty could not be considered \u201cappreciably detrimental\u201d given its nature, duration or manner of execution (see Ezeh and Connors, cited above, \u00a7 126).146.\u00a0\u00a0As already found above, the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders did not pursue the purpose of educational supervision ... The stated purpose of the applicant\u2019s placement in the detention centre for juvenile offenders was to correct his behaviour and to deter him from committing further delinquent acts rather than to punish him. However, the Court\u2019s case-law indicates that it may be necessary to look beyond the appearances and the language used and concentrate on the realities of the situation (see Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295\/99, \u00a7 64, ECHR 2002\u2011IV, and Ezeh and Connors, cited above, \u00a7 123).147.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s detention lasted thirty days and was served in a detention centre for juvenile offenders rather than in an educational institution. As established above, the centre was closed and guarded to prevent inmates from leaving without authorisation. Inmates were subject to constant supervision and to a strict disciplinary regime ... The Court therefore considers that the deprivation of liberty, imposed after a finding that the applicant\u2019s actions contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion and served in a detention centre for juvenile offenders subject to a quasi-penitentiary regime as described above, contained punitive elements as well as elements of prevention and deterrence. The Court finds it difficult to distinguish between the punishment and deterrent aims of the measure in question, these objectives not being mutually exclusive and being recognised as characteristic features of criminal penalties. Indeed, in the Court\u2019s case-law criminal penalties have customarily been recognised as comprising the twin objectives of punishment and deterrence (see \u00d6zt\u00fcrk, cited above, \u00a7 53; Bendenoun v. France, 24 February 1994, \u00a7 47, Series A no. 284; Lauko v. Slovakia, 2 September 1998, \u00a7 58, Reports 1998\u2011VI; and Ezeh and Connors, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 102 and 105).148.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the nature, duration and manner of execution of the deprivation of liberty which was liable to be, and which actually was, imposed on the applicant, the Court finds no exceptional circumstances capable of rebutting the presumption that the proceedings against the applicant were \u201ccriminal\u201d within the meaning of Article 6.149.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court concludes that the nature of the offence, together with the nature and severity of the penalty, were such that the proceedings against the applicant constituted criminal proceedings within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. This Article therefore applies to the proceedings against the applicant.\u201d180.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not see any reason to depart from the Chamber\u2019s findings, which are detailed and well reasoned. Like the Chamber, it emphasises the need to look beyond appearances and the language used and to concentrate on the realities of the situation (see paragraph 146 of the Chamber judgment). When doing so in the applicant\u2019s case, the Court considers that his placement for thirty days in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders had clear elements of both deterrence and punishment (see paragraph 147 of the Chamber judgment).181.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above, the Court does not agree with the Government\u2019s contention that the complaints should be considered under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. In its view, since the proceedings taken against the applicant concerned the determination of a criminal charge, the applicant\u2019s complaints should be seen in the context of the more far-reaching procedural guarantees enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention rather than Article 5 \u00a7 4. The Court would add that it does not agree with the Government\u2019s submission that the applicant\u2019s situation should be treated in the same way as that of a mentally ill defendant. In cases of mentally ill defendants, the proceedings can lead to their being placed in closed institutions for treatment and to prevent them from committing further criminal acts. There are no punitive or deterrent elements involved, unlike in the applicant\u2019s case.182.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court concludes that the proceedings against the applicant constituted criminal proceedings within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention and that this provision is therefore applicable in the present case.B.\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with the requirements of Article 61.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment183.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the applicant\u2019s complaint that he had been questioned by the police in the absence of his guardian, a defence lawyer or a teacher, the Chamber noted that there was no evidence to support the Government\u2019s claim that the applicant\u2019s grandfather, his guardian, or anyone else had been present during the questioning. Moreover, having regard to his young age, it considered the circumstances surrounding the questioning to have been psychologically coercive. The Chamber further observed that the applicant\u2019s confession to the police had been used against him in the ensuing proceedings. Thus, the absence of a lawyer while in police custody had irremediably affected his defence rights and undermined the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. There had therefore been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c).184.\u00a0\u00a0Next, the Chamber noted that the applicant had had no opportunity to cross-examine S. and his mother although their witness statements were the only evidence against him and had therefore been decisive. Moreover, no efforts had been made by the authorities to secure the appearance of S. or his mother in court, nor had they made a reasonable effort to compensate for this. It therefore found that the applicant\u2019s right to question and challenge witnesses had been restricted to an extent incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d).185.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Chamber observed that the above-mentioned restrictions on the applicant\u2019s defence rights had been due to the special legal regime applicable to his situation because he had not reached the statutory age of criminal responsibility. The Minors Act, applicable to the proceedings against the applicant, provided for significantly restricted procedural guarantees. In view of the above considerations, the proceedings against the applicant had not been fair and there had been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1.2.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant186.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant fully agreed with the Chamber judgment. He maintained that he had been deprived of his right to a defence both at the time of his initial questioning at the police station and during the court proceedings to place him in the temporary detention centre. He had also been deprived of legal safeguards such as the right to question witnesses and be presumed innocent.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government187.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had been questioned by a specially trained officer from the Juveniles Inspectorate at the police station in the presence of his grandfather. He had also been informed of his right not to make self-incriminating statements, which was confirmed by his signature on the first page of his confession statement.188.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, since the Government considered that the court hearing of 21 February 2005 ordering the applicant\u2019s detention in the temporary detention centre should be examined for compliance with the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, instead of Article 6, they developed their arguments with reference to that provision. They emphasised, in particular, that the procedure under Article 5 \u00a7 4 did not necessarily have to be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6 for criminal proceedings.189.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, the Government pointed out that the hearing of 21\u00a0February\u00a02005 had been held in compliance with section 31.2(2) of the Minors Act and attended by the applicant, his grandfather, a court-appointed lawyer, the officer from the Juveniles Inspectorate who had delivered the ruling of 12 January 2005 on the refusal to initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant, as well as a prosecutor. The applicant\u2019s grandfather had denied that the applicant had committed any offences, referring to his visit to a doctor earlier on the relevant day, and the applicant had refused to give any explanation. The court-appointed lawyer had objected to the applicant\u2019s placement in the temporary detention centre. While acknowledging that S. and his mother had not been heard during the hearing, the Government expressed doubts as to whether the applicant had even requested their attendance, since this did not appear from the judgment. Moreover, the court hearing record had been destroyed together with the case file in 2013. Furthermore, in his cassation complaint of 2\u00a0March 2005, the applicant\u2019s grandfather did not claim to have made such a request to the court. The Government further noted that section 31.2 of the Minors Act neither required nor prohibited the examination of witnesses.190.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Government considered that the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the fairness of the proceedings did not disclose any violation of the Convention.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Third-party interveners(i)\u00a0\u00a0The MDAC191.\u00a0\u00a0The MDAC stressed that States had a positive obligation to apply stringent and effective safeguards in order to ensure that rights were \u201cpractical and effective\u201d and that this was particularly important in relation to children with disabilities, who were very vulnerable. Article 13 of the CRPD addressed the specific issue of access to justice of persons with disabilities and stated that States Parties must ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities, including through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodation, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct or indirect participants in all legal proceedings. Reasonable accommodation meant that appropriate modification and adjustments, which did not impose a disproportionate or undue burden, should be taken in each particular case. Moreover, Article 40 of the CRC dealt with children in conflict with the law and listed the minimum guarantees for children, including the right to legal assistance (see paragraph 82 above). The MDAC reiterated that the best interests of the child had to be of primary importance.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0League of Human Rights192.\u00a0\u00a0The League of Human Rights (\u201cthe LIGA\u201d) also referred to Article\u00a040 of the CRC. It further referred to the Beijing Rules (see paragraph 86 above), the Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System (Annex to UN Resolution 1997\/30, adopted on 21 July 1997) and the Havana Rules (see paragraph 87 above) which all provided for a right to legal counsel and assistance for children in conflict with the law. Moreover, the LIGA pointed out that Council of Europe Recommendation CM\/Rec(2008)11 on the European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to sanctions or measures (see paragraph 79 above) provided that juveniles should not have fewer legal rights and safeguards than those provided to adult offenders by the general rules of criminal procedure. The LIGA also stressed that the right to legal assistance, referred to in various international instruments, applied from the very outset of a procedure, including the police questioning stage, involving children and those under the age of criminal responsibility. Since children below the age of criminal responsibility were often subject to very paternalistic proceedings on the grounds that the proceedings were not penal but protective, the traditional procedural safeguards were often not applied. That approach was based on the theory of welfare juvenile justice systems which had emerged in the United States of America and Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and had been systematically criticised by a number of scholars for its overall paternalistic approach to children, typically suppressing their procedural rights and treating them as objects of care and discipline.193.\u00a0\u00a0According to the LIGA, the particular vulnerability of children should instead require additional protection of their rights. In particular, legal assistance should be provided to all children on a mandatory basis. Lastly, it noted that Guideline 30 of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child friendly justice (see paragraph 80 above) stated that a child who had been taken into custody should not be questioned in respect of criminal behaviour, or asked to make or sign a statement concerning such involvement, except in the presence of a lawyer or one of the child\u2019s parents or, if no parent was available, another person whom the child trusted.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles194.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, as the requirements of paragraph 3 of Article 6 are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by paragraph 1, it often examines the complaints under both provisions taken together (see, among many other authorities, Luc\u00e0 v. Italy, no.\u00a033354\/96, \u00a7 37, ECHR 2001\u2011II; Krombach v. France, no. 29731\/96, \u00a7\u00a082, ECHR 2001\u2011II; and Poitrimol v. France, 23 November 1993, \u00a7 29, Series A no. 277\u2011A). Moreover, where the applicant complains of numerous procedural defects, the Court may examine the various grounds giving rise to the complaint in turn in order to determine whether the proceedings, considered as a whole, were fair (see Insanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 16133\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0159 et seq. 14 March 2013, and Mirilashvili v. Russia, no. 6293\/04, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0164 et seq., 11 December 2008).195.\u00a0\u00a0As regards juvenile defendants, the Court has held that the criminal proceedings must be so organised as to respect the principle of the best interests of the child. It is essential that a child charged with an offence is dealt with in a manner which takes full account of his age, level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, and that steps are taken to promote his ability to understand and participate in the proceedings (see Adamkiewicz v. Poland, no. 54729\/00, \u00a7 70, 2 March 2010; Panovits v. Cyprus, no. 4268\/04, \u00a7 67, 11 December 2008; V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888\/94, \u00a7 86, ECHR 1999\u2011IX; and T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724\/94, \u00a7 84, 16 December 1999). The right of a juvenile defendant to effective participation in his criminal trial requires that the authorities deal with him with due regard to his vulnerability and capacities from the first stages of his involvement in a criminal investigation and, in particular, during any questioning by the police. The authorities must take steps to reduce, as far as possible, the child\u2019s feelings of intimidation and inhibition and ensure that he has a broad understanding of the nature of the investigation, of what is at stake for him, including the significance of any penalty which may be imposed as well as of his rights of defence and, in particular, of his right to remain silent (see Martin v. Estonia, no. 35985\/09, \u00a7 92, 30 May 2013; Panovits, cited above, \u00a7 67; and S.C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60958\/00, \u00a7 29, ECHR 2004\u2011IV).196.\u00a0\u00a0In view of his status as a minor, when a child enters the criminal-justice system his procedural rights must be guaranteed and his innocence or guilt established, in accordance with the requirements of due process and the principle of legality, with respect to the specific act which he has allegedly committed. On no account may a child be deprived of important procedural safeguards solely because the proceedings that may result in his deprivation of liberty are deemed under domestic law to be protective of his interests as a child and juvenile delinquent, rather than penal. Furthermore, particular care must be taken to ensure that the legal classification of a child as a juvenile delinquent does not lead to the focus being shifted to his status as such, while neglecting to examine the specific criminal act of which he has been accused and the need to adduce proof of his guilt in conditions of fairness. Processing a child offender through the criminal-justice system on the sole basis of his status of being a juvenile delinquent, which lacks legal definition, cannot be considered compatible with due process and the principle of legality (see, mutatis mutandis, Achour v. France [GC], no.\u00a067335\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 45-47, ECHR 2006\u2011IV, relating to the legal classification of recidivism). Discretionary treatment, on the basis of someone being a child, a juvenile, or a juvenile delinquent, is only acceptable where his interests and those of the State are not incompatible. Otherwise \u2013 and proportionately \u2013 substantive and procedural legal safeguards do apply.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Right to legal assistance197.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, although not absolute, the right under Article\u00a06 \u00a7 3 (c) of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial (see Poitrimol, cited above, \u00a7 34).198.\u00a0\u00a0As regards legal assistance at the pre-trial stages of the proceedings, the Court has emphasised the importance of the investigative stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which the offence charged will be considered at trial. Therefore, the Court has held that the particular vulnerability of the accused at the initial stages of police questioning can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer, whose task is, among other things, to help to ensure respect of the right of an accused not to incriminate himself. Indeed, this right presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. It is further important to protect the accused against coercion on the part of the authorities and contribute to the prevention of miscarriage of justice and ensure equality of arms. Accordingly, in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently \u201cpractical and effective\u201d, Article 6 \u00a7 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as soon as a suspect is questioned by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict that right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction \u2013 whatever its justification \u2013 must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced where incriminating statements made during police questioning without access to a lawyer are used to secure a conviction (see Panovits, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 64-66, and Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 50-55, ECHR 2008).199.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the particular vulnerability of children, and taking into account their level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, the Court stresses in particular the fundamental importance of providing access to a lawyer where the person in custody is a minor (see Salduz, cited above,\u00a0\u00a7 60; see also the case-law cited in paragraph 195 above).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses200.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) enshrines the principle that, before an accused can be convicted, all evidence against him must usually be produced in his presence at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument. Exceptions to this principle are possible but must not infringe the rights of the defence, which, as a rule, require that the accused should be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either when that witness makes his statement or at a later stage of the proceedings (see Luc\u00e0, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a039-40).201.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, having regard to the Court\u2019s case-law, firstly, there must be a good reason for the non-attendance of a witness at the trial and, secondly, when a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence may be restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 (see Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766\/05 and 22228\/06, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2011, as refined in Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC], no. 9154\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 107 and 118, ECHR 2015).202.\u00a0\u00a0Where a conviction is based solely or decisively on the evidence of absent witnesses, the Court must subject the proceedings to the most searching scrutiny. The question in each case is whether there are sufficient counterbalancing factors in place, including measures that permit a fair and proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence to take place. This would permit a conviction to be based on such evidence only if it is sufficiently reliable given its importance in the case (see Al-Khawaja and Tahery, cited above, \u00a7 147, and as further developed in Schatschaschwili, cited above, \u00a7 116).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case203.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes from the outset that the applicant in the present case was only 12 years old when the police took him to the police station and questioned him. He was thus well below the age of criminal responsibility set by the Criminal Code (fourteen years) for the crime that he was accused of, namely, extortion. In view of this, he was in need of special treatment and protection by the authorities, and it is clear from a variety of international sources (see, for instance, Council of Europe Recommendations No. R (87) 20 and Rec(2003)20; Guidelines 1, 2, and 28 to 30 of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child friendly justice; Article\u00a040 of the CRC, and General Comment No. 10, point 33; and Rule\u00a07.1. of the Beijing Rules, all cited above in paragraphs 77, 78, 80, 82, 84 and 86 respectively) that any measures against him should have been based on his best interests and that, from the time of his apprehension by the police, he should have been guaranteed at least the same legal rights and safeguards as those provided to adults. Moreover, the fact that the applicant suffered from ADHD, a mental and neurobehavioural disorder (see paragraph 12 above), made him particularly vulnerable and thus he required special protection (see Guideline 27 of the Council of Europe Guidelines on child friendly justice, and Article 23 of the CRC, and General Comment No. 9, points 73-74, all cited above in paragraphs 80 and 82-83 respectively).204.\u00a0\u00a0Against this background, the Court will look at the applicant\u2019s specific complaints under Article 6, that is, whether he was provided with legal assistance and had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, in order to determine whether the proceedings to place him in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders were fair.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Right to legal assistance205.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it is undisputed that the applicant was taken to the police station without being told why. He also had to wait a certain amount of time before being questioned by a police officer. However, there is no indication that the applicant was in any form or manner informed that he had the right to call his grandfather, a teacher, a lawyer or another person of confidence during this period for them to come and assist him during the questioning. Nor were any steps taken to ensure that legal assistance was provided to him during the questioning. The Government\u2019s submission that the applicant\u2019s grandfather was present during the questioning remains unsupported by evidence. Moreover, the Court notes that the confession statement signed by the applicant \u2013 the probative value of which must be considered to be extremely questionable given his young age and health condition \u2013 did not mention the grandfather\u2019s presence and was not countersigned by him. The written statement signed by his grandfather on the same day could, as claimed by the applicant, have been signed later, after the applicant had been questioned by the police officer, and thus does not prove his presence during the questioning. In this connection, the Court notes that it was marked on the applicant\u2019s confession statement that he had been informed of his right not to make self-incriminating statements. However, that document did not mention that the applicant had been informed of his right to have legal counsel or someone else present during the questioning or that any such person had indeed been present.206.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore the Court considers it established that the police did not assist the applicant in obtaining legal representation. Nor was the applicant informed of his right to have a lawyer and his grandfather or a teacher present. This passive approach adopted by the police was clearly not sufficient to fulfil their positive obligation to furnish the applicant, a child, suffering, moreover, from ADHD, with the necessary information enabling him to obtain legal representation (see Panovits, cited above, \u00a7 72).207.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that the domestic law does not provide for legal assistance to a minor under the age of criminal responsibility when interviewed by the police is not a valid reason for failing to comply with that obligation. The Court has previously found that a systematic restriction on the right of access to legal assistance, on the basis of statutory provisions, is sufficient in itself to constitute a violation of Article 6 (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 56). Moreover, it is contrary to the basic principles set out in international sources according to which a minor should be guaranteed legal, or other appropriate, assistance (see, for example, Article 40 \u00a7 2 (b) (ii) of the CRC, and the comments thereto; Rule 7.1 of the Beijing Rules; and Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (87) 20, point 8, all cited in paragraphs 82, 83-84, 86 and 77 above).208.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court considers that the applicant must have felt intimidated and exposed while being held alone at the police station and questioned in an unfamiliar environment. In fact, he retracted the confession immediately when his grandfather came to the police station, and protested his innocence. In this regard, the Court emphasises that the confession statement, made in the absence of a lawyer, was not only used against the applicant in the proceedings to place him in the temporary detention centre but actually formed the basis, in combination with the witness statements of S. and his mother, for the domestic courts\u2019 finding that his actions contained elements of the criminal offence of extortion, thus providing the ground for his placement in the centre.209.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court finds that the absence of legal assistance during the applicant\u2019s questioning by the police irretrievably affected his defence rights and undermined the fairness of the proceedings as a whole (see Panovits, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 75-76, and Salduz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a058 and 62).210.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses211.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the applicant\u2019s complaint that he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine S. or his mother during the District Court hearing to decide on his placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders, the Court firstly notes that it was a single judge at the Sovetskiy District Court of Novosibirsk, in accordance with sections 22(3)(2) of the Minors Act, who ordered the applicant\u2019s placement, after holding a hearing. At the hearing, the applicant, his grandfather and court-appointed counsel were present, as were a prosecutor and the officer from the Juveniles Inspectorate who had ruled on 12 January 2005 not to initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant. From the judgment, it appears that the applicant and his grandfather had the opportunity to address the court and submit documents. Thus, the Court notes that, on the face of it, it would appear that the proceedings afforded certain procedural safeguards for the applicant.212.\u00a0\u00a0However, the District Court was provided with the results of the pre-investigation inquiry, among other material concerning the applicant. This included the statements made by the alleged victim S. and his mother, as well as the confession statement signed by the applicant. The Court reiterates that the applicant had retracted the confession and had claimed that it had been obtained under duress. Moreover, as found above, the applicant did not benefit from the assistance of a lawyer during the questioning at the police station, which irremediably affected his defence rights. Furthermore, the grandfather also claimed that the applicant had been at a doctor\u2019s surgery earlier on the relevant day. However, the Court observes that neither S. nor his mother was called to the hearing to give evidence and provide the applicant with an opportunity to cross-examine them, despite the fact that their testimonies were of decisive importance to the pre-investigation inquiry\u2019s conclusion that the applicant had committed a delinquent act, namely, extortion.213.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, it is also relevant to note that there is no indication, nor has it been claimed by the Government, that S. and his mother were not available or that it would otherwise have been difficult to summon them to the hearing as witnesses. There was, consequently, no good reason for the witnesses\u2019 non-attendance. Moreover, in view of the fact that the applicant had retracted his confession, the Court considers that it was important for the fairness of the proceedings that S. and his mother be heard. In the Court\u2019s view, this safeguard is even more important when the matter concerns a minor under the age of criminal responsibility in proceedings determining such a fundamental right as his right to liberty.214.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, although court-appointed counsel was present at the hearing to represent the applicant, it is unclear when she was appointed and to what extent she actually defended the applicant\u2019s rights. If it is correct, as indicated by the Government, that no request to hear S. or his mother was made to the District Court by the applicant, then this would indicate a lack of diligence on the part of counsel and, in the Court\u2019s view, also on the part of the judge, who should have ensured that the principle of equality of arms was respected during the proceedings. In fact, no efforts were made by the authorities to secure the appearance of S. and his mother in court, even though the Minors Act does provide for the possibility of hearing witnesses, as acknowledged by the Government. Having regard to the fact that what was at stake for the applicant in the placement proceedings was his deprivation of liberty for thirty days \u2013 not a negligible length of time for a 12-year-old boy \u2013 the Court considers that it was of utmost importance that the District Court guarantee the fairness of the proceedings.215.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court notes that there were no counterbalancing factors to compensate for the applicant\u2019s inability to cross-examine S. and his mother at any stage of the proceedings. As noted by the Chamber in paragraph 173 of its judgment, the applicant was not provided with an opportunity to scrutinise the witnesses\u2019 questioning by the investigator, nor was he then or later provided with the opportunity to have his own questions put to them. Furthermore, as the witnesses\u2019 statements to the investigator were not recorded on video, neither the applicant nor the judges were able to observe the witnesses\u2019 demeanour under questioning and thus form their own impression of their reliability (see, for similar reasoning, Makeyev v. Russia, no. 13769\/04, \u00a7 42, 5 February 2009).216.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all of the above, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s defence rights, in particular the right to challenge and question witnesses, were restricted to an extent incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, and there has accordingly been a violation of these provisions.(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion217.\u00a0The Court has found that the applicant\u2019s defence rights were restricted to an extent incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article\u00a06 of the Convention because of the absence of legal assistance during police questioning and the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose evidence against him had been decisive for the domestic court\u2019s decision to place him in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders for thirty days.218.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court considers it important to add, as did the Chamber (see paragraph 176 of its judgment), that the above restrictions were due to the fact that the applicant was under the age of criminal responsibility and therefore fell outside the protection offered by the procedural guarantees provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 59-63 above). Instead, the Minors Act was applicable to the applicant. This Act provided for significantly restricted procedural safeguards (see paragraph 68 above) since it was intended as protective legislation for minors. According to the Court, and as also noted by the LIGA in its submission (see paragraph 192 above), this is where, as illustrated by the present case, the legislature\u2019s intention to protect children and ensure their care and treatment comes into conflict with reality and the principles set out in paragraph 196 above, since the child is deprived of his liberty without having the procedural rights to defend himself properly against the imposition of such a harsh measure.219.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, minors, whose cognitive and emotional development in any event requires special consideration, and in particular young children under the age of criminal responsibility, deserve support and assistance to protect their rights when coercive measures, albeit in the guise of educational measures, are applied in their regard. As is clear from the relevant international materials before the Court (see paragraphs 77-89 above), this has been established in many international documents. It has also been emphasised by the third-party interveners. Thus, the Court is convinced that adequate procedural safeguards must be in place to protect the best interests and well-being of the child, certainly when his or her liberty is at stake. To find otherwise would be to put children at a clear disadvantage compared with adults in the same situation. In this connection, children with disabilities may require additional safeguards to ensure that they are sufficiently protected. The Court would point out that this does not mean, however, that children should be exposed to a fully fledged criminal trial; their rights should be secured in an adapted and age-appropriate setting in line with international standards, in particular the Convention on the Rights of the Child.220.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all of the above-mentioned considerations, the Court concludes that the applicant was not afforded a fair trial in the proceedings leading to his placement in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders in violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) and (d) of the Convention.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION221.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions222.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 7,500 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, as awarded to him by the Chamber in its judgment, although he submitted that it would not fully cover all costs for the recovery of his physical and mental health.223.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that sum and considered that if the Court were to find a violation of the Convention, the Court\u2019s judgment in this respect should in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment224.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber, making an assessment on an equitable basis, awarded the applicant EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment225.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it has found the same combination of violations as the Chamber in the present case. Moreover, the applicant has requested the same sum as granted to him by the Chamber in its judgment. The Court finds this to be an equitable amount and thus awards the applicant EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions226.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed a total of 24,979 roubles (RUB) (approximately EUR 417) for legal fees (RUB 20,000), translation costs (RUB 4,620) and postal expenses (RUB 359) incurred before the Grand Chamber, in addition to the sum granted by the Chamber in its judgment.227.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested both the sum awarded by the Chamber and the applicant\u2019s additional claims before the Grand Chamber. They considered that the available payment receipts submitted to the Court could not be viewed as valid documentary evidence since they bore stamps of a Bar association but were signed by the representative himself. Moreover, no legal-assistance contract between the applicant, or his grandfather, and the representative had been submitted to the Court. The random payment receipts from a translation centre were also insufficient to confirm translation expenses. The Government further pointed out that the representative was not mentioned in any of the domestic courts\u2019 decisions and that his involvement in the proceedings before the Court had been limited, most of the work having been done by the applicant\u2019s grandfather.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment228.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber awarded the applicant EUR 1,493 for legal fees and translation expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment229.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court finds no reason to question the sum granted by the Chamber to the applicant for his costs and expenses. It further finds that the invoices and payment receipts submitted by the applicant to the Court prove that he has paid his representative RUB 20,000 for his legal services in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. It also accepts in full the invoices and payment receipts relating to costs for translations and postal services.230.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court grants the applicant the full amount claimed, that is, EUR 1,493, for the proceedings before the Chamber and EUR 417 for the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, namely, a total amount of EUR 1,910, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest231.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28057":"I.\u00a0\u00a0SCOPE OF THE CASE95.\u00a0\u00a0In her submissions of 10 February 2013 made in reply to the Government\u2019s observations, the first applicant complained for the first time about the conditions of her detention in cell no. 409, in which she had been held from 27 January to 2 March 2012. More specifically, she alleged that although she had been pregnant, she had had to sleep on the upper level of a bunk bed.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that this grievance is not an elaboration on the first applicant\u2019s original complaint about the conditions of her detention with her baby from 14 March to 8\u00a0November 2012 in cell no. 408. Accordingly, the Court does not find it appropriate to take up this new matter in the context of the present application (see, for example, Irakli Mindadze v. Georgia, no. 17012\/09, \u00a7 25, 11 December 2012, with further references).II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE ALLEGED SHACKLING OF THE FIRST APPLICANT IN THE MATERNITY HOSPITAL97.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained that she had been shackled to her bed in the maternity hospital, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. This provision reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention, and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions99.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant maintained her complaint, relying on her version of events as summarised in paragraph 14 above. She emphasised that her shackling had been grossly unjustified, painful and humiliating given her physical and psychological state.100.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the first applicant had failed to submit any evidence to substantiate her allegation. They considered the statement by former nurse Ms P. relied on by her of no relevance, because it concerned events which had supposedly taken place about seven years earlier in a different region (see paragraph 24 above).101.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, they submitted that the first applicant\u2019s allegation had been refuted by the statements of the security guards and numerous members of hospital staff.102.\u00a0\u00a0They also observed that the first applicant had not been able to specify exactly how she had been shackled, and that her submissions in that regard had been inconsistent.103.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, they claimed that there had been a considerable delay in the first applicant raising her complaint in that regard at the domestic level.104.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant submitted in reply to the Government\u2019s observations that, given her condition at the time, she could not have been expected to remember all the factual details regarding her shackling in hospital.105.\u00a0\u00a0She also contested their interpretation of the statements of the hospital staff. In her opinion, they rather confirmed the accuracy of her allegation.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the parties are in dispute as to whether the impugned measure was applied in respect of the first applicant at all.107.\u00a0\u00a0The only evidence available in the case file relied on by both parties consists of the statements of the maternity hospital staff and the security guards.108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court agrees with the Government in so far as it also considers the statement of former nurse Ms P. irrelevant to the circumstances of the present case.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not, however, share the Government\u2019s opinion that the statements of the other witnesses refuted the first applicant\u2019s allegation. It observes in this connection that none of the six maternity hospital staff questioned by the domestic authorities in respect of that allegation stated that she had not been subjected to shackling in hospital; on the contrary, most of them witnessed her being shackled to a gynaecological examination chair or her bed (see paragraphs 20-22 above). It is true that according to several of those witnesses, the first applicant was not shackled during the delivery; however, she has never denied this in her submissions before the Court (see paragraph 14 above). Lastly, the Court takes note of the fact that the application of any security measures to the applicant was the direct responsibility of her security guards. Accordingly, it is not prepared to take at face value their statements denying her handcuffing (see paragraph 23 above).110.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, from the evidence at hand the Court finds it sufficiently established that the first applicant was subjected to continuous shackling in the maternity hospital from 22 to 25 May 2012.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that handcuffing does not normally give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where the measure has been applied in connection with lawful detention and does not entail the use of force or public exposure exceeding what is reasonably considered necessary. In this regard, it is important to consider, for instance, the danger of a person absconding or causing injury or damage (see Raninen v. Finland, 16\u00a0December 1997, \u00a7 56, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011VIII, and Henaf v. France, no. 65436\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 50-53, ECHR 2003\u2011XI). The Court has also held on many occasions that handcuffing or shackling of an ill or otherwise weak person is disproportionate to the requirements of security and implies an unjustifiable humiliation, whether or not intentional (see, for example, Okhrimenko v. Ukraine, no. 53896\/07, \u00a7 98, 15 October 2009, and Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no.\u00a028005\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0155 and 156, 14\u00a0March 2013).112.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the first applicant was already shackled to a gynaecological examination chair in the hospital admissions unit she had been taken to on the day of her baby\u2019s delivery (see paragraph 20 above). Any risk of her behaving violently or attempting to escape would have been hardly imaginable given her condition. In fact, it was never alleged that she had behaved aggressively towards the hospital staff or the police, or that she had attempted to escape or had posed a threat to her own safety.113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the first applicant\u2019s unjustified shackling continued after the delivery, when she was particularly sensitive.114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also attaches weight to the fact that she was guarded by three guards at all times. This measure appears to have been severe enough to respond to any potential risks.115.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the present case, where the impugned measure was applied to a woman suffering labour pains and immediately after the delivery, it amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.116.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this regard.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 IN RESPECT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE APPLICANTS\u2019 DETENTION117.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further complained under Article 3 of the Convention that they had been detained in poor conditions in the Kharkiv SIZO (see also paragraphs 25, 95 and 96 above), and that the second applicant had not been provided with adequate medical care.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0Physical conditions of detention119.\u00a0\u00a0The parties maintained their accounts as regards the physical conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention in the SIZO (see paragraphs 26-37 above).120.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to several statements of detainees who had shared the cell with the applicants and had been satisfied with the conditions of their detention (see paragraph 46 and the summary of the first two statements by Ms M. in paragraph 48 above).121.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant submitted that those detainees had been entirely dependent on the SIZO administration, so their statements could therefore not be relied on. She observed in this connection that Ms M. had changed her statement regarding the conditions of detention in the SIZO once she had been transferred to a prison (see paragraph 48 above). The first applicant, in her turn, referred to the statements of some other cellmates, criticising the conditions of their detention (see paragraphs 49 and 50 above).122.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant also submitted that cell no. 408 had not been equipped for pregnant women or women with babies. She presumed that the administration had prepared that cell before each inspection. More specifically, she suggested that the refrigerator and other appliances and furniture had been placed in the cell merely for inspections. To support her suspicion, the first applicant submitted, in particular, that the inspection on 1\u00a0February 2012 did not report that there had been any pregnant women in the SIZO at the time, whereas her presence there was proof of the opposite (see paragraph 38 above). She also observed that there was no mess or any other indication that detainees with babies were being held in the cell on the photographs provided by the Government (see paragraph 36 above).123.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the photograph taken of her in the special walking area (see paragraph 37 above), the first applicant submitted that she had been allowed to walk there \u201conly a couple of times\u201d.124.\u00a0\u00a0She did not contest the Government\u2019s submission regarding the considerable number of food parcels from her mother; however, in her opinion, it was rather indicative that the SIZO administration had failed to provide her with adequate nutrition.125.\u00a0Lastly, the first applicant referred to the CPT report following its delegation\u2019s visit to the Kharkiv SIZO from 29 November to 6 December 2011 (see paragraph 94 above) which, in her opinion, supported her allegation about poor detention conditions.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Medical care for the second applicant126.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant submitted that her newborn son, the second applicant, had not been provided with regular and adequate medical supervision and care. More specifically, she contended that he had not been examined by a paediatrician from 28 May to 10 September 2012. She noted that with no paediatrician in the medical unit of the SIZO, she had been fully dependent on the SIZO administration, who had ignored her requests for examinations of her son or for medical care for him, particularly when he had had stomachache. She also complained that her baby\u2019s health issues, phimosis and a patent foremen ovale (see paragraph 55 above), had not received proper attention from medical specialists. She also submitted that the second applicant had not had any vaccinations, contrary to the applicable regulations. Lastly, she submitted that inadequate records had been kept in respect of his growth, development and health, and that the relevant medical file in the SIZO had been forged (see paragraph 57 above).127.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the second applicant had been under constant medical supervision and provided with timely and sufficient medical care. They further contended that, even if there had been some minor issues with the child\u2019s health, they could be characterised as a rather normal condition for a newborn and not warranting any medical treatment. Lastly, the Government observed that the first applicant had not raised any complaints in this regard at the domestic level.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General considerations128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7\u00a095, ECHR 2002\u2011VI).129.\u00a0\u00a0As recognised in the applicable international documents, in particular the CPT\u2019s standards, it is a particularly problematic issue whether it should be possible for babies and young children to remain in prison with their mothers. The CPT has noted in this connection that \u201c[this] is a difficult question to answer given that, on the one hand, prisons clearly do not provide an appropriate environment for babies and young children while, on the other hand, the forcible separation of mothers and infants is highly undesirable. ... In the view of the CPT, the governing principle in all cases must be the welfare of the child.\u201d (see paragraph 93 above). Likewise, the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners state that \u201cdecisions to allow children to stay with their mothers in prison shall be based on the best interests of the children\u201d (see paragraph 91 above).130.\u00a0\u00a0The principle of the protection of a child\u2019s best interests has also been enshrined in the Court\u2019s case-law where children have been affected (see, for example, Kleuver v. Norway (dec.), no. 45837\/99, 30\u00a0April 2002), and X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853\/09, \u00a7\u00a095, ECHR\u00a02013).131.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court takes note of the WHO recommendations, according to which a healthy newborn must remain with the mother (see paragraph 92 above). This imposes on the authorities an obligation to create adequate conditions for those requirements to be implemented in practice, including in detention facilities.132.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that, strictly speaking, only the first applicant was detained, whereas her newborn son, the second applicant, was allowed to stay with her in the SIZO. He could not be separated from her, however, given his particularly young age. Accordingly, he remained under the full control of the authorities and it was their obligation to adequately secure his health and well-being.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Physical conditions of detention133.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held on many occasions that cases concerning allegations of inadequate conditions of detention do not lend themselves to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges something must prove that allegation), because in such instances only the respondent Government have access to information capable of corroborating or refuting such allegations. Accordingly, applicants might experience certain difficulties in procuring evidence to substantiate a complaint in that connection. Nonetheless, in such cases applicants may well be expected to submit at least a detailed account of the facts complained of and provide \u2013 to the greatest possible extent \u2013 some evidence in support of their complaints (see Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a032362\/02, \u00a7\u00a045, 20 May 2010). However, after the Court has given notice of the applicant\u2019s complaint to the Government, the burden is on the latter to collect and produce the relevant documents. A failure on their part to submit convincing evidence on material conditions of detention may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant\u2019s allegations (see Gubin v. Russia, no. 8217\/04, \u00a7 56, 17\u00a0June 2010, and Khudoyorov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 6847\/02, \u00a7 113, ECHR 2005\u2011X (extracts)).134.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the parties disagreed on many aspects concerning the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention. Furthermore, both parties relied on the statements of the first applicant\u2019s fellow detainees, which sometimes contradicted each other. It therefore remains to be seen which of the facts as presented in the case file could be regarded as being sufficiently established.135.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes from the outset that the first applicant\u2019s statement of 12 November 2012, given in one month after the Court applied Rule 39, in which she declared that she was entirely satisfied with the conditions in the SIZO (see paragraph 41 above), cannot be taken at face value. As the Court has previously held in a case involving similar statements, the applicant\u2019s position might be particularly vulnerable when he or she is held in custody with limited contact with his or her family or the outside world (see Enache v. Romania, no.\u00a010662\/06, \u00a7\u00a068, 1 April 2014).136.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the photographs provided by the Government as evidence. It further notes that the first applicant, even though she submitted that some of the furniture and appliances had been displayed there merely for reporting purposes, did not contest that the photographs were of the cell in which she had actually been detained. Nor did she say that the cell had been refurbished at any point during her detention. The Court therefore discards the description of that cell by the former detainee Ms Sa., which clearly contradicts what can be seen on the photographs (see paragraphs 36 and 49 above).137.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers it sufficiently established that the applicants were detained in a light cell in a good state of repair. As can also be seen from the photographs, the toilet was properly separated from the living area, contrary to the first applicant\u2019s submission in that regard (see paragraphs\u00a026 and 36 above).138.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the first applicant did not provide any factual details to substantiate her allegation about inadequate heating or any health-related risks posed by her sharing the cell with other inmates.139.\u00a0\u00a0As regards her allegation about a lack of hot water and an irregular supply of cold water, the Court notes that her account is quite detailed and is corroborated by the statements of several fellow detainees (see paragraphs\u00a026, 48 and 50 above). The Court does not consider that the Government\u2019s generally-worded submission to the contrary rebuts that allegation.140.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already criticised a detention facility for having an insufficient water supply resulting in a dirty environment arousing in a person feelings of anguish (see, for example, Vitkovskiy v. Ukraine, no.\u00a024938\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0120 and 121, 26\u00a0September 2013). In the present case the Court cannot but stress that adequate hygienic conditions are vital for a new-born baby and a nursing mother.141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the first applicant\u2019s allegation about insufficient and poor quality food in the SIZO is confirmed by the statements of her fellow detainee (see paragraph 48 above). The fact that her mother sent her about thirty parcels, often with the most basic foodstuffs, is another indication that such food was not provided to the first applicant by the SIZO administration (see paragraph\u00a043 above). The\u00a0Court has already held that where food given to an applicant is clearly insufficient, this in itself raises an issue under Article 3 of the Convention (see Kadi\u0137is v. Latvia (no. 2), no.\u00a062393\/00, \u00a7 55, 4 May 2006, and Stepuleac v. Moldova, no.\u00a08207\/06, \u00a7\u00a055, 6 November 2007). The issue becomes crucial in the case of a breastfeeding mother.142.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it does not escape the Court\u2019s attention that, as acknowledged by the respondent Government, on the days of court hearings the first applicant was obliged to miss at least one of her meals and was not provided with a packed lunch instead (see paragraph 33 above).143.\u00a0\u00a0The Court stresses that the absence of any restriction on the number of food parcels from the first applicant\u2019s relatives and, possibly, on being allowed to take her own food on hearing days was not a substitute for appropriate catering arrangements, because it is primarily the State that is responsible for the well-being of people deprived of their liberty (see Vlasov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 78146\/01, \u00a7 96, 12 June 2008).144.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that the first applicant did not receive sufficient and wholesome food corresponding to her needs as a breastfeeding mother in detention.145.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the Government did not provide convincing evidence to refute the first applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the duration and place of her daily outdoor walks with her baby. Moreover, the applicable legal provisions do not clearly establish the duration of daily walks for detained women with children (see paragraph 83 above). As compared to ordinary detainees who are entitled to one-hour daily walk, women with children may have the duration of their outdoor walks extended \u201cup to two hours\u201d. In other words, the failure to grant such an extension or a very insignificant extension would not appear to contravene that requirement.146.\u00a0\u00a0It is to be emphasised that when assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no.\u00a040907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR\u00a02001-II, and Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826\/03, \u00a7\u00a094, 22 May 2012).147.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that in the circumstances of the present case the cumulative effect of malnutrition of the first applicant, inadequate sanitary and hygiene arrangements for her and her newborn son, as well as insufficient outdoor walks, must have been of such an intensity as to induce in her physical suffering and mental anguish amounting to her and her child\u2019s inhuman and degrading treatment.148.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the physical conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention in the SIZO.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Medical care for the second applicant149.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical care in detention remains the most difficult element to determine. The mere fact that a detainee has been seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical care provided was adequate (see Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and\u00a013413\/04, \u00a7\u00a0116, 29 November 2007). The authorities must also ensure that a comprehensive record is kept of the detainee\u2019s state of health and his or her treatment while in detention (see, for example, Khudobin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2006-XII), that the diagnoses and care are prompt and accurate (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 115, and Melnik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006), and that where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at curing the detainee\u2019s diseases or preventing their aggravation, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109 and 114; Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4 October 2005; and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7 211, 13 July 2006). The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0116, and Holomiov v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 117, 7 November 2006).150.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008).151.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has already held (see paragraph 132 above), it was the authorities\u2019 obligation in the present case to provide adequate medical supervision and care for the second applicant as a newborn staying with his mother in a detention facility.152.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the second applicant remained in the SIZO for almost six months, starting from the fourth day of his life. As a newborn, he was particularly vulnerable and required close medical monitoring by a specialist; under the applicable regulations of the Ministry of Public Health, he was supposed to be examined by a paediatrician every week during the first month of his life and every month thereafter (see paragraph 86 above). The reality, however, was different.153.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds plausible the first applicant\u2019s allegation that some of the records in her son\u2019s medical file kept in the SIZO were inaccurate.154.\u00a0\u00a0It observes in this connection that one such inaccuracy concerns the date of the baby\u2019s initial medical examination after his discharge from the maternity hospital. As\u00a0submitted by the first applicant and confirmed by the chief doctor of the children\u2019s hospital, it had taken place on 28\u00a0May 2012, whereas the relevant record refers to an examination on 31\u00a0May 2012 (see paragraphs 53 and 54 above).155.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also considers that the case material provides a sufficient basis for a factual inference that, as alleged by the first applicant, her son had had no medical examinations between 28\u00a0June and 10\u00a0September 2012. The Court observes, in particular, that neither the SIZO administration nor the chief doctor of the local children\u2019s hospital was able to respond to the first applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s enquiries about the baby\u2019s health sent on 28\u00a0August and 6 September 2012 respectively. It was only after the complete medical examination (undertaken in an unrelated context \u2013 see paragraphs 62 and 63 above) that the SIZO administration sent the baby\u2019s medical file to the lawyer. Furthermore, if he had indeed been examined by a paediatrician on 12\u00a0June and 20 July 2012 as recorded in that file, it is not clear why the chief doctor of the children\u2019s hospital referred only to the examination on 28 May 2012 in his letter of 6\u00a0September 2012. The doctor further stated that it was impossible to provide any information on the child\u2019s health at the time in the absence of any requests for medical care for him until then (see paragraph 61 above).156.\u00a0\u00a0Another contradiction in the available documents does not escape the Court\u2019s attention. According to the chief doctor of the children\u2019s hospital, whenever the second applicant was examined by a paediatrician, it was without the first applicant present, whereas the SIZO administration recorded in the baby\u2019s medical file that the paediatrician had provided her with advice on childcare (see paragraphs\u00a054, 56 and 71 above).157.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers it established that the second applicant remained without any monitoring by a paediatrician from 28\u00a0May to 10 September 2012. Having particular regard to his young age, the Court considers this circumstance alone sufficient to conclude that adequate health-care standards were not met in the present case, without finding it necessary to analyse all the other factual details (such as the second applicant\u2019s health issues and the lack of vaccinations).158.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore finds that there has also been a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention in this regard.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST APPLICANT\u2019S PLACEMENT IN A METAL CAGE DURING COURT HEARINGS159.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant also complained under Article 3 of the Convention about her placement in a metal cage during court hearings.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility160.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits161.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant submitted that although she had been suspected of a violent criminal offence, her placement in a metal cage during court hearings had been grossly unjustified and humiliating.162.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the first applicant had been held behind the metal bars in the courtroom in accordance with the relevant domestic legislation. They explained that the bars were intended to separate defendants upon whom the preventive measure of detention had been imposed from the bench and those present in the courtroom, so that those individuals could be securely guarded during the court hearings.163.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the State authorities had not intended to humiliate or debase the first applicant. She had been held behind the metal bars in the interest of public safety. Furthermore, the measure of holding the first applicant behind metal bars could in no way have caused her distress or humiliation of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering or humiliation inherent in detention. The Government also observed that during the court hearing the first applicant\u2019s baby had been with a SIZO medical worker outside the cage and that he had been transferred to her every time when requested.164.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held in its recent judgment of the Grand Chamber in the case of Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia that holding a person in a metal cage during a trial constitutes in itself \u2013 having regard to its objectively degrading nature which is incompatible with the standards of civilised behaviour that are the hallmark of a democratic society \u2013 an affront to human dignity in breach of Article 3 ([GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a0138, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).165.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the first applicant was held in a metal cage during all the hearings in her case, which took place on 12 April, 17 May, 15 June, 2 and 31 August and 15\u00a0November 2012. During the first two hearings she was at a very advanced stage of pregnancy, whereas during the remaining four hearings she was a nursing mother separated from her baby in the courtroom by metal bars. In fact, no justification for such a restraint measure was even considered given the judge\u2019s position that the mere placement of the first applicant outside the cage would have been equal to her release, contrary to the custodial preventive measure applied (see paragraph 73 above).166.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore finds a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on this account.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION167.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage168.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 150,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, including EUR 50,000 for the first applicant and EUR\u00a0100,000 for the second applicant.169.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the above claim as unsubstantiated and exorbitant.170.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants suffered non-pecuniary damage on account of the violations of their rights under Article 3 of the Convention, which cannot be compensated for by the mere finding of a violation of their Convention rights. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41, the Court awards the first applicant EUR\u00a012,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount. The Court also awards the second applicant EUR 7,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses171.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed EUR 13,059 in respect of their legal representation, comprising approximately 124\u00a0hours of legal work in the domestic proceedings and the proceedings before the Court.172.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the above claims.173.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must first establish whether the costs and expenses indicated by the first applicant were actually incurred and, secondly, whether they were necessary (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, \u00a7 220, Series A no. 324).174.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the first applicant the sum of EUR 3,000 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest175.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28076":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION114.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the State authorities had failed to investigate effectively their allegations of indecent sexual acts perpetrated against them by a sports coach from a State sports school, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. By doing so, the State had failed to exercise its positive obligation of preventing indecent acts against minors and of protecting their physical integrity, in violation of Article 8.115.\u00a0\u00a0The provisions of the Convention relied upon by the applicants, in so far as relevant, read as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 8\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19\u00a0February 1998, \u00a7 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011I), finds that the domestic authorities\u2019 procedural obligation as regards the applicants\u2019 allegations of indecent sexual acts by O.B. falls within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Abuse of the right of individual application(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions117.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, the Government \u2013 relying on Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and Rule 47 \u00a7 6 of the Rules of Court (Rule 47 \u00a7 6 until 6\u00a0May 2013, currently Rule 47 \u00a7 7) \u2013 invited the Court to reject the present application as abusive.118.\u00a0\u00a0They argued that the applicants had failed to disclose to the Court the information about civil proceedings against the coach, O.B., including the first instance judgment (see paragraphs 90 et seq. above). In the Government\u2019s view these civil proceedings were closely related to the subject matter of the applicants\u2019 complaints before the Court, which had been prevented from adopting an informed decision prior to its communication of the application to the Government.119.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the applicants had not sufficiently explained their failure to disclose the said information.120.\u00a0\u00a0In response to the Government\u2019s allegation of an abuse, the applicants\u2019 counsel agreed that the civil claim against O.B. had been lodged prior to their application to the Court. She added that the application to the Court had been made within six months of the final decision in the criminal proceedings.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment121.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the Government\u2019s argument of abuse, the Court reiterates that the submission of incomplete and thus misleading information may amount to an abuse of the right of application, especially if the information concerns the very core of the case and no sufficient explanation has been provided for the failure to disclose that information (see Gross v.\u00a0Switzerland [GC], no.\u00a067810\/10, \u00a7 28, ECHR 2014, with further case-law references).122.\u00a0\u00a0The same applies if new, important developments have occurred during the proceedings before the Court and the applicant, despite being expressly required to do so by Rule 47 \u00a7 7 (former Rule 47 \u00a7 6) of the Rules of Court, has failed to disclose that information to the Court, thereby preventing it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the facts. However, even in such cases, the applicant\u2019s intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty (ibid.).123.\u00a0\u00a0As to the civil proceedings against O.B., the Court has indeed accepted that in respect of less serious acts between individuals, the obligation of the State under Article 8 to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection could also consist of civil-law remedies (see S\u00f6derman, cited above, \u00a7 85). In that light, the counsel\u2019s failure to disclose to the Court the information about civil proceedings against O.B. is problematic.124.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Court notes that the applicants\u2019 complaints before it were directed specifically at a criminal investigation by the State authorities into the applicants\u2019 allegations of indecent sexual acts perpetrated by O.B. The civil proceedings against O.B. were different in their judicial character, and they are not decisive for examination of the complaints pursued by the applicants before the Court.125.\u00a0\u00a0In that light, the Court is unable to conclude with sufficient certainty that the applicants failed to provide the said information with the intention of misleading the Court.126.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court does not find it appropriate to declare the application inadmissible as abusive within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Victim status(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions127.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicants could no longer claim under Article 34 of the Convention to be the victims of a violation of Article 8.128.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that the civil courts in the first instance proceedings against O.B. had expressly acknowledged a breach of the applicants\u2019 rights and had redressed the situation by awarding them compensation. The applicants had not appealed against that first instance judgment, which indicated their satisfaction with it.129.\u00a0\u00a0However, the applicants\u2019 counsel contested that the applicants\u2019 grievances had been remedied by the civil proceedings against O.B. She argued that a civil action could not result in a punishment comparable to that in criminal proceedings. If O.B. had received a criminal-law penalty he would not have been able to continue coaching minors. Civil proceedings, on the other hand, could not exclude similar occurrences in the future.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the question raised by the Government as to whether the applicants may still claim to be the victims of a violation of Article 8 in respect of the alleged inadequate criminal investigation conducted by the State authorities, where the possibility of civil-law proceedings also existed, is closely linked to the question of whether in the present case it was only by way of a criminal investigation that the State could meet its positive obligation under Article 8.131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore decides to join the Government\u2019s objection of a lack of victim status to the merits and will examine it further below.3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants\u2019 complaints raise questions of law which are sufficiently serious that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits, and no other grounds for declaring them inadmissible have been established. The Court therefore declares the applicants\u2019 complaints admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants133.\u00a0\u00a0It was pleaded on behalf of the applicants that the investigation into the alleged indecent sexual acts perpetrated against them by O.B. had not been effective.134.\u00a0\u00a0In the application to the Court, the applicants\u2019 counsel submitted that the investigating authorities had not interviewed all students who had attended the sauna. Also, the investigator, T.M., had not questioned the sports school\u2019s doctor, S.K., as requested by the first and second applicants\u2019 mother, who had learnt from S.K. that the sauna used by O.B. had been old and unhygienic and had not been recommended for children. Moreover, the investigator had not taken the statements from the boys who had travelled with the third applicant and O.B. to Lithuania. The events in Lithuania had been fully ignored.135.\u00a0\u00a0The investigator\u2019s conclusion that the girls had voluntarily undressed for the sauna was incorrect. When the second applicant, aged fourteen at the time, had attended the sauna half-undressed, O.B. had startled her by entering the sauna without warning. Instead of apologising and leaving immediately, he had ridiculed her and had pressurised her to undress. The second applicant never did attend the sauna undressed fully, because she talked to her parents in the meantime. Also, according to the first and third applicants, O.B. had pressurised the students into attending the sauna naked by alleging that wearing swimsuits in the sauna was unhealthy. The psychologist\u2019s report ordered by the police had not concluded that the applicants had undressed voluntarily. On the contrary, it emerged that they had been manipulated and that the first and third applicants had been unable to resist due to their personality. These aspects had been disregarded by the investigator, T.M. The reasons which had led O.B.\u2019s under-age students to undress for the sauna had not been examined.136.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the investigating authorities had not considered the circumstance that the girls had been dependent upon and subordinated to O.B. and therefore had been unable to defy him. They had been taught to obey their coach and had listened to him. The children, below the age of eighteen, had been handed into O.B.\u2019s care as coach. Everything had taken place under his direction.137.\u00a0\u00a0The investigating authorities had, furthermore, disregarded the fact that O.B. had touched the girls\u2019 intimate body parts during massages and when entering their changing room. The second applicant had seen O.B. laying the third applicant on her back and massaging one of her legs while holding it up. As the girls could have massaged their legs themselves, it was evident that in this case the girl\u2019s body had been used for a sexual purpose. It also emerged that none of the girls\u2019 parents had been aware of O.B. massaging their daughters naked in sauna.138.\u00a0\u00a0It was further argued that the investigator, T.M., had not attempted to find out O.B.\u2019s motive in pressurising the girls to undress for the sauna and touching their intimate body parts during massages. The coach had not suggested that the girls wear cotton underwear in the sauna. None of the other sport school\u2019s coaches had massaged girls naked. No psychiatric report had been ordered for O.B.139.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the report by the psychologist K.V. had not been taken into consideration, in particular as regards the consequences suffered by the applicants.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government140.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to the Court\u2019s finding in the case of M.\u00a0and C. v. Romania (no. 29032\/04, \u00a7 111, 27 September 2011), pointing out that States have a positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal-law provisions effectively punishing sexual abuse of children and to apply them in practice through effective investigation and prosecution. However, only serious offences such as rape and violent physical and sexual abuse of minors by private individuals raised the State\u2019s positive obligation under Articles 3 and 8 and extended it to include the requirement of an effective criminal investigation. In support of this argument the Government relied on M.C. v. Bulgaria (no. 39272\/98, ECHR 2003\u2011XII); C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania (no.\u00a026692\/05, 20\u00a0March 2012); and M. and C. v. Romania (cited above). The present case in the Government\u2019s view concerned entirely different factual circumstances.141.\u00a0\u00a0O.B.\u2019s behaviour had not reached the threshold of criminal sexual assault within the meaning of the Court\u2019s case-law, which related to the most appalling examples of child abuse. Neither did it fall within the notion of \u201csexual abuse\u201d under the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, which left the term \u201csexual activities\u201d undefined (see paragraphs 112 and 113 above). At the same time, the \u201csexual abuse\u201d had to be committed intentionally for there to be a criminal liability. That approach was followed in the Criminal Law, under the provisions of which O.B.\u2019s conduct had not constituted a crime.142.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the allegations against O.B. had been brought before the State police more than two years after the disputed events. The investigation had been opened the same day. There had been conflicting versions and a complete lack of direct evidence. The State police had obtained testimonies from everyone who had any direct or indirect information relevant to the case, including the applicants and the sports school\u2019s students and staff. Every facet thus had been examined. Also, a psychologist\u2019s report had been ordered. In particular, with regard to the applicants\u2019 argument that O.B. should be punished, the Government emphasised that the obligation to investigate was not an obligation as to results but as to means.143.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the psychologist\u2019s report obtained by the applicants\u2019 parents, the Government submitted that it had pursued an aim and employed a method different from those encompassed by the police-ordered report. The former had been conducted at the expense of the applicants\u2019 parents, whereas the latter had aimed to answer the questions posed by the investigating authority. What is more, the conclusions of the psychologist engaged by the applicants\u2019 parents had been obtained after the investigation by the State police had been concluded. This aspect and the delay of almost ten months between the criminal complaint and the parents\u2019 decision to obtain their own psychologist\u2019s report had undermined that action\u2019s credibility and effectiveness.144.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed that the national authorities had failed to take note of the psychologist\u2019s report furnished by the applicants\u2019 parents. Even though it had been produced after the investigation by the State police had been closed, the prosecution service had familiarised themselves with it and had reflected it in their decisions.145.\u00a0\u00a0The aforementioned psychologist\u2019s report could not have contributed to the reopening of the criminal proceedings. This is because the Criminal Law required that the offence be committed intentionally, whereas the report had only suggested that the applicants exhibited the symptoms of psychological trauma. The report had, furthermore, been delivered three and a half years after the events in question. Even if the applicants had suffered a traumatic experience in November 2011, it could have been triggered by other factors, such as peer or parental pressure, contact with investigating authorities or psychiatric examination. Also, no such symptoms had been evident in the earlier psychologist\u2019s report, delivered more than two years after the events in issue.146.\u00a0\u00a0As regards civil-law remedies, the Government pointed out the proceedings against O.B., and, by reference to Blumberga v. Latvia (no.\u00a070930\/01, 14 October 2008), argued that if the applicants had considered the criminal investigation to be ineffective, it was incumbent on them to pursue civil proceedings. The outcome of the criminal proceedings was not determinative for their success. In that regard they also referred to Y\u00a0v. Latvia (no. 61183\/08, \u00a7\u00a071, 21\u00a0October\u00a02014). The fact that the applicants had not appealed against the first instance judgment indicated that they had been satisfied with the sums awarded. The civil proceedings had afforded sufficient protection of the applicants\u2019 right to respect for private life, as required by Article 8 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles147.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities. However, this provision does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there are positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see S\u00f6derman, cited above, \u00a7\u00a078, with further references).The choice of the means calculated to secure compliance with Article 8 of the Convention in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that falls within the Contracting States\u2019 margin of appreciation, whether the obligations on the State are positive or negative. There are different ways of ensuring respect for private life and the nature of the State\u2019s obligation will depend on the particular aspect of private life that is at issue. Where a particularly important facet of an individual\u2019s existence or identity is at stake, or where the activities at stake involve a most intimate aspect of private life, the margin allowed to the State is correspondingly narrowed (see ibid., \u00a7 79, with further references).148.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding, more specifically, serious acts such as rape and sexual abuse of children, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, it falls upon the member States to ensure that efficient criminal-law provisions are in place (see, for example, X and Y v.\u00a0the\u00a0Netherlands, 26 March 1985, \u00a7 27, Series A no. 91, and M.C. v.\u00a0Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 150). This obligation stems also from other international instruments, such as, inter alia, Articles 19 and 34 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and Chapter VI, \u201cSubstantive criminal law\u201d, of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (see paragraphs 110 and 112 above) (see S\u00f6derman, cited above, \u00a7 82).149.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning such serious acts, the State\u2019s positive obligation under Articles 3 and 8 to safeguard the individual\u2019s physical integrity may also extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of the criminal investigation (see, among other authorities, C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, cited above, \u00a7\u00a072; M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 22457\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 110, 15\u00a0November 2011; and M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 152) and to the possibility of obtaining reparation and redress (see, mutatis mutandis, C.A.S. and C.S. v.\u00a0Romania, cited above, \u00a7 72), although there is no absolute right to obtain the prosecution or conviction of any particular person where there were no culpable failures in seeking to hold perpetrators of criminal offences accountable (see, for example, Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a032457\/04, \u00a7 64, 27 November 2007, and Szula v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 18727\/06, 4 January 2007).150.\u00a0\u00a0As to acts which do not attain the seriousness of those at issue in X\u00a0and Y v. the Netherlands (cited above) and M.C. v Bulgaria (cited above), the Court has examined under Article 8 the State\u2019s obligation to protect, for example, a minor against malicious misrepresentation (see K.U. v. Finland, no. 2872\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 45-49, ECHR 2008). The act in that case did not involve any physical violence, but could not be considered trivial as it entailed a potential threat to the minor\u2019s physical and mental welfare, brought about by the impugned situation, namely that he had been made a target for approaches by paedophiles. The act constituted a criminal offence under domestic law and the Court considered that practical and effective protection of the applicant required the availability of a remedy enabling the actual offender to be identified and brought to justice.151.\u00a0\u00a0More generally, however, in respect of less serious acts between individuals which may nonetheless violate psychological integrity, the obligation of the State under Article 8 to maintain and implement an adequate legal framework affording protection does not always require that an efficient criminal-law provision covering the specific act be in place. The legal framework could also consist of civil-law remedies capable of affording sufficient protection (see S\u00f6derman, cited above, \u00a7 85, with further references).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application in the present case152.\u00a0\u00a0There is no dispute between the parties as to the applicability of Article 8. The facts allegedly underlying the complaints concern the issue of \u201cprivate life\u201d, a concept which covers the physical and moral integrity of the person. The Court further notes that the applicants were below the age of majority at the material time and the alleged incidents took place in the course of their coaching by O.B., to whom the applicants had been entrusted by their parents.153.\u00a0\u00a0It is worth noting that while the applicants did not complain of a lack of legal framework affording protection against acts allegedly committed by O.B., they argued that the State had not complied with its obligation to conduct an effective criminal investigation. They submitted that civil proceedings against O.B. were insufficient and contended that an effective criminal investigation was the only way that the State could fulfil its positive obligation under Article 8.154.\u00a0\u00a0Further to these preliminary observations, the Court will proceed to examine whether, in the specific circumstances of the case before it, the State was required under Article 8 to ensure an effective criminal investigation. As the acts at issue were of differing seriousness and thus affected the applicants\u2019 intimate aspects of private life to varying degrees, the Court will assess the said matter in relation to each set of circumstances.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Acts concerning the second applicant, O.B.\u2019s entering the changing room and events in Lithuania155.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that in S\u00f6derman (cited above) it did not consider that the stepfather\u2019s attempting to film his stepdaughter \u2013 who was aged fourteen at the material time \u2013 in the bathroom naked attained the seriousness of the grave acts in the Court\u2019s case-law involving the rape and sexual abuse of children, considered not only under Article 8 but also Article 3 of the Convention (ibid, cited above, \u00a7 86 in fine). While in S\u00f6derman (cited above) the Court addressed the existence of an adequate legal framework providing the stepdaughter with protection against her stepfather\u2019s conduct rather than the requirement for criminal investigation of such conduct (ibid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 88 and 89) \u2013 which is the aspect the Court is concerned with in the present case \u2013 it is notable that in S\u00f6derman (cited above) the Court found that recourse to the criminal law was not necessarily the only way that the respondent State could fulfil its obligation under Article 8 (ibid, cited above, \u00a7 108). The incident in that case could in fact also be addressed outside the criminal justice framework (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0108 et seq., where the Court considered the existence of appropriate civil-law remedies). Since in the present case the applicants are seeking an effective criminal investigation, that is to say, for their allegations to be dealt with through the criminal justice mechanism, the Court\u2019s assessment of the situation in S\u00f6derman (cited above) is of relevance here.156.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to O.B.\u2019s alleged conduct vis \u00e0 vis the third applicant during their trip to Lithuania, the Court observes that \u2013 as in S\u00f6derman (cited above, \u00a7 86) \u2013 it did not involve any physical violence or abuse. The third applicant did not allege to the investigating authorities that O.B. had touched her in a sexual manner (see paragraphs 34 and 35 above). As to O.B.\u2019s entering the changing room, the applicants had claimed that he had, as if by accident, touched the girls on their intimate body parts. The second applicant claimed that she had prevented O.B. from touching her and did not allege that she had been massaged by him.157.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the above-mentioned incidents, the Court is unable to discern any alleged conduct on the part of O.B. of such gravity that an effective criminal investigation would be the only way for the State to fulfil its positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court reaches the same conclusion as regards the second applicant\u2019s allegation that O.B. had entered the sauna when she had been half-undressed and had ridiculed her.158.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there has been no breach of Article 8 on that account. In the view of this finding, the Court deems it unnecessary to examine the Government\u2019s objection of the lack of victim status in relation to the above-mentioned events.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The first and third applicants\u2019 attendance of the sauna and their massaging by O.B.159.\u00a0\u00a0The situation with regard to the first and third applicants\u2019 attendance of the sauna and their massaging by O.B. is different, however. While these incidents did not attain the seriousness of X and Y v. the Netherlands (cited above), in which a breach of Article 8 arose from the lack of an effective criminal sanction in respect of the rape of a girl with disabilities, they cannot be treated as trivial (see, mutatis mutandis, K.U.\u00a0v.\u00a0Finland, cited above, \u00a7 45).160.\u00a0\u00a0The allegations triggered a criminal investigation under section\u00a0162\u00a0of the Criminal Law (sexual abuse). They concerned under-age girls who had been exposed naked in front of an adult male who was thus able to observe their intimate body parts during massages in the sauna. O.B. himself described the massage procedure as involving the lifting up of one or both legs (see paragraph 46 above). The first applicant submitted that O.B. had touched her between her legs (see paragraph 37 above). The second applicant attested to O.B.\u2019s massaging the third applicant in the sauna (see paragraph 27 above). The above-mentioned allegations therefore concerned intimate aspects of the first and third applicants\u2019 private lives.161.\u00a0\u00a0The Court in particular attaches importance to the fact that the incidents took place in the context of a relationship of trust and authority resulting from O.B.\u2019s position as an educator with respect to the applicants, who were vulnerable persons due to their young age. Also, as acknowledged by the domestic courts it was not a tradition in Latvia to appear naked \u2013 even in the sauna \u2013 in front of opposite sex, and massaging naked girls with a besom had been unethical and in contravention of general moral principles (see paragraph 95 above). The incidents in issue were even of greater seriousness and the police considered that a criminal investigation was required.162.\u00a0\u00a0Mindful of the seriousness of the case and that it might have fallen under section 162 of the Criminal Law, the Court takes the view that the State was required under Article 8 to put that criminal-law provision into practice through the conduct of an effective investigation.163.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s argument concerning the civil proceedings, effective deterrence of the acts such as those alleged in the present case is indispensable and it can be achieved only by applying criminal-law provisions in practice through the conduct of an effective investigation (see, mutatis mutandis, K.U. v. Finland, cited above, \u00a7\u00a043, and Remetin v.\u00a0Croatia, no.\u00a029525\/10, \u00a7 76, 11 December 2012).164.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s objection formulated as the lack of victim status must be rejected. For the same reasons the Court is unable to accept the Government\u2019s argument that, if the applicants found the criminal investigation to be ineffective, it was incumbent on them to pursue civil proceedings (see paragraph 146 above).165.\u00a0\u00a0Turning next to the criminal investigation conducted by the domestic authorities, the Court reiterates that it is not concerned with allegations of errors or isolated omissions in the investigation; that it cannot replace the domestic authorities in the assessment of the facts of the case; and that it cannot make any decision as to the alleged perpetrator\u2019s criminal responsibility. It was for the authorities to explore all the facts and reach a decision on the basis of an assessment of all the surrounding circumstances (see C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, cited above \u00a7\u00a077).166.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the steps taken by the Latvian authorities, the Court observes that the police opened criminal investigation on the day the alleged crime was brought to their attention (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). Soon after, they apprehended and questioned O.B. as a suspect (see\u00a0paragraph 44 above). From January to August 2010 they questioned numerous witnesses (see paragraphs 50-58 above), including the applicants who were granted the status of injured parties in the proceedings (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a022 above), and ordered the psychologist\u2019s report (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a036 above).167.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the first and third applicants argued that the investigating authorities did not question the sports school\u2019s doctor S.K. or that they did not consider the report by the psychologist K.V., the Court notes that an important issue of the investigation was whether O.B. had acted with a sexual purpose, an element required under section 162 of the Criminal Law (see paragraphs 61, 69, 75 and 84 above). The Court is not persuaded that the evidence noted by the applicants could have changed the assessment as regards the mental element of the alleged crime. In particular, the applicants submitted that S.K. could have given evidence in relation to the poor state of the sauna (see paragraph\u00a0134 above), and the report by K.V. assessed the consequences caused to the applicants, namely, that the first applicant had suffered psychological trauma and the third applicant exhibited possible post-traumatic stress symptoms (see paragraphs 66, 86, 88 and 139 above).168.\u00a0\u00a0It is true that the investigating authorities did not question A.F. and A.B., who according to the applicants had attended the sauna (see paragraph\u00a029 above). At the same time, the mother of A.F. stated that according to A.F. the coach had not harassed the girls and that she had undressed for the sauna following the example of the other girls (see\u00a0paragraph 53 above), and from the evidence furnished to the Court it emerged that A.B. was a relative of the coach (see paragraph 29 above).169.\u00a0\u00a0The investigating authorities questioned the other two students who according to the applicants had attended the sauna, V.A. and K.D. It emerged however that V.A. had attended the sauna only a couple of times (see paragraphs 29 and 51 above), and K.D. stated that she had trained with O.B. until 2008 (see paragraph 52 above). The statements from other students or their parents did not produce any leads as regards the mental element of the alleged crime.170.\u00a0\u00a0While the Latvian authorities therefore faced a difficult task, as they were confronted with two conflicting versions of the events and little direct evidence, the Court is unable to discern that they failed to take the reasonable steps available to them to obtain evidence concerning the alleged incidents. Also, their reaction to the complaint was prompt; no delays emerged in identifying witnesses, taking statements or obtaining the psychologist\u2019s report.171.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the evidence collected, the investigator concluded that there was no case to answer (see paragraphs 59-61 above). This conclusion was subsequently affirmed by the prosecution service (see paragraphs 67-70, 74-76, and 83-85 above). The Court in particular notes that they could not establish that O.B. had acted with a sexual purpose.172.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the first and third applicants argued that the investigator and the prosecution service had incorrectly assessed O.B.\u2019s motive, the Court reiterates that, as a general rule, it is for the domestic authorities to assess the evidence before them. The Court, having examined the documents in its possession, finds no reason to doubt the assessment by the investigator or the prosecution service.173.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing and being mindful of its subsidiary role the Court is unable to conclude that the investigation into the allegations of the first and third applicants concerning their attendance of the sauna and their massaging by O.B. revealed significant shortcomings (see regarding the \u201csignificant flaw\u201d test for the State\u2019s positive obligation of investigation S\u00f6derman, cited above, \u00a7 90).174.\u00a0\u00a0The Latvian authorities therefore met their positive obligation to conduct an effective investigation in that regard and to ensure adequate protection of the first and third applicants\u2019 private life.175.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of the first and third applicants.","28093":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3, 8 AND 14 OF THE CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 12 TO THE CONVENTION47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained under Articles 3, 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention about the failure to investigate adequately their criminal complaints concerning acts of violence motivated by hatred against homosexuals, and more generally about the lack of adequate legislative and other measures to combat hate crimes directed against the LGBTI minority. They further complained that, when conducting the investigation, the authorities did not take into account the fact that the offences against them were motivated by their sexual orientation. They therefore failed to meet the procedural obligations enshrined in the above Articles.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case and does not consider itself bound by the characterisation given by an applicant or a government (see, among the most recent authorities, Gherghina v. Romania (dec.) [GC], no. 42219\/07, \u00a7\u00a059, 18 September 2015). Therefore, when communicating these complaints, it considered that they would be more appropriately examined under Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention (which Protocol became applicable as regards Romania on 1\u00a0November 2006), which read as follows:Article 3 (prohibition of torture)\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 8 (right to respect for private and family life)\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201dArticle 14 (prohibition of discrimination)\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201dArticle 1 of Protocol No. 12 (General prohibition of discrimination)\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.2.\u00a0\u00a0No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Preliminary objections49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government raised two preliminary objections concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six-month time-limit for lodging the application with the Court.(a)\u00a0\u00a0Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0The Government50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies for the alleged discrimination as regards both the motives behind the incident and the allegedly racist attitudes of the investigators. They enumerated all the domestic laws dealing with discrimination and argued that the applicants should have lodged a complaint with the C.N.C.D. A favourable decision from the Council would have allowed them to seek damages before the domestic courts.51.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, they argued that the applicants could have relied on Decree no. 31\/1954 taken in conjunction with Articles 998-999 of the former Civil Code in force at the relevant date to seek redress for an alleged infringement of their non-pecuniary rights. They made reference to the domestic case-law presented in Man and Others v. Romania, no.\u00a039273\/07 (case communicated on 4 October 2012 to the respondent Government).52.\u00a0\u00a0They further contended that the applicants should have lodged criminal complaints against the investigators both for protracting the investigations and for the alleged discrimination against the applicants.(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants pointed out that the Government had done no more than refer to the legislation in place rather than providing any relevant case\u2011law citations to support the alleged effectiveness of the remedies invoked.54.\u00a0\u00a0They further contended that the objection raised pertained exclusively to the complaint of discrimination and not to the case as a whole.55.\u00a0\u00a0They considered that they had done everything that could reasonably have been expected of them to exhaust the domestic remedies: they had raised all their complaints at the domestic level and pursued the chosen avenues until their conclusion. They contended that as victims of hate crimes, they have to rely exclusively on a criminal investigation, the authorities being the only ones having the means to hold the culprits accountable for their deeds. For this reason, the only effective domestic remedy is a criminal investigation carried out in a timely manner and capable of identifying and holding accountable the culprits. None of the remedies indicated by the Government was therefore effective. Moreover, in so far as the alleged discrimination in the investigation was concerned, those remedies could only be used at the end of the investigation itself, when it would be known to the applicants who was responsible for each investigative measure. They reiterated that access to the criminal file was denied them for six years (until 2012). To start fresh proceedings before the civil courts or the C.N.C.D. at that point would have been ineffective because of the long period of time that had elapsed from the date of the events.56.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, they point out that the C.N.C.D. would not be able to deal with criminal offences such as the ones perpetrated in the instant case, as the police and prosecutor\u2019s office are the only authorities with power in that sphere. The Council has also declared any alleged discrimination perpetrated within the police to be outside the scope of its activity. They made reference to the C.N.C.D.\u2019s decision no. 108 of 28 March 2012 (paragraph 44 above).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0General principles57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is a fundamental feature of the machinery of protection established by the Convention that it is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. This Court is concerned with the supervision of the implementation by Contracting States of their obligations under the Convention. It should not take on the role of the Contracting States, whose responsibility it is to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined therein are respected and protected at a domestic level. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is based on the assumption \u2013 reflected in Article 13 of the Convention, with which it has a close affinity \u2013 that there is an effective remedy available in respect of the alleged violation. The rule is therefore an indispensable part of the functioning of this system of protection (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 65, Reports 1996\u2011IV; Gherghina, cited above, \u00a7 83; Mocanu and Others v.\u00a0Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7 220, ECHR\u00a02014 (extracts); and Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], no. 17153\/11 and 29 other cases, \u00a7 69, 25\u00a0March 2014).58.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires an applicant to make normal use of the remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7 66; Gherghina (dec.) [GC], cited above, \u00a7 85; and Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7 71).59.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court has also frequently underlined the need to apply the exhaustion rule with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7 69; Kuri\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Slovenia [GC], no. 26828\/06, \u00a7 286, ECHR 2012 (extracts); Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7 76; and Gherghina (dec.) [GC], cited above, \u00a7 87).60.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the burden of proof, it is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time. Once this burden has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted, or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from this requirement (see McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0117 and 120, 10 September 2010; Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a077; and Gherghina(dec.) [GC], cited above, \u00a7 88).(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the case61.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that whilst the Government\u2019s objection refers primarily to the complaint of discrimination, it also touches upon the allegations of lack of an effective investigation. The Court will examine the arguments accordingly. It notes that the applicants lodged a criminal complaint with the domestic courts in which they raised both the issue of ill\u2011treatment and the issue of discrimination. When properly conducted, the criminal investigation constitutes an effective domestic remedy for these complaints: violence such as that suffered by the applicants is punishable by the domestic criminal law, the legal classification thereof being dependant on the concrete circumstances of the case and the severity of the injuries inflicted on the victims (see paragraph 39 above). All elements of the file, including allegations of racist motives for the crimes, should also be taken into account by the investigators. The applicants had no reason to doubt the effectiveness of this remedy.62.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the C.N.C.D. considers that it lacks jurisdiction to deal with both aspects of the applicants\u2019 complaint of discrimination: the first \u2013 violence \u2013 as it is a criminal offence and the second, police attitude \u2013 which should be dealt with internally by the police hierarchy (see paragraph 44 above). The applicant could only appeal to the C.N.C.D. once the identity of the perpetrators was established and they therefore had to wait for the criminal proceedings to end before they could start any proceedings before the Council. As the investigation ended without any establishment of responsibility concerning both the initial attack and the manner in which the investigation had been conducted, in practice, this remedy was not available to the applicants.63.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, failure to establish the identity of the attackers renders any civil law remedy futile in so far as the allegations of discrimination are concerned. As for the remaining remedies, the Government failed to demonstrate their effectiveness in the case.64.\u00a0\u00a0For these reasons, the Court is satisfied that the applicants availed themselves of the remedies which were available and sufficient for the purpose of this application. It therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s preliminary objection.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Six month rule(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0The Government65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicants had waited too long to bring their application to the Court, and in particular that they must have been aware of the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation long before they petitioned the public prosecutor on 19 March 2012. It was due to their own negligence that they had failed to act more expeditiously (they refer to Bayram and Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m v.\u00a0Turkey (dec.), no. 38587\/97, ECHR 2002\u2011III). More precisely, the alleged failure of the judicial authorities to act must have become gradually apparent by 2007, when the applicants had been informed that their case file had been logged by the Metro Police Station. They had failed to take any steps after that date to find out about the development of the investigation, even though it would have been in their interest to seek information, in particular since their initial complaint had been filed against unidentified persons.66.\u00a0\u00a0The onus had therefore been on the applicants to ensure that the claims were raised before both the relevant domestic authorities and the Court with sufficient expedition to ensure that they could be properly and fairly resolved. However, the applicants had waited until 9 August 2011 when, without referring to any new developments, they had merely contacted the authorities, with the effect of prodding them into some belated activity after a lull of almost four years.(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0The Applicants67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants contested the Government\u2019s position and their allegations of lack of interest in the domestic proceedings. They reiterated that they had lodged the criminal complaint on the same day as they had been subjected to the ill\u2011treatment, had produced most of the evidence in the case, and had identified two individuals in the group of attackers, one of them also by name (paragraph 19 above). The authorities had opened the investigations and had kept the file open all this time; the last investigative action had been recorded on 10\u00a0March 2011.68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that they had had no reason to doubt the effectiveness of the remedy. They pointed out that criminal investigations in Romania took a long time as a general rule. Furthermore, there had been no regular communication between the authorities and the victims: the latter had given testimony at the beginning of the investigation and had then been informed at the end about the outcome, but had had no access to the prosecution file until the end of the proceedings. They reiterated that they did not get access to the file until 9\u00a0May 2012.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0General principles69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, as a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where it is clear from the outset, however, that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of cognisance of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant (see, among other authorities, Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7\u00a0259, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). Article 35 \u00a7 1 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to bring his complaint before the Court before his position in connection with the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level, otherwise the principle of subsidiarity would be breached. Where an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 \u00a7 1 to take the start of the six-month period as the date when the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see idem, \u00a7\u00a0260 and Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, \u00a7\u00a0157, ECHR 2009).70.\u00a0\u00a0In cases of a \u201ccontinuing situation\u201d, the period starts to run afresh each day and it is in general only when that situation ends that the six\u2011month period actually starts to run. However, not all continuing situations are the same. Where time is of the essence in resolving the issues in a case, the burden is on the applicant to ensure that his or her claims are raised before the Court with the necessary expedition to ensure that they may be properly, and fairly, resolved (see Varnava and Others, cited above, \u00a7 160). This is particularly true with respect to complaints relating to any obligation under the Convention to investigate certain events. As the passage of time leads to the deterioration of evidence, time has an effect not only on the fulfilment of the State\u2019s obligation to investigate but also on the meaningfulness and effectiveness of the Court\u2019s own examination of the case. An applicant has to become active once it is clear that no effective investigation will be provided, in other words once it becomes apparent that the respondent State will not fulfil its obligation under the Convention (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0261-262 with further references).71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already held that, in cases concerning an investigation into ill-treatment, as in those concerning an investigation into the suspicious death of a relative, applicants are expected to take steps to keep track of the investigation\u2019s progress, or lack thereof, and to lodge their applications with due expedition once they are, or should have become, aware of the lack of any effective criminal investigation (see Bayram and Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m v.\u00a0Turkey (dec.), no. 38587\/97, ECHR 2002\u2011III).72.\u00a0\u00a0In line with the principle of subsidiarity, it is best for the facts of cases to be investigated and issues to be resolved, in so far as possible, at domestic level. It is in the interests of the applicant, and the efficacy of the Convention system, that the domestic authorities, who are best placed to do so, act to put right any alleged breaches of the Convention (see Varnava and Others, cited above, \u00a7 164).73.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the obligation of diligence incumbent on an applicant contains two distinct but closely linked aspects: on the one hand, the applicant must contact the domestic authorities promptly concerning progress in the investigation \u2013 which implies the need to apply to them with diligence, since any delay risks compromising the effectiveness of the investigation \u2013 and, on the other, he must lodge the application promptly with the Court as soon as he becomes aware or should have become aware that the investigation is not effective (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 264 with further references).(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the case74.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicants acted promptly in informing the authorities about the alleged crimes, lodging their criminal complaint within hours of the incident (see paragraph 16 above and, in contrast, Vartic v. Romania (dec.), no. 27631\/12, \u00a7\u00a048, 52 and 53 6 May 2014, and Manukyan v. Georgia (dec.), no.\u00a053073\/07, \u00a7 33, 9\u00a0October 2012). In the following days, they presented to the authorities all the evidential materials in their possession which could have contributed to the identification of the perpetrators and to the correct classification of the crimes allegedly committed.75.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation ran its course and on 4 October 2011 the prosecutor decided not to start a criminal prosecution in the case. This decision was neither triggered nor influenced in any manner by the applicants\u2019 activity (or lack thereof) during the investigation, specifically their requests for information, the latest being that on 9 August 2011 (see paragraph 29 above).76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants used the remedies at their disposal and contested the prosecutor\u2019s decision. Their objection led to a re-examination of that decision, first by the prosecutor in chief and then by the courts. Any of these instances possessed the power to quash the prosecutor\u2019s decision and to send the case back for re-examination. The mere fact that the decision was upheld at all levels does not, as such, deprive the remedy of its effectiveness (see, in contrast, Bayram and Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131mi, cited above; Mehmet Yaman v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a036812\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 43-49, 24 February 2015; and Tekpetek v.\u00a0Turkey (dec.), no.\u00a040314\/08, \u00a7 40, 25 November 2014).77.\u00a0\u00a0As a criminal investigation by the police is normally an effective means to address allegations of ill-treatment and discrimination, it was normal for the applicants to have put their trust in the system and to have waited for the end of the investigations before lodging their complaint with the Court. Notwithstanding this, the Court will examine whether the applicants observed their duty to keep themselves abreast of the investigations.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that while the file moved between various police stations, the applicants made inquiries about the progress of the case. It is true that once the jurisdiction was finally attributed to the Metro Police Station, there was a period of apparent inactivity on the part of the applicants. However, no negative consequences should be inferred from this attitude in so far as the investigation phase of criminal proceedings \u2012 being neither public nor adversarial \u2012 requires little input from the victims once they have given their statements and presented all the relevant elements in their possession (see paragraphs 36 and 37 above). It is normal for the investigators, police or prosecutor, not to have contact with the parties until the end of the investigation; it is also expected that the authorities act of their own motion (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 321; Georgescu v.\u00a0Romania (dec.), no. 4867\/03, \u00a7\u00a025, 22\u00a0October 2013; Bucure\u015fteanu v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a020558\/04, \u00a7\u00a042, 16 April 2013; and, mutatis mutandis, Poede v.\u00a0Romania, no. 40549\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 56-57, 15\u00a0September 2015).79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants could not be considered to have lost interest in their case as they eventually sought fresh information as to its progress, inquired about the case and got answers (see paragraph 29 above). Moreover, it was in their interest to await the outcome of the investigation before taking any other action (for instance seeking compensation for the damage suffered as a result of ill-treatment or discrimination) in order to know the identity of the culprits (see Varnava and Others, cited above, \u00a7 164).80.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that, for the purposes of Article 35 of the Convention, the six\u2011month period starts running from the date of the final decision in the case, that is to say from 9 August 2012 (see paragraph 33 above). Consequently, in lodging their application with the Court on 6 February 2012, the applicants observed the six-month time-limit in the case.The Government\u2019s objection should therefore be dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Other reasons for inadmissibility81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that their ill-treatment attained the threshold of severity necessary to come within the sphere of Article 3. They repeated the details of the attack and contended that both the way the attack had been carried out and the reason why they had been targeted caused them feelings of distress, anxiety and debasement. They had had to undergo group therapy for several weeks to recover from the attacks.83.\u00a0\u00a0They furthermore contended that a separate issue arose under Article\u00a08 of the Convention as, at the relevant time, the criminal law did not adequately address hate crimes and the law enforcement authorities did not give enough attention to such crimes (notably paragraphs 40 and 41 above). They reiterated that homosexuals are amongst the three most discriminated-against groups in Romania.84.\u00a0\u00a0As for the manner in which the investigation had been carried out, the applicants pointed out that the authorities had themselves acknowledged that they had been hampered by the fact that the file had not arrived at the Metro Police Station until almost one year after the events. Moreover, they objected to the manner in which the situation of the witness R.S.A. had been handled by the investigators who had failed to clarify the contradictions between his statements and the remaining evidence. He had also been considered as a sole witness even though he had been accompanied at the time by his girlfriend and both of them belonged to the group which had attacked the applicants and although Z.E. had also been an eye-witness and gave statements to the police in this capacity.85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further asserted that the investigation had lasted too long, and that its length could not be justified in so far as the facts under investigation had not been very complex. They reiterated that the prosecutor had taken ten months to decide which police station was competent to deal with the case. They further pointed out that the main investigative steps had been carried out over relatively short periods of time: 3 to 26 June 2006, 27\u00a0April to 12\u00a0June 2007 and October 2009, the remaining periods being unaccounted for.86.\u00a0\u00a0They also complained that, since the prosecution file had remained secret, they had not had the chance to contest the actions carried out until after the prosecutor had issued a decision in the case. At that point, the statute of limitation had come into effect and they had had no opportunity to ask that the investigations be continued under a different legal classification of the crimes committed. For example, they had suggested that if the prosecutor had examined the facts under the provisions of Article 323 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits association with the aim of committing crimes (see paragraph 39 above), the statute of limitations would not have been activated. They further reiterated that they had not had full access to the prosecution file until the autumn of 2012.87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also argued that the authorities had failed to take into account the sensitive nature of the case, in particular the seriousness of the attack, the acts perpetrated by the groups of counter-demonstrators, and R.S.A.\u2019s role in the incidents.88.\u00a0\u00a0They further contended that the respondent State did not treat hate crimes with seriousness sufficient to generate effective deterrence against such acts. This created a general feeling of vulnerability in the individuals and groups exposed to hate crime and discrimination. They reiterated that homosexuals are one of the three most discriminated-against groups in Romania. They made reference to the Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity commissioned by the Fundamental Rights Agency in respect of Romania. They also pointed to findings by the US State Department according to which investigations into complaints of alleged hate crimes are usually terminated due to length of proceedings, with the perpetrators remaining unidentified or not having the legal capacity to stand trial (e.g. children, drunks, mentally challenged). According to the same analysis extremist journalism is considered to be an expression of free speech.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicants had failed to produce sufficient evidence to overturn the findings of the domestic courts, which should therefore not be called into question. They considered that the complaint was of a \u201cfourth instance\u201d nature and that the Court should be sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and refrain from reassessing the case on the merits.90.\u00a0\u00a0Even assuming that the claim raised were arguable, they asserted that the investigation had been effective and thorough and had strived to find the truth. They reiterated that the applicants themselves had seemed uninterested for a long period of time as they had not sought information about the progress of the case. They further pointed that, despite the applicants\u2019 allegations to the contrary, the identity of the perpetrators had not been known to the investigators. Moreover, the Government claimed, the applicants themselves had made conflicting statements during the investigation.91.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities had been diligent in the investigation: they had obtained the names and photos of those who had been fined during the gay march and had heard testimony from witnesses. On 9 May 2012 they had also allowed the applicants\u2019 representative access to the prosecution file.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that the authorities had had an additional duty to take all reasonable steps to establish whether or not hatred or prejudice regarding different sexual orientation might have played a role in the events. They considered that the elements of the file could not lead to the conclusion that the incident had had the character of a hate crime. Nor had the authorities displayed any unwillingness or resistance to initiating a criminal investigation. Moreover, it did not appear that they had discouraged the applicants from pursuing their complaint.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also argued that there was no reason for the Court to examine the complaint raised under Article 8 of the Convention since, in their view, the essence of the applicants\u2019 complaint fell within the scope of the procedural obligations under Article 3.94.\u00a0\u00a0For the same reasons, they also argued that the Court should not undertake a separate examination of the complaint raised under Article 14 of the Convention and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention. They also reiterated that the applicants had had at their disposal an effective remedy to complain about discrimination in the form of the Anti\u2011discrimination Act.95.\u00a0\u00a0Based on the facts of the case, the Government contended that the evidence pointed to the conclusion that the incidents had constituted an isolated occurrence. The burden of proof therefore remained with the applicants, who had failed to prove that they had been discriminated against.96.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, they pointed out that the complaint raised under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention was identical to the complaint raised under Article 14.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Third parties(i)\u00a0\u00a0APADOR-CH97.\u00a0\u00a0The APADOR-CH explained that, following the filing of a criminal complaint under Articles 221-222 of the CCP, the investigating body may carry out preliminary investigations (acte premerg\u0103toare) under Article\u00a0224 of the CCP. This phase of criminal proceedings was intended to constitute a mere preliminary verification and was therefore not regulated in detail by the CCP. The rights and obligations of the participants in criminal proceedings were usually referred to in relation to the criminal investigation, which was opened by means of a formal decision subsequent to the preliminary investigation stage. This situation created a \u2018grey area\u2019 as regards the preliminary investigation, with a lack of clarity as to the rights and duties of the parties involved in this phase.98.\u00a0\u00a0The APADOR-CH further contended that, because of the requirement that special prescription periods be observed, the effectiveness of the investigations and trial depended directly on the expeditiousness of the authorities involved and argued that it was for the prosecutor to ensure that the investigations were carried out in a timely manner and that the investigating bodies (that is to say, the police) played an active role in the matter.99.\u00a0\u00a0The APADOR-CH further pointed out that, from their own experience, it appeared that criminal investigations could be stalled for years, especially in sensitive cases such as those involving violence and death caused by State agents. In such cases there reigned a general culture of impunity as regards police officers who abuse their position and of discrimination towards the victims of crimes based on their ethnic origins, sexual orientation, or beliefs. According to the APADOR-CH, the practice of the investigating bodies was to keep the file open and carry out limited verification procedures, while not formally instituting criminal investigations. At some point, a formal decision not to start criminal investigations would be issued by the prosecutor and notified to the victim. Until that moment, which might not occur until several years after the alleged crime, the victim had no access to the file.100.\u00a0\u00a0The APADOR-CH asserted that the duration of the criminal proceedings was especially important in cases of battery, bodily harm and aggravated bodily harm, where the prescription periods were rather short, varying from three to ten years. However, from the official statistics provided by the Superior Council of Magistrates and the Prosecutor\u2019s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, it appeared that only a very small percentage of such cases were terminated because of the prescription period (0.1% of the total cases solved by the prosecutor in 2011 and 2012). The APADOR-CH concluded that the victims of such crimes should expect that their complaint would be solved after a lengthier time (especially the more sensitive cases), but still within the prescription period.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0ILGA101.\u00a0\u00a0ILGA submitted several reports by international instances revealing a general climate of hostility towards LGBTI individuals in Europe. It pointed out that in the respondent State, the level of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was the fifth highest in the European Union.102.\u00a0\u00a0ILGA further pointed out that both the Court in its relevant case law and the Committee of Ministers in their recommendation recognised the necessity of introducing criminal laws in order to protect individuals from treatment contrary to Article 3 and the discriminatory motives behind such attacks. A failure to protect LGBTI individuals from violent attacks or to properly investigate allegations of hate crime and bring the perpetrators to justice threatened, in its view, not only the rights of the victims but also the rights of the LGBTI community as a whole, as they would fear becoming victims of violent homophobic crimes. It referred to Modinos v. Cyprus, 22\u00a0April 1993, Series A no.\u00a0259.103.\u00a0\u00a0ILGA stressed that merely passing laws prohibiting discriminatory offences, or increasing the punishment for them, was not sufficient to protect LGBTI individuals from attack, as evidenced by the many documented hate crimes that had occurred in countries where such crimes were specifically prohibited. In order to satisfy the requirements of the Convention in this area, the States must ensure genuine protection through effective investigation and prosecution. The obligation to investigate effectively was of particular relevance where treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention was a hate crime motivated by prejudice, including prejudice based on sexual orientation or gender identity. A failure to ensure that a prohibition was effective in practice would send out the message that the discrimination in question was not taken seriously and could even suggest tacit approval of the actions of the perpetrators because of a prejudice shared by the investigating authorities.104.\u00a0\u00a0ILGA called for adequate training for all law enforcement agencies in the field of LGBTI rights and hate crimes, arguing that a failure to provide such training should be regarded by the Court as a failure to provide adequate protection against hate crime. In this connection, reference was made to Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 192-198, ECHR 2009.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Scope of the case105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the authorities\u2019 duty to prevent hatred\u2011motivated violence on the part of private individuals and to investigate the existence of any possible discriminatory motive behind the act of violence can fall under the positive obligations enshrined in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, but may also be seen as forming part of the authorities\u2019 positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination. Owing to the interplay of the above provisions, issues such as those in the present case may indeed fall to be examined under one of these two provisions only \u2012 with no separate issue arising under any of the others \u2012 or may require simultaneous examination under several of these Articles. This is a question to be decided in each case in the light of its facts and the nature of the allegations made (see Ciorcan and Others v. Romania, nos. 29414\/09 and 44841\/09, \u00a7 158, 27 January 2015; Identoba and Others v. Georgia, no.\u00a073235\/12, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a063 and 64, 12 May 2015; Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, no. 15250\/02, \u00a7 70, ECHR 2005\u2011XIII (extracts); B.S. v. Spain, no.\u00a047159\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 59\u201163, 24 July 2012; and compare with Begheluri and Others v. Georgia, no.\u00a028490\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 171\u201179, 7 October 2014).106.\u00a0\u00a0In the particular circumstances of the present case, in view of the applicants\u2019 allegations that the violence perpetrated against them had homophobic overtones which had been completely overlooked by the authorities in the investigation, the Court finds that the most appropriate way to proceed would be to subject the applicants\u2019 complaints to a simultaneous dual examination under Articles 3 and 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (see Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a064) and if need be, of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0General principles107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates at the outset that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, for example, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2015; M. and M. v. Croatia, no. 10161\/13, \u00a7\u00a0131, 3 September 2015; A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7\u00a020, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VI; and Costello-Roberts v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 247\u2011C).108.\u00a0\u00a0Treatment has been held by the Court to be \u201cdegrading\u201d \u2012 and thus to fall within the scope of the prohibition set out in Article 3 of the Convention \u2012 if it causes in its victim feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority (see, for example, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 167, Series A no. 25, and Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7\u00a0203, ECHR 2012), if it humiliates or debases an individual (humiliation in the victim\u2019s own eyes, see Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 32, Reports 1997\u2011VIII, and\/or in other people\u2019s eyes, see Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 34529\/10, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2013 (extracts)), whether or not that was the aim (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0120, ECHR 2000\u2011IV), if it breaks the person\u2019s physical or moral resistance or drives him or her to act against his or her will or conscience (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a054810\/00, \u00a7 68, ECHR 2006\u2011IX), or if it shows a lack of respect for, or diminishes, human dignity (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 118 and 138, 17 July 2014).109.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation of the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure for everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill\u2011treatment administered by private individuals (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7\u00a0149, ECHR 2003\u2011XII, confirmed more recently in O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).110.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the absence of any direct State responsibility for acts of violence of such severity as to engage Article 3 of the Convention does not absolve the State from all obligations under this provision. In such cases, Article 3 requires that the authorities conduct an effective official investigation into the alleged ill-treatment, even if such treatment has been inflicted by private individuals (see M.C., cited above, \u00a7\u00a0151; C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692\/05, \u00a7 69, 20 March 2012; and Denis Vasilyev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 32704\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 98-99, 17 December 2009).111.\u00a0\u00a0Even though the scope of the State\u2019s positive obligations might differ between cases where treatment contrary to Article 3 has been inflicted through the involvement of State agents and cases where violence has been inflicted by private individuals, the requirements regarding an official investigation are similar. For the investigation to be regarded as \u201ceffective\u201d, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation as to the results to be achieved but as to the means to be employed. The authorities must have taken the steps reasonably available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and so on. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard, and a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. In cases under Article 3 of the Convention where the effectiveness of the official investigation has been at issue, the Court has often assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time. Consideration has been given to the opening of investigations, delays in taking statements and the length of time taken for the preliminary investigation (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0119\u2011123; Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 322; Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7 66; Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7 99; Denis Vasilyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0100 with further references; and Stoica v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a042722\/02, \u00a7 67, 4\u00a0March 2008). A prompt response by the authorities in investigating allegations of ill\u2011treatment may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their maintenance of the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. Tolerance by the authorities towards such acts cannot but undermine public confidence in the principle of lawfulness and the State\u2019s maintenance of the rule of law (see Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v.\u00a0Georgia, no. 71156\/01, \u00a7 97, 3 May 2007).112.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, when the official investigation has led to the institution of proceedings in the national courts, the proceedings as a whole, including the trial stage, must satisfy the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. In this respect the Court has already held that the protection mechanisms available under domestic law should operate in practice in a manner that allows for the examination of the merits of a particular case within a reasonable time (see, for example, W. v. Slovenia, no. 24125\/06, \u00a7 65, 23\u00a0January 2014).113.\u00a0\u00a0When investigating violent incidents, such as ill\u2011treatment, State authorities have a duty to take all reasonable steps to uncover any possible discriminatory motives, which the Court concedes is a difficult task. The respondent State\u2019s obligation to investigate possible discriminatory motives for a violent act is an obligation to use its best endeavours to do so, and is not absolute. The authorities must do whatever is reasonable in the circumstances to collect and secure the evidence, to explore all practical means of discovering the truth, and to deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may be indicative of violence induced by, for instance, racial or religious intolerance, or violence motivated by gender-based discrimination (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 160, ECHR 2005\u2011VII; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others, \u00a7\u00a7 138-42, cited above; and Mudric v. the Republic of Moldova, no.\u00a074839\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 60-64, 16 July 2013, recently reiterated in Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7 67). Treating violence and brutality arising from discriminatory attitudes on an equal footing with violence occurring in cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. A failure to make a distinction in the way situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention (see, for instance, Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7 173).114.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, positive obligations on the part of a State are inherent in the right to effective respect for private life under Article 8; these obligations may involve the adoption of measures even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals is in principle within the State\u2019s margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against serious acts, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal-law provisions. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection (see, notably, S\u00f6derman v. Sweden [GC], no.\u00a05786\/08, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2013; C.A.S. and C.S., \u00a7 71 and M.C., \u00a7 150, judgments cited above; and, mutatis mutandis, O\u2019Keeffe, \u00a7 144 and Identoba and Others\u00b8 \u00a7\u00a7 72-73 and 94, judgments cited above).115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has not excluded the possibility that the State\u2019s positive obligation under Article 8 to safeguard an individual\u2019s physical integrity may extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal investigation (see C.A.S. and C.S., \u00a7 72, and M.C., \u00a7 152, judgments cited above).(c)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case(i)\u00a0\u00a0Threshold of severity116.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complained that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into their allegations that the violence perpetrated against them had had homophobic overtones, the Court notes that the applicants were attacked on their way home from a gay march. The march itself had been accompanied by counter-demonstrations which, despite the police protection afforded to the participants, ended in several individuals being fined for disturbing the event (see paragraphs 21 and 26 above). The applicants were attacked by a group of individuals who, the applicants believed, had observed them during the march and then followed them into the metro. The attackers came straight at them and abused them both physically and verbally (see paragraph 9 above). Both applicants sustained injuries (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above) and underwent group therapy to deal with the psychological trauma suffered (see paragraph 82 above). They described the feelings of distress, anxiety and debasement that they suffered because of the attack.117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the aim of the physical and verbal abuse was probably to frighten the applicants so that they would desist from their public expression of support for the LGBTI community (see Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7 70). The applicants\u2019 feelings of emotional distress must have been exacerbated by the fact that, although they followed to the letter the instructions issued by the organisers of the march in order to avoid becoming victims of aggression (see paragraph 8 above) and had no distinctive marks on them, they were attacked because of their participation in the gay march and thus because they were exercising rights guaranteed by the Convention.118.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing in mind the reports referred to in paragraphs 46 and 101, above, the Court acknowledges that the LGBTI community in the respondent State finds itself in a precarious situation, being subject to negative attitudes towards its members.119.\u00a0\u00a0In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the treatment, convincingly described by the applicants, to which they were subjected and which was directed at their identity and must necessarily have aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity (compare with Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a071, and Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 108 and 117) was not compatible with respect for their human dignity and reached the requisite threshold of severity to fall within the ambit of Article\u00a03 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Effectiveness of the investigation120.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the applicants had lodged a criminal complaint on the night of the incidents and within days had presented all the evidence at their disposal, which \u2012 in their view \u2012 rendered possible the identification of some of the members of the group of attackers (see paragraphs 16, 18 and 19 above). However, no significant steps were taken in the investigation for a period of almost a year, from June 2006 \u2012 the date on which the criminal complaint was lodged \u2012 to April 2007, the date on which the file was finally allocated to the Metro Police Station. Even at the time when the investigation was officially closed by the prosecutor, more than five years after the initial criminal complaint, the police had not established the identity of the culprits (see paragraph 30 above). Furthermore, the Court cannot ignore that during the investigation there were significant periods of inactivity on the part of the authorities. The whole process lasted until 9 August 2012, that is to say a total period of more than six years, a passage of time which is liable not only to undermine an investigation, but also to compromise definitively its chances of being ever completed (see paragraph 111 above).121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is prepared to accept that the investigation may not have been easy, given the significant number of persons involved in the counter\u2011demonstration and the steps required to identify them; moreover the organisational changes within the police force had added to the difficulties in resolving the case. Organisational changes and restructuring, however, do not suspend the State\u2019s obligations under the Convention. Moreover, the Court observes several shortcomings in the investigation, some of them acknowledged by the national authorities themselves (see, notably, paragraphs 28 and 33 above). In particular it is to be noted that throughout the investigation the police did no more than hear evidence from one witness, R.A.S., as well as attending 29 football matches and making random checks at the metro stations on five occasions (see paragraphs 25 and 27 above). It does not appear that they made use in any significant way of the evidence adduced by the applicants, specifically statements, photographs and the identification of some individuals in the group of attackers (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The Court in particular notes that, even though the applicants had identified some of the attackers, the domestic authorities (see paragraph 28 above) and the Government in their pleadings before the Court (see paragraph 90 above) have continued to assert the impossibility of conducting an investigation in the present case due to the failure to identify the perpetrators of the violence (see Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0118). Moreover, the Court cannot accept that the investigative actions undertaken by the domestic authorities could be deemed appropriate steps towards identifying and punishing those responsible for the incident, in particular as these measures took place such a long time after the initial events.122.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it is to be noted that at no point did the authorities initiate criminal inquiries against the alleged culprits (urm\u0103rirea penal\u0103). The Court has already held that failure to open criminal inquiries \u2012 albeit when ill-treatment was inflicted by State agents \u2012 may compromise the validity of the evidence collected during the preliminary stages of investigation (see Poede, cited above, \u00a7 60 with further references). The Court sees no reason to find otherwise in the circumstances of the present case, where the ill-treatment was perpetrated by private individuals but the investigation fell under the State\u2019s positive obligations in respect of Article\u00a03.123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, in protracting the investigation, the domestic authorities had also allowed the statute of limitation to come into play (see Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0119). They refused to examine the facts under any other Articles of the Criminal Code despite the applicants\u2019 express request to that effect, which remained unanswered (see paragraph 31 above). The Court notes that the applicants\u2019 request was not without merits, as there might have been other provisions of the Criminal Code which could have better described the crimes investigated (see paragraph 39 above).124.\u00a0\u00a0More importantly on this point, the Court considers that the authorities did not take reasonable steps with the aim of examining the role played by possible homophobic motives behind the attack. The necessity of conducting a meaningful inquiry into the possibility of discrimination motivating the attack was indispensable given the hostility against the LGBTI community in the respondent State (see paragraph 46 above) and in the light of the applicants\u2019 submissions that hate speech, that was clearly homophobic, had been uttered by the assailants during the incident. The authorities should have done so \u2012 despite the fact that incitement to hate speech was not punishable at the time when the incidents occurred (see paragraph 40 above) \u2012 as the crimes could have been assigned a legal classification that would have allowed the proper administration of justice. The Court considers that without such a rigorous approach from the law\u2011enforcement authorities, prejudice-motivated crimes would inevitably be treated on an equal footing with cases involving no such overtones, and the resultant indifference would be tantamount to official acquiescence to, or even connivance with, hate crimes (see Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a077; and, mutatis mutandis, Ciorcan and others, cited above, \u00a7 167). Moreover, without a meaningful investigation, it would be difficult for the respondent State to implement measures aimed at improving the policing of similar peaceful demonstrations in the future, thus undermining public confidence in the State\u2019s anti-discrimination policy (see Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a080 in fine).125.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the investigations into the allegations of ill-treatment were ineffective as they lasted too long, were marred by serious shortcomings, and failed to take into account possible discriminatory motives.There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 (procedural limb) of the Convention read together with Article 14 of the Convention on this point.126.\u00a0\u00a0This conclusion means that the Court need not examine the remainder of this complaint \u2012 raised under Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention \u2012 namely that the police intentionally protracted the investigations for homophobic motives and the allegations made under Articles 8 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION127.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that, as they had been victims of aggression in relation to their participation in a peaceful assembly, by failing to conduct effective investigations the State had breached its positive obligations under Article 11 of the Convention, taken alone or together with Article 14. They further complained that they had had no effective remedy at their disposal to complain either about the fact that the crimes against them had been motivated by their sexual orientation, or that the criminal investigation had lasted too long and had been inefficient, thus hindering their access to civil redress. The complaints were communicated to the respondent Government under Articles 11, 13 and 14, which read as follows:Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association)\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.2.\u00a0\u00a0No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.\u201dArticle 13 (right to an effective remedy)\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d128.\u00a0\u00a0The parties presented observations on these points.129.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and its findings relating to Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention (see paragraph 125 above), the Court finds that these complaints are likewise admissible but considers that it has examined the main legal questions raised in the present application and that there is thus no need to give a separate ruling on the merits of the remaining complaints (see, for a most recent authority, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 156, ECHR 2014, with further references).III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION130.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage131.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.132.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the amounts sought were excessive and that, in any case, the finding of a violation should constitute sufficient redress for the non-pecuniary damage allegedly suffered.133.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the violations found in the present case must have caused the applicants suffering and frustration which cannot be compensated for by the mere finding of a violation. Therefore, having regard to its previous case-law and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards EUR 7,000 to each applicant in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses134.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed jointly the following amounts for the costs and expenses incurred:\u2013\u00a0\u00a0EUR 50.36 for costs and expenses during the domestic proceedings, specifically court fees and forensic examination fees;\u2013\u00a0\u00a0EUR 116.66 for costs and expenses during the Court proceedings, specifically the cost of their postal communications with the Court;\u2013\u00a0\u00a0EUR 3,696 in fees for legal counselling for the preparation of two sets of observations in the proceedings before the Court.They submitted the respective invoices.135.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the validity of the claim. They argued that the invoices were illegible and did not allow any causal link with the current proceedings to be established. Moreover, they argued that the lawyers\u2019 fee was exorbitant and overestimated.136.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award jointly the sum of EUR 3,863.02 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest137.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28096":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION READ ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1432.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the verbal abuse and threats to which she had been subjected from a member of a right-wing group had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. She complained that the authorities had failed in their obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the incident. She relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, member of Roma minority, also complained that the domestic authorities had not taken sufficient action to establish a possible racist motive for the assault, given that she was a member of the Roma minority. She relied on Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 3.Article 14 provides as follows: \u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201dThe Government contested these arguments.A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, since the impugned treatment did not reach the minimum threshold of severity required for Article 3 to come into play. There was no evidence that the applicant was a victim of any physical assault. Nor were the verbal threats and insults so serious as to attain the minimum level of severity required.35.\u00a0\u00a0In the alternative, the Government requested the Court to declare the complaint inadmissible for the failure to exhaust domestic remedies. They contended that the applicant should have pursued the substitute private prosecution proceedings, which would have provided an adequate remedy in the circumstances of the present case.36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that she had been attacked by a member of an extremist group and it had been only by chance that she had not been severely injured. She submitted that she and her daughter had been threatened with an axe by a member of an anti-Gypsy organisation, and that she had escaped suffering actual physical harm only because of the intervention of a third person. This incident had to be assessed against other circumstances, namely that she had been subjected to continuous harassment due to the presence in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata over several days of racist, paramilitary groups.37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further invited the Court to dismiss the Government\u2019s preliminary objection concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, maintaining that the substitute private prosecution proceedings did not provide an effective remedy affording redress in respect of hate crimes.38.\u00a0\u00a0The European Roma Rights Centre considered that in the circumstances of the case the applicant should not be obliged to have recourse to this remedy. Members of a disadvantaged group could not be expected to pursue substitute private prosecution proceedings in cases concerning hate crimes, since it would give the impression that the duty of public authorities to investigate was less important.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment39.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities\u2019 duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence on the part of private individuals, as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence can fall under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, but may also be seen to form part of the authorities\u2019 positive responsibilities under Article\u00a014 of the Convention to secure the fundamental value enshrined in Article\u00a03 without discrimination. Owing to the interplay of the two provisions, issues such as those in the present case may indeed fall to be examined under one of the two provisions only, with no separate issue arising under the other, or may require simultaneous examination under both Articles. This is a question to be decided in each case in the light of its facts and the nature of the allegations made (see Identoba and Others v.\u00a0Georgia, no. 73235\/12, \u00a7 \u00a063, 12 May 2015).40.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant alleged that the insults and threats directed against her had had racist overtones, which rendered the treatment sufficiently severe to attain the relevant threshold under Article 3. She further alleged that the authorities had failed both to protect her from and sufficiently to investigate that bias-motivated verbal violence. Consequently, the Court prefers to subject the applicant\u2019s complaints to a simultaneous dual examination under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (compare with Abdu v. Bulgaria, no. \u00a026827\/08, \u00a7 31, 11 March 2014).41.\u00a0\u00a0The primary issue in respect of this complaint is whether the applicant\u2019s treatment at the hands of the protestors constituted ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3. If it did not, then the issue of whether the respondent Government fulfilled its obligations under that provision taken together with Article 14 does not arise.42.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court does not find it necessary to examine the Government\u2019s objection concerning the applicant\u2019s failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as the present complaint is in any event inadmissible for the reasons set out below.43.\u00a0\u00a0In order to fall within the scope of Article\u00a03, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative by definition, and depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the ill-treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the victim\u2019s sex, age and state of health. Further factors to be taken into account include the purpose of the ill-treatment and the underlying intention or motivation (see, for example, El\u00a0Masri v. \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d [GC], no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7\u00a0196, ECHR 2012). The Court has considered some types of treatment \u201cinhuman\u201d, particularly where it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering, and also \u201cdegrading\u201d because it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see, among other authorities, Labita v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000-IV).44.\u00a0\u00a0Even where the victim did not suffer serious or lasting physical injuries, the Court has held that corporal punishment inflicted on an adolescent should be described as \u201cdegrading\u201d in so far as it constituted an assault on \u201cprecisely that which it is one of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, namely a person\u2019s dignity and physical integrity\u201d (see Tyrer \u00a0v.\u00a0United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, \u00a7 33, Series A no. 26). By the same token, in a case concerning harassment of a person suffering from physical and mental disabilities, the Court ruled that the feelings of fear and helplessness caused by the ill-treatment were sufficiently serious to attain the level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention, even though the applicant had suffered physical injuries on only one occasion (see \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 41526\/10, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2012). The Court has on several occasions examined from the angle of Article\u00a03 situations in which the applicants had not suffered any physical injuries (see, for example, G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2010, concerning threats of torture, and Kurt v. Turkey, 25\u00a0May \u00a01998, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0133-34, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, relating to the disappearance of a relative).45.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Convention organs have accepted, in the context of acts attributable to State officials, that discrimination based on race could, in certain circumstances, of itself amount to \u201cdegrading treatment\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 (see Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi, cited above, and East \u00a0African Asians v.\u00a0United Kingdom, nos. 4403\/70 and others, Commission report of 14\u00a0December 1973, Decisions and Reports 78, pp. \u00a057 \u00a0and 62, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0196 and 207). Discriminatory remarks and racist insults must in any event be considered as an aggravating factor when assessing a given instance of ill-treatment in the light of Article 3 (see Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), nos. 41138\/98 and 64320\/01, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2005-VII (extracts), and B.S. v. Spain, no.\u00a047159\/08, \u00a7 41, 24 July 2012). This approach was confirmed in respect of treatment attributable to private individuals (see Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7 65; Abdu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a023-24; and Koky and Others v. Slovakia, no. 13624\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 223-25, 12\u00a0June 2012).In the context of religious intolerance, the Court has held that the guarantees under Article 3 could not be limited to acts of physical ill-treatment, but could also cover the infliction of psychological suffering by third parties (see Begheluri and Others v. Georgia, no. 28490\/02, \u00a7 100, 7\u00a0October 2014).46.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the applicant admitted that she had not suffered physical injury at the hands of Mr S.T. or any other person participating in the marches on 10 March 2011; her complaint was based on the psychological effect which the conduct of Mr S.T. had had on her and other members of the Roma minority. She stressed that the purpose of the demonstration had been to spread fear among the Roma in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata and that when the incident had occurred her young child had been with her.47.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the evidence before it, in particular the report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minorities, the Court accepts that the behaviour of those participating in the marches was premeditated and motivated by ethnic bias. It also notes that the marches continued for about two weeks after the incident in question and were designed to cause fear among the Roma minority (see paragraph 31 above).48.\u00a0\u00a0Nonetheless, the applicant\u2019s situation is not comparable to the case of P.F. and E.F. v. the United Kingdom, where young schoolgirls and their parents were found to have been subjected to considerable mental suffering when they were exposed to two months of daily abuse \u2013 including \u201cthrowing bricks, rubbish, balloons filled with urine and dog excrement, firecrackers and, on one occasion, an explosive device ...; shouting death threats, sectarian abuse and obscenities of a sexual nature; displaying explicit pornographic material; accusing priests ... of being paedophiles; spitting at the children and their parents; wearing masks; and using whistles, sirens, horns and other instruments to create an intimidating atmosphere\u201d (see P.F. and E.F. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28326\/09, 23\u00a0November 2010).49.\u00a0\u00a0The case is also to be distinguished from the cases of Begheluri and Others (cited above) and Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia (no.\u00a071156\/01, 3\u00a0May 2007), where the threats directed against members of the religious community were accompanied by searches, severe beatings, robbery and a series of humiliating and intimidating acts. The continuous organised harassment was designed to force the applicants to act against their will and conscience, and took place within a general national climate of religious intolerance.50.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant\u2019s situation stands in contrast to Identoba and Others (cited above), where the verbal abuse and serious threats directed against the applicants \u2013 marchers promoting lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights \u2013 were discriminatory. They were followed by actual physical assault on some of the applicants in circumstances where the demonstrators were surrounded by an angry mob that outnumbered them.51.\u00a0\u00a0It the present case, although the right-wing groups were present in the applicant\u2019s neighbourhood for several days, they were continuously monitored by the police. Indeed, throughout most of that period there was a considerable police presence in the municipality. As it appears from the case file, no actual confrontation took place between the Roma inhabitants and the demonstrators. Mr S.T.\u2019s utterances and acts, although openly discriminatory and performed in the context of marches with intolerant overtones, were not so severe as to cause the kind of fear, anguish or feelings of inferiority that are necessary for Article 3 to come into play.52.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the minimum level of severity required in order for the issue to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention has not been attained. Accordingly, the Court rejects the applicant\u2019s complaint about the authorities\u2019 failure to fulfil their positive obligations under Article 3 read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article \u00a035 \u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 \u00a03 \u00a0(a) \u00a0and 4 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to apply relevant, in particular criminal-law, measures against the participants of the anti-Roma rallies so as to discourage them from the racist harassment that eventually took place. She also maintained that by failing to properly investigate this incidence of racist verbal abuse, the authorities had neglected their positive obligations. She relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which provides as follows:\u201c1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d54.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those arguments.A.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the complaint concerning the domestic authorities\u2019 failure to carry out an effective investigation1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions55.\u00a0\u00a0The Government requested the Court to declare this complaint inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. They submitted that the applicant should have pursued the substitute private prosecution proceedings; and the criminal complaint lodged by the applicant against unknown perpetrators could not be regarded as an effective remedy for the domestic authorities\u2019 alleged failure to carry out an effective investigation. The alleged violation of the State\u2019s procedural obligations under Article\u00a03 could only have been remedied by the pursuit of the substitute private prosecution proceedings. The substitute private prosecution procedure had been conceived to redress faults allegedly committed by the authorities in criminal proceedings.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the Court\u2019s findings in Borb\u00e1la Kiss v.\u00a0Hungary (no. 59214\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 25-26, 26 June 2012) and Gubacsi v. Hungary (no. 44686\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 31-32, 28 June 2011) were not applicable in the present case, since in those cases the reason for dismissing the Government\u2019s preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies was the apparent legal uncertainty concerning the substitute private prosecution proceedings. In the present case, however, the applicant had been informed by means of the decision of 21 March 2012 of the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office about the possibility of instituting private prosecution proceedings (see paragraph 27 above). She had availed herself of that remedy, but had subsequently dropped the charges. Furthermore, a court judgment in such proceedings could have also opened the way for a constitutional complaint. The Government suggested that the Court should take the same approach as it had in the case of Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi v. Hungary ((dec.) no.\u00a02351\/06, 9\u00a0November 2010), which was declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies on the ground that the applicants had not raised the issue of the racist motives of the alleged criminal offence in the substitute private prosecution proceedings.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also argued that the admittedly low success rate of substitute private prosecution proceedings did not mean that this procedure was inefficient, since the dismissal of such applications was mainly due to incompliance with the formal requirements of private prosecution.58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, for her part, submitted that substitute private prosecution proceedings did not provide an effective remedy affording redress in respect of hate crimes, in particular given the difficulties in obtaining evidence, for example as to the intent of the perpetrator. She argued that the low success rate of substitute private prosecution proceedings proved that they had no prospect of success either in her case or in general. Lastly, she maintained that she had decided to drop the charges against Mr S.T. since she had serious reasons to believe that the Hungarian authorities were unwilling to protect her from further racist harassment which was likely to follow if she pursued prosecution.59.\u00a0\u00a0The European Roma Rights Centre submitted that Roma persons could not be expected to pursue substitute private prosecution proceedings in cases involving failures by the domestic authorities to investigate hate crimes. In its view, the requirement for them to institute substitute private prosecution proceedings would be tantamount to exempting the public authorities from investigating hate crimes. Furthermore, it would be particularly unfair to require a member of a disadvantaged group to perform investigative activities. Lastly, if the failure to conduct effective investigations was due to institutional racism, then to require Roma victims to pursue substitute private prosecution would expose them to the consequences of challenging an entrenched aspect of anti-Gypsyism.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment60.\u00a0\u00a0The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention obliges applicants to use first the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. Where there is a choice of remedies open to an applicant, Article 35 must be applied to reflect the practical realities of the applicant\u2019s position in order to ensure the effective protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention (see, inter alia, Hilal v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a045276\/99, 8 February 2000, and Krumpel and Krumpelova v. Slovakia, no.\u00a056195\/00, \u00a7 43, 5 July 2005). Indeed, where an applicant has a choice of remedies and their comparative effectiveness is not obvious, the Court tends to interpret the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies in the applicant\u2019s favour (see Budayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 15339\/02, 21166\/02, 20058\/02, 11673\/02 and 15343\/02, \u00a7 110, ECHR 2008 (extracts), and the cases cited therein). Moreover, an applicant who has used a remedy which is apparently effective and sufficient cannot be required also to have tried others that were also available but probably no more likely to be successful (see Ivan Vasilev v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 48130\/99, \u00a7\u00a056, 12 April 2007 and the cases cited therein).61.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against unknown perpetrators on charges of \u201cviolence against a member of a group\u201d. There is nothing to indicate that the ensuing proceedings were in principle not capable of leading to the identification and, if appropriate, punishment of those responsible.62.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, by virtue of that remedy the State was afforded an opportunity to put matters right. The applicant must therefore be regarded as having brought the substance of her complaint to the notice of the national authorities and as having sought redress through the domestic channels for her complaint. She was thus not required in addition to pursue the matter by instituting substitute private prosecution proceedings, which would have had the same objective as her criminal complaint (see, mutatis mutandis, Borb\u00e1la Kiss, cited above, \u00a7 26, and Matko v. Slovenia, no.\u00a043393\/98, \u00a7 95, 2 November 2006).63.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the Court cannot subscribe to the Government\u2019s view that in the cases of Borb\u00e1la Kiss and Gubacsi, the applicants were not required to pursue private prosecution proceedings because of the uncertainty prevailing at that time concerning the effectiveness of that legal avenue. Rather, it was the fact that the applicants had already lodged a criminal complaint concerning the alleged ill-treatment that led the Court to conclude that they could not be expected to have lodged a second, virtually identical but nominative complaint about particular individuals (see Borb\u00e1la \u00a0Kiss, cited above, \u00a7 26, and Gubacsi, cited above, \u00a7 32).64.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s reference to the application of Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi, the Court considers that the related conclusions reached in that case are not applicable to the present circumstances, since the private prosecution proceedings in that case did not concern racial discrimination but endangering minors. The effectiveness of such proceedings in examining a claim of racial discrimination could not therefore be examined.65.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s preliminary objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the law-enforcement authorities had not paid attention to the investigation of racist motives. She pointed out that her lawyer had requested the police to concentrate the investigation on charges of violence against a member of a group, instead of harassment, since the assault against her had been motivated by racial bias; nonetheless, the police had disregarded that aspect of her case. She argued that the police had ignored the evidence supporting her allegations, namely the fact that Mr\u00a0S.T. was a member of an extreme right-wing organisation, his statements given to a police officer and the manner in which the incident had been described on a right-wing online news portal.68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also argued that the ineffectiveness of investigations into hate crimes committed against members of vulnerable minority groups and the failure to take such crimes seriously was a structural problem in Hungarian law-enforcement practice.69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained of several perceived omissions on the part of the investigating authorities. In particular, the police had not promptly informed her that her case had been joined to one concerning the criminal complaint lodged by Mr J.F. As a consequence, the domestic authorities had failed to follow up the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint promptly: the investigation into her specific allegations had not been opened until seven months after the incident, in October 2011. Moreover, the police had not taken the necessary measures in due time to hear witnesses, who were first questioned some nine months after the incident. Nor had the witnesses been confronted with each other or with her to clarify certain contradictions in their testimonies.70.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the domestic authorities had ignored the evidence pointing to a racist motive of the incident such as the perpetrator\u2019s membership of Bety\u00e1rsereg, a paramilitary right-wing organisation, his statements given to the police about his intention \u201cto enforce public order in the local Roma community\u201d, and his subsequent comments on an Internet portal about enforcing \u201corder among the Roma of Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata with a single whip\u201d.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the domestic authorities had complied with their positive obligations in that they had conducted an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint.72.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, the criminal investigation undertaken after the rallies into the conduct of Mr S.T. had complied with the State\u2019s procedural obligation to establish the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator and to unmask his alleged racist motives. They submitted that by alleging that the investigations had been inadequate, the applicant was seeking the reassessment of evidence obtained in the investigations. Moreover, her perceived argument that the domestic authorities should have applied a lower standard of proof to establish the criminal responsibility of the alleged perpetrator was misplaced, since it was not the Court\u2019s role to interpret the domestic law.73.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the other alleged shortcomings in the investigation, the Government pointed out that the applicant had been confronted with Mr\u00a0S.T. in the course of the minor-offence proceedings, and that the record of the confrontation had been included in the file concerning the charges of harassment. As regards the allegation that the applicant\u2019s witnesses had been heard belatedly, this had had no influence on the outcome of the case since neither of them had claimed that they did not remember the incident owing to the lapse of time.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also submitted that at the material time, right-wing paramilitary marches were a new phenomenon. The legislator realised the unlawful character of this conduct and adopted Act no. XL of 2011 on the amendment of the Criminal Code, extending the definition of violence against a member of a group to conducts of provocative anti-social behaviour causing fear. This provision, however, could not have a retroactive effect and was not applicable to the applicant\u2019s complaint.75.\u00a0\u00a0The European Roma Rights Centre viewed the issue in the present case through the lens of \u201canti-Gypsyism\u201d and maintained that there had been an increase in anti-Roma rhetoric, racism and physical violence against the Roma in Hungary. It pointed out that the United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, Amnesty International and the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (\u201cthe FRA\u201d) had all reported patterns of anti-Roma attacks, including harassment, assault and threats, and the growth of paramilitary organisations with racist platforms.76.\u00a0\u00a0The European Roma Rights Centre also submitted that the general situation in Hungary was one of institutional racism against the Roma minority within State bodies, evidenced by the \u201cfailure of the authorities to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin\u201d. It relied on the FRA\u2019s thematic report entitled \u201cRacism, discrimination, intolerance and extremism: learning from experiences in Greece and Hungary\u201d, which showed that the laws on investigating and prosecuting racially motivated crimes were not being implemented effectively. It also pointed out that the report on the visit to Hungary of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights from 1\u00a0to 4 July 2014 expressed concerns about the Hungarian authorities\u2019 failure to identify and respond effectively to hate crimes.77.\u00a0\u00a0The European Roma Rights Centre further argued that vulnerable victims alleging racially motivated violence were unlikely to be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they had been subjected to discrimination, especially when they were also victims of a failure on the part of the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation. It maintained that the Court\u2019s analysis under Article 14 read in conjunction with the procedural limb of Article 2 or Article 3 (see, for example, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, ECHR 2005\u2011VII, and \u0160e\u010di\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 40116\/02, 31 May 2007) was limited in that it had not addressed the question whether the failure to carry out an effective investigation in general had been due to institutional racism. It invited the Court to find that the failures in investigations into hate crimes overall were due to discrimination, depriving the Roma of access to the evidence needed to prove a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with the procedural limb of Article 3.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment78.\u00a0\u00a0The notion of \u201cprivate life\u201d within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of the guarantees provided for by Article 8. It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of a person\u2019s physical and social identity. The Court has accepted in the past that an individual\u2019s ethnic identity must be regarded as another such element (see S. and Marper v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562\/04 and 30566\/04, \u00a7 66, ECHR 2008, and Ciubotaru \u00a0v. \u00a0Moldova, no. 27138\/04, \u00a7\u00a049, 27 April 2010). In particular, any negative stereotyping of a group, when it reaches a certain level, is capable of impacting on the group\u2019s sense of identity and the feelings of self-worth and self-confidence of members of the group. It is in this sense that it can be seen as affecting the private life of members of the group (see Aksu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 4149\/04 and 41029\/04, \u00a7 58, ECHR 2012).79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s case-law does not rule out that treatment which does not reach a level of severity sufficient to bring it within the ambit of Article\u00a03 may nonetheless breach the private-life aspect of Article 8, if the effects on the applicant\u2019s physical and moral integrity are sufficiently adverse (see Khan v. Germany, no. 38030\/12, \u00a7 35, 23\u00a0April 2015, and Costello-Roberts v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, \u00a7 36, Series A no. 247\u2011C).80.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant, who is of Roma origin, felt offended and traumatised by the allegedly anti-Roma rallies organised by different right-wing groups between 1 and 16\u00a0March 2011 in the predominantly Roma neighbourhood of Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata and, in particular, the racist verbal abuse and attempted assault to which she had been subjected on 10 March 2011, in the presence of her child. For the Court, the central issue of the complaint is that the abuse that occurred during ongoing anti-Roma rallies was directed against the applicant for her belonging to an ethnic minority. This conduct necessarily affected the applicant\u2019s private-life, in the sense of ethnic identity, within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.81.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s contention that the investigation of the alleged racist abuse was ineffective, the Court recalls that while the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this negative undertaking there may be positive obligations inherent in the effective respect for private life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see Tavl\u0131 v. Turkey, no.\u00a011449\/02, \u00a7 28). Moreover, as far as positive obligations under Article 8 are concerned, this is an area in which Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention with due regard to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals (see Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, \u00a7\u00a067, Series A no. 94).82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s task is not to substitute itself for the competent Hungarian authorities in determining the most appropriate methods of protecting individuals from attacks on their personal integrity, but rather to review under the Convention the decisions that those authorities have taken in the exercise of their power of appreciation (see Sandra \u00a0Jankovi\u0107 \u00a0v.\u00a0Croatia, no. 38478\/05, \u00a7 46, 5 March 2009).83.\u00a0\u00a0When investigating violent incidents, State authorities have an additional duty under Article 3 of the Convention to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to establish whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have also played a role in the events (see Abdu, cited above, \u00a7 44, and \u0160e\u010di\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 66). Furthermore, the Court has previously found under Article 8 of the Convention that acts of violence such as inflicting minor physical injuries and making verbal threats may require the States to adopt adequate positive measures in the sphere of criminal-law protection (see Sandra Jankovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 47).84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore considers that a similar obligation might arise in cases where alleged bias-motivated treatment did not reach the threshold necessary for Article 3, but constituted an interference with the applicant\u2019s right to private life under Article 8, that is, when a person makes credible assertions that he or she has been subjected to harassment motivated by racism, including verbal assaults and physical threats. In this connection it stresses that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies (see, mutatis mutandis, Selmouni v. France, [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 101, ECHR 1999-V). Moreover, in the Court\u2019s view, in situations where there is evidence of patterns of violence and intolerance against an ethnic minority (see paragraphs 75-76 above), the positive obligations incumbent require a higher standard of States to respond to alleged bias-motivated incidents.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will therefore examine whether the Hungarian authorities, in dealing with the applicant\u2019s case, were in breach of their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention, and in particular whether the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms were implemented in the instant case were defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.86.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the criminal complaint into the verbal abuse and threats directed against the applicant by the participants of the rallies was lodged less than a month after the incident, on 7\u00a0April 2011. The Police Department joined the applicant\u2019s case to another criminal complaint concerning the same events and initiated an investigation into the offence of harassment. Following the applicant\u2019s enquiry about the outcome of her criminal complaint, a separate investigation into her allegations was opened on 7\u00a0October 2011.87.\u00a0\u00a0In the initial criminal complaint of 7 April 2011 the applicant had already submitted that she had been victim of a racially motivated attack, alleging that it constituted violence against a member of a group and harassment. Nonetheless, in the reinitiated investigation the law-enforcement authorities concentrated again on harassment. In her subsequent requests of 20 October and 28 November 2011 to have the scope of the investigation extended to \u201cviolence against a member of an ethnic group\u201d the applicant submitted a detailed description of the events and argued that the anti-Roma motive had been an important element and should have been assessed in the investigation. However, her submissions were to no avail, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office finding that the use of force, an objective element of the alleged crime, could not be established. Thus, the police confined themselves to assessing whether Mr\u00a0S.T.\u2019s threats had been directed against the applicant or uttered \u201cin general\u201d and they found that the threats not being addressed directly to the applicant, the offence of harassment had not occurred.88.\u00a0\u00a0The impugned insults and acts took place during an anti-Roma rally lasting for several days and came from a member of an openly right-wing paramilitary group. Because of these factual circumstances the Court considers that there were grounds to believe that it was because of her Roma origin that the applicant had been insulted and threatened by a member of a right-wing paramilitary group. Thus, it was essential for the relevant domestic authorities to conduct the investigation in that specific context, taking all reasonable steps with the aim of unmasking the role of racist motives in the incident. The necessity of conducting a meaningful inquiry into the discrimination behind the incident was indispensable given that it was not an isolated incident but formed part of the general hostile attitude against the Roma community in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata (see paragraph 31 above).89.\u00a0\u00a0As to the criminal-law mechanisms in the Hungarian legal system the Court notes that Article\u00a0174\/B (violence against a member of a group) and Article 269 (incitement against a group), as in force at the material time, appear to provide an apt legal basis for launching a criminal investigation into alleged bias-motives. However, in the applicant\u2019s case the law-enforcement authorities found that an objective element of the crime of violence against a member of a group could not be established and there were no grounds to pursue the investigations into that offence. The Court also observes that the provision of the Criminal Code on harassment does not contain any element alluding to racist motives.90.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the specific and substantiated allegations made by the applicant during the investigation and the factual circumstances of the incident, the competent authorities had evidence at their disposal suggesting a racist motive for the verbal violence directed against the applicant. However, the legal provisions, as in force at the material time, provided no appropriate legal avenue for the applicant to seek remedy for the alleged racially motivated insult.91.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, this state of affairs did not provide adequate protection to the applicant against an attack on her integrity and showed that the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms were implemented in the instant case were defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the complaint concerning the authorities\u2019 inaction during the rallies1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government urged the Court to declare the complaint inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In their view, the applicant could have brought a civil action for damages, claiming a violation of her personality rights.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Government relied on the findings of a report by the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights, according to which \u201cby means of two weeks of continuous presence, the police was able to ensure that no violence against people or property took place and the aggression remained at the level of words\u201d. They stated that the Hungarian authorities had taken all the necessary steps to protect the Roma minority in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata by policing the rallies.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also maintained that when deciding on the dispersal of the rallies, the domestic authorities had had to strike a fair balance between the applicant\u2019s right under Article 8 and that of the demonstrators under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.95.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the possibility of lodging a civil action for damages against the authorities, the applicant argued that the Government had not submitted any relevant case-law to support their assertion as to the availability and efficacy of that remedy in any relevant context.96.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further contended that by promptly applying criminal or at least minor-offence sanctions against the participants of the rallies as of 1\u00a0March 2011, the police could have prevented the escalation of the situation and the racist harassment that she had suffered. By failing to do so, they had infringed their positive obligation under Article\u00a08 to protect the applicant\u2019s right to respect for her private life.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not consider it necessary in the present case to rule on the Government\u2019s objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as this complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.98.\u00a0\u00a0As it has been outlined above, the concept of private life extends also to the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see paragraph 80 above). States have a duty under Article 8 to protect the physical and moral integrity of an individual from other persons (see A.\u00a0v.\u00a0Croatia, no. 55164\/08, \u00a7 60, 14 October 2010).99.\u00a0\u00a0Nonetheless, as the Court held in the context of Articles 2 and 3, bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures in certain well-defined circumstances to protect an individual must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities (see \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 41526\/10, \u00a7 139, ECHR 2012, and Osman \u00a0v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 116, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII). For the Court, the same consideration holds true as regards the State\u2019s positive obligation under Article 8 to protect an individual\u2019s private life from the acts of another individual, while taking into account the wide margin of appreciation the Contracting States enjoy in this area (see paragraphs 80 above). In this context, the Court accepts that in certain situations the domestic authorities might be required to proceed with the dispersal of a violent and blatantly intolerant demonstration for the protection of an individual\u2019s private life under Article\u00a08. Nonetheless, in the present case, the applicant\u2019s complaint was merely directed against the authorities\u2019 failure to apply criminal-law sanctions against the demonstrators to prevent an infringement of her private life.100.\u00a0\u00a0In this respect, the Court finds that another relevant consideration in the assessment of State\u2019s positive obligations in this area is the need to ensure that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice, including the guarantees contained in Articles \u00a05 and 8 of the Convention (see Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156\/01, \u00a7\u00a096, 3 May 2007, and Osman, cited above, \u00a7 116).101.\u00a0\u00a0Although the Court accepts that the ongoing demonstrations may have been stressful for the applicant, it considers that the response of the police to the events as they unfolded was reasonable in the circumstances and not incompatible with the authorities\u2019 duty under Article\u00a08. The impugned operational decision of the police about the manner in which it maintained order and security during the marches fell within the ambit of legitimate police discretion. Thus, there has been no appearance of a breach of the State\u2019s positive obligation implied by Article 8 of the Convention to safeguard the applicant\u2019s physical and psychological integrity.102.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION103.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 4,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Government found that amount excessive.106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage on account of the violation found and awards her the full sum claimed.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses107.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 3,717 plus VAT for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This sum corresponds to fifty-nine hours\u2019 legal work billable by his lawyer at an hourly rate of EUR 63 plus VAT.108.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.109.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court finds it reasonable to award the full sum claimed, that is, EUR 3,717.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28107":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention26.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained, in the light of the authorities\u2019 failure to provide her with a hearing aid, free of charge and promptly, that her detention amounted to inhuman treatment. The complaint falls to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention which provides as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed this argument, arguing that the applicant\u2019s medical care while in prison had been adequate. She had been treated every time the need arose and had had access to specialist medical care including prison hospitals. They maintained that there had been no clear indication that providing a hearing aid free of charge had been absolutely necessary in her case. The nature of her hearing impairment was such that the doctors needed to first treat its cause and only later assess the need for the prosthesis. The medical certificates of 7 April 2011 and 15 April 2013 recommended the hearing aid but did not consider it absolutely necessary. The applicant failed to inform the prison authorities what problems she had encountered while in prison and to what extent her loss of hearing had negatively influenced her serving her sentence.28.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, on 23 July 2014 the applicant had been fitted with a hearing aid free of charge. Her situation had thus been better than that of individuals covered by the national insurance scheme, as the cost of their hearing aids would be reimbursed only in part and would be subject to many conditions. In particular it was only available to people in employment. The hearing aid offered to the applicant had been adapted to her needs and her complaint that she was not provided with a more advanced version was therefore manifestly ill-founded.29.\u00a0\u00a0In general the Government concluded that the State had fulfilled their positive obligations and had provided her with adequate medical care throughout her detention.30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the medical attention she had received in various detention facilities had not been adequate, taking into account her special needs. Moreover, the staff of the prison had displayed a negative attitude to her amounting to ill-treatment. Her situation had reflected a general problem in the organisation of the health service in Polish prisons which was characterised by an insufficient number of trained staff and a lack of funds for medical services.31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the lack of a hearing aid had not made her detention impossible but had amounted to degrading punishment and had diminished her human dignity. People suffering hearing loss who do not use hearing aids tend to be isolated socially and to experience various practical and psychological difficulties. In consequence, the quality of her life in prison had diminished noticeably and she had consulted psychologists and psychiatrists on numerous occasions. She felt humiliated and debased.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. In considering whether treatment is \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a03, one of the factors which the Court will take into account is the question whether its object was to humiliate and debase the person concerned, although the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of Article 3 (see, among many other authorities, Price\u00a0v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 33394\/96, \u00a7 24, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011VII; Peers\u00a0v.\u00a0Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 67-68 and 74, ECHR\u00a02001\u2013III; and Engel\u00a0v.\u00a0Hungary, no. 46857\/06, \u00a7 26, 20 May 2010).33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to transfer him to a civil hospital, even if he is suffering from an illness that is particularly difficult to treat (see, among others, Mouisel v. France, no. 67263\/01, \u00a7 40, ECHR 2002\u2011IX). However, this provision does require the State to ensure that prisoners are detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI; S\u0142awomir Musia\u0142, cited above, \u00a7 86; and Kaprykowski, cited above, \u00a7 69). There are three particular elements to be considered in relation to the compatibility of an applicant\u2019s health with his stay in detention: (a) the medical condition of the prisoner, (b) the adequacy of the medical assistance and care provided in detention and (c) the advisability of maintaining the detention measure in view of the state of health of the applicant (see Sakkopoulos v. Greece, no.\u00a061828\/00, \u00a7 39, 15 January 2004; and Melnik v. Ukraine, no.\u00a072286\/01,\u00a0\u00a7 94, 28 March 2006). The authorities must also ensure that\u00a0\u2011\u00a0where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition \u2012 supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy that seeks, to the extent possible, to cure the detainee\u2019s diseases or to avoid aggravating them, rather than to address them on a symptomatic basis (see Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 114, 29 November 2007; Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4 October 2005; Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 211, 13 July 2006; Mikalauskas v. Malta, no.\u00a0 4458\/10, \u00a7 63, 23 July 2013; Pozai\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 5901\/13, \u00a7\u00a053, 4\u00a0December 2014; and Kushnir v. Ukraine, no. 42184\/09, \u00a7\u00a0135, 11\u00a0December 2014).34.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the instant case, the Court first of all notes that the crux of the present application is the question of whether the failure to provide the applicant promptly with a hearing aid amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment.35.\u00a0\u00a0It is not contested that the applicant was first diagnosed with a hearing deficiency in September 2010 and that she received the hearing aid in July 2014. The parties differ as to the assessment of whether or not her hearing deteriorated during this period and whether the impairment was such as to render a hearing aid urgent and absolutely necessary.36.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court notes that the medical certificates of 7\u00a0April 2011 and 15 April 2013 stated, as submitted by the Government, that a hearing aid had been recommended, but they had not indicated its absolute necessity or urgency. The authorities were aware of her hearing deficiency and the main reason for the refusals to cover for the costs of her hearing aid had been budgetary limitations of the prisons in which she had been serving her sentence.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Government explained that it had been possible for the applicant to cover the costs of her hearing aid in part, however, she insisted on being provided with it on the total expense of the prison. According to the domestic law the national insurance scheme does not provide hearing aids to the population free of charge (see paragraph 28 above). It provides only for a partial reimbursement subject to further conditions. Therefore according to the Government the applicant as a prisoner was in a better position that the general public as regards access to hearing aid devices.38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant explained the difficulties that people with hearing deficiency face on the everyday basis (see paragraph 31 above). The Court agrees that partial deafness is a serious condition which could have made the applicant\u2019s life in prison more difficult. The Court understands that people with hearing deficiency may have adjustment problems and function less well, both in and outside prison. When imprisoned they may be more vulnerable and their situation should attract the particular attention of the authorities.39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant referred in general terms to feeling humiliated and debased as a result of her hearing problems. However, she did not specify if, during the period of time that she was awaiting the hearing aid, she had been subjected to any instances of ill-treatment linked to her partial deafness. In so far as she intended to claim that she was being humiliated or ill-treated by other detainees, such allegations have neither been supported by any evidence brought before the Court, nor by reference to any actual incidents; nor has it been shown that they have ever been brought to the attention of the domestic authorities.40.\u00a0\u00a0Likewise, there is no evidence of any incident involving prison guards, medical staff or other authorities in which she had been persecuted or debased because of her condition. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Court is unable to conclude that the delay in providing her with a hearing aid at the public\u2019s expense could be perceived as humiliating or debasing treatment of the applicant.A prisoner with special needs is more vulnerable to the hardships of detention in view of his or her health problems, and the applicant must have felt excluded due to her hearing difficulties. However, the applicant failed to submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the conditions of her imprisonment, in the context of her hearing impairment, had reached the threshold of severity required to constitute degrading treatment. For those reasons the Court holds that the treatment of the applicant in the circumstances of the present case was not contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see Vladimir Vasilyev v. Russia, \u00a7 55, no. 28370\/05, 10\u00a0January 2012; V.D. v. Romania, no. 7078\/02, \u00a7 92, 16 February 2010 and Slyusarev v. Russia, no. 60333\/00, \u00a7 43, 20 April 2010 and Ostrowski (dec.), cited above, \u00a7 76).41.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicant\u2019s complaint about refusal of prison leave in 2011 and 2012 may be examined under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court notes that she failed to substantiate that at the material time her state of health had been incompatible with detention. It was not disputed by the parties that the applicant had been treated for various medical conditions and suffered, in particular, from back pain. She has seen doctors with many different specialisations on numerous occasions. The prison authorities, having access to medical documentation and expert opinions, considered that all the ailments of which she had complained could be treated in prison. There is no evidence that this assessment had been arbitrary or incorrect. The Court is therefore satisfied that the authorities examined the compatibility of the applicant\u2019s condition with her ongoing detention.42.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Other alleged violations of the Convention43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained before the prison courts in 2011 that the proceedings concerning her application for leave from prison had been unfair. She contested the experts\u2019 testimonies and other errors allegedly committed by the courts.44.\u00a0\u00a0However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols (see Ostrowski (dec.), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 84-94 ).45.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 12 May 2016.Marialena TsirliAndr\u00e1s Saj\u00f3RegistrarPresident","28119":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Joinder of the applications48.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given their similar factual and legal background.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s preliminary objection1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s submissions49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the applications incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention. In particular, they submitted that Ms Gribanova had not provided any valid authority confirming her standing to lodge applications with the Court on behalf of N. and M., so she was acting on her own initiative and in her own name. Taking into account that the present applications had been lodged after N. and M.\u2019s disappearance, and that their current whereabouts were unknown, the applications should have been lodged by N. and M.\u2019s relatives or a lawyer hired by them, as had been the case in numerous previous disappearance cases examined by the Court. In the absence of any valid authority to act issued by the relatives it was impossible to establish N. and M.\u2019s true intentions, or to ascertain whether their interests were being properly represented by Ms Gribanova.2.\u00a0\u00a0Ms Gribanova\u2019s submissions50.\u00a0\u00a0Ms Gribanova claimed that she did have legal standing to lodge applications on behalf of N. and M. with the Court. She relied on two arguments. Firstly, the nature of the violation of the Convention raised before the Court in the present case had made it impossible for N. and M. to issue a valid authority to act. However, the statements they had addressed to her prior to their disappearance proved their wish to be represented by her. Secondly, the present case was similar to the cases of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania ([GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, ECHR 2014) and Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania \u2013 Helsinki Committee on behalf of Ionel Garcea v.\u00a0Romania (no. 2959\/11, 24 March 2015), in which the Court held that in exceptional circumstances and in cases involving allegations of a serious nature it should be open to associations to represent victims in the absence of a power of attorney, and notwithstanding that the victim may have died before the application was lodged with the Court. The present case concerned serious allegations of breaches of N. and M.\u2019s rights guaranteed under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention; neither of them had relatives or close family members in Russia, and she had represented them in the domestic proceedings.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s case-law51.\u00a0\u00a0In order to rely on Article 34 of the Convention, an applicant must be able to claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention. According to the Court\u2019s established case-law, the concept of \u201cvictim\u201d must be interpreted autonomously, and irrespective of domestic concepts such as those concerning an interest or capacity to act (see Nencheva and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 48609\/06, \u00a7 88, 18 June 2013). The individual concerned must be able to show that he or she was \u201cdirectly affected\u201d by the measure complained of (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania, cited above, \u00a7 96, with further references).52.\u00a0\u00a0An exception is made to this principle where the alleged violation or violations of the Convention are closely linked to a death or disappearance in circumstances allegedly engaging the responsibility of the State. In such cases, the Court has recognised the standing of the victim\u2019s next of kin to submit an application (see Nencheva and Others, cited above, \u00a7 89, and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a098-99, with further references).53.\u00a0\u00a0Where the application is not lodged by the victims themselves, Rule\u00a045 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court requires the production of a written authority to act, duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court (see Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 21727\/08, 20 January 2009; Nencheva and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a083; and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0102).54.\u00a0\u00a0Special considerations may arise in the case of victims of alleged breaches of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention at the hands of the national authorities.55.\u00a0\u00a0In Lambert and Others v. France [GC] (no. 46043\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 93-95, ECHR 2015 (extracts)) the Court reviewed the cases in which the Convention institutions had accepted that a third party (a close relative, an association or a legal professional), could, in exceptional circumstances, act in the name and on behalf of a vulnerable person who had not been able to lodge a complaint with the Court on account of his or her age, sex or disability, and identified the following criteria: the risk that the direct victim would be deprived of effective protection of his or her rights, and the absence of a conflict of interests between the victim and the applicant (see Lambert and Others, cited above, \u00a7 102).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case56.\u00a0\u00a0It is not disputed by the parties that N. and M., who appear to be direct victims of the alleged violation of the Convention, have never been in contact with the Court. The present applications on their behalf were lodged with the Court by Ms Gribanova, a lawyer practising in Kaliningrad. She did not provide any written authority to act, but claimed that prior to their disappearance N. and M. had addressed statements to her which should be regarded as the expression of their wish to authorise her to lodge applications with the Court on their behalf. Alternatively, she considered that, having regard to the serious nature of the violations alleged, the fact that there were no close family members in Russia and the fact that she had represented N. and M. in the domestic proceedings, it should be open to her to act on their behalf in the proceedings before the Court, notwithstanding the fact that she did not have specific authority to do so.57.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as Ms Gribanova referred to the statements which N. and M. had addressed to her in April 2012 (see paragraph 14 above), the Court agrees that the statements could have been regarded as an indication that N. and M. had trust in Ms Gribanova, particularly taking into account that they had also given her their passports. However, the Court observes that the statements had been made two years prior to the alleged disappearance of N. and M. and contain no specific and explicit instructions as to the actions to be taken before the Court. It follows that the statements by N. and M. addressed to Ms Gribanova two years prior to their alleged disappearance cannot be accepted as proof of their wish to be represented by Ms\u00a0Gribanova in the proceedings before it.58.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to be examined whether, in the circumstances of the present case, Ms Gribanova may lodge applications with the Court in the name of and on behalf of N. and M.59.\u00a0\u00a0In order to answer this question the Court has to decide whether the principles established in the Lambert and Others case are applicable in the present case and, more particularly, whether N. and M. can be considered vulnerable persons who were not able to lodge complaints to the Court themselves.60.\u00a0\u00a0In Lambert and Others the Court held that third parties could, in exceptional circumstances, act in the name of and on behalf of a vulnerable person who had not been able to lodge a complaint with the Court on account of his or her age, sex or disability. The Court considers that this list is not exhaustive. Indeed, individuals may be considered vulnerable on account of many other factors, such as the very nature of the complaint lodged with the Court on their behalf, as in the present case. The Court therefore considers that N. and M. can be regarded as vulnerable individuals who have not been able to lodge applications with the Court as, allegedly, they have been abducted. It follows that the criteria established in Lambert and Others can be applied to the present case. It thus remains to be determined whether the case at hand satisfies those criteria: whether there is a risk of N. and M. being deprived of effective protection of their rights and whether there is a conflict of interests between them and Ms Gribanova (see Lambert and Others, cited above, \u00a7 102).61.\u00a0\u00a0It was established in the domestic proceedings that both N. and M. had close family members in Uzbekistan with whom they were in regular contact (see paragraphs 41-43 above). After their disappearance their relatives had been in contact with Ms\u00a0Gribanova (see paragraphs 30 and 33 above) so could have become aware of their alleged abduction. The Court does not have at its disposal any information allowing it to conclude that members of N. and M.\u2019s families have been unable to lodge applications with the Court to complain about (the investigation concerning) N. and M.\u2019s disappearance. The fact that N. and M.\u2019s family members were questioned by the Uzbek authorities does not automatically mean that they were subject to any kind of pressure which prevented them from applying to the Court.62.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court does not discern any risk of N. and M. being deprived of effective protection of their rights since, in accordance with the Court\u2019s settled case-law, it has been open to the immediate family to cite before the Court on their own behalf the rights set out in the relevant Convention provisions (see, for instance, Varnava and Others v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, \u00a7\u00a7 111-13, ECHR 2009). Therefore, the present case is different from the cases of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu and Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania \u2013 Helsinki Committee on behalf of Ionel Garcea, both cited above, in which the direct victims of the alleged violations had died and had no one to represent them.63.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the above, the Court discerns no exceptional circumstances in the present case that would allow Ms Gribanova to act in the name and on behalf of N. and M. and concludes that she does not have standing to lodge the applications in the name and on behalf of N. and M. It follows that the applications are incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04.64.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,Decides to join the applications;Declares the applications inadmissible.Done in English and notified in writing on 19 May 2016.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Stephen PhillipsLuis L\u00f3pez GuerraRegistrarPresident","28146":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by three detainee escort officers on the premises of Riga Regional Court on 8 May 2006. Referring to Article 1 and Articles\u00a03 and\u00a013 of the Convention he also complained about the investigation into these events. He stated that the investigation had not been thorough, diligent and impartial, and that it had been unreasonably long.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government64.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies.65.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, under sections 1635 and 1779 of the Civil Law, the applicant had had the right to seek compensation for the damage caused by the State Police. Referring to the cases of Blumberga v. Latvia (no. 70930\/01, \u00a7 68, 14\u00a0October 2008) and Y v. Latvia (no. 61183\/08, \u00a7 71, 21 October 2014), the Government argued that the outcome of criminal proceedings did not determine the success of compensation proceedings. They noted the examples of domestic case-law provided to the Court in the case of Y\u00a0v.\u00a0Latvia (cited above).66.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the applicant had failed to appeal against the decision of 29\u00a0May 2009 upholding the termination of the criminal investigation into the events of 8 May 2006. Under section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Law the applicant could have lodged an appeal against the decision with two further levels of the prosecution service. Referring to the cases of Leja v.\u00a0Latvia (no. 71072\/01, \u00a7 68, 14\u00a0June\u00a02011) and Lobanovs v. Latvia ((dec.), no.\u00a016987\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a040-43, 28\u00a0September 2010) the Government submitted that an appeal to a higher-ranking prosecutor was an effective remedy.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant67.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, the applicant submitted that compensation proceedings on the basis of sections 1635 and 1779 of the Civil Law could be effective only if, within the framework of the criminal proceedings, the domestic authorities had established that an offence against him had been committed.68.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, he pointed out that he had appealed against all the decisions rendered in the criminal proceedings.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system, and those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged, first of all, to use the remedies provided by the national legal system. The Court is not a court of first instance; it does not have the capacity, nor is it appropriate to its function as an international court, to adjudicate on large numbers of cases which require the finding of basic facts or the calculation of monetary compensation \u2013 both of which should, as a matter of principle and effective practice, fall within the domain of domestic jurisdictions (see Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7 70, 25 March 2014, with further case-law references).70.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. There is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective. To be effective, a remedy must be capable of remedying directly the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success. However, the existence of mere doubt about the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust that avenue of redress (see ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a071, 73 and 74).71.\u00a0\u00a0In cases of wilful ill-treatment by State agents in breach of Article\u00a03, the Court has found that two measures are necessary to provide sufficient redress. Firstly, the State authorities must have conducted a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Secondly, an award of compensation to the applicant is required where appropriate or, at least, the possibility of seeking and obtaining compensation for the damage which the applicant sustained as a result of the ill-treatment (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7\u00a0116, ECHR 2010, and Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7\u00a050, 5 February 2015).72.\u00a0\u00a0In cases of wilful ill-treatment by State agents, a breach of Article\u00a03 cannot be remedied by the mere award of compensation to the victim because, if the authorities could confine their reaction to incidents of wilful ill-treatment by State agents to the mere payment of compensation while at the same time not doing enough to prosecute and punish those responsible, it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity, and the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, despite its fundamental importance, would be ineffective in practice (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0119; Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7\u00a078, 24\u00a0July 2008; and Razzakov, cited above, \u00a7 50).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application in the present case73.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the Government\u2019s argument about the effectiveness of the compensation proceedings, the Court notes that a purely compensatory remedy cannot be regarded as sufficient to meet a Contracting State\u2019s obligations under Article\u00a03 of the Convention, as such a remedy is aimed at awarding damages rather than identifying and punishing those responsible (see Sapo\u017ekovs v. Latvia, no. 8550\/03, \u00a7 55, 11 February 2014, and Holodenko v. Latvia, no. 17215\/07, \u00a7 57 in fine, 2 July 2013).74.\u00a0\u00a0As regards appealing against the decision of 29\u00a0May 2009 upholding the termination of the criminal investigation, the Court notes that the parties are in dispute as to whether or not the applicant did in fact appeal. However, even assuming that the applicant did not lodge an appeal, the Court observes that the applicant\u2019s earlier appeals had resulted in two further rounds of investigation. The question of whether or not the applicant was required to pursue a third round of appeals is closely related to the substance of the complaints, and will be assessed together with the State\u2019s positive obligation to take effective measures to protect against ill-treatment, in particular the obligation to carry out an effective investigation (see Holodenko, cited above, \u00a7 58).75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that there had been a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.77.\u00a0\u00a0He argued that he had suffered the injuries as a result of ill-treatment by his escort officers. His allegations were supported by the evidence of S.\u0160. and M.R. (see paragraphs 20 and 41 above). There was no evidence to the effect that he had sustained the injuries in any other circumstances or that he had sustained them prior to 8 May 2006.78.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, there was no evidence that the applicant had been in a position to seriously threaten the officers. Shouting or the use of \u201cstrong language\u201d could not have justified the use of force against him.79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not provide any comment regarding the question of an effective investigation of his allegations.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government80.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the use of force by M.P. against the applicant had been legitimate and had not attained the minimum level of severity for Article 3 of the Convention to apply.81.\u00a0\u00a0They pointed out that a form of constraint applied by police officers may be justified where the person being controlled offers physical resistance or presents a risk of a violent behaviour (referring to Y v. Latvia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a054). In the present case the applicant had behaved aggressively and had attempted to hit M.P., who had entered the applicant\u2019s cell in order to calm him down. Recourse to physical force by M.P. had therefore been strictly necessary to subdue the applicant.82.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s allegations that the escort officers had kicked him on his head, chest, spine, in the kidney area or on other parts of the body, or that they had hit him with a truncheon, were not supported by the medical evidence. Also, according to the results of X-ray examinations on 6 and 9 May 2006 (see paragraph 13 above) the applicant had sustained the injuries prior to the incident at issue. Given his medical history, in particular the injury in 2005 and treatment in March\u00a02006 (see paragraphs\u00a010 and 17 above) the applicant was suffering from a chronic illness, similar to the applicant in the case of Lobanovs (cited above).83.\u00a0\u00a0In their initial observations, the Government did not comment on the Court\u2019s question regarding the investigation by the domestic authorities into the incident of 8 May 2006. In their additional observations, they stated that the applicant had not provided any reasonable argument as regards the alleged ineffectiveness of the domestic investigation, and that they did not find it necessary to provide detailed observations in this regard.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0The substantive aspect(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article\u00a03 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).85.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. In respect of a person deprived of his liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see ibid., \u00a7 120, and Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7 101, ECHR 2015).86.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18\u00a0January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25). However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. On this latter point the Court has explained that where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim. In the absence of such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 82 and 83, with further case-law references).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application in the present case87.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that it was common ground between the parties that the escort officers had used some force against the applicant. The parties disagreed, however, as to whether or not the force applied by the escort officers had been necessary and whether or not the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused by their actions.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that at the time of the events at issue the applicant was under control of the escort officers. It further observes that his allegation of ill-treatment was corroborated by some medical evidence. It is apparent from the case file that he was found to have a number of injuries subsequent to the alleged incident, in particular a fracture to the third lumbar vertebra and a left kidney contusion (see paragraphs\u00a010, 14 and 17 above). In addition, the Court notes that shortly after the incident at issue the applicant had informed the ambulance staff that the escort officers had kicked him (see paragraphs 10 and 33 above). S.\u0160. had seen two or three officers entering the applicant\u2019s cell and then kicking \u201csomething\u201d, and he had heard the applicant groan (see paragraphs 20 and\u00a023 above). Also some of the other detainees had heard noise and shouted requests for a beating to be stopped (see paragraph 41 above).89.\u00a0\u00a0Given these circumstances, it is incumbent on the respondent Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by submitting evidence of how the diagnosed injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article\u00a03 of the Convention.90.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, the Court is not persuaded by the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant had undergone an X-ray examination that revealed the injury to the lumbar vertebra in the prison hospital in Olaine two days prior to the events at issue, that is to say, on 6\u00a0May 2006 (see paragraphs 13 and 82 above). According to the letter from the prison in Olaine, he was treated at the prison hospital in Olaine from 8\u00a0May\u00a02006 (see paragraph 14 above), having been admitted to that hospital on 8 May and not on 6\u00a0May 2006 (see paragraph 10 above).91.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the injury to the lumbar vertebra, the Court notes that the Government have presented other materials \u2012 such as the expert medical report and the conclusions of the domestic investigation \u2012 to corroborate their argument that the applicant could have sustained this injury before the alleged incident. The Court observes, however, that the expert medical report admitted that the applicant could also have sustained this injury on the day of the incident, that is, 8 May 2006 (see paragraph 17 above).92.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Government have not presented any evidence to explain the applicant\u2019s initial diagnosis of a left kidney contusion (see paragraphs 10 and 14 above). The domestic investigation was silent on this initial diagnosis, including on the question of whether or not it had been accurate (see Danilov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a02585\/06, \u00a7\u00a064, 13\u00a0March 2014).93.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, the domestic investigation failed to clarify how force had been used against the applicant (see paragraph 103 below), even though the officers themselves had stated that they had used force against him (see paragraphs 38 and 54 above).94.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court considers that the respondent Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and to submit any evidence or plausible explanation refuting the applicant\u2019s account of events. Therefore, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s injuries diagnosed shortly after the incident at issue (see paragraph 10 above) were sustained as a result of the use of force by the escort officers against him on 8 May 2006.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore considers that it has not been shown that the recourse to physical force against the applicant was made strictly necessary by his own conduct. In particular, it refers to its findings below that in the course of the investigation the domestic authorities failed to assess the proportionality of the force used (see paragraphs 106-108 below). Therefore, the Court cannot but conclude that the use of force was unnecessary and excessive (see Rizvanov v. Azerbaijan, no.\u00a031805\/06, \u00a7\u00a050, 17 April 2012). The Court considers that the injuries sustained by the applicant must have caused him physical pain and suffering, as well as considerable mental suffering, diminishing his human dignity.96.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court considers the ill-treatment complained of as inhuman and degrading within the meaning of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.97.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The procedural aspect(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been ill-treated by the State authorities in breach of Article\u00a03, that provision \u2012 read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention \u2012 requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7 131, and Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII).99.\u00a0\u00a0An obligation to investigate \u201cis not an obligation as to result, but as to means\u201d: not every investigation should necessarily come to a conclusion which coincides with the applicant\u2019s account of events. However, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7\u00a0107, 26 January 2006).100.\u00a0\u00a0Any investigation into allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough. This means that the authorities must make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation (see Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos.\u00a010865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7 325, ECHR 2014 (extracts), and Assenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 103). Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of the applicable standard (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 120).101.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation must also be effective in the sense that it should be capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used by the police was or was not justified in the circumstances (see Fanziyeva v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a041675\/08, \u00a7 70, 18 June 2015).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application in the present case102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant\u2019s complaint lodged with the domestic authorities and supported by medical evidence, that the escort officers had beaten him constituted an arguable claim of ill-treatment which required the authorities to conduct an effective investigation. While the Court notes that they did carry out an inquiry into his allegations, it does not consider, however, that the inquiry was sufficiently thorough and effective to meet the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.103.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the Court observes that the prosecution service acknowledged that the first round of investigation had been incomplete. It accordingly instructed the Internal Security Office of the State Police to verify the evidence of the applicant and the escort officers, M.P. and A.P., at the scene to establish the circumstances in which the applicant had fallen (see paragraph 28 above). However, in the course of the second round of investigation the Internal Security Office of the State Police failed to verify the evidence of the escort officers at the scene (see paragraph 38 above). The Court notes that when the senior inspector questioned M.P. and A.P. more than nine months after the investigation had been opened, they were unable to recall in which holding cell the applicant had been placed or to demonstrate how force had been used against him (see paragraph 31 above). Neither could they give such evidence when the senior inspector verified their statements at the scene in the course of the subsequent inquiry, more than a year after the investigation had been opened (see paragraph\u00a040 above).104.\u00a0\u00a0As a result of the aforementioned delays in obtaining further evidence from the escort officers as regards the use of force against the applicant, the ability to establish exactly what had happened to him was significantly undermined, particularly the ability to assess the credibility of the version of the events given by the escort officers (see paragraph\u00a024 above) and the witness, S.\u0160. (see paragraph 20 above). This shortcoming compromised the availability and quality of the evidence considered and was therefore prejudicial to the effective conduct of the investigation for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention.105.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, in the course of the investigation neither the Internal Security Office of the State Police nor the prosecution service inquired into the diagnosis of a left kidney contusion made at the prison hospital in Olaine subsequent to the incident at issue (see paragraph 10 above). Similarly, there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that they attempted to obtain statements from the ambulance staff who had seen the applicant prior to and after the incident on the premises of Riga Regional Court and therefore might have had useful information about the applicant\u2019s state of health and the holding cell where he had been placed. In addition, the Court notes that the expert medical report was based only on the applicant\u2019s medical records (see paragraph 17 above). The expert did not examine the applicant in person (see, for example, Djundiks v. Latvia, no.\u00a014920\/05, \u00a7 63, 15 April 2014, and Holodenko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a077).106.\u00a0\u00a0But most importantly, although the Internal Security Office of the State Police and the prosecution service found that force had been used against the applicant (see paragraphs 22, 24, 28, 38, 46 and 48 above), they failed to assess its proportionality (see B\u0113rzi\u0146\u0161 v. Latvia no. 25147\/07, \u00a7\u00a0115, 25\u00a0February 2014; see also Sapo\u017ekovs, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 76\u00a0in\u00a0fine and\u00a077). In this connection, the Court reiterates that Article 3 does not prohibit the use of force in certain well-defined circumstances. However, such force may be used only if it is indispensable and it must not be excessive (see, among many others, Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29462\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 68-78, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011XII, and Ivan Vasilev v. Bulgaria, no. 48130\/99, \u00a7 63, 12 April 2007). Recourse to physical force which has not been rendered strictly necessary by the person\u2019s own conduct diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the rights set forth in Article 3 of the Convention (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0101).107.\u00a0\u00a0In that regard, the Court notes that the Internal Security Office of the State Police found that the officer M.P. had forced the applicant onto the floor (see paragraph 22 above). Furthermore it considered that the applicant could have sustained the lumbar vertebral fracture by falling against a hard object, which in its view corresponded to the escort officers\u2019 version of the events (see paragraphs 24 and 45 above). At the same time, both the Internal Security Office of the State Police and the prosecution service failed to examine whether the measures applied against the applicant had been indispensable and not excessive. Such assessment was even more important given the applicant\u2019s medical condition at the time, in particular the fact that he had been in pain and was suffering from kidney stones and a renal colic (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). Furthermore, he had been given painkillers a couple of hours prior to the use of force (see paragraph\u00a07 above).108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in closing the investigation, the Internal Security Office of the State Police pointed out several discrepancies between the applicant\u2019s statements and other evidence (see paragraphs\u00a043 and\u00a044 above). The Court is not satisfied that those discrepancies were such that a more thorough assessment of the case was not required, including assessment of the proportionality of the force used against the applicant, in particular given the fact that subsequent to the incident at issue the applicant had been diagnosed with a fracture to the third lumbar vertebra and a left kidney contusion and the escort officers had stated that they had used force on him.109.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, in response to the Government\u2019s objection that the applicant had failed to appeal to a higher prosecutor against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 29 May 2009 (see paragraphs 47-49 and 66 above), the Court observes that the initial decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings was twice reviewed by the prosecution service. In his decision of 29\u00a0May 2009 the prosecutor noted that it was impossible to establish when the injuries on the applicant had been caused (see paragraph 48 above), and that the Internal Security Office of the State Police had taken all investigative steps requested by the prosecution service (see paragraph\u00a049 above).110.\u00a0\u00a0Given the aforementioned wording of the decision of 29 May 2009, the Court is of the opinion that a third round of appeals within the hierarchy of the prosecution service would have had no prospect of success. The applicant could therefore not be asked to try that remedy (see Sorokins and\u00a0Sorokina v. Latvia, no. 45476\/04, \u00a7 81, 28\u00a0May 2013, and Holodenko, cited above, \u00a7 81). This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that investigation becomes more problematic with the passage of time (see Holodenko, cited above, \u00a7 81). In this regard, the Court notes that the escort officers could no longer recall the holding cell in which the applicant had been placed nor could they demonstrate how force had been used against him. The Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objection.111.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the investigation into the alleged ill-treatment was not effective. There has accordingly been a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION112.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage113.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.114.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, deciding on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 5,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28162":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained about her conditions of detention, which in her view amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d36.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The Government37.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not brought her complaint before the domestic authorities. They considered that the applicant had a twofold remedy, namely constitutional redress proceedings to challenge the conditions of her detention while she was in detention and an action for damage in tort after she left detention. They further noted that an action under the European Convention Act was not subject to any time\u2011limits.38.\u00a0\u00a0As to the constitutional jurisdictions, the Government submitted that they had wide-ranging powers to deal with Convention violations. Such proceedings could also be heard with urgency, reducing the time span of such proceedings to two months from filing. The Government noted that the Court had previously criticised the duration of such proceedings. Nevertheless, a fresh assessment according to prevailing circumstances had to be done in each case. In the Government\u2019s view any delays in constitutional proceedings were counterbalanced by the fact that those jurisdictions could issue interim orders pending proceedings. They cited for example a decree in the case of Emanuel Camilleri vs Inspector Louise Callejja and the Commissioner of Police (no. 50\/2013) where the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction released a sentenced person from prison pending the proceedings given the particular circumstances of that case, namely where the main witness, who had testified in the applicant\u2019s trial which had ultimately returned a guilty verdict, was now being tried for perjury in connection with her testimony. Thus, in the Government\u2019s view, in the absence of speedy proceedings there nevertheless existed a speedy interim remedy which could be decreed by the constitutional jurisdictions under Article 46 (2) of the Constitution and Article 4 (2) of the European Convention Act. Despite the exceptional circumstances of the case, the example went to show that releasing persons from prison by means of an interim measure was indeed a possibility which could be used by the constitutional jurisdictions, and the applicant had not proved the contrary.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the applicant could also avail herself of the services of a legal-aid lawyer (governed by Article 911 et seq. of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure).40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further relied on the Court\u2019s general principles cited in Abdi Ahmed and Others v. Malta ((dec.), no.\u00a043985\/13, 16\u00a0September 2014) and to its findings in that case, where the Court had established that the situation having ended, the duration of proceedings no longer rendered the remedy ineffective. The Court had also noted that the applicant had the same chances of lodging domestic proceedings as she had to lodge international proceedings, namely by means of NGO lawyers.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the applicant could also have instituted an action for damages in tort where she, as a released detainee, could have obtained damage for loss sustained on the account of her conditions of detention, if she could have proved on the basis of probabilities that she had suffered damage and that such damage was attributable to the Government\u2019s acts or omissions.42.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government it was evident that these remedies were effective. They formed part of the normal process of redress, were accessible, and offered reasonable prospects of success where this was justified.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that there existed no effective domestic remedy which should have been used; in fact most of the Government\u2019s arguments had already been rejected by the Court in its judgment in the case of Aden Ahmed v. Malta (no. 55352\/12, 23 July 2013) concerning an immigrant detained at around the same time as the applicant in the present case. The Court\u2019s conclusions in that case were in line with the findings of the European Commission Directorate-General for Justice in a report entitled The EU Justice Scoreboard \u2013 A tool to promote effective justice and growth (2013), which showed that the Maltese judicial system was one of the systems with the longest delays among the member States. By means of example, the case of The Police vs Pauline Vella (42\/2007), lodged in 2007, which looked at the conditions of detention at Mount Carmel Hospital, was decided on appeal on 30 September 2011.44.\u00a0\u00a0As to the use of interim measures by the constitutional jurisdictions, the applicant submitted that in the very specific circumstances of the example given by the Government, the first-instance constitutional jurisdiction itself repeatedly stressed, in its decree, the exceptional nature of interim orders. It finally considered that that specific case was serious enough to warrant such a measure. The applicant considered that the circumstances of that case, which pointed towards a wrongful conviction, could not be compared to that of the applicant, and nothing indicated that persons in the applicant\u2019s position would obtain provisional release pending a complaint on conditions of detention.45.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, one could not rely on the findings of this Court in Abdi\u00a0Ahmed and Others (dec.), cited above, which concerned significantly different circumstances, and where, the moment the application was filed, preventive action was no longer necessary. However, in the present case, when the applicant applied to the Court she was still in detention, and thus preventive action was still necessary, but was not available due to the excessive duration of constitutional redress proceedings.46.\u00a0\u00a0 Lastly, the applicant also referred to the Court\u2019s considerations regarding a lack of a proper structured system enabling immigration detainees to have concrete access to effective legal aid.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment47.\u00a0The Court refers to its case-law concerning exhaustion of domestic remedies, in particular in connection with complaints of conditions of detention, as reiterated in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 54-58, with references therein).48.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the Court notes firstly that the circumstances of the present case are different to those in the case of Abdi Ahmed and Others v. Malta ((dec.), no. 43985\/13, 16 September 2014), relied on by the Government. That case concerned a determination as to whether, following the Court\u2019s decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to indicate to the Government that they should desist from deporting the applicants - a decision which had been respected by the Maltese Government - the applicants in that case had had access to an effective remedy (for the purposes of, inter alia, their Article 3 complaint, which did not concern conditions of detention) which they were required to use before continuing their application before this Court.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case, when the applicant lodged her application with the Court (19 August 2013) complaining, inter alia, about her conditions of detention, the applicant was still in detention, and thus, apart from requiring a remedy providing compensation, she was required to have a preventive remedy capable of putting an end to the allegedly ongoing violation of her right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court will thus proceed to assess the matter.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already considered in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7 73) that it had not been satisfactorily established that an action in tort may give rise to compensation for any non-pecuniary damage suffered and that it clearly was not a preventive remedy in so far as it cannot impede the continuation of the violation alleged or provide the applicant with an improvement in the detention conditions (see Torreggiani and Others v.\u00a0Italy, nos. 43517\/09, 46882\/09, 55400\/09, 57875\/09, 61535\/09, 35315\/10\u00a0and 37818\/10, 8 January 2013, particularly \u00a7 50, and the case-law cited therein). It thus concluded that it cannot be considered an effective remedy for the purposes of a complaint about conditions of detention under Article 3 (see also Mikalauskas v. Malta, no. 4458\/10, \u00a7 49, 23 July 2013). Nothing has been brought to the attention of the Court which could cast doubt on that conclusion.51.\u00a0\u00a0As to constitutional redress proceedings, again, in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 61-63), the Court held that such an action provides a forum guaranteeing due process of law and effective participation for the aggrieved individual. In such proceedings, courts can take cognisance of the merits of the complaint, make findings of fact, and order redress that is tailored to the nature and gravity of the violation. These courts can also make an award of compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage, and there is no limit on the amount which can be awarded to an applicant for such a violation. The ensuing judicial decision will be binding on the defaulting authority and enforceable against it. The Court was therefore satisfied that the existing legal framework rendered this remedy capable, at least in theory, of affording appropriate redress. However, given the delay in those proceedings, the Court held that while it could not rule out that constitutional redress proceedings dealt with urgently (as should be the case concerning complaints of conditions of detention) may in future be considered an effective remedy for the purposes of such complaints under Article 3, the then state of domestic case-law could not allow the Court to find that the applicant was required to have recourse to such a remedy. In the present case the Government have not submitted any further examples enabling the Court to revisit its conclusion concerning the delay in such proceedings. On the contrary, they appear to acknowledge the existence of such delays, arguing however that such delays are counterbalanced by the possibility of interim measures being issued by constitutional jurisdictions pending proceedings.52. In this connection, the Court notes that the example put forward by the Government is indeed very specific and is unrelated to circumstances such as those of the present case. Accepting that the provision of examples may be more difficult in smaller jurisdictions, such as in the present case, where the number of cases of a specific kind may be fewer than in the larger jurisdictions, nevertheless the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s example concerning a case of conditions of detention did not have such a measure applied, despite the excessive duration, extending to four years. Similarly, the case of Tafarra Besabe Berhe, referred to by the applicant (in her submissions below, at paragraph 100) concerning the lawfulness of immigrants\u2019 detention and the conditions of such detention, which was still pending six years after it was lodged, also does not appear to have applied such a measure. Admittedly, the Court is aware that no examples may exist because applicants fail to make such requests. However, in the absence of any other comparable examples, the Court finds no indication that the constitutional jurisdictions would be willing on a regular basis to release immigrant detainees pending a decision on their claims on conditions of detention.53.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that, in circumstances such as those of the present case, the hypothetical possibility that interim measures may be issued pending proceedings does not make up for deficiencies detected in the remedy at issue \u2013 a remedy which would be effective both as a preventive and a compensatory remedy, if it were carried out in a timely manner. Thus, current domestic case-law does not allow the Court to find that the applicant was required to have recourse to such a remedy.54.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the Government have not dispelled the Court\u2019s previously expressed concerns about the accessibility of such remedies in the light of the apparent lack of a proper structured system enabling immigration detainees to have concrete access to effective legal aid (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 66).55. In conclusion, none of the remedies put forward by the Government, alone or in aggregate, satisfy the requirements of an effective remedy in the sense of preventing the alleged violation or its continuation in a timely manner.\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s objection is dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant considered the conditions of detention to be basic. She noted in particular the lack of access to constructive or recreational activities, insufficient provision of basic needs, lack of information, difficulties communicating with the outside world, limited access to open air, and obstacles in obtaining the most basic services. Other factors which had to be taken into consideration were her age and her inability to communicate in English.58.\u00a0\u00a0 Each zone (measuring 300 sq. m according to a M\u00e9decins Sans Fronti\u00e8res report) consisted of a landing, three adjacent dormitories all opening on to a narrow corridor, nine or ten showers and toilets, a small room used as a kitchen with one or two hotplates, a common room containing metal tables and benches screwed to the ground, and one television. There was no room to store food or other materials. Free movement between zones was not possible, and for most of the day the detainees were confined to their respective zones.59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further submitted that conditions in her zones (C, D\u00a0and A) were particularly difficult in the summer months, as it became crowded because of increased arrivals. When the zone was at full capacity (sixty people), bearing in mind the areas of the dormitories and the common areas, each detainee had an average 5 sq. m of shelter space, which meant that in August, when the applicant\u2019s zone had sixty-nine inmates, the average shelter space was of 4.3 sq. m, and in May when it had sixty-one the average shelter space was 4.9 sq. m. She further noted that between her arrival on 6 May and July 2012 the detainees were not allowed out of the zone, and thus they spent twenty-four hours inside the cramped space. The applicant felt that it was difficult to live in a room with twenty women, each having different sleeping times, who were noisy when it suited them, and where basic necessities were lacking.60.\u00a0\u00a0 Windows were barred and most of them glazed with opaque Perspex (which was removed in the summer months for air, though they then let air through in the cold winter months). On the one hand, in summer the facility was often crowded and the heat would become oppressive despite the presence of ceiling fans. On the other hand, in winter it was unbearably cold, as the facility was not heated and, moreover, was exposed to the elements as there were no adjoining buildings.61.\u00a0\u00a0 The food provided was also of poor quality, was not nutritious enough, lacked variety (chicken was served every evening) and was culturally inappropriate. According to reports by M\u00e9decins Sans Fronti\u00e8res and the JRS (relevant links submitted to the Court) the diet provided had led to a number of gastrointestinal problems among detainees.62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained about the difficulties she had in obtaining information about her situation and the ongoing vulnerability assessment procedure. Detainees had nothing to do all day except watch television, and only very limited access (one and half hours) to the open air, in a small dusty yard \u2013 which could be arbitrarily closed from one day to another because of security concerns or escapes. She noted that the books in the library were in English, and that the classes held by Integra mentioned by the Government only started after her release (as with the telephone service offered by the Red Cross). Other projects did not consist of more than one activity per week.63.\u00a0\u00a0Detainees had limited contact with the outside world, as no Internet was available and telephone credit was insufficient for overseas calls.64.\u00a0\u00a0The detention centre lacked female staff, and only one woman worked on the shift with the zones. This meant that all the care of detained women was carried out by male staff (most having a security background) who guarded the facility, conducted headcounts (in the dormitories twice daily, including the mornings when the women were asleep \u2013 thus the applicant had to sleep fully clothed including headscarf), took care of the distribution of basic necessities, including items of personal hygiene and underwear, and accompanied them to medical appointments. This state of affairs was confirmed by a local report drawn up by a Maltese magistrate (the Valenzia Report). The applicant referred to international reports on the matter (see paragraphs 30-32 above), and considered that the situation was even more frustrating given that under the domestic system there was no mechanism to complain about ill-treatment or abuse by detention staff.65.\u00a0\u00a0She further complained that the detention itself had an impact on her physical and mental wellbeing. She noted that she had nothing to do apart from read and all she did in detention was worry about her problems, she did not watch TV and did not go to the yard because she did not enjoy it, and got dizzy walking down two flights of steps to reach it. Her detention conditions were particularly unfortunate given her state of health. She explained that already in Somalia she used to experience headaches and earaches, at a time during which she was experiencing considerable hardship and trauma because of the war, and subsequently her voyage across the desert and eventually the Mediterranean. While in Libya she began to experience intense bouts of nervousness\/anxiety followed by blackouts. This happened several times but she was not seen by a doctor. In Benghazi, while imprisoned, she became ill again, was taken to hospital and transferred to a UNHCR camp. In Malta too she continued to experience both physical symptoms and psychological ill-health, which she considered were linked to her long-term detention and the anxiety caused by the rejection of her asylum application. She continued to suffer from headaches and earaches which were exacerbated by the noise in detention (people talking loudly and the television). She stated that the pain was sometimes so bad that she felt dizzy and fainted. She claims that her health degenerated after her asylum application was rejected at first instance. She was fainting more often and was constantly crying. She referred to her medical records (see paragraphs 16-19 above), which showed repeated visits to the clinic for a variety of ailments, including fainting, dizziness and possible fits. In fact, she had been referred to AWAS for assessment with a view to possible release on grounds of vulnerability on account of her ill-health and her poor psychological health. In her view it was in the light of her particular circumstances that the conditions of her detention had to be evaluated.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government66.\u00a0\u00a0As to the structure of Hermes Block, the Government submitted that it consisted of three equally sized rooms that together had a total capacity to accommodate sixty people. Records held by detention services showed that during the period that the applicant was housed in Hermes Block, in the month of May 2012 there were sixty-one occupants, while during the peak August month there were sixty-nine detainees. Indeed the dimensions shown by the applicant herself had shown that there was no issue of overcrowding according to the Court\u2019s standards.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the zones were well kept and that the Government provided shelter, food, clothing, and medical assistance to migrants. In the Government\u2019s view the facility catered for all the needs of the migrants. Gates which separated the different zones were intended to protect the migrants, and separation was provided in relation to migrants having different ethnicities and religious beliefs as well as gender.68.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, upon arrival an emergency bag is distributed, containing a towel, two bed sheets, a pair of flip-flops, two T\u2011shirts, two pairs of shorts, a bar of face soap, shower gel (which can also be used as shampoo), a bar of laundry soap, a toothbrush and toothpaste, a pillow and pillow case, toilet paper, a plastic cup, a plate and cutlery set, a blanket, a five-euro telephone card, a packet of sanitary towels, and a quilt (for winter arrivals only). A second bag is supplied on the second day, containing bras and underwear, slippers or running shoes, a tracksuit, and other items of clothing. Further supplies are provided on a regular basis, such as cleaning products every two weeks in order to secure the cleanliness of the areas. The applicant was also given clothing and supplies to cater for her personal hygiene, and had access to sanitary facilities equipped with hot and cold water, as well as secluded showers.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that whilst in detention the applicant was housed in a sheltered compound with adequate bedding and was provided with three meals a day on a daily basis. Meals were provided from a pre-set menu, however, particular dietary requests were regularly respected and the food supplied respected the relevant religious traditions. It surely could not be said that the fact that chicken was served regularly would be of any concern. The detention centres had a medical practitioner and a nurse who provided on-site treatment and could make referrals to hospital treatment, and \u201ccustody clinics\u201d are set up in all compounds housing migrants.70.\u00a0\u00a0Immigration detainees are provided with telephone cards and various telephones can be found in the detention centre. Moreover, the Red Cross also operates a mobile phone calling service on a daily basis and any restrictions on the use of mobile phones and internet were due to security reasons. Further, the Government noted that while the applicant was in detention, two female detention officers were assigned to the zones were females were held. The detainees are further provided with stationery and books on request. They have access to a television, as well as a kitchen offering basic cooking facilities and a common room with tables and benches. They are free to practise their religion and have unlimited access to NGOs and legal assistance (sic). They also have the opportunity to attend language and integration classes provided by NGOs.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that access to outside exercise was limited to one and a half hours daily per zone. If one zone refused to use its time the allotted time would be added to that of the other zones. During the period of April to July 2012 access to the yard had only been limited because of the significant number of break-outs, and thus was justified for security reasons. According to the Government, on various occasions it was the migrants themselves who refused to go out into the yard.72.\u00a0\u00a0As to heating (which was installed after the applicant\u2019s release), the Government considered that this was counterbalanced by the provision of warm clothing and blankets. In Malta winters were mild and the coldest temperatures were felt from January to March.73.\u00a0\u00a0As to the detention staff, the Government considered that it was not debasing to have male staff, given that they were trained. As to the headcounts, they considered that in any event female detainees had to dress appropriately even with respect to other detainees in the dormitory. The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegation that there was no complaint mechanism, and alleged that instances of misbehaviour were brought to the attention of the Head of Detention Services, either directly by the detainee or through NGOs. Without giving examples, the Government alleged that such complaints were investigated and, where necessary, disciplinary proceedings undertaken.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that immigrants were given information on their arrival, by means of an information leaflet and verbally, and the Commissioner for Refugees holds information sessions with the aid of interpreters. As to information concerning the AWAS procedure the Government submitted that information was easily available had the applicant asked for it from the staff at the detention centre;75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to the Court\u2019s case-law (Sizarev v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 17116\/04, 17 January 2013; Selcuk and Akser v. Turkey, nos.\u00a023184\/94 and 23185\/94, 24 April 1998; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, ECHR 2002\u2011III); and particularly Aden Ahmed (cited above), and the principles cited therein. They considered that the conditions of detention at issue could not be compared to those in facilities in respect of which the Court had found a violation (for example, Dougoz v. Greece, no.\u00a040907\/98, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011II; S.D. v. Greece, no. 53541\/07, 11 June 2009; and A.A. v.\u00a0Greece, no. 12186\/08, 22 July 2010). While shared facilities could create some discomfort, this could not reach the relevant Article 3 threshold. In the present case the applicant had been given ample personal space with adequate ventilation and bedding as well as warm clothing and she had a balanced and varied diet.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government distinguished the present case from that of Aden\u00a0Ahmed (cited above) in so far as that case had concerned a detention of eighteen months (sic.), but not the present one. Moreover, in that case the applicant had been in a particularly vulnerable situation which combined to the conditions of detention led to a violation of Article 3. However, in the present case the applicant had been referred to the Vulnerable Adult\u2019s Assessment Procedure only on 1 October 2012, five months after her arrival and two months from the rejection of her asylum application. The Government considered that the applicant\u2019s aim was to obtain a monetary award, which was why she tried to compare the two cases, a comparison which in their view was not well founded.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that available medical officers made referrals to hospital if need arose and the applicant had received \u201cconstant medical assistance even though her condition could not be defined as that of a seriously ill person\u201d. This was also shown by the evidence submitted by the applicant herself. They further noted that the noise in the centre could not be considered as a health hazard and that the Maltese Government was not responsible for any treatment she had suffered before arriving in Malta. Furthermore, her asylum claim was swiftly determined, at first instance, after two months, and conclusively a little more than seven months later, it was thus not correct for the applicant to claim that the concern about her claim made her increasingly unwell and depressed. Thus, in their view, the circumstances as a whole could not amount to a violation of Article 3.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court makes reference to its general principles concerning conditions of detention, as reiterated in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a085\u201190).79. The Court notes that\u00a0having regard to the numbers provided by the applicant and confirmed by the Government, and the measurements provided by the applicant and not contested by the Government, on regular months of her detention (excluding August) during which sixty or fewer than sixty people were detained in her zone, and sixty-one were held in May, the applicant had approximately 5 square metres of shelter space in her zone. Such a measurement does not refer only to the space available in her dormitory, but to the entirety of the space to which she had access in her zone. However, given that the applicant had in fact the opportunity to move around in the zone, the Court considers that there is no reason why the entirety of the area should not be taken into consideration for the purposes of her living space. Even considering that in reality this space should be significantly lower in view of the fixtures in the rooms, both the common rooms and the dormitories (see Yarashonen v. Turkey, no. 72710\/11, \u00a7\u00a076, 24\u00a0June 2014, and Torreggiani and Others, cited above, \u00a7 75), the Court considers that the ultimate living space over those months did not go below the acceptable minimum standard of multi-occupancy accommodation.The same must be said for the month of August, where the applicant\u2019s zone had sixty-nine inmates, and thus her average shelter space was 4.3\u00a0square metres. In these circumstances the Court cannot find that the overcrowding was so severe as to justify in itself a finding of a violation of Article 3.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will thus continue to assess the other aspects of the conditions of detention which are relevant to the assessment of the compliance with Article 3.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that even scarce space in relative terms may in some circumstances be compensated for by the freedom to spend time away from the dormitory rooms (see Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, \u00a7\u00a0103 and\u00a0107, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII, and Nurmagomedov v.\u00a0Russia\u00a0(dec.), no.\u00a030138\/02, 16 September 2004). The Court observes that while it is true that adjacent to the dormitories the applicant could move around in the common room as well as the corridors, by the Government\u2019s own admission during the period of April to July 2012 access to the yard was limited because of the significant number of break-outs. In the Government\u2019s view this limitation was justified for security reasons. The Court observes that no specific date as to when this limitation came to an end in July 2012 was submitted by any of the parties, thus, the applicant having been detained on the premises since 8 May 2012 (following her release from hospital), this meant that the applicant had no access to any outdoor exercise for anything between eight and twelve weeks (compare, Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a096, concerning a period of three months). This is a matter which must be given due weight when assessing the cumulative effects of detention. To cite one example, the detention of an asylum seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals, has been considered to be degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3 (see Tabesh v. Greece, no. 8256\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 41- 44, 26 November 2009).82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that access to outdoor exercise is a fundamental component of the protection afforded to those deprived of their liberty under Article 3, and as such it cannot be left to the discretion of the authorities (see Yarashonen, cited above, \u00a7 78); according to the CPT, all detainees, even those confined to their cells as a punishment, have a right to at least one hour of exercise in the open air every day regardless of how good the material conditions might be in their cells (see the CPT standards, document no. CPT\/Inf\/E (2002) 1\u2011Rev. 2013, \u00a7 48). These standards also say that outdoor exercise facilities should be reasonably spacious and whenever possible provide shelter from inclement weather (see Neshkov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, nos. 36925\/10, 21487\/12, 72893\/12, 73196\/12, 77718\/12 and 9717\/13, \u00a7 234, 27 January 2015, with further references).\u00a0The physical characteristics of outdoor exercise facilities are also relevant. For instance, an exercise yard that is just two square metres larger than the cell, is surrounded by three-metre-high walls, and has an opening to the sky covered with metal bars and a thick net, does not offer inmates proper opportunities for recreation and recuperation (see Ananyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0152, with further references).83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already had occasion to comment on the yard referred to in the present case in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7 96), where it noted that it was small for use by sixty people (recreation being available in just one zone at a time), it was secured on three sides by wire fencing topped with barbed wire, and left much to be desired given that it was the only outdoor access enjoyed by detainees for a limited time daily. Further, it is not disputed that in the present case there was not even any access to this yard for between eight and twelve weeks. The Court considers that the Government\u2019s argument is no justification, and indeed the authorities should be in a position to provide safe exercise space irrespective of any fears of escape. The latter concerns may be addressed by other relevant measures falling under the authorities\u2019 responsibility, without impinging on the well-being of all the detainees indiscriminately.84.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the other aspects raised by the applicant, the Court considers that the fact that the detention centre was basic cannot in itself raise an issue, particularly given that from the Government\u2019s explanation it appears that sanitary and other standards were better than those often assessed by this Court. Moreover, the applicant had access to a common area equipped with a television, as well as telephone cards and three meals a day. The meals of which the applicant complains do not appear to have been entirely unbalanced or to have worsened her health, nor has the applicant explained what made them culturally inappropriate. Further, the applicant\u2019s basic needs have been seen to by the distribution of materials free of charge. Nevertheless, the Court notes with concern the applicant\u2019s statements that dormitories were shared by so many people with little or no privacy, that she suffered from heat and cold, and that there was a lack of female staff to deal with the women detainees (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 92).85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that suffering from cold and heat cannot be underestimated, as such conditions may affect one\u2019s well-being, and may in extreme circumstances affect health (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 94). Nevertheless, the applicant admits that ceiling fans were in place, and despite the fact that Malta is an extremely hot country in the summer months the Court considers that the authorities cannot be expected to provide the most advanced technology. However, the Court is concerned by the applicant\u2019s allegation that detainees suffered from the cold. Little comfort can be found in the Government\u2019s argument that January to February are the coldest months, given that the applicant was detained from May 2012 to September 2013. While, the Court observes that the provision of blankets must have alleviated the situation to some extent, individuals who are vulnerable because of their health may require further measures.86.\u00a0\u00a0For the same reasons as those given in various reports (see for example paragraph 31 above), the Court also finds disconcerting the lack of female staff in the centre (see also Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 95). The Government admitted that only two females had been working in the detention centre at the time, and did not dispute that only one of them was working in the applicant\u2019s zone. The Government\u2019s submission that male staff were trained to distribute intimate products, even if it were true, cannot counteract the degree of discomfort to the female detainees who were for the most time dealt with and surrounded by male officers for their detention over several months. Moreover, it has not been submitted by the Government that it was impossible, or even difficult, to staff the centre with female personnel. Of some concern too is the fact that little privacy is found in the dormitories, which moreover lack any furniture of the kind in which individuals could store their personal belongings.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that this situation and the aforementioned conditions persisted for a period of sixteen months and one week. Moreover, the detention was imposed in the context of immigration, and was therefore a measure which is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to asylum seekers (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 98).88.\u00a0\u00a0 Further, the Court notes that, contrary to what was stated by the Government, the case is akin to that of Aden Ahmed, repeatedly cited above. Indeed the present case concerns the same premises during more or less the same period, and the duration of the detention is comparable - namely fourteen and a half months in the case of Aden Ahmed (\u00a7 98, on the basis of \u00a7\u00a7 18 and 30 concerning the facts) and more than sixteen months in the present case. Most importantly, as in the case of Aden Ahmed the applicant in the present case was also vulnerable.The Court notes that in Aden Ahmed the domestic authorities, through the AWAS procedure, had not acknowledged the applicant\u2019s vulnerability. Nevertheless, the Court considered that that applicant was in a vulnerable position, not only because of the fact that she was an irregular immigrant and because of her specific past and her personal emotional circumstances (see also M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 232, ECHR 2011), but also because of her fragile health (\u00a7 97).In the present case, the domestic authorities, through the AWAS procedure, had established that the applicant was vulnerable and had to be released (see paragraph 24 above). This finding appears to have been clear already after her interview in December 2012 (see paragraph 12 above) despite the fact that it took eight months (until 10 August 2013) for the authorities to formally issue their decision - months during which no further interviews with the applicant were held. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds no reason to second guess the domestic assessment.89.\u00a0\u00a0 In view of the applicant\u2019s vulnerability as a result of her health, all the above-mentioned circumstances, namely the fact that the applicant had no access to outdoor exercise for anything between eight and twelve weeks, the poor environment for outdoor exercise in the remaining period, the lack of specific measures to counter act the cold, the lack of female staff, the little privacy offered in the centre, and the fact these conditions persisted for over sixteen months, lead the Court to conclude that the cumulative effect of the conditions complained of, diminished the applicant\u2019s human dignity and aroused in her feelings of anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing her and possibly breaking her physical or moral resistance. In sum, the Court considers that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in Hermes Block amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.90.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained that she did not have a remedy which met the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4, as outlined in the Court\u2019s jurisprudence, to challenge the lawfulness of her detention. The provision reads as follows:\u201c4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201d92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection ratione materiae93.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that Article 5 \u00a7 4 did not apply to the present case since, according to the Court\u2019s case-law, such a remedy is no longer required once an individual is lawfully free. They noted that the applicant had been released on 7 February 2013 (sic).94.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant noted that she was entitled to raise this complaint, since she had not had such a remedy during her detention, and had instituted proceedings before the Court while she was still in detention.95.\u00a0\u00a0While it is true that Article 5 \u00a7 4 cannot be relied on by a person who has been lawfully released (see Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), no.\u00a011956\/07, \u00a7\u00a0102, 21\u00a0April 2009), the Court notes that when the applicant lodged her application with the Court, namely on 19 August 2013, contrary to that claimed by the Government, she was still detained, given that as confirmed by the Government in their earlier submissions she was only released on 12 September 2013 and she was precisely complaining that she did not have an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of her detention during the time she was detained. She is not complaining of the absence of such a remedy following her release. In consequence the provision is applicable (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 105).96.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant relied on the Court\u2019s findings in Louled Massoud v.\u00a0Malta (no. 24340\/08, 27 July 2010), whereby the Court held that the available remedies in the Maltese domestic system were ineffective and insufficient for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4. In respect of Article 25 A\u00a0(6) of the Immigration Act, she added that as a rule the Board granted bail in connection with removal orders, but has done so at least once in connection with a challenge as to the lawfulness of detention under regulation 11(10) mentioned above at paragraph 29. Nevertheless, bail could only be granted against a financial deposit (usually around 1,000 euros (EUR)) as well as a third-party guarantee showing that the applicant will have accommodation and subsistence, conditions which were unlikely to be fulfilled by immigrants arriving by boat (as opposed to those overstaying visas). In any event the applicant highlighted that a request for bail concerned temporary release and was independent from a review of the lawfulness of the detention.99.\u00a0\u00a0Following the Louled Massoud judgment the only change in the law concerned the transposition of the EU return directive. Nevertheless, the \u201cnew\u201d remedy envisaged, namely an application to the Immigration Appeals Board in terms of Regulation 11\u00a0(10), also failed to meet the requirements of speediness, accessibility and certainty. Further, it was not even clear whether such a remedy was available in cases such as that of the applicant, in view of the limitations under Regulation 11 (1). This also appeared to be the case given the lack of reference to this remedy by the Government in their first round of observations. Also, there was no information on the possibility of using this remedy to challenge the lawfulness of detention, nor any access to legal aid to attempt the remedy. In any event, in the applicant\u2019s knowledge, of four such applications lodged only one had been determined before the claimants in those cases were released (between two and nine months after the application had been lodged), and the only one determined was decided twelve months after it was lodged.100.\u00a0\u00a0As to constitutional proceedings, the applicant relied on the Court\u2019s previous findings, and considered that there were no reasons to alter those findings. Indeed, the three cases concerning lawfulness of detention under Article 5 which were pending before the constitutional jurisdictions while the applicant was detained only showed the excessive duration of such proceedings. Indeed the case of Tafarra Besabe Berhe vs Commissioner of\u00a0Police (27\/2007) showed that requests for hearing with urgency were of little avail, since the case remained pending six years after it was filed, on\u00a08\u00a0May\u00a02007. The case of Essa Maneh Et vs Commissioner of Police\u00a0(53\/2008) lodged on 16 December 2009, was also still pending on appeal (in January 2015). A further example, Maximilain Ciantar vs AG (35\/2010), had been lodged on 31 May 2010 and had ended on appeal only on 7 January 2011. Neither was there any evidence to suggest that the Court Practice and Procedure and Good Order Rules cited by the Government had had any effect on the efficacy and speed of proceedings, as shown by the domestic case-law cited.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government101.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations concerning the complaint under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a04 the Government submitted that the Court\u2019s findings in Aden Ahmed and Suso Musa, both cited above, concerning the ineffectiveness of constitutional proceedings should be revisited by the Court, given the evidence that showed that constitutional jurisdictions could give interim relief pending proceedings (see paragraph 38 above). The Government also contended that it was impossible (sic) to provide a number of examples, given the limitations on small States.102.\u00a0\u00a0On indication by the applicant, the Government submitted in their last round of observations that the remedy provided by Regulation\u00a011 was available to the applicant and could have allowed her release.103. In connection with their objection of domestic remedies under Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01, the Government made reference to subsidiary legislation 12.09, namely the Court Practice and Procedure and Good Order Rules\u00a0dealing also with constitutional matters, which emphasised the need for speedy resolution of such matters. Secondly, they noted that it was possible for an applicant to request that a case be dealt with, heard and concluded with urgency. The Government strongly objected to the fact that the Court was allowing applicants in cases involving irregular immigrants to circumvent domestic remedies. They considered that this could only be done when there were no effective remedies. They also claimed that the applicant had not lodged a request for bail before the Immigration Appeals Board.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its general principles concerning Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a04, as established in its case-law and reiterated in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0113\u2011114, and 120).105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has repeatedly examined in detail the remedies available in Malta for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4, and has held that applicants seeking to challenge the lawfulness of their immigrant detention, in the Maltese context, did not have at their disposal an effective and speedy remedy under domestic law (see, for example, Aden Ahmed and Suso Musa, both cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 60 and 123 respectively). Nevertheless, the Government claimed that the Court\u2019s findings should be revised concerning constitutional redress proceedings, despite their inability to submit any examples. They also submitted that the remedy provided by Regulation\u00a011 was available to the applicant and they referred to the possibility of applying for bail before the IAB.106. As to the remedy provided by Regulation 11, the Court observes that the latter regulation states that the provisions of Part IV of the subsidiary legislation 217.12 do not apply to individuals apprehended or intercepted in connection with irregular crossing by sea. The Court notes that Regulation 11 is part of Part IV of the subsidiary legislation mentioned, and the applicant was intercepted in connection with an irregular crossing by sea. Despite the Court\u2019s findings in the cases of Suso Musa v.\u00a0Malta\u00a0(no.\u00a042337\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 58-59) and Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0121\u201122) that, even assuming that such a remedy applied in the applicant\u2019s case, it was also not effective, the Government failed to explain why such a remedy was still available to the applicant despite such limitation and the circumstances as appeared at the time. In any event, again, the Court notes that not one example was put forward by the Government concerning this remedy, and the examples referred to by the applicant, which, while lacking appropriate substantiation have not been disputed by the Government, continue to show the ineffectiveness of the remedy. Thus, the Court finds no reason to alter its conclusions in Suso\u00a0Musa and Aden Ahmed (both cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58-59 and \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0121\u201122 respectively). Similarly, in reply to an unexplained statement by the Government concerning a request for bail under Article 25 A (6) of the Immigration Act, the Court reiterates its findings in Suso Musa (\u00a7\u00a7\u00a056\u201158) to the effect that this was also not an effective remedy.107.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, in the absence of any further dispute concerning the Court\u2019s findings in relation to remedies other than constitutional redress proceedings, the Court finds no reasons to re-examine the situations already examined in previous cases (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 115-24; Suso\u00a0Musa, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 52-61; and Louled Massoud, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 42-47). In particular it notes that in the judgment of Suso Musa, cited above, the Court called for general measures in this connection, and the case remains under consideration by the Committee of Ministers and has not yet been closed.108.\u00a0\u00a0As to constitutional redress proceedings, while the illustration of the practical effectiveness of a remedy with examples of domestic case-law may be more difficult in smaller jurisdictions (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 63), the Court cannot ignore that the examples from the Maltese context previously brought to the Court\u2019s attention, and reiterated by the applicant in the present case continue to show that constitutional redress proceedings are not effective for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4, in view of their duration.109.\u00a0\u00a0In connection with constitutional redress proceedings, the Government relied on the possibility of obtaining interim relief pending lengthy proceedings, the Court refers to its findings at paragraph 53 in fine above, and reiterates its consideration that it is unlikely that constitutional jurisdictions would be willing on a regular basis to release immigrant detainees pending a decision on their claims of unlawful detention. It follows that, in the Court\u2019s view, constitutional redress proceedings are still not an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4.110.\u00a0\u00a0It follows from the above that it has not been shown that the applicant had at her disposal an effective and speedy remedy under domestic law by which to challenge the lawfulness of her detention.111.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention has therefore been violated.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION112.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that her lengthy detention, more than seven months of which pending a decision on her asylum request and the rest allegedly pending her removal, despite no steps having been taken, was contrary to Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. She relied on the case of Suso Musa v. Malta (no. 42337\/12, 23 July 2013). The provision reads as follows:\u201cEveryone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201d\u00a0113.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies114.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not brought her complaint before the domestic authorities. She had not made a request for bail before the Immigration Appeals Board, nor had she brought constitutional redress proceedings.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already held that the applicant did not have at her disposal an effective and speedy remedy by which to challenge the lawfulness of her detention (see paragraph 110 above). It follows that the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant117.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that her initial detention was for the purpose of deportation as a result of the removal order and was in line with Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act. Nevertheless, once she had applied for asylum she could no longer be detained under either limb as, in her view, Maltese law provided that once such an application was lodged the asylum seeker \u201cshall not be removed ... and the applicant shall be allowed to enter or remain in Malta pending a final decision\u201d (see Suso Musa, cited above, \u00a7 31). However, even assuming that the first part of her detention, before her asylum claim was rejected, was to be considered as falling under the first limb, she considered that seven and a half months\u2019 detention was arbitrary, as it exceeded the time reasonably required for its purpose, and thus could not be closely connected to the purpose of preventing an unauthorised entry.118.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, she had been held in a detention facility within an army barracks, in conditions that were far from appropriate for the detention of a young single female asylum seeker. The applicant relied on the Court\u2019s findings in Suso Musa (cited above, \u00a7100-102) and Aden Ahmed, cited above. In the latter case the Court had decided that in the circumstances of that case, the conditions in Lyster barracks had amounted to a violation of Article 3. The applicant submitted that no changes had been made to that facility in the meantime.119.\u00a0\u00a0As to the detention subsequent to the rejection of her asylum claim, the applicant submitted that during those eight months she was not once approached by the immigration authorities concerning her removal, nor was she ever informed about the stage of the removal procedures. The applicant conceded that nothing had been done not so much because of inefficiency or lack of willingness on behalf of the national authorities but because of the real logistical difficulties presented by removal to Somalia, indeed the Maltese authorities had never effected removals of rejected asylum seekers to Somalia or Somaliland. It followed that her eight-month detention was not in pursuit of any eventual deportation, the impossibility of which was evident in the early stages of her detention. Thus, the detention was not closely connected with the ground relied on. It was also important to note, that unlike that stated by the Government, the applicant was released not when it had become evident that she could be repatriated but only when AWAS had acceded to her request for release on grounds of vulnerability.120.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, detention policy in Malta established fixed terms of detention, which applied to all cases (except those concerning most vulnerable people). Thus, the applicant\u2019s detention was not determined by an individual assessment of her situation, including the possibility of return, but solely on the applicable policy. Moreover, even if removal had been in any way possible, an eight-month detention to that effect was excessive.121.\u00a0\u00a0In addition the applicant submitted that her detention had been governed by unclear laws and policies, which were vague as to the exceptions to detention concerning vulnerable persons. There were no clear publicly available rules regulating the procedure, the criteria on which decisions were to be based, or the time-limit within which a decision is to be taken. This meant that the procedure was anything but certain in practice, as the applicant\u2019s case exemplifies. Moreover, contrary to what the defendants submitted, in many cases it was also far from expeditious. In fact between July 2011 and June 2012, according to JRS records, out of a total of thirty\u2011nine adults released on grounds of vulnerability due to mental health problems or serious chronic illness, one was released within two weeks of referral; six within one month; thirteen within two months; six within three months; seven within four months; two within five months; one within seven months and three within eight months. This effectively meant that one-third of these vulnerable persons spent over three months in detention awaiting the outcome of vulnerability assessment procedures. In view of these factors national rules regulating detention failed to meet the standard set by Court, which has repeatedly stressed that \u201cwhere national law authorizes deprivation of liberty, it must be sufficiently accessible and precise to avoid ail risk of arbitrariness\u201d (Dougoz v. Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a055).122.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant noted that throughout all the detention period she had no access to adequate guarantees against arbitrary detention, as had been held by the Court in the above mentioned Suso Musa and Aden Ahmed judgments as well as in Louled Massoud (cited above, \u00a7 71).(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government123.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the \u201cfirst part\u201d of the applicant\u2019s detention fell within the first limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f). They further submitted that the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty was required for the purpose of repatriation. It had continued until there were no longer any prospects of her return, and at that point she was released on 12 September 2013 given that, while it transpired that she was not Somali, the Government were unable to establish the exact country of origin of the applicant.124.\u00a0 They noted that practically all immigrants reaching Malta did not carry documents and thus ascertaining their identities upon entry was a lengthy process which dependent on the cooperation of the migrants themselves, which was rarely forthcoming.125.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered, however, that the detention was carried out in good faith, as the centre at issue had been set up especially for that purpose, and the detention had fulfilled all the conditions indicated by the Court in Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC] (no.\u00a013229\/03, ECHR\u00a02008). They also considered that detention was based in law and was not discriminatory, nor was it applied across the board.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its general principles concerning Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01, as established in its case-law and reiterated in Aden Ahmed (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0138-141).127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant was kept in detention from 6\u00a0May 2012 until 12 September 2013 that is a total of sixteen months and one week. It is noted that the applicant does not complain about the lawfulness and compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 1 of her detention between 6\u00a0May 2012 (the date of her arrival by boat) and 9 May 2012, when she applied for asylum (see paragraph 117 above, in primis).128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already held, in Suso Musa (cited above, \u00a7 99) that up to the decision on an asylum claim, such detention can be considered to fall under the first limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f), namely to \u201cprevent effecting an unauthorised entry\u201d. There is no reason to find otherwise in the present case concerning the first period of seven and half months, between 9 May 2012 and 18 December 2012, the latter being the date when the applicant\u2019s asylum claim was finally determined, and rejected.129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant has been detained in terms of the provisions of the Immigration Act (Articles 5 and 14(2), Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta). While expressing reservations about the quality of all the applicable laws seen together in such context, the Court has already accepted that in cases similar to those of the applicant, the detention had a sufficiently clear legal basis (see Suso Musa, cited above, \u00a7 99).130.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicant complained about the quality of the rules regulating the AWAS procedure (see paragraph 121 above), the Court considers that there is room for improvement. Nevertheless, given that the provisions mentioned above - which provide a lawful basis for immigration detention - do not exempt vulnerable individuals from detention, the legal framework regulating the procedure for release of vulnerable individuals is not subject to the same scrutiny. However, the application of such framework in practice may have an incidence on the determination of whether the detention was arbitrary, in particular in connection with whether the detention was carried out in good faith; whether it was closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; whether the place and conditions of detention were appropriate; and whether the length of the detention exceeded that reasonably required for the purpose pursued.131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already noted a series of odd practices on the part of the domestic authorities when dealing with immigrant arrivals and subsequent detentions and it has expressed its reservations as to the Government\u2019s good faith in applying an across-the-board detention policy (save for specific vulnerable categories) and the by-passing of the voluntary departure procedure (see Suso Musa, cited above \u00a7 100) - reservations which it maintains, noting that the two practices persisted in the present case (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above).132.\u00a0\u00a0More specifically of relevance to the present case is the fact that Government policy allowed allegedly vulnerable individuals to apply for release from detention on the ground of their vulnerability. The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s vulnerability assessment took eleven months to be concluded (October 2012 \u2013 September 2013). No explanation has been given as to why it took two months from the lodging of her request for the applicant to be interviewed, or why it took another eight months to indicate to the applicant that she may be released (see paragraph 12 above), and yet another month to actually release her on the basis of a decision stating that her claim was acceded to (see paragraph 24 above). The examples referred to by the applicant (see paragraph 131 above) and not rebutted by the Government, go to show that this is often a lengthy procedure, which has reached deplorable delays in the present case.133.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court notes that while it is true that the applicant benefited from the opportunity to apply for the AWAS Adult Vulnerability Assessment Procedure, she did this only in October 2012, six months after her detention. It is unclear whether this delay was due to her situation having deteriorated to a relevant extent only at that time, or whether it was due to the applicant\u2019s unawareness of this procedure. While the Government claimed that this procedure \u201cwas widely known within the migration sector and a policy document had been issued about it\u201d and that \u201cForms were distributed to individuals working in the sector such as NGOs\u201d (see paragraph 15) it has not been submitted that detainees were directly informed of this possibility, nor has it been claimed that the authorities take any active steps to detect any such vulnerable detainees. It appears, to the contrary, that the authorities limit themselves to strongly relying on any goodwill gestures by NGOs.134.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that such a lack of relevant information and active steps by the authorities in this regard, as well as the exorbitant delays in the vulnerability assessment procedure, certainly defeat the point of exempting vulnerable persons from detention and raise serious questions as to the Government\u2019s good faith. This is even more disconcerting, given that it is one of the few applicable exceptions to the \u201cacross-the-board\u201d detention policy.135.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, even accepting that the applicant\u2019s first period of detention remained connected to the ground of detention relied on (see paragraph 128), the delays in the AWAS procedure in the applicant\u2019s case raise serious questions as to the Government\u2019s good faith. These delays are of serious concern when coupled with the fact that the applicant had no other procedural safeguards to rely on (see paragraphs 110 and 111 above), and bearing in mind that, as a result of the delay in her assessment, the applicant endured several months of detention in inappropriate conditions (see paragraph 89 above) despite her ill-health. Thus, the national system failed as a whole to protect the applicant from arbitrary detention.136. This situation persisted, at least, in respect of the last part of the applicant\u2019s first period of detention (amounting to more than two and half months), which fell under the first limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f), as well as to the entire part of her second period of detention.137.\u00a0\u00a0As to the second period of nearly nine months (19 December 2012 to 12 September 2013) subsequent to the determination of the applicant\u2019s asylum claim (which was rejected on 18 December 2012), the Court is, in principle, ready to accept that it fell under the second limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) (see Aden Ahmed, \u00a7 144), namely, for the purposes of deportation. The Court reiterates that detention falling under the second limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) will be justified only for as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress.138.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant was released when it became obvious that there were no prospects of establishing the applicant\u2019s exact country of origin, and thus no prospects of deportation. The Court notes a number of inconsistencies and lacunae in the Government\u2019s defence. Primarily, while the Government considered that the applicant\u2019s country of origin could not be established, it transpires that (unlike the first-instance asylum decision) the appeal decision rejecting the applicant\u2019s asylum claim was based on considerations related to Mogadishu, Somalia and her possibility of returning there (see paragraph 9 above). It follows that, already in December 2012, it had been established by the domestic authorities that the applicant was Somali. Nevertheless, by Government\u2019s implied admission, no steps were taken to return her there, following the final rejection of her claim. Even assuming that the authorities considered that such a decision was not \u201creliable\u201d \u2013 a matter which would raise serious concerns about the asylum system and its functioning - the Government did not submit the slightest detail as to in what way they tried to establish the applicant\u2019s origin, and what went on in those nine months of detention, and thus it cannot be said that any return procedures were at all initiated, let alone pursued with due diligence. Furthermore, the Court cannot but note that the Government\u2019s claim that the applicant was released only when it transpired, for some unspecified reason, that her identification would not be possible, is in stark contrast with the facts as established above, which show that the applicant was released solely because her vulnerability assessment request had been accepted. In consequence, the latter period of detention cannot be considered compatible with Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f).139. In conclusion, having regard to the above, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 in respect of both the first and the second period of the applicant\u2019s detention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION140.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage141.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, as a result of the violations of Article 3 and 5 in the present case.142.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the claim made by the applicant as excessive, and noted that such awards were made by the Court only in cases of excessive beatings by the authorities and other serious Article\u00a03 violations. They considered that a sum of EUR 3,000 would suffice in non-pecuniary damage, given the circumstances of the case.143.\u00a0The Court notes that it has found a violation of Articles 3, 5 \u00a7\u00a01 and 5 \u00a7 4 in the present case, and therefore awards the applicant EUR\u00a012,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses144.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 4,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, representing sixty hours of legal work charged at an hourly rate of EUR 60, as well as clerical costs of EUR 400.145.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that such an award should not exceed EUR 2,000.146.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the above criteria and the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,500 covering costs for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest147.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28152":"A.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s unilateral declaration13.\u00a0\u00a0On 15 April 2015 the Court communicated to the Government the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 and Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention (see paragraph 12 above).14.\u00a0\u00a0By a letter of 30 September 2015 the Government informed the Court that they proposed to make a unilateral declaration with a view to resolving some of the issues raised by the communicated application, while they considered the remainder of the application inadmissible. They further requested the Court to strike out the application in accordance with Article\u00a037 of the Convention.15.\u00a0\u00a0The declaration provided as follows:\u201cThe Government of Georgia express their regretful acknowledgement of a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights on account of the failure of domestic courts to give due consideration to the applicant\u2019s version of events of 30 January 2006 in the course of the determination of criminal charges against him.The Government in particular acknowledge the violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention due to the applicant\u2019s inability to examine prosecution witnesses, namely B. Akh. and T. T., during the proceedings in domestic courts as well as obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.Having due regard to the fact that the Investigative Department of the Ministry of Justice, which conducted the criminal investigation against the applicant, did not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality as provided for under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention;Bearing in mind the applicant\u2019s right envisaged under Article 310 (e) of the Criminal Code of Procedure of Georgia, entitling him to address a domestic court with a request to re-open a criminal case on the basis of a decision\/judgment rendered by the Court;The Government undertake to pay Mr Aleksandre Manukian 2,000 (two thousand) Euros to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages and costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.This sum will be converted into the Georgian national currency at the rate applicable on the date of payment, and will be free of any taxes that may be applicable. It will be payable within three months from the date of notification of the decision by the Court pursuant to Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the event of failure to pay this sum within the said three-month period, the Government undertake to pay simple interest on it, from the expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.The Government therefore invite the Court to strike out this part of the application, as \u201cany other reason\u201d justifying the striking out of the case of the Court\u2019s list of cases referred to in Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention.\u201d16.\u00a0\u00a0By a letter of 16 November 2015, the applicant indicated that he was ready to accept the terms of the Government\u2019s proposal, on condition that the Government in addition secure his early release from prison.17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 37 of the Convention provides that it may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to one of the conclusions specified, under (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 of that Article. Article\u00a037 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c) enables the Court in particular to strike a case out of its list if:\u201cfor any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application\u201d.18.\u00a0\u00a0It also reiterates that in certain circumstances, it may strike out an application under Article 37 \u00a7 1\u00a0(c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government even if the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued (see, among many other cases, Taktakishvili v.\u00a0Georgia (dec.), no. 46055\/06, 16 October 2012; Beridze v. Georgia (dec.), no. 16206\/06, 30 April 2013; Tabagari v. Georgia (dec.), nos.\u00a070820\/10 and 60870\/11, 18 June 2013; and Tsaguria v. Georgia (dec.), no.\u00a065969\/09, 15\u00a0September 2015).19.\u00a0\u00a0To that end, the Court has examined the declaration in the light of the principles emerging from its case-law, in particular in Tahsin Acar v.\u00a0Turkey ((preliminary objections) [GC], no. 26307\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 75-77, ECHR\u00a02003-VI); (see also WAZA Sp\u00f3\u0142ka z o.o. v. Poland (dec.), no.\u00a011602\/02, 26\u00a0June\u00a02007; and Sulwi\u0144ska v. Poland (dec.), no. 28953\/03, 18\u00a0September\u00a02007).20.\u00a0\u00a0In examining the Government\u2019s declaration, the Court notes at the outset that the Government have explicitly acknowledged that a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention took place. In that regard, it notes that the Court has already established its practice on the various aspects of fair trial guarantees relied upon by the applicant in his Article 6 complaints (see, for instance, Schatschaschwili v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 9154\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 100-165, ECHR 2015 with further references therein, and Huseyn and Others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 35485\/05, 45553\/05, 35680\/05 and 36085\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 205-207, 26 July 2011; see also, mutatis mutandis, Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria, no. 46317\/99, \u00a7 99, 23\u00a0February 2006; Antipenkov v. Russia, no. 33470\/03, \u00a7 69, 15 October 2009; and Virabyan v. Armenia, no. 40094\/05, \u00a7 153, 2 October 2012).21.\u00a0\u00a0The explicit acknowledgment of a breach of the applicant\u2019s right to a fair trial under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention further opens to the applicant the possibility, as expressly noted in the Government\u2019s declaration, to request the reopening of the criminal proceedings conducted against him under Article 310 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Georgia (see Taktakishvili (dec.), \u00a7 22, and Tabagari (dec.), \u00a7 26, both cited above; see also Molashvili v. Georgia (dec.), no. 39726\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 33-34, 30 September 2014).22.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, having regard to the nature of the admissions contained in the Government\u2019s unilateral declaration, the consequent possibility for the applicant to request the reopening of the relevant criminal proceedings, as well as the amount of compensation proposed,\u00a0the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of this part of the application (Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c)).23.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, in the light of the above considerations, and in particular given the clear case-law on the topic, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of this part of the application (Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine).24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the arrangements agreed by the respondent Government for the payment of the proposed amount (see paragraph 15 above).25.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Court emphasises that, should the Government fail to comply with the terms of their unilateral declaration, the application could be restored to the list in accordance with Article\u00a037 \u00a7 2 of the Convention (see Josipovi\u0107 v. Serbia (dec.), no. 18369\/07, 4\u00a0March 2008).26.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike this part of the application out of the list of cases.B.\u00a0\u00a0As to the remainder of the application27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated during the events of 30\u00a0January 2006 by the head of the prison department, the accompanying staff members and by officers from the special unit; that he had subsequently been put in a punishment cell and left without the required medical assistance in inadequate conditions; and that no adequate investigation had been conducted into his allegations of ill\u2011treatment.1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions28.\u00a0\u00a0The Government in their observations submitted that the above complaints were inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies or in the alternative that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month rule. They stressed that the applicant had never filed a formal criminal complaint requesting the opening of a criminal investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment during the events of 30 January 2006 or in their immediate aftermath. He had maintained his grievances during the criminal proceedings conducted against him, however those proceedings, according to the Government, had not been the appropriate forum for the applicant\u2019s Article 3 complaints. Moreover, if the applicant had been afraid to lodge a separate criminal complaint concerning his alleged ill-treatment, or if he had believed that the available domestic remedies would have been ineffective, he should have complained to the Court within six months of the alleged incident.29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted in reply that there had been special circumstances at the material time which had dispensed him from the obligation to use the remedy suggested by the Government. His argument in that respect was threefold. Firstly, while in prison, the applicant had not had adequate access to the services of the Public Defender of Georgia, human rights NGOs, lawyers or even the social services. Secondly, the applicant had found himself in a particularly vulnerable situation after the alleged incident of ill-treatment: despite a substantial deterioration in his health no medical or other type of support had ever been provided to him. Lastly, the practice of physical and psychological abuse of prisoners had been regular and systematic at the material time and no adequate remedies had been available as a culture of impunity had been prevalent.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter if it has been submitted within six months of the date of the final decision in the process of the exhaustion of domestic remedies.\u00a0The purpose of the six-month rule is to promote legal certainty and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable time. Furthermore, it also protects the authorities and others concerned from being in a position of uncertainty for a prolonged period of time (see, for example, Bulut and Yavuz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 73065\/01, 28 May 2002).31.\u00a0\u00a0The only remedies that must be exhausted are those which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged, but not such which are inadequate or ineffective (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18\u00a0December 1996, \u00a7 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI; see also Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7\u00a7 71-75, 25 March 2014, with further references therein). If no remedies are available or if they are judged to be ineffective, the six\u2011month time-limit in principle runs from the date of the act complained of (see, among many other examples, Hazar and Others v.\u00a0Turkey (dec.), no.\u00a062566\/00, 10 January 2002, and Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania (dec.), no.\u00a044558\/98, 14 March 2000). However, special considerations may apply in exceptional cases, where an applicant avails himself of or relies on an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective. In that situation, it is appropriate to take as the start of the six-month period the date when he or she first became aware or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see, among other authorities, Paul and Audrey Edwards v.\u00a0the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 46477\/99, 7 June 2001; Bulut and Yavuz, and Hazar and Others, both cited above).32.\u00a0\u00a0Where time is of the essence for resolving an issue in a case, there is a burden on the applicant to ensure that his or her claims are raised before both the relevant domestic authorities and the Court with the necessary expedition to ensure that they may be properly and fairly resolved (see, amongst others, Bayram and Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m v. Turkey (dec.), no. 38587\/97, ECHR\u00a02002-III, and Aydin and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 46231\/99, 26\u00a0May 2005). Indeed, with the lapse of time, witnesses\u2019 memories fade, witnesses may die or become untraceable, evidence deteriorates or ceases to exist, and the prospects that any effective investigation can be undertaken will increasingly diminish. All those factors can mean that the Court\u2019s own examination and judgment may be deprived of meaningfulness and effectiveness (see Manukyan v. Georgia (dec.), no. 53073\/07, \u00a7 28, 9\u00a0October 2012, with further references therein).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of above principles to the circumstances of the current case33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes, having regard to the relevant national legislation (see paragraph 11 above) and the Court\u2019s case-law (see Mikiashvili v.\u00a0Georgia, no. 18996\/06, \u00a7 61, 9 October 2012 with further references therein; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), no. 1704\/06, 26 June 2007; and Taktakishvili (dec.), cited above, \u00a7 29), that the remedy normally available in Georgian law in respect of inhuman and degrading treatment allegedly caused by prison officials is a criminal complaint to the prosecuting authorities. In the current case, the applicant did not lodge a complaint with the competent domestic authorities that could have brought about such an investigation. He argued in that respect that he had been exempted from pursuing that remedy for a number of reasons (see paragraph 29 above).34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not find it necessary to determine whether it could be said that there existed such special circumstances in the present case which would dispense the applicant from the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies. It notes in that regard the following: the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant happened on 30 January 2006 and in its immediate aftermath, whereas the current application was lodged with the Court more than two and a half years later, on 25 September 2008. Should the applicant have believed from the very outset that no effective domestic remedy was available to him to complain of his alleged ill-treatment, he should have lodged his application with the Court within six months of the date of the incident, that is on 30 July 2006 at the latest (see, among many other authorities, Manukyan (dec.), cited above, \u00a7 29, Akhvlediani and Others v.\u00a0Georgia (dec.), no. 22026\/10, \u00a7 26, 9 April 2013; X and Y v. Georgia (dec.), no. 5358\/14, 9 September 2014; and Davitashvili v. Georgia (dec.), no. 11182\/10, \u00a7 12, 1 December 2015). The applicant did not explain to the Court why he had waited for more than two years to lodge the present application.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not lose sight of the fact that at the material time the trial against the applicant was ongoing and that he raised his allegations of ill-treatment during it. The Government submitted in that connection that those proceedings were not the proper judicial forum for voicing Article 3 complaints (see paragraph 28 above). The Court doubts whether raising the ill\u2011treatment grievance during the applicant\u2019s trial on various charges against him could be considered effective as such. The judges were not authorised to order a preliminary investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment or direct the prosecutor to do so (see paragraph 11 above; compare with Virabyan, cited above, \u00a7 142). Indeed, the trial court and appeal court judges did not admit the applicant\u2019s complaints (see paragraphs 7-9 above; see, a contrario, Virabyan, cited above, \u00a7 141-142; see also Akulinin and Babich v. Russia, no. 5742\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 31-33, 2 October 2008; and Vladimir Fedorov v. Russia, no. 19223\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 41-50, 30 July 2009). As for the prosecutor, he showed indifferent to the allegations and remained passive throughout the proceedings.In those circumstances, the ongoing trial could not have enabled the applicant to obtain redress for the alleged ill-treatment and whatever expectations he may have had in that regard were groundless (see Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others, cited above, para.75; see also, mutatis mutandis, Akhvlediani and Others (cited above), \u00a7 25, and Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 34529\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a098-99, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). The inadequacy of such a potential remedy should have been all the more obvious to the applicant and his lawyer given their argument that there existed a persistent culture of impunity among prison officials in Georgia at the material time (see paragraph 29 above).36.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant stated in his observations that he had made several attempts to voice his ill-treatment allegations before various national authorities in 2008 and then again in 2013-14, but that those had no effect whatsoever. The Court notes that while providing copies of letters sent, inter alia, to the Public Defender of Georgia and to members of Parliament to corroborate his statement, the applicant failed to provide the Court with a single copy of any criminal complaint filed with the prosecution authorities. In any event, it appears to the Court that at this stage the applicant has not submitted any new information so as to warrant the interruption of the initial six-month period (see Manukyan (dec.), cited above, \u00a7 32, with further references therein).37.\u00a0\u00a0In view of all the aforementioned factors, the Court concludes that the applicant failed to act with due diligence and expedition and that his complaint concerning the alleged ill-treatment on 30 January 2006 and the lack of an effective investigation in that regard is inadmissible under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention for failure to comply with the six-month rule.38.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s additional complaint under Article 3 of the Convention concerning his placement in a punishment cell in poor conditions, the Court notes the following. According to the case file, the applicant left the punishment cell on 24 February 2006, while the current application was not submitted to the Court until 25 September 2008. It therefore considers that that part of the applicant\u2019s complaints has also been lodged out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 4 of the Convention (see Mikiashvili, cited above, \u00a7 63, and compare with Ramishvili and Kokhreidz (dec.), cited above).For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Takes note of the terms of the respondent Government\u2019s declaration under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention and of the arrangements for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein;Decides to strike the part of the application that relates to the above\u2011mentioned complaints out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention.Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 26 May 2016.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Krzysztof Wojtyczek\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident","28175":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had not been afforded adequate medical treatment in detention, excluding the periods when he had been treated in Moscow City Hospital no. 20, and that the conditions of his detention and transfer to the correctional colony had been degrading. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201c No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The Governments\u2019 submissions60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that their obligations under Article 3 of the Convention had been fully discharged. As regards the applicant\u2019s medical treatment, they submitted that shortly after his very first complaint to the resident doctor in October 2013, he had been subjected to an in-depth medical examination and had received comprehensive medical treatment comprising injections, a drug regimen and physiotherapy. The authorities had used their utmost efforts to restore his health. In support of their arguments the Government submitted the applicant\u2019s complete medical file.61.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the conditions of his detention, the Government considered that they had been in line with the requirements of the Convention. The applicant had thus had an individual sleeping place and had been afforded sufficient living space. The authorities had ensured that he had been assisted with his daily needs by personal care workers and inmates after his health had deteriorated.62.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government stated that the escort authorities had taken cognisance of the applicant\u2019s illness when arranging for him to be transferred. The vehicles used had been suitable for transporting bedridden detainees. The Government submitted the applicant\u2019s itinerary, the train schedule and a written statement by officers who had escorted the applicant in Yaroslavl (see paragraph 40 above).2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s submissions63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints, arguing that in August 2013 he had lost movement in his legs and since then had been confined to bed, being assisted only by inmates. The remand prisons had not been equipped to detain seriously ill inmates, had not employed trained \u201cassistive personnel\u201d and had been unable to provide him with the required neurological treatment. He provided the Court with a copy of a written transcript of an interview given by an inmate to his lawyer on 17\u00a0March 2014. The inmate stated that the applicant had complained of headaches and back and leg pain from the first few days of his detention, but had still retained his ability to walk and had not required any assistance at that time. However, a fall from the upper bunk in August 2013 had resulted in the applicant\u2019s leg becoming completely paralysed. The inmate noted that the applicant had become confined to his bed and had only received assistance from inmates who had volunteered to help.64.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant disputed the Government\u2019s description of the vehicles used to transfer him. He indicated that the Gazel minivan had only been equipped to transport bedridden patients.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility\u00a065.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Medical treatment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles66.\u00a0 The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Verbin\u0163 v.\u00a0Romania, no. 7842\/04, \u00a7 63, 3 April 2012, with further references).67.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III, with further references).68.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 208, 13 July 2006). In most of the cases concerning the detention of persons who were ill, the Court has examined whether or not the applicants received adequate medical assistance in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to secure the health and well-being of detainees, among other things, as an obligation on the part of the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7 94; Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI; and Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)).69.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists, in particular, that authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v.\u00a0Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011; Gladkiy v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a03242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21 December 2010; Hummatov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos.\u00a09852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29 November 2007; Melnik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 121, 7 November 2006), and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 114; Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4 October 2005; and Popov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0211). The Court further reiterates that medical treatment within prison facilities must be appropriate and comparable to the quality of treatment the State authorities have committed themselves to providing to the entire population. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each detainee must be guaranteed the same level of treatment as is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Cara-Damiani v.\u00a0Italy, no.\u00a02447\/05, \u00a7\u00a066,\u00a07\u00a0February 2012).70.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case71.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant, a seriously ill person suffering from paraplegia and a number of related conditions, including serious bowel and bladder dysfunctions, was detained from 16 July 2013 to 18\u00a0August 2014. He argued that his health had significantly deteriorated in detention, as a result of the authorities\u2019 failure to comply with their obligations under Article 3 of the Convention and to provide him with the requisite medical care.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has to undertake a first-hand evaluation of a significant quantity of medical evidence in order to determine whether the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention have been respected in the present case.73.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset it observes that the Government submitted extensive medical documents, including the applicant\u2019s medical file drawn up in detention, treatment summaries, test results and medical opinions. The documents cover the entire period of the detention. The applicant did not dispute the authenticity or quality of those documents. The Court therefore has no reason to doubt their accuracy and reliability.74.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of this, the Court is unable to accept the applicant\u2019s allegations that although he had developed a pain syndrome and had lost the ability to move in August 2013, he had remained without any medical attention for two months, until October 2013. The medical record indicated that he had applied for medical assistance for the first time in October\u00a02013, complaining of pain in his back, head and abdomen (see paragraph 25 above). That date will be\u00a0accordingly taken by the Court as the date when the authorities became aware, for the first time, of the early signs of the applicant\u2019s paraplegia.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that as soon as the authorities became aware of the applicant\u2019s health problems they put him on a drug regimen, (see paragraph 25 above). Several days later he was admitted to the prison medical unit, where he underwent the necessary testing for the prompt and correct diagnoses. He was seen by various doctors, including a neurologist, and prescribed comprehensive treatment (see paragraph 26 above). Further complex examinations, such an analysis of the cerebrospinal fluid, followed. These were scheduled and performed in a timely and proper manner (see paragraph 29 above). The applicant\u2019s drug regimen was amended when necessary and his treatment strategy went far beyond attempts aimed at mere pain relief. It was aimed at fully restoring the lost use of the applicant\u2019s legs. There is nothing in the Court\u2019s possession to show that the prescribed treatment was not administered properly or was interrupted. The detention authorities continued with the treatment, providing prescribed drugs and injections, irrespective of the place of the applicant\u2019s detention, whether in hospital or a standard detention facility (see paragraphs 31, 33, 36 and 45 above). They also introduced physiotherapy for him, thus ensuring that the he had access to a key component of the rehabilitation process (see paragraph 34 above).76.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances the Court finds no evidence to support the applicant\u2019s assertion that the deterioration of his health had been brought about by insufficient or poor treatment. The Court cannot disregard others factors, which he himself did not exclude, such as the steady development of his back disorders rooted in the injuries sustained in 2008 and 2010 (see paragraph 22 above) and aggravated by a new injury received in detention (see paragraph 24 above). The Court also attributes particular weight to the fact that the independent medical specialist, who had assessed the quality of the applicant\u2019s treatment at his lawyer\u2019s request, did not identify any serious defects in the treatment, merely accentuating the general need to treat him in a neurological hospital (see paragraph 35 above). The specialist noted the applicant\u2019s bedsores. However, the Court considers that they are not so much a matter of the quality of medical treatment but rather of the general care and conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention, which will be addressed by the Court under a separate heading.77.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, the Court considers that the authorities provided the applicant with the requisite medical assistance in detention. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention on that account.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Conditions of detention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention requires the State to ensure that prisoners are detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method in which the measure is enforced do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a092-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Meln\u012btis v. Latvia, no.\u00a030779\/05, \u00a7\u00a069, 28\u00a0February 2012).79.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court has considered that where the authorities decide to place and keep a disabled person in detention, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to the special needs resulting from his disability (see Z.H. v. Hungary, no. 28937\/11, \u00a7\u00a029, 8 November 2012; Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744\/08, \u00a7\u00a059, 21\u00a0December 2010; and Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, \u00a7 56, 2 December 2004).80.\u00a0\u00a0In the above-cited case of Farbtuhs, the Court noted that the prison authorities had permitted family members to stay with the applicant for twenty-four hours at a time and that this had taken place on a regular basis. In addition to being cared for by his family, the applicant, who had a physical disability, was assisted by the medical staff during working hours and was helped by other inmates outside working hours on a voluntary basis. The Court expressed its concerns in the following terms (\u00a7 60):\u201c The Court doubts the appropriateness of such a solution, leaving as it did the bulk of responsibility for a man with such a severe disability in the hands of unqualified prisoners, even if only for a limited period. It is true that the applicant did not report having suffered any incident or particular difficulty as a result of the impugned situation; he merely stated that the prisoners in question sometimes \u2018refused to cooperate\u2019, without mentioning any specific case in which they had refused. However, the anxiety and unease which such a severely disabled person could be expected to feel, knowing that he would receive no professional assistance in the event of an emergency, in themselves raise a serious issue from the standpoint of Article 3 of the Convention.\u201d81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also held that detaining a disabled person in a prison where he cannot move around and, in particular, cannot leave his cell independently, amounts to degrading treatment (see Vincent v.\u00a0France, no.\u00a06253\/03, \u00a7 103, 24 October 2006). Similarly, the Court has found that leaving a person with a serious physical disability to rely on his cellmates for assistance with using the toilet, bathing and getting dressed or undressed contributes to its finding that the conditions of detention amount to degrading treatment (see Engel v. Hungary, no. 46857\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a027 and 30, 20\u00a0May 2010).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case82.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the parties submitted conflicting descriptions of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in remand prisons nos. 77\/1 and 77\/2 (see paragraphs 61 and 63). The Government argued that he had been assisted by personal care workers and detainees, while he stated that assistance had only been provided by inmates as the facilities had not employed staff to assist him with his daily needs.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously held that in certain instances the respondent Government alone have access to information capable of firmly corroborating or refuting allegations under Article 3 of the Convention and that failure on a Government\u2019s part to submit such information without a satisfactory explanation may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant\u2019s allegations (see, for example, Ahmet \u00d6zkan and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689\/93, \u00a7 426, 6 April 2004).84.\u00a0\u00a0In this respect, the Court considers that it was for the Government in the present case to demonstrate that the detention authorities had arranged the necessary general care and assistance for the applicant, who had been clearly unable to care for himself independently owing to serious leg impairment. The Government however failed to submit any evidence, such as staff registration logs or employment certificates, statements by attending doctors, by the medical staff who had allegedly cared for him or, at least, by the applicant\u2019s inmates, confirming that the detention facilities accommodating him had employed a sufficient number of personal care workers and that the staff had provided him with the necessary assistance with his daily needs. The applicant, on the other hand, not only gave a detailed and consistent description of the circumstances, but provided the Court with statements by his inmate confirming his allegations (see paragraph 63 above). In these circumstances the Court concludes that the applicant was left received no assistance from trained staff, but was forced to rely entirely on the help of his inmates.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in cases in which prison staff felt that they had been relieved of their duty to provide security and care to more vulnerable detainees by making their cellmates responsible for providing them with daily assistance or, if necessary, first aid (see, Semikhvostov v. Russia, no. 2689\/12, \u00a7\u00a085, 6\u00a0February 2014, and, mutatis mutandis, Kaprykowski v.\u00a0Poland, no.\u00a023052\/05, \u00a7 74, 3 February 2009). The circumstances of the present case are even more acute because the applicant\u2019s need for bedside assistance was exceptionally high. It is evident that his inmates were unable to provide such enhanced assistance, which requires special skills and knowledge. This fact is accentuated by the presence of bedsores, developed outside the hospital, which were recorded by the resident doctor and noted by the independent medical expert as a sign of neglect on the part of the authorities (see paragraphs 30 and 35 above). The Court is prepared to conclude that the developed bedsores indicated that the applicant was not repositioned regularly, was forced to spend much time in bed in one position, and was not regularly bathed or his skin was not kept clean. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the applicant suffered from bladder and bowel dysfunction (see paragraph 32 above). The absence of proper general care and assistance could have also contributed to development of the bedsores, through the delay in notifying the prison doctors of their appearance, given that the inmates assisting the applicant were not trained to duly recognise the early signs of bedsores or offer treatment to prevent them developing further.86.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s inevitable dependence on his inmates and the need to ask for their help with intimate hygiene procedures put him in a very uncomfortable position and adversely affected his emotional well-being, impeding his communication with the cellmates who could have been dissatisfied with the burdensome work they had to perform involuntarily.87.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention were further exacerbated by the failure to provide him with, as is apparent from the documents submitted by the parties, a hospital bed or any other equipment, such as a special pressure-relieving mattress, which could have afforded him at the very least a minimum level of comfort during more than a year of detention.88.\u00a0\u00a0To conclude, the Court finds that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the remand prisons were such as to qualify as inhuman and degrading treatment. There has thus been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on that account.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Conditions of transfer89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the applicant complained about the conditions of his transfer to the correctional colony from the first train station to the final destination. He gave a sufficiently detailed and consistent description of the conditions in which he was transferred. The respondent Government provided the Court with an itinerary of the trip. They also contended that the conditions of the transfer corresponded to the needs of bedridden patients. They did not however submit any information as to the special adjustments made or equipment installed on the trains or prison van in which the applicant travelled. The only items of evidence lodged by the Government which could have shed at least some light on the conditions of the applicant\u2019s transfer were the written statements by two escort officers. They noted that the applicant had spent about two hours lying on a thin blanket on the hard floor of the prison van while being taken to and from the remand prison in Yaroslavl the only reason being for, it appears, a change in the escort crew (see paragraph 40 above). The Court notes that the escort officers\u2019 statements supported the applicant\u2019s statements that in Yaroslavl he had been transported lying on the floor of a prison vehicle.90.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court accepts the veracity of the applicant\u2019s description of the conditions of his transfer and will base on it the examination of his complaint in this respect (see Yevgeniy Bogdanov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 22405\/04, \u00a7 103, 26 February 2015, and Igor Ivanov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 34000\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 34\u201135, 7 June 2007).91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant was transported to the correctional colony in standard train carriages and prison vans with no special equipment installed to meet the needs of a bedridden person suffering from a serious back condition and bladder problems. The first part of the trip took nine hours, during which he was confined to a bunk in the train carriage. The trip, which could have presented no serious issues for a healthy inmate, had an evident detrimental effect on the applicant.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has established that during the following part of the trip he spent at least two hours being driven in a prison van to and from a detention facility in Yaroslavl. The Court is concerned that the authorities failed to take any corrective measures to meet the applicant\u2019s needs during the transfer, treating with indifference his complaints of acute pain when he was lying on the hard floor of the prison van or being carried around on a blanket used as a stretcher. His being placed directly on the floor of the van exposed him to vibrations from the road during the journey and resulted in him suffering additional pain. Given his fragile condition, the Court is mindful of the possible negative impact such treatment could have had for his back and legs.93.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s trip to the correctional colony was completed after a further five hours on a train and a journey in a prison van. The Court does not find any evidence that the conditions on the train or in the van were in any way different from those during the first part of his trip.94.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court takes the view that the cumulative effect of the material conditions of the applicant\u2019s transfer, and the duration of the trip, were serious enough to qualify as inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see Tarariyeva v. Russia, no. 4353\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 112-117, ECHR 2006\u2011XV (extracts)).95.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s transfer to the correctional colony.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 3 OF THE CONVENTION96.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time and alleged that the orders for his detention had not been based on sufficient reasons. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cEveryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions97.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the Russian courts had authorised the applicant\u2019s arrest because they had had sufficient reasons to believe that he had committed a serious criminal offence. When authorising or extending his detention, they had taken into account the seriousness of the charges, the nature of the criminal offences in question, and the risk of him absconding if released. Given that the applicant had been on the run from January to July 2013, and a forged passport had been discovered in his flat during a search, the courts had correctly considered this to be a real risk. Moreover, they had duly considered the applicant\u2019s state of health and examined the possibility of applying other, less strict preventive measures, but had found them insufficient to offset the above-mentioned risks.98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the authorities had known of his serious illness, and that his state of health had warranted his release. His diagnosis had diminished the risk of him absconding or reoffending. However, the courts had continued extending his detention on far-fetched grounds. The detention orders had been issued as a mere formality.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. The complaint must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles100.\u00a0\u00a0The persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of his or her continued detention, whatever other grounds may exist. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are found to have been \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed \u201cspecial diligence\u201d in the conduct of the proceedings. The presumption is in favour of release. As the Court has consistently held, the second limb of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until his conviction, the accused must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continued detention ceases to be reasonable. A person charged with an offence must always be released pending trial unless the State can show that there are \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d reasons to justify his or her continued detention (see, among other authorities, Castravet v. Moldova, no. 23393\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 30 and 32, 13 March\u00a02007; McKay\u00a0v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543\/03, \u00a7 41, ECHR 2006-X; Jab\u0142o\u0144ski v. Poland, no. 33492\/96, \u00a7 83, 21 December 2000; and Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, \u00a7 4, Series A no. 8). Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention cannot be seen as unconditionally authorising detention provided that it lasts no longer than a certain period. Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities (see Shishkov v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a038822\/97, \u00a7\u00a066, ECHR 2003-I).101.\u00a0\u00a0It is incumbent on the domestic authorities to establish the existence of specific facts relevant to the grounds for continued detention. Shifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined cases (see Rokhlina v. Russia, no. 54071\/00, \u00a7 67, 7\u00a0April 2005, and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 84-85, 26 July 2001). The national judicial authorities must examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty, and must set them out in their decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is not the Court\u2019s task to establish such facts and take the place of the national authorities which ruled on the applicant\u2019s detention. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in the domestic courts\u2019 decisions and of the established facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention (see Korchuganova v. Russia, no. 75039\/01, \u00a7 72, 8 June\u00a02006; Ilijkov, cited above, \u00a7 86; and Labita, cited above, \u00a7 152). When deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial (see Idalov v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a05826\/03, \u00a7\u00a0140, 22\u00a0May 2012, and Suslov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a02366\/07, \u00a7\u00a086, 29\u00a0May 2012, with further references).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case102.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was arrested on 16 July 2013 and convicted on 13\u00a0January 2014. The period to be taken into consideration is therefore slightly less than six months.103.\u00a0\u00a0It is not disputed by the parties that the applicant\u2019s detention was initially warranted by a reasonable suspicion that he had committed large\u2011scale fraud and presented a flight risk. It remains to be ascertained whether the judicial authorities gave \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d grounds to justify his continued detention and whether they displayed \u201cspecial diligence\u201d in the conduct of the proceedings.104.\u00a0\u00a0The seriousness of the charges was one of the factors for assessing the applicant\u2019s potential to abscond, reoffend or obstruct the course of justice (see paragraphs 9, 12, 16 and 17 above). However, the Court has repeatedly held that, although the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in assessing the risk of an accused absconding or reoffending, the need to continue the deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the offence. Nor can continuation of the detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Panchenko v. Russia, no. 45100\/98, \u00a7\u00a0102, 8\u00a0February 2005; Goral v. Poland, no. 38654\/97, \u00a7 68, 30 October\u00a02003; Ilijkov, cited above, \u00a7 81; and Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, \u00a7 51, Series\u00a0A no. 207). The Court will therefore examine whether the other grounds referred to by the domestic courts were sufficient to justify the applicant\u2019s detention.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that while extending the applicant\u2019s detention, the Russian court attached particular weight to the risk of him absconding. The evaluation of that risk was based on his previous behaviour, namely his attempt to abscond and his being on the run from January to July 2013; his being unemployed and thus having no ties with his place of residence in Moscow, and the discovery by the police of a forged passport (see paragraphs 9, 12, 16 and 17 above).106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts the reasonableness of the Russian courts\u2019 concerns that the applicant was likely to abscond. The evidence before them convincingly demonstrated that such a risk existed. The applicant had previously attempted to escape (see paragraph 8 above) and had again demonstrated to the authorities his determination to go on the run when they discovered the false passport (see paragraph 15 above). His unemployment could not, on its own, warrant his detention, but was capable of adding weight to the Russian courts\u2019 finding that he posed a flight risk.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also finds it significant that when deciding whether it was necessary to continue the applicant\u2019s detention, the Russian courts took into account his condition after hearing from the attending doctors or examining other medical evidence. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that the applicant\u2019s state of health drastically changed in October 2013 when he lost the ability to move unaided. In November 2013 it appears he entirely lost the use of his legs. While the Court accepts that those developments decreased the risk of him absconding, the risk was not entirely eliminated given his resourcefulness both when it came to his financial situation and his ability to organise his escape, including through the forgery of official documents. The Court therefore accepts that the Russian courts thoroughly evaluated and balanced the risk in question (see Amirov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a051857\/13, \u00a7 108, 27 November 2014, in which no violation of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7 3 of the Convention was found on account of the continued detention on remand of a wheelchair-bound inmate with a need for constant medical supervision).108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that there were relevant and sufficient grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention pending investigation and trial. The assessment of these reasons, however, cannot be detached from the actual length of detention on remand. Accordingly, it remains to be ascertained whether the judicial authorities displayed \u201cspecial diligence\u201d in the conduct of the proceedings.109.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant was held in detention on remand for less than six months. The domestic courts assessed the diligence of the investigative authorities and concluded that the length of the investigation was justified by the complex nature of the case. The Court notes that there is nothing in the material submitted to show any significant period of inactivity on the part of the prosecution or the court (see, for similar reasoning, Amirov, cited above; Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no.\u00a046108\/11, 5\u00a0February 2013; Sopin v. Russia, no. 57319\/10, 18\u00a0December\u00a02012; Arutyunyan v. Russia, no. 48977\/09, 10 January 2012; and Buldashev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 46793\/06, 18 October 2011). In such circumstances, the competent domestic authorities cannot be said to have not displayed special diligence in handling the applicant\u2019s case.110.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his appeals against the detention orders of 17 July and 13 September 2013 had not been examined speedily. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA. Submissions by the parties112.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that there had been a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, since his appeals against the detention orders of 17 July and 13 September 2013 had not been examined speedily.113.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint and took note of the Government\u2019s admission.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the Government\u2019s acknowledgment of the violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. It notes that the applicant\u2019s appeals against the detention orders dated 16 July and 13 September\u00a02013 were examined by the domestic courts in thirty-four and sixty days respectively (see paragraphs 11 and 14 above). In these circumstances, and having regard to its case-law (see, for example, Idalov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0154\u2011158), the Court finds no reason to hold otherwise. It therefore concludes that there has been a violation of that provision.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION116.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage117.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 35,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.118.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the amount claimed was excessive.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, considers it reasonable to award EUR 19,500 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses120.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 500 for legal services.121.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had not provided any evidence in support of his claim to show that those expenses had indeed been incurred.122.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the lack of relevant documents and the above criteria, the Court rejects the applicant\u2019s claim for costs and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28187":"39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that if she and her children were transferred to Italy they would be exposed to a risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention owing to the difficult living conditions of asylum-seekers in Italy. Article 3 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions40.\u00a0\u00a0The respondent Government referred to the new Italian policy, as set out in its letters of 5 August 2015 and 22 February 2016, and the Court\u2019s findings in J.A. and Others v. the Netherlands ((dec.), no. 21459\/14, 3\u00a0November 2015), and A.T.H. v. the Netherlands ((dec.), no. 54000\/11, 17\u00a0November 2015), and submitted that there were no substantial grounds for believing that the applicant and her children would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if transferred to Italy.41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the policy set out in the circular letter sent by the Italian authorities on 5 June 2015 was not sufficient in that it was likely that the number of reserved places indicated by the Italian Government would be far from enough.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the relevant principles of Article 3 of the Convention, as set out most recently in Tarakhel (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 93-99), which include the need for the ill\u2011treatment to attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant\u2019s situation as a single mother of minor children, who were all born during her stay in the Netherlands, is one of the relevant factors in making this assessment. The material date for making this assessment is the actual date of expulsion. However, if an applicant has not yet been removed when the Court examines the case, the relevant time for assessing the existence of the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 will be that of the proceedings before the Court (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2008; M.A. v. Switzerland, no. 52589\/13, \u00a7 54, 18 November 2014; and Khamrakulov v. Russia, no. 68894\/13, \u00a7 64, 16 April 2015).44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant is to be considered as an asylum-seeker in Italy because even though she has been admitted to Italy in the past as an alien requiring subsidiary protection, the validity of her Italian residence permit has expired. Consequently, she would have to file a fresh asylum request in Italy if she was returned there.45.\u00a0\u00a0It thus has to be determined whether the situation in which the applicant is likely to find herself in Italy can be regarded as incompatible with Article 3, taking into account her situation as an asylum\u2011seeking single mother with young children and, as such, belonging to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 97, and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 251, ECHR 2011).46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the current situation in Italy for asylum\u2011seekers cannot be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment (cited above) and that the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 114-115).47.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s personal situation, the Court has noted that she landed on the coast of Lampedusa in April 2003, where she applied for asylum and where she was admitted to a reception centre for asylum\u2011seekers which she left in February 2004 for an unknown destination. Being unaware of her whereabouts, the Italian authorities eventually rejected her asylum request in January 2005. However, in October 2005, after she had been returned to Italy under the terms of the Dublin Regulation and had apparently filed a fresh asylum request, the Italian authorities granted her a residence permit based on compelling humanitarian reasons. That permit was later converted at her request to a residence permit for employment purposes. She then moved to the Netherlands, where she unsuccessfully applied for asylum and where her children were born.48.\u00a0\u00a0Similar to the applicants in Tarakhel (cited above), who were a family with six minor children, the applicant is a single mother with at least three young children. However, unlike the situation in Tarakhel, the Netherlands authorities \u2013 as regards transfers to Italy under the Dublin Regulation \u2013 decide in consultation with the Italian authorities how and when the transfer of an asylum-seeker to the competent Italian authorities will take place. In particular, where it concerns a family with children, prior notice of transfer is given to the Italian authorities, thus allowing the latter to identify where adequate accommodation is available.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that for efficiency reasons the Italian authorities cannot be expected to keep open and unoccupied for an extended period of time places in specific reception and accommodation centres reserved for asylum-seekers awaiting transfer to Italy in accordance with the Dublin Regulation and that, for this reason, once a guarantee of placement in a reception centre has been received by the State requesting transfer, transfer should take place as fast as practically possible.50.\u00a0\u00a0In this context, the Court has noted that on 5 February 2013 the Italian Government were duly informed by the Netherlands authorities about the applicant\u2019s family situation and the scheduled arrival of the applicant and her children. The Court further understands from the two circular letters sent by the Italian Dublin Unit (see paragraphs 34 and 36 above), that the applicant and her children will be placed in one of the reception facilities in Italy which have been earmarked for families with minor children.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has noted the applicant\u2019s concern that the number of places earmarked will be insufficient but, in the absence of any concrete indication in the case file, does not find it demonstrated that the applicant and her children will be unable to obtain such a place when they arrive in Italy. Furthermore, bearing in mind how the applicant was treated by the Italian authorities after her arrival in Italy in 2003, the Court considers that the applicant has not demonstrated that her future prospects, if returned to Italy with her children, whether looked at from a material, physical or psychological perspective, disclose a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship that is severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3.52.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4.53.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court comes to an end.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 9 June 2016.Stephen PhillipsHelen KellerRegistrarPresident\u00a0\u00a0","28209":"22.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that her removal to the DRC would violate her rights under Article 2 and\/or 3 of the Convention.The relevant part of Article 2 reads:\u201c1. Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. ...\u201dArticle 3 provides: \u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions23.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to establish that she would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention as no credibility had been given to her claimed identity, nationality and hence her account in support of her asylum application. She had not submitted any documents to confirm her identity and nationality and had also failed in her statements to make a convincing case for her claims of origin.24.\u00a0\u00a0The mere fact that the applicant is a woman was, according to the Government, not a sufficient reason to conclude that she ran a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. They submitted that the applicant should make a persuasive case on the basis of personal facts and circumstances that on returning to the DRC she would face the threat of violence, sexual or otherwise.25.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed, submitting that being a young single woman of Banyamulenge origin with no social or other ties outside of South Kivu made her very vulnerable and it was thus plausible that in the DRC she would run a real risk of being subjected to treatment in violation of Article\u00a03.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reaffirms that a right to asylum and a right to a residence permit are not, as such, guaranteed by the Convention and that, under the terms of Article 19 and Article 32 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the Court cannot review whether the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention have been correctly applied by the Netherlands authorities (see, for instance, I. v.\u00a0the Netherlands (dec.), no. 24147\/11, \u00a7 43, 18 October 2011).27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further finds that it is more appropriate to deal with the complaint under Article 2 in the context of its examination of the related complaint under Article 3, and will proceed on that basis (see J.H. v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 48839\/09, \u00a7 37, 20 December 2011).28.\u00a0\u00a0It is the Court\u2019s settled case-law that as a matter of well-established international law, and subject to their treaty obligations, including those arising from the Convention, Contracting States have the right to control the entry, residence and removal of aliens. However, expulsion by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. In such a case, Article 3 implies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country. It principally applies to prevent a deportation or expulsion where the risk of ill-treatment in the receiving country emanates from intentionally inflicted acts of the public authorities there or from non-State bodies when the authorities are unable to afford the applicant appropriate protection (see N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 30-31 with further references, ECHR 2008).29.\u00a0\u00a0As to the material date, the existence of the risk of ill-treatment must be assessed primarily with reference to the facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of expulsion (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2012). However, since the applicant has not yet been expelled, the material point in time must be that of the Court\u2019s consideration of the case. It follows that, although the historical position is of interest in so far as it may shed light on the current situation and its likely evolution, it is the present conditions which are decisive (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V; M.A. v. Switzerland, no.\u00a052589\/13, \u00a7 54, 18 November 2014; and Khamrakulov v. Russia, no.\u00a068894\/13, \u00a7 64, 16 April 2015).30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the domestic authorities disbelieved the applicant\u2019s claimed ethnic and geographical origin and, consequently, her asylum statement which was based thereon. Even assuming that the applicant actually comes from Bukavo in South Kivu and is of Banyamulenge origin, the Court further notes that the Netherlands authorities acknowledge that the general situation in the eastern part of the DRC, including the Kivu provinces, falls within the scope of Article\u00a015(c) of the Qualification Directive but consider that rejected asylum seekers hailing from the region have a safe relocation alternative in other parts of the DRC, including Kinshasa (see paragraph 16 above).31.\u00a0\u00a0The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the interpretation of the Convention and it would not, therefore, be appropriate for it to express any views on the ambit or scope of article 15 (c) of the Qualification Direction. However, based on the interpretation of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Elgafaji (see C-465\/07 Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, judgment of 17 February 2009) the Court is not persuaded that Article 3 of the Convention, as interpreted in NA. v. the United Kingdom (no. 25904\/07, 17\u00a0July 2008), does not offer parallel protection to that afforded under the Directive. In particular, it notes that the threshold set by both provisions may, in exceptional circumstances, be attained in consequence of a situation of general violence of such intensity that any person being returned to the region in question would be at risk simply on account of their presence there (see Sufi and Elmi, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7 226, 28 June 2011).32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 does not, as such, preclude Contracting States from relying on the existence of an internal flight or relocation alternative in their assessment of an individual\u2019s claim that a return to the country of origin would expose him or her to a real risk of being subjected to treatment proscribed by that provision. However, the Court has held that reliance on such an alternative does not affect the responsibility of the expelling Contracting State to ensure that the applicant is not, as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3. As a precondition for relying on an internal flight or relocation alternative, certain guarantees therefore have to be in place: the person to be expelled must be able to travel to the area concerned, gain admittance and settle there, failing which an issue under Article 3 may arise, all the more so if in the absence of such guarantees there is a possibility of his or her ending up in a part of the country of origin where there is a real risk of ill\u2011treatment (see B.K.A v. Sweden, no. 11161\/11, \u00a7 44 with further references, 19\u00a0December 2013).33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is aware of the regular occurrence of reports of human rights violations in the DRC, including discrimination based on ethnicity and (sexual) violence against women. However, the applicant did not demonstrate that, apart from the two provinces in eastern DRC considered by the Netherlands authorities to fall within the scope of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, the general security situation in the DRC, including Kinshasa, was such that all persons living there had to be regarded as at risk of suffering treatment prohibited by Article 3, or that the applicant \u2013 for belonging to the Banyamulenge minority or for being a woman \u2013 would be exposed to such a risk in those areas of the DRC. The case file contains no material indicating that the applicant\u2019s personal position would be any worse than most other Banyamulenge women currently living in those areas of the DRC. Although the Court accepts that the general situation in the DRC for women, including those of Banyamulenge origin, may be far from ideal, it cannot find that it must be regarded as so harrowing that there would already be a real risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 in the event that a woman was to be removed to the DRC.34.\u00a0\u00a0It has therefore not been established that the applicant, if expelled to the DRC, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.35.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.36.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 16 June 2016.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Stephen PhillipsLuis L\u00f3pez GuerraRegistrarPresident","28211":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 3 of the Convention21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that, if the applicant mother and her children were transferred to Italy, they would be exposed to a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention owing to the difficult living conditions of asylum-seekers in Italy. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d22.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the relevant principles of Article 3 of the Convention, as set out most recently in Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no.\u00a029217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 28-48 and \u00a7\u00a7 101-104, ECHR 2014 (extracts), which include the need for the ill\u2011treatment to attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.23.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants\u2019 situation as a single mother and minor children is one of the relevant factors in making this assessment. The material date for making this assessment is the actual date of expulsion. However, if an applicant has not yet been removed when the Court examines the case, the relevant time for assessing the existence of the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 will be that of the proceedings before the Court (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a037201\/06, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2008; M.A. v. Switzerland, no. 52589\/13, \u00a7 54, 18 November 2014; and Khamrakulov v. Russia, no. 68894\/13, \u00a7 64, 16\u00a0April 2015).24.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants are to be considered as asylum-seekers in Italy. It thus has to be determined whether the situation in which the applicants are likely to find themselves in Italy can be regarded as incompatible with Article 3, taking into account the applicant mother\u2019s situation as an asylum\u2011seeking single mother with young children and serious health problems and, as such, belonging to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 97; and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7\u00a0251, ECHR 2011).25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the situation in Italy for asylum\u2011seekers cannot be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S.\u00a0v.\u00a0Belgium and Greece judgment (cited above) and that the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 114-115).26.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicants\u2019 personal situation, they are a single mother and her two minor children. Their situation is thus similar to that of the applicants in Tarakhel (cited above), who were a family with six minor children. However, unlike the situation in Tarakhel, the Finnish authorities \u2013 as regards transfers to Italy under the Dublin Regulation \u2013 decide in consultation with the Italian authorities how and when the transfer of an asylum-seeker to the competent Italian authorities will take place. In particular, where a family with children is involved, prior notice of transfer is given to the Italian authorities, thus allowing the latter to identify where adequate accommodation is available.27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that for efficiency reasons the Italian authorities cannot be expected to keep open and unoccupied for an extended period of time places in specific reception and accommodation centres reserved for asylum-seekers awaiting transfer to Italy in accordance with the Dublin Regulation and that, for this reason, once a guarantee of placement in a reception centre has been received by the State requesting transfer, transfer should take place as quickly as practically possible.28.\u00a0\u00a0In this context, the Court notes that on 31 August 2015 the Italian Government were duly informed by the Finnish authorities about the applicants\u2019 family situation and the scheduled arrival of the applicant mother and her children. The Court is confident that, when the applicants\u2019 removal will take place, the Finnish authorities will duly inform the Italian authorities of the applicants\u2019 removal, in order for the applicants to be taken charge of, upon arrival, in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the family would be kept together (see Tarakhel, cited above, and the Italian authorities\u2019 assurances provided for in the letter of 8 June 2015 and updated on 15 February 2016 (see paragraph 13 above)).29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the applicants\u2019 concern that the number of places earmarked will be insufficient but, in the absence of any concrete indication in the case file, does not find it demonstrated that the applicant mother and her children will be unable to obtain such a place when they arrive in Italy. Furthermore, the Court considers that the applicants have not demonstrated that their future prospects, if returned to Italy, whether looked at from a material, physical or psychological perspective, disclose a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship that is severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3.30.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4.31.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court comes to an end.B.\u00a0\u00a0The remainder of the application32.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also complained under Article 8 of the Convention that their removal would break the family bond with the children\u2019s father before his situation was fully examined in Finland. They complained under Article 13 of the Convention that they had no effective remedy, as their removal order could be immediately enforced and they would therefore be unable to take full advantage of their right to appeal.33.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, this part of the application must also be rejected as manifestly ill-founded and declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 16 June 2016.Abel CamposMirjana Lazarova TrajkovskaRegistrarPresident\u00a0","28217":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS OF DETENTION52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in the prison hospital had been inhuman and degrading and that he had not had an effective domestic remedy for his grievances. He referred to Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, which read:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 13\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had been detained in conditions that fully satisfied domestic standards. The prison hospital had been neither overcrowded, nor unsanitary. They relied on certificates issued by the administration of the prison hospital, on inmates\u2019 statements, photos and other documents (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above).54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disputed the Government\u2019s description of the conditions of his detention, claiming that it was not based on creditable evidence such as the registration logs. In any event, even if that description was accurate, he had been afforded less than the 7 sq. m of personal space recommended by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.55.\u00a0\u00a0Invoking the case of Ananyev and Others (cited above) he argued that no effective remedy for complaints concerning conditions of detention existed in the Russian legal system.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with Article 3 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates at the outset that in order to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention, ill\u2011treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a024724\/94, \u00a7 68, 16 December 1999).58.\u00a0\u00a0When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR\u00a02001-II). The length of the period during which a person was detained in the particular conditions also has to be considered (see, among other authorities, Alver v. Estonia, no. 64812\/01, 8 November 2005).59.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18\u00a0January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25). Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII). An applicant must provide an elaborate and consistent account of the conditions of his or her detention mentioning the specific factors, such as the dates of his or her transfer between facilities, which would enable the Court to determine that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded or inadmissible on any other grounds (see Sakhvadze v. Russia, no. 15492\/09, \u00a7 87, 10 January 2012).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case60.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court reiterates that the focal point for its assessment of the detention conditions is the living space afforded in detention (see Mela v. Russia, no. 34044\/08, \u00a7 61, 23 October 2014; Klyukin v. Russia, no. 54996\/07, \u00a7 55, 17 October 2013; and Geld v. Russia, no. 1900\/04, \u00a7 24, 27 March 2012). The applicant claimed that he had been detained in cramped conditions, mainly in cell no.\u00a04 where each detainee had been afforded around 3.6 sq. m of personal space (see paragraph 9 above). The Government disputed the applicant\u2019s submissions, stating that he had always been afforded more than 4 sq. m of personal space. They supported their submissions with certificates issued by the detention authorities, extracts from the inmates\u2019 transfer logs, photos and inmates\u2019 written statements (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above).61.\u00a0\u00a0Having assessed the evidence presented by the parties, the Court accepts the primary documents produced by the Government and rejects the applicant\u2019s allegation of overcrowding during the period of his detention. It finds that there was no shortage of sleeping space in the cells and that the applicant disposed of at least 4 sq. m of personal space. It cannot be said that the overall dimensions of his cells were so small as to restrict the inmates\u2019 freedom of movement beyond the threshold tolerated by Article 3 of the Convention (see Sergey Chebotarev v. Russia, no.\u00a061510\/09, \u00a7 42, 7\u00a0May 2014, and Fetisov and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a043710\/07, 6023\/08, 11248\/08, 27668\/08, 31242\/08 and 52133\/08, \u00a7\u00a0134, 17 January 2012).62.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the parties\u2019 submissions and the legal regulations regarding the regime in Russian detention facilities, as applicable at the material time (see paragraph 45 above), the Court also considers the following to be established. Windows in the cells, which, as both parties agreed, had not been covered by metal shutters or any other contraptions, allowed sufficient natural light to penetrate into the cell. Where available, a window casing could have been opened for flow of fresh air. Cells were additionally equipped with properly functioning artificial lighting and ventilation.63.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the sanitary and hygiene conditions, it is noted that the dining table was located inside the cells. A high partition separated the toilet pan on one side; a door had been installed on another side forming a cubicle and thus completely shielding an inmate inside it from view. Cold running water was available in cells and detainees had access to showers once every seven days. In punishment cells, were the applicant was kept alone, the sanitary facilities were separated by curtains.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also finds it established that the applicant had been allowed a daily hour-long exercise period in the recreation yard. He could also move between rooms in the medical block while undergoing inpatient treatment.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court acknowledges that the conditions of detention of the applicant fell short of the Minimum Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the European Prison Rules and the recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture in some aspects. Nevertheless, taking into account the cumulative effect of those conditions, the Court does not consider that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention reached the threshold of severity required to characterise the treatment as inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see, for similar reasoning, Fetisov and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 137-38, and Sergey Chebotarev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 38-46).66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the prison hospital.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with Article 13 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that an applicant is normally required to have recourse only to those remedies that are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. It is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a056581\/00, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2006\u2011II, and Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094, with further references).68.\u00a0\u00a0Where the fundamental right to protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is concerned, the preventive and compensatory remedies have to be complementary in order to be considered effective. The existence of a preventive remedy is indispensable for the effective protection of individuals against the kind of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed, the special importance attached by the Convention to that provision requires, in the Court\u2019s view, that the Contracting Parties establish, over and above a compensatory remedy, an effective mechanism in order to put an end to any such treatment rapidly. Had it been otherwise, the prospect of future compensation would have legitimised particularly severe suffering in breach of this core provision of the Convention (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 98, and Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 78, 24 July 2008).69.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of preventive remedies, the domestic authority or court dealing with the case must be able to grant relief which may, depending on the nature of the underlying problem, consist either in measures that affect only the complainant or \u2013 for instance where overcrowding is concerned \u2013 in wider measures that are capable of resolving situations of massive and concurrent violations of prisoners\u2019 rights resulting from inadequate conditions in a given correctional facility (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 219, and Neshkov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, nos. 36925\/10, 21487\/12, 72893\/12, 73196\/12, 77718\/12 and 9717\/13, \u00a7 188, 27 January 2015). In the context of compensatory remedies, monetary compensation should be accessible to any current or former inmate who has been held in inhuman or degrading conditions and has made an application to this effect. A finding that the conditions fell short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention will give rise to a strong presumption that they have caused non-pecuniary damage to the aggrieved person, and the level of compensation awarded for non-pecuniary damage must not be unreasonable in comparison with the awards made by the Court in similar cases (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 228-30). Lastly, prisoners must be able to avail themselves of remedies without having to fear that they will incur punishment or negative consequences for doing so (see Neshkov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 191).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case70.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of its conclusion on the admissibility of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 56 above), the Court finds that it was \u201carguable\u201d. In\u00a0Ananyev\u00a0and Others\u00a0(cited above, \u00a7\u00a0119), it has already found that the Russian legal system did not provide an effective\u00a0remedy\u00a0that could be used to prevent the alleged violation or its continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress in connection with a complaint about inadequate\u00a0conditions of detention. The Government have presented no arguments or evidence to enable the Court to reach a different conclusion in the case at hand. The Court therefore concludes that the applicant had no effective domestic\u00a0remedy\u00a0at his disposal in respect of his complaint concerning the conditions of his detention in the prison hospital.71.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had not taken steps to safeguard his health and well-being, having failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lastly claimed that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy for complaining of these violations of the guarantee against ill-treatment, as required under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government put forward two lines of argument.75.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, they argued that the applicant\u2019s claim should be rejected owing to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They stated that the applicant should have raised his complaint before the Russian authorities, in particular, before the detention facilities\u2019 administration and a court. However, he had failed to do so. The Government stressed that although the applicant had applied to a court, he had not appealed against the first\u2011instance judgments.76.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, they argued that the applicant had been afforded adequate medical treatment. He had been subjected to regular medical examinations and his health had been duly monitored by medical specialists. The applicant had been admitted to hospital for inpatient treatment when necessary. The length of his treatment and the failure to cure the applicant had resulted from his uncooperative behaviour. He had often refused to take medication, and had failed to see the attending doctors or refused to undergo medical examinations.77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that he had contracted tuberculosis in detention and that he had not received regular and systematic treatment. He was rarely seen by a doctor. The medicines prescribed had been often out of stock. He had therefore been unable to receive the complete course of his drug therapy. He had occasionally and for minor periods refused to take medication to draw the attention of the authorities to the poor quality of his treatment. Those minor interruptions had not undermined the efficiency of the therapy which, in the absence of a drug susceptibility test, had had no prospects of success.78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant noted the Government\u2019s claim related to his failure to exhaust domestic remedies. He stressed that his numerous complaints to the authorities, including oral complaints to the detention authorities, had been fruitless and that he had therefore had no effective remedy by means of which to complain about the quality of his treatment. He had had no opportunity to appeal against the court judgments in his cases as he had not received copies of them.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government raised an objection in respect of the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. This issue is closely linked to the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint that he did not have at his disposal an effective remedy for his complaints concerning the absence of effective medical care. It is therefore necessary to join the Government\u2019s objection to the merits of the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies and compliance with Article 13 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention obliges those seeking to bring a case against a State before the Court to first use the remedies provided by the national legal system. Consequently, States are exempted from answering for their acts before an international body until they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. The rule is based on the assumption \u2012 reflected in Article 13 of the Convention, with which it has close affinity \u2012 that there is an effective remedy available to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d under the Convention and to provide appropriate relief. Moreover, it is an important aspect of the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights (see Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 152, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Handyside v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, \u00a7 48, Series A no. 24).82.\u00a0\u00a0An applicant is normally required to have recourse only to those remedies that are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the alleged breaches. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see, inter alia, Vernillo v. France, 20 February 1991, \u00a7 27, Series A no. 198, and Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 18 December 1986, \u00a7 22, Series A no. 112). It is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available both in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say that it was accessible, was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints, and offered reasonable prospects of success. However, once this burden of proof has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact used or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances exempting him or her from the requirement.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that the application of this rule must make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied in the context of the machinery for the protection of human rights that the Contracting Parties have agreed to set up. Accordingly, it has recognised that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see Cardot v. France, 19\u00a0March 1991, \u00a7\u00a034, Series A no. 200). It has further recognised that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically: in reviewing whether it has been observed it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of each individual case (see Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6\u00a0November 1980, \u00a7 35, Series A no. 40). This means that, amongst other things, account must be taken \u2012 realistically \u2012 not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate, as well as the personal circumstances of the applicants (see Akdivar and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 65-68, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV).84.\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article 13 of the Convention varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint; the \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. At the same time, the remedy required by Article 13 of the Convention must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law, in the sense of either preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 157-58, and Wasserman v.\u00a0Russia (no. 2), no. 21071\/05, \u00a7\u00a045, 10 April 2008).85.\u00a0\u00a0Where the fundamental right to protection against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, the preventive and compensatory remedies must be complementary in order to be considered effective. The existence of a preventive remedy is indispensable for the effective protection of individuals against the kind of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed, the particular importance attached by the Convention to that provision requires, in the Court\u2019s view, that the Contracting Parties establish, over and above a compensatory remedy, an effective mechanism in order to put a rapid end to any such treatment. Were it otherwise, the prospect of future compensation would legitimise particularly severe suffering in breach of this core provision of the Convention (see Vladimir Romanov, cited above, \u00a7 78).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case86.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court is not convinced by this submission. The documents produced by the applicant, such as the copies of letters from various domestic authorities, show that he complained to the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Udmurtiya, the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Republic of Udmurtiya, the Ombudsman and the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Republic (see paragraphs 40-44 above), as well as lodged two claims before the Russian court. The applicant therefore attempted to draw the authorities\u2019 attention to his state of health and the inappropriate, in his view, quality of the medical care he had been afforded in detention. This fact alone has on many occasions been sufficient for the Court to dismiss the Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion (see, for instance, Gurenko v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a041828\/10, \u00a7\u00a078, 5\u00a0February 2013).87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that it has on many occasions examined the effectiveness of the domestic remedies suggested by the Government, namely lodging a complaint with the authorities of a detention facility, prosecutor\u2019s office or a court (see, among many other authorities, Patranin, cited above, \u00a7 86; Gorbulya v. Russia, no.\u00a031535\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 56-58, 6 March 2014; and Reshetnyak, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 65-73). In the aforementioned cases the Court has established that none of the legal avenues put forward by the Government constituted an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation, or to provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his or her complaints under Article\u00a03 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Government\u2019s objections of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies were dismissed.88.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the applicant\u2019s grave health problems and the seriousness of his allegations about the way they were addressed by the authorities, the Court considers that he had an \u201carguable claim\u201d of inadequate medical care in detention and that the authorities, accordingly, had an obligation to ensure the availability of an effective remedy to deal with the substance of his complaint. Taking into account the circumstances of the present case and the aforementioned case-law, the Court sees no reason to depart from its previous findings on the issue. It concludes that the legal avenues put forward by the Government did not constitute an effective remedy that could have been used to prevent the alleged violations or their continuation and provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.89.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and finds a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with Article 3 of the Convention(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him or her to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his or her health and well\u2011being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7\u00a0208, 13\u00a0July 2006). In most cases concerning the detention of sick people, the Court has examined whether or not the applicant received adequate medical care in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 of the Convention does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to assure the health and well-being of detainees as an obligation on the part of the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094; Khudobin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts); and Kalashnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI).91.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists, in particular, that authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v.\u00a0Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011; Gladkiy v. Russia, no.\u00a03242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21\u00a0December 2010; Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos.\u00a09852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29\u00a0November 2007; Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0104-06, 28 March 2006; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v. Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7\u00a0121, 7\u00a0November\u00a02006) and that \u2012 where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition \u2012 supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at successfully treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109 and 114, and Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a03456\/05, \u00a7\u00a079, 4\u00a0October 2005). The Court reiterates that medical treatment within prison facilities must be appropriate and comparable to the quality of treatment which the State authorities have committed themselves to providing for the entirety of the population. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each detainee must be guaranteed the same level of medical treatment that is available in the best healthcare establishments outside prison facilities (see Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a047152\/06, \u00a7 137, 23 March 2016, and Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no.\u00a02447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012).92.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves a fair degree of flexibility in defining the required standard of healthcare, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7\u00a0140, 22\u00a0December 2008).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case93.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes the applicant\u2019s submission that he was infected with tuberculosis in detention. In connection with this it reiterates that even if it was indeed so, this in itself would not imply a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, provided that he received treatment for it (see Yevgeniy Bogdanov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 22405\/04, \u00a7\u00a090, 26 February 2015; Gorbulya, cited above, \u00a7\u00a084; Asyanov v. Russia, no.\u00a025462\/09, \u00a7 31, 9\u00a0October 2012; Vasyukov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 2974\/05, \u00a7 66, 5\u00a0April 2011; Pitalev v. Russia, no. 34393\/03, \u00a7 53, 30 July 2009; and Alver, cited above, \u00a7 54). The Court is therefore bound to assess the quality of medical treatment rendered to the applicant and to determine whether he was deprived of adequate medical assistance as he claims and, if so, whether this amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see Sarban, cited above, \u00a7 78).94.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset the Court notes that the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis in 2006. Although at that time his disease was at the initial stage and was not chronic, it took more than seven years to get it under control. For several years the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis remained MBT\u2011positive. This is a major sign of the inadequacy of the applicant\u2019s treatment (see Gladkiy, cited above, \u00a7 92). However this element by itself is unable to warrant the conclusion that the applicant\u2019s treatment was inadequate since various factors may influence the progress of the disease. The Court will therefore examine the course of the applicant\u2019s treatment.95.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the above, the Court observes that the evidence assessment in cases such as the one at hand calls for expert knowledge in various medical fields. In this connection the Court emphasises that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, and recognises that it must be cautious in assuming the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d (see, mutatis mutandis, Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7 51, 14 October 2010, and Ribitsch v. Austria, 4\u00a0December 1995, \u00a7 32, Series A no. 336).96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined a large number of cases against Russia raising complaints of inadequate medical care afforded to inmates (see, among the most recent ones, Patranin, cited above; Gorelov v. Russia, no.\u00a049072\/11, 9 January 2014; Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, 9 January 2014; Bubnov v. Russia, no. 76317\/11, 5 February 2013; Dirdizov, cited above; and Reshetnyak, cited above). In the absence of any effective remedy in Russia to handle those complaints, the Court has been obliged to evaluate the evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention had been respected. In that role, paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants in view of their detention, the Court has called on the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the Government failed to comply with its request to provide medical documents covering the entire period of the applicant\u2019s detention (see paragraph 24 above). In the absence of any explanation from the Government, the Court is unable to establish whether their failure is a product of the domestic authorities\u2019 inability to keep a comprehensive record concerning the applicant\u2019s state of health and the treatment he received (see, for example, Khudobin, cited above, \u00a7 83) or a result of the Government\u2019s omission to enclose with their submissions to the Court a part of the applicant\u2019s medical record which may be considered vital evidence as it contains information capable of corroborating or refuting the allegations put forward by the applicant. However, irrespective of the reasons for that failure, the Court is prepared to draw inferences as to the well-foundness of the applicant\u2019s allegations and the Government\u2019s conduct in the instant case (see Bekirski v. Bulgaria, no. 71420\/01, \u00a7 115, 2\u00a0September 2010, with further references, and Imakayeva v. Russia, no.\u00a07615\/02, \u00a7 124, ECHR 2006\u2011XIII (extracts)).98.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of accurate information on the applicant\u2019s treatment in the period between March 2007 and March 2008, in particular, the absence of medical prescriptions, the Court accepts the applicant\u2019s argument that in that initial period of his treatment he received no special anti\u2011tuberculosis therapy (see paragraph 29 above). In this respect the Court observes that the authorities\u2019 inability to ensure a regular, uninterrupted supply of essential anti-tuberculosis drugs to patients is a key factor in tuberculosis treatment failure (see, for similar reasoning, Gladkiy, cited above, \u00a7 94, and Yakovenko v. Ukraine, no. 15825\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 98-102, 25\u00a0October 2007).99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is also mindful of another element in the management of the applicant\u2019s case, namely the authorities\u2019 failure to perform a drug\u2011susceptibility test. The importance and value of this test may be seen from the Guidelines of the World Health Organisation listed in paragraph 50 above. Given the length of the treatment, its occasional interruptions and lack of clear signs of improvement in the applicant\u2019s condition for a significant period of time, there was a crucial necessity to perform the test. It was impossible to choose an appropriate treatment regimen for the applicant without testing him for drug resistance. The Court has already condemned delays in recommending and performing such a test in the initial stages of the diagnostic process (see Kushnir v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a042184\/09, \u00a7\u00a0146, 11 December 2014; Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, no.\u00a035254\/07, \u00a7\u00a090, 22 November 2011; and Gladkiy, cited above, \u00a7 93). In over seven years of treating the applicant for tuberculosis the Russian authorities did not make recourse to this important diagnostic procedure which was vital for the setting of a proper course of treatment and drug therapy.100.\u00a0\u00a0Against this background the Court rejects the Government\u2019s submissions that the applicant\u2019s uncooperative behaviour undermined the efficiency of his therapy. The Court observes that the applicant had interrupted the treatment for the first time in June 2008 (see paragraph 34 above), that is to say more than a year and a half after the initiation of the therapy which had proved to be ineffective and had not, in any respect, ameliorated the applicant\u2019s condition. It therefore considers that the applicant\u2019s decision to interrupt the treatment was no more than a legitimate attempt to draw the authorities\u2019 attention to the poor quality of the medical care. Taking into account that the period of interruption lasted less than a month, the Court is not persuaded that it could have significantly impacted the quality of the applicant\u2019s treatment.101.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, the Court finds that the Government did not provide sufficient evidence to enable it to conclude that the prolonged period of the applicant\u2019s suffering from tuberculosis was caused by any other factor than mismanagement of his illness. The failure of the Russian authorities to ensure the proper medical care for the applicant is clearly demonstrated in the absence of any drug therapy at the initial stage of his treatment and incomplete drug therapy at the later stages. The authorities\u2019 failure to perform a drug-susceptibility test must have adversely affected the chances of the applicant\u2019s therapy of having any real prospect of success. As a result the applicant was exposed to continuous mental and physical suffering diminishing his human dignity. The authorities\u2019 failure to provide him with the requisite medical care amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also examined other complaints submitted by the applicant. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as those complaints fall within the Court\u2019s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be also rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION103.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the finding of a violation would in itself be adequate just satisfaction.106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, considers it reasonable to award EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses107.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed:(i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 50 for postal services and photocopying;(ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 550 for legal expenses incurred before the domestic authorities and the Court for his representation by Mr Kosolapov;(iii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 3,050 for legal expenses incurred before the Court for his representation by Mr E. Markov, who has represented him before the Court since May 2013. The applicant asked for the latter sum to be paid directly into Mr\u00a0Markov\u2019s bank account.108.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the claims to be excessive.109.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession, the volume of the submissions by the applicant\u2019s representative, the advanced stage of the Court proceedings at which he joined them, and bearing in mind that the applicant was granted EUR 850 in legal aid for his representation before the Court, it considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,500 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. Of the award made, the sum of EUR 500 is to be paid into the applicant\u2019s bank account and EUR 1,000 into the bank account of Mr\u00a0E.\u00a0Markov.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28218":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the Romanian authorities had not investigated her allegations of rape effectively and had breached their positive obligation to protect her from inhuman and degrading treatment.\u00a0The relevant Convention provisions read as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 8\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the authorities had not investigated her allegations of rape effectively. As there had been no physical evidence of assault, the criminal justice system had been more inclined to believe the perpetrators, showing no concern for the need to protect her as a minor. Discrepancies in the evidence had been disregarded and undue emphasis placed on the absence on her body of any signs of physical violence and on her lack of resistance to the perpetrators. The authorities failed to take into consideration her young age and her physical and psychological condition or the fact that six adult men had participated in her abuse. This approach intensified her feelings of humiliation, anguish and frustration without rendering an effective conviction.48.\u00a0\u00a0The severe consequences of this situation on the applicant\u2019s state of mind had been documented by the medical reports submitted during the domestic proceedings, as well as before the Court.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the investigation had been thorough and effective. All possible steps had been taken to gather the necessary evidence and to establish the facts, and in the absence of \u201cdirect\u201d proof of rape, the national authorities had taken into consideration all the circumstances of the case. The authorities had not found it established that rape had been committed. The applicant had given conflicting testimony while the perpetrators had presented a constant position throughout the investigation. She had agreed to accompany the boys to the deserted house and had not asked for help. In addition, the difference in age between the applicant and the perpetrators was not significant.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that from the examples of domestic practice as already submitted in the case of M.G.C. v. Romania (cited above), it was obvious that the domestic courts were not requiring proof of physical violence in order to establish the existence of rape and that the victim\u2019s resistance was not considered an important element in the analysis of such cases. When a victim was not young enough for the act to be automatically classified as rape, but was under the age of fifteen and gave her\/his consent to the sexual act, the law provided that the victim\u2019s will was not valid because of her young age and classified the act as the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor. The domestic courts have made a distinction between the two crimes, holding that the victim\u2019s failure to defend herself\/himself or to express her\/his will must be established on a case-by-case basis. A fourteen-year-old girl might find herself unable to express her consent, whereas a much younger victim might have the capacity to defend herself and express her will.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation of the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see I.G.\u00a0v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 53519\/07, \u00a7 40, 15 May 2012). These measures should provide effective protection, in particular, of children and other vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 150). In the case of people in a vulnerable position, including people with disabilities, the Court held that the authorities must show particular vigilance and afford increased protection in view of the fact that such individuals\u2019 capacity or willingness to pursue a complaint will often be impaired (see B. v. Romania, no. 42390\/07, \u00a7 50, 10 January 2012).52.\u00a0\u00a0On that basis, the Court considers that States have a positive obligation inherent in Article 3 of the Convention to enact criminal-law provisions that effectively punish rape and to apply them in practice through effective investigation and prosecution (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7 153, 4 December 2003). In addition, in accordance with contemporary standards and trends in this area, member States\u2019 positive obligations under Articles 3 of the Convention must be seen as requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution of any non-consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by the victim (ibid., \u00a7 166).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present case53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the authorities in the current case were confronted with two conflicting versions of the events. The applicant alleged that she had been raped on the evening of 13 January 2007. However, the six men involved in the incident claimed that she had consented to having sexual intercourse that evening. Therefore, the authorities\u2019 central task in this case was to determine whether the sexual intercourse had been consensual.54.\u00a0\u00a0In similar cases the Court has already held that the presence of two irreconcilable versions of the facts obviously called for a context-sensitive assessment of the credibility of the statements made and for verification of all the surrounding circumstances (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 177). That could be done by questioning people known to the applicant and the perpetrators, such as friends, neighbours, teachers and others who could shed light on the trustworthiness of their statements or by seeking an opinion from a specialist psychologist (see I.G. v. Moldova, cited above, \u00a7\u00a043). In this context, the authorities could also verify whether any reasons existed for the victim to make false accusations against the alleged perpetrators. However, the Court observes that none of the above was done at any stage of the investigation and trial in the current case.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that international materials on the situation of people with disabilities point out that the rate of abuse and violence committed against people with disabilities is considerably higher than the rate for the general population (see paragraphs 42-44 above). According to medical documents dated 15 February 2007 the applicant had been diagnosed with slight intellectual disability. In this context, the nature of the sexual abuse against her was such that the existence of useful detection and reporting mechanisms were fundamental to the effective implementation of the relevant criminal laws and to the applicant\u2019s access to appropriate remedies (see, mutatis mutandis, Juppala v. Finland, no.\u00a018620\/03, \u00a7 42, 2 December 2008). Indeed the Court is of the view that failure to properly investigate or provide appropriate judicial response to complaints of sexual abuse against children or other vulnerable persons such as persons with intellectual disabilities creates a background of impunity which may be in breach of the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.56.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s intellectual disability, confirmed by medical documents, placed her in a heightened state of vulnerability and required both the investigative authorities and the domestic courts to show increased diligence in analysing the applicant\u2019s statements (compare B v. Romania, cited above, \u00a7 57). Moreover, particular attention should have been also focused on analysing the validity of the applicant\u2019s consent to the sexual acts in the light of her intellectual capacity. However, it appears that none of the personal circumstances of the applicant, such as her age and her mental and physical development or the circumstances in which the incident took place \u2013 at night, in cold weather, as well as the number of men who took part in it \u2013 were considered by the prosecutors or the judges deciding on this case.57. The conclusions drawn by the prosecutor and the domestic courts appear to have been based only on the statements given by the alleged perpetrators, taken together with the fact that the applicant\u2019s body showed no signs of violence and that she had not called for help or immediately told her girlfriends about the alleged abuse (see paragraphs 34 and 36 above). The Court notes in this context the multitude of investigative steps conducted in the example of domestic case-law submitted by the Government (see paragraph 39 above).58.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above elements, the Court considers that the authorities put undue emphasis on the absence of proof of resistance from the applicant and they failed to take a context-sensitive approach in the current case (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 182). The authorities\u2019 conduct was aggravated by the fact that no psychological evaluation was ever ordered by the domestic courts for the purposes of obtaining a specialist analysis of the applicant\u2019s reactions from the point of view of her age. At the same time, the extensive medical evidence of the trauma suffered by the applicant following the incident at issue was not considered by the authorities at all.59.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government claimed, among other arguments, that the applicant had given conflicting statements to the authorities. However, the Court notes that in the statements she gave throughout the investigation and trial, the applicant had merely clarified her initial statement, given immediately after the incident. The ones who appear to have re-considered their statements were M.C. and M.I.C. (see paragraphs 14, 22 and 26 above). Nevertheless, it is not clear from the case file whether the authorities took any steps to verify their credibility or the course of the events as described by the two men.60.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, without expressing an opinion on the guilt of M.C., A.C.L. and V.F., the Court finds that the investigation of the applicant\u2019s case fell short of the requirements inherent in the States\u2019 positive obligations to apply effectively a criminal-law system punishing all forms of rape and sexual abuse.61.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of the respondent State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention. In view of this conclusion, the Court also holds that no separate issue arises under Article 8 of the Convention (see I.G. v. Moldova, cited above, \u00a7 45).II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION62.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the amount claimed was excessive.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered distress and psychological trauma resulting at least partly from the shortcomings in the authorities\u2019 approach in the present case. Making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards her EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not claim costs or expenses. Accordingly, the Court does not make any award under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28245":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the Government had failed to comply with the letter and spirit of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 and had thus violated their right of individual application. They relied on Article 34 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201dRule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:\u201c1.\u00a0The Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Rule may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of their own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which they consider should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings.2.\u00a0\u00a0Where it is considered appropriate, immediate notice of the measure adopted in a particular case may be given to the Committee of Ministers.3.\u00a0The Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Rule may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any interim measure indicated.4. The President of the Court may appoint Vice-Presidents of Sections as duty judges to decide on requests for interim measures.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions105.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed the applicants\u2019 submissions, pointing out that they had complied with the interim measure indicated by the Court. In this connection, they maintained that they had submitted all the material and documents concerning the applicants\u2019 state of health.106.\u00a0\u00a0They further submitted that, although all the monthly information reports concerning the applicants\u2019 state of health had been forwarded to the applicants by the Court, the applicants had failed to comment or to request any further information about them in this regard from the Government. In these circumstances, the applicants had been precluded from raising a complaint in their observations concerning the implementation of the interim measure.107.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that the Government had failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court on 30 September 2014. In this connection, they noted that, although the interim measure had indicated to the Government to inform the Court, on a monthly basis, of the applicants\u2019 state of health and medical treatment, they had failed to provide any medical evidence in this respect. In particular, they pointed out that the Government had contented themselves with repeating in their very brief monthly reports sent to the Court that \u201cthe applicants\u2019 state of health was satisfactory and stable\u201d or \u201cthe applicants\u2019 state of health was under constant medical supervision\u201d, without submitting any documents concerning the medical prescriptions or recommendations of the doctors who had examined them.108.\u00a0\u00a0They further submitted that the Government\u2019s failure to provide the Court with medical evidence regarding their state of health had fundamentally undermined the protective purpose of the interim measure in question. They noted in this connection that the Court had indicated to the Government to provide the first applicant with adequate medical treatment in prison and, if such treatment was unavailable in prison, to ensure her immediate transfer to an appropriate medical facility for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. However, the Government\u2019s failure to provide the Court with medical evidence regarding her medical treatment in prison had made it impossible for the Court to assess whether she had been provided with adequate medical treatment or whether such treatment had been unavailable in prison and that she should be transferred to an appropriate medical facility.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, pursuant to Article 34 of the Convention, Contracting States undertake to refrain from any act or omission that may hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application, and this has been consistently reaffirmed as a cornerstone of the Convention system (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2005\u2011I). Although the object of Article 34 is essentially that of protecting an individual against any arbitrary interference by the authorities, it does not merely compel States to abstain from such interference. In addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there are positive obligations inherent in Article 34 requiring the authorities to furnish all the necessary facilities to make possible the proper and effective examination of applications. Such an obligation will arise in situations where applicants are particularly vulnerable (see Naydyon v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a016474\/03, \u00a7 63, 14\u00a0October 2010; Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no.\u00a038773\/05, \u00a7\u00a0156, 26 July 2012; and Iulian Popescu v. Romania, no. 24999\/04, \u00a7\u00a033, 4\u00a0June 2013).110.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s established case-law, a respondent State\u2019s failure to comply with an interim measure entails a violation of the right of individual application. The Court cannot emphasise enough the special importance attached to interim measures in the Convention system. Their purpose is not only to enable an effective examination of the application to be carried out, but also to ensure that the protection afforded to the applicant by the Convention is effective. Such measures subsequently allow the Committee of Ministers to supervise the execution of the final judgment. Interim measures thus enable the State concerned to discharge its obligation to comply with the final judgment of the Court, which is legally binding by virtue of Article 46 of the Convention (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0125; Khloyev v. Russia, no. 46404\/13, \u00a7 60, 5 February 2015; and Patranin v. Russia, no. 12983\/14, \u00a7 46, 23 July 2015).111.\u00a0\u00a0The crucial significance of interim measures is further highlighted by the fact that the Court issues them, as a matter of principle, only in truly exceptional cases and on the basis of a rigorous examination of all the relevant circumstances. In most of these cases, the applicants face a genuine threat to life and limb, with the ensuing real risk of grave, irreversible harm in breach of the core provisions of the Convention. The vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system not only underpins their binding legal effect on the States concerned, as upheld by the established case-law, but also commands that the utmost importance be attached to the question of the States Parties\u2019 compliance with the Court\u2019s indications in that regard (see Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857\/13, \u00a7 67, 27 November 2014, and Khloyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a061).\u00a0112.\u00a0\u00a0A complaint under Article 34 of the Convention is of a procedural nature and therefore does not give rise to any issue of admissibility under the Convention (see Ergi v. Turkey, 28 July 1998, \u00a7 105, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011IV, and Cooke v. Austria, no. 25878\/94, \u00a7\u00a046, 8 February 2000). Article 34 will be breached if the authorities of a Contracting State fail to take all the steps which could reasonably be taken in order to comply with an interim measure indicated by the Court (see Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806\/05, \u00a7 88, 10 March 2009). It is for the respondent Government to demonstrate to the Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation (see Paladi, cited above, \u00a7 92; Gror v.\u00a0Albania, no. 25336\/04, \u00a7 184, 7 July 2009; and Patranin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a048).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case, on 30 September 2014 it decided to indicate to the Azerbaijani Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, to provide both applicants with adequate medical treatment in prison, and, if such treatment was unavailable in prison, to ensure that the first applicant was immediately transferred to an appropriate medical facility for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. The Court also requested the Government to inform it, on a monthly basis, of the applicants\u2019 state of health and medical treatment.114.\u00a0\u00a0Following the indication of the interim measure, on 3 November 2014 the Government provided the Court with a letter containing an overview of the medical examinations that the applicants had undergone in October 2014. The letter indicated that the applicants\u2019 state of health was stable and did not require their transfer to a specialist medical facility. No medical documents were attached.115.\u00a0\u00a0Similar letters containing general information about the applicants\u2019 state of health and medical examinations in detention had been sent monthly by the Government to the Court from November 2014 to December 2015 (see paragraphs 79-85 above). However, none of them contained any medical documents concerning the medical treatment provided to the applicants in prison.116.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court observes that the Government did not dispute their obligation under Article 34 of the Convention to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court. Rather, they disputed the applicants\u2019 submissions and insisted that they had complied with the interim measure in its entirety by informing the Court, on a monthly basis, of the applicants\u2019 state of health and medical treatment and submitting all the material and documents in this respect.117.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument and notes at the outset that it cannot accept their submissions that all the material and documents concerning the applicants\u2019 state of health and medical treatment had been submitted to the Court. In particular, it observes that, although from November 2014 to December 2015 the Government sent monthly reports to the Court containing information about the applicants\u2019 state of health and medical treatment, none of them contained any medical documents in support of the information submitted. The only medical documents submitted by the Government following the indication of the interim measure were those submitted in their observations of 27 May 2015 concerning the results of the applicants\u2019 medical tests and examinations conducted between their arrest and 12 March 2015.\u00a0118.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court reiterates that whilst the formulation of an interim measure is one of the elements to be taken into account in the Court\u2019s analysis of whether a State has complied with its obligations under Article 34, the Court must have regard not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the interim measure indicated (see Paladi, \u00a7 91, and Patranin, \u00a7\u00a052, both cited above) and, indeed, to its very purpose. The Court notes in this respect that the main purpose of the interim measure in the present case \u2011 and the Government did not claim to be unaware of this \u2013 was to prevent the applicants\u2019 exposure to inhuman and degrading suffering in view of their poor health and to ensure that they received adequate medical treatment in prison. In these circumstances, it was crucial for the Court to be provided information by the Government on a regular basis concerning the applicants\u2019 state of health supported by the relevant medical documents, without which the Court would not be able to assess the quality of the treatment the applicants received in prison and the adequacy of the conditions of their detention for their medical needs. In this connection, the Court agrees with the applicants\u2019 argument that the Government\u2019s failure to provide the Court with medical evidence regarding their state of health had made it impossible for the Court to assess whether the first applicant was receiving adequate medical treatment, or, whether such treatment was unavailable in prison and that she should be transferred to an appropriate medical facility, as indicated by the interim measure of 30 September 2014.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus considers that the Government\u2019s failure to provide the Court with the relevant medical documents with their monthly information reports impaired the very purpose of the interim measure, preventing it from being able to establish whether the applicants were receiving adequate medical treatment in detention as required by the interim measure. Moreover, the Government did not explain their failure to comply with the interim measure nor did they demonstrate any objective impediment preventing compliance with it.120.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Court concludes that in the present case the State has failed to comply with the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in breach of its obligation under Article 34 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION AS REGARDS THE APPLICANTS\u2019 MEDICAL TREATMENT IN DETENTION121.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had not been provided with adequate medical treatment in detention and that their state of health had been incompatible with their conditions of detention. Article 3 of the Convention provides as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions122.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, without specifying which remedies had been effective and available. In this connection, they submitted in a general manner that the applicants had failed to bring before the domestic authorities the complaints made subsequently to the Court.123.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further relied on the case of A.I. v. the Prison Service of the Ministry of Justice, pointing out that the decision in question represented an example of the effectiveness of one of several available domestic remedies.124.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants disagreed with the Government\u2019s submissions and reiterated their complaints. They noted that there had been no effective domestic remedies in respect of their complaints relating to their medical treatment in detention and the compatibility of their state of health with their conditions of detention. In this connection, they submitted that the Government had failed to demonstrate that there had been an effective remedy available both in theory and in practice capable of providing redress in respect of their complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment125.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention obliges applicants to use first the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. Article 35 \u00a7 1 also requires that the complaints intended to be brought subsequently before the Court should be made first to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements laid down in domestic law, although there is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 65-67, Reports 1996\u2011IV, and Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 51-52, Reports 1996-VI). Moreover, where the fundamental right to protection against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, the preventive and compensatory remedies have to be complementary in order to be considered effective (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a042525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7 98, 10 January 2012, and Dirdizov v. Russia, no.\u00a041461\/10, \u00a7 73, 27 November 2012).126.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the distribution of the burden of proof, it is incumbent on the Government claiming non\u2011exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available both in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say that it was accessible, capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success. Once this burden of proof has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted, or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case, or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from this requirement (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7 68, and Muradova v. Azerbaijan, no. 22684\/05, \u00a7 84, 2 April 2009).127.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes at the outset that the Government merely noted that the applicants had not lodged any complaints concerning their medical treatment in detention. They neither specified what type of remedy would have been an effective remedy in their view, nor provided any further information as to how such a remedy could have prevented the alleged violation or its continuation or provided the applicants with adequate redress (compare Popov v. Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7 205, 13 July 2006).128.\u00a0\u00a0Inasmuch as the Government\u2019s contention that the case of A.I.\u00a0v.\u00a0the Prison Service of the Ministry of Justice constituted an example of the effectiveness of one of several available domestic remedies could be understood to mean that the applicants should have lodged a complaint against the Prison Service under the CAP in the domestic courts, the Court observes at the outset that under the CAP a complaint may be lodged with the domestic courts against any administrative act, action or inaction of an administrative organ violating individuals\u2019 rights and liberties. The Court further observes that, although Article 40 of the CAP allows a judge to grant an injunction as a temporary defence measure requiring the respondent party to take or refrain from taking some action, no specific time-limit was provided for the examination of a request for application of a temporary defence measure (see paragraph 98 above). In this connection, the Court considers that, even assuming that such a complaint constituted an effective remedy in theory, the Government failed to show the existence of settled national case-law that would prove the effectiveness of the remedy in question, particularly as regards complaints concerning medical treatment in detention.129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in order to be \u201ceffective\u201d, a remedy must be available not only in theory but also in practice. This means that the Government should normally be able to illustrate the practical effectiveness of the remedy with examples of domestic case-law (see Dirdizov, cited above, \u00a7 88). In the present case, the Government relied solely on the decision of Baku Administrative Economic Court No. 1 dated 24 July 2012, in which a temporary defence measure was ordered under Article 40 of the CAP to transfer a detainee from a penal facility to a medical facility to undergo surgery (see paragraph 99 above). However, the decision in question did not recognise the violation of the detainee\u2019s rights on account of a lack of medical treatment in prison or the incompatibility of his state of health with the conditions of detention. Nor did it provide the detainee with adequate redress for the violation. In any event, the Court reiterates that a single case cited by the Government is insufficient to show the existence of settled domestic practice that would prove the effectiveness of a remedy (see Horvat v. Croatia, no. 51585\/99, \u00a7 44, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII, and Varga and Others v. Hungary, nos. 14097\/12, 45135\/12, 73712\/12, 34001\/13, 44055\/13, and 64586\/13, \u00a7 53, 10 March 2015). It follows that the Court cannot but conclude, on the basis of the information before it, that a complaint under the CAP before the domestic courts could not be considered an effective remedy.130.\u00a0\u00a0For the above reasons, the Court finds that the complaint cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. It considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions131.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicants had received comprehensive medical treatment in detention. They submitted that the applicants had been under constant medical supervision and that there had been no deterioration in their health. They referred in this connection to various medical examinations that the applicants had undergone during their detention. As to the first applicant, the Government relied on the results of examinations on 31 July, 19 August, 12 November and 29 December 2014, as well as on 26 January and 12 March 2015. They also submitted an undated note signed by C.W. indicating that her medical examinations had been conducted in his presence in accordance with the internationally accepted diagnostic rules and that he had been immediately informed of their results. The Government further referred to the first applicant\u2019s \u201cbad faith\u201d in refusing on many occasions to be seen by the doctors.132.\u00a0\u00a0As to the second applicant, the Government submitted that he had undergone a monthly general medical examination, but these had not revealed any deterioration in his health. In this connection, they submitted the results of an undated blood test and a biochemical test, as well as three undated electrocardiographs.133.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also submitted that the applicants\u2019 conditions of detention complied with international standards. In particular, the first applicant was held with four other detainees in a cell measuring 26.32 sq.\u00a0m designed to hold six detainees. The cell was adequately lit and ventilated. She was provided with food, water, bedding, clothing and other essentials. As regards the second applicant, he was held alone in a cell measuring 8\u00a0sq.\u00a0m designed to hold two inmates. The cell was adequately lit and ventilated. He was provided with hot and cold water, bedding, clothing and other essentials.134.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants disagreed with the Government\u2019s submissions, arguing that they had not been provided with the requisite medical assistance in detention. In this connection, they complained that they had been unable to obtain effective medical care, which had led to a serious deterioration in their condition and subjected them to severe physical and mental suffering. They also complained that their conditions of detention had not been adapted to their state of health.135.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the first applicant, the applicants noted that, although she had been examined on several occasions by C.W. within the framework of the Government\u2019s cooperation with the European Parliament, the Government had failed to provide her or the Court with the medical recommendations or prescriptions made by C.W. following these examinations. Moreover, when on 21 February 2015 they had directly asked C.W., through their lawyers, for the documents in question, they could not obtain them. C.W. had indicated that confidentiality was a strict condition of his cooperation with the European Parliament and that, in the event of information being leaked out, he would be prevented from entering Azerbaijan for subsequent examinations of the first applicant. They also rejected the Government\u2019s reliance on the first applicant\u2019s \u201cbad faith\u201d in refusing to be seen by the doctors, noting that her refusal had been a protest against the lack of adequate medical treatment and her unlawful detention. As regards the adaptation of the first applicant\u2019s conditions of detention to her state of health, the applicants submitted that she had been deprived of diabetic food and medication from 5 to 23 August 2014. Moreover, although the Government submitted that she had been provided with special diabetic food, they had failed to specify what had actually been given to her. They also submitted that, even assuming that the cell in which she had been detained had measured more than 20 sq.\u00a0m as submitted by the Government, its size could not be considered sufficient for a detainee such as her suffering from diabetes. In particular, she had not had enough space for physical activity despite the fact that one of the treatments for diabetes was taking exercise.136.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the second applicant, the applicants submitted that his state of health had been incompatible with his detention. In particular, they noted that, although he had suffered from grade 3 chronic hypertension, which was an illness precluding detention in prison, he had been unlawfully detained. They further submitted that the Government had failed to submit any medical documents proving that the second applicant had been provided with adequate medical treatment in detention and had contented themselves with noting that he was \u201cunder constant medical supervision\u201d and that his state of health \u201cwas assessed as satisfactory\u201d. They had also failed to submit any information as to whether his detention environment had been adapted to his state of health.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles137.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s conduct (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. Assessment of this minimum level depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0162, Series A no. 25; Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7 91, ECHR\u00a02000-XI; and Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a067, ECHR 2001-III). Although the purpose of such treatment is a factor to be taken into account, in particular whether it was intended to humiliate or debase the victim, the absence of any such purpose does not inevitably lead to a finding that there has been no violation of Article 3 (see Peers, cited above, \u00a7 74).138.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094, and Popov, cited above, \u00a7 208). In exceptional cases, where a detainee\u2019s state of health is absolutely incompatible with his or her detention, Article 3 may require the release of that person under certain conditions (see Rozhkov v. Russia, no. 64140\/00, \u00a7\u00a0104, 19 July 2007). However, Article 3 cannot be construed as laying down a general obligation to release detainees on health grounds. It rather imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance (see Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 77, 4 October 2005, and Khudobin v.\u00a0Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 93, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)). Medical treatment provided within prison facilities must be appropriate, that is, at a level comparable to that which the State authorities have committed themselves to provide to the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this does not mean that every detainee must be guaranteed the same level of medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152\/06, \u00a7 137, 23 March 2016). A lack of appropriate medical care and, more generally, the detention in inappropriate conditions of a person who is ill, may in principle amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see, for example, \u0130lhan v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a022277\/93, \u00a7 87, ECHR\u00a02000\u00adVII, and Helhal v. France, no. 10401\/12, \u00a7\u00a048, 19 February 2015).139.\u00a0\u00a0In cases in which there are conflicting accounts of events, the Court is inevitably confronted, when establishing the facts, with the same difficulties as those faced by any first-instance court. It reiterates that, in assessing evidence, it has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, it has never been its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that standard. Its role is to rule not on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States\u2019 responsibility under the Convention. The specific nature of its task under Article 19 of the Convention \u2013 to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention \u2011conditions its approach to the issues of evidence and proof. In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all the evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions. In accordance with its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specific nature of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (see Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012, and the cases cited therein).140.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. The Court reiterates its case-law under Articles\u00a02 and 3 of the Convention to the effect that where the events at issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries, damage and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII; and Oleg Nikitin v. Russia, no.\u00a036410\/02, \u00a7 45, 9 October 2008). In the absence of such an explanation the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the respondent Government (see, for instance, Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7\u00a0274, 18 June 2002, and Buntov v. Russia, no. 27026\/10, \u00a7 161, 5 June 2012).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the first applicant was detained from 31 July 2014 to 9 December 2015 and the second applicant was detained from 5 August 2014 to 12 November 2015. The medical evidence in the case file confirmed \u2013 and it was not disputed by the parties \u2013 that, when detained, the applicants had several serious medical problems. In particular, the first applicant suffered from chronic hepatitis C, type 2 diabetes, gallstones, a single cyst in the left kidney (measuring 0.91\u00a0cm) and pseudophakia (replacement of the natural lenses of the eyes with intraocular lenses). The second applicant suffered from grade 3 chronic hypertension and hypertensive crisis with an increased risk of cardiovascular complications. However, contrary to the applicants\u2019 allegations, it does not appear from the medical evidence in the case file that the second applicant suffered from a type of grade 3 chronic hypertension leading to one of the three situations indicated in the List of Serious Illnesses Precluding the Detention of Prisoners (see paragraph 95 above). The Court thus notes that, although nothing suggests that these diseases were in principle incompatible with detention, it is clear that they required appropriate medical care on a regular, systematic and comprehensive basis.142.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, as in most cases concerning the detention of persons who are ill, the Court shall examine whether or not the applicants in the present case received adequate medical assistance in detention. The Court reiterates in this regard that the \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The mere fact that a detainee was seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical assistance was adequate (see Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 116, 29 November 2007, and Jeladze v. Georgia, no. 1871\/08, \u00a7 42, 18\u00a0December 2012). The authorities must also ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no.\u00a041833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27\u00a0January 2011) and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Poghosyan v.\u00a0Georgia, no. 9870\/07, \u00a7 59, 24 February 2009, and Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no. 32362\/02, \u00a7 69, 20 May 2010). The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through (see Hummatov, \u00a7 116, and Jeladze, \u00a7 42, both cited above).143.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicants were immediately examined by a doctor and underwent various medical tests upon their admission to the detention facilities and that their diagnoses were prompt and accurate. However, it notes that, although the domestic authorities were aware of the applicants\u2019 poor health from the very beginning of their detention, it does not appear from the case file that they were provided with adequate medical treatment in detention.144.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court firstly observes that during the first few months of her detention, from August to November 2014, the first applicant was examined only once on 19 August 2014 by a specialist endocrinologist, who advised her to continue her previous treatment against diabetes without making any further recommendations (see paragraph 51 above). In particular, although she suffered from chronic hepatitis C, she was not examined by a virologist. It appears that during that period the main medical assistance provided to her by the detention facility medical unit was the transfer of the medication brought in by her friends and occasional examinations with the prison doctor when she complained about her state of health (see paragraph 62 above).145.\u00a0\u00a0As to the adequacy of the first applicant\u2019s subsequent medical examinations by C.W. and the other doctors, it is clear from the documents in the case file that from 29 December 2014 she was regularly examined by C.W. and underwent various medical tests. However, the Court cannot consider on the basis of this fact alone that her medical treatment was adequate. In this connection, the Court firstly refers to its above-mentioned findings concerning the Government\u2019s failure to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court on 30 September 2014 (see paragraphs\u00a0113\u2011120 above). Moreover, when communicating this case, the Court also asked the Government to provide full information on the medical treatment received by the applicants in respect of all their health problems. However, neither the Court nor the applicants were provided with the medical prescriptions or recommendations made by C.W. or the other doctors following these medical examinations and the Government contented themselves with submitting an undated note signed by C.W., according to which the first applicant\u2019s medical examinations were conducted in compliance with international standards. No explanation was given by the Government for this failure. The Court also notes that these findings are also relevant to the second applicant\u2019s case. In fact, although the Government argued that the second applicant had been provided with adequate medical treatment throughout his detention, neither the Court nor the applicants were provided with any medical prescriptions or recommendations concerning his medical treatment in detention.146.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that this failure on the part of the Government to provide the Court with full information on the medical treatment received by the applicants in respect of all their health problems deprived it of the ability to examine whether the treatment prescribed to the applicants in the present case was comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating their health problems. It can therefore draw inferences from the Government\u2019s conduct and finds that the applicants were not provided with adequate medical treatment in detention. In this connection, the Court also considers it necessary to reiterate that the fact that the applicants were left without the relevant information in respect of their illnesses, and thus were kept in the dark about their state of health and deprived of any control over it, must have caused them perpetual anguish and fear (see Testa v. Croatia, no. 20877\/04, \u00a7 52, 12 July 2007).147.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court cannot overlook the fact that the Government also failed to show that the necessary conditions were created for any medical treatment prescribed to the applicants to actually be followed through, except for the fact that the first applicant was provided with a blood glucose meter in the detention facility. In particular, although it was clear in view of the nature of the applicants\u2019 illnesses that they should follow a diet, the Government failed to specify what kind of food the applicants had been provided in detention. In general, there is no indication that the applicants\u2019 detention environment was adapted to their state of health.148.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the Government\u2019s argument relating to the first applicant\u2019s \u201cbad faith\u201d, the Court notes that she did indeed refuse to be seen by the doctors on several occasions. However, it does not attach significant importance to that fact, taking into account that by that time more three months had elapsed of not being provided with adequate medical assistance in detention and that her refusal was a protest against this lack of medical assistance (see paragraph 144 above). Moreover, there was no indication that when she was examined by C.W. and the other specialists or underwent comprehensive medical examinations she refused to co-operate with the doctors. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that her refusal to accept medical treatment in such conditions could be interpreted as \u201cbad faith\u201d (see Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 119, 7 November 2006).149.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s argument that there was no deterioration in the applicants\u2019 health in detention, the Court observes that this argument is contradicted by the very fact that the applicants were transferred to the medical department of the Prison Service at the request of the doctors (see paragraph 85 above). Moreover, the second applicant was released from detention precisely on health grounds at the request of the medical department of the Prison Service. The Government also did not dispute the fact that the first applicant lost a considerable amount of weight during her detention. In any event, the Court points out that it is not necessary to show that a failure to provide requisite medical assistance led to a medical emergency or otherwise caused severe or prolonged pain to find that a detainee was subjected to treatment incompatible with the guarantees of Article 3. The fact that a detainee needed and requested such assistance but it was unavailable to him may, in certain circumstances, suffice to conclude that such treatment was degrading within the meaning of that Article (see Davtyan v. Armenia, no. 29736\/06, \u00a7 88, 31 March 2015).150.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus finds that the applicants did not receive adequate medical treatment for their illnesses while in detention (see, a contrario, Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, no. 49872\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 214-219, 30 April 2013). It believes that, as a result of this lack of adequate medical treatment, they were exposed to prolonged mental and physical suffering diminishing their human dignity. The authorities\u2019 failure to provide them with the medical care they needed amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.151.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE FIRST APPLICANT\u2019S ILL-TREATMENT IN PRISON BY A PRISON GUARD AND HER CELLMATE152.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained that she had been beaten by a prison guard on 23 September 2014 and subjected to verbal and physical violence by a repeat offender placed in her cell, and that the domestic authorities had not carried out an effective investigation in this respect. Article 3 of the Convention provides as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d153.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the first applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of her ill-treatment allegation. In particular, they pointed out that the Sabunchu District Prosecutor\u2019s Office had launched a criminal inquiry into the first applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment in prison and that on 22 October 2014 the investigator in charge of the case had refused to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence. However, the first applicant had never challenged this decision before the domestic courts.154.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant disagreed with the Government\u2019s submissions and maintained her complaint.155.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present case, following the first applicant\u2019s complaints to the domestic authorities and the publication in the media of information about her alleged ill-treatment in prison, the prosecution authorities launched a criminal inquiry. However, by a decision of 22 October 2014 the Sabunchu District Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence to support the allegations. As with any decision by the prosecution authorities concerning a refusal to institute or to discontinue criminal proceedings, this decision was amenable to appeal before the domestic courts (see paragraph 93 above), however the first applicant did not appeal against this decision (see Rzakhanov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no. 4242\/07, \u00a7 82-84, 4 July 2013).156.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant did not state whether there were special circumstances in the present case which would dispense her from having to challenge the investigator\u2019s refusal to institute criminal proceedings. The Court reiterates that mere doubts about the effectiveness of a remedy are not sufficient to dispense with the requirement to make normal use of the available avenues for redress (see Kunqurova v.\u00a0Azerbaijan (dec.), no.\u00a05117\/03, 3 June 2005).157.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and\u00a04 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION158.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage159.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) each in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.160.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the amount claimed by the applicant was unsubstantiated and excessive. They further submitted that EUR 10,000 would constitute reasonable compensation for the non\u2011pecuniary damage allegedly sustained by the applicants.161.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants have suffered non\u2011pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation, and that compensation should thus be awarded. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards each applicant the sum of EUR 13,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses162.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed EUR 3,000 jointly for costs and expenses incurred before the Court. They also claimed a further EUR 1,902 for translation costs and 100 Azerbaijani manats for postage costs. In support of their claim, they submitted a contract for legal services rendered in the proceedings before the Court, a contract concluded with a translator and eight invoices for postage costs. They also supplied two documents detailing the specific legal and translation services provided by their representative and the translator.163.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the amount claimed for costs and expenses incurred before the Court was excessive. In particular, they submitted that the amount claimed for translation costs were not necessarily incurred and asked the Court to apply a strict approach in respect of the applicants\u2019 claims.164.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Having regard to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 4,000 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest165.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28259":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their expulsion to Sudan would subject them to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. They argued in particular that the third and fourth applicants would be subjected to female genital mutilation in Sudan, with neither the other applicants nor the Sudanese authorities in a position to protect them.34.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d35.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The third applicant36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the third applicant does not wish to maintain the application in so far as it concerns her as she has now been granted a residence permit.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, in these circumstances, the applicant may be regarded as no longer wishing to pursue her application, within the meaning of Article 37 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the continued examination of the case.38.\u00a0\u00a0It is therefore appropriate to strike the case out of the list to the extent that it concerns the third applicant.2.\u00a0\u00a0The other applicants39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application as brought by the first, second, fourth and fifth applicants is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the reason the first and second applicants had not mentioned their fear of their daughters\u2019 being subjected to FGM until their third asylum request was that they had believed that the problems faced by the second applicant would suffice for them to obtain asylum. Furthermore, their daughters had not been at risk in the Netherlands, and the first and second applicants had therefore not deemed it a pressing issue to be brought up in the earlier procedures.41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants underlined that the issue had become more pressing after the family\u2019s first asylum request had been rejected and when they were told to leave the Netherlands. During their stay in that country the first applicant had learned more about women\u2019s rights and her daughters had expressed their aversion to FGM.42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further submitted that the first and second applicants had managed to avoid their elder daughter being subjected to FGM in Sudan by saying that she suffered from asthma and was therefore too sick. Moreover, although the fourth applicant was now indeed outside the age-range during which FGM is generally performed, international material showed that it was by no means uncommon for women to undergo the procedure at a later stage in life (e.g. before marriage or after childbirth). This was often due to strong pressure exerted by (older) female counterparts in the community.43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were, moreover, of the opinion that it was a contravention of the absolute protection afforded under Article 3 for the Government to assume that, since the first and second applicants had failed to demonstrate that they had not received a higher education, they must therefore have received such a higher education. The applicants argued that it had become sufficiently evident during the domestic procedures that the first and second applicants had not had the benefit of a higher education.44.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicants submitted that international evidential material showed that the effect of education on the choice made regarding the performance of FGM had not proven to be significant and that a substantial proportion of educated families do still practice it, albeit in a less extreme form.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that, in the light of the Court\u2019s established case-law, it was up to the applicants to substantiate that there would be a real risk of a violation of the provision of Article 3 if they were to return to their country of origin.46.\u00a0\u00a0Although the Government acknowledged that FGM is contrary to Article 3 and is common practice in parts of Sudan, they considered that the applicants had failed to establish that the fourth applicant would face a real risk of being subjected to it.47.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Government submitted that the fact that the applicants had only advanced the risk of FGM as part of their third attempt to obtain asylum cast doubts on the veracity of their claim in that respect.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also emphasised that in all three asylum procedures the applicants had failed to establish their identity, origin, education history and former place of residence in Sudan. Given that the practice of FGM in Sudan was much more common in the North than in the South, the applicants had therefore not convincingly demonstrated that the fourth applicant risked being subjected to FGM.49.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Government held that FGM was traditionally practised on girls aged between 4 and 10, and the fourth applicant was now well past that age. However, when the family had fled Sudan, the daughters had been aged 7 and 10, that is to say at the age when they would both have been at most risk of FGM. Since the first and second applicants had apparently been able to avoid FGM being performed on their daughters up until that point, the Government failed to see why the applicants would be unable to continue with such resistance if they were to return to Sudan.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates at the outset that the Convention and its Protocols cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must be interpreted in harmony with the general principles of international law of which they form part. Account should be taken, as indicated in Article 31 \u00a7 3 (c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of \u201cany relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties\u201d, and in particular the rules concerning the international protection of human rights (see Margu\u0161 v. Croatia [GC], no. 4455\/10, \u00a7 129 with further references, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).51.\u00a0\u00a0It also reaffirms that the right to political asylum and the right to a residence permit are not, as such, guaranteed by the Convention and that, under the terms of Article 19 and Article 32 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the Court cannot review whether the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention have been correctly applied by the Netherlands authorities (see, for instance, I. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 24147\/11, \u00a7 43, 18\u00a0October 2011).52.\u00a0\u00a0It is the Court\u2019s settled case-law that \u2013 as a matter of well\u2011established international law, and subject to their treaty obligations, including those arising from the Convention \u2013 Contracting States have the right to control the entry, residence and removal of aliens. However, expulsion by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3 \u2012 and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention \u2012 where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. In such circumstances, Article 3 implies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country. \u00a0Article 3 principally applies to prevent a deportation or expulsion in cases where the risk of ill\u2011treatment in the receiving country emanates from intentionally inflicted acts by the public authorities there or from non-State bodies when the authorities are unable to afford the applicant appropriate protection (see N.\u00a0v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 30-31 with further references, ECHR 2008).53.\u00a0\u00a0As to the material date, the existence of such risk of ill-treatment must be assessed primarily with reference to the facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of expulsion (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2012). However, since the applicants have not yet been deported, the material point in time must be that of the Court\u2019s consideration of the case. It follows that, although the historical position is of interest in so far as it may shed light on the current situation and its likely evolution, it is the present conditions which are decisive (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15\u00a0November 1996, \u00a7 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V; M.A. v. Switzerland, no.\u00a052589\/13, \u00a7\u00a054, 18 November 2014; and Khamrakulov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a068894\/13, \u00a7 64, 16 April 2015).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case54.\u00a0\u00a0It is not in dispute that subjecting a child or adult to FGM amounts to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention (see, in this context, Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden (dec.), no. 23944\/05, 8 March 2007 Izevbekhai and others v. Ireland (dec.), no. 43408\/08, 17 May 2011, \u00a7 73). Nor is it contested that a considerable majority of girls and women in Sudan have traditionally been subjected to FGM and continue to be, although attitudes appear to be shifting given that the prevalence of FGM in Sudan is gradually declining. The crucial issue for the present purposes is to assess whether the fourth applicant would face a real risk of being subjected to FGM upon her return to Sudan.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has, first and foremost, given consideration to the legal position on FGM in Sudan. Despite the fact that there is no national law prohibiting FGM, some provinces \u2013 including the province of South Kordofan where the applicants claim to come from \u2013 have passed laws prohibiting FGM as a harmful practice affecting the health of children (see paragraphs 31-32 above). The Court has further noted that, although the reported average prevalence rate of FGM in Sudan varies between 68% and 88%, action is being taken in Sudan, both within government and by NGOs, to combat FGM in all its forms and these efforts have resulted in both a perceptible decline in the prevalence of FMG and a noticeable drop in support for this practice (see paragraph 32 above).56.\u00a0\u00a0It appears that in general there is no real risk of a girl or woman being subjected to FGM at the instigation of persons who are not family members. In the case of an unmarried woman, the risk of FGM being practised will depend on the attitude of her family, most particularly her parents but also her extended family and, if a woman\u2019s parents are opposed to FGM, they will normally be in a position to ensure that she does not marry a man who (or whose family) is in favour of it, regardless of the attitude of other relatives of the woman concerned (see paragraph 30 above).57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that the question of whether a girl or young woman will be circumcised in Sudan is mainly one of parental choice and finds it established that when parents oppose FGM they are able to prevent their daughter(s) from being subjected to this practice against their wishes.58.\u00a0\u00a0In this context, the Court notes that the fourth applicant is a healthy adult woman whose parents and siblings are against FGM. The Court further notes that, apart from the third applicant, none of the applicants has been admitted to the Netherlands and it is likely that they will be removed together, as a family, to Sudan. The Court lastly notes that the applicants\u2019 alleged home town is situated in the province of South Kordofan, where the authorities have passed laws prohibiting FGM.59.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court does not find that it has been demonstrated that the fourth applicant will be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to FGM and thus to treatment contrary to Article 3 upon return to Sudan. Accordingly, her removal would not give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. As the allegations of the first, second and fifth applicants are all contingent on the risks to the fourth applicant, it follows that their removal would not give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, either.","28276":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS OF DETENTION IN REMAND PRISON AND CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT TO AND FROM ","28304":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had not taken the necessary steps to safeguard his health and well-being, having failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties72.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had been provided with adequate medical treatment. The authorities had ensured his placement in the prison medical unit and his admission to the Penitentiary Hospital when necessary. During the applicant\u2019s detention his state of health had been stable and his medical condition had not called for urgent surgery. As soon as the Court had indicated to the Government the need for a colostomy, under Rule 39, the applicant had undergone the surgery.73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints. He argued that his health had seriously deteriorated while in detention. In addition, he had not received adult absorbent briefs or the hygiene products required for his condition. The detention authorities had demonstrated a lax attitude to his health and had delayed the required medical tests and surgical treatment.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0162, Series A no. 25).76.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III, with further references).77.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7\u00a0208, 13\u00a0July 2006). In most cases concerning the detention of sick people, the Court has examined whether or not the applicant received adequate medical care in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to assure the health and well-being of detainees as an obligation on the part of the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094; Khudobin, cited above, \u00a7 96, and Kalashnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002-VI).78.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of an effective remedy to air complaints of inadequate medical services afforded to inmates, the Court may find itself obliged to perform a first-hand evaluation of evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention have been respected (see Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, 13 November 2012; Dirdizov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a041461\/10, 27 November 2012; Reshetnyak v. Russia, no.\u00a056027\/10, 8\u00a0January 2013; Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108\/11, 5 February 2013; Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, 5 February 2013; Bubnov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a076317\/11, 5 February 2013; Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, 9\u00a0January 2014; Gorelov v. Russia, no. 49072\/11, 9 January 2014; and Amirov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 51857\/13, 27 November 2014, \u00a7 90). In that role, paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants in view of their detention, the Court has consistently called on Governments to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned has received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.79.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists, in particular, that authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7 85, 11 October 2011; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v.\u00a0Russia, no. 41833\/04, \u00a7 100, 27 January 2011; Gladkiy v. Russia, no.\u00a03242\/03, \u00a7 84, 21\u00a0December 2010; Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos.\u00a09852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29\u00a0November 2007; Melnik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0104-06, 28 March 2006; and, mutatis mutandis, Xiros v.\u00a0Greece, no. 1033\/07, \u00a7 72, 9 September 2010 and Holomiov v. Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7\u00a0121, 7\u00a0November\u00a02006) and that \u2012 where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition \u2012 supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at successfully treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109 and 114, and Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a03456\/05, \u00a7\u00a079, 4\u00a0October 2005).80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that medical treatment within prison facilities must be appropriate and comparable to the quality of treatment which the State authorities have committed themselves to provide to the entirety of the population. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each detainee must be guaranteed the same medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Blokhin v.\u00a0Russia\u00a0[GC], no. 47152\/06, \u00a7 137, 23 March 2016 and Cara-Damiani v.\u00a0Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7\u00a066,\u00a07\u00a0February 2012).81.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves a fair degree of flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468\/06, \u00a7\u00a0140, 22\u00a0December 2008).82.\u00a0\u00a0While the mere fact that an applicant\u2019s state of health has deteriorated may raise, at an initial stage, certain doubts concerning the adequacy of his or her treatment in prison, it cannot suffice, by itself, for a finding of a violation of the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention if, on the other hand, it can be established that the relevant domestic authorities have provided in a timely fashion all reasonably available medical care in a conscientious effort to hinder development of the disease in question (see, among other authorities, Goginashvili v. Georgia, no.\u00a047729\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 69-71, 4 October 2011).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case83.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that it is not disputed by the parties that the applicant suffered from colon cancer and that his condition could only be addressed by colorectal surgery. The main subject of the parties\u2019 disagreement is whether the applicant\u2019s state of health called for urgent surgery and, accordingly, whether the colostomy was performed in a timely fashion.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the parties provided different medical opinions on that issue. While the senior medical officials from the colorectal department of the State Regional Civilian Hospital, Dr N. and Dr Z., unanimously described the applicant\u2019s condition as serious and insisted on the urgency of the surgery (see paragraphs 39, 46 and 55 above), a surgeon from the Penitentiary Hospital consistently held that the applicant was in a stable and satisfactory condition and did not see an urgent need for surgery (see paragraphs 36, 45, 48 and 52 above).85.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account that Dr N. and Dr Z. are specialists in the treatment of conditions such as the applicant\u2019s, the Court is prepared to attach particular weight to their opinion and to conclude that surgery was indeed urgent for the applicant. Moreover, that conclusion is supported by other evidence submitted by the parties. The applicant\u2019s medical history convincingly demonstrates that his condition continued rapidly to deteriorate in detention in the absence of surgical treatment. It was accompanied, and this fact was not disputed by the Government, by intense pain in his ordinary daily physical activities, such as walking. It also manifested itself through physical impairments, the prolapsed sigmoid colon and faecal incontinence. The medical condition not only significantly undermined the quality of the applicant\u2019s life, but it was also described as life-threatening by medical specialists. In those circumstances, the Government\u2019s argument that there was no urgency in carrying out surgery is unacceptable. It is particularly so when taking account of the fact that they did not cite any alternative treatment the applicant received or could have received to ameliorate his condition and prevent the progress of the cancer.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus finds that radical curative treatment was a necessity for the applicant. However, the authorities delayed surgery for almost a year and only performed it in response to the interim measure applied by the Court. The Court sees no circumstances in the case justifying such a lengthy delay in the treatment of advanced cancer. It is also concerned with the authorities\u2019 decision to postpone surgery until his release from detention, which, in fact, they could neither foresee nor guarantee would happen in the near future (see paragraph 48 above).87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would also note the applicant\u2019s argument, supported by evidence and not rebutted by the Government, that the authorities did not provide him with the much-needed adult absorbent briefs. That failure on the part of the detention authorities must have been a cause of serious distress and embarrassment for the applicant.88.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, the Court finds that the authorities\u2019 failure to provide the applicant with adequate medical treatment for the particularly serious condition in which he found himself amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the quality of medical treatment.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION89.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in the remand prison were inhuman, degrading and incompatible with his state of health. The provision of the Convention which he invoked reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties90.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the detention authorities had taken due consideration of the state of the applicant\u2019s health and had therefore ensured his detention on his own in spacious cells which fully satisfied the applicable standards.91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints. He disputed the Government\u2019s statement about his confinement on his own by questioning the authenticity of the supporting evidence. According to him, he had shared cells with other detainees and had entirely lacked the privacy which he desperately needed. His serious health condition had caused significant distress to him and to other inmates and had strained relationships in the cells.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim\u2019s conduct (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0119).94.\u00a0\u00a0Measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve an inevitable element of suffering or humiliation. Nevertheless, the level of suffering and humiliation involved must not go beyond that which is inevitably connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment.95.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of prisoners, the Court has emphasised that a detained person does not lose, by the mere fact of his incarceration, the protection of his rights guaranteed by the Convention. On the contrary, persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them. Under Article 3 the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII).96.\u00a0\u00a0When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2001-II). The length of the period during which a person is detained in the particular conditions also has to be considered (see, among other authorities, Alver v. Estonia, no. 64812\/01, 8 November 2005).97.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of prison conditions the Court has frequently found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in cases which involved overcrowding in prison cells (see, among many other authorities, Lind v.\u00a0Russia, no. 25664\/05, \u00a7 59, 6 December 2007). However, in other cases where the overcrowding was not so severe as to raise an issue in itself under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court noted other aspects of the physical conditions of detention as being relevant for its assessment of compliance with that provision. Such elements included, in particular, the availability of ventilation, access to natural light or air, the adequacy of heating arrangements, compliance with basic sanitary requirements and the possibility of using the toilet in private (Mandi\u0107 and Jovi\u0107 v. Slovenia, nos.\u00a05774\/10 and 5985\/10, \u00a7 76, 20 October 2011).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case98.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the core of the applicant\u2019s complaint is that he was detained in overcrowded cells without the privacy which he particularly needed in view of his medical condition. However, the Government submitted that he had never shared a cell with other inmates.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that both parties provided documentary evidence to support their statements. The applicant supported his argument with written statements by three former co-detainees who insisted they had shared cells with the applicant. In addition, he submitted a certificate issued at the time of his detention (see paragraph 64 above). The Government also supported their version of events with certificates, the only difference being that the latter were issued long after the applicant\u2019s release (see paragraph\u00a062 above). Although it was open to the Government to submit copies of\u00a0registration logs\u00a0recording cell population and showing the names of inmates detained together with the applicant in the relevant period, they failed to do so. The Government\u2019s certificates therefore, are of little evidential value for the Court\u2019s analyses (see Chudun v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a020641\/04, \u00a7 84, 21 June 2011). Taking into account the general problem of overcrowding in Russian remand prisons (see Ovchinnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a09807\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 67-73, 17 June 2010; Bakhmutskiy v. Russia, no.\u00a036932\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 88-97, 25 June 2009; Khudoyorov v. Russia, no.\u00a06847\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 104 et seq., ECHR 2005-X (extracts); Novoselov v. Russia, no. 66460\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 41 et seq., 2 June 2005; Mayzit v. Russia, no. 63378\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a039 et seq., 20\u00a0January\u00a02005; and Kalashnikov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 97 et seq.) the Court has doubt as to the Government\u2019s submission that the authorities allocated detention cells measuring around 40 square metres and suitable for ten inmates for the applicant\u2019s exclusive use.100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that at the time of the applicant\u2019s admission to the detention facility in early November 2006, his health problems had not yet become particularly serious. His medical condition worsened only several weeks later, in December 2006 (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above). In light of the above, the authenticity of the remand prison\u2019s order dated 3\u00a0November 2006 for the applicant to be placed in detention in a single occupancy cell on account of his medical condition is doubtful.101.\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, the Court is persuaded by the arguments of the applicant, supported by documentary evidence and witness statements, which the Government failed to rebut. These arguments provided a convincing and clear description of the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention in the remand prison. The Court therefore accepts that he shared cells with other inmates and was afforded less than 2.5 square metres of living space for a considerable amount of time.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a serious lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as a factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the detention conditions described are \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention and may disclose a violation, both alone or taken together with other shortcomings (see, amongst many other authorities,\u00a0Ananyev and others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0146\u201149, and\u00a0Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no.\u00a053254\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 39-40, 7\u00a0April\u00a02005).103.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to overcrowding, the applicant\u2019s situation was exacerbated by a lack of privacy. The height of the partitions installed to separate the lavatory from the living area in several of the cells where the applicant was kept, was not able to ensure his privacy when he had to use the toilet and wash himself. For several months of his detention, the applicant could be seen by his cellmates, and possibly by guards, while carrying out such intimate procedures. The situation must have taken a particularly heavy toll on him, being a source of serious distress and hardship which exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and going \u00a0beyond the threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Moiseyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a062936\/00, \u00a7\u00a0124, 9 October 2008).104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds no need to look at other aspects of the applicant\u2019s detention as the conditions noted above demonstrate that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in the applicant\u2019s case.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 OF THE CONVENTION105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time and alleged that the orders for his detention had not been founded on sufficient reasons. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cEveryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s position was that the gravity of the charges against the applicant, the complexity of the case and other circumstances noted by the domestic courts were sufficient to warrant the applicant\u2019s detention pending investigation.107.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints.\u00a0He argued that he had had neither the intention nor the possibility to abscond. He had a family and a home and he had been suffering from such a serious medical condition that he had barely been able to perform simple daily activities, let alone go on the run. The courts\u2019 findings as to the risks of his absconding and influencing witnesses had not been supported by any evidence. He stressed that the courts had used stereotyped formulae when extending his detention and had relied mainly on the seriousness of the charges. They had failed to assess whether the length of his pre-trial detention had been reasonable. He concluded by noting that his detention had not been based on relevant and sufficient grounds.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles109.\u00a0\u00a0The persistence of a reasonable suspicion that a person who has been arrested has committed an offence is a conditio sine qua non for the lawfulness of his or her continued detention, whatever other grounds may exist. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are found to have been \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed \u201cspecial diligence\u201d in the conduct of the proceedings. The presumption is in favour of release. As the Court has consistently held, the second limb of Article 5 \u00a7 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until his conviction, the accused must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continued detention ceases to be reasonable. A person charged with an offence must always be released pending trial unless the State can show that there are \u201crelevant and sufficient\u201d reasons to justify his or her continued detention (see, among other authorities, Castravet v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a023393\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 30 and 32, 13\u00a0March 2007; McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543\/03, \u00a7\u00a041, ECHR 2006-X; Jab\u0142o\u0144ski v. Poland, no. 33492\/96, \u00a7 83, 21 December 2000; and Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, \u00a7 4, Series A no. 8). Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention cannot be seen as unconditionally authorising detention provided that it lasts no longer than a certain period. Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities (see Shishkov v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a038822\/97, \u00a7\u00a066, ECHR 2003-I).110.\u00a0\u00a0It is incumbent on the domestic authorities to establish the existence of specific facts relevant to the grounds for continued detention. Shifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined cases (see Rokhlina v. Russia, no. 54071\/00, \u00a7 67, 7\u00a0April 2005, and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 84-85, 26 July 2001). The national judicial authorities must examine all the facts for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, and must set them out in their decisions dismissing applications for release.When deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial (see Idalov v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a05826\/03, \u00a7\u00a0140, 22\u00a0May 2012, and Suslov v. Russia, no.\u00a02366\/07, \u00a7\u00a086, 29\u00a0May 2012, with further references). It is not the Court\u2019s task to establish such facts and take the place of the national authorities which ruled on the applicant\u2019s detention. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in the domestic courts\u2019 decisions and of the established facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention (see Korchuganova v. Russia, no. 75039\/01, \u00a7 72, 8 June\u00a02006; Ilijkov, cited above, \u00a7 86; and Labita, cited above, \u00a7 152).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the entire period of the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention lasted slightly more than one year and three months.112.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to this considerable period of detention in the light of the presumption in favour of release, the Court finds that the Russian authorities were required to put forward weighty reasons for keeping the applicant in detention.113.\u00a0\u00a0When extending the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention, the domestic authorities mainly referred to the gravity of the charges against him, and a risk of him absconding and interfering with the administration of justice by putting undue pressure on witnesses.114.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, the Court is prepared to admit that the combination of the above arguments could justify the applicant\u2019s detention as a suspect in the criminal proceedings for some time. The question arises whether the arguments adduced by the courts were sufficient to justify the period of over fifteen months in which this seriously ill applicant was held in custody.115.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the domestic authorities\u2019 reliance on the gravity of the charges as the decisive element, the Court has repeatedly held that this reason cannot in itself serve to justify long periods of detention. Although the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of absconding or reoffending, the need to continue the deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the offence. Nor can a continuation of detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see, among other authorities, Fedorenko v. Russia, no. 39602\/05, \u00a7 67, 20 September 2011). This is particularly true in cases such as the present one, where the characterisation in law of the facts \u2013 and thus the sentence faced by the applicant \u2013 was determined by the prosecution without judicial review of whether the evidence collected supported a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences he was charged with (see\u00a0Yevgeniy Gusev v. Russia, no. 28020\/05, \u00a7 84, 5 December 2013, and Rokhlina, cited above, \u00a7 66).116.\u00a0\u00a0The risk of absconding was inferred primarily from the gravity of the charges and the applicant\u2019s presumed fear of receiving a lengthy prison sentence, the grounds discussed above. However, the Court reiterates that such a risk cannot be gauged solely on the basis of the severity of the sentence faced. It must be assessed with reference to a number of other relevant factors which may either confirm the existence of a danger of absconding or make it appear so slight that it cannot justify detention pending trial (see\u00a0Panchenko v. Russia, no.\u00a045100\/98, \u00a7 106, 8 February 2005; and\u00a0Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, \u00a7 43, Series A no. 207). In the present case the decisions of the domestic authorities gave no reasons why they considered the risk of his absconding to be decisive. The Court finds that the existence of a risk that the applicant might abscond was not established. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s health condition made the risk of absconding very slight as he was mostly bedridden and had difficulties walking on his own.117.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the last major reason for detention put forward by the domestic courts, namely the risk of putting pressure on witnesses, the Court notes that it appears from the documents in its possession that the domestic courts accepted the prosecution\u2019s statements in that regard without asking for any evidence in support. In any event, even if a risk of undue influence existed, it may be assumed that it would decrease gradually as the investigation proceeded and the witnesses were interviewed, with the records of their questioning being attached to the case file as evidence. The Court is therefore not persuaded that compelling reasons existed to fear that he would interfere with witnesses or otherwise hamper the investigation of the case throughout the entire period of his detention, and certainly not compelling enough to outweigh the applicant\u2019s right to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial.118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that in ordering the extensions of the applicant\u2019s detention the national courts used identical or similar wording repeatedly. Such an approach may suggest that there was no genuine judicial review of the need for detention at each extension of detention (see\u00a0Ya\u011fc\u0131 and Sarg\u0131n v. Turkey, 8 June 1995, \u00a7 50 et seq., Series A no.\u00a0319-A).119.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above, the Court considers that by relying essentially on the seriousness of the charges, by failing to substantiate their findings by pertinent specific facts, and by failing to assess the alleged risks in the light of the applicant\u2019s health condition, the authorities extended his detention on grounds which, although \u201crelevant\u201d, cannot be regarded as sufficient to justify a duration of over fifteen months. In those circumstances it is not necessary for the Court to examine whether the domestic authorities acted with \u201cspecial diligence\u201d.120.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION121.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage122.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 150,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.123.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that that claim was excessive.124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, considers it reasonable to award EUR 16,500 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses125.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 7,000 for the legal expenses incurred before the Court.126.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant\u2019s legal expenses were excessive.127.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 4,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28310":"41.\u00a0\u00a0WLW claimed that its inability to supply a written authority was a direct consequence of the State\u2019s action in expelling the applicant without any prior notice to that effect. The organisation claimed that it had re\u2011established contact with the applicant through Ms H.M. after the former\u2019s expulsion and had found out that she had been recaptured by her traffickers. However, in that telephone conversation the applicant had confirmed to Ms\u00a0H.M. that she wished WLW to bring her case before the international courts. In conclusion it argued that, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case and the serious nature of the allegations, the Court should regard the written authority dated 11 March 2010 (see paragraph 16 above) as sufficient.42.\u00a0\u00a0Rule\u00a036 of the Rules of Court reads, in the relevant part:\u201c1. Persons, non-governmental organisations or groups of individuals may initially present applications under Article 34 of the Convention themselves or through a representative. ...4. (a) The representative of the applicant shall be an advocate authorised to practise in any of the Contracting Parties and resident in the territory of one of them, or any other person approved by the President of the Chamber.\u201d43.\u00a0\u00a0Rule 45 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court, in so far as relevant, reads:\u201c1. Any application made under Articles 33 or 34 of the Convention shall be submitted in writing and shall be signed by the applicant or by the applicant\u2019s representative. ...3. Where applicants are represented in accordance with Rule 36, a power of attorney or written authority to act shall be supplied by their representative or representatives.\u201d44.\u00a0\u00a0Where applicants choose to be represented under Rule 36 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court rather than lodging the application themselves, Rule 45 \u00a7\u00a03 requires them to produce a written authority to act, duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim within the meaning of Article 34 on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court (see N. and M. v. Russia (dec.), no. 39496\/14 and 39727\/14, \u00a7\u00a053, 26 April 2016, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2014, and Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a021727\/08, 20 January 2009; as regards the validity of an authority to act, see Aliev v. Georgia, no. 522\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 44-49, 13 January 2009). What is important for the Court is that the written authority to act should clearly indicate that the applicant has entrusted his or her representation before the Court to a representative and that the representative has accepted that commission (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 53, ECHR 2012, and Ryabov v. Russia, no. 3896\/04, \u00a7 40, 31 January 2008).45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the presentation of a written authority to act is not the sole requirement indicated for the purposes of Article 36 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court. The applicant\u2019s representative must also maintain contact with the applicant throughout the proceedings (see Sharifi and Others v.\u00a0Italy and Greece, no. 16643\/09, \u00a7 124, 21 October 2014; see, conversely, Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 50 and 54, and Ali v.\u00a0Switzerland, 5\u00a0August 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 31 and 32, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V). Such contact is essential in order to foster a deeper knowledge of the factual elements concerning the applicant\u2019s personal situation and to confirm the ability and willingness of applicants to maintain and support applications purportedly introduced on their behalf for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, which does not provide for the institution of an actio popularis (see Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, \u00a7\u00a033, Series A no.\u00a028; Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no.\u00a09103\/04, \u00a7\u00a072, ECHR 2008; and Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a013378\/05, \u00a7\u00a033; ECHR\u00a02008).46.\u00a0\u00a0As argued by WLW, the Convention institutions have held that special consideration may be appropriate in the cases of victims of alleged breaches of Articles 2, 3 and 8 at the hands of national authorities. On this basis, applications lodged on behalf of such victim(s), have been declared admissible even though no valid written authority to act was presented (see conversely N. and M. v. Russia, cited above, \u00a7 63 and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7 103; \u0130lhan v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no. 22277\/93, \u00a7\u00a055, ECHR 2000\u2011VII; Y.F. v. Turkey, no.\u00a024209\/94, \u00a7 29, ECHR 2003\u2011IX; and S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom, no. 23715\/94, Commission decision of 20 May 1996).47.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, given the lack of a written authority as prescribed in the Rules of Court, it must be ascertained whether, in view of the circumstances of the case, it may be considered that the applicant wished to exercise her right of individual application under Article 34 of the Convention and, if so, whether she wished WLW to act as her legal representative.48.\u00a0\u00a0In this respect it must firstly be noted that, at the time of the applicant\u2019s expulsion, she had initiated two parallel sets of asylum proceedings, within whose framework she had been represented by two lawyers duly authorised to act on her behalf at domestic level (one of them a legal aid lawyer). In each set of proceedings, the lawyers had presented on the applicant\u2019s behalf different and detailed submissions as to the applicant\u2019s situation and had challenged the enforcement of the expulsion order issued in 2007. It must therefore be assumed that the applicant was in contact with her lawyers during the proceedings. However, according to the case file, she never instructed her lawyers to lodge an application on her behalf before the Court (see N. and M. v. Russia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a061).49.\u00a0\u00a0As regards WLW, the organisation first contacted the applicant on 11\u00a0March 2010, while she was in immigration detention pending her expulsion. The applicant signed the written authority dated 11 March 2011, which only conferred authority on WLW to represent her in the administrative proceedings seeking a recovery and reflection period (see, conversely, Diallo v. the Czech Republic, no. 20493\/07, \u00a7 22, 23\u00a0June\u00a02011). However, as admitted by WLW (see paragraph 38 above), the organisation did not represent the applicant at any stage of the asylum proceedings, nor \u2012 as has been already stated \u2012 did the applicant provide WLW with any written authority to act before the Court or produce any explicit instruction in this regard.50.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, according to the communications sent by WLW to the Court on 22 July 2014 and on 10 and 19 June 2015, the organisation has had no direct contact with the applicant since her expulsion. Ms H.M.\u2019s statement that the applicant had confirmed to her by phone in 2011 that she wanted WLW to bring her case before the international courts does not constitute an adequate basis for the Court to establish that the applicant was aware of and in agreement with the WLW\u2019s intention to lodge an application before the Court on her behalf and with the approach that WLW would adopt in that application (see N. and M. v. Russia, cited above, \u00a7 57).51.\u00a0\u00a0It is also important to note that the domestic courts withdrew the authority dated 11 March 2010 and found that WLW lacked legal standing to represent the applicant in judicial proceedings. The courts were not satisfied by WLW\u2019s reasons as to why the applicant had been incapable of issuing a written authority to act through any of the means provided within the Spanish legal framework, such as the duty rota of the notaries\u2019 professional association or the Spanish consular services available in Nigeria.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that, contrary to what is suggested by WLW, the Court\u2019s findings in the case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu (cited above) are not applicable to the present case. In Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, the Court held that it was of considerable significance that neither the capacity of the Centre for Legal Resources (the organisation bringing the case before the Court) to act nor its representations on Mr C\u00e2mpeanu\u2019s behalf before the domestic medical and judicial authorities were questioned or challenged in any way. The Court also pointed out other relevant circumstances as regards Mr\u00a0C\u00e2mpeanu\u2019s extreme vulnerability which were absent in the applicant\u2019s case: he would have been incapable of initiating proceedings in the domestic courts without proper legal support and advice. The Centre for Legal Resources had become involved at a time when he was manifestly incapable of expressing any wishes or views regarding his own needs and interests, let alone whether or not to pursue any remedies. Lastly, the respondent Government had failed to comply with its statutory obligation to appoint a legal representative (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0104-114).53.\u00a0\u00a0In the view of the aforementioned, the Court cannot but conclude that WLW has no standing to lodge the application. Consequently, in the circumstances of the case the application must be rejected for being incompatible ratione personae, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 12 July 2016.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Helena J\u00e4derblom\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident\u00a0","28323":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION44.\u00a0\u00a0In a letter submitted to the Court in September 2009 referring to the description of the conditions of his detention in the Poltava SIZO, the applicant alleged that they were contrary to the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of this complaint because he had not raised it before the prosecutors or other domestic authorities. The applicant maintained his complaints.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has rejected the Government\u2019s similar objections in a number of other cases concerning Ukraine (see, for example, Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no. 32362\/02, \u00a7 52, 20\u00a0May 2010). The Government provided no information which would enable the Court in the present case to depart from its findings and therefore it considers that this part of the application cannot be\u00a0declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. It is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits47.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to their own description, the Government claimed that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention had been adequate.48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint.49.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention requires States to ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000-XI). When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2001\u2011II; Idalov v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a05826\/03, \u00a7 94, 22 May 2012). The length of time a person is detained in the particular conditions also has to be considered (see, among other authorities, Alver v. Estonia, no. 64812\/01, 8 November 2005).50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates, in particular, that a serious lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as a factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the detention conditions described are \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 and may disclose a violation, both alone or taken together with other shortcomings (see, amongst many other authorities, Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no.\u00a053254\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 39-40, 7\u00a0April 2005 and Ananyev and others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0146-149, 10 January 2012). The Court notes, in the light of its post-Ananyev case-law, that in principle short and occasional minor reductions in the required personal space may rebut the strong presumption of a violation of Article 3. This was, for example, the case in Fetisov and Others v. Russia (nos. 43710\/07, 6023\/08, 11248\/08, 27668\/08, 31242\/08 and 52133\/08, 17\u00a0January 2012) where a prisoner disposed of approximately 2\u00a0square meters of floor surface for nineteen days.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the available evidence indicates that during his stay in the SIZO the applicant lacked personal space. For twenty-eight days the applicant was held in a cell allowing 2.6 square meters personal space. For more than a year he was held in a cell where 3.1 square meters personal space was available to him. The Court is mindful of the fact that each cell contained four beds, which must have further reduced the floor area available to the applicant as personal space.52.\u00a0\u00a0Of the other elements relevant for the assessment of the conditions of detention, special attention must be paid to the availability and duration of outdoor exercise and the conditions in which prisoners could take it. The Court has found a violation of Article 3 because the lack or short duration of outdoor exercise was a factor that further exacerbated the situation of the applicant, who was confined to his cell for all or the rest of his time (see Ananyev and others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 149-151 and the case-law cited therein).53.\u00a0The Court observes from the material in the case file that the applicant had no freedom of movement and was confined to his cells at all times.54.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of its case-law (see, among other authorities, Ananyev and others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 160-166, Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a0103, 28 March 2006, cited above, Gorbatenko v. Ukraine, no. 25209\/06, \u00a7\u00a0139, 28 November 2013, and Iglin v. Ukraine, no. 39908\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 51-52, 12\u00a0January 2012), the Court finds that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the SIZO, in particular the lack of personal space afforded to the applicant, combined with the lack of access to outdoor activities for the whole period of his detention, amounted to degrading treatment. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this respect.55.\u00a0\u00a0In view of those findings, the Court does not find it necessary to address the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the food and the impossibility to open the windows.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that during his detention the police questioned him several times without a lawyer being present and the statements which he had made during those questionings had been used for his conviction. He also complained that lawyer S.\u2019s advice had \u201cworsened his situation\u201d. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:... (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, according to the material in the case file which the parties did not dispute, after the applicant was placed in a cell at the Novy Sanzhary Police Station he was questioned without a lawyer on 8 or 9\u00a0July 2006 (see paragraph 11 above), on 10 July 2006 (see paragraphs 11-15 above) and also on 14 July 2006 (see paragraph 19 above). On the latter date he was questioned without a lawyer after he had signed a waiver of legal assistance.58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that neither the letter nor the spirit of Article\u00a06 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial. However, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, a waiver of the right must be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance. A waiver of the right, once invoked, must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a right (see Pishchalnikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 7025\/04, \u00a7 77, 24 September 2009).59.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicant did not state that he had been forced into signing the waiver on 14 July 2006 and there are no grounds to believe that he did so against his will. He signed it after he had had at least one meeting with the police-appointed lawyer V. and one meeting with S., the lawyer of his own choosing. Moreover, the Court notes that in the reasoning of their judgments the courts did not refer to the clothes which the applicant described on 14 July 2006 as evidence of the applicant\u2019s guilt (see\u00a0paragraphs 35 and 37 above).60.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s allegation that lawyer S.\u2019s advice had \u201cworsened his situation\u201d, the Court notes that the applicant did not indicate any specific deficiencies in the advice given to him by that lawyer. Moreover, on several occasions the applicant confirmed that he wished to have S. as his lawyer. He never sought to change lawyer or complained about S.\u2019s services to the domestic authorities.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that, in so far as the present part of the application concerns the applicant\u2019s questioning on 14 July 2006 and alleged ineffectiveness of the assistance of lawyer S., it is manifestly ill\u2011founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.62.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the present part of the application concerns the applicant\u2019s questionings without a lawyer on 8, 9 and 10 July 2006, it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s questioning without a lawyer on 10 July 2006 had not undermined the fairness of the proceedings as a whole because the statements which he had made on that date had not been referred to by the courts and had not constituted a basis for his conviction. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning restriction on his access to a lawyer was examined by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 32 above). In the presence of a lawyer the applicant confirmed the statements which he had earlier made without a lawyer being present.64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the right set out in Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) of the Convention is one element, among others, of the concept of a fair trial in criminal proceedings contained in Article 6 \u00a7 1 (see Salduz v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no.\u00a036391\/02, \u00a7 50, ECHR 2008).66.\u00a0\u00a0As a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. The right to defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction (see\u00a0Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 55). Under the Court\u2019s case-law, a person acquires the status of a suspect calling for the application of the Article 6 safeguards not when it is formally assigned to him or her, but when the domestic authorities have plausible reasons for suspecting that person\u2019s involvement in a criminal offence (see Brusco v. France, no. 1466\/07, \u00a7 47, 14 October 2010 and Dvorski v. Croatia [GC], no. 25703\/11, ECHR 2015).67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently viewed early access to a lawyer as a procedural guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination and a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment, noting the particular vulnerability of an accused at the early stages of the proceedings, when he is confronted with both the stress of the situation and the increasingly complex criminal legislation involved (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 54).68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that shortly after K.\u2019s disappearance was reported to the authorities they established that for the last time she had been seen by witnesses in the morning on 28 June 2006, when she had been walking down the road together with the applicant. On an unspecified date between 4 and 8 July 2006 the police questioned the applicant as a witness and he provided an account of his actions on that morning. However, the statements of the taxi drivers and the applicant\u2019s own conduct at the taxi stand (see paragraph 9 above) casted serious doubt on the truthfulness of that account. On 8 July 2006, after the questioning and the visit to the taxi stand, the applicant was detained and placed in a cell in connection with a certain \u201coffence of minor public disorder\u201d. The case file does not contain any material which would allow the Court to establish what the nature of this offence was (see paragraph 10 above).69.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court considers that the fact that the applicant was the last person with whom K. had been seen before her disappearance combined with the fact that the taxi drivers refuted his statements regarding the morning on 28 June 2006 (see paragraph 68 above) threw a serious suspicion on the applicant. Looking beyond the appearances and concentrating on the realities of the situation, the Court finds that after the visit to the taxi stand, which took place between 4 and 8 July 2006, the police received strong reasons to suspect the applicant\u2019s involvement into K.\u2019s disappearance and on 8 July 2006 placed him in detention to ensure his availability for questioning as a criminal suspect (see Rudnichenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 2775\/07, \u00a7\u00a066, 11 July 2013 with further reference).70.\u00a0\u00a0From the moment when the police started strongly suspecting the applicant he became entitled to legal assistance (see Brusco v. France, \u00a7\u00a047, cited above and Dvorski v. Croatia [GC], cited above). It follows that he was entitled to it when he was placed in a cell on 8 July 2006 and questioned between 8 and 10 July 2006. On 10 July 2006, when G. opened a criminal case against the applicant and arrested him on suspicion of murder, robbery and rape, his legal representation became mandatory under Article 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 41 above). However, between 8 and 10 July 2006 I., F., and G. questioned the applicant and made him participate in the reconstruction of events without a lawyer being present. From the material in the case file it does not follow that there were any, let alone compelling, reasons for not assigning a lawyer to the applicant as early as on 8 July 2006. The Court therefore considers that his right to legal assistance was restricted on this account.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, on 10 July 2006, that is on the third day of his detention at the police station, being questioned by police officers in the absence of a lawyer, the applicant indicated the location of K.\u2019s corpse and confessed to her murder, robbery and rape. There is no proof that these statements were extracted from him by ill-treatment or under the threat thereof.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that being questioned in the presence of a lawyer on 11, 12 and 18 July 2006 the applicant repeated the statements which he had made on 10 July 2006 without a lawyer being present. Being questioned again in a lawyer\u2019s presence on 9 September and 16 November 2006 the applicant slightly modified his account of the circumstances surrounding K.\u2019s death (see paragraphs 24 and 29 above). However, during all questionings in the presence of a lawyer the applicant maintained that he was responsible for having killed K.73.\u00a0\u00a0When deciding whether the admission of a statement made without legal assistance was compatible with Article 6, the Court should examine, in particular, whether the statement was promptly retracted and the admissions made in it consistently denied, particularly once legal advice had been obtained.\u00a0The Court reiterates that in Bandaletov v. Ukraine (no.\u00a023180\/06, \u00a7\u00a067, 31 October 2013) which concerned lack of access to a lawyer at the early stages of criminal proceedings, no violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1, 3 (c) of the Convention was found having regard, inter alia, to the fact that when being legally represented the applicant maintained the statements which he had earlier made in the absence of a lawyer. In the case Titarenko v.\u00a0Ukraine (no. 31720\/02, 20 September 2012) the Court found a violation of Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01, 3 (c) of the Convention having regard, inter alia, to the fact, that as soon as the applicant became legally represented, he retracted the confessions which he had earlier made without a lawyer being present.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is of the opinion that in the present case the statements which the applicant made without a lawyer on 10 July 2006 predetermined all the statements which he could make later. In particular, on 10 July 2006 the applicant incriminated himself not only by saying that he had robbed, raped and killed K., but also by showing the crime scene to the police which immediately inspected it and collected physical evidence. The Court accepts that after the applicant became legally represented, theoretically speaking, it was open for him to say that he had not robbed, killed and raped K. It is, however, difficult to see how it would be possible for him to retract the statement concerning location of the crime scene after it had been actually found and inspected by the police. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the absence of legal assistance on 10\u00a0July 2006 could not be remedied by the fact that subsequently the applicant was legally represented and repeated his self-incriminating statements in the presence of a lawyer.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the judgment of the trial court contains reference to the reconstruction of events carried out on 10 July 2006 when the applicant\u2019s right to legal assistance was restricted (see paragraph\u00a035 above). It also contains reference to the physical evidence discovered on the basis of the applicant\u2019s statements made on 10 July 2006 (ibid.).76.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above circumstances, the Court considers that the restriction on the applicant\u2019s defence rights undermined the fairness of the proceeding as a whole. There was thus a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3\u00a0(c) of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION77.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that claim.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered non\u2011pecuniary damage as a result of the violation in his case. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards him EUR\u00a05,000 for non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not lodge a claim for cost and expenses; the Court therefore sees no call to make an award under that head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28322":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of police officers which amounted to torture. He further complained that no effective investigation had been carried out into his complaints. The applicant invoked Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, which read as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 13\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the available effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint about ill-treatment since he had not appealed to either a prosecutor or a court against the decision to terminate the proceedings in his case. There was no evidence of such an appeal either in the criminal case-file or among the documents submitted by the applicant to the Court. In the Government\u2019s view such an appeal could have influenced the course of the proceedings since all of the applicant\u2019s previous appeals had been successful.61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he had not received a copy of the decision of the Tomashpilskyy District Prosecutor\u2019s Office of 19 October 2008 to terminate criminal proceedings until July 2009. He had challenged that decision before the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office but had received no reply.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Government\u2019s objection raises issues concerning the effectiveness of the criminal investigation in establishing the facts regarding the events of which the applicant complained and responsibility for those events. It is therefore closely linked to the substance of the applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention and the Court joins it to the merits of the case (see Lotarev v. Ukraine, no.\u00a029447\/04, \u00a7 74, 8 April 2010).63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that the applicant\u2019s complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. The complaints should therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the Government\u2019s assertion that he had sustained the injuries referred to in the medical certificate of 11 February 2003 (see paragraph 16 above) after falling over when being chased by a police officer.65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that the Government had failed to provide any evidence to show that the applicant had sustained the injuries in question before his alleged encounter with the police officer on the factory premises. Furthermore, there was no evidence showing that the applicant had sustained the injuries after being released from police custody. There were therefore two possible explanations for the origin of the applicant\u2019s injuries: ill\u2011treatment by police officers or falling over during the course of being chased by a police officer.66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant noted that the Government claimed that their version of events was supported by witness statements and had not been refuted by the conclusions of the forensic medical examinations. This would mean that the applicant had sustained all his injuries before being arrested, but, contrary to legal requirements, no such injuries had been documented at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrival at the police station. Moreover, if the applicant had indeed had such injuries at the moment of his arrest, the police officers would have taken him to hospital, which did not happen.67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that his claim that he had been ill-treated by police officers had not been contradicted by the results of the forensic medical examinations and was the more plausible explanation.68.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant alleged that his ill-treatment at the hands of police officers had amounted to torture in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Government69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s version of events, submitted that the applicant\u2019s statements were unsubstantiated, and argued that the alternative version proposed by the national authorities is supported by the material in the case-file, including the testimonies of several impartial witnesses.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the police officers had denied allegations of ill-treating the applicant and the judge who had seen the applicant on the day following the events in question had later testified that the applicant neither had any injuries, nor complained about any health problems. Given the applicant\u2019s doubtful version of events at the factory, the Government considered that his statements regarding events at the police station were also implausible.71.\u00a0\u00a0The only witness to the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment was his mother-in-law. However, she was related to the applicant and had changed her testimony during the proceedings. Two months after the events in question she had testified that the police officer had merely aimed a blow at the applicant, whereas more than a year and a half later she had stated that the police officer had kicked him.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that there had been five forensic medical examinations in the applicant\u2019s case. It was established that the injuries in question could have been inflicted between 30 December 2002 and 2\u00a0January 2003 following blows and kicks, or as a result of multiple falls onto various hard objects. On 14 October 2008 a forensic expert had concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries had probably originated from the multiple falls in the circumstances described.73.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, it had therefore been established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had already sustained serious bodily injuries when brought to the police station. It further stated that \u201ceven assuming that the applicant did in fact sustain injuries at the police station, given that he had fallen down before being arrested, it was impossible to establish the degree of seriousness of the injuries sustained in the police station\u201d. Therefore, in the Government\u2019s view, it is impossible in the present case to establish \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted in the police station.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment74.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances or the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see, for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). Nevertheless, when allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny, even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place (see, Av\u015far v. Turkey, no. 25657\/94, \u00a7 283, ECHR 2001\u2011VII (extracts); Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine, no. 42310\/04, \u00a7\u00a0148, 21 April 2011).76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls its jurisprudence confirming that the standard of proof applied when assessing evidence is that of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see, Av\u015far v. Turkey, cited above, \u00a7 282). Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that to fall under Article 3 of the Convention, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the gender, age and state of health of the victim (see Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, \u00a7 101, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII). The Court has considered treatment to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. It has deemed treatment to be \u201cdegrading\u201d because it was such as to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 92, ECHR 2000\u2011XI). The Court emphasizes that in respect of a person who is deprived of his liberty, or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 88, 28\u00a0September 2015).78.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that, according to the hospital certificate and forensic medical documents, the applicant sustained several bodily injuries of medium severity (see paragraphs 16 and 24 above) including broken ribs and concussion, and was kept in hospital for nearly forty days.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, in the present case, the applicant\u2019s injuries were sufficiently serious to fall within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention. It remains to be determined whether the State authorities can be held responsible for having inflicted those injuries and held accountable under the above provision.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasizes that where an individual is taken into police custody in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, there is a rebuttable presumption that the injuries suffered are the result of ill\u2011treatment. It is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of the cause of such injuries, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see Tomasi v. France, 27 August 1992, \u00a7\u00a7 108-111, Series A no. 241\u2011A; Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0336). Nevertherless, in order to benefit from this presumption, individuals claiming to be victims of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention must demonstrate that they display traces of ill-treatment after having been under the control of the police or a similar authority. Many of the cases with which the Court has dealt show that such persons usually provide medical certificates for that purpose, describing injuries or traces of blows, to which the Court attaches substantial evidential weight (see Bouyid v.\u00a0Belgium [GC], cited above, \u00a7 92).81.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court notes that there is no evidence that the applicant had any injuries before his entry into the factory, which took place a maximum of one hour before he was brought to the police station. As for the events in the factory, the Court notes that the parties\u2019 accounts differ considerably. While the applicant stated that he had left the factory quietly, according to the Government \u2012 which referred to several witness statements \u2012 the applicant left the factory in a hurry, running away from police officer L. and falling over several times on his way, including a fall from a two metre-high fence. Contrary to the applicant\u2019s statement that he had climbed over the fence by stepping onto a pile of manure on the other side, according to the statements of the applicant\u2019s neighbours, that pile was located 1.5 metres away from the wall (see paragraph 49 above). The forensic experts also repeatedly concluded that the applicant could have sustained the injuries in question by falling from various heights onto hard objects.82.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court considers that it is not self-evident that the applicant was still in good health when taken into police custody (see Kobets v. Ukraine, no. 16437\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 46-48, 14 February 2008). Moreover, the applicant did not go to hospital until two days after the events in question. According to one of the forensic medical reports, the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been sustained between 30 December 2002 and 2 January 2003 and he had been released from police custody on 31\u00a0December 2002. Furthermore, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s submissions regarding his complaint before the judge is not corroborated (see paragraph 36 above).83.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, given all the information in its possession and notwithstanding the principles established by the Court in the recent case of Bouyid v. Belgium [GC] (cited above), where there was compelling evidence pointing to the applicants\u2019 ill-treatment when they were in police custody, the Court cannot conclude \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d that the applicant\u2019s injuries were caused by the police officers as stated by the applicant. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that there has been a violation of the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Adequacy of the investigation(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed with the Government\u2019s submission that there existed an effective investigation mechanism in Ukraine.85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated at the outset that it was not his fault that his complaint about ill-treatment had been lodged more than a month after the events in question. The applicant had told the hospital doctors that he had been ill-treated by the police and the doctors had been under a legal obligation to inform the police about it. Since it was a public hospital, the applicant argued that it was the State which was to blame for the delay in initiating the investigation. In any event, in the applicant\u2019s view, the doctors\u2019 failure to report his ill-treatment had actually had a positive effect, since the doctors would otherwise have been forced by the police to forge his medical data.86.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also submitted that there had been no witness questioning in his case for nearly two years because proper questioning was only possible once criminal proceedings have been instituted.87.\u00a0\u00a0As an example of the delays that had occurred in investigating his case, the applicant pointed out that the investigative authorities had failed to verify in good time his allegation that an ambulance had been called for him whilst in detention and later such verification had become impossible. Those authorities had also failed to investigate why the applicant had been brought back to the police station after the court hearing on 31 December 2002 and had not taken into account the fact that ultimately the applicant was not prosecuted for theft. While the Government dismissed the applicant\u2019s version of events according to which he had entered the factory premises to fulfil his citizen\u2019s duty and to prevent a crime, it remained unclear what police officer L. had been doing at the factory.88.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also remarked that he had not been provided in good time with copies of the decisions refusing to instigate criminal proceedings in relation to his complaints, which had caused further delays in the investigation.89.\u00a0\u00a0As for the forensic medical examinations, the applicant claimed that all of them except for the first one had been limited to perfunctory studies of the applicant\u2019s medical files. Moreover, they had all been performed by experts from the same forensic bureau. The questions for the experts had never been discussed with the applicant and he had not been informed about the results of the examinations. Nor had the applicant participated in the inspection, on 27 September 2004, of the site where the incident had occurred.90.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant argued that the investigation in his case had not been independent. The prosecutor\u2019s office had, on numerous occasions, ordered police officers to conduct various investigative actions such as the identification of witnesses to the applicant\u2019s arrest. Moreover, police officers L. and P. had continued to occupy their posts throughout the investigation.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Government91.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, contrary to the applicant\u2019s statements, the investigation into his complaints had complied with all the requirements of an effective investigation under Article 3 of the Convention.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted at the outset that the applicant had not complained about his alleged ill-treatment until 10 February 2003, although the events in question had taken place on 30 December 2002. Between 3\u00a0January and 10 February 2003 the applicant had been in a hospital where a number of his injuries were documented. The applicant claimed, in particular, that he had been hit on the head with a gun handle. However, there is no record of such an injury in the applicant\u2019s hospital medical file and after 10 February 2003, when the applicant lodged his complaint, a forensic expert examination of the applicant\u2019s hospital medical records was all that had been possible, since after more than forty days the traces of inflicted blows had already disappeared. The fact that the applicant lodged his complaint with a considerable delay therefore undermined the effectiveness of the investigation.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that all the necessary investigative actions had been conducted aimed at establishing the circumstances in which the bodily injuries of the applicant had been sustained. The police officers\u2019 and the applicant\u2019s versions had both been checked. All possible witnesses had been questioned several times \u2013 in particular, the applicant had been questioned four times, L. seven times and P. twice. Everyone who had seen the applicant at the factory had been questioned three or four times, the applicant\u2019s mother-in-law and his other family members had been questioned four times. A number of other witnesses had been questioned, including the police officers who had been in contact with the applicant at the police station and the judge who had seen the applicant the day after his arrest. A number of face-to-face confrontations had been held in order to clarify the contradictions between the testimonies of the applicant and those of the aforementioned persons. Other investigative actions such as forensic medical examinations, reconstructions of events, site examinations etc. had also been conducted.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that all the investigative steps needed to establish the truth in the case had been performed. However, it could not be concluded that the applicant had been ill-treated by the police officers L. and P. Moreover, there was evidence suggesting the contrary.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Government concluded that the investigation in the present case had complied with the requirements of Article 3.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been ill-treated by State authorities in breach of Article 3, that provision \u2012 read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention \u2012 requires that there should be an effective official investigation. Such an investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice, and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see\u00a0Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII, and Labita v. Italy [GC], cited above, \u00a7\u00a0131).97.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 requires that the investigation should start as soon as an arguable claim has been lodged by the applicant or, even in the absence of an express complaint, if there are sufficiently clear indications that ill\u2011treatment might have occurred (see Begheluri v. Georgia, no. 28490\/02, \u00a7\u00a099, 7\u00a0October 2014).98.\u00a0\u00a0Once an investigation has been triggered, the following elements establishing its effectiveness can be derived from the Court\u2019s case-law.99.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation should be conducted promptly. A prompt response by the authorities in the investigation of a case of ill-treatment may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see Bat\u0131 and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7\u00a0136, ECHR 2004\u2011IV (extracts)). In order to accomplish the necessary steps, the collection and securing of evidence should also be done promptly (see Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, no. 38812\/97, \u00a7 126, ECHR 2003\u2011V).100.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation must be thorough, that is to say the authorities should make a serious attempt to find out what happened and not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 103 et seq.). In particular, all reasonable available steps should be taken to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including eyewitness statements and forensic evidence which provides a complete and accurate record of injuries and an objective analysis of the clinical findings. The investigation\u2019s conclusions must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements.101.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities undertaking the investigation should be independent (both institutionally and in practical terms) from those involved in the events (see, for example, Barbu Anghelescu v. Romania, no. 46430\/99, \u00a7\u00a066, 5\u00a0October 2004) and the victim should be able to actively participate therein (see Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 38773\/05, \u00a7 114, 26 July 2012).102.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the investigation into the events in question started after the applicant lodged a complaint on 10 February 2003, that is to say more than forty days after these events. While the applicant stated that the public hospital doctors had failed, contrary to their legal obligation, to inform the police about his injuries, the Court questions to what extent such an obligation exempts an applicant from lodging a formal complaint. In the present case, the applicant did not submit any evidence indicating that he or his lawyer had not had any possibility of lodging such a complaint before 10 February 2003.103.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, this delay of over 40 days in submitting his complaint to the relevant authorities had a negative impact on the subsequent investigation since it rendered it more difficult to examine the applicant in a timely fashion, record his injuries and draw the correct inferences therefrom. Consequently, all the forensic experts reached their conclusions on the basis of the applicant\u2019s hospital medical records, which are kept in order to track the applicant\u2019s diagnosis and treatment and not to document injuries for the purpose of a criminal investigation.104.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court notes that, even accepting that the applicant was responsible for some delay in beginning the investigation, once it had been initiated it was marred by significant shortcomings for which the investigative authorities must be held responsible. In particular, the decision not to institute criminal proceedings was taken nearly a month after the applicant had lodged his complaint, without a reconstruction of events having been staged or a forensic medical opinion having been issued on how the injuries in question could have been sustained. Those shortcomings were noted by the national authorities when decisions refusing the institution of criminal proceedings were quashed and the case remitted for additional investigation.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that, after criminal proceedings were finally instituted in October 2004, there were six subsequent decisions to terminate them. Five of those decisions were quashed by higher prosecutors or a court for various shortcomings. As a result, those proceedings lasted for more than five and a half years and were eventually terminated with the finding that it had been impossible to find any evidence of a crime due to the passage of time (see paragraph 50 above).106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the Government\u2019s submissions that, by the end of the investigation, the witnesses and the persons involved in the incident had been questioned on numerous occasions, and that five forensic medical examinations and other investigative steps had been conducted. Nevertheless the Court observes that those investigative steps, although relevant, were very often performed only as a response to instructions from higher prosecutors or the court and resembled formal perfunctory steps rather than parts of a prompt and thorough investigation.107.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court notes that on several occasions the police bodies were asked by the prosecutor\u2019s office to conduct certain investigative steps, in particular to find witnesses. Although those requests were addressed to an entity different from the one where the police officers L. and P. were employed, the fact that an entity within the Ministry of Interior was involved in an investigation concerning employees of that same Ministry is capable of undermining the independence of such an investigation. In this respect the Court also refers to the findings of the CPT, which has long been urging the Ukrainian authorities to create an independent investigative agency specialised in the investigation of complaints against public officials (see paragraph 58 above).108.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court concludes that the applicant\u2019s complaints were not the subject of an effective investigation. Moreover, the Court would like to underline that apart from the applicant\u2019s failure to substantiate his complaint under the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention it was the authorities\u2019 failure to carry out an effective investigation into it that kept the crucial issues of the case unclear (see\u00a0Dzhulay v. Ukraine, no. 24439\/06, 3 April 2014). Consequently, there has been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention. It follows that the Government\u2019s preliminary objection (see paragraph\u00a060 above) must be dismissed.109.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its finding under Article 3, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether in this case there has also been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention (see Kobets v. Ukraine, cited above, \u00a7 57).II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED BREACH OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION110.\u00a0\u00a0In a fax dated 12 December 2010 the applicant\u2019s representative submitted that on 15-16 October 2010 the police had searched the office where he worked and had seized his computer, which contained some documents and letters relating to the present case.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that this information is to be examined in the light of Article 34 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person... The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant112.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, the Government did not advance any reasons for the seizure of the computers and documents or for breaching the right to respect for a person\u2019s home notwithstanding the absence of a court decision authorising the search and seizure and the lack of permission from the premises\u2019 owner for such a search.113.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, the State agents had been in possession of a court decision authorising them to search the premises at K. Street 54\/1, where the applicant\u2019s representative resided, but they possessed no such decision in respect of the premises at K. Street 54\/3. A video recording of the search shows that the employees of the human rights organisation protested against the police officers\u2019 presence on the premises. The State agents had been aware that there were no personal belongings of the applicant\u2019s representatives on the premises and the employees present had reiterated this.114.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that although the police officers had allegedly been looking for \u201cpornographic material\u201d, they had seized 15\u00a0kilograms of papers which included refugees\u2019 files as well as documents relating to the applicant\u2019s case.115.\u00a0\u00a0Despite the Government\u2019s assertions to the contrary, the applicant\u2019s representative lodged a complaint and then appealed against the decision not to institute criminal proceedings, but that appeal was at the time of submitting the present observations still pending.116.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, the fact that State agents who were allegedly looking for pornographic material unlawfully seized the documents in question \u2012 despite being informed about the nature of their contents \u2012 raises doubts about the agents\u2019 real intentions.117.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant submitted that the seized computers contained files concerning a psychological examination of the applicant carried out for the purpose of substantiating the amount of non-pecuniary compensation sought, correspondence with the experts involved, and copies of preliminary documents which at that time had not yet been submitted to the Court. Therefore, in the applicant\u2019s view, the State had not respected the procedural guarantees regarding confidentiality of correspondence with the Court, which constituted a breach of Article 34 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government118.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 34 of the Convention was manifestly ill-founded and unsupported by any evidence. The Government further argued that the search of the office of the applicant\u2019s representative had been lawful, had not been intended to exert any pressure on the applicant or his representative, and had not influenced the proceedings before the Court.119.\u00a0\u00a0The search in question had been conducted in the apartment containing the belongings of the applicant\u2019s representative within the framework of criminal proceedings that had been instituted on suspicion of the distribution of pornographic materials.120.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view the search and seizure of the documents and equipment had not affected the applicant\u2019s representation before the Court. The applicant\u2019s representative never asked for the documents and files which he allegedly needed for the applicant\u2019s representation before the Court to be returned to him. Nor did he provide any evidence that the aim of the search was to hinder the representation of the applicant\u2019s interests before the Court or that this search had any effect on his representation in the present case.121.\u00a0\u00a0Following the complaints about an allegedly unlawful search, the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings and the applicant\u2019s representative did not appeal against that decision.122.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above the Government stated that there had been no interference with the exercise of the right of individual application in the present case.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a complaint under Article 34 of the Convention is of a procedural nature and therefore does not give rise to any issue of admissibility under the Convention (see Iulian Popescu v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a024999\/04, \u00a7 29, 4 June 2013).124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore points out that for the effective operation of the system of individual application instituted by Article\u00a034, it is of the utmost importance that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints (see,\u00a0among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 105, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV). In this context, \u201cpressure\u201d includes not only direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation, but also other improper indirect acts or contacts designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention remedy (see\u00a0Kurt v.\u00a0Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7 159, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011III).125.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the question of whether or not a particular form of contact between the authorities and an applicant is tantamount to unacceptable practice from the standpoint of Article 34 must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. In this respect, regard must be had to the vulnerability of the complainant and his or her susceptibility to influence exerted by the authorities (see Akdivar and Others, \u00a7 105, and Kurt, \u00a7 160, both cited above).126.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the computers and documents of the applicant\u2019s representative were seized by the authorities in the course of the unrelated criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant\u2019s representative. The Court observes, however, that there is no evidence that, at the moment of the seizure, the State authorities were aware what material the computer contained. There is equally no evidence that their real aim was to hinder the applicant\u2019s representation in the present case or to discourage him from pursuing it. In particular, when complaining about the seizure to the national authorities, the applicant\u2019s representative stated only that \u201cone of the seized computers contained, inter alia, some confidential correspondence\u201d to the Court in the present case. He did not request access to the seized documents, nor did he state at any stage that he was unable to substantiate his submissions before this Court because of the above seizure.127.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that the State has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 34 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION128.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d129.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction.","28341":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the relevant principles of Article 3 of the Convention, as set out most recently in Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no.\u00a029217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 93-99, ECHR 2014 (extracts), which include the need for the ill-treatment to attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant\u2019s situation as a single mother of two minor children, who were born during her stay in Denmark, is one of the relevant factors in making this assessment. The material date for making this assessment is the actual date of expulsion. However, if an applicant has not yet been removed when the Court examines the case, the relevant time for assessing the existence of the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 will be that of the proceedings before the Court (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2008; M.A. v.\u00a0Switzerland, no. 52589\/13, \u00a7 54, 18 November 2014; and Khamrakulov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 68894\/13, \u00a7 64, 16 April 2015).26.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant mother was registered in Italy on 15 January 2014. On 26\u00a0February 2014, she entered Denmark and applied for asylum. On 16\u00a0May\u00a02014, Italy agreed to take back the applicant and her daughter under Article 13(1) of the Dublin Regulation. On 9 September 2015, the applicant gave birth to another daughter. It thus has to be determined whether the situation in which the applicant mother is likely to find herself in Italy can be regarded as incompatible with Article 3, taking into account her situation as an asylum\u2011seeking single mother with two small children and, as such, belonging to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 97, and also M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 251, ECHR 2011).27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the current situation in Italy for asylum\u2011seekers cannot be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment (cited above) and that the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 114-115).28.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s personal situation, the Court has noted that,\u00a0similar to the applicants in Tarakhel (cited above), who were a family with six minor children, the applicant is a single mother with two young children. However, unlike the situation in Tarakhel, the Danish authorities \u2013 as regards transfers to Italy under the Dublin Regulation \u2013 decide in consultation with the Italian authorities how and when the transfer of an asylum-seeker to the competent Italian authorities will take place. In particular, where it concerns a family with children, prior notice of transfer is given to the Italian authorities, thus allowing the latter to identify where adequate accommodation is available.29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that for efficiency reasons the Italian authorities cannot be expected to keep open and unoccupied for an extended period of time places in specific reception and accommodation centres reserved for asylum-seekers awaiting transfer to Italy in accordance with the Dublin Regulation and that, for this reason, once a guarantee of placement in a reception centre has been received by the State requesting transfer, transfer should take place as quickly as practically possible.30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Refugee Appeals Board\u2019s decision of 3\u00a0February 2016 was based, among other things, on the circular letter of 8\u00a0June 2015 from Italy and Italy\u2019s subsequent assurances on the appropriate standard of its reception capacity at the meeting of the Contact Committee on 24\u00a0June 2015, and the decisions in J.A. and Others v. the Netherlands ((dec.), no.\u00a021459\/14, 3\u00a0November 2015) and A.T.H. v. the Netherlands ((dec.), no.\u00a054000\/11, 17\u00a0November 2015). It was thus a prerequisite for the applicants\u2019 removal to Italy that they would be accommodated in one of the said reception facilities earmarked for families with minor children, that those facilities satisfied the requirements of suitable accommodation which could be inferred from Tarakhel and, in addition, that the Italian Government would be notified of the applicants\u2019 particular needs before the removal.31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further understands from the two circular letters sent by the Italian Dublin Unit (see paragraphs 11 and 19), that the applicant and her children will be placed together in one of the reception facilities in Italy which have been earmarked for families with minor children.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has noted the applicants\u2019 concern that the number of places earmarked will be insufficient but, in the absence of any concrete indication in the case file, does not find it demonstrated that the applicant and her children will be unable to obtain such a place when they arrive in Italy. Furthermore, the Court considers that the applicant has not demonstrated that her future prospects, if returned to Italy with her children, whether looked at from a material, physical or psychological perspective, disclose a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship that is severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3.33.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4.B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention34.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the requirements of exhaustion of domestic remedies, (see, inter alia, Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7\u00a7 70-72, 25\u00a0March 2014), the Court reiterates that States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system, and those who wish to rely on the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system. It should be emphasised that the Court is not a court of first instance.35.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, even if it can be said that the applicants relied on Article 8 of the Convention, in form or substance, before the Immigration Service and the Refugee Appeals Board, they did not bring before the domestic courts, as they could have done (see paragraph 22 above), the complaint now lodged before the Court, that their removal to Italy would be at variance with Article 8 of the Convention because they would be separated from the father of the second child.36.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible for non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.37.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be discontinued.For these reasons, the Court unanimouslyDeclares the application inadmissible.Done in English and notified in writing on 21 July 2016.Stanley NaismithI\u015f\u0131l Karaka\u015fRegistrarPresident","28376":"43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that having had to stay in the Refuge Garage had violated his rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. These Articles provide:Article 2\u201c 1. Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.\u201dArticle 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that it is more appropriate to deal with the complaint under Article 2 in the context of its examination of the related complaint under Article 3, and will proceed on this basis.1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles45.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies and prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman degrading treatment or punishment irrespective of the circumstances and of the victim\u2019s conduct (see, among many authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV). The prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a value of civilisation closely bound up with respect for human dignity (Bouyid v.\u00a0Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2015).46.\u00a0\u00a0Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions, and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned. (see, among other authorities, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 79, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V; Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no. 13255\/07, \u00a7 192, ECHR 2014 (extracts); and Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7 113, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held on numerous occasions that to fall within the scope of Article 3 the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see for example Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a091, ECHR 2000\u2011XI).48.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these aspects, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition set forth in Article 3 (see, among other authorities, Vasyukov v. Russia, no. 2974\/05, \u00a7\u00a059, 5 April 2011; G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2010; Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, \u00a7 114; and Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7 192).49.\u00a0\u00a0The present case concerns the question whether the State had a positive obligation under Article 3 to provide the applicant \u2013 a rejected asylum-seeker at the material time \u2013 emergency social assistance. In that regard, the Court reiterates that Contracting States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens (see, for example, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 113, ECHR 2012; \u00dcner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410\/99, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2006-XII; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, \u00a7\u00a067, Series A no. 94; and Boujlifa v. France, 21 October 1997, \u00a7 42, Reports 1997-VI). The corollary of a State\u2019s right to control immigration is the duty of aliens to submit to immigration controls and procedures and leave the territory of the Contracting State when so ordered if they are lawfully denied entry or residence (Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no.\u00a012738\/10, \u00a7 100, 3 October 2014).50.\u00a0\u00a0Aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot, in principle, claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance and services provided by the expelling State (see N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565\/05, \u00a7 42, 27 May 2008).51.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home (see Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238\/95, \u00a7 99, ECHR 2001\u2011I). Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living (see M\u00fcslim v. Turkey, no. 53566\/99, \u00a7 85, 26 April 2005).52.\u00a0\u00a0In the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC], no.\u00a030696\/09, ECHR 2011), the Court, attaching \u201cconsiderable importance to the applicant\u2019s status as an asylum-seeker and, as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection\u201d (\u00a7 251), considered, in so far as relevant:\u201c252.\u00a0\u00a0... the Court must determine whether a situation of extreme material poverty can raise an issue under Article 3.253.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has not excluded the possibility \u2018that State responsibility [under Article 3] could arise for \u201ctreatment\u201d where an applicant, in circumstances wholly dependent on State support, found herself faced with official indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity\u2019 (see Budina v. Russia (dec.), no. 45603\/05, 18 June 2009).\u201d2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case53.\u00a0\u00a0The main thrust of the applicant\u2019s complaint pertains to Articles 13 and 31 of the Charter and the decisions adopted by the ECSR on 1 July 2014 (see paragraph 37) which, in his view, lead to the conclusion that the denial of shelter and social assistance diminished his human dignity in a manner incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. The Court acknowledges the importance of the economic and social rights laid down in the Charter and the issues raised in the two decisions by the ECSR. However, it cannot accept the applicant\u2019s argument that the findings by the ECSR under the Charter should be considered to lead automatically to a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.54.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have implications of a social or economic nature (see Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, \u00a7 26, Series A no. 32). Furthermore, inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual\u2019s fundamental rights (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7\u00a0July 1989, \u00a7 89, Series A no. 161). While it is necessary, given the fundamental importance of Article 3 in the Convention system, for the Court to retain a degree of flexibility to prevent expulsion in very exceptional cases, Article\u00a03 does not place an obligation on the Contracting State to alleviate such disparities through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. A finding to the contrary would place too great a burden on the Contracting States (see A.S. v.\u00a0Switzerland, no. 39350\/13, \u00a7 31, 30 June 2015).55.\u00a0\u00a0In the case at hand and during the period complained of, the applicant was not entitled to any social assistance in the Netherlands. Referring to M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (cited above), the applicant argued that the situation he found himself in was very similar to the situation in that case. However, there are crucial differences in that, unlike the applicant in M.S.S who was an asylum-seeker, the applicant in the present case was at the material time a failed asylum-seeker under a legal obligation to leave the territory of the Netherlands. Furthermore, even though the applicant\u2019s loss of entitlement to legal residence in the Netherlands after the rejection of his asylum claim did not automatically affect his vulnerability as a migrant, the situation in which he found himself remained significantly different from that of M.S.S.. In the latter case, the relevant facts which had culminated in a finding of violation of Article 3, were the long duration in which the applicant had lived in a state of the most extreme poverty (the lack of food, hygiene and a place to live), and of fear of being attacked and robbed together with the fact that there had been no prospect of improvement. Furthermore, that situation was linked to his status as an asylum-seeker and, consequently, the applicant\u2019s suffering could have been alleviated if the Greek authorities had promptly assessed his asylum application. By failing to do so the applicant was left in uncertainty.56.\u00a0\u00a0Turning back to the present case, and emphasising once more that the applicant was a failed asylum-seeker at the material time, the uncertainty he found himself in was inherently different from M.S.S. in that it was not linked to the Netherlands authorities\u2019 assessment of his asylum request. His asylum statement had already been examined and his asylum application refused, of which the applicant has not complained before the Court. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the Netherlands\u2019 authorities have shown ignorance or inaction towards the applicant\u2019s situation. After the applicant\u2019s asylum proceedings had come to an end, the applicant was afforded a four week grace period to organise his voluntary return to his country of origin during which period he retained his entitlement to State-sponsored care and accommodation. Moreover, after he had overstayed this grace period, the applicant had the possibility of applying for reception facilities at a centre where his liberty would be restricted (see paragraph 31 above). The fact that admission to this centre was subject to the condition that he would cooperate in organising his departure to his country of origin cannot, as such, be regarded as incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also takes into account the fact that if it had been impossible for the applicant to return to his country of origin \u2013 either voluntarily or involuntarily \u2013 for reasons which cannot be attributed to him, he had the possibility of applying for a residence permit for persons who, through no fault of their own, are unable to leave the Netherlands (see paragraph 32 above). Nothing in the case file shows, however, that he has ever applied for such a residence permit. Nor has he ever contended at any stage during the domestic proceedings that he could not leave the Netherlands through no fault of his own.58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that according to the general information provided by the Repatriation and Departure Service, returns to Ethiopia \u2013 voluntary or not \u2013 are possible, albeit with the alien\u2019s cooperation if he or she is not in the possession of an original passport (see paragraph 39 above). The applicant submitted that he was released from immigration detention in July 2013 because an effective removal to his country of origin proved impossible, however without explaining why this was so. As the applicant was an undocumented migrant at the material time (see paragraph 6 above), his cooperation \u2013 in the form of expressing a willingness to return to Ethiopia and signing the request for a laissez-passer \u2013 was required in order to obtain a laissez-passer. However, in the applicant\u2019s own admission, he did not wish to cooperate with the domestic authorities in organising his departure to Ethiopia.59.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court reiterates that there is no right to social assistance as such under the Convention and to the extent that Article 3 requires States to take action in situations of the most extreme poverty \u2013 also when it concerns irregular migrants \u2013 the Court notes that the Netherlands authorities have already addressed this in practical terms. In the first place, the applicant had the possibility of applying for a \u201cno-fault residence permit\u201d and\/or to seek admission to a centre where his liberty would be restricted. It is furthermore possible for irregular migrants to seek a deferral of removal for medical reasons and to receive free medical treatment in case of emergency (see paragraph 30 above). In addition, the Netherlands have most recently set up a special scheme providing basic needs for irregular migrants living in their territory in an irregular manner (see paragraph 5 above). It is true that that scheme was only operational as from 17 December 2014, one year after the applicant had taken shelter in the Refuge Garage. However, it is inevitable that the design and practical implementation of such a scheme by local authorities of different municipalities take time. Moreover, the scheme was brought about as a result of a series of elements at the domestic level, including the applicant\u2019s pursuit of domestic remedies in connection with his Article 3 claim. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the Netherlands authorities have fallen short of their obligations under Article 3 by having remained inactive or indifferent.60.\u00a0\u00a0Considering the above, the Court finds that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Other complaint61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained under Article 6 that the Central Appeals Tribunal, in its decision of 26 November 2015, had failed to address his argument that he had been recognised by the State as a refugee, which in his opinion, should have prompted the Netherlands authorities to grant him emergency social assistance retroactively.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers, assuming that the right claimed by the applicant does exist under domestic law and thus falls within the scope of Article 6 \u00a7 1, that this provision obliges domestic courts to give reasons for their judgments and decisions without, however, going so far as requiring a detailed answer to every argument (Borovsk\u00e1 and Forrai v. Slovakia, no.\u00a048554\/10, \u00a7 57, 25 November 2014; Ruiz Torija v. Spain, no. 18390\/91, \u00a7 29, 9 December 1994). In the light of all the material in its possession, the Court finds no appearance of a violation of the rights guaranteed by Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.63.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 28 July 2016.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Stephen PhillipsLuis L\u00f3pez GuerraRegistrarPresident[1].\u00a0\u00a0In the Dutch administrative system, a central municipality performs a specific function for surrounding communities in the setting of an intercommunal cooperation scheme under the Joint Regulations Act (Wet Gemeenschappelijke Regelingen).","28381":"A.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s preliminary objectionThe parties\u2019 submissions34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that Mr Isakov\u2019s whereabouts were unknown and that it was practically impossible to establish his genuine intentions or to verify whether his interests were properly represented by Ms\u00a0Yermolayeva, who had not provided a valid authority form in the instant proceedings before the Court. They further pointed out that the application could have been lodged by Mr Isakov\u2019s relatives, as was done in numerous cases concerning disappearances. The Government considered that the application should be rejected as incompatible with the provisions of the Convention ratione personae.35.\u00a0\u00a0Ms Yermolayeva argued that she had legal standing to represent Mr\u00a0Isakov before the Court by virtue of the authority form signed by him in 2008. In view of Mr Isakov\u2019s disappearance, it was impossible for him to issue a new authority form and the Court should take into account the will he had expressed previously.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has developed the following principles as regards the applicant\u2019s locus standi and in the proceedings before the Court (see, Lambert and Others v. France [GC], no. 46043\/14, ECHR 2015 (extracts)):\u201c89.\u00a0\u00a0In the recent cases of Nencheva and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria (no.\u00a048609\/06, 18\u00a0June\u00a02013) and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v.\u00a0Romania ([GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, ECHR 2014), the Court reiterated the following principles.In order to rely on Article 34 of the Convention, an applicant must be able to claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention. According to the Court\u2019s established case-law, the concept of \u201cvictim\u201d must be interpreted autonomously and irrespective of domestic concepts such as those concerning an interest or capacity to act (see Nencheva and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a088). The individual concerned must be able to show that he or she was \u201cdirectly affected\u201d by the measure complained of (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7 96, with further references).90.\u00a0\u00a0An exception is made to this principle where the alleged violation or violations of the Convention are closely linked to a death or disappearance in circumstances allegedly engaging the responsibility of the State. In such cases the Court has recognised the standing of the victim\u2019s next-of-kin to submit an application (see Nencheva and Others, cited above, \u00a7 89, and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a098-99, with further references).91.\u00a0\u00a0Where the application is not lodged by the victims themselves, Rule\u00a045 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court requires a written authority to act, duly signed, to be produced. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court (see Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 21727\/08, 20 January\u00a02009; Nencheva and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a083; and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0102). However, the Convention institutions have held that special considerations may arise in the case of victims of alleged breaches of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention at the hands of the national authorities. Applications lodged by individuals on behalf of the victim or victims, even though no valid form of authority was presented, have thus been declared admissible (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0103).92.\u00a0\u00a0Particular consideration has been shown with regard to the victims\u2019 vulnerability on account of their age, sex or disability, which rendered them unable to lodge a complaint on the matter with the Court, due regard also being paid to the connections between the person lodging the application and the victim (ibid.).93.\u00a0\u00a0For instance, in the case of S.P., D.P. and A.T. v. the United Kingdom (no.\u00a023715\/94, Commission decision of 20 May 1996), which concerned, inter alia, Article 8 of the Convention, the Commission declared admissible an application lodged by a solicitor on behalf of children whom he had represented in the domestic proceedings, in which he had been instructed by the guardian ad litem, after noting in particular that their mother had displayed no interest, that the local authorities had been criticised in the application and that there was no conflict of interests between the solicitor and the children.In the case of \u0130lhan v. Turkey ([GC], no. 22277\/93, \u00a7\u00a7 54-55, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011VII), where the direct victim, Abd\u00fcllatif \u0130lhan, had suffered severe injuries as a result of ill\u2011treatment at the hands of the security forces, the Court held that his brother could be regarded as having validly introduced the application, based on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, since it was clear from the facts that Abd\u00fcllatif \u0130lhan had consented to the proceedings, there was no conflict of interests between himself and his brother, who had been closely concerned with the incident, and he was in a particularly vulnerable position because of his injuries.In the case of Y.F. v.\u00a0Turkey (no.\u00a024209\/94, \u00a7 31, ECHR 2003\u2011IX), in which a husband alleged under Article 8 of the Convention that his wife had been forced to undergo a gynaecological examination following her detention in police custody, the Court found that it was open to the applicant, as a close relative of the victim, to make a complaint concerning allegations by her of violations of the Convention, in particular having regard to her vulnerable position in the special circumstances of the case.94.\u00a0\u00a0Still in the context of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court has also accepted on several occasions that parents who did not have parental rights could apply to it on behalf of their minor children (see, in particular, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221\/98 and 41963\/98, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0138\u2011139, ECHR 2000\u2011VIII; \u0160neersone and Kampanella v. Italy, no.\u00a014737\/09, \u00a7 61, 12 July 2011; Diamante and Pelliccioni v.\u00a0San Marino, no. 32250\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 146-47, 27\u00a0September 2011; A.K. and L. v.\u00a0Croatia, no.\u00a037956\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 48-50, 8 January 2013; and Raw and Others v.\u00a0France, no.\u00a010131\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 51-52, 7\u00a0March 2013). The key criterion for the Court in these cases was the risk that some of the children\u2019s interests might not be brought to its attention and that they would be denied effective protection of their Convention rights.95.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court recently adopted a similar approach in the case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, concerning a young man of Roma origin, seriously disabled and HIV positive, who died in hospital before the application was lodged and had no known next-of-kin and no State-appointed representative. In view of the exceptional circumstances of the case and the seriousness of the allegations, the Court recognised that the Centre for Legal Resources had standing to represent Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu. The Court emphasised that to find otherwise would amount to preventing such serious allegations of a violation of the Convention from being examined at an international level (\u00a7\u00a0112)....102. A review of the cases in which the Convention institutions have accepted that a third party may, in exceptional circumstances, act in the name and on behalf of a vulnerable person (see paragraphs 93-95 above) reveals the following two main criteria: the risk that the direct victim will be deprived of effective protection of his or her rights, and the absence of a conflict of interests between the victim and the applicant.\u201d37.\u00a0\u00a0In Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania \u2013 Helsinki Committee on behalf of Ionel Garcea v. Romania (no.\u00a02959\/11, 24\u00a0March 2015), the Court accepted a representative of a person who had died without making an application to the Court. The rationale for that decision, as in the case of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, was that \u201cto find otherwise would amount to preventing such serious allegations of a violation of the Convention from being examined at an international level, with the risk that the respondent State might escape accountability under the Convention\u201d (paragraph 42, referring to Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu).38.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes, and it is not disputed by the parties, that Mr Isakov has never been in the direct contact with the Court in connection with the present case, and that Ms Yermolayeva does not claim that she acts on his instructions. The authority form submitted by Ms Yermolayeva was completed by Mr\u00a0Isakov in connection with a previous application lodged with the Court in 2008 (no.\u00a014049\/08, referred to above), and cannot constitute a valid form of authority in the present case, which relates to facts which occurred after the judgment in that case. In such circumstances, the Court must therefore ascertain whether it is open for Ms Yermolayeva to act as Mr\u00a0Isakov\u2019s representative.39.\u00a0\u00a0In order to answer this question the Court has to decide whether the principles established in the Lambert and Others case are applicable in the present case and, more particularly, whether Mr Isakov can be considered a vulnerable person who was not able to lodge complaints to the Court himself (see N. and M. v. Russia (dec.), no. 39496\/14, \u00a7\u00a059; 26\u00a0April\u00a02016).40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is mindful of the precariousness of Mr Isakov\u2019s situation, whose disappearance is at issue in the present case. The Court found in his first application that he had been charged with politically motivated crimes in Uzbekistan, that he would be directly placed in custody in Uzbekistan if extradited and that he would run a serious risk of ill-treatment there (see Abdulazhon Isakov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0110). The Court accordingly considers that Mr Isakov can be regarded as a vulnerable person who has not been able to lodge the application before the Court. It follows that the criteria established in Lambert and Others can be applied to the present case. The Court is thus to determine whether there is a risk of Mr Isakov being deprived of effective protection of his rights (see, for similar reasoning, N.\u00a0and M., cited above, \u00a7\u00a060).41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes into account the fact that Mr Isakov has close family members in Russia. Mr Isakov\u2019s nephew reported his disappearance to the regional department of the interior, and his family retained counsel to represent them in the domestic proceedings. Further, in the course of those proceedings, Mr Isakov\u2019s son and brother have been questioned.42.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court does not discern any risk of Mr\u00a0Isakov being deprived of effective protection of his rights since, in accordance with the Court\u2019s settled case-law, it remains open to his family members to bring the application on his and their own behalf (see, among other authorities, Varnava and Others v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], nos.\u00a016064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, \u00a7\u00a7 111-13, ECHR 2009). The present case is therefore different from the cases of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu and Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania \u2013 Helsinki Committee on behalf of Ionel Garcea (both cited above), in which the direct victims of the alleged violations had died and had no one to represent them.43.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the above, the Court discerns no exceptional circumstances in the present case that would allow Ms Yermolayeva to act in the name and on behalf of Mr Isakov and concludes that Ms\u00a0Yermolayeva does not have standing to introduce the application in the name and on behalf of Mr Isakov. It follows that the application is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04.44.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in the present case comes to an end.For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 28 July 2016.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Stephen PhillipsLuis L\u00f3pez GuerraRegistrarPresident","28404":"...II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION97.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that the placement of their child in administrative detention when he was four years old, in the Toulouse-Cornebarrieu centre, constituted treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants wished firstly to point out certain events that had taken place prior to their placement in detention. They said that their child, who was brutally snatched from his day-to-day environment, as he had been going to school, had been arrested and taken away in a police van in the presence of an escort of several uniformed officers for a journey lasting nearly five hours.99.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants then complained about the noise level in the Toulouse-Cornebarrieu detention centre. This centre was located in an area unsuitable for construction, according to the land-use plan, on account of the noise level caused by its proximity to Toulouse-Blagnac airport. According to the noise exposure survey of 2007, the level of exposure to noise in the centre ranged on average between 62 and 70 decibels (db). According to the World Health Organisation, exposure to noise at 70 db led to a loss of hearing and at 55 db to serious discomfort, while at 30 db children\u2019s sleep was disturbed and at 35 db speech was no longer intelligible. According to an opinion of 6 May 2004 of the Superior Council of Public Health in France, a noise level of 60 db on the outside wall of residential buildings should not be exceeded.100.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants asserted that, in any event, even though they were held in a centre which included a family area, it was unsuitable for small children on account of the tension and anxiety necessarily caused by such confinement. The physical conditions of organisation were not adapted to their presence. Their child had thus been shocked by loud-speakers which, by permanently broadcasting messages, created an ambient noise that was difficult to put up with, thus exacerbating the feeling of despair and putting detainees on edge. The applicants further emphasised that a four-year-old child was not supposed to remain for a whole day in the same room and that a small courtyard containing a slide was surrounded by railings several metres high with an escape-prevention net over the top. They added that they had not been preserved from the daily violence stemming from the confinement of other adults. They would come into contact with those adults in the communal areas of the centre. In addition, their child had been obliged to follow them in all their movements around the centre (OFII, CIMADE, medical visits), then on their visits to the courthouse (when summoned to appear before the Liberties and Detention Judge, Court of Appeal, Administrative Court), when they were always escorted by armed police in uniform, sometimes crossing paths with other detainees who were handcuffed. The applicants explained that they had shared the family area with a couple who had four children of between 14 months and 5 years and that the couple\u2019s children had been particularly traumatised as the father had violently slashed his arm in front of them using a knife, slicing tendons and nerves.101.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicants argued, producing a medical certificate in evidence, that their child had undergone a traumatic experience.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government sought to distinguish the present case from the Popov judgment, in which the Court had found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention \u201cin view of the children\u2019s young age, the length of their detention and the conditions of their confinement in [the] detention centre\u201d. In the present case, while similar to the Popov case in terms of the child\u2019s age and the length of the detention, the conditions of accommodation for families in the Toulouse\u2011Cornebarrieu centre were, in the Government\u2019s view, far superior to those examined by the Court in Popov. Relying on reports by the CPT and of the Inspector-General of Custodial Premises, they submitted that the Toulouse\u2011Cornebarrieu detention centre, a recent construction (2006) designed from the outset to cater for families, contained functional and modern facilities providing all detainees in general, and families in particular, with accommodation to the highest standard. They went on to say that the reception area for families was equipped with separate and tailored outdoor courtyards, that games were made available to children, and that appropriate toiletries and food were provided.103.\u00a0\u00a0In response to the applicants\u2019 arguments about the proximity of the airport, the Government emphasised that neither the Inspector-General of Custodial Premises nor the CPT had commented on this issue and in particular neither of them had referred to an excessive noise level.104.\u00a0\u00a0They argued that the applicants were asking the Court to find that the presence of a child in a detention centre constituted in itself, regardless of the physical conditions prevailing in that centre, treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. That view, said the Government, went beyond the Court\u2019s case-law, the Guidelines on Forced Return issued by the Committee of Ministers on 4 May 2005 and the provisions of the EU Return Directive.105.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government rejected the applicants\u2019 argument that the young boy\u2019s mental health problems were entirely attributable to his confinement in the centre. They pointed out that the medical certificate drawn up three months after the applicants\u2019 release had only indicated \u201cpolymorphous manifestations of psychiatric disorders in a child of 4 years and 9 months, related to a destabilisation of family life, precarity of day-to-day surroundings, uprooting and a loss of habitual references\u201d, without expressly associating these problems with the detention.106.\u00a0\u00a0For these reasons, the Government took the view that the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention could not be regarded as constituting a violation of Article 3.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Applicable principles107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention makes no provision for exceptions. This absolute prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment shows that Article 3 enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, \u00a7\u00a088, Series A no. 161).108.\u00a0\u00a0In order to fall within the scope of Article 3, the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity, the assessment of which depends on all the circumstances of the case, and in particular the nature and context of the treatment, the manner in which it was inflicted, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, \u00a7 55, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII).109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on a number of occasions on account of the placement in migrant detention centres of accompanied minors (see Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v.\u00a0Belgium, no. 41442\/07, 19 January 2010; Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, no.\u00a015297\/09, 13 December 2011; and Popov, cited above) or unaccompanied minors (see Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, no. 13178\/03, ECHR 2006\u2011XI, and Rahimi v. Greece, no. 8687\/08, 5 April 2011). In cases concerning the placement of accompanied foreign minors, it has found a violation of Article 3 in particular on account of a combination of three factors: the child\u2019s young age, the length of the detention and unsuitability of the premises for the accommodation of children.2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that in the present case, as in the case of Muskhadzhiyeva and Others (cited above), the applicants\u2019 child was accompanied by his parents throughout the period of detention. It takes the view, however, that this factor is not such as to release the authorities from their obligation to protect the child and to adopt appropriate measures in line with their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7 58) and it is important to bear in mind that the child\u2019s extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes precedence over considerations relating to the child\u2019s status as illegal immigrant (see Popov, cited above, \u00a7 91; compare Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki\u00a0Mitunga, cited above, \u00a7 55). It observes that the European Union directives regulating the detention of migrants adopt the position that minors, whether or not they are accompanied, constitute a vulnerable category requiring the special attention of the authorities. Children certainly have specific needs, resulting in particular from their age and dependence.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, during the detention in question, the applicants\u2019 child was four years old and he was held with his parents for eighteen days at the Toulouse-Cornebarrieu detention centre.112.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the physical conditions of the detention, the Court observes that the Toulouse-Cornebarrieu centre is one of the facilities that is \u201cauthorised\u201d to receive families under a decree of 30 May 2005 ... It can be seen from the inspection reports on this centre ... that the authorities were careful to separate families from the other detainees, to provide them with specially fitted rooms and to make available material that was tailored to child care. Moreover, the NGOs have acknowledged that, unlike the situation in Popov (cited above), the physical conditions in the centre were not problematic.113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would observe, however, that the Toulouse\u2011Cornebarrieu detention centre, being situated right next to the runways of Toulouse-Blagnac airport, is exposed to particularly high noise levels which have resulted in the land being classified as an \u201carea unsuitable for building\u201d ... It points out that children, for whom periods of outdoor leisure activities are necessary, are thus particularly affected by the excessive noise. The Court further finds, without having to rely on the medical certificate produced by the applicants, that the constraints inherent in a place of detention, which are particularly arduous for a young child, together with the centre\u2019s conditions of organisation, must have caused the applicants\u2019 child some anxiety. The boy, who could not be left alone, was obliged to attend, with his parents, all the meetings required by their situation, together with the various judicial and administrative hearings. While being transferred for that purpose he would mix with armed police officers in uniform. In addition, he was constantly subjected to the announcements made through the centre\u2019s loudspeakers. Lastly, he witnessed the mental distress sustained by his parents, in a place of confinement that did not allow him to distance himself.114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is of the view that such conditions, even though they necessarily represent a significant source of stress and anxiety for a small child, are not sufficient, where the confinement is for a short duration, depending on the circumstances of the case, to attain the threshold of severity required to engage Article 3. It is convinced, however, that in the case of a longer period, the repetition and accumulation of such mental and emotional aggression would necessarily have harmful consequences for a young child, exceeding the above-mentioned threshold. Accordingly, the passage of time is of primary significance in this connection for the application of this Article. The Court concludes that the permissible short duration has been exceeded in the present case, which concerns the detention of a four-year-old child lasting for eighteen days in the conditions set out above.115.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, in view of the age of the applicants\u2019 child, and the length and conditions of his confinement in the Toulouse-Cornebarrieu detention centre, the Court finds that the authorities subjected this child to treatment which exceeded the threshold of severity required to engage Article 3 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of that Article in respect of the applicants\u2019 child.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 AND 4 OF THE CONVENTION116.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that the placement of their child in administrative detention was in breach of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0and 4. Those provisions read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition....4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 11.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions117.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants contended that Article 5 \u00a7 1 had been breached as the authorities had failed to ascertain whether an alternative to administrative detention could be envisaged. They claimed that they had been accommodated since 2009 on a continuous basis, though without being settled, in the asylum-seekers\u2019 reception centre at Chaingy and that they had even presented, during the proceedings, a certificate of accommodation from one of their relatives offering to receive them.118.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, the present case had to be distinguished from Popov for three reasons. Firstly, they contended that the accommodation conditions in the detention centre were not unsuited to the placement of the applicants and their child pending removal. Secondly, they pointed out that Article L. 553-1 of the Entry and Residence of Aliens and Right of Asylum Code, as worded following the Law of 16 June 2011, now indicated that minors could be held in certain centres when the law expressly provided that they could stay there with their parents. Lastly, the Government noted that the prefectoral authority had examined beforehand the possibility of an alternative measure of restricted residence but had rejected it because the applicants had not presented guarantees that they would not abscond. In the detention order the prefect had thus noted that the applicants did not have sufficient guarantees that they would not abscond, as they did not have \u201ca valid passport, ... neither a fixed abode nor sufficient resources, [had] not complied with the previous removal directions issued to [them] and [had] formally opposed, when interviewed, [their] return to [their] country of origin\u201d. The Liberties and Detention Judge had also been careful to assess the relationship between the reason for the applicants\u2019 detention and the place and conditions of that detention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment119.\u00a0\u00a0In order to comply with Article 5 \u00a7 1, any deprivation of liberty has to follow \u201ca procedure prescribed by law\u201d and must be \u201clawful\u201d (see, among other authorities, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, \u00a7 37, Series A no. 33, and Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629\/95, \u00a7 78, ECHR 2000\u2011III).120.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates, moreover, that all that is required for detention to be compatible with Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) is that action is being taken with a view to deportation and that the detention is carried out for the purposes of enforcing the measure. In principle it is therefore immaterial whether the underlying decision to expel can be justified under national or Convention law, or whether the detention was reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent the person concerned from absconding or from committing an offence. The Court nevertheless has regard to the specific situation of the detained person. Thus, by way of exception, when a child is involved it considers that the deprivation of liberty must be necessary to fulfil the aim pursued, namely to secure the family\u2019s removal. In the case of Popov (cited above) it found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 after observing in particular that the authorities had not verified that the placement in administrative detention was a measure of last resort for which no alternative was available (ibid., \u00a7 119).121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that French law regulates certain aspects of the presence of minors accompanying parents who have been placed in administrative detention ... However, there are no statutory provisions governing the conditions in which the child\u2019s presence is possible. In particular, as a foreign minor under eighteen cannot be subject to an obligation to leave France ..., there is no provision in domestic law to the effect that a child can be subject to a detention order for the purposes of removal. This explains why the order in the present case was only made against the parents and not against the child accompanying them.122.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court observes that the situation of children is intrinsically linked to that of their parents, from whom they should not be separated as far as possible. That link, which is in the children\u2019s interest, has the consequence that, where the parents are placed in detention, their children are themselves de facto deprived of liberty. That deprivation of liberty stems from the legitimate decision of the parents, having authority over their children, not to entrust them to the care of a third party. The Court can accept that such a situation is not, in principle, incompatible with domestic law. It nevertheless emphasises that the environment in which the children then find themselves is a source of anxiety and tension that may cause them serious harm.123.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, the Court finds that the presence in a detention centre of a child accompanying its parents will comply with Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) only where the national authorities can establish that this measure of last resort has been taken after actual verification that no other measure involving a lesser restriction of their freedom could be implemented.124.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that the applicants and their child were placed in a detention centre pending their removal and, accordingly, this constituted a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f). The Court would refer to the finding of the Administrative Court of Appeal that there was no indication in the detention orders that the prefect had verified, in view of the child\u2019s presence, whether an alternative measure that would have been less coercive than detention was possible. Accordingly, while having regard to the reasons given in the prefect\u2019s decision to place the applicants in a detention centre, the Court takes the view that the evidence before it is not sufficient for it to be satisfied that the domestic authorities had effectively verified that the administrative detention of the family was a measure of last resort with no possible alternative.125.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in respect of the applicants\u2019 child....","28437":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION34.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that if extradited to Kyrgyzstan he would be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment because he belonged to the Uzbek ethnic minority. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government35.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations, arguing that the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan had improved dramatically since 2010, that the Kyrgyz authorities had provided the Government with adequate assurances against the risk of ill-treatment, and finally that the applicant had not submitted convincing evidence that he would risk ill\u2011treatment if extradited to Kyrgyzstan (for more details see Gayratbek Saliyev v. Russia, no. 39093\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 50\u201152, 17 April 2014; Kadirzhanov and Mamashev v. Russia, nos. 42351\/13 and 47823\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 80\u201183, 17 July 2014; Khamrakulov v. Russia, no. 68894\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 49\u201156, 16 April 2015; Nabid Abdullayev v. Russia, no. 8474\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 52\u201153, 15 October 2015; Turgunov, cited above , \u00a7\u00a7 38\u201144, 22 October 2015, and Tadzhibayev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a029\u201136, 1 December 2015).2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that he was still at serious and real risk of ill\u2011treatment in Kyrgyzstan. He relied firstly on the Court\u2019s recent case\u2011law and international reports about the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan in 2014\u20112015 and argued that no substantial change in the situation in Kyrgyzstan had occurred. He furthermore considered that the diplomatic assurances provided by the Kyrgyz authorities could not suffice to protect him against the risks of ill-treatment in the light of the criteria established in the Court\u2019s case-law. Finally, he submitted that the domestic authorities had not carried out an independent and rigorous examination of his claims concerning the existence of substantial grounds for fearing the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if extradited to Kyrgyzstan.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that it has already examined on several occasions the situation of ethnic Uzbeks whose extradition was sought by the Kyrgyz authorities in relation to a number of serious offences they allegedly committed in the course of the violent inter-ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek nationals in June 2010. In those cases it consistently held that, given the attested widespread and routine use of torture and other ill-treatment by law-enforcement agencies in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in respect of members of the Uzbek community, the impunity of law\u2011enforcement officers, and the absence of sufficient safeguards for the applicants in the requesting country, there were substantial grounds for believing that the applicants would face a real risk of exposure to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Kyrgyzstan (see Khamrakulov, cited above, \u00a7 65; Mamadaliyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a05614\/13, \u00a7\u00a060, 24\u00a0July 2014; Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above, \u00a7 91; Gayratbek Saliyev, cited above, \u00a7 61; and Makhmudzhan Ergashev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a049747\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 71\u201173, 16 October 2012). It is undisputed that the applicant belongs to the same category of persons.39.\u00a0\u00a0As in previous similar cases, the applicant unsuccessfully brought the above circumstances to the attention of the Russian authorities in the course of the extradition and refugee proceedings (see paragraphs 19\u201130 above). The Court is mindful of the fact that the domestic courts\u2019 reasoning in the applicant\u2019s case was more detailed (see, by contrast, Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above, \u00a7 94; Khamrakulov, cited above, \u00a7 67; Turgunov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 52-53; Gayratbek Saliyev, cited above, \u00a7 63; and compare to Nabid Abdullayev, cited above, \u00a7 65). However, their arguments justifying rejection of the applicant\u2019s claims have already been addressed by the Court in its previous judgments and found insufficient by it (see in particular as regards the insufficiency of diplomatic assurances and of the monitoring mechanism Nabid Abdullayev, cited above, \u00a7 53 and \u00a7\u00a7\u00a065\u201169). As to the last argument relied upon by the Supreme Court and based on the fact that the applicant\u2019s extradition was sought for ordinary criminal offences, to some of which he had initially confessed (see paragraph 24 above), the Court can only reiterate that the applicant\u2019s conduct \u2012 however undesirable or dangerous it might have been \u2012 cannot overturn the absolute prohibition of ill-treatment under Article 3 of the Convention (see Chahal v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7\u00a7 79-80, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V). In this respect, the Court recalls that the applicant is an ethnic Uzbek, whose extradition was sought by the Kyrgyz authorities for crimes allegedly committed in the course of the violence of June 2010 (see paragraph 9 above). He is thus a member of a group that is systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment (see paragraph 30 above).40.\u00a0\u00a0Considering that the applicant belongs to the same vulnerable group and in the absence of any new element or fact demonstrating a fundamental improvement in that area in the receiving country (see recently for the assessment of the latest available information Turgunov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a050), the Court finds the argument that the applicant would face a real risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Kyrgyzstan well-founded.41.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s forced return to Kyrgyzstan, in the form of extradition or otherwise, would be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that there were no avenues whereby to obtain judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention which reads as follows:\u201c4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits44.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations on just satisfaction submitted on 15\u00a0February 2016, the Government referred only to the possibility open to the applicant under the Russian criminal legislation to lodge an application for release either with a court or with a prosecutor without further details.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already found a violation of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention where an applicant was not able to bring about a judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention during a fixed period of detention, notwithstanding changes in the circumstances in the course of that period which were capable of affecting the lawfulness of the detention (see Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above \u00a7\u00a7 134-39). In the present case, the applicant\u2019s detention was authorised for a fixed period from 16 January 2015 to 23 July 2015. The changed circumstances which might have had an impact on the lawfulness of the detention were the Court\u2019s interim measure on 24 March 2015 and the extradition order becoming final on 25 March 2015. There was therefore a period of a little short of four months during which it was not open to the applicant to bring about a judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention.46.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of any new arguments or facts which would enable the Court to reach a different conclusion from that in the previous cases, for example as regards an application for release (see Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above \u00a7\u00a7 131-32, and Nabid Abdullayev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a087), the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT47.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.48.\u00a0\u00a0It considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court (see above paragraph 4) must continue in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION49.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Government suggested that, were the Court to find any violation of the Convention in the applicant\u2019s case, such a finding in itself would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that no breach of Article 3 of the Convention has yet occurred in the present case. However, it has found that the decision to extradite the applicant would, if implemented, give rise to a violation of that provision. It considers that its finding regarding Article 3 in itself amounts to adequate just satisfaction for the purposes of Article 41 (see Turgunov, cited above, \u00a7 65, and Tadzhibayev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a054). Nonetheless, considering the above finding of a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, the Court awards EUR 5,000 to the applicant in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount (see Kadirzhanov and Mamashev, cited above \u00a7 146).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 4,600 for the costs and expenses in respect of his representation by Ms Yermolayeva and Ms Davidyan before the Supreme Court and the Court. He submitted his lawyers\u2019 time sheets.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disagreed.55.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the Court\u2019s case-law, especially in similar cases, and to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum as claimed, plus any tax which may be chargeable to the applicant on that amount, to be paid into his representative\u2019s bank account (see Gayratbek Saliyev, cited above, \u00a7 91).C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28439":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their return to Iraq would entail a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment56.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber noted that, although the general situation in Iraq had significantly worsened since June 2014, so far there were no international reports on Iraq which could lead it to conclude that the general situation was so serious as to cause, by itself, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in the event of a person\u2019s return to that country.57.\u00a0\u00a0As to the particular circumstances of the applicants, the Chamber first noted that their claims had been carefully examined by the Migration Agency and the Migration Court, both of which had acknowledged that the first applicant had cooperated with Americans and that, as a result, the applicants had been subjected to serious threats and violence by al-Qaeda during the years 2004 to 2008. However, since the first applicant had stopped working with American companies in 2008 they had considered it unlikely that any possible threats against the applicants were still so present and concrete as to justify the granting of asylum.58.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber further noted that, before the Migration Agency, the first applicant had confirmed that he had not received any personal threats from al-Qaeda since 2008. However, having been refused asylum by the Migration Agency on 22 November 2011, the applicants had changed their explanations and had stated that al-Qaeda had also come looking for the first applicant on 10 September 2011 at their house in Baghdad and had burned down their house on 12 November 2011. The Chamber underlined that the Migration Agency had not found the applicants or the documents submitted on these points to be credible. The Chamber found it noteworthy that the first applicant had not mentioned the first incident to the Migration Agency, despite being interviewed by that body three times. Moreover, it observed that the evidence submitted to the domestic courts as well as to the Court, allegedly certifying that al-Qaeda had also searched for the first applicant in September 2011 and that his house had been burned down on 12 November 2011, was very simple in nature, such as to cast doubt on its authenticity. Accordingly, the Chamber found no reason to disagree with the Migration Agency that the applicants had not substantiated their allegation that they had been threatened and persecuted by al-Qaeda after 2008.59.\u00a0\u00a0Likewise, as to the applicants\u2019 allegation that the first applicant was at risk because of his participation in a televised public debate in February 2010, the Chamber noted that the applicants had not mentioned the recording at all to the Migration Agency, despite being interviewed several times. The first applicant had submitted the recording for the first time with his written submissions to the Migration Court on 1 February 2012. The Swedish authorities were not convinced that the recording had dated from February 2010 or that the applicants would be unable to obtain protection from the Iraqi authorities because the first applicant had publicly criticised them during the debate. In sum, the Chamber agreed with the Swedish authorities that the applicants had failed to substantiate these allegations.60.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above, and noting that the first applicant had ceased his business with the Americans in 2008, that the most recent substantiated violent attack by al-Qaeda against the applicants had taken place in October 2008, almost six and a half years earlier, and in particular that the first applicant had stayed in Baghdad until December 2010 and the second and third applicants until September 2011, without having substantiated their allegation that they had been subjected to further direct threats, the Chamber endorsed the assessment by the Swedish authorities that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the applicants would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Iraq. Accordingly, the Chamber found that their removal would not give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that in its Chamber judgment the Court had decided to place the entire burden of proof on the applicants and had not granted them the benefit of the doubt. It had chosen to ignore parts of the applicants\u2019 evidence, finding that the last threat from al-Qaeda had occurred in 2008. Concerning the threats from 2008 onwards, the applicants claimed that the Swedish authorities and courts had dismissed the evidence submitted by them and had found that it was not likely that there were threats against the first applicant in his home country. It was common in the Swedish asylum process for evidence submitted by asylum-seekers to be investigated in order to ascertain its credibility. However, in the present case, the domestic authorities had categorically dismissed the evidence submitted by the applicants without making any effort to investigate its veracity by, for example, contacting the Iraqi authorities or the Alhurra media channel. They had thus not fulfilled their obligations under Articles\u00a03 and 6 of the Convention. Had the Swedish authorities \u2013 and the Chamber \u2013 had any doubts about the credibility of the evidence submitted, they should first have made a well-informed decision on whether or not to accept it as credible. Had they correctly evaluated the evidence submitted, their assessment would most likely have been different from the one they had made in their decisions. As the Swedish authorities had not questioned the veracity of the applicants\u2019 claims, they should have given the first applicant the benefit of the doubt.62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants pointed out that the Qualification Directive had established a \u201cbenefit of the doubt\u201d rule for asylum-seekers regarding evidence submitted in support of their asylum cases. If an asylum-seeker\u2019s general credibility was not called into question, he or she should make an honest effort to support his or her oral submissions. In the assessment of the credibility of the submissions, importance should be placed on whether they were coherent and not contradictory, and whether their essential elements remained unchanged during the asylum proceedings. In the first applicant\u2019s case there had been no reason to call his credibility into question. There had been a natural reason for invoking his political activities late in the asylum process: he had not been afforded an opportunity to give a complete account of his arguments in his asylum interview and therefore he had focused on the most urgent threat, namely that posed by al-Qaeda. Whether the televised public debate had been aired in 2008 or 2010 did not in any way invalidate or mitigate the first applicant\u2019s credibility or the threat level against him. The fact that the debate had been aired should have been a sufficient reason to take it seriously and investigate it. The only reason why the first applicant had not been subjected to ill-treatment between 2008 and 2011 was that he had been in hiding.63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants contended that if the first applicant were to be deported to his home country, he would necessarily have to be in contact with government agencies. If a threat from government agencies had existed before he had fled to Sweden, the threat would continue to exist upon his return. Should he be forced to return, he would have to deny his identity and hide from the government authorities, and this would be in clear breach of the Convention. Available country information suggested that former employees of the American troops were placed in a vulnerable situation. Besides being regarded as traitors to their homeland by al-Qaeda, they were now also under threat from ISIS, who saw them as direct targets. Many former collaborators had lost their lives in areas under ISIS control.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Swedish courts and authorities, as well as the Chamber, had acknowledged that the first applicant had had a well-founded reason to fear for his life during the period between 2004 and 2008. The ill-treatment he had suffered was in essence comparable to torture. On the sole basis of the incidents to which he had referred, the burden of proof should have been placed on the Swedish authorities and not on him. The incidents referred to and the ill-treatment suffered by the first applicant were also indicative of the assessment of the potential threats and risks he was likely to face on his return. As the domestic authorities had accepted that all these incidents had actually taken place, the incidents at issue should have been the starting-point for a forward-looking threat assessment. The Swedish authorities should have presented enough arguments to counter this threat assessment on the basis of actual events. Since they had failed to do so, the assumption had to be that the same threat scenario still persisted. The Swedish authorities should also have taken into consideration the first applicant\u2019s previous experiences and his vulnerability resulting from cooperation with the American forces in Iraq. The Iraqi authorities would not be able to protect him if he needed protection in the future. The burden of proof should have rested with the Swedish authorities, which had not been able to prove that the first applicant would not be subjected to any ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if returned to his home country.65.\u00a0\u00a0Under Swedish law, asylum-seekers had to make a plausible claim in order to discharge their burden of proof. However, the standard of probability varied from case to case and from court to court, and there were no established guidelines as to when, for example, a document was to be considered to be of such low quality that it had no evidentiary value. This assessment was thus arbitrary. In the present case, the authorities had placed the whole burden of proof on the applicants and, throughout the proceedings, had found that they had not discharged this burden of proof. This had been done without stating, in detail or otherwise, how the facts had actually been established. For this reason it was difficult to determine whether an excessive burden of proof had been placed on the applicants.66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants concluded that, on the basis of their previous experiences and the deteriorating security situation in Iraq, they would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 if returned to Iraq.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government agreed with the Chamber\u2019s conclusion that there would be no violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicants were returned to Iraq.68.\u00a0\u00a0As to the general situation in Iraq, the Government noted that both the Migration Agency and the Migration Court had found that the security situation in Iraq was not such that there was a general need for international protection for asylum-seekers, a finding that had been confirmed by the Court in its Chamber judgment. According to the most recent information provided by the Migration Agency, the intensity of violence in Baghdad still did not constitute a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. The Court\u2019s assessment in its Chamber judgment was thus still valid as far as the general situation in Iraq, including Baghdad, was concerned.69.\u00a0\u00a0As regards protection by the Iraqi authorities, country-of-origin information indicated that there was a properly functioning judicial system in place in Baghdad. According to the Migration Agency\u2019s legal opinion, the issue of whether the protection afforded by the authorities in a country was sufficient had to be considered on the basis of whether the country in question would take the necessary action to prevent persecution of, or severe injury to, a person.70.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the applicants\u2019 personal circumstances, the Government noted that the first applicant had not mentioned his alleged persecution by al-Qaeda in his interviews which had taken place only a few weeks after the alleged incident, and that the documents submitted in support of that allegation had been of a very simple nature, thus casting doubt on their authenticity. The Government agreed with the Chamber that the applicants had not substantiated their allegation that they had been persecuted by al-Qaeda after 2008. The Government stressed that the first applicant had not provided any evidence that he had been subjected to any personal threats since 2008. He had stayed in Baghdad until December 2010 and his wife and son until September 2011 without being subjected to any direct threats or assaults. Two of his daughters still lived in Baghdad and had not been subjected to any threats. As the attacks on the first applicant had been focused on those years when he had had a business contract with the American forces and had ceased thereafter, it was likely that the threats and attacks were not linked to him personally but rather were intended to deter him from cooperating with the Americans. Moreover, the first applicant had never asked the Iraqi authorities for any protection. The Government maintained that the applicants had failed to show that they had been unable to be granted protection by the Iraqi authorities.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the first applicant had also alleged a risk of persecution owing to his participation in a televised public debate. However, he had failed to mention this issue in his asylum interviews, in his written submissions to the Migration Agency and in his appeal to the Migration Court. When he had done so in his subsequent submissions, he had initially claimed that the debate had taken place in February 2008, then in February 2010. The DVD of the debate submitted as evidence clearly indicated that the recording had not been made after 4 March 2008. The Chamber had agreed with the Government that the applicants had failed to show either that the recording had been made after 4 March 2008 or that the first applicant risked being persecuted on account of it.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further contended that there was no reason to believe that the first applicant and his family would find themselves in a particularly vulnerable situation upon returning to Baghdad. The Government agreed with the Chamber that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that, owing to their personal circumstances, the applicants would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article\u00a03 of the Convention if returned to Iraq.The Government submitted that the available country-of-origin information showed that the general situation in Baghdad in 2008, with groups linked to al-Qaeda threatening and punishing anyone cooperating or working with American or Western forces, no longer prevailed. Instead, current country-of-origin information indicated that the greatest threat in relation to the general situation in Baghdad today emanated from ISIS, which was seeking to persecute Shia Muslims in general and other religious minorities.In the applicants\u2019 case, the threats and the violence had been closely connected to the first applicant\u2019s cooperation with the American forces. As this cooperation had long since ceased, the situation for the applicants had changed. Furthermore, according to country-of-origin information, the Iraqi authorities were no longer deemed to be infiltrated by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or ISIS, contrary to the applicants\u2019 contention. While such groups had their origins in Sunni extremist groups, the authorities in Baghdad were dominated by the Shiite community.Thus, when making a full and ex nunc assessment, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the applicants would face a real and individual risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if the expulsion orders were to be implemented.73.\u00a0\u00a0As to the issue of burden of proof, the Government noted that, according to Swedish case-law, the UNHCR Handbook was an important source of law and the UNHCR reports and recommendations an important source of guidance which, however, had to be balanced against information about the situation in a given country. According to the domestic case-law, a person applying for a residence permit bore the initial burden of proving that the actual circumstances required for a residence permit to be granted were in place. While the initial burden of proof lay with the applicant, the obligation to elicit and evaluate the relevant facts was shared between the applicant and the migration authorities and courts. According to the travaux pr\u00e9paratoires to the Swedish Aliens Act, the standard of proof could not be set too high for claims concerning the risk of persecution as it was rarely possible to present solid evidence that could clearly confirm the existence of such a risk. It was often necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt when all available evidence had been obtained and checked and when the examiner was satisfied with the applicant\u2019s general credibility. A prerequisite for the benefit of the doubt was that the applicant\u2019s statement was coherent and not contradictory and that the essence of the statement remained unchanged during the asylum procedure.74.\u00a0\u00a0According to the principle that the courts had ultimate responsibility for investigations, as set forth in section 8 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act, the Migration Court had to take all relevant circumstances into account and ensure that the investigation of the case was adequate and complete. The Migration Agency had an obligation to provide service and guidance and to investigate. It had to help individuals to take advantage of their rights and guide them by taking the initiative to conduct further investigations, depending on the circumstances. In asylum cases this obligation to investigate was even more far-reaching. Moreover, according to the domestic case-law, the threshold for evidence was set higher for circumstances that could reasonably be confirmed by the applicant but lower for circumstances that were more difficult to prove.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that, in the present case, the first applicant\u2019s account of the risk of persecution by al-Qaeda until 2008 was essentially consistent and detailed, did not contain contradictory information, and was supported by relevant country-of-origin information. He had thus discharged his burden of proof and was therefore entitled to be given the benefit of the doubt. However, as the applicants had not sought asylum until December 2010 and September 2011, they had to plausibly establish that, as matters stood at the time of the domestic proceedings, they would still face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention upon returning to Baghdad. They had failed to discharge this burden of proof. It was only after the Migration Agency had denied the applicants residence permits that they had come up with new claims and evidence which had been incoherent and contradictory. As the essence of their account had changed, they could not be given the benefit of the doubt. As there was a lack of credibility, the domestic authorities and courts had no reason to investigate these claims any further. The applicants\u2019 situation had changed after 2008 and their need for protection had ceased. During the domestic proceedings the migration authorities had taken all relevant circumstances into account and ensured that the investigation of the case was adequate and complete. The domestic decisions did not imply that an excessive burden of proof had been placed on the applicants.76.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government pointed out that the present case differed from the case of R.C. v. Sweden (no. 41827\/07, 9 March 2010), which concerned allegations of torture and ill-treatment at the hands of the domestic authorities. In the present case the alleged persecution of the applicants had been carried out by non-State actors. The applicants had failed to substantiate their claim that they faced a substantial risk of being subjected to ill-treatment upon their return, at this point in time, to Iraq.C.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles(a)\u00a0\u00a0General nature of obligations under Article 377.\u00a0\u00a0The Court noted the following in Labita v. Italy ([GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV):\u201cAs the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999\u2011V, and the Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, p. 3288, \u00a7 93). The Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim\u2019s conduct (see the Chahal v. the United Kingdom judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V, p. 1855, \u00a7 79).\u201d(b)\u00a0\u00a0Principle of non-refoulement78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has on many occasions acknowledged the importance of the principle of non-refoulement (see, for example, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 286, ECHR 2011, and M.A. v. Cyprus, no.\u00a041872\/10, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). The Court\u2019s main concern in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum-seekers is \u201cwhether effective guarantees exist that protect the applicant against arbitrary refoulement, be it direct or indirect, to the country from which he or she has fled\u201d (see, among other authorities, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0286; M\u00fcslim v. Turkey, no. 53566\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 72-76, 26 April 2005; and T.I. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 43844\/98, ECHR 2000-III).(c)\u00a0\u00a0General principles concerning the application of Article 3 in expulsion cases79.\u00a0\u00a0The general principles concerning Article 3 in expulsion cases have been set out in Saadi v. Italy ([GC] no. 37201\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 124-133, ECHR 2008) and, most recently, in F.G. v. Sweden ([GC], no. 43611\/11, ECHR 2016). The relevant paragraphs of the latter judgment read as follows:\u201c111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Contracting States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens (see, for example, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 113, ECHR 2012; \u00dcner v.\u00a0the\u00a0Netherlands [GC], no.\u00a046410\/99, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2006-XII; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, \u00a7 67, Series A no. 94; and Boujlifa v.\u00a0France, 21 October 1997, \u00a7 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011VI). However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the destination country. In these circumstances, Article 3 implies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country (see, among other authorities, Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 124-125, ECHR 2008).112.\u00a0\u00a0The assessment of whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces such a real risk inevitably requires the Court to examine the conditions in the destination country in the light of the standards of Article 3 of the Convention (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and\u00a046951\/99, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2005-I). These standards entail that the ill-treatment the applicant alleges he will face if returned must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this level is relative, depending on all the circumstances of the case (see Hilal v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a045276\/99, \u00a7 60, ECHR 2001-II).(d)\u00a0\u00a0Risk of ill-treatment by private groups80.\u00a0\u00a0Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranteed, Article 3 of the Convention applies not only to the danger emanating from State authorities but also where the danger emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials. However, it must be shown that the risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection (see NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7 110, 17 July 2008; F.H. v. Sweden, no.\u00a032621\/06, \u00a7\u00a0102, 20\u00a0January 2009; and H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, \u00a7 40, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011III).81.\u00a0\u00a0In this context, the possibility of protection or relocation of the applicant in the State of origin is also of relevance. The Court reiterates that Article 3 does not, as such, preclude Contracting States from placing reliance on the existence of an internal flight alternative in their assessment of an individual\u2019s claim that a return to his country of origin would expose him to a real risk of being subjected to treatment proscribed by that provision (see Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948\/04, \u00a7 141, 11\u00a0January 2007; Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7\u00a098, Reports 1996-V; and Hilal v. the United Kingdom, no. 45276\/99, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a067-68, ECHR 2001-II).82.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court has held that reliance on an internal flight alternative does not affect the responsibility of the expelling Contracting State to ensure that the applicant is not, as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see Salah Sheekh, cited above, \u00a7 141, and T.I. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), cited above). Therefore, as a precondition of relying on an internal flight alternative, certain guarantees have to be in place: the person to be expelled must be able to travel to the area concerned, gain admittance and settle there, failing which an issue under Article 3 may arise, the more so if in the absence of such guarantees there is a possibility of his ending up in a part of the country of origin where he may be subjected to ill-treatment (see Salah\u00a0Sheekh, cited above, \u00a7 141, and Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos.\u00a08319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7 266, 28 June 2011).(e)\u00a0\u00a0Principle of ex nunc evaluation of the circumstances83.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s case-law the principle of ex nunc evaluation of the circumstances has been established in a number of cases. This principle has most recently been set out in F.G. v. Sweden (cited above):\u201c115.\u00a0\u00a0If the applicant has not already been deported, the material point in time for the assessment must be that of the Court\u2019s consideration of the case (see Chahal, cited above, \u00a7 86). A full and ex nunc evaluation is required where it is necessary to take into account information that has come to light after the final decision by the domestic authorities was taken (see, for example, Maslov v. Austria [GC], no.\u00a01638\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 87-95, ECHR 2008 and Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 215). This situation typically arises when, as in the present case, deportation is delayed as a result of the indication by the Court of an interim measure under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court. Since the nature of the Contracting States\u2019 responsibility under Article 3 in cases of this kind lies in the act of exposing an individual to the risk of ill treatment, the existence of the risk must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known by the Contracting State at the time of the expulsion. The assessment must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the applicant\u2019s removal to the country of destination, in the light of the general situation there and of his or her personal circumstances (see, for example, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948\/04, \u00a7\u00a0136, 11 January 2007; and Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 107 and 108).\u201d(f)\u00a0\u00a0Principle of subsidiarity84.\u00a0\u00a0In F.G. v. Sweden (cited above), the Court described the nature of its examination in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum-seekers as follows:\u201c117.\u00a0\u00a0In cases concerning the expulsion of asylum-seekers, the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum applications or verify how the States honour their obligations under the Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees. Its main concern is whether effective guarantees exist that protect the applicant against arbitrary refoulement, be it direct or indirect, to the country from which he or she has fled. By virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the guaranteed rights and freedoms is laid on the national authorities. The machinery of complaint to the Court is thus subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights. This subsidiary character is articulated in Articles 13 and 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no.\u00a030696\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 286-287, ECHR 2011). The Court must be satisfied, however, that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating from other reliable and objective sources such as, for instance, other Contracting or third States, agencies of the United Nations and reputable non-governmental organisations (see, among other authorities, NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7 119, 17\u00a0July 2008).118.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court\u2019s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them (see, among other authorities, Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 179-80, 24\u00a0March 2011; Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 31890\/11, \u00a7 113, 3 October 2013; and Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386\/10, \u00a7 155, ECHR 2013 (extracts). As a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned (see, for example, R.C. v. Sweden, no. 41827\/07, \u00a7 52, 9 March 2010).\u201d(g)\u00a0\u00a0Assessment of the existence of a real risk85.\u00a0\u00a0In Saadi v. Italy (cited above, \u00a7 140) the Court held:\u201c... for a planned forcible expulsion to be in breach of the Convention it is necessary \u2013 and sufficient \u2013 for substantial grounds to have been shown for believing that there is a real risk that the person concerned will be subjected in the receiving country to treatment prohibited by Article 3 (see paragraphs 125 and 132 above and the case-law cited in those paragraphs).\u201d86.\u00a0\u00a0In F.G. v. Sweden (cited above), the Court found the following concerning the assessment of the existence of a real risk:\u201c113.\u00a0\u00a0The assessment of the existence of a real risk must necessarily be a rigorous one (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 96, Reports 1996-V, and Saadi v. Italy, cited above, \u00a7 128). It is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see, for example, Saadi v.\u00a0Italy, cited above, \u00a7 129, and N. v. Finland, no. 38885\/02, \u00a7 167, 26 July 2005). ...114.\u00a0\u00a0The assessment must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the applicant\u2019s removal to the country of destination, in the light of the general situation there and of his or her personal circumstances (see Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, \u00a7 108, Series A no. 215). In this connection, and where it is relevant to do so, the Court will have regard to whether there is a general situation of violence existing in the country of destination (see Sufi and Elmi v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, nos.\u00a08319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7 216, 28 June 2011)....116.\u00a0\u00a0It is for the Court to consider in an expulsion case whether, in all the circumstances of the case before it, substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. If the existence of such a risk is established, the applicant\u2019s removal would necessarily breach Article 3, regardless of whether the risk emanates from a general situation of violence, a personal characteristic of the applicant, or a combination of the two. However, it is clear that not every situation of general violence will give rise to such a risk. On the contrary, the Court has made it clear that a general situation of violence would only be of sufficient intensity to create such a risk \u2018in the most extreme cases\u2019 where there was a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence on return (see Sufi and Elmi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 216 and 218. See also, among others, L.M. and Others v. Russia, nos. 40081\/14, 40088\/14 and 40127\/14, \u00a7 108, 15\u00a0October 2015; and Mamazhonov v. Russia, no. 17239\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 132\u2011133, 23 October 2014).\u201d87.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the assessment of evidence, it has been established in the Court\u2019s case-law that \u201cthe existence of the risk must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of expulsion\u201d (see F.G.\u00a0v.\u00a0Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 115, quoted at paragraph 83 above). The Contracting State therefore has the obligation to take into account not only the evidence submitted by the applicant but also all other facts which are relevant in the case under examination.88.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing the weight to be attached to country material, the Court has found in its case-law that consideration must be given to the source of such material, in particular its independence, reliability and objectivity. In respect of reports, the authority and reputation of the author, the seriousness of the investigations by means of which they were compiled, the consistency of their conclusions and their corroboration by other sources are all relevant considerations (see Saadi v. Italy, cited above, \u00a7 143; NA. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 120; and Sufi and Elmi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0230).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also recognises that consideration must be given to the presence and reporting capacities of the author of the material in the country in question (see Sufi and Elmi, cited above, \u00a7 231). The Court appreciates the many difficulties faced by governments and NGOs gathering information in dangerous and volatile situations. It accepts that it will not always be possible for investigations to be carried out in the immediate vicinity of a conflict and, in such cases, information provided by sources with first-hand knowledge of the situation may have to be relied on (see Sufi and Elmi, cited above, \u00a7 232).90.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing the risk, the Court may obtain relevant materials proprio motu. This principle has been firmly established in the Court\u2019s case-law (see H.L.R. v. France, cited above, \u00a7 37; Hilal, cited above, \u00a7 60; and Hirsi\u00a0Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 116, ECHR 2012). In respect of materials obtained proprio motu, the Court considers that, given the absolute nature of the protection afforded by Article 3, it must be satisfied that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating from other reliable and objective sources such as, for instance, other Contracting or non-Contracting States, agencies of the United Nations and reputable non-governmental organisations (see F.G.\u00a0v.\u00a0Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 117, quoted at paragraph 84 above). In its supervisory task under Article 19 of the Convention, it would be too narrow an approach under Article 3 in cases concerning aliens facing expulsion or extradition if the Court, as an international human rights court, were only to take into account materials made available by the domestic authorities of the Contracting State concerned, without comparing these with materials from other reliable and objective sources (see Salah Sheekh, cited above, \u00a7 136).(h)\u00a0\u00a0Distribution of the burden of proof91.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the burden of proof in expulsion cases, it is the Court\u2019s well-established case-law that it is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article\u00a03; and that where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts about it (see F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 120; Saadi v.\u00a0Italy, cited above, \u00a7 129; NA. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0111; and R.C. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 50).92.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, it is incumbent on persons who allege that their expulsion would amount to a breach of Article 3 to adduce, to the greatest extent practically possible, material and information allowing the authorities of the Contracting State concerned, as well as the Court, to assess the risk a removal may entail (see Said v. the Netherlands, no.\u00a02345\/02, \u00a7 49, ECHR 2005\u2011VI). The Court, however, acknowledges the fact that with regard to applications for recognition of refugee status, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the person concerned to supply evidence within a short time, especially if such evidence must be obtained from the country from which he or she claims to have fled. The lack of direct documentary evidence thus cannot be decisive per se (see Bahaddar v.\u00a0the\u00a0Netherlands, 19 February 1998, \u00a7 45, Reports 1998\u2011I, and, mutatis mutandis, Said, cited above, \u00a7 49).93.\u00a0\u00a0Owing to the special situation in which asylum-seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when assessing the credibility of their statements and the documents submitted in support thereof. Yet when information is presented which gives strong reasons to question the veracity of an asylum-seeker\u2019s submissions, the individual must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged inaccuracies in those submissions (see F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0113; Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden (dec.), no. 23944\/05, 8 March 2007; and S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60367\/10, \u00a7 71, 29 January 2013). Even if the applicant\u2019s account of some details may appear somewhat implausible, the Court has considered that this does not necessarily detract from the overall general credibility of the applicant\u2019s claim (see Said, cited above, \u00a7 53, and, mutatis mutandis, N. v. Finland, no.\u00a038885\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0154-155, 26 July 2005).94.\u00a0\u00a0As a general rule, an asylum-seeker cannot be seen as having discharged the burden of proof until he or she provides a substantiated account of an individual, and thus a real, risk of ill-treatment upon deportation that is capable of distinguishing his or her situation from the general perils in the country of destination.95.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, although a number of individual factors may not, when considered separately, constitute a real risk, the same factors may give rise to a real risk when taken cumulatively and when considered in a situation of general violence and heightened security (see NA. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 130). The following elements may represent such risk factors: previous criminal record and\/or arrest warrant, the age, gender and origin of a returnee, a previous record as a suspected or actual member of a persecuted group, and a previous asylum claim submitted abroad (see NA.\u00a0v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 143-144 and 146).96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it is the shared duty of an asylum-seeker and the immigration authorities to ascertain and evaluate all relevant facts of the case in the asylum proceedings. Asylum-seekers are normally the only parties who are able to provide information about their own personal circumstances. Therefore, as far as the individual circumstances are concerned, the burden of proof should in principle lie on the applicants, who must submit, as soon as possible, all evidence relating to their individual circumstances that is needed to substantiate their application for international protection. This requirement is also expressed both in the UNHCR documents (see paragraph\u00a06 of the UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims and paragraph 196 of the UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, both referred to in paragraphs 53-54 above) and in Article\u00a04 \u00a7\u00a01 of the EU\u00a0Qualification Directive, as well as in the subsequent case-law of the CJEU (see paragraphs 47 and 49-50 above).97.\u00a0\u00a0However, the rules concerning the burden of proof should not render ineffective the applicants\u2019 rights protected under Article 3 of the Convention. It is also important to take into account all the difficulties which an asylum-seeker may encounter abroad when collecting evidence (see Bahaddar, cited above \u00a7 45, and, mutatis mutandis, Said, cited above, \u00a7\u00a049). Both the standards developed by the UNCHR (paragraph 12 of the Note and paragraph 196 of the Handbook, both cited in paragraphs\u00a053-54 above) and Article 4\u00a0\u00a7\u00a05 of the Qualification Directive recognise, explicitly or implicitly, that the benefit of the doubt should be granted in favour of an individual seeking international protection.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, as far as the evaluation of the general situation in a specific country is concerned, a different approach should be taken. In respect of such matters, the domestic authorities examining a request for international protection have full access to information. For this reason, the general situation in another country, including the ability of its public authorities to provide protection, has to be established proprio motu by the competent domestic immigration authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, H.L.R.\u00a0v.\u00a0France, cited above, \u00a7 37; Hilal, cited above, \u00a7 60; and Hirsi\u00a0Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 116). A similar approach is advocated in paragraph\u00a06 of the above-mentioned Note issued by the UNHCR, according to which the authorities adjudicating on an asylum claim have to take \u201cthe objective situation in the country of origin concerned\u201d into account proprio motu. Similarly, Article 4 \u00a7 3 of the Qualification Directive requires that \u201call relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin\u201d are taken into account.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Past ill-treatment as an indication of risk99.\u00a0\u00a0Specific issues arise when an asylum-seeker alleges that he or she has been ill-treated in the past, since past ill-treatment may be relevant for assessing the level of risk of future ill-treatment. According to the established case-law, in the evaluation of the risk of future ill-treatment it is necessary to take due account of the fact that the applicant has made a plausible case that he or she was subjected to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the past. For example, in R.C. v. Sweden, in which the applicant had already been tortured, the Court considered that \u201cthe onus rest[ed] with the State to dispel any doubts about the risk of his being subjected again to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the event that his expulsion proceeded\u201d (see R.C. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 55). In R.J.\u00a0v.\u00a0France, while sharing the French Government\u2019s doubts as to the claims made by the applicant, a Tamil from Sri Lanka, concerning the conditions of his detention and his financial support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Court found that the Government had failed to effectively rebut the strong presumption raised by the medical certificate of treatment contrary to Article 3 (see R.J. v. France, no.\u00a010466\/11, \u00a7\u00a042, 19\u00a0September 2013). In the case of D.N.W. v. Sweden the Court concluded that \u201cthe applicant ha[d] failed to make it plausible that he would face a real risk of being killed or subjected to ill-treatment upon return to Ethiopia\u201d even though it accepted that the applicant had been detained and subjected to ill-treatment by the Ethiopian authorities in the past (see D.N.W. v.\u00a0Sweden, no.\u00a029946\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 42 and 45, 6 December 2012).100.\u00a0\u00a0This issue has also been touched upon in the EU Qualification Directive and in the UNHCR documents. In particular, Article 4 \u00a7 4 of the Qualification Directive (see paragraph 47 above) provides \u2013 as regards the assessment of refugee status or other need for international protection by the authorities of European Union member States \u2013 that \u201c[t]he fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or direct threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious indication of the applicant\u2019s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated\u201d.101.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, this issue, which is closely linked with the general questions of assessment of evidence, is addressed in paragraph 19 of the UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, dealing with indicators for assessing the well-foundedness of a fear of persecution, which states as follows: \u201cWhile past persecution or mistreatment would weigh heavily in favour of a positive assessment of risk of future persecution, its absence is not a decisive factor. By the same token, the fact of past persecution is not necessarily conclusive of the possibility of renewed persecution, particularly where there has been an important change in the conditions in the country of origin\u201d (see paragraph 53 above). The Court considers that the UNHCR\u2019s general approach to the burden of proof is also of interest in the present context: while the burden of proof lies with the asylum-seeker, the State official examining the asylum claim shares the duty to ascertain and evaluate all relevant facts with the asylum-seeker (see paragraph 6 of the UNHCR 1998 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims and paragraph 196 of the UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status \u2013 cited in paragraphs 53 and 54 above). Moreover, as regards the assessment of the overall credibility of an asylum claim, paragraph 11 of the Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims states that credibility is established where the applicant has presented a claim which is coherent and plausible, not contradicting generally known facts, and therefore is, on balance, capable of being believed (see paragraph 53 above).102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the fact of past ill-treatment provides a strong indication of a future, real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3, in cases in which an applicant has made a generally coherent and credible account of events that is consistent with information from reliable and objective sources about the general situation in the country at issue. In such circumstances, it will be for the Government to dispel any doubts about that risk.(j)\u00a0\u00a0Membership of a targeted group103.\u00a0\u00a0The above-mentioned requirement that an asylum-seeker is capable of distinguishing his or her situation from the general perils in the country of destination is, however, relaxed in certain circumstances, for example where an applicant alleges that he or she is a member of a group systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment (see Salah Sheekh, cited above, \u00a7 148; S.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 19956\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 69-71, 15\u00a0June\u00a02010; and NA.\u00a0v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 116).104.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, in Saadi v. Italy (cited above) the Court held:\u201c132.\u00a0\u00a0In cases where an applicant alleges that he or she is a member of a group systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, the Court considers that the protection of Article 3 of the Convention enters into play when the applicant establishes, where necessary on the basis of the sources mentioned in the previous paragraph, that there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and his or her membership of the group concerned (see, mutatis mutandis, Salah Sheekh, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 138-49).\u201d105.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, the Court will not then insist that the applicant demonstrate the existence of further special distinguishing features if to do so would render illusory the protection offered by Article 3. This will be determined in the light of the applicant\u2019s account and the information on the situation in the country of destination in respect of the group in question (see Salah Sheekh, cited above, \u00a7 148; and NA. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 116).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the applicants\u2019 case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Material time of the risk assessment106.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s established case-law, the existence of a risk of ill-treatment must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of expulsion (see F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 115, quoted at paragraph 83 above). However, if the applicant has not yet been extradited or deported when the Court examines the case, the relevant time will be that of the proceedings before the Court (see Saadi v. Italy, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0133; Chahal, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 85-86; and Venkadajalasarma v. the Netherlands, no.\u00a058510\/00, \u00a7 63, 17 February 2004).107.\u00a0\u00a0Since the applicants in the present case have not yet been deported, the question whether they would face a real risk of persecution upon their return to Iraq must be examined in the light of the present-day situation. The Court will therefore consider the applicants\u2019 situation as it presents itself today, taking into account the historical facts in so far as they shed light on the current situation.(b)\u00a0\u00a0General security situation in Iraq108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that both the Swedish Migration Agency and the Migration Court concluded in 2011 and 2012 respectively that the security situation in Iraq was not such that there was a general need for international protection for asylum-seekers. This finding was subsequently confirmed by the Chamber in its judgment of June 2015 in the present case.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted in their written observations that, according to the most recent information provided by the Migration Agency, the intensity of violence in Baghdad still did not constitute a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. They referred, inter alia, to the United Kingdom Home Office\u2019s report from April 2015 and reports by the Norwegian Landinfo from 2014 and 2015. The applicants simply noted in their observations that the security situation in Iraq was deteriorating, without making reference to any supporting documents.110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts the Government\u2019s position on the general security situation in Iraq and finds that it is substantiated. Furthermore, the most recent reports by the United Kingdom Home Office, dating from November 2015, support this finding. Although the security situation in Baghdad City has deteriorated, the intensity of violence has not reached a level which would constitute, as such, a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Nor do any of the recent reports from independent international human rights protection associations referred to in paragraphs 32-34 above contain any information capable of leading to such a conclusion.111.\u00a0\u00a0As the general security situation in Iraq does not as such prevent the applicants\u2019 removal, the Court must therefore assess whether their personal circumstances are such that they would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 if expelled to Iraq.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Personal circumstances of the applicants112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes first of all that, in the present case, the alleged threats have concerned several members of the applicant family, including the first and second applicants\u2019 daughter and the first applicant\u2019s brother. As these threats were mainly due to the first applicant\u2019s actions, the Court will therefore focus on his situation. The first applicant claimed that he would run a real risk of ill-treatment if returned to Iraq, on two grounds: on the one hand, his alleged persecution by al-Qaeda on account of his business relationship with the American forces until 2008 and, on the other hand, the possible persecution by the Iraqi authorities on account of a televised public debate in which he had participated.113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is assessing the applicants\u2019 situation from the present-day point of view. The main question is not how the Swedish immigration authorities assessed the case at the time (that is, when the Migration Agency and the Migration Court took their decisions on 22\u00a0November 2011 and 23 April 2012 respectively) but rather whether, in the present-day situation, the applicants would still face a real risk of persecution for the above-mentioned reasons if removed to Iraq (see F.G.\u00a0v.\u00a0Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 115).114.\u00a0\u00a0From the outset, the Court sees no reason to cast doubt on the Migration Agency\u2019s findings that the family had been exposed to the most serious forms of abuses (ytterst allvarliga \u00f6vergrepp) by al-Qaeda from 2004 until 2008 (see paragraph 17 above, and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0117-118, quoted in paragraph 84 above), which do not seem to have been questioned in the Agency\u2019s submissions to the Migration Court, or in the conclusions of the latter, and which appear to be undisputed in the Convention proceedings. The Court also notes that the applicants alleged in the proceedings before the Migration Agency that indirect threats against them and attacks on the first applicant\u2019s business stock had continued after 2008, that they had only escaped further abuses by going into hiding and that they had been unable to avail themselves of the Iraqi authorities\u2019 protection as the latter were infiltrated by al-Qaeda. The Court sees no reason to question this account. Thus, on the whole, the Court is satisfied that the applicants\u2019 account of events which occurred between 2004 and 2010 is generally coherent and credible. This account is consistent with relevant country-of-origin information available from reliable and objective sources (see paragraph 39 above). Having regard to the fact that the applicants had been subjected to ill-treatment by al-Qaeda, the Court finds that there is a strong indication that they would continue to be at risk from non-State actors in Iraq (see paragraph 102 above).115.\u00a0\u00a0It is therefore for the Government to dispel any doubts about that risk. In this connection the Court notes that the Government submitted before it that the Migration Agency had argued before the Migration Court that the documents submitted by the applicants in respect of the alleged events in September and November 2011 were of a simple nature and of little evidentiary value; the Government also questioned why the applicants had not made more detailed submissions concerning the continuing abuses after 2008 at an earlier stage in the asylum proceedings. They argued that this state of affairs lessened the applicants\u2019 credibility, as did the timing and manner of their reliance on the DVD containing the audiovisual recording of the television debate in which the first applicant had participated (see paragraph 71 above), whereas the applicants disputed that contention (see paragraph 61 above). However, the Court observes that the Migration Agency did not comment on the applicants\u2019 credibility or the DVD. Nor did the Migration Court specifically address these issues in its reasoning.In the absence of further concrete reasoning on these issues in the Migration Authority\u2019s and the Migration Court\u2019s respective findings, the Court does not have the benefit of their assessment in this regard.However, the Court does not find it necessary to resolve the disagreement between the parties on these matters since, in any event, the domestic decisions do not appear to have entirely excluded a continuing risk from al-Qaeda.Instead they appear to have supported the view that \u2013 at the time of their decisions \u2013 the ability of al-Qaeda to operate freely had declined, as had that group\u2019s infiltration of the authorities, and that conversely, the authorities\u2019 ability to protect the applicants had increased (see paragraphs 17 and 19 above).116.\u00a0\u00a0It appears from various reports from reliable and objective sources that persons who collaborated in different ways with the authorities of the occupying powers in Iraq after the war have been and continue to be targeted by al-Qaeda and other groups. The United Kingdom Home Office\u2019s Country of Origin Information Report on Iraq of 2009 stated that civilians employed or otherwise affiliated with the Multi-National Force in Iraq were at risk of being targeted by non-State actors. Similarly, the Home Office\u2019s report of 2014 stated that persons who were perceived to collaborate or had collaborated with the current Iraqi Government and its institutions, the former US or multinational forces or foreign companies were at risk of persecution in Iraq. The reports single out certain particularly targeted groups, such as interpreters, Iraqi nationals employed by foreign companies, and certain affiliated professionals such as judges, academics, teachers and legal professionals (see paragraphs 39-42 above).117.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant belongs to the group of persons systematically targeted for their relationship with American armed forces. The Court is mindful of the fact that the level and forms of involvement in \u201ccollaboration\u201d with foreign troops and authorities may vary and that, consequently, the level of risk can also vary to some extent. In this connection attention must be paid to the fact that it has already been established that the first applicant was ill-treated until 2008. Moreover, another significant factor is that his contacts with the American forces were highly visible as his office was situated at the United States military base referred to by the applicants as \u201cVictoria Camp\u201d. The above-mentioned reports provide little or no support for the assumption \u2013 which transpires from the domestic decisions \u2013 that threats from al-Qaeda must have ceased once the first applicant terminated his business relationship with the American forces. In the light of the particular circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the first applicant and the two other members of his family who are applicants in this case would face a real risk of continued persecution by non-State actors if returned to Iraq.118.\u00a0\u00a0A connected question is whether the Iraqi authorities would be able to provide protection to the applicants. The applicants contested this, whereas the Government contended that a properly functioning judicial system was in place in Baghdad.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in this connection that, according to the standards of European Union law, the State or entity providing protection must meet certain specific requirements: in particular, it must be \u201coperating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution of serious harm\u201d (see Article 7 of the Qualification Directive, cited in paragraph 48 above).120.\u00a0\u00a0It appears from the most recent objective international human rights sources that there are deficits in both the capacity and the integrity of the Iraqi security and legal system. The system still works, but the shortcomings have increased since 2010 (see paragraph 43 above).Moreover, the US Department of State has noted that widespread corruption at all levels of government and society has exacerbated the lack of effective human rights protections and that the security forces have made limited efforts to prevent or respond to societal violence (see paragraph 44 above). The situation has thus clearly deteriorated since 2011 and 2012, when the Migration Agency and the Migration Court respectively assessed the situation and the latter found that, in the event that threats still existed, it appeared likely that the Iraqi law-enforcement authorities were both willing and able to offer the applicants the necessary protection (see paragraph\u00a019 above). Lastly, this issue is to be seen against a background of a generally deteriorating security situation, marked by an increase in sectarian violence and attacks and advances by ISIS, as a result of which large areas of the territory are outside the Iraqi Government\u2019s effective control (see paragraph\u00a044 above).121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, in the light of the above information on matters including the complex and volatile general security situation, the Iraqi authorities\u2019 capacity to protect their people must be regarded as diminished. Although the current level of protection may still be sufficient for the general public in Iraq, the situation is different for individuals, such as the applicants, who are members of a targeted group. The Court is therefore not convinced, in the particular circumstances of the applicants\u2019 case, that the Iraqi State would be able to provide them with effective protection against threats by al-Qaeda or other private groups in the current situation. The cumulative effect of the applicants\u2019 personal circumstances and the Iraqi authorities\u2019 diminished ability to protect them must therefore be considered to create a real risk of ill-treatment in the event of their return to Iraq.122.\u00a0\u00a0As the Iraqi authorities\u2019 ability to protect the applicants must be regarded as diminished throughout Iraq, the possibility of internal relocation is not a realistic option in the applicants\u2019 case.123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore finds that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the applicants would run a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 if returned to Iraq. Accordingly, the Court considers that the implementation of the deportation order in respect of the applicants would entail a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION124.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage125.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 20,000 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage.126.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed that the deportation order in respect of the applicants had not been enforced and therefore no compensation for pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage should be awarded to them. They accordingly submitted that the applicants\u2019 claims should be dismissed.127.\u00a0\u00a0As to pecuniary damage, the Court considers that the applicants have not substantiated their claim and therefore rejects it. As to non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers that its finding in the present judgment (see paragraph 123 above) constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants (see, to similar effect, Saadi v. Italy, cited above, \u00a7 188, and Nizamov and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos. 22636\/13, 24034\/13, 24334\/13 and 24528\/13, \u00a7\u00a050, 7\u00a0May 2014).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses128.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 25,000 Swedish kronor (SEK \u2013 approximately EUR 2,729) for costs and expenses incurred before the Chamber and SEK 144,180 (approximately EUR 15,738) for those incurred before the Grand Chamber, corresponding to seventy-eight hours\u2019 work. Their total claim for costs and expenses was thus SEK\u00a0169,180 (approximately EUR 18,467).129.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the compensation for costs and expenses before the Grand Chamber should not exceed an amount equivalent to thirty hours\u2019 work.130.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers the sum of EUR 10,000 (plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants) to be reasonable to cover costs under all heads, and awards that sum to the applicants.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28447":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the police had beaten him during his arrest and while he was detained at the police station and that the authorities had not carried out an effective investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that complaint.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies because, firstly, he had not challenged the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings within the time-limit laid down in domestic law and, in any event, he had failed to request the restoration of the time-limit. Secondly, the Government argued that the applicant had not instituted administrative court proceedings for compensation for the damage allegedly caused by the use of force, although it had been open to him to do that.76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested those arguments.77.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the first objection, the Court notes that the applicant submitted his appeal against the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings in accordance with the clear and unambiguous wording of the law as it was reproduced in the decision sent to him. The relevant provision provided that the applicant had to lodge an appeal with the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office \u201cwithin ten days of receipt\u201d of the decision. The Government have not called into question the clarity of that wording. The Court observes that because the Code of Criminal Procedure did not contain provisions on the service of documents, the general provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act applied by way of analogy. Those were interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that when a document is sent by ordinary mail, in breach of the general requirement to send it by registered mail, the public authority has to prove that the person concerned has received the letter; it is not enough for the public authority to show that it has posted the letter (see paragraph 71 above). In the present case the authorities sent the decision to the applicant by ordinary mail and failed to prove that the applicant received it before the date the applicant claimed he did. The Court also notes that the same arguments and interpretation of the law as the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the Court of Appeal used in the applicant\u2019s case were shortly after dismissed by the Supreme Court in another case (see paragraph 72 above).78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is unable to agree with the Government that the applicant\u2019s case was materially different from the one decided subsequently by the Supreme Court. The Government argued that in the applicant\u2019s case it had been proven that his mother, at whose address the applicant was living, had received the letter containing the decision before the date the applicant claimed to have received it himself. In the Court\u2019s view, in both cases the issue was whether the authorities had proven that a decision had been received on a certain date, which would serve as the starting point for the calculation of the time-limit for submitting an appeal. Before the Supreme Court the authorities sought to prove their case by relying on calculations based on the deadlines for mail delivery as declared by the postal service operator, but the court rejected that argument. The prosecutor\u2019s office put forward the same arguments in the applicant\u2019s case. In that context it is irrelevant whether they were used to support the conclusion that the applicant\u2019s mother had received the letter before a certain date or that the applicant himself ought to have received it before that date. What counts is that the prosecutors were not able to prove the exact date the applicant received the decision in a situation where they had not served the decision by registered mail, as they were required to do, and where the applicant denied having received it on the date suggested by the authorities. The failure to serve the decision by registered mail made it in practice impossible for the authorities to challenge the applicant\u2019s statement that he received the decision on 5 March 2010.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is also unable to agree with the Government that the applicant should have sought the restoration of the time-limit for appealing against the decision. The Court repeats that the applicant acted in accordance with the clear and unambiguous wording of the relevant provision, relying on an understanding of the law that was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court. He had therefore no reason to believe that he had not submitted the appeal on time and needed to seek the restoration of the time-limit. In any event, the Court considers that it would have been futile to request that the time-limit be restored. According to the domestic case-law which the Government themselves referred to, the time-limit could only have been restored if the person had not been able to submit the appeal owing to external circumstances beyond his or her control, or because of some extraordinary personal circumstance, such as serious illness, temporary mental disorder and so forth. The decision of the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office confirms that the applicant could not have relied on any of those grounds (see paragraph 54 above).80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore considers that the applicant did everything that could reasonably have been expected of him to comply with the time-limits laid down in domestic law and, thus, to exhaust the remedies available to him within the domestic criminal justice system (see, among others, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 74, ECHR 1999\u2011V, where the Court restated that the complaint intended to be made subsequently to the Court must first have been made \u2013 at least in substance \u2013 to the appropriate domestic body, and be in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law; see also \u0130lhan v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a022277\/93, \u00a7 59, ECHR 2000\u2011VII, where the Court reiterated that it must examine whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the applicant had done everything that could reasonably be expected of him or her to exhaust domestic remedies).81.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s second objection, the Court considers, in line with its consistent case-law, that as the applicant had exhausted the remedies available to him within the criminal justice system, he was not required to attempt to obtain compensation by instituting separate administrative court proceedings (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII; Julin v. Estonia, nos. 16563\/08, 40841\/08, 8192\/10 and 18656\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 114\u2011115, 29 May 2012; and Korobov and Others v. Estonia, no. 10195\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 88\u201189, 28 March 2013, where the Court held that the applicants were not required to embark on a separate set of proceedings before the administrative courts when they served substantially the same purpose as complaining to the prosecuting authorities about their ill-treatment under the Penal Code).82.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the applicant did not fail to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his complaint of ill-treatment. Thus, the Government\u2019s objections as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the police had used excessive force on him during his arrest. He had not been committing a breach of the peace while at the playground. Before the arrival of the police officers, he had been neither aggressive nor violent towards anybody. He had not been in possession of any dangerous object. It had not therefore been necessary to force him to the ground or keep him there by force and handcuff him tightly. The applicant accepted that he had used obscene language and had resisted the police. However, he had done so only after the police officers had used force on him, as a natural reaction to express his indignation about such behaviour.85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that his version of what happened during his detention (see paragraph 9 above) had been confirmed by the statements of A.P., M.S., R.L., M.Z., the ambulance nurse and doctor, as well as the medical documents collected in the criminal investigation (see paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 24, 26 and 42 above). He considered that the police investigator\u2019s assessment of that evidence had lacked impartiality, and had been incomplete and incorrect and that she had therefore come to the wrong conclusion.86.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant added that he could not have behaved aggressively or resisted the police in the police station as he had been handcuffed. He also pointed out that Officers S.B. and E.V., who had ill-treated him, were patrol officers. It was therefore unclear why they had stayed at the police station after the applicant had been transported there and what work\u2011related duties they could have carried out there. The applicant\u2019s beating had also been confirmed in the judgment acquitting him of the misdemeanour charges (see paragraph 60 above).87.\u00a0\u00a0His concussion, external haematomas, the oedema of the left ear, left temple and left eye and the haematomas on the upper limbs had been consistent with the battery of a person who could not protect himself with his hands. The beating had been deliberately carried out with just enough force so as not to leave any serious marks. The injuries on his wrists confirmed that he had been handcuffed in a particularly painful manner. As to the haematoma of the left eye, which had been recorded only on 1 May 2009, it could be explained by the fact that he had not complained about it on 30 April 2009 and that haematomas on the soft and hard parts of the body appeared at different times. In addition, the applicant had not been examined by forensic medical experts but only by ordinary duty doctors. The applicant also contended that the beating had resulted in a partial loss of vision in his left eye.88.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant considered that the investigation which the authorities carried out had not been effective, as required under Article 3 of the Convention.89.\u00a0\u00a0Both the police and the prosecutor had initially refused to deal with the applicant\u2019s complaint. Although the police eventually allowed it to be submitted on 30 April 2009, they had only opened an official investigation on 5 May 2009, after the applicant had lodged another complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office.90.\u00a0\u00a0Several important investigative measures had never been taken or had been taken too late to provide any useful evidence. In particular, the police had never ordered a medical examination of the applicant to determine the nature and causes of his injuries. Instead, and only after the applicant had insisted on it, had the police ordered a forensic medical examination on the basis of documentary evidence. The police had interviewed the applicant on 13 May 2009, almost two weeks after the events. They had interviewed the suspects on 2 June and 8 June 2009, which was more than a month after the events. That delay had given the suspects and their colleagues ample time to coordinate their statements. The people who had seen the arrest and the events at the police station had not been identified by the police but by the applicant himself. The police had thus interviewed them at the applicant\u2019s request, though it would have been easy for the police to identify and interview them on their own initiative. Two witnesses (Y.B., who had witnessed the arrest, and A.D., who had been present at the police station) had never been interviewed, despite the fact that the applicant had on several occasions explained to the police that they had seen the events. The police had not held formal confrontations between the applicant and the suspects to examine the significant differences in their statements. Nor had the investigator examined the police station\u2019s security camera recordings.91.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant argued that the investigation could not have been independent because it had been carried out by a police officer from the same police prefecture as the suspects. He added that the prosecutor had not effectively supervised the investigation.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government denied any ill-treatment of the applicant during his arrest and thereafter. The Government submitted that their version of events (see paragraph 10 above) was based on the evidence gathered in the criminal proceedings and assessed in the decision to discontinue the investigation. They added that the use of force and handcuffs at the playground had been necessary also because the applicant had been a danger to himself. Likewise, the use of force and handcuffs at the police station had ultimately helped to ensure the applicant\u2019s own safety. The Government noted that the handcuffs had been removed as soon as the applicant had calmed down. The Government also highlighted the contradictions in the applicant\u2019s statements and in his behaviour to show that he himself did not have a clear picture of what had happened to him. Regarding the applicant\u2019s subsequent acquittal of the misdemeanour charges, the Government contended that that did not alter the fact that at the time of the application of force and the use of handcuffs the applicant had been a danger to himself and others. As to the activities of the patrol officers at the police station, their tasks also included drafting reports about the incidents they were involved in while on patrol.93.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the injuries the applicant had sustained, the inevitable use of proportionate force and handcuffing had regrettably caused him some bodily harm which could not have been avoided. That had been due to the applicant\u2019s active resistance to his arrest, being placed in the police vehicle and his refusal to obey orders at the police station. Notably, the haematoma and oedema on the left temple could have been caused when the applicant had hit his head against the door of the police van when he had resisted being transported to the police station, when he had hit himself against the internal walls of the police van during his transportation or when he had fallen off the chair at the police station. The oedema of the right wrist could be explained by his resistance to the police while being handcuffed. However, the bodily harm in question was minor and of a temporary nature. Regarding the haematoma around the left eye and the haematomas on the upper limbs recorded for the first time on 1 May 2009, their origin remained unclear. It could not be excluded that the applicant had hurt himself after being released from the police station, especially because he had also been in a state of intoxication the day after his release. In any event, the applicant\u2019s injuries were inconsistent with his allegation that the police officers had punched and kicked him all over his body for several hours. Some weight should also be given to Officer E.V.\u2019s opinion that the applicant had intentionally caused the injuries in order later to accuse the police. Health issues discovered later could not be presumed to have been caused by the police.94.\u00a0\u00a0As to the investigation, the Government were of the opinion that it had been effective.95.\u00a0\u00a0It had been opened promptly and carried out with sufficient expedition. The delay of five days from the applicant submitting his complaint had been due to the fact that the day of its submission had been followed by a public holiday, Friday, 1 May 2009, and by a weekend. The police had opened the investigation on Tuesday, 5 May which had been one day after the registration of the complaint on Monday, 4 May. Investigative measures had been taken between 13 May 2009 and 14 September 2009.96.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation had been thorough. The police had taken all the relevant and reasonable investigative measures to collect evidence without delay and had acted on their own initiative. In particular, they had questioned the applicant, eighteen witnesses and the two suspects. They had ordered a forensic medical assessment of the applicant\u2019s injuries and had held an interview with the expert. They had also presented photographs of suspects for identification to the applicant and one of the witnesses. The reasons why some statements had not been considered credible or reliable had been set out in the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings. In adopting that decision the authorities had not assessed the evidence in an arbitrary manner.97.\u00a0\u00a0As to the independence of the investigation, the criminal proceedings had been discontinued with the prosecutor\u2019s approval. Thus it had not been the Police Prefecture alone which had decided the case.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a) General principles98.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the core values of democratic societies (see, among many others, Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7 95, and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a081).99.\u00a0\u00a0Allegations of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, among others, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161 in fine, Series A no.\u00a025; Labita, cited above, \u00a7 121; Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a054810\/00, \u00a7\u00a067, ECHR 2006\u2011IX; Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no.\u00a059450\/00, \u00a7\u00a0117, ECHR 2006\u2011IX; G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7 92, ECHR\u00a02010; and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 82).100.\u00a0\u00a0On that latter point the Court has explained that where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of people within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 83, and the case-law cited therein). In particular, where an individual, when taken into police custody, is in good health, but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see Tomasi v. France, 27 August 1992, \u00a7\u00a7 108-11, Series A no. 241\u2011A, and Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7 87). In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government (see, among other authorities, El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 152). That is justified by the fact that people in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see, among other authorities, Salman, cited above, \u00a7 99).101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also pointed out in El-Masri (cited above, \u00a7 155) that although it recognised that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact where this was not made unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000), it had to apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d where allegations were made under Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 32, Series\u00a0A no. 336, and Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7 51, 14 October 2010), even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations had already taken place (see Cobzaru v. Romania, no. 48254\/99, \u00a7 65, 26 July 2007). In other words, in such a context the Court is prepared to conduct a thorough examination of the findings of the national courts. In examining them it may take account of the quality of the domestic proceedings and any possible flaws in the decision-making process (see Denisenko and Bogdanchikov v. Russia, no. 3811\/02, \u00a7 83, 12 February 2009).102.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 162; Jalloh, cited above, \u00a7 67; G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 88; El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 196; Korobov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 92; and Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7 114, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). Further factors include the purpose for which the ill-treatment was inflicted, together with the intention or motivation behind it (compare, inter alia, Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, \u00a7 64, Reports 1996\u2011VI; Egmez v. Cyprus, no. 30873\/96, \u00a7 78, ECHR 2000\u2011XII; and Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222\/99, \u00a7 53, 30 September 2004; see also, among other authorities, G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 88; and El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 196), although the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see, among other authorities, V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a024888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999\u2011IX, and Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, \u00a7 114). Regard must also be had to the context in which the ill-treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions (compare, for example, Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7 104; Egmez, cited above, \u00a7 78; see also, among other authorities, G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a088).103.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of those aspects, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition set forth in Article 3 (see, among other authorities, Vasyukov v. Russia, no. 2974\/05, \u00a7\u00a059, 5 April 2011; G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 89; Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, \u00a7 114; and Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no. 13255\/07, \u00a7 192, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). It should also be pointed out that it may well suffice that the victim is humiliated in his own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others (see, among other authorities, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, \u00a7 32, Series A no. 26, and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 220, ECHR 2011).104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that Article 3 does not prohibit the use of force in certain well-defined circumstances. However, such force may be used only if indispensable and must not be excessive (see Anzhelo Georgiev and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 51284\/09, \u00a7 66, 30 September 2014; see also Klaas v. Germany, judgment of 22 September 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 269; Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29462\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 68-78, ECHR 2000-XII).105.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of a person who is deprived of his liberty, or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is, in principle, an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see, among other authorities, Ribitsch, cited above, \u00a7 38; Mete and Others, cited above, \u00a7 106; El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0207; and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 100). The Court has recently emphasised in Bouyid (ibid., \u00a7 101) that the words \u201cin principle\u201d cannot be taken to mean that there might be situations in which such a finding of a violation is not called for, because the minimum severity threshold has not been attained. Any interference with human dignity strikes at the very essence of the Convention. For that reason any conduct by law-enforcement officers vis-\u00e0-vis an individual which diminishes human dignity constitutes a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. That applies in particular to their use of physical force against an individual where it is not made strictly necessary by his conduct, whatever the impact on the person in question.106.\u00a0\u00a0 When an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see Assenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 102, and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000-IV). The minimum standards of effectiveness, as defined in the Court\u2019s case-law, were recapitulated, inter alia, in El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 182\u2011185, ECHR 2012; Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0316\u2011326, ECHR 2014 (extracts); and Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 115\u2011123, ECHR 2015).107.\u00a0\u00a0Generally speaking, for an investigation to be effective, the persons responsible for carrying it out must be independent from those targeted by it. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also independence in practice (see, among others, \u0110ur\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no.\u00a052442\/09, \u00a7 85, ECHR 2011 (extracts); Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 320; and, mutatis mutandis, Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and Fecire Tun\u00e7 v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 219\u2011234, 14 April 2015).108.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation must be prompt and reasonably expeditious (see, among many others, Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 323). The Court assesses whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 133\u2011135). Consideration is given to the starting of investigations and delays in taking statements (see Virabyan v. Armenia, no. 40094\/05, \u00a7 163, 2 October 2012).109.\u00a0\u00a0Any investigation of serious allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough. This means that the authorities must make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis for their decisions (see Assenov, cited above, \u00a7 103 et seq., and Korobov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 113). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and so on (see Korobov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 113). Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7 108, 26 January 2006; El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 183; and Korobov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 113). The mere fact that appropriate steps were not taken to reduce the risk of collusion between alleged perpetrators amounts to a significant shortcoming in the adequacy of the investigation (see, mutatis mutandis, Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391\/99, \u00a7 330, ECHR 2007\u2011II; mutatis mutandis, Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 47708\/08, \u00a7 208, ECHR 2014; and Lyalyakin v. Russia, no. 31305\/09, \u00a7 84, 12 March 2015).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the principles to the present case110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the parties were in agreement that the police used force against the applicant and that the applicant sustained certain injuries as a result. The disagreement between the parties concerned, firstly, the issue of whether recourse to physical force both during his arrest and subsequently at the police station was made strictly necessary by the applicant\u2019s own conduct; secondly, the type and intensity of force used (including the issue of whether he was beaten); and, thirdly, the exact nature and causes of the applicant\u2019s injuries.111.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to those disputed issues, the Court considers that the burden rests on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation as to how the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been caused as well as regarding the issues of whether the force was strictly necessary and not excessive (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 83, as well as Rehbock, cited above, \u00a7 72).112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Government\u2019s position regarding the disputed issues is based exclusively on the findings and conclusions of the domestic investigation. The Court accepts that the explanation required from the Government can be said to have been provided when it is proved to the Court\u2019s satisfaction by the Government that their national authorities have conducted an effective investigation capable of establishing the circumstances and the nature of the force used (see Cemal Y\u0131lmaz v. Turkey, no. 31298\/05, \u00a7 32, 7 February 2012).113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that in compliance with the procedural obligation, arising from Article 3 of the Convention, the authorities opened and carried out a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations. However, for the reasons that follow, the Court is not satisfied that the investigation was effective so as to meet the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the authorities did not open an investigation promptly upon receipt of the applicant\u2019s complaint. In that regard, the Court notes that the initial refusal of the police officer and the prosecutor to allow the applicant to submit his complaint, as well as their directing the applicant to the other authority (see paragraph 17 above), was unlawful under domestic law, which provides that a report of a criminal offence may be submitted to an investigative body or a prosecutor\u2019s office either orally or in writing (see paragraph 69 above). Even after the complaint was finally accepted for submission, the police did not formally open an investigation into the incident until 5 May 2009, when six days had gone by (see paragraph 18 above). The Government justified that delay by saying that the complaint had been lodged the day before a public holiday and just before the weekend. The Court considers that weekends and public holidays cannot serve as an excuse for unacceptable delays in carrying out an effective investigation, as required under Article 3 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence in the case file of any investigative activity between 6 May 2009 when, according to the Government, the police asked the hospital to provide the applicant\u2019s medical records, and 13 May 2009 when the applicant gave a statement as a victim two weeks after the complaint had been lodged.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the delay of almost one month between opening the investigation and taking statements from the alleged perpetrators, and the delay of 10 days to more than a month between opening the investigation and questioning other police officers hampered the effectiveness of the investigation. The Court has noted that delays in questioning the potential perpetrators of a crime constitute a serious challenge to the effectiveness of an investigation, especially when there is a risk of justice being obstructed through collusion, which is particularly acute in a situation of hierarchical subordination and common service, such as that of police officers (see Antayev and Others v. Russia, no. 37966\/07, \u00a7 108, 3 July 2014). In the past the Court has found a violation of the Convention where the alleged perpetrators were not kept separate after the incident, and were not questioned for nearly three days, notwithstanding the fact that no evidence indicated any collusion among them or with their colleagues. As indicated above (\u00a7 108), the Court found that the mere fact that appropriate steps were not taken to reduce the risk of such collusion amounted to a significant shortcoming in the adequacy of the investigation. In the present case, the Court is unaware of any measure taken by the authorities to reduce the risk of collusion among the alleged perpetrators or with the other police officers. The delays in taking statements from the police officers therefore greatly increased the risk of collusion between the suspects and among other police officers who served as witnesses.116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also finds that the authorities did not take all reasonable steps available to collect the necessary evidence. In particular, the authorities never ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant in person to determine the exact nature and causes of his injuries. Even the assessment of the applicant\u2019s medical records and certain other documents by a forensic medical expert was ordered more than a month and delivered more than three months after the criminal proceedings were opened (see paragraphs 37 and 42 above). The Court emphasises that a forensic medical examination should have been ordered as soon as the applicant had alleged ill-treatment. The failure to do so made it almost impossible to determine exactly what injuries the applicant had sustained and how he had got them and whether his complaint about the loss of vision in his left eye (see paragraph 87 above) was related to his alleged ill\u2011treatment.117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also points out in this context that it is hard to understand why the police did not inform the applicant about the decision to request a forensic medical expert to assess the applicant\u2019s relevant medical records and other documents or immediately send the report of that assessment to the applicant. The Court considers that that hindered the possibility for the applicant to substantiate his claims of ill-treatment and comment on the findings of the assessment. Turning to the content of the expert\u2019s opinion, the expert insisted both in writing and subsequently in his oral statements that the haematoma around the left eye could have been caused between 29 April and 1 May 2009. On the basis of that information the police investigator concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegation that the haematoma had resulted from the incident at the police station on 29 April was completely baseless and did not conform to reality. However, in the Court\u2019s view the investigator\u2019s conclusion, as based on the expert\u2019s opinion, seems unjustifiably categorical.118.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, despite repeated statements by the applicant the police never took statements from Y.B., who allegedly witnessed the applicant\u2019s arrest, or from A.D., who was detained in the police station at the same time as the applicant. The authorities\u2019 failure to interview witnesses who could have had relevant information about the course of events, without giving any reasons, is regrettable. It is all the more so given the investigator\u2019s questioning of all the police officers who were involved in or otherwise incidentally witnessed some of the events. The Court also observes that the documents submitted to it do not reveal any efforts on the part of the authorities to find the elderly man present during the applicant\u2019s arrest (see paragraph 31 above), who could have been a valuable and impartial source of evidence.119.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the authorities did not hold any face-to-face formal confrontations between the applicant and any of the witnesses or the suspects, as suggested by the applicant, to eliminate contradictions in their statements. The Court does not comprehend why that investigative measure, which was provided for under domestic law (see paragraph 67 above), was not used in a situation where it was appropriate and there were no practical obstacles to it (compare Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 128, and Velikanov v. Russia, no. 4124\/08, \u00a7 63, 30 January 2014, where the Court considered it relevant for the purposes of assessing the effectiveness of an investigation under Article 3 that the authorities failed to hold or arrange for a face-to-face confrontation which might have helped establish the facts; and Perrillat-Bottonet v. Switzerland, no. 66773\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 21, 65 and 66, 20 November 2014, where the Court considered it relevant that the authorities had held a confrontation under similar circumstances as in the present case).120.\u00a0\u00a0The police investigator also did not try to clarify facts by other means (for example, by taking additional statements or putting detailed questions to the applicant, suspects and witnesses about specific aspects of the events). For instance, the investigator did not seek to establish whether the applicant was given any clear orders before the police had recourse to force in order to arrest him, whether he was warned about the consequences of failing to obey such orders, or whether the situation was tense to the point of allowing the police to dispense with those obligations. However, those aspects were of material importance for deciding whether the use of force was lawful and not an offence of abuse of authority (see paragraph 66 above).121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also points out that the investigation did not attempt to explain the discrepancy between the statements made by M.Z. during the presentation of photographs for the identification of suspects (see paragraph 44 above) and his earlier statements (see paragraph 26 above). Nor does the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings explain why the police investigator preferred the later statements to the earlier ones.122.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, the decision does not explain why the statements about the alleged beating in the police station given by one of the persons detained there (see paragraph 22 above) were considered more credible than the conflicting statements of two other detainees who testified in the applicant\u2019s favour (see paragraphs 24 and 20 above). That is all the more incomprehensible in view of the fact that one of the detainees was not interviewed at all (see paragraph 118 above).123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the police investigator found the applicant\u2019s statements contradictory and therefore not credible. The applicant asserted twice that the same officer had beaten him at the playground, but then on the third occasion, during the presentation of the photographs for identification, he said that he did not remember whether that officer had beaten him at the playground. In the Court\u2019s view, this can hardly be characterised as the kind of contradiction which would serve to support the conclusion that the applicant\u2019s statements as a whole were not credible. The applicant\u2019s allegations have been consistent throughout the proceedings. He stated from the beginning that the police officers had beaten him at the playground and at the police station. The applicant\u2019s later statements do not contradict that position. In any event, the alleged contradiction does not at all concern the statements about the beating at the police station.124.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, those differences may, in the Court\u2019s opinion, be attributable to the time and manner in which the police investigator organised the presentation of suspects for identification by the applicant and by M.Z. In the first place, it is not evident why an attempt at identification was made at all at that stage of the investigation. By the time the photographs were presented for identification there was no longer any doubt about the identity of the possible suspects. It was clear that E.V. and S.B. were the officers who had responded to the call about an alleged breach of the peace. It was equally clear that the applicant and M.Z. accused those officers of beating the applicant at the scene of the arrest and later in the police station and, even more importantly, the suspects themselves never denied that they had been the ones who had used force on the applicant. Be that as it may, the time between the incident and the identification might have affected the results of the identification process. The outcome might have also been influenced by the fact that the investigator presented photographs for the identification of the suspects instead of holding an identification parade with real people. Notably, the applicant stated during the identification procedure that he would have been able to recognise the officer in person, based on his features and height.125.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s criticism that the authorities did not examine recordings of the police station\u2019s security cameras (see paragraph 90 above), the Government have not contested this and have not submitted any reports to the Court about any examination of those recordings. The Court is unable to understand why they were not duly examined.126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that the police did not immediately identify the children who were present during the applicant\u2019s arrest or the people present at the police station and then question them as witnesses. The Government have not disputed the fact that they were only heard as witnesses after the applicant had himself identified those people. The Court reiterates that the authorities must act of their own motion once a matter of importance has come to their attention and that they cannot leave it to the initiative of the person concerned to request particular investigative procedures (see, mutatis mutandis, \u0130lhan, cited above, \u00a7 63, and Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 111, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011VII). In the present context the Court notes, nevertheless, that most of those people were eventually interviewed.127.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court considers that the investigation did not conform to the requirement of independence.128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the police officer in charge of the investigation was a police investigator from the internal control bureau of the East Police Prefecture. In that capacity she was part of the same regional substructure (the prefecture) of the police force as the suspects and other police officers implicated in the events. In essence, she was investigating the activities of her colleagues. The investigation therefore lacked the necessary appearance of independence as it was carried out by a police officer institutionally linked to those targeted by it (compare, among others, \u0110ur\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, cited above, \u00a7 87; Grimailovs v. Latvia, no. 6087\/03, \u00a7\u00a0112, 25 June 2013; and Kummer v. the Czech Republic, no.\u00a032133\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a085 and 86, 25 July 2013, where the Court found that the standards of an independent investigation had not been respected when, in substance, the police had been charged with investigating allegations relating to their own officers).129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that by the time the police investigator signed the decision to discontinue the proceedings on 20 January 2010, her position within the police force had changed. Following a merger and reform of the Police Board and the Border Guard Board on 1 January 2010, her job title had changed to senior disciplinary officer of the III department of the internal control bureau of the Police and Border Guard Board. That meant that the police investigator\u2019s post in the organisational structure had been transferred from a regional level to the central administration. However, by that time the investigative measures had already been taken and the investigation had in substance been finished. Simply changing the police investigator\u2019s position within the organisational structure could not therefore have influenced the potential undermining of the independence of the present investigation.130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has taken note of the Government\u2019s argument that the prosecutor\u2019s acceptance of the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings guaranteed the independence of the investigation. It is true that the Court has found that shortcomings in the independence of those carrying out an investigation could, to a certain extent, be counterbalanced by effective supervision of the investigation (see, among others, Vovru\u0161ko v. Latvia, no. 11065\/02, \u00a7 51, 11 December 2012). However, the Court held in Kummer (cited above, \u00a7 87) that while the prosecutor was independent from the police, his role as a mere supervisor was not sufficient to make the police investigation comply with the requirement of independence. In the present case there is no evidence of active participation by prosecutors in directing or supervising the investigation which could have counterbalanced shortcomings in its independence. On the contrary, the Court observes that the prosecutors\u2019 position was tainted by the unlawful refusal to admit the applicant\u2019s initial complaint (see paragraph 114 above). There were also several dismissals by the prosecutor, on purely formal grounds, of the applicant\u2019s requests to take certain, apparently justifiable, investigative measures, which in the end were never taken, including a forensic medical examination of the applicant in person (see paragraph 116 above) and an examination of Y.B. and A.D. as witnesses (see paragraph 118 above)). Additionally, the prosecution dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 54 above). The Court therefore cannot accept that the prosecutors\u2019 role in the present case guaranteed an independent investigation, as required under its case-law.131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also considers it relevant that the findings of the investigation were never the object of any judicial scrutiny (see paragraphs 54, 55 and 77\u201179 above).132.\u00a0\u00a0The cumulative effect of the those shortcomings, which concerned important aspects of the applicant\u2019s arrest and detention, is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the domestic authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding the alleged use of force by the police against the applicant. Thus the Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof of demonstrating that the use of force was strictly necessary and not excessive as well as providing a satisfactory and convincing explanation as to how the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been caused.133.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION134.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage135.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 17,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. That comprised EUR 10,000 for mental and physical suffering caused by the alleged violations and EUR 7,000 for partial loss of vision in his left eye.136.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the Convention had not been violated and that therefore there was no basis for an award of damages. Should the Court find a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights, a finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction. Should the Court nevertheless decide to make an award for non-pecuniary damage, the Government called on it to determine a reasonable amount. In so far as the applicant sought damages for partial loss of vision in his left eye, such loss of vision had not been proven. In any event, there was no causal link between the possible violation and the damage alleged.137.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not consider it established by the evidence submitted to it that the applicant has partially lost vision in his left eye. It therefore rejects the claim in respect of EUR 7,000. The Court accepts however that the applicant suffered some non\u2011pecuniary damage as a result of the violation of Article 3. It considers that such damage cannot be compensated solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 10,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses138.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 5,281.80 for costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and before the Court. The costs and expenses incurred before the domestic authorities and courts included EUR 76.70 for submitting a complaint to the Estonian Internal Security Service; EUR 354.70 for submitting various complaints and requests to the police investigator and prosecutors in the course of the criminal proceedings; EUR 95.90 for legal assistance during the applicant\u2019s interview as a victim; and EUR 57.50 for drafting an appeal against the decision of the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office. The costs and expenses incurred before the Court amounted to EUR 3,990 for the services of the applicant\u2019s representative and EUR 707 for translation fees.139.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the costs incurred in the domestic proceedings as neither necessary nor justified, especially in so far as they concerned the complaint to the Estonian Internal Security Service and other complaints and requests in the course of the criminal investigation.140.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court agrees with the Government that it was not necessary to submit a complaint to the Estonian Internal Security Service and observes that the applicant has not submitted any documents about the expenses related to lodging an appeal against the decision of the State Prosecutor\u2019s Office. Furthermore, the Court considers that in the present case a reduction should be applied to the amount claimed in respect of legal fees and costs on account of the fact that some of the applicants\u2019 complaints were declared inadmissible. 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